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about lloyd’s

Lloyd’s is the world’s leading specialist insurance market, conducting business in over 200 countries and territories
worldwide – and is often the first to insure new, unusual or complex risks. We bring together an outstanding concentration
of specialist underwriting expertise and talent, backed by excellent financial ratings which cover the whole market.

about 360 risk insight

Global risks change rapidly. Companies need to anticipate tomorrow’s risks today. At Lloyd’s, we’ve been helping businesses
do just that for over 300 years. From climate change to terrorism, energy security to liability, boards must anticipate and
understand emerging risks to successfully lead their companies into the future.

Lloyd’s 360 Risk Insight brings together some of the views of the world’s leading business, academic and insurance experts.
We analyse the latest material on emerging risk to provide business with critical information. Through research, reports,
events, news and online content, Lloyd’s 360 Risk Insight drives the global risk agenda as it takes shape. We provide practical
advice that businesses need to turn risk into opportunity.

Get the latest reports and analysis on emerging risk at www.lloyds.com/360

about chatham house

Chatham House’s mission is to be a world-leading source of independent analysis, informed debate and influential ideas on
how to build a prosperous and secure world for all. Chatham House pursues this mission by drawing on its membership to
promote open as well as confidential debates about significant developments in international affairs and about the context
and content of policy responses. The Energy, Environment and Development Programme (EEDP) at Chatham House aims to
advance the international debate on energy, environment, resources and development policy and to influence and enable
decision-makers – governments, NGOs and business – to make well-informed decisions that contribute to achieving
sustainable development.

about the authorS

Antony Froggatt is a Senior Research Fellow at Chatham House. He has worked on international energy and climate issues for
over 20 years providing research and information for a wide range of bodies including companies, governments, the media,
non-government organisations and international organisations and has published over 50 reports and papers.

Glada Lahn is a Research Fellow specialising in energy governance and development issues at Chatham House. She has published
several papers on Asian energy security and oil and gas investment trends and is currently researching energy policy in the Gulf.
Glada has also worked for a number of organisations as a freelance consultant on Middle East political and economic issues.

acknowledgements

Lead authors:

Antony Froggatt and Glada Lahn

Contributing authors:

William Blyth, Kirsty Hamilton, Bernice Lee, John Mitchell, Cleo Paskal, Felix Preston and Paul Stevens

(all Chatham House)

We would like to thank the following peer reviewers and commentators:

Liz Collett, Dr Muriel Desaeger (Toyota

Motor Europe), Mark Dominik, Dr Oliver Inderwildi (Smith School, University of Oxford), Chris McCann.

At an early stage of the drafting, we also held a workshop to discuss key themes with the business
community. Representatives from the following companies and organizations took part:

Alstom,

Anglo American plc, Arthur D. Little, Beazley, BP, Deutsche Bank, E.ON-UK, The Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
Gaz de France, Maersk Group, McKinsey, Shell, Siemens AG, Statoil, Travelers, Walmart, Watkins Syndicate.

These individuals offered valuable suggestions and advice during the drafting process. However, the authors
are solely responsible for any opinions expressed in the text and for any errors or omissions.

Foreword
Executive Summary
Introduction
Trends
1. The changing dynamics of energy demand and

resource availability

    1.1 The resurgence of coal
    1.2 Gas as the ‘transition fuel’
    1.3 Oil consumption driven by transport and price
    1.4 Uranium
  2.  Climate change and the drive towards

renewable energy

3. The risks associated with a new

technology revolution

    3.1 National and international policy risks
    3.2 New scarcity risks in some raw materials
    3.3 Competing resource uses
    3.4 New environmental risks
  4. Risks to energy and transport infrastructure
    4.1 Power sector risks
    4.2 Changing risk landscape for transport routes
    4.3 Oil and gas infrastructure
Challenges and risks for global businesses
  Implications and risks for business in general
  Implications and risks for the energy sector
  New business opportunities
Conclusions
References
Useful contacts

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sustainable

energy security

Strategic risks and

opportunities for business

WHITE PAPER

about lloyd’s

about 360 risk insight

Get the latest reports and analysis on emerging risk at www.lloyds.com/360

about chatham house

about the authorS

acknowledgements

Lead authors:

Antony Froggatt and Glada Lahn

Contributing authors:

William Blyth, Kirsty Hamilton, Bernice Lee, John Mitchell, Cleo Paskal, Felix Preston and Paul Stevens

(all Chatham House)

We would like to thank the following peer reviewers and commentators:

Liz Collett, Dr Muriel Desaeger (Toyota

Motor Europe), Mark Dominik, Dr Oliver Inderwildi (Smith School, University of Oxford), Chris McCann.

At an early stage of the drafting, we also held a workshop to discuss key themes with the business
community. Representatives from the following companies and organizations took part:

Alstom,

Lloyd’s 360° Risk Insight

Sustainable energy security: strategic risks and opportunities for business

foreword

from the chief executive officer of lloyd’s

This report, jointly
produced by Lloyd’s 360
Risk Insight programme
and Chatham House,
should cause all risk
managers to pause.
What it outlines, in stark
detail, is that we have
entered a period of deep
uncertainty in how we
will source energy for
power, heat and mobility,
and how much we will
have to pay for it.

Is this any different from the normal volatility of the oil
or gas markets? Yes, it is. Today, a number of pressures
are combining: constraints on ‘easy to access’ oil; the
environmental and political urgency of reducing carbon
dioxide emissions; and a sharp rise in energy demand
from the Asian economies, particularly China.

All of this means that the current generation of business
leaders – and their successors – are going to have to
find a new energy paradigm. As the report makes clear,
we can expect dramatic changes: prices are likely to
rise, with some commentators suggesting oil may reach
$200 a barrel; regulations on carbon emissions will
intensify; and reputations will be won or lost as the public
demands that businesses reduce their environmental
footprint. The growing demand for energy will require
an estimated $26trn in investment by 2030. Energy
companies will face hard choices in deciding how to
deploy these funds in an uncertain market with mixed
policy messages. The recent Deepwater oil spill shows
all too clearly the hazards of moving into ever more
unpredictable terrain to extract energy resources. And
the rapid deployment of cleaner energy technologies will
radically alter the risk landscape.

At this precise point in time we are in a period akin to
a phony war. We keep hearing of difficulties to come,
but with oil, gas and coal still broadly accessible – and

largely capable of being distributed where they are
needed – the bad times have not yet hit. The primary
purpose of this report is to remind the reader that all
businesses, not just the energy sector, need to consider
how they, their suppliers and their customers will be
affected by energy supplies which are less reliable and
more expensive.

The failure of the Copenhagen Summit has not helped to
instil a sense of urgency and it has hampered the ability
of businesses – particularly those in the energy sector
– to plan ahead and to make critical new investments
in energy infrastructure. Like the authors of this report,
I call on governments to identify a clear path towards
sustainable energy which businesses can follow.

Independently of what happens in UN negotiating rooms,
businesses can take action. We can plan our energy
needs, we can make every effort to reduce consumption,
and we can aim for a mix of different energy sources. The
transformation of the energy environment from carbon
to clean energy sources creates an extraordinary risk
management challenge for businesses. Traditional models
that focus on annual profits and, at best, medium term
strategies may struggle. Parts of this report talk about
what might happen in 2030 or even 2050 and I make no
apology for this. Energy security requires a long term view
and it is the companies who grasp this who will trade on
into the second half of this century.

Dr Richard Ward

Chief Executive Officer
Lloyd’s

Lloyd’s 360° Risk Insight

Sustainable energy security: strategic risks and opportunities for business

executive summary

1. BUSINESSES WHICH PREPARE FOR AND TAKE ADVANTAGE OF

THE NEW ENERGY REALITY WILL PROSPER – FAILURE TO DO SO

COULD BE CATASTROPHIC

Energy security and climate change concerns are unleashing a wave of policy initiatives and investments around the
world that will fundamentally alter the way that we manage and use energy. Companies which are able to plan for and
take advantage of this new energy reality will increase both their resilience and competitiveness. Failure to do so could
lead to expensive and potentially catastrophic consequences.

2. MARKET DYNAMICS AND ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS MEAN

BUSINESS CAN NO LONGER RELY ON LOW COST TRADITIONAL

ENERGY SOURCES

Modern society has been built on the back of access to relatively cheap, combustible, carbon-based energy sources.
Three factors render that model outdated: surging energy consumption in emerging economies, multiple constraints on
conventional fuel production and international recognition that continuing to release carbon dioxide into the atmosphere
will cause climate chaos.

3. CHINA AND GROWING ASIAN ECONOMIES WILL PLAY AN

INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT ROLE IN GLOBAL ENERGY SECURITY

China and emerging Asian economies have already demonstrated their weight in the energy markets. Their importance in
global energy security will grow. First, their economic development is the engine of demand growth for energy. Second,
their production of coal and strategic supplies of oil and gas will be increasingly powerful factors affecting the international
market. Third, their energy security policies are driving investment in clean energy technologies on an unprecedented scale.
China in particular is also a source country for some of the critical components in these technologies. Fourth, as ‘factories
of the world’, the energy situation in Asian countries will impact on supply chains around the world.

4. WE ARE HEADING TOWARDS A GLOBAL OIL SUPPLY CRUNCH

AND PRICE SPIKE

Energy markets will continue to be volatile as traditional mechanisms for balancing supply and price lose their power.
International oil prices are likely to rise in the short to mid-term due to the costs of producing additional barrels from difficult
environments, such as deep offshore fields and tar sands. An oil supply crunch in the medium term is likely to be due to a
combination of insufficient investment in upstream oil and efficiency over the last two decades and rebounding demand
following the global recession. This would create a price spike prompting drastic national measures to cut oil dependency.

5. ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY

VULNERABLE AS A RESULT OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND

OPERATIONS IN HARSHER ENVIRONMENTS

Much of the world’s energy infrastructure lies in areas that will be increasingly subject to severe weather events caused by
climate change. On top of this, extraction is increasingly taking place in more severe environments such as the Arctic and
ultra-deep water. For energy investors this means long-term planning based on a changing – rather than a stable climate.
For energy users, it means greater likelihood of loss of power for industry and fuel supply disruptions.

Lloyd’s 360° Risk Insight

Sustainable energy security: strategic risks and opportunities for business

6. LACK OF GLOBAL REGULATION ON CLIMATE CHANGE IS CREATING

AN ENVIRONMENT OF UNCERTAINTY FOR BUSINESS, WHICH IS

DAMAGING INVESTMENT PLANS

Without an international agreement on the way forward on climate change mitigation, energy transitions will take place
at different rates in different regions. Those who succeed in implementing the most efficient, low-carbon, cost-effective
energy systems are likely to influence others and export their skills and technology. However, the lack of binding policy
commitments inhibits investor confidence. Governments will play a crucial role in setting policy and incentives that will
create the right investment conditions, and businesses can encourage and work with governments to do this.

7. TO MANAGE INCREASING ENERGY COSTS AND CARBON

EXPOSURE BUSINESSES MUST REDUCE FOSSIL FUEL

CONSUMPTION

The introduction of carbon pricing and cap and trade schemes will make the unit costs of energy more expensive. The
most cost-effective mitigation strategy is to reduce fossil fuel energy consumption. The carbon portfolio and exposure of
companies and governments will also come under increasing scrutiny. Higher emissions standards are anticipated across
many sectors with the potential for widespread carbon labelling. In many cases, an early capacity to calculate and reduce
embedded carbon and life-cycle emissions in operations and products will increase competitiveness.

8. BUSINESS MUST ADDRESS ENERGY-RELATED RISKS TO

SUPPLY CHAINS AND THE INCREASING VULNERABILITY

OF ‘JUST-IN-TIME’ MODELS

Businesses must address the impact of energy and carbon constraints holistically, and throughout their supply chains. Tight
profit margins on food products, for example, will make some current sources unprofitable as the price of fuel rises and
local suppliers become more competitive. Retail industries will need to either re-evaluate the ‘just-in-time’ business model
which assumes a ready supply of energy throughout the supply chain or increase the resilience of their logistics against
supply disruptions and higher prices. Failure to do so will increase a business’s vulnerability to reputational damage and
potential profit losses resulting from the inability to deliver products and services in the event of an energy crisis.

9. INVESTMENT IN RENEWABLE ENERGY AND ‘INTELLIGENT’

INFRASTRUCTURE IS BOOMING. THIS REVOLUTION PRESENTS

HUGE OPPORTUNITIES FOR NEW business PARTNERSHIPS

The last few years have witnessed unprecedented investment in renewable energy and many countries are planning
or piloting ‘smart grids’. This revolution presents huge opportunities for new partnerships between energy suppliers,
manufacturers and users. New risks will also have to be managed. These include the scarcity of several essential
components of clean energy technologies, incompatible infrastructures and the vulnerability of a system that is
increasingly dependent on IT.

Lloyd’s 360° Risk Insight

Sustainable energy security: strategic risks and opportunities for business

INTRODUCTION

“In some cases, the surprise element

is only a matter of timing: an energy

transition, for example is inevitable; the

only questions are when and how abruptly

or smoothly such a transition occurs. An

energy transition from one type of fuel

(fossil fuels) to another (alternative) is an

event that historically has only happened

once a century at most with momentous

consequences.”

US National Intelligence Council 2008

The first part of this report sets out several trends
propelling us towards a carbon-constrained world, these
include: the dynamics affecting availability and demand
for hydrocarbons; and the international climate change
mitigation agenda. It considers the responses from
government and industry in terms of renewable energy
and carbon legislation, and the new risks emanating from
technological change and climate instability. The second
part explores the implications and associated risks of
these trends for businesses in general, and for the energy
sector specifically, in the coming decade.

The report looks at short-term (one to five years)
and medium-term (five to ten years) risks to general
business. It also considers longer-term (ten years plus)
issues, particularly as they impact on technological and
investment choices for the energy sector. While energy
supply disruption is frequently the result of technical
faults and strike action, we do not deal with this here,
but concentrate instead on the impacts of constraints
on carbon and carbon-based resources.

A new look at energy security

Historically, energy security has been understood as
defence against supply disruption and price instability.
Within this mindset, protecting the status quo is
paramount. Yet dynamic trends, including the sharp
rise in demand from newly industrialising economies,
carbon-dioxide (C0

) induced global warming and the

growth of alternative energy technologies, mean that
protecting traditional energy practices will make us far

less secure, and less competitive, in the future. This is in
addition to the threat that climate change poses to energy
infrastructure. These are not issues for the energy sector
alone. The return to high and volatile oil prices after 2005
reinforced the link between energy prices, profits and
economic stability for most businesses.

The looming climate challenge

Climate change creates many risks and uncertainties
for society and industry. Anticipated disruption around
energy, water and other critical natural resources pose
new political, economic and human security challenges.

We know that to keep global warming to 2°C above
historical levels requires a step-change in the way energy
is produced, transported and used. But international
progress has been slow. The Copenhagen Accord of 2009
lists actions that the governments of over 100 developed
and developing countries propose to take to achieve this,
but there is no binding legal commitment.

Until now, supply concerns and relations with energy
exporters have tended to dominate national energy
policies, but this is changing. Energy efficiency will
be the mantra of governments trying to ensure both
national security and C0

reductions, and energy users

are increasingly central in this vision. Energy efficiency
is also vital for economic competitiveness and insulates
companies from the worst of the energy price volatility.
On the supply side, renewable energy has moved into
the mainstream and is now supplying the majority of
new electricity in some regions. To increase efficiency
and allow the uptake of more renewable energy, radically
different infrastructures are being planned around the
world. These may include local and transnational ‘smart
grids’ that communicate with household and industrial
appliances and electric vehicles, and can send power
back into the grid to help regulate demand flows.

Why is it important for businesses?

Meeting the dual challenge of maintaining stable energy
services in the short term, without jeopardising them in
the long term, means reformulating ‘energy security’ as

Lloyd’s 360° Risk Insight

Sustainable energy security: strategic risks and opportunities for business

‘securing the transition to a low or no carbon economy’.
This cannot be based purely on access to affordable
units of energy, be it litres of fuel or kilowatt hour (kwh),
but rather one which prepares for a long-term vision of
efficient, clean, safe delivery of energy services to meet
societal needs.

At the global level, there is little sign that energy
demand will go down, with business as usual
forecasts suggesting a 40% increase by 2030. This will
require $26trn of investment - some 1.4% of global
GDP.

Given the global commitment to radically reduce

emissions and the finite nature of conventional fossil
fuel sources, a rapid movement towards a highly

efficient non-fossil energy future would seem to be
the logical investment choice.

For energy businesses, the higher upfront investment
costs, technological uncertainties and lack of confidence
in the short-term economics (compared with conventional
fuels) raise problems and risks. These include the dangers
of changes in policy or higher costs associated with being
a first mover. Businesses in the wider economy also
need to be aware of the changing energy context their
operations and supply chains will rely on. Businesses that
can adapt their activities to benefit from emerging energy
trends and manage the risks will gain an advantage over
their competitors.

1176

Biomass & waste

265

Hydro

709

Nuclear

2512

Gas

4093

Oil

Other renewables

3184

Coal

Lloyd’s 360° Risk Insight

Sustainable energy security: strategic risks and opportunities for business

trends

“Secure and reliable energy supply and

infrastructure impacts the feasibility and

costs of doing business from perspectives

of competitiveness and productivity.

Energy security is a vital consideration,

not only for day-to-day operations, but

also for long-term investment.”

International Chamber of Commerce, 2007

Today, the majority of our heating, power and mobility rely
on extractive energy resources. Oil, coal, gas and uranium,
account for around 90% of the world’s traded energy. Oil
in particular, because it is widely traded on global markets
and is the main fuel for transport, has been one of the
drivers of global growth over the last century. With world
population growth and pressure for higher standards of
living in developing countries, demand for energy will
reach new heights. But how long can we rely on these
ultimately exhaustible and, with the exception of uranium,
C0

emitting fuels?

The chart below (Figure 1) shows the contributions
of different energy sources to global demand. It also
highlights the importance of biomass (material from living
or recently living organisms, eg wood or dung) and waste,
which is often not traded but plays a vital role particularly
in developing countries and rural areas.

Figure 1:

Global energy demand in 2007

(million

tonnes of oil equivalent – mtoe)

Source: International Energy Agency 2009

There is now widespread acknowledgement that we are
in a ‘transition’ period heading towards less-polluting,
more-sustainable forms of energy. Yet there are a variety
of views as to what this involves, the duration, and to
what extent hydrocarbons should be part of the energy
mix. Added to this is the uncertainty around what will
replace them. This involves scaling up new technologies
and introducing completely different energy delivery
systems. These changes will naturally impact jobs,
profits, national economies and the environment, just as
the dramatic increase in coal use during the industrial
revolution and the onset of the ‘oil age’ did in the first
part of the 20th century. This means that there will be
push and pull factors from stakeholders. This will form
the political context for many business transactions and
operations over the next 30 years.

This section looks at the trends that will affect this
transition in terms of changing energy demand and
resource availability; climate change policies and the
drive towards renewable energy; a technology revolution;
and energy and transport infrastructure in a changing
climate. While we cannot forecast exactly when and how
this transition will take place, there are several indicators
which business should be aware of. These are:

• Global energy demand is putting pressure on fossil fuel

markets and increasing price volatility

• Past investment trends coupled with resurging demand

suggest that an ‘oil supply crunch’ is imminent. This will
lead to harsher national policies to restrain oil consumption

• Increases in policy and regulation to reduce carbon

emissions are inevitable and will impact on the
economic viability of current investments and
operations

• Renewable energy has attracted an unprecedented

upsurge in investment and been promoted into the
mainstream energy mix in some countries

• The rapid deployment of new technologies brings

new risks

• As the climate changes, our existing energy and

transport infrastructure are vulnerable to extreme
weather events.

Lloyd’s 360° Risk Insight

Sustainable energy security: strategic risks and opportunities for business

Several variables will influence demand for different
fuels in the coming years. These include: the pace of
economic growth in developing countries; technological
development; and policies to augment energy security
and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

This creates risk for energy companies and natural
resource owners who must invest large amounts of
capital years in advance of expected returns. However,
the obvious trends in the short to mid term are a huge
surge of demand for all fuels from Asia, particularly China
(see Box 1) a declining market for oil and coal in the
Atlantic region and the increasing use of gas for electricity
generation across the globe.

Energy exporters with comparatively low domestic pricing,
such as those in the Middle East, are also increasingly
significant as energy consumers. This will have a dramatic
effect on where oil will go, where competition for oil
resources will take place, and who has the power to
balance the oil market in the coming years (see Box 2).

Box 1: China’s global energy impact

Growth in China will impact upon the energy trade like
no other country in the world. Currently China’s energy
consumption is dominated by domestic coal. In the
electricity sector it provides 80% of the power. While
the Chinese government aims to reduce its share in the
mix, an additional 450 gigawatts (GW) of new coal-fired
generating capacity is planned between now and 2030. In
spite of China’s massive coal reserves, the pace of growth
is leading to significant coal imports. Recent Chinese
commercial investments in Australian coal demonstrate
this expectation. Domestic oil production in China is
expected to peak in 2013, while demand could more than
double by 2030. This would account for nearly half of the
predicted global increase over the same period. Because
of the toll the extra imports would take on China’s foreign
currency reserves and the volatility of the oil market, the
government is keen to encourage alternative transport

fuels at home as well as securing long-term oil supply
contracts at stable prices.

China is also becoming a major importer of gas, both
through pipelines from Turkmenistan (and later Russia
and Burma) and shipped liquid natural gas (LNG). By 2030,
around 50% of the country’s gas demand is expected
to be met by imports. Energy security is resulting in
strong policies to improve energy efficiency and develop
renewable and nuclear energy. In the longer term, what
happens in the areas of policy and new technology to
reduce consumption in China, India and other developing
countries will shape and catalyse the energy transition in
the rest of the world.

Energy is a globalised commodity. Sudden demand
pressures for certain fuels in one place, coupled with
previous inadequate investment in the necessary resources
elsewhere, will push up prices on the international market.
As traditional Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) countries decline as oil consumers,
so will their power as rule setters in the international oil
market. For example, Chinese strategic oil stocks (not yet
included in the International Energy Agency’s security
mechanism) will become vital to balancing global markets.

Before new models of international energy governance are
developed, insecurity will encourage strategic investments
by the most import-dependent countries. Together with
policies to reduce subsidies and increase efficiency, these
trends will drive up final consumer prices for transport,
fuel, heat and electricity in the short to mid term.

While price rises will vary from country to country (see
Box 5), all businesses will be affected through their
own exposure to energy costs or that of their suppliers.
The more efficient will have an important competitive
advantage in times of high and volatile energy prices,
especially in energy-intensive sectors or where supply
chains are sensitive to energy costs.

1. The changing dynamics of energy demand

and resource availability

000 b/d

30000

Middle East surplus

Year

25000

20000

15000

10000

5000

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

2025

2030

Asia-Pacific deficit

Lloyd’s 360° Risk Insight

Sustainable energy security: strategic risks and opportunities for business

Box 2: A change in the energy market balance
between East and West

Advanced economies remain the biggest consumers
of primary energy per person but by 2008 non-OECD
countries led by China and India had outstripped them
in terms of the share of world demand.

This shift began

in the 1990s, partly because manufacturing shifted
eastwards. Meanwhile, lower population growth, de-
industrialisation, greater efficiency, higher fuel prices and
a concern for the environment are lowering demand for
oil-based fuels and coal in the OECD.

These consumption trajectories mean there is likely to
be a tipping point in 2015 when countries in Asia-Pacific
need more imported oil in total than the Middle East
(including Sudan) can export.

Figure 2:

Middle East oil surplus vs Asia-Pacific deficit

Source: John Mitchell, Chatham House 2010

of power are not new, but the changing growth dynamics
have introduced new actors and relationships to the
game. Key ‘hot spots’ include:

• African countries, where the industrialised and

industrialising world increasingly view resources as
ripe for taking. For example China, is reported to have
invested up to $50bn in the past decade on accessing
raw materials in Africa, including uranium reserves
in Niger, oil interests in Southern Sudan and bauxite
concessions in Guinea. Former US Vice President, Dick
Cheney said: “Along with Latin America, West Africa is
expected to be one of the faster-growing sources of oil
and gas for the American market.”

• Countries in Central Asia, which have become a key

area for competition amongst Russian, Chinese and
western oil companies. Turkmenistan in particular will
be crucial for the diversification of gas for both China
and the EU.

• The Middle East, whose dominance in global oil and gas

supply is growing, as other resources deplete – see Box 2.

• Russia, a vital energy supplier, not only to Europe, but

also to East Asia. Currently, the EU depends on Russia
for 33% of its imported oil and 42% of its gas, with
growing dependency in both sectors. Sales of gas and
oil to Asia are increasing with the construction of new
pipelines, including the 4,700km East Siberia-Pacific
Ocean oil pipeline, which reached China in 2009. This
diversification of customers gives added security and
influence to Russia.

The following sections look at the demand trends for coal,
gas, oil and uranium, and how they might be met, with
special attention to effects on the price of oil.

1.1 The resurgence of coal

In spite of high CO

emissions per unit of energy (two

to three times more CO

than natural gas when burned

in conventional thermal power plants), coal is the

West Africa, Eastern Russia, Central Asia and Northern
Iraq are becoming ‘pivot zones’ which can export to both
western and eastern markets. These are already centres
for competition and collaboration between western and
Asian (usually state-backed) companies.

Box 3: Geopolitics of Energy

Competition among states for access to resources and
the impact of energy trade on the international balance

3500

(Cubic km per year)

Industry

(Cubic km per year)

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

1965

1969

1973

1977

1981

1985

1989

1993

1997

2001

2005

Total Asia-Pacific

Total Africa

mtoe

Total Middle East

Total Europe and Eurasia

Total S. & Cent. America

Total North America

3000

2500

2000

4000

3500

1500

1000

500

1965

1972

1979

1986

1993

2000

2007

2014

2021

2028

Total Asia-Pacific

Total Africa

Total Middle East

Total Europe and Eurasia

Total S. & Cent. America

IEA - Reference Scenario

mtoe

Lloyd’s 360° Risk Insight

Sustainable energy security: strategic risks and opportunities for business 11

fastest growing fossil fuel. Demand for coal for electricity
generation in places with large national and usually cheaper
reserves (like China and the US) is rising. This illustrates
the clash between policies to keep the cost of energy
down and reduce dependence on foreign imports by using
cheap domestic resources and policies to mitigate climate
change, which may be more expensive in the short term
and require resource imports, such as gas or technologies.

Figure 3 shows the extent of the growth that is driven by
increases from South East Asia. Between now and 2020,
546 GW of new coal-fired power generation is planned
in Asia - more than double that currently deployed in the
EU.

China and India lay claim to the world’s third and fifth

largest coal reserves respectively, yet they are consuming
coal faster than they can develop domestic mines. In the
last five years, China has gone from being a significant
exporter of thermal coal to a net importer.

Figure 3:

Historical coal consumption in major

world regions (mtoe)

Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2009

Prices will rise in response to demand surges, with knock-on
effects on electricity prices in other coal-importing countries.
For example, wholesale electricity prices in the UK rose by
66% between 2007 and 2008 – due not only to the rising
price of gas, but also higher world coal prices affected by
China’s import demand.

Given transportation difficulties, shortages of coal stocks
at power plants are also likely to cause more frequent
power disruptions in emerging economies (see also 4.2).

1.2 Gas as the ‘transition fuel’

Many countries plan to increase the share of natural gas in
their national energy mixes as it has lower emissions than
coal and oil and is more versatile (eg it can replace coal
as a fuel for electricity generation and oil-based transport
fuels in gas-to-liquid and compressed forms).

Figure 4:

Growth in global natural gas consumption

and future projections (mtoe)

Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy and IEA WEO 2009

The supply outlook

While estimates suggest coal reserves are plentiful,

a gap in supply may arise as a result of sharp demand
rises in Asia before new extraction projects are
completed. There will be strong expectation from
Australia and Indonesia who provide around half of
global exports, and there are doubts about the ability
of these countries to expand exports fast enough.

Uncertainty surrounds the supply and demand for gas
in Asia and, in particular, China over the next decade.
The Chinese government projects a tripling of current
consumption to 300 billion cubic metres by 2020. Given
the lengthy negotiations over routes from Russia’s far east
gas fields it is hard to tell how much will be politically or
economically possible via pipeline, and how much China
will rely on the LNG market. The EU is also planning to
increase imports of LNG as a diversification strategy.

Lloyd’s 360° Risk Insight

Sustainable energy security: strategic risks and opportunities for business

The supply outlook

Recoverable reserves of natural gas are enough to meet
world demand for heat, power and petrochemical uses to
at least 2030, according to the IEA. But production equal to
that of two Russias would need to come on-stream by then
just to make up for the decline in existing fields.

Over half

of conventional natural gas resources are concentrated
in three countries Russia, Iran and Qatar, and there are
political, geological and technological obstacles that may
restrict international supplies in the short to medium term.

Two developments are counted on to ease gas supply
constraints, the greater use of liquefied natural gas and
the exploitation of shale gas. Until recently, getting gas
from reserves to markets was limited by the direction and
feasibility of pipelines. LNG, which can be transported by
sea allows a more fluid trade and greater security options
for gas-dependent countries.

The recent exploitation of shale gas is adding to global
supplies by alleviating the need for imports of gas to the
US, and may do the same for other regions (see Box 4).
This has led to a gas glut in the global market, discouraging
investment in LNG.

Box 4: What can we expect from shale gas?

“A major new factor – unconventional

natural gas – is moving to the fore in the

US energy scene…it ranks as the most

significant energy innovation so far this

century. It has the potential, at least, to

cause a paradigm shift in the fuelling of

North America’s energy future.”

HIS-CERA 2010

Unanticipated technological developments dramatically
increased the availability of non-conventional (mostly
shale) gas in the US last year. In 2000, non-conventional
gas provided just 1% of total gas supply, but by 2009 it had
reached 20%. Forecasts suggest this will reach 50% by
2035. As natural gas prices fell in the US, demand for LNG

fell internationally and volumes destined for US import
were redirected to other (mainly Asian) markets. But the
full impact is highly uncertain. Production from shale gas
wells seems to peak much faster than conventional gas,
and data is limited. Assessments of the Barnett wells in
the US using horizontal drilling showed that most of the
recoverable gas is extracted in the first few years.

Is the US experience set to become a global
phenomenon? Some suggest that resources in OECD
Europe are large enough to displace 40 years of imports
of gas at the current level, assuming recovery rates in
line with those in North America.

Exploration is already

under way in Europe (including in France, Germany,
Poland and the UK) to assess this potential.

1.3 Oil consumption driven by transport
and price

Global oil demand will grow in the medium term. But
recent demand trends vary regionally. China, India and the
Middle East show high rates of oil consumption growth
(6% to 10% a year), while consumption in the OECD
declines at around 1% a year.

In the developing world, increasing car ownership and
subsidised fuel prices will continue to drive up oil demand
in the next few years. Whereas fuel efficiency standards,
taxed fuel prices and alternatives, including biofuels,
reduce demand in the advanced economies. Peak oil
demand (the suggestion that reductions in demand as a
result of policy, technology and behavioural changes will
occur before any geological driven change) is a distinct
possibility in the longer term.

Unsustainable consumption trends are forcing many
countries, particularly oil exporters, to rethink their
energy pricing and subsidy systems to encourage greater
efficiency (see Box 5). Strong policy measures here, and
the uptake of new vehicle technology in major markets,
such as the US and China, could set oil-fuel consumption
on a downward trajectory.

Lloyd’s 360° Risk Insight

Sustainable energy security: strategic risks and opportunities for business 13

Box 5: The impact of government policy
on energy pricing

National taxation or subsidisation is a major factor
determining the price of fuel at the pump and power at
the plug. For example, in Europe the wholesale price of
diesel fuel is relatively constant across the EU at about

€

0.6 per litre, and the final price varies from around

€

to over

€

1.4, depending on the tax.

However, in China

the final price would be around

€

0.75, in India

€

0.52 and

in Saudi Arabia

€

0.7.

Governments that tax domestic energy become dependent
on the revenue, which makes them reluctant to reduce it in
the event of higher international prices. Governments that
do not tax energy, or that subsidise it, are under pressure
to raise prices when the international price is high. This
is for various reasons: to encourage greater efficiency;
to lower dependency on energy imports; to reduce the
subsidy bill; or to free up more energy resources for
export. For example, the Chinese government doubled
prices for gasoline and diesel between 2004 and 2008,
and the Egyptian government recently committed to
phasing out energy subsidies for industry by 2011.

The supply outlook

Despite the global importance of oil (the most widely
used fossil fuel) there is disagreement on how much will
be available to meet future demands. There are basically
three positions on this:

• Using advanced technologies will allow us to carry on

producing enough oil for generations, particularly from
non-conventional sources, such as oil sands and shale.

• Oil production will reach its peak level and go into

irrevocable decline sooner than we are prepared for, with
catastrophic effects on our societies and economies.

• There may be plenty of oil in the ground but above-ground

factors such as cost, willingness to invest and political
barriers will constrain its production.

Box 6: Oil research - below ground constraints

“Peak oil presents the world with a risk

management problem of tremendous

complexity.”

US Department of Energy 2007

A vast array of studies have attempted to predict the time at
which global oil production will reach a maximum level, from
which point it will go into irrevocable decline. Some suggest
that this ‘peak’ has already occurred, while others maintain it
is either impossible to predict or shows no sign of appearing.
Looking further than a decade into the future presents many
uncertainties, including: the availability and cost of extraction
technologies; substitute technologies; pricing systems in
major economies; and carbon legislation.

A comprehensive two-year study by the UK Energy Research
Centre completed in August 2009 found that a peak in
conventional oil production before 2030 appears likely, and
there is a significant risk of a peak before 2020. With average
rates of decline from current fields, the report says that just
to maintain current production levels would require the
equivalent of a new Saudi Arabia coming on-stream every
three years. What’s more, giant fields pass peak production
levels and there is a shift to smaller, more difficult to produce
fields that have faster depletion rates meaning the rate of
decline will accelerate.

This uncertainty makes it hard for governments and
businesses to plan the move away from oil. A report
produced for the US Department of Energy highlighted
the economic chaos that would result from the onset of
declining oil production as global demand continued to rise.
It recommended “a mitigation crash program” involving a
radical overhaul of the transportation system at least 20
years before peaking. Yet it acknowledged that enacting
such policies and paying for it with tax-payers money would
be difficult without clear evidence for the peaking date.

Even before we reach peak oil, we could witness an oil
supply crunch because of increased Asian demand. Major

Lloyd’s 360° Risk Insight

Sustainable energy security: strategic risks and opportunities for business

new investment in energy takes 10-15 years from the
initial investment to the first production, and to date we
have not seen the amount of new projects that would
supply the projected increase in demand.

• The IEA projections assume that additional supply from

the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries will
largely fill the gap between declining non-OPEC production
and rising world demand. But this implies the willingness
and ability of those countries to invest or attract foreign
investment into their oil sectors. The evidence reveals
a serious lack of investment relative to demand growth
throughout the 1990s, and a subsequent fall in the rate of
discoveries. A look at the forecasts and actual outcomes
for both OPEC crude capacity and non-OPEC production
show that country targets and IEA expectations over the
past decade have generally gone unmet.

• In the wake of the oil price crash of 2008 and the

subsequent global financial crisis, over 20 planned
large-scale upstream oil and gas projects were deferred
indefinitely or cancelled.

Production from Iraq is the wild card. The current target
of 12 million barrels a day by 2016 would make Iraq the
world’s number one producer, potentially increasing
global spare capacity and sending the oil price down.
However, numerous legal, security and administrative
problems hinder this development.

Box 7: Unconventional fossil fuels: prospects
and problems

The constraints on access to conventional fossil
fuel reserves, namely oil and natural gas, have led
to the expansion of the exploitation of the so-called
unconventional fossil fuels.

The primary differences between conventional and
unconventional petroleum liquids are the density of the

liquid and how easily it flows. Petroleum or conventional
oil is found in liquid form and flows naturally or is capable
of being pumped without being treated.

Unconventional oil, including very heavy oil, oil sands,
and tar sands (bitumen), has a high viscosity. It flows very
slowly and requires processing or dilution to be extracted
through a well bore. Very heavy oil in Venezuela, oil sands
in Canada, and oil shale in the US account for more than
80% of unconventional resources.

While some oil companies have invested large amounts in
non-conventional oil, there are a number of limiting factors,
including: environmental impacts; capital and operating
costs; and the energy balance of the whole operation (how
much energy is required to extract, process and transport
the fuel compared to the final product).

Unconventional natural gas resources include tight sands,
coalbed methane, and gas shales. The primary difference
between these and conventional gases is the reservoir in
which the gas is located. To extract these gases requires
hydraulic fracturing (use of pressurised liquids to crack
the rocks) of the host reservoirs.

The costs, environmental impact and security
implications of these options differ and are at the centre
of fierce debates about the trade-offs between climate
and energy security. For example, CO

emissions from

oil sands are at least 20% higher than for oil currently
consumed in the US.

This is because the energy input

(usually in gas) needed to get the oil out is around three
times as much as for conventional oil. It also takes three
barrels of water to produce each barrel of oil, most of
that being too toxic to return to the rivers.

Emissions

from shale oil are likely to be higher and those from
coal to liquids are at least double the levels of those
from conventional oil-based fuel. Gas to liquids would
produce emissions some 10% to 15% higher than those
from conventional petrol or diesel.

For example, plans such as the development of Kuwait’s northern oil fields has been delayed for over 15 years due to ongoing parliamentary

obstruction to foreign participation.

140

160

USD per barr

120

180

200

100

2010

2015

2020

2025

2030

Bank America/ Merill Lynch (range)
OPEC (high)
OPEC (low)
EIA 2009 reference (2007 USD)

Barclays Capital
IEA WEO 2009 reference (2008 USD)
Deutsche Bank
Paul Stevens, Chatham House

Lloyd’s 360° Risk Insight

Sustainable energy security: strategic risks and opportunities for business 15

The May 2010 Deepwater Horizon rig explosion and oil
leak in the Gulf of Mexico has highlighted the problems
with difficult to reach oil. Operating at depths of 5000
feet below the surface has been technically challenging,
which is all too graphically demonstrated by the inability
of the companies to stem the vast amounts of oil (with
estimates ranging from 5,000 to 60,000 barrels per day)
that are gushing out.

The long-term impact on the environment, the companies
involved and the sector as a whole is difficult to predict.
One commentator likened the accident to Three Mile
Island: “The real legacy of Three Mile Island wasn’t what
happened back in 1979, but rather what happened - or
more precisely didn’t happen - over the course of the
next 40 years in the US. Literally overnight, the near-
meltdown of the reactor core changed public acceptance
of nuclear power plants. No company in the US has built
a new one since.”

Already President Barack Obama has

suspended his recent decision to open new offshore
areas for oil development and has declared a moratorium
on new drilling.

Supply constraints will drive up the price of oil

“A supply crunch appears likely around

2013…given recent price experience,

a spike in excess of $200 per barrel is

not infeasible”

Professor Paul Stevens, Chatham House

Oil price changes affect the price of other types of
energy, particularly natural gas, and many aspects of
the economy, for example: mobility; transported goods,
including essential foods; importing government tax
revenues or subsidy costs; and exporting country
investment income. The global impact of higher oil
prices on the economy was illustrated by the global
recession of 2008-2009.

Given the expense of extracting

unconventional and difficult oils, the cost of oil is likely to
rise. The question is when and by how much. Although

there is a huge variety of opinion on how high the oil
price will rise, and when it will reach these figures, most
commentators agree that the trajectory is upwards
(see Figure 5).

Figure 5:

Range of oil price forecasts

Source: Chatham House, listed sources.

A price spike, inevitable if the supply crunch described
above takes place, would prompt government action to
make legal and infrastructural changes that would lead to
a declining demand for oil.

1.4 Uranium

To meet energy and climate security objectives, many
countries are planning new nuclear power plants. At
present, these depend on uranium - also a finite resource.
Estimates from the OECD assume that, at current prices,
the economically viable reserves for uranium (assuming
the same level of nuclear production) will last for around
80 years. If the number of reactors increases as suggested
by some, other fuel sources and technologies would need
to be added to increase the longevity of nuclear power
(see Box 8).

Lloyd’s 360° Risk Insight

Sustainable energy security: strategic risks and opportunities for business

Box 8: The progress of nuclear power

Nuclear power has been in commercial operation for
over 50 years and currently provides around 14% of the
world’s electricity. There are 444 reactors in operation
in 30 countries, mainly in the OECD. Over the past two
decades the use of nuclear power has not increased
significantly and in fact the global peak for reactors in
operation was in 1989. This lack of growth is the result
of a combination of factors, including: cheaper natural
gas; higher investment costs than alternatives; public
opposition; slower growth in electricity demand; and the
closure of the oldest reactors. However, some regions of
the world, particularly Asia, have active and fast growing
nuclear power construction programmes.

The current generation of reactors is fuelled by uranium;
future designs are likely to diversify as a result of mineral
constraints. This may include thorium, while international

programmes are also underway to develop so-called
Generation IV reactors, which use plutonium fuels. While
the diversification of fuel sources increases supply
security, it also brings new technical problems and
heightens proliferation concerns.

Fusion is another type of nuclear power being developed.
This releases energy by combining atoms, rather than
splitting atoms (nuclear fission), which occurs in existing
nuclear power plants. A large, international demonstration
facility, the International Thermonuclear Experimental
Reactor (ITER), is under construction in France and was
originally scheduled for completion in 2018. However, it is
currently over budget and delayed.

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Sustainable energy security: strategic risks and opportunities for business 17

The threat of man-made climate change and
supply security concerns is challenging the relative
competitiveness of fossil fuels in terms of cost,
environmental impact, energy output and access.
This is driving the rapid deployment of renewable
energy technologies, which hold the promise of
energy generation free of greenhouse gas emission,
with virtually infinite inputs that are often available
domestically. As President Obama said in his State
of the Union address in February 2010, “We know the
country that harnesses the power of clean, renewable
energy will lead the 21st Century.” Renewable energy
solutions can help diversify the energy portfolio of
many businesses, bringing added price and supply
security in the long-term while adding to a company’s
sustainability profile.

Box 9: Renewable energy

There are a large variety of sources of renewable
energies that are available in different concentrations
all over the world. These include:

• Heating and cooling: passive solar architecture; solar

thermal collectors; biomass-based combined heat and
power; and geothermal energy.

• Electricity: solar photo-voltaic; solar thermal; hydro;

solid biomass; biogas; geothermal; on and offshore
wind; marine energies like sea current, wave and
tidal energies.

• Transport (internal combustion-based): bioethanol;

biomethanol; oils from biomass; and biomass-based
synthetic fuels.

Until the last decade, the commercial renewable energy
field was dominated by hydropower for electricity,

biomass for heating, and solar thermal for hot water.
However, the commercial strength of onshore wind has
led to unprecedented growth in this area in a number
of regions. This trend is likely to continue, as will the
development of solar power for electricity production.
The use of biofuels as a transport fuel remains
controversial, due to the impact on food prices, land
use and water consumption. If the use of biofuels is
to be expanded, it is likely to require rapid technology
innovation and the use of non-food sources for fuel,
such as algae.

The most common critique of wind and solar power is
that they both rely on intermittent sources. This means
that thermal or nuclear capacity is still needed as back-up
to compensate for times when the wind doesn’t blow
or the sun doesn’t shine. Solutions are being developed
which involve storage and ‘super’ smart grids and which
will enable far greater efficiency and transfer of excess
electricity across borders (see also Box 19).

For the majority of the world’s scientific community,
one of the greatest challenges that the human race
faces is how to avoid global temperatures rising by 2°C
over pre-industrial levels.

Developed countries will

have to make sharp emissions cuts and move close to
a zero-carbon economy by 2050, with major developing
countries following suit well before the end of the century.

A 50% global reduction by 2050 implies average global
emissions of around two tonnes of CO

per person

(less than half the present Chinese level, a fifth of
the level in Europe and a tenth of that in the US). This
implies a transformation in the way we live and the way
governments regulate our activities, particularly in relation
to industry, transport and buildings.

2. Climate change and the drive towards

renewable energy

A concentration level of 450 ppm CO2 eqivalent would maintain a 50% chance of staying below 2°C, with a 400 ppm CO2eq providing a

greater than 50% chance. To achieve either of these targets, global emissions would need to be at least 50% below 1990 levels by 2050.
This would imply cutting developed country emissions to at least 30–35% below 1990 levels by 2020, while allowing developing economy
emissions to grow until 2010 or 2020, but reducing them substantially thereafter.

150

Billion tons C0

e per year

Year

100

2000

2040

2020

2060

2080

2100

Business
as usual

965 ppm

Atmospheric

Temp. increase

over preindustrial

(90% C.I.)

1410 ppm

4.8˚C (2.9º - 7.7º)

8.7ºF (5.2º - 13.9º)

775 ppm

1020 ppm

3.9˚C (2.3º - 6.2º)

7ºF (4.2º - 11.2º)

585 ppm

725 ppm

2.9˚C (1.7º - 4.7º)
5.2ºF (3.1º - 8.4º)

470 ppm

520 ppm

2˚C (1.2º - 3.1º)

3.5ºF (2.1º - 5.7º)

Confirmed
proposals

Potential
proposals

Low
emissions path

Global C0

Equivalent Emissions

2100 Values

Lloyd’s 360° Risk Insight

Sustainable energy security: strategic risks and opportunities for business

Box 10: The failure of Copenhagen to set
a 2°C pathway

Despite great expectations, the Copenhagen Summit in
December 2009 did not lead to a binding international
treaty on global greenhouse gas emission reductions.
The Copenhagen Accord did create a framework in which
national low-carbon pledges are monitored, even though
these do not yet pave the way for the 2°C scenario.
Figure 6 describes the shortfall and points to the potential
increase in global emissions that could lead to a rise of
3°C to 4°C by 2100.

The outcome is seen by many in the private sector as
a missed opportunity. Without clearer and stronger
domestic policies in key markets, it is unclear whether
there are sufficient drivers for large-scale renewable
investment and deployment. At the same time, the weak
outcome from Copenhagen has revitalised discussion
around carbon leakage and addressing it through
border measures. Unilateral action to impose border tax
adjustment outside any global climate agreement is likely
to prompt trade-related retaliatory actions, undermining
the global trading system.

To achieve the 2°C target (by the IEA’s calculation)
countries and markets must stimulate opportunities
in low-carbon and energy-efficient investments across
the globe and generate $30trn of investment in the
next two decades.

This requires a massive increase of

investment in both efficiency and the renewable and
clean energy sector.

According to Bloomberg New Energy Finance, the extent
of global investment in clean energy sources reached
$112bn in 2009, up from just $18bn in 2004. Only strong
policy incentives will promote renewable energy activity
under existing market conditions. This is often described
as a ‘market failure’ in need of market mechanisms or
policies that factor in the environmental cost of higher
emitting fuels or subsidise cleaner ones, as a public good.

Lack of confidence in the binding nature of national
renewable energy targets or incentive mechanisms
has hampered the growth of the sector. But where
there is political will, investments are taking place. By
2008, nearly a quarter of all new electricity generation
was from renewable sources In Europe. In 2009, wind

Figure 6:

Impact of Copenhagen Accord on global emissions

Source: Climate Scoreboard, 2010

2002

2.9%

15%

16%

23%

3.1%

3.2%

3.6%

3.9%

4.4%

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

Additional Renewable generation as % of all power additions
Installed Renewable generation as a % of overall generation mix

Lloyd’s 360° Risk Insight

Sustainable energy security: strategic risks and opportunities for business 19

power installations accounted for 39% of new power
installations, the second year running that more
wind power was installed than any other generating
technology. Renewable power installations in general
accounted for nearly two-thirds of new installations in
Europe in 2009.

Figure 7:

Global growth of renewable energy in the

power sector (excluding large hydro)

Source: UNEP et al., “Global Trends in Sustainable Energy
Investment 2009”, 2009

doubling of production in the last five years. This equates
to around 5% of US transport fuel.

Electric vehicles, which could encourage renewable
electricity generation through their capacity for storage,
are also generating a high level of interest. China is
deploying large volumes of electric motorbikes and is
seen both as a centre for manufacturing and a market.

Box 11: The Carbon Reduction Commitment and
the building trade

As part of the UK government commitment on climate
change, it launched the legally binding CRC Energy
Efficiency Scheme (formerly the Carbon Reduction
Commitment) in 2010. It requires companies that pay
more than £500,000 a year for electricity to report on
carbon emissions from all energy sources consumed
by fixed installations. This affects not only the standards
that construction companies work to but also creates
a market for them, especially among large companies
for whom the only way to reduce the emissions from
their operations is to make their buildings more energy
efficient. It provides the demand for energy efficient
fit out and refurbishment services which many of
the bigger construction companies have diversified
into: “The CRC is having an impact on many large UK
companies because it increases the cost of carbon,
increases the risk of fines associated with incorrect
reporting, and also introduces a performance league
table for publicly rating companies on their carbon
reduction,” said Liz Collett, Group Environment Manager
with Morgan Sindall Fit Out. “Morgan Sindall has to
report on carbon both as a company in its own right and
as a supplier to Government departments - so the client
pressures for reporting are increasing.”

The success of wind power is not confined to the OECD
countries in manufacture or deployment. In 2009, China
became the world’s second largest installer of wind
power and the largest manufacturer. It has now set
targets to deploy 100 GW of wind power by 2020. Similarly,
India has a strong wind industry, with rapid developments
also taking place in Africa and Latin America. This global
production will further reduce costs and drive forward
technological innovation.

Renewable energy is also making a growing contribution
in the transport sector. Given the virtual monopoly of oil
in aviation and road transport, there are strong industrial
efforts and government mandates for the production and
deployment of biofuels. In Western Europe, the EU has set
a binding target of least 10% of liquid transport fuels to
come from renewable energy sources by 2020 - most of
this is expected to come from biofuels. The US has seen a

Lloyd’s 360° Risk Insight

Sustainable energy security: strategic risks and opportunities for business

The transformation of the energy sector has been
described as the ‘third industrial revolution’.

It will

challenge all aspects of energy services: from energy
sources and storage; to user-technologies, such as
lighting, vehicles and electric motors; and infrastructure.
Available technologies can deliver a large part of the
necessary changes, especially in the field of energy
efficiency, but new ones will need to be developed, tested
or scaled up to meet this global challenge. Below we set
out some emerging material, environmental and security
risks that businesses will need to take into account as
new energy resources and technologies are developed.

3.1 National and international policy risks

In spite of broad international agreement on the
importance of inventing and deploying technologies at
scale to meet energy and climate security goals, progress
has been too slow. Uncertainties around domestic and
international regulations and pricing structures can
stall investment, discourage collaborative projects and
generally dampen investor confidence. For example,
inconsistent policies have entrenched a pattern of
boom and bust in the renewable energy and efficiency
industries in many parts of the world, including the US.

Enacting policies and freeing up the necessary finance
for technological transformation is even harder in the
context of the global financial crisis and volatile energy
prices. Technology developers worry about recouping
their investment in R&D and losing their intellectual
property. Naturally, all businesses worry that government
subsidies, tax breaks or funds might favour their
competitors and disadvantage them. Uneven deployment
of technologies across the world is inevitable, with
breakthroughs occurring in those countries where there is
most encouragement, and consistency, in terms of policy
frameworks and market signals.

3.2 New scarcity risks in some
raw materials

As demand for certain technologies rises, so will the
demand for their raw material components - some of
which are rare (see Box 12 on rare earth metals). The
availability and price of these materials will determine the
prospects for large scale commercialisation. Table 1 gives
some examples of new energy technology fields and the
materials used in their manufacture.

Table 1:

Material use on new energy sources

Source:

Materials Innovation Institute, November 2009

Raw materials (application)

Fuel cells

Platinum

Palladium

Rare earth metals

Cobalt

Hybrid cars

Samarium (permanent magnets)

Neodymium (high

performance magnets)

Silver (advanced electromotor

generator)

Platinum group metals (catalysts)

Alternative energies

Silicon (solar cells)

Gallium (solar cells)

Silver (solar cells, energy

collection / transmission,

high performance mirrors)

Gold (high performance mirrors)

Energy storage

Lithium (rechargeable batteries)

Zinc (rechargeable batteries)

Tantalum (rechargeable batteries}

Cobalt (rechargeable batteries)

3. The risks associated with a new technology revolution

Lloyd’s 360° Risk Insight

Sustainable energy security: strategic risks and opportunities for business 21

The demand for these minerals has prompted more
research into their availability. This is leading to an
increase in reserves in the case of some, but not all,
minerals. One study that looked at 57 cases of mineral
extraction detected a clear production peak in 11 of
these. This included zirconium, the extraction of which is
in decline despite demand and rising prices.

Companies

pursuing technologies which rely on these and other
limited mineral resources will need to consider the ability
to re-use or recycle the material or to substitute for
alternatives.

Box 12: Rare earth metals

Rare earth metals (REMs) are a group of 17 elements
whose unique properties make them indispensable in
a wide variety of advanced technologies. They are an
important example of material scarcity in the ‘third energy
revolution’, because they are indispensable for so many
of the advanced technologies that will allow us to achieve
critical national objectives.

As such, disruption to their

global supply is a new energy security concern.

Their production, alongside the metals and magnets that
derive from them, is dominated by one country, China.
At present, China produces 97% of the world’s rare earth
metals supply, almost 100% of the associated metal
production, and 80% of the rare earth magnets.

REMs such as neodymium are the world’s strongest
magnets and are key components for more efficient
wind turbines, each of which requires about two tonnes.
They are also important in enabling the miniaturising
of electronic equipment; consequently demand grew
between 15% to 25% per year from 2003 to 2008.

3.3 Competing resource uses

The production of energy can compete with resources
previously destined for other uses. Two well known
examples are the production of first-generation biofuels
and the development of coal to liquids, both being
developed primarily to combat security of supply
concerns around oil.

The growth of the current generation of biofuels is
expected to slow due to environmental concerns and
the impact of such large-scale production on land use
and food prices. These concerns have accelerated the
development of the next generation of biofuels, which will
no longer use potential food sources for the production
of ethanol (such as wheat), but farm waste instead. These
could become more widespread in the next couple of
years.

Commercially viable third-generation biofuels

from specially farmed plant forms, such as algae, are at
the research stage.

3.4 New environmental risks

The development of new technologies can bring
immediate or longer-term adverse environmental impacts.
The industrial landscape is littered with technologies that
have been widely used and then abandoned because of
their effect on the environment (eg DDT or asbestos).

There are numerous environmental liability concerns
relating to major new energy infrastructure, such as
nuclear power stations, and carbon capture and storage
(CCS) facilities for adapting fossil fuel generation. For
example, for CCS to be effective it must contain the CO

for at least a few centuries until we develop a way to
neutralise its effects on the atmosphere. However, it is
likely that the companies engaged in the storage will
either cease to exist or will change ownership over this
period. The legal mechanisms which will be put in place
to ensure adequate accountability in the eventuality of
system failure is a crucial issue for the industry.

Lloyd’s 360° Risk Insight

Sustainable energy security: strategic risks and opportunities for business

Energy generation, extraction, refining, processing
and distribution depend on a complex, interlinked,
expensive (and sometimes global) infrastructure. Yet
much of that infrastructure lies in areas that could be
increasingly subject to severe weather events caused
by climate change. Energy businesses owning or
planning infrastructure now will need to ensure they
are resilient to a changing climate, taking account
of more frequent unusual weather events and more
extreme seasonal fluctuations.

4.1 Power sector risks

Energy infrastructure tends to have a long lifespan. The
Hoover Dam in the western US was completed in 1935
and is still an important hydroelectric generator. New
sites for refineries, coal power plants and high-voltage
transmission lines are likely to be resisted by local
communities and therefore replacements are often built
on the same locations. This means that sites chosen in
the 1980s may still be in operation in 2080 and beyond.

Water flows are fundamental for agriculture, power
generation and cooling. Hydropower contributes around
15% of global electricity production, by far the largest of
any renewable energy. It relies on the ability to predict the
volume of water entering the system. Before construction,
care is taken to assess river levels, hydrological cycles and
precipitation patterns. Until recently those findings were
considered to be constants. However, climate change
is expected to cause accelerated changes in the rainfall
patterns and what were constants are now becoming
variables. This can cause problems for both glacier-
dependent and precipitation-dependent power plants.

In Europe, cooling for electrical power generation
(including both nuclear and fossil fuel plants) accounts
for around one-third of all water used. During Europe’s

record-breaking heat wave of 2003, temperatures across
the continent reached more than 40° Celsius. As a result,
France had to power down 17 nuclear power plants,
because of heat and water problems. In 2006, France,
Spain and Germany all had to power down nuclear plants
for the same reasons. The UK Met Office’s Hadley Centre
for Climate Change predicts that, by 2040, such heat
waves would be ‘commonplace’.

4.2 Changing risk landscape for
transport routes

Environmental change (extreme weather events, water
shortages, changing sea levels and melting glaciers)
will generate great threats to critical infrastructure and
to transport routes that underpin traditional energy
production and delivery systems. The map below (Figure 8)
illustrates the density of a handful of shipping lanes upon
which global energy trade depends.

All of the world’s largest energy importers are dependent
on sea imported oil. The US imports 60% of the oil it
consumes (over 95% delivered by tankers) while the
growing markets of China and India import 90% by sea.
Japan is almost completely dependent on maritime oil
imports. The traffic is increasing as countries require
greater energy imports further from their markets. For
example, both China and India are importing coal from
Colombia for the first time in 2010 and bottlenecks
at the Australian port of Newcastle in 2007 and 2008
kept coal vessels waiting for weeks restricting supply
and contributing to the increasing price of deliveries to
thermal power stations.

The development of Arctic resources will create new and
riskier shipping routes. Climate change will bring rising
tides and more frequent extreme weather events that
could increase shipping accidents and damage ports.

4. Risks to energy and transport infrastructure

Energy Infrastructure

World ports

Pipelines

Nightime lights

Low

High

Low

Shipping density

Lloyd’s 360° Risk Insight

Sustainable energy security: strategic risks and opportunities for business 23

Figure 8:

Global shipping routes, pipelines and world ports

Sources:

Hadley Centre (2010), NCEAS (shipping routes1), FAO (ports2), GIS-Lab (pipelines3), NOAA (night-time lights)

4.3 Oil and gas infrastructure

As accessible oil and gas sites are depleted, more
difficult offshore and coastal sites are becoming more
significant. Offshore and coastal oil and gas extraction is
carried out under a wide range of conditions, from the
tropics to the tundra.

Over a quarter of US oil production and close to 15% of
US natural gas production comes from the Gulf of Mexico.
In the summer of 2005, Hurricane Katrina shut off what
amounted to around 19% of US refining capacity, damaged
457 pipelines and destroyed 113 platforms. Oil and gas
production dropped by more than half; causing a global
spike in oil prices. Much of the infrastructure destroyed in
2005 was rebuilt in the same location, leaving it vulnerable
to similar weather events in the future.

The US Geological Survey estimates that the Arctic
might contain over a fifth of all undiscovered oil and

gas reserves.

Siberia could contain as much oil as the

Middle East.

However, dreams of a resource bonanza

in the north are premature. The environment is difficult
and becoming increasingly unpredictable as a result
of the changing climate. The thawing of permafrost in
the north is already causing infrastructural damage and
reportedly costing Russia around $1.9bn a year to repair
infrastructure and oil and gas pipelines in West Siberia.

Many of the challenges outlined above can be overcome
with sufficient research, planning, engineering and
financing. In some cases it may even be possible to
integrate change into planning in such a way that energy
output increases with changes rather than decreases.
For example, hydro installations in regions that are
expecting higher rainfall could be designed to eventually
take advantage of that excess flow, rather than be
overwhelmed by it.

Lloyd’s 360° Risk Insight

Sustainable energy security: strategic risks and opportunities for business

“Predictable supply of energy is one

of the top policy priorities for business

and governments in the major global

economies.”

Business and Industry Advisory Council to the
OECD - 2006

The constraints on carbon in terms of resource availability,
price, policy and the move to a low-carbon economy will
have a huge impact and risk implications for businesses,
both within and outside the energy sector. This section
looks at the implications of the trends outlined above
for businesses in general, as well as the energy sector
specifically. The last section discusses some opportunities
that the shift to a decarbonised energy system presents.

Key challenges that will affect businesses across the
board are:

Cost and stability of services:

All businesses depend

on energy, both directly and indirectly, and projected
changes in prices and resource availability will affect
their competitiveness and economic viability. Without
long-term contracts or hedging mechanisms, the impact
of changes in direct costs (such as fuel for transport,
heating or electricity) will be immediate, and will result
in significantly higher running costs to business. Indirect
costs, such as materials or delivery charges affected
by higher energy inputs through the supply chain, may
be less immediate, but would reduce profit margins on
exposed product lines or services. The potential for actual
power outages and fuel shortages could also be direct
(affecting the area of operations) or indirect (disrupting
the supply chain).

Pressure to reduce carbon emissions:

The carbon

portfolio of companies and governments will also come
under increasing scrutiny. Higher emissions standards are
anticipated across the major sectors. These will require
carefully planned changes in practice and technology
in the most energy intensive sectors - energy, heavy
industry, construction and transportation. Carbon and
efficiency standards in major markets will not only affect
national industries, but also those in manufacturing
export centres. In the transport sector, we can already
see how binding legislation or voluntary standards
are affecting the world’s major vehicle markets and
encouraging competition in efficient technologies.

For energy sector businesses, the dual task of meeting
rising energy demand and leading the transition to
radically lower carbon emissions presents enormous
opportunities. Risks will vary considerably depending on
the location of operations and specialisation, as well as
technology and practices.

The transformative changes in the energy sector:

The use of different resources, technologies and networks
will in turn affect the way that we manage energy security.
This also presents great business opportunities and new
markets. The carbon market and policy mechanisms, such
as feed-in-tariffs, are making new investments viable.

In all areas, an assessment of vulnerability to changes
in the energy system and markets, and early preparation for
these new realities, will give businesses a competitive edge.

Challenges and risks

for global businesses

Other

26%

Transport

Service Sector

29%

Households

33%

Manufacturing

22.7%

Other

1.9%

Aluminium

6.4%

Pulp and Paper

Cement

23%

Steel

34%

Chemical/Petroleum

Lloyd’s 360° Risk Insight

Sustainable energy security: strategic risks and opportunities for business 25

Three sectors dominate global energy use today:
manufacturing, household consumption and transport
(see Figure 9). We can gauge the price exposure
of a company by looking at its turnover divided by
energy costs. The energy costs of heavy industry and
transportation are likely to form a larger share of revenue
than, say, an IT company or a retailer. But the specific
nature of a firm’s processes will determine the impact of
higher prices or supply insecurity on its bottom line. Can
manufacturing processes in a plant stop and restart with
little impact? Will it be practical to switch fuels? Firms
which have long and complicated supply chains will need
to consider the potential exposure of suppliers or logistics
operators to energy prices just as carefully. For example,
Walmart has 100,000 first-tier suppliers. A ‘just-in-time’
business model (used by many companies) will mean
that disruptions can quickly escalate costs and damage
reputation. Therefore, risk managers should investigate
whether this model is adequate to cope with emerging
energy risks.

Figure 9:

Global final energy consumption (2005)

Source:

IEA 2008

Figure 10:

Major global energy users in

manufacturing sector (2005)

Source:

IEA 2008

Implications and risks for business in general

We have grouped the risks for business into broad
categories, but these will overlap and be prioritised
differently within each company. Some require fairly
rapid decisions and contingency measures to prevent
either disruption to operations or unsustainable costs.
Others deal with events or conditions that should be
taken into account in ‘strategic’ decision-making in order
to minimise vulnerability and maximise advantage over
a longer time period. Although reputational damage
is treated as a separate risk, mismanagement of any
of these other dimensions can also contribute to
reputational risk.

Uncertain political commitment

to technology incentives

Policy change undermining

viability of investments

Lack of global climate

policy framework for

long-term planning

Regional carbon pricing

Carbon price uncertainty

Increasing legislation and

standards on efficiency

Consumer pressure for CO

emissions labelling

Government policies

Higher and volatile

energy prices

Fuel and electricity

supply disruptions

Scrutiny of carbon portfolio

Delivery of services

compromised by

energy disruptions

Technological risks

Risks for general business

Longer-term

operational risks

Financial and

regulatory risks

Short term operational

and supply chain risks

Reputational management

Lloyd’s 360° Risk Insight

Sustainable energy security: strategic risks and opportunities for business

Figure 11:

Risks for the wider business sector

Profits in the transport sector are especially sensitive
to the upward price trend of oil. For the aviation and
shipping industries, this exposure is high and largely
unavoidable. The movement of goods is also dominated
by fossil fuel, in this case diesel, which accounts for
82% of movements. This lack of diversity makes these
sectors vulnerable to oil price spikes and tighter
markets for diesel. For example, United Airlines decided
to ground around a fifth of its fleet when the oil price
was at its highest in 2008. In an attempt to reduce fuel
costs, research is underway into the use of biofuels,
with Lüfthansa announcing that by 2012 they would
be blending biofuels with traditional fuel. The key risk
management strategies for the transport sectors
involve long-term strategic and investment decisions to:

Short term operational and supply chain risks:
price and supply

Ultimately, governments will determine end-user energy
prices - so where a business’s operations and supply
chains are located is crucial. Its place in the supply
chain will also affect vulnerability to price. Energy-
intensive sectors, such as chemicals, steel or cement,
are by nature more exposed to changes in the price or
availability of energy (see Figure 10 for the share of major
energy users in the manufacturing sector). For these
sectors, even small changes in the prices they pay for
energy domestically will affect the economic viability
of manufacturing. Costs will be added onto the price of
traded goods, affecting their global competitiveness. This
has encouraged the shift of energy-intensive sectors to
countries where the price of energy is comparatively low
and often subsidised.

Lloyd’s 360° Risk Insight

Sustainable energy security: strategic risks and opportunities for business 27

• Use energy more efficiently. This may include upgrading

buildings, installing ‘smart’ electricity management
systems and planning operations to maximise the
productivity of energy.

• Diversify energy supplies and types. This may involve

the investment in own back-up generation or large
and more permanent domestic generation, such as
very small or micro renewables. However, this may
also lead to active support of research into and
development of alternatives.

Energy supply disruptions will affect businesses differently
depending on how reliant their activities are on certain
types of energy, where they are located and how their
supply chains work. However, the absolute dependence
of modern societies on electricity means that even
short-term disruption to this electricity may cause
multiple operational failures and incur heavy restart costs.
Although energy supply disruptions have decreased in
most OECD countries in recent decades, significant losses
of electricity supply still occur. For example, in California
(2000), New York (2003) and Italy (2003) technical failures
coupled with inadequate back-up systems and poor
electricity management resulted in widespread blackouts.
Many larger businesses and infrastructure operators have
invested in back-up generators. In 2010 the city of New
York purchased stand alone generators for their water
treatment plans as a result of the experiences in 2003.

Resilience measures tend only to be justified as
‘responses’ to crises. A 2006 study found that
risk managers in the food industry tended to take
uninterrupted power supply for granted and believed
the government would step in to ensure fuel provision
in the event of a crisis.

However, in terms of essential

national services

III

, the food and finance industries are not

guaranteed state protection in the event of a fuel supply
crisis (see Box 15).

More frequent outages are likely in the developing world
where capacity cannot keep pace with demand growth.

Access to reliable electricity is still not guaranteed, even
for major industries and cities in developing countries. The
lack of fuel for power stations and significant over-demand
has led to power rationing and frequent power cuts.
Rolling blackouts in South Africa in 2008 (which caused
the shut-down of major industries, including gold mines)
and brownouts (periods of reduced electrical voltage or
scheduled cut offs for selected users) in eastern China in
winter 2010 demonstrated the vulnerability of emerging
economies to a depletion of coal stocks. As an increasing
number of manufacturing and service industries are based
in Asia-Pacific countries, this will have a major impact
on global supply chains. The case of the textiles industry
during the ongoing energy crisis in Pakistan illustrates this
well (see Box 13).

Box 13: Electricity and gas cut-offs: the case of the
textiles industry in Pakistan

The effect of unscheduled electricity blackouts and gas
supply cuts on industry in Pakistan gives a clear example
of the problems facing rapidly industrialising nations. As
demand for power outstripped supply in Pakistan over the
last decade, electricity and gas outages have blighted the
textiles industry (which accounts for 60% of exports). This
has disadvantaged local companies against competitors
in China, India and Bangladesh and they are often unable
to meet the requirements of buyers. The larger integrated
companies, such as Chenab, which serves Western
brands, such as Ralph Lauren and IKEA, have invested
in their own gas-fired power plants to keep the looms
going. Many of the smaller firms cannot afford these and
are forced to shut down for several hours each day. Even
Chenab had to shut down production during winter gas
shortages and was operating at 70% capacity in 2009.

Gas cut-offs, which have taken place sporadically during
winter, halt the cleaning of raw wool and cotton at mills as
the water cannot be heated. According to one report, the
profit margins of Rahat Woollen Mills have fallen by about
50% as a result.

In April 2010, the authorities decided

to schedule the cut-offs for one day a week - rotating

III

These are the communications, emergency services, energy, finance, food, government, health, transport and water sectors

Lloyd’s 360° Risk Insight

Sustainable energy security: strategic risks and opportunities for business

between industrial zones. Power supply is not guaranteed
by the Water and Power Development Authority of
Pakistan so the mill and factory owners must absorb the
costs. This has led to mass lay-offs. Chenab cut almost a
third of its workforce (4,000 people), which is adding to
political unrest in the country.

Financial and regulatory considerations: counting
the cost of carbon

Assuming a global agreement on climate change is
eventually made, all businesses (not just the heavy
industrial sector), will be impacted by the price of
carbon. Such an increase would noticeably affect energy
emissions costs for all businesses. In the EU, through
the latest phase of the Emissions Trading Scheme (see
Box 14), all emissions will be auctioned in the power
sector (as opposed to granted for free as occurred in
the earlier phases of the ETS) post 2013. There are some
suggestions that this will lead to a 10% to 15% increase
in electricity prices.

Box 14: European carbon market

The European Emissions Trading Scheme, which began in
January 2005, is the world’s largest cap and trade system.
The scheme works by reducing the total emissions
granted to the affected sectors over time while allowing
them to trade emissions permits. Initially the scheme
only applied to facilities over 20 MW and mainly impacted
power stations and large factories. Therefore it covered
only around 50% of the EU’s C0

emissions. During

the first two phases, the emissions permits have been
allocated and given for free to companies. However, in
phase three (which will take place in 2013), companies
will have to buy the majority of the allocations and the
number of sectors the ETS applies to will increase, and
include the petrochemicals and aluminium sectors.

For most of 2008, the carbon price in the EU-ETS varied
within the range of

€

20 to

€

27 per tonne of CO

, but with

the worsening financial outlook towards the end of that

year, prices dropped and have remained in the range of

€

11 to

€

14 per tonne of CO

since. One obvious driver for

this price drop has been the reduced production forecasts
for manufacturing output and electricity generation as
a result of the recession which has led to lower CO

emissions forecasts and lower price expectations.

Carbon prices have often been closely correlated with
gas prices as higher gas prices lead to the greater use of
coal, which in turn results in more C0

emissions. Energy

prices therefore have a direct impact on carbon prices.
In addition, carbon has become a commodity traded by
speculators and the prices have followed a similar trend
to many other commodities in the recession.

Ultimately, for carbon pricing to work on a global level
a single market or intricately linked series of markets is
required. This would remove the tensions around different
production standards, competitiveness and eventually
remove the threat of ‘carbon leakage’. As this is some
way off, sectoral agreements from particularly affected
sectors, such as iron and steel, and a comprehensive
agreement on the affects of carbon pricing on global
trade, would go a long way in assisting businesses in their
risk analysis.

Legislation and standards on energy efficiency, carbon
emissions and other environmental impacts will
increasingly affect all businesses as they apply to premises,
mobility and products. In 2009, for example, the EU adopted
legislation which requires all new buildings to comply with
tough energy-performance standards and (after 2020)
meet a significant proportion of their energy requirements
from renewable sources. Stricter requirements were made
for public sector buildings, requiring ‘nearly zero’ energy
standards by the end of 2018. While this legislation is vague
and the concept of ‘nearly zero’ is undefined allowing
member states to make their own standards, it has set an
agenda for the construction industry. Life-cycle analysis
of the carbon (and perhaps also greenhouse gases)
emissions of buildings will become the norm. More detailed

Lloyd’s 360° Risk Insight

Sustainable energy security: strategic risks and opportunities for business 29

legislation could follow in the next few years specifying
efficiency improvements in existing buildings. This has
so far been a voluntary or incentive-based undertaking
in most countries. The regulatory environment for these
kinds of developments presents a risk in itself given the
investments companies are expected to make.

Mounting consumer pressure has also led to several
private initiatives to assess the embedded carbon content
of specific products with a view to introducing carbon
labelling and allowing consumers to make more informed
purchasing decisions. In 2007, Tesco announced that it
would be seeking “a universally accepted and commonly
understood measure of the carbon footprint of every
product we sell looking at its complete life cycle from
production, through distribution to consumption”, and
that they would establish a clear system of labelling for
their customers. This is initially being piloted on twenty
products and has required the active support of Tesco’s
suppliers.

These schemes are voluntary at present, but

could well become mandatory - as has occurred with
energy use in products, such as fridges.

In moving forward on carbon labelling, as with carbon life-
cycle assessments, it is important to caution businesses
against over-simplistic processes. Complicated accounting
methods could be required, especially for manufactured
goods, as hundreds of processes can contribute to the
final product.

Longer-term operational and supply chain risks

The lack of a legally binding global climate policy has
revitalised appetite for assessing and addressing the issue
of carbon leakage. The energy intensive sectors, such
as steel and cement, fear that they will be competitively
disadvantaged by regional carbon pricing, and that
high-emitting industries or companies will relocate to
developing countries that do not have a cap on carbon.
This is an extremely sensitive political issue for emerging
economies, such as China and India, which rely on
export-led growth. Managing the potentially explosive
dynamics around border carbon mechanisms to address

carbon leakage is critical to energy-intensive industries.
Consequently, these sectors are actively engaged in
seeking to influence the development of national policies
and international agreements.

A number of attempts have been made to develop sector
agreements and standards. One example is the Cement
Sustainability Initiative, coordinated by the World Business
Council for Sustainable Development. Members have
set targets for the reduction of their own emissions and
shared best practice. Work within the initiative is also
progressing on modelling of sectoral targets within the
framework of an international climate deal. Unilateral
action to impose border tax adjustment outside any
global climate agreement could prompt trade-related
retaliatory actions, undermining the global trading system.

Reputational management

With increasing reliance on globalised supply chains and
IT, stable energy supplies become even more vital to
the delivery of services on which reputation is built. For
example, some retail industries may need to re-evaluate
the ‘just-in-time’ business model (see Box 15) and
some global supply chain linkages for potential energy
vulnerabilities in order to avoid reputational damage in
addition to the economic losses.

The emissions profiles of governments, companies and
other institutions are likely to come under increasing
scrutiny by the public. Voluntary or mandatory carbon
reporting - as required in the European Emissions
Trading Scheme or regional initiatives in North America
- is increasingly common. A McKinsey Quarterly article
suggests that: “Over the next 5 to 15 years the way a
company manages its carbon exposure could create or
destroy its shareholder value”.

The development of the global low-carbon economy is
expected to bring further pressures for harmonisation of
reporting and additional verification mechanisms, as has
occurred with the expansion of the ETS to cover more
and more sectors.

Pre farm (fertiliser, pesticides

& machinery production)

28%

Net trade

20%

Households (shopping,

storage & preparation)

Catering (hotels & restaurants)

12%

Commercial transportation (UK & overseas)

11%

Retail

Farming & fishing

13%

Manufacturing

Lloyd’s 360° Risk Insight

Sustainable energy security: strategic risks and opportunities for business

Box 15: How the food industry could be affected
by energy disruption

Food production straddles several business sectors
and is particularly dependent on fossil fuel energy
throughout the supply chain – from fuelling farm
equipment to electricity for the supermarket till. Food
retail chains are highly dependent on global supply
chains. The just-in-time business model and the trend
towards strategic outsourcing have reduced the
direct control that companies have over contingency
planning. A study commissioned by the Department
for Food and Rural Affairs in the UK found that the
imperative to reduce space used for storage in both
retail and manufacturing and the increase in fresh and
chilled products had increased the vulnerability of food
suppliers to electricity and fuel disruption.

For example,

the UK now imports more exotic fruit on a JIT basis and
the packaging and the gasses needed for many chilled
foods are produced overseas.

Figure 12:

Energy use in the UK food sector

Source:

DEFRA Food Pocket Book 2009

over fuel price rises prevented the distribution of fuel
from depots to the rest of the country. Supermarkets
were obliged to put the government’s priority user
scheme in place at its petrol stations. They also faced
‘panic-buying’ which in some cases ran down stocks
before replacements arrived. Several stores decided
to implement rationing of basic goods like bread and
milk. Companies that prepare and deliver fresh goods
to retailers daily were particularly vulnerable. UK food
group Geest announced that its deliveries would be
unlikely to reach the supermarkets if fuel supplies were
not restored in a matter of days.

The chief executive of

Sainsbury’s wrote to the Prime Minister to warn that the
petrol crisis was threatening Britain’s food stocks and
that stores were likely to be out of food in “days rather
than weeks”.

Fuel disruptions in other parts of the

world also affects transportation of goods to markets,
and higher energy prices could push up the price of
basic food commodities, such as rice, soya and wheat
- as they did in 2008.

A UK food manufacturer interviewed for the DEFRA report
commented: “Rolling power cuts would stop operations
very quickly.”

The same study also highlighted just

how many transactions and logistics depend on IT, and
therefore electricity. The 2008 food price rises were
partially attributed to both higher oil prices and the
spill-over effects of increased biofuel production from
corn and rapeseed oil in that year.

Food businesses have the potential to improve the
resilience of their own transportation system. For
example, through long-term investments in more efficient
fleets including hybrids and electric vehicles. Other
measures food companies can consider could include
sourcing fresh produce more locally. One example is the
Mid-Counties branch of UK food retailer The Co-operative,
which launched ‘Local Harvest’ – a food sourcing scheme
designed to support local suppliers and reduce food
miles. This has benefited smaller suppliers, providing them
with a reliable market.

As supermarkets tend to keep only two–three days worth
of perishables on their shelves, a transportation fuel
disruption lasting just a few days would affect availability.
This happened during September 2000 when protests

Uncertain political commitment

to technology incentives

Policy change undermining

viability of investments

Environmental damage resulting

from difficult-to-extract fossil fuels

Pollution from

new technologies

Accidents in

extreme environments

Environmental pollution

and liability

Increasing emissions

performance standards

Renewable energy

policy uncertainty

Future demand

uncertainty

Impact of pricing

fluctuations on investment

decision-making

Carbon price uncertainty

Political threats to operations

in unstable regions

Harsher physical environments

Infrastructure failure in changing

climatic conditions

Transition to cleaner technologies

making infrastructure obsolete

Cyber threats to smart grids

Technological risks

Scarcity of essential

mineral components

Risks for the energy sector

Reputational risks

Regulatory and

environmental issues

Financial and

investment risks

Physical and

operational risks

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Sustainable energy security: strategic risks and opportunities for business 31

Implications and risks for the energy sector

Energy businesses face important choices over their
strategic direction. The coming decades will require the
building and rebuilding of global energy infrastructure
on an unprecedented scale to meet future demand.
Anticipated rises in consumption, outmoded power
generation and national energy security imperatives
mean governments will welcome and incentivise
cost-effective, innovative solutions from the energy sector.

Regulatory and environmental risks

Our existing energy system faces two key challenges: how
to adapt to a resource constrained and low-carbon world
and how to deliver the non-traditional energy sources that
are being encouraged by government policy.

The need to replace depleting energy reserves is
leading energy companies to explore harder to get and
harder to process reserves. The scale and longevity of
the oil leak following the accident at the Deepwater
Horizon rig in the Gulf of Mexico highlights the dangers
of pollution and the environmental risks of operating in
these harsh environments. These risks are increasing
with operations in more environmentally sensitive
areas, such as the Arctic and the boreal forests of
Alberta, Canada. To date, most environmental policies
tend to charge polluters for the costs of cleaning up
pollution, for the economic cost that pollution causes
to other’s property, or for the purchase of consents to
discharge pollution. However, as the environment is

Figure 13:

Risks for the energy sector

Lloyd’s 360° Risk Insight

Sustainable energy security: strategic risks and opportunities for business

generally regarded as a ‘public good’ it is not priced
in a conventional market place creating uncertainty
around liability limits and how to insure against such
hazards (see also reputational risks below).

As governments seek to meet their medium term
climate objectives, standards are being introduced to
reduce emissions from individual energy sectors. Some
regions and countries have introduced or are considering
introducing emissions performance standards for the
power sector that set a ceiling on the carbon intensity of
the electricity, ie how much CO

is emitted for every unit

of electricity produced (CO

/kWh). This may lead to the

rapid phasing out of certain types of fuel, such as coal,
or the requirement to install radical emission reduction
technologies, such as carbon capture and storage. This
standard setting approach will also potentially be used
in the extractive industries and is being considered to
discourage the extraction of non-conventional oils, such
as tar sands (due to their higher emissions count).

Globally, over 73 countries have renewable energy policy
targets and much of the renewable energy market activity
remains predominantly policy driven. While not affected
by emission performance standards, the renewable
energy sector is exposed to regulatory risks. A lack of
confidence in the binding nature and the delivery of
renewable energy targets or incentive mechanisms would
hamper growth in the sector. This will affect not only the
renewable energy sector, but also raises questions for
the energy sector as a whole, with uncertainties over the
need for traditional energy sources.

Government implementation of ‘investment grade’
energy policy

will reduce these risks and give investors

confidence in the longevity and breadth of the proposed
policies. To achieve this it is necessary to establish long
term policy targets and incentives that remove ambiguities
and ensure that all aspects of energy policy and investment
are addressed. This will require action across the whole
of the energy sector, including on-demand, planning,
connectivity, grids and tariffs. This is something that energy
businesses can actively lobby for.

Financial and investment risks

The key question facing the energy sector is how much
energy will be needed in the future. Concerns over
security of supply and the need for a low-carbon future
have created demand uncertainty for energy producers.
According to OPEC projections, demand for OPEC crude
could be anywhere between 29 million and 37 million
barrels per day by 2020. The OPEC Secretary General noted
that: “This translates into an uncertainty gap for upstream
investments in OPEC Member Countries of over $250bn.
There is therefore the very real possibility of wasting
financial resources on unneeded capacity.”

The investment dilemma is further complicated by
price fluctuations. In the last decade, high energy prices
have led to great surges in investment, for instance in
unconventional oil and gas extraction in the Atlantic region,
in the petrochemical industries in the Middle East and Asia-
Pacific, and in renewable energy technologies worldwide.
But many projects were stalled, cancelled or became
unprofitable when the price fell. Between September 2008
and April 2009, refining capacity of 1.5 million barrels per
day were cancelled or deferred in Germany, Italy, Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia, South Korea and the US.

Renewable and alternative energy technologies tend to
become more competitive if the price of oil is sustained
above a certain level. For example, a McKinsey Quarterly
report for the Republic of Ireland showed that onshore
wind would require a subsidy at $60 per barrel of oil but
be highly profitable at $120 per barrel.

The uncertainties of price fluctuations are amplified by
variations in the carbon price and the uncertainties over
which sectors it will affect. Large energy producers in
some countries - including the UK - have called for the
government to introduce a floor price for carbon, to
reduce the risks to business.

The need for accelerated energy investment and financial
stimulus packages have increased the level of public-sector
expenditure on energy infrastructure projects, particularly
for grid extensions and for new power, transport and CCS

Lloyd’s 360° Risk Insight

Sustainable energy security: strategic risks and opportunities for business 33

demonstration projects. This finance comes with its own
risks, such as increased bureaucracy or susceptibility to
policy change.

Box 16: Centrica – from energy supplier to energy
service provider?

Recognising the new realities of the energy market, some
major energy companies are adapting their business
strategies. The future business model will not be based
on the units of energy that are sold, but on delivering
the necessary energy services. One of the largest energy
companies in the UK, Centrica (owner of British Gas)
states: “The competitive retail market is now driving a
transformation in energy services, reflected in the growing
role of energy efficiency and small-scale generation
in reducing emissions and energy consumption.” It is
remarkable that a company that has been built on the
ethos of selling more energy now states: “A key benefit of
a vibrant demand side will be that there may be less of a
need for new generation capacity and/or reinforcements
to networks”.

In February 2010 Centrica’s Chief

Executive announced four new strategic priorities for the
business one of which focuses on shifting the British Gas
business model away from energy supply and towards
energy services. In April 2010, the company purchased
Hillserve, a significant UK insulating firm and stated its
objective was to become the leading supplier of domestic
insulation. It predicts that the market for home insulation will
rise from around £0.6bn a year in 2010 to £1.4bn in 2015.

Technology risks

The widespread use of innovative technologies
and practices to provide more energy with less CO

emissions is a strategic priority for many companies
in the energy sector. New technologies and processes
must be developed, piloted and scaled up, yet
incentives to drive their innovation and deployment
at the scale and necessary pace often lack long-term
political commitment. Research by Chatham House and
CambridgeIP found that inventions in the clean energy
sector have generally taken two to three decades to
reach the mass market.

Consequently, many businesses would prefer to adopt
a ‘wait-and-see’ approach rather than be subject to
‘stroke-of-the pen’ risk (the risk of government policy
changing and undermining the viability of investments).
The current situation with CCS highlights the risks and
dilemmas. The technology brings no additional security
of supply benefits, in fact the reverse with an (as yet
unknown) energy penalty associated with its use. In a
carbon-constrained world, the use of CCS may be the
only way in which coal is usable. But without a clear
financial incentive or binding requirement for its use,
early movers deploying the technology gain little, and
therefore the large utilities are reluctant to act.

Box 17: Carbon capture and storage

Commercial scale demonstration projects are planned
for the use of carbon capture and storage on coal
fired power stations. Coal emits the highest carbon
emissions of all conventional fuel sources per unit
of energy produced but is the most widely available
(and cheapest) fossil fuel. Attempts are being made to
develop economically and commercially viable methods
of separating and storing the C0

produced during coal

combustion. The idea is to make coal an acceptable
fuel in a low carbon energy system. However, the use of
CCS is yet to be proven at scale and there are concerns
about the long-term safety and legal issues surrounding
the underground storage of C0

. Its impact on security of

supply also raises concerns for developing countries. This
is because using CCS is likely to reduce the efficiency of
a coal-fired power plant, effectively needing more coal
to generate the same amount of electricity produced.
The EU target is to have 12 CCS demonstration plants in
operation by 2015, although progress to date has been
slow. However, funding has been earmarked through the
European Economic Recovery Plan and the European
Emission Trading Scheme, which may speed things up.

Physical and operational risks

Politics and geology remain major areas of risk for
the extraction and supply of energy resources to their
markets. The depletion of ’easy to produce’ oil and gas

Lloyd’s 360° Risk Insight

Sustainable energy security: strategic risks and opportunities for business

in some areas and political limitations on access to it in
others, is leading companies to spend more on exploiting
resources in riskier geological and political terrain.

Infrastructure investments generally have long pay-back
periods and, in the case of power plants, working lifetimes
of up to 50 years. Infrastructure and systems not built to
withstand changing environmental conditions will require
retrofitting, become increasingly expensive to operate
and/or become redundant. For example, power stations
that use river water may need to build cooling towers
to enable operation in periods of higher temperatures
(as higher river temperatures affect the efficiency of the
power stations) or droughts.

Energy planners and financiers need to take into account
the global transition towards greater sustainability. At
the same time, policies to incentivise the deployment of
progressively cleaner energy technologies may mean the
need to retire some energy infrastructures prematurely.
It is therefore critical that investments made today are
assessed to meet both medium and long-term energy
security and climate change goals.

Some utilities companies are also seeking to change their
businesses models, so that they supply energy services,
rather than just selling units of energy. This requires new
technology and infrastructure such as smart grids (see
Box 19) and institutional changes to manage different
practices, such as rewarding efficiency and allowing
electricity to be easily sold back into the grid. While
bringing new opportunities, these innovations also bring
new vulnerabilities, such as exposure to cyber attack
(see Box 19).

Box 18: Energy and water use - a new flashpoint?

Energy production and sources of drinkable water
are intimately linked. Their interdependence, coupled
with increasing shortages in some parts of the world,
poses a major global dilemma. Energy is essential for

obtaining drinkable water while water is a prerequisite
for major sources of energy production. Hydropower,
cooling of thermal and nuclear power plants, fossil fuel
production and processing, biomass production and
hydrogen production are all dependent on a plentiful
supply of water. In fact, energy production accounts
for approximately 39% of all water withdrawals in the
US and 31% in the EU.

Contamination of underground

and surface fresh water supplies as a result of energy
generation worsens this impact. With energy production
forecast to grow by approximately 45% over the next two
decades, water consumption for energy production will
more than double over the same period.

Another report published by Lloyd’s 360° Risk Insight
highlights the potential risks for business resulting from
growing water scarcity. The report notes that climate
change will make rainfall patterns less predictable and
that efforts to reduce C0

may impose penalties on

water practices that are energy/carbon intensive, such
as desalination.

Reputational risks

NGO campaigns and the media can have substantial
effects on a company’s share price and the availability of
capital. Recent campaigns against some forms of energy
production have raised awareness of their impacts on
limited resources such as fresh water and ancient forests.
This can harm the reputation of companies operating in
or funding the operations. For example, some campaigns
have lobbied pension funds that invest in oil companies
with operations in the Canadian tar sands

and banks

that lend to companies carrying out mountain top
removal coal mining in the US.

Green energy companies could also face damaging
criticism on health, safety and environmental grounds.
For example, a Chinese polysilicon manufacturer was
exposed in the Washington Post for dumping its toxic
waste products in a nearby village

and Greenpeace

Lloyd’s 360° Risk Insight

Sustainable energy security: strategic risks and opportunities for business 35

raised awareness of banks funding palm oil production
for biodiesel when this leads to deforestation.

Electronic

waste, from solar and other high-tech energy systems,
is a growing phenomenon not yet fully legislated for and
the industry will have to address increasing pressure
for transparency in their practices and supply chains.

These risks and the necessary costs of pollution control
and recycling processes will have to be factored into
investment decision-making.

Operating in more difficult terrains increases the risk
of accidents which have human, environmental and
economic consequences. The economic consequences
relate to the costs of remediation, compensation and
the potential impact of reputational damage on the
company’s share prices. The pressure to invest in areas
with unclear legal frameworks and governance challenges
will continue to expose companies to accusations of
collusion in human rights abuses or corruption.

Box 19: Smart energy systems bring new
opportunities and risks

As energy technologies mature, advances in design,
site selection and operation increasingly depend on
innovation in information and communication systems.
This means that companies and countries with strengths
in information communications technology (ICT) are
well placed to capitalise on the growth opportunities
as these technology systems evolve. Smarter energy
systems will also generate opportunities for different
kinds of partnerships between energy providers and
the manufacturers of user technology. With so much
dependence on ICT, security against technical failure,
loss of energy supply to the servers and cyber risk will
become more important.

A ‘smart grid’ uses information technology to create an
‘intelligent’ electricity system which monitors, protects
and automatically optimises operation. Smart grids will
not only supply but also communicate with industrial

and household users by means of building automation
systems, energy storage installations, thermostats
and appliances.

Most major economies are planning the introduction
of smart grids although with differing timescales.
China began building its first pilot smart grid for the
Sino-Singapore Eco-City in Tianjin in April 2010. Smart
grids will lessen the need for investment in peak load
power plants and enable greater deployment
of renewable energy. Some renewables, such as
wind power, are dependent on the weather on
a day-to-day and hour-to-hour basis (this is called
intermittent generation). Companies, such as Siemens
in Germany, where wind power is a significant part of
the electricity mix, are engaged in planning an efficient
system that maximises electricity from renewables.
If grids are extended widely enough (across all the
countries of the EU, for example) non-renewable and
renewable energy surpluses could be shifted from
country to country. An extensive study by the
European Climate Foundation found that given the
necessary investment including the rapid development
of a European smart grid with interconnection into
North Africa, 100% of Europe’s electricity could come
from renewable energy.

Modernising the ageing grid and deploying smart grid
technology is currently thought to have a market of
around $21bn, but this is expected to increase to $200bn
over the next five years, with companies like Cisco, IBM,
Motorola, GE and Siemens all vying for a share of the
market.

The two-way flow of electricity and information would
also enable electric cars to be used as a form of mobile
storage. ‘Vehicle-to-grid’ technology would help balance
loads by charging at night when demand is low, selling
power back to the grid when demand is high and
providing some back-up in the event of outages (see
also Box 20).

Lloyd’s 360° Risk Insight

Sustainable energy security: strategic risks and opportunities for business

New business opportunities

Markets for low-carbon energy products are likely to be
worth at least $500bn per year by 2050, and perhaps
much more, according to the Stern Review.

For example,

several major insurance markets (including syndicates
at Lloyd’s) now have units dedicated to insuring the
renewable energy market, and construction companies
are opening up new lines in low or zero-carbon housing.

“No one should underestimate the sheer

scale of the opportunity the transition

to a low-carbon economy will offer the

construction industry. The requirement

for low-carbon construction is probably

the biggest change management

programme that the industry has

faced since Victorian times.”

Paul Morrell, The UK Government's
Chief Construction Adviser

The developing world is also a growth market for products
that can combine efficiency and emissions reductions.
Several Asian companies are succeeding in this area.
For example, Chinese telecoms company Huawei has
a ‘Green Communications’ arm which provides next
generation telecommunications network infrastructure
featuring ‘intelligent management’ of electricity and
renewable energy options. This claims to cut power
consumption by over 60% and is proving especially
successful in Africa and South Asia where there are
frequent power cuts or areas without grid access. Huwei
won a major contract with Reliance Communications in
India in 2007 and built Pakistan’s first 100% solar-powered
base station for Warid Telecom in 2008. More companies
are embracing a so-called ‘game-changing strategy’ -
one that allows a company to leapfrog its competitors
by creating new markets or reshaping old ones in such
a way that they generate or sustain its domination. This
strategy often involves collaboration between companies
in order to bring about the right conditions to compete in
international markets.

Box 20: Competition and collaboration for the
low-carbon space - the example of electric vehicles

Electric vehicles (EVs) are an example of how low-carbon
innovation is creating new types of industrial partnerships
– from research and development all the way to the
customers’ experience. Collaboration is required because
few companies have assets and expertise that cut
across batteries, electricity, automobiles and information
systems. However, electric vehicles are unlikely to take
significant market share until common standards can be
agreed for plugging in and charging the vehicles. Finally,
new financing models will be needed – the upfront costs
of the battery technology are high, even if the running
costs are much lower than diesel. In one example,
Swedish power company Vattenfall and car manufacturer
Volvo have joined forces to create a plug-in hybrid car
to be on the road by 2012. The idea is for Volvo to make
the car and Vattenfall to develop the charging systems.
Meanwhile, battery packs for the vehicles are expected to
be supplied by LG-Chem, the leading South Korean firm.

Partnerships between the manufacturer and customer
are helping to speed up deployment, such as the deal
between Sainsbury’s and Smith Edison to produce the
supermarket chain’s electric vehicle fleet – now the
largest in the UK. The calculation is that the fleet will save
the company money in the long-run given that they are
exempt from the London congestion charge, have around
20% lower running costs and may benefit from lower fleet
insurance. Nissan says it will install home charging points
(supplied by AeroVironment, best known for advanced
military technology) when a customer buys an electric
vehicle in the US. This suggests an ongoing relationship
with the customer more akin to a mobile phone than a
conventional car purchase.

Standardisation of charging and battery technology is a
major challenge given that there are still many different
options being pursued. A group of Japanese car makers
(ChaDeMo), including Toyota and Nissan, have created a

Lloyd’s 360° Risk Insight

Sustainable energy security: strategic risks and opportunities for business

We can expect dramatic changes in the energy sector in
the coming decades. This report encourages businesses,
both in the energy sector and beyond, to look at how this
will impact on their firms. The transition towards a low-
carbon economy and the interim volatility in traditional
fossil fuel markets presents businesses with numerous
risks but also opportunities. In order to reduce potential
vulnerability and seize opportunities, business should be
aware that:

1. Energy security is now inseparable from
the transition to a low-carbon economy and
businesses plans should prepare for this new
reality.

Security of supply and emissions reduction

objectives should be addressed equally, as prioritising
one over the other will increase the risk of stranded
investments or requirements for expensive retro-fitting.

2. Traditional fossil fuel resources face serious
supply constraints and an oil supply crunch is
likely in the short-to-medium term with profound
consequences for the way in which business
functions today.

Businesses would benefit from taking

note of the impacts of the oil price spikes and shocks
in 2008 and implementing the appropriate mitigation
actions. A scenario planning approach may also help
assess potential future outcomes and help inform
strategic business decisions.

3. A ‘third industrial revolution’ in the energy
sector presents huge opportunities but also
brings new risks. Of particular importance for
new technologies is the risk of constraints on raw
materials such as rare earth metals, as scarcity
may drive up costs.

The rapid and widespread diffusion

of some new technologies may also incur negative
environmental implications.

conclusions

4. Energy infrastructure will be increasingly
vulnerable to unanticipated severe weather
events caused by changing climate patterns
leading to a greater frequency of brownouts
and supply disruptions for business.

This throws

out a critical challenge to energy providers, investors
and planners in terms of choosing the location of new
infrastructure and fortifying existing plants and networks.
Those businesses for which uninterrupted access to
energy is of fundamental importance should actively
consider investing in alternative energy supply systems.

5. Increasing energy costs as a result of reduced
availability, higher global demand and carbon
pricing are best tackled in the short term by
changes in practices or via the use of technology
to reduce energy consumption.

he wider use of

renewable energy and even self generation, bring
added price and supply security benefits.

6. The sooner that businesses reassess global
supply chains and just-in-time models,
and increase the resilience of their logistics
against energy supply disruptions, the better

The current system is increasingly vulnerable to
disruption, given the trends outlined in this report.

7. While the vast majority of investment in the
energy transition will come from the private
sector, governments have an important role in
delivering policies and measures that create the
necessary investment conditions and incentives.

If the global carbon market is to become a reality then
government action must be taken to bring additional
price stability and transparency. Investing in a secure,
low-carbon energy future may have higher upfront
costs, but will deliver lower cost energy in the future.
Sound renewable energy and demand side measures
are crucial elements in delivering the necessary
energy services for businesses and the expected return
on investments.

Lloyd’s 360° Risk Insight

Sustainable energy security: strategic risks and opportunities for business 39

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Sustainable energy security: strategic risks and opportunities for business

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Sustainable energy security: strategic risks and opportunities for business

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Lloyd’s 360° Risk Insight

Sustainable energy security: strategic risks and opportunities for business

Lloyd’s is a member of ClimateWise, the insurance industry initiative through which members work individually and
collectively to pro-actively reduce the societal and economic risks associated with climate change. Members include
leading international brands from across the industry.

ClimateWise was launched in September 2007 and all members commit to principles in six key areas. These cover climate
risk analysis, public policy, climate awareness amongst customers, investment strategies and the impact of their business
operations. Members also commit to independent public reporting against all of these commitments.

For more information, visit www.climatewise.org.uk

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