convert

Major foreign policy challenges

for the next US President

International Affairs 85: 1 (2009) 53–60

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

This article appears as a new president assumes office in the United States. He

does so in the middle of a widespread crisis of confidence in America’s capacity

to exercise effective leadership in world affairs. That may be a stark thought, but

it is a fact. Though American leadership over the decades that have passed since

the United States replaced Great Britain as the Great Power of the world has been

essential to global stability and to global development, the cumulative effects of

national self-indulgence, of financial greed and irresponsibility, of an unnecessary

war of the country’s own choice, falsely justified, and of ethical transgressions have

discredited that leadership. Making matters worse is the global economic crisis.

The resulting international challenge that now confronts the new US President

is compounded in its complexity by the fact that it is occurring in the context of

two simultaneous, and interacting, transformational developments on the world

political scene.

The first concerns the emergence of global issues pertaining to human well-

being as critical worldwide political concerns—issues such as climate, environ-

ment, starvation, health and social inequality. These issues are becoming more

contentious because they have come to the fore in the context of what I have

described in my writings as ‘the global political awakening’, itself a truly transfor-

mative event on the global scene. For the first time in human history almost all of

humanity is politically activated, politically conscious and politically interactive.

There are only a few pockets of humanity left in the remotest corners of the world

that are not politically alert and engaged with the political turmoil and stirrings

that are so widespread today around the world. The resulting global political

activism is generating a surge in the quest for personal dignity, cultural respect and

economic opportunity in a world painfully scarred by memories of centuries-long

alien colonial or imperial domination.

The second pertains to yet another fundamental change: a shift in the distribu-

tion of global power from the West to the East. The 500-year-long domination

of the world by the Atlantic powers—Portugal, Spain, France, the Netherlands,

Britain and, more recently, the United States—is coming to an end with the new

This article is an edited version of the John C. Whitehead lecture delivered at Chatham House, London, on 17

November 2008.

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International Affairs 85: 1, 2009

political and global pre-eminence of both China and Japan (the latter already

the number two economic power in the world). Waiting in the wings are India

and perhaps a recovered Russia, though the latter is still restless and unsure of its

identity, ambivalent about its recent past and very insecure about its place in the

world.

But these major world powers, new and old, also face a novel reality: while

the lethality of their military might is greater than ever, their capacity to impose

control over the politically awakened masses of the world is at a historic low. To

put it bluntly: in earlier times, it was easier to control one million people than to

physically kill one million people; today, it is infinitely easier to kill one million

people than to control one million people. That insight bears directly on the use

of force, particularly by societies that are culturally alien even if technologically

superior. As a result, in the current post-colonial era, it is too costly to under-

take colonial wars. That is a reality some recent American policy-makers failed to

assimilate, to America’s detriment.

In this dynamically changing world context, the crisis of American leadership

could in fact become the crisis of global stability. Yet—despite the Schadenfreude

at America’s financial travails evident in some capitals during the early stages of

the current crisis—in the foreseeable future no state or combination of states can

replace the linchpin role America plays in the international system. The fact of

the matter is that without an American recovery there will be no global recovery.

But there could be an American recovery without the recovery of some major

economies. That reality underlies the proposition that at this stage of history there

is no international alternative to a central American role. In fact, the only real

alternative to a constructive American world role is global chaos.

It follows from the foregoing that the monumental task in foreign affairs for the

newly elected President of the United States (beyond coping with the immediate

financial crisis) is to regain global legitimacy for America by spearheading a collec-

tive effort for a more inclusive system of global management. Four little but

strategically pregnant words define the essence of the response required: to unify;

to enlarge; to engage; and to pacify.

To unify means to re-establish a shared sense of purpose between America

and Europe (more specifically, between the United States and the EU), as well

as in NATO, pointing towards more truly shared decision-making. To that end,

informal but frequent top-level consultations are badly needed, especially after

the last eight years of sloganeering under the banner ‘If you are not with us, you

are against us’. However, it is much easier to define this as a desirable goal than to

accomplish it. Americans and Europeans alike are very well aware that there is no

such thing yet as a politically unified Europe. The absence of a politically unified

Europe creates real complications for any process of revitalizing, re-establishing,

and making central a renewed transatlantic dialogue.

What, then, is a viable alternative? To rely on the institutional arrangements

implicit in the Treaty of Lisbon might be the formal response, but that would

simply ignore the political realities of intra-European divisions regarding key

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International Affairs 85: 1, 2009

strategic issues as well as the great disparities of power among the various sovereign

components of the EU. Therefore, the only practical solution in the near future

is to cultivate a more deliberate dialogue between the United States and the three

European countries that have a global orientation and, in varying degrees, global

interests: the United Kingdom, France and Germany.

But a US dialogue with the European Triad can in turn only be effective and

meaningful if those three countries establish a broad and fundamental consensus

among themselves. One of the key problems of the past eight years, irrespective

of the shortcomings of US foreign policy, has been that there was no European

partner for the United States to consider seriously, no partner who could give

Washington its honest advice, no partner with whom America could share

common decisions and burdens. The United States had a very close, personal and

loyal ally in the United Kingdom, a country with which America shares genuine

kinship. But if one were to assign historical responsibility for America’s war of

choice in Iraq, the unfortunate fact is that such responsibility has to be shared with

the UK, whose prime minister publicly defended the war vigorously, and privately

advocated it persuasively—even if occasionally whispering some reservations and

making alternative suggestions which the US President could safely ignore while

pocketing the much needed public endorsement. France and Germany, for their

part, engaged essentially in competitive public denunciations of US policy (which,

even if merited, are still painful to Americans), and that was not helpful to the

emergence of a serious transatlantic dialogue. As a result, there was no conversa-

tion of any note between President Bush and Chancellor Schroeder and equally

little between President Bush and President Chirac (who in the process offended

parts of Europe by asking them to ‘shut up’ when they were inclined to support

the United States).

As a practical matter, there is no alternative to an informal arrangement between

the United States and the three leading European powers—once they have come

to share a common strategic purpose. If that should materialize, America would

listen. And together, America and the EU, which between them account for more

than half of global GDP, could muster a weighty capacity for influencing the

world in a positive and responsible direction.

If this new unity is to be meaningful, both sides have to be willing to share both in

decisions and in the resulting burdens. For too many years now, the general pattern

has been that the United States makes the decisions and expects the Europeans to

share the burdens. For too many years, the Europeans have complained they are

excluded from decision-making but have been perfectly willing to let the Ameri-

cans assume the burdens of implementation. The current differences among the

allies over Afghanistan are but the latest example of that persisting dilemma.

It is, therefore, to be hoped that the new US administration will make a

deliberate effort to revitalize the American–European dialogue at the highest level.

This task could be assigned personally to the Vice-President, who has impressive

expertise in foreign affairs, knows the continent well, and is personally known in

its political circles. The task cannot be a full-time job for the President himself,

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International Affairs 85: 1, 2009

though his unique global standing should help in the pursuit of this transatlantic

goal. Similarly, the new Secretary of State can play a constructive role, though

obviously she will be occupied with many other issues.

To enlarge entails a deliberate effort to nurture a wider coalition of principal

partners who are committed to the principle of interdependence and prepared

to play a significant political, as well as economic, role in promoting more effec-

tive global management. The partners have to be genuine practitioners of inter-

dependence and be ready to participate in the necessary consultations, in the

required institutionalization of the process, and in the assumption of some jointly

determined burdens.

It is evident by now that the G7, subsequently enlarged to G8, has outlived

its function. The G7 started as an informal council of the advanced industrial

democratic societies. Russia, an industrial society, was admitted at a time when its

democratic credentials were debatable but at least to some extent evident. Today,

these democratic credentials are discredited. In any case, neither the original G7 or

the later G8 reflects existing global realities.

Accordingly, some formula for regular consultations ranging in composition

from G14 to G16 should be devised to bring together countries that possess not

only economic and financial weight but also regional geopolitical significance.

To be sure, such an arrangement would somewhat duplicate the existing formal

mechanisms of the UN, which have attained an almost eternal lifespan because

they require international unanimity to change them. Those who benefit the

most from the 1945 arrangements are clearly not prepared to reform the UN

in order to reflect the current realities of global power. A politically minded

grouping of states with clout consulting regularly outside the UN is therefore

essential.

To engage means the cultivation, in addition to a wider circle of partners, of

regular top-level but informal dialogues among the several powers of the world

that are crucial to global geopolitical stability: specifically, the United States, the

European Triad, China, Japan, Russia and possibly India. A regular and mutually

confidence-building personal dialogue between the top US leader and the top

Chinese leader would be especially beneficial to the development of a shared sense

of global responsibility between the only current global superpower and the most

likely next global power. China is the most important rising power in the world,

and without China many of the key problems we face collectively cannot be effec-

tively tackled.

Admittedly, China is economically nationalist, and that is a problem, but it is

also a fundamentally cautious and a patient revisionist power. It wishes to change

the international system as ‘China rises peacefully’, but it is cautious in the way it

is pursuing that objective. Indeed, among the hallmarks of Chinese leadership are

foresight, prudence and patience. I have dealt with Chinese leaders for 30 years

now, and I have come to respect their sense of balance and proportion. To me,

what Deng Xiaoping said in the early 1990s articulated best how China defines its

international approach: ‘Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs

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calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile;

and never claim leadership.’

These words also underline the significant distinction between China’s and

Russia’s conduct on the international scene. Russia, like China, is a revisionist

power in that it wishes to revise the existing international patterns; but in pursuit

of this end it tends towards impatience, frustration and sometimes even posturing

in a threatening fashion. Nonetheless, it is in the interest of the United States and

of Europe to engage Russia, with regard to the larger strategic issues as well as

more specifically European geopolitical dilemmas.

In so doing, America should concentrate on the strategic issues and seek new

arrangements and agreements with Russia that would enhance global stability,

promote reductions in nuclear weapons and also deal with such regional problems

as Iran. At this stage, however, Russia is more a regional power than a global power.

Hence, Europe has a special responsibility to try to engage Russia in a fashion that

draws it into a closer association with Europe but without bringing its imperial

baggage.

Unfortunately, the current generation of Russian leaders, notably Putin,

are still unable to come to terms with Russia’s diminished global status and its

regional realities. It is unreconciled to the loss of its empire. It is unwilling to

come to terms with its totalitarian and specifically its Stalinist experience. The

Foreign Minister of Russia recently declared that to equate Nazism and Stalinism

is ‘a blasphemy’. Yet there are millions of people in Europe who recall that the

two were profoundly similar and equally inhuman to their victims. The difficult

process of self- recognition will take time until a new Russian elite emerges.

Nonetheless, the current financial crisis may create conditions for a gradual

improvement in relations with Russia. That financial crisis has made the Russian

elite aware of a circumstance unprecedented in Russian history: Russia today is in

fact interdependent with the rest of the world. The top political leaders of Russia

until recently seemed to be oblivious to that reality, and they premised Russia’s

future development on the notion of a continued spiral in the price of oil and on

the erroneous assumption of Russia’s economic invulnerability vis-à-vis the rest

of the world.

In the context of Russia’s painfully learned awareness of its interdependence

with the global economy, it may be more feasible to deal with such difficult issues

as those posed by Ukraine and Georgia. Both for strategic and for historical reasons,

neither the United States nor the EU can be indifferent to what transpires in the

relations between Russia and these two countries. Last but not least, neither the

United States nor the EU can lose sight of the fact that if the Georgian government

were to be overthrown (and both Putin and his foreign minister, Lavrov, have

spoken openly of that being their desire), the strategically vital access of the West

to Azerbaijan, to the Caspian and to Central Asia would be cut, to the detriment

of our collective interests. But if Russia is able to suborn either or both of these

regimes, its imperial nostalgia will be stimulated, and Russia will become a more

difficult geopolitical problem.

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It follows, therefore, that the April 2009 NATO summit should provide an

opportunity for some collective steps designed to enhance a sense of security

and stability in Ukraine and Georgia, though not in a manner that could exacer-

bate tensions with Russia. Both America and Europe will have to find a way of

reaffirming their commitment to the territorial integrity and democratic viability

of these two states, while conveying to Russia that the western interest in them is

related to the gradual construction of a larger democratic Europe and not designed

to threaten Russia itself. Ultimately, Russia can be a more engaged participant in

the Euro-Atlantic community only if its immediate neighbours to the west and

south do not feel threatened by its lingering imperial aspirations. If Ukraine and

Georgia are gradually assimilated into the Euro-Atlantic structures, Russia will

have no alternative but to follow suit. The reality of interdependence is not only

economic or financial; it is now also geopolitical.

To pacify requires a deliberate American effort to avoid becoming bogged down

militarily and politically in the vast area ranging from east of Suez to west of

India. An America bogged down in this area will be an America engaged in a

protracted post-imperial war in the post-colonial age, a war not easy to win against

aroused populations. The United States could even find itself confronted simulta-

neously with an escalating Israeli–Palestinian conflict (if the peace process falters),

continued instability in Iraq impeding military disengagement and (possibly)

the eruption of a conflict with Iran, as well as a deepening and widening war in

Afghanistan and Pakistan. It follows, therefore, that urgent decisions need to be

made by the United States, with the help of Europe, regarding these critical and

potentially interactive issues.

The Israeli–Palestinian peace process needs to be addressed as a priority. It

is evident by now that the parties in the conflict will never reach a solution by

themselves. Therefore, they have to be helped. America, with Europe’s help, can

do so by defining explicitly the fundamental requirements of a genuine peace of

reconciliation. The US President, even before sending a new envoy to the region,

should state on the record that a peaceful accommodation between the two parties

has to involve, first, a demilitarized Palestinian state, perhaps with a NATO

presence on its soil to enhance Israel’s sense of security; second, a territorial settle-

ment based on the 1967 lines with equitable exchanges permitting Israel to incor-

porate the more heavily urbanized settlements on the fringes of those lines; third,

acceptance by both parties of the fact that Palestinian refugees cannot return to

what is now Israel, though they should be provided with some compensation and

assistance for settling preferably in the independent Palestinian state; and last but

not least, acceptance by Israelis that a durable peace of reconciliation will require

the genuine sharing of Jerusalem as the capital of two states, with some kind of

joint arrangement for the old city and a Palestinian flag over the golden dome.

The war in Iraq is clearly waning, unless it is reignited by conflicts in the

adjoining regions. To bring it to a final close, not only will American troops have

to be withdrawn, but the United States will have to engage in serious discussions

with Iraqi leaders regarding a firm date for US disengagement, as well as a serious

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dialogue with all of Iraq’s neighbours regarding regional stability. Iraq’s neigh-

bours have a collective interest in preventing any ensuing conflicts in Iraq from

spilling into their countries. They will be more prepared, however, to discuss this

issue directly with the United States once it becomes clear that the United States

is firm about military disengagement.

The United States will also have to undertake a serious process of negotia-

tions with Iran. The threat of military action is not a constructive option because

it creates the impression that negotiations are being conducted under duress.

Brandishing the threat plays into the hands of Iranian extremists. A war would

be a disaster unpredictable in its scope and consequences. But, to be successful,

the negotiations have to be genuinely reciprocal. That means abandoning the

current US posture that the Iranians a priori have to make a one-sided concession as

a precondition to negotiations.

Finally, the strategy guiding America’s response to the increasingly linked

security problems involving Afghanistan and Pakistan needs to be fundamentally

reassessed. The United States and its allies should strive to avoid the mistakes

that the Soviet Union committed in Afghanistan. While some additional troops

may be necessary, the emphasis should be shifted from a military engagement to

a more subtle effort to seek a decentralized political accommodation with those

portions of the Taleban who are prepared to negotiate in a constructive fashion.

In areas controlled by the Taleban, a mutual accommodation should involve the

willingness of the Taleban to eliminate or to terminate any Al-Qaeda presence

in return for western military disengagement from the pertinent territory. The

process should also be accompanied by intensified American–European efforts to

help with the reconstruction of Afghanistan’s society and economy, both devas-

tated by the extraordinarily brutal war that the Russians conducted for a decade.

Such reconstruction should not be confused with ‘nation-building’, which in the

case of Afghanistan is unlikely to be achieved if the western presence becomes

increasingly viewed by the Afghans as a hostile military intrusion.

Let me conclude on a parochial American note. America will have an intel-

ligent foreign policy when we have an intelligent American president, and in this

regard there is reason to be optimistic because we have just chosen one. But that

is not enough. America is a democracy, and for American foreign policy to be

effective, it needs the support of an intelligent and well-informed public. Unfor-

tunately, the American public is woefully undereducated about the wider world.

It knows little about it and understands it even less, whether in the form of global

geography or the history of other peoples. In the complex new age, it is impossible

for the American democracy to conduct an intelligently complex policy if the

public is not educated about the world. Even worse, in recent times the American

public became infected by a demagogically propagated culture of fear which then

contributed to America’s self-isolation in the world.

It follows that the new President will have to respond to the fact that the

American public needs systematic education about the world. He will have to

strive to make the American public understand the novel dimensions of global

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