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TAblE Of CONTENTS

1. Foreword by the Director

2. Introduction

3. TE-SAT 2008 Methodology

3.1.

Definitions

3.2.

TE-SAT 2008 Data

4. Overview of the Situation in the EU 2007

4.1.

Terrorist Attacks

4.2.

Arrested Suspects

4.3.

Convictions and Penalties

4.4.

Key Findings

5. Islamist Terrorism

5.1.

Terrorist Attacks

5.2.

Arrested Suspects

5.3.

Terrorist Activities

5.4.

Situation outside the EU

5.5.

Key Findings

6. Ethno-Nationalist and Separatist Terrorism

6.1.

Terrorist Attacks

6.2.

Arrested Suspects

6.3.

Terrorist Activities

6.4.

Key Findings

7. Left-Wing and Anarchist Terrorism

7.1.

Terrorist Attacks

7.2.

Arrested Suspects and Terrorist Activities

7.3.

Key Findings

8. Right-Wing Terrorism

8.1.

Key Findings

9. Single Issue Terrorism

9.1.

Key Findings

10. Trends

TE-SAT

2008

3. TE-SAT 2008 METhODOlOgy

3.1. Definitions

Terrorism

Terrorism is not an ideology or movement, but a
tactic or a method for attaining political goals.
This view is also reflected in the Council Framework
Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism
(2002/475/JHA).

All member states had to align

their  national  legislation  with  this  Framework
Decision  by  31  December  2002.  At  the  end  of
November  2007,  the  EU  Counter-Terrorism
Coordinator  reported  to  the  European  Council
that,  apart  from  Slovakia,  all  member  states  had
fully completed the implementation. In Slovakia,
the Framework Decision was partially implement-
ed with the exception of the provisions concern-
ing the liability of legal persons.

An overview of the legislation on terrorism, or cur-
rent proposals of legislation, regarding the ten
countries which provided information on court
cases to Eurojust is described in Annex 3.

Whereas  the  member  states  have  harmonised
their  national  legislation  with  the  provisions  of
the Framework Decision, the definition of terrorist
acts provided in Article 1 of the Decision includes
elements, such as the impact of the act concerned,
which  are  open  to  interpretation.

For practical

reasons, the data collected for TE-SAT 2008
relies on the member states’ definitions of ter-
rorist offences.

TE-SAT 2007 restricted its reporting purely to ter-
rorism, disregarding extremism. The disparities
currently existing between the member states

with regard to the crime areas which are defined
as  terrorism  or  extremism,  respectively,  were
reflected  in  the  contributions  to  the  report.  As  a
result,  the  European  scope  of  the  crime  areas
could not be fully described. For TE-SAT 2007 this
was  especially  true  for  left-wing  and  right-wing
terrorism.  For  TE-SAT  2008,  this  problem  would
also have affected the reporting on the new cate-
gory of single issue terrorism.

TE-SAT 2008 continues to focus on terrorism.
Although not all forms of extremism sanction the
use of violence, extremism as a phenomenon may
be related to terrorism and exhibit similar behav-
ioural patterns.

Criminal acts committed by

extremists, with the potential to seriously
destabilise or destroy the fundamental politi-
cal, constitutional, economic or social struc-
tures of a country

will consequently be included

in TE-SAT 2008 if reported by the member states.

In TE-SAT 2008, this methodological modification
only applies to the qualitative part.

With regard

to  the  quantitative  part,  the  member  states
were  again  asked  to  provide  data  on  arrests,
attacks  and  activities  defined  as  terrorism  at
national level

The member states have been asked to contribute
data on all individuals arrested for terrorism
offences in the course of 2007.

“Arrests” refers to

judicial  arrests  warranted  by  a  prosecutor  or
investigating  judge,  whereby  a  person  is
detained for questioning on suspicion of com-
mitting a criminal offence for which detention
is  permitted  by  national  law

. That the person

An outline of this Council Decision is included in the Annex 2.

An amendment of the Criminal Code is in preparation in Slovakia and will comprise specific provisions on this aspect.

TE-SAT

2008

may subsequently be provisionally released or
placed under house arrest does not impact on the
calculation of the number of arrests.

Attacks have been reported by member states
as failed, foiled or successfully executed

. The cat-

egory “reported activities” relates to terrorist activi-
ties investigated as such in the member states.

Types of Terrorism

Terrorist organisations in the TE-SAT are catego-
rised by their source of motivation. However this is
not always an easy task, as many groups have a
mixture of motivating ideologies, although usually
one ideology or motivation dominates. The choice
of categories used in the TE-SAT is pragmatic and
reflects the current situation in the EU. The catego-
ries are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

Islamist terrorism

is motivated either in whole or

in part by an abusive interpretation of Islam; the
use of violence is regarded by its practitioners as a
divine duty or sacramental act.

Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist groups

such as Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), Kurdistan
Workers’ Party (PKK/KONGRA-GEL) and Real Irish
Republican Army (RIRA), seek international recogni-
tion and political self-determination. They are moti-
vated by nationalism, ethnicity and/or religion.

Left-wing terrorist groups

, such as the Revolu-

tionary People’s Liberation Army (DHKP-C), seek to
change the entire political, social and economic sys-
tem of a state according to an extremist leftist
model. Their ideology is often Marxist-Leninist. The
agenda of

anarchist terrorist groups

, such as the

Unofficial Anarchist Federation (Federazione
Anarchica Informale, FAI), is usually revolutionary,
anti-capitalist and anti-authoritarian. Not all mem-
ber states have distinguished between activities of
left-wing and anarchist terrorist groups in their con-
tributions. For this reason, both categories are dis-
cussed in the same chapter of this report.

Right-wing terrorist groups

seek to change the

entire political, social and economic system on an
extremist rightist model. The ideological roots of
European right-wing terrorism can usually be
traced back to National Socialism.

Singe Issue Terrorism

is violence committed with

the desire to change a specific policy or practice
within a target society. The term is generally used
to describe animal rights and environmentalist
terrorist groups.

3.2. TE-SAT 2008 Data

The  data  collection  for TE-SAT  2008  covered  ter-
rorist  attacks,  activities  and  arrests  in  the  EU  in
2007 and terrorist attacks outside the EU in which
EU  interests  were  affected.  In  addition,  Eurojust
collected  data  on  prosecutions  and  convictions
for terrorist offences in member states.

Both quantitative and qualitative data on terrorist
attacks and activities was collected from the mem-
ber states. Terrorism is not mass or collective vio-
lence but rather the work of small groups, howev-
er popular these groups may be. Even if supported
by a larger organisation, the number of militants
who engage in terrorism is usually very limited.

However, some aspects of the phenomenon, such
as attacks and arrested suspects, can also be ana-
lysed with the use of quantitative research meth-
ods. Due to the relatively small number of investi-
gations into terrorist activities reported by the
member states, terrorist activities are analysed
and described mainly with the help of qualitative
data, although quantitative data was also collect-
ed to support the analytical work.

Europol extracted quantitative TE-SAT data on ter-
rorist attacks and activities as well as on arrested
suspects  from  reports  on  terrorist  incidents  con-
tributed  by  the  member  states.  The  processed
data was cross-checked and, in case of gaps, com-
plemented  by  open  source  data  systematically
monitored,  collected  and  processed  by  Europol.

Compare to Hoffman, Bruce

(2006)

Inside Terrorism

, pp. 83 and 89-97.

Their American counterparts, white supremacist groups, are often categorised as religious terrorists. See Hoffman,

Bruce (2006)

Inside Terrorism

, p. 237.

See Wilkinson, Paul (2001)

Terrorism versus democracy

, first edition, p 20.

Crenshaw, Martha (2003) “Thoughts on Relating Terrorism to Historical Contexts”, in

Terrorism in Context

, ed.

Crenshaw, Martha (2003), pp. 3-26, esp. p. 4.

TE-SAT

2008

TE-SA

2008

ODO

After this, Europol requested the member states
to validate their national data.

Eurojust collected data on the basis of the Council
Decision of 20 September 2005 on the exchange of
information  and  cooperation  concerning  terrorist
offences  (2005/671/JHA),  according  to  which  the
member  states  are  obliged  to  collect  all  relevant
information  concerning  prosecutions  and  convic-
tions for terrorist offences and send it to Eurojust.

According to the 2005 Council Decision, the infor-
mation submitted to Eurojust is in relation to

final

convictions. If convictions in 2007 were appealed
but came to a conclusion before the end of the
year, Eurojust counted the proceedings as one.

Ten member states provided Eurojust with infor-
mation on cases in their national courts: Belgium,
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
the  Netherlands,  Spain  and  the  UK.  The  UK  was
not able to provide a comprehensive overview for
2007  within  the  timeframe  set,  but  most  high-
level cases were included. Although some data is
still lacking, the member states most affected by
terrorist  offences  provided  their  contribution.  In
general, the contributions to Eurojust were of bet-
ter quality compared to 2006 with a much higher
level of detail.

Due to differences in the data con-

tributed to Eurojust for 2006 and 2007, however, it
was not always possible to compare the findings.

The  aforementioned  Council  Decision  2005/671/
JHA also obliges the member states to collect all
relevant  information  concerning  and  resulting
from  criminal  investigations  conducted  by  their
law  enforcement  authorities  with  respect  to  ter-
rorist offences and sets out the conditions under
which this information should be sent to Europol.
This  information  facilitates  Europol’s  data  collec-
tion for the TE-SAT only to a limited extent, as the
TE-SAT  does  not  contain  information  that  may
jeopardise ongoing investigations.

The data contributed by the member states to TE-
SAT 2008 was generally of high quality with a high
level of details. In addition to the quantitative con-
tribution, all member states also provided Europol
with a qualitative contribution.

The collected data for 2007 referred to a total of
583 attacks, 1044 arrested suspects and 331 con-
victions for terrorism charges in the EU.

It should

be noted that the arrests and convictions may
be related to terrorist offences that took place
before 2007 and, consequently, may not be
related to activities and attacks reported for
the purpose of TE-SAT 2008.

Although the member states’ reporting on terror-
ist attacks, activities and arrests continues to vary
in degree of elaboration, it can generally be stated
that  the  data  contributed  by  the  member  states
for  2007  was  more  detailed  than  that  for  2006.
Concerning  TE-SAT  2008,  the  main  information
gap is found in the number of fatalities and casu-
alties in terrorist attacks. Regarding Islamist terror-
ism,  reporting  on  group  affiliation  was  generally
missing. In a few cases, the type of terrorism was
not  specified.  In  the  statistics,  such  cases  were
registered under the category “other”.

Gaps in the data collected by Europol may be due
to the fact that the investigations into the terrorist
attacks or activities concerned are still ongoing. In
addition, it is a well known fact that terrorist activ-
ities are not always prosecuted as terrorist offenc-
es.  Furthermore,  it  seems  likely  that  terrorist
attacks  and  activities  with  perceived  low  and/or
local impact remained underreported to Europol.
It is not possible to track these investigations by
monitoring open sources and include them in the
data,  as  generally  only  the  most  “spectacular”
cases,  in  particular  as  regards  terrorist  activities,
are reported in the media.

As was the case for TE-SAT 2007, the UK was not
able  to  provide  Europol  with  comprehensive
quantitative  data  for  TE-SAT  2008.  Nevertheless,
two  failed  Islamist  terrorist  attacks  in  2007  were
contributed.  As  for  the TE-SAT  2007,  UK  authori-
ties  contributed  the  total  number  of  persons
arrested  under  the  Terrorism  Act  2000  without
any affiliation. The UK did, however, contribute a
comprehensive  qualitative  report.  TE-SAT  2008
describes  and  analyses  the  situation  in  the  UK
mainly based on this contribution.

Information  on  and  analysis  of  Islamist  activities
on the Internet is the result of a project initiated at
Europol in October 2004 within the framework of
the  second  EU  counter-terrorism  task  force  and
later  transferred  to  Europol’s  counter-terrorism
unit. The description and analysis of the situation
outside  the  EU,  both  for  separatist  and  Islamist
terrorism, is mainly based on open sources.

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Eurojust.

TE-SAT

2008

TE-SA

2008

ODO

4. OvERvIEw Of ThE

SITUATION IN ThE EU 2007

4.1. Terrorist Attacks

In  2007,  nine  member  states  reported  a  total  of
583 failed, foiled or successfully executed attacks.
This  is  a  24  percent  increase  from  what  was
reported  in  2006.  Of  the  583  attacks,  517  were
claimed or attributed to separatist terrorist groups
in  Spain  and  France.  The  vast  majority  of  these
attacks were arson attacks aimed at causing mate-
rial  damage.  Although  the  number  of  casualties
and fatalities is limited, two persons were killed in
an attack claimed by the Basque separatist terror-
ist group ETA.

With  regard  to  Islamist  terrorism,  two  failed  and
two attempted attacks were reported for 2007. As
in  2006,  failed  or  attempted  Islamist  terrorist
attacks  took  place  in  the  UK,  Denmark  and
Germany. Police investigations into the attempted
attacks  in  Denmark  and  Germany  have  shown
that the intended targets were likely to be located
on their national territory. The failed and attempt-
ed attacks mainly aimed at causing indiscriminate
mass casualties.

Member

state

Islamist

Separatist

Left Wing

Right Wing

Single Issue

Not

Specified

Total 2007

Austria

Denmark

France

253

267

Germany

Greece

Italy

Portugal

Spain

264

279

–

Total

532

583

Figure 2: Number of failed, foiled and successfully executed attacks in 2007 per member state and affiliation

2006
2007

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

Attacks

Arrests

Num

ber

Figure 1: Number of failed, foiled and successfully

executed attacks and number of arrests

2007 compared to 2006

TE-SAT

2008

Left-wing and anarchist groups were responsible
for 21 attacks in the EU during 2007. The most
affected countries were Italy followed by Spain.
The vast majority of the attacks were successfully
executed and aimed at governmental institutions
or private businesses.

The majority of attacks related to right-wing
organisations are contributed as extremism. One
right-wing terrorist attack was reported for 2007,
in Portugal.

Single issue terrorism was introduced as a new
category for 2007. Although a number of inci-
dents were attributed or claimed by animal rights
and environmentalist extremist groups, only one
was contributed as a terrorist attack.

A complete list of all contributed attack and arrest
data for 2006 and 2007 can be found in Annex 4
and 5.

Member state

Islamist

Separatist

Left Wing

Right Wing

Single Issue

Total 2007

Austria

Belgium

Bulgaria

Cyprus

Denmark

France

315

409

Germany

Ireland

Italy

Portugal

Romania

Slovakia

Spain

196

261

Sweden

the Netherlands

–

203

Total

201

548

1044

Figure 3: Number of arrested suspects in 2007 per member state and affiliation

4.2. Arrested Suspects

A total of 1044 individuals were arrested for ter-
rorism-related offences in 2007. This is an increase
of 48 percent compared to 2006. France, Spain
and the UK have reported the largest number of
arrests per member state.

The number of arrested suspects for separatist ter-
rorism  has  more  than  doubled  in  comparison  to
2006.  This  increase  is  mainly  due  to  the  vast
increase  in  the  number  of  arrests  in  France  and
Spain. In 2007, Spain saw a seven-fold increase in
arrested suspects: from 28 in 2006 to 196 in 2007.
France went from 188 people arrested in 2006 to
315 in 2007, an increase of almost 68 percent.

Concerning Islamist terrorism, the number of arrest-
ed individuals decreased compared to 2006. In
2007, 201 persons were arrested for Islamist terror-
ism, compared to 257 in 2006. This decrease can
mainly be attributed to a 35 percent decrease in the
number of arrested suspects reported by France.

TE-SAT

2008

SITUA

TION

2007

However, the UK reported a 30 percent increase in
arrested suspects. Although no affiliation could be
assigned, UK authorities estimate that, out of the
203 persons arrested in 2007, the vast majority
were in relation to Islamist terrorism.

At the time of their arrest, all suspects were
between 17 to 72 years of age. The average age
was 35 years, with two thirds of the arrested being
between 23 and 43 years old. Persons arrested for
anarchist and right-wing terrorism offences were
generally younger than 30.

The vast majority of the arrested suspects were EU
citizens. A large number of these were separatist
terrorists arrested in France and Spain.
Furthermore, an increasing number of the arrest-
ed suspects have the citizenship of the country of
arrest.

As  in  2006,  the  vast  majority  of  suspects  were
arrested  for  membership  of  a  terrorist  organisa-
tion. Twenty-two percent were arrested for attack-
related crimes such as planning, preparing or exe-
cuting an attack. As in 2006, financing, facilitation
and recruitment continue to be activities of which
the  arrested  are  suspected.  The  number  of  sus-
pects arrested for propaganda has increased. The
suspects arrested for this offence are mainly linked
to Islamist terrorism.

The number of women arrested for terrorism
offences is still relatively low.

In 2007, ten per-

cent of all arrested suspects were women. There is,
however, a noticeable difference between the dif-
ferent types of terrorism, ranging from seven per-
cent women among Islamist terrorists to fourteen
percent among separatist terrorist groups. Eighty
percent of all women arrested for terrorism were
EU citizens.

4.3. Convictions and

Penalties

In the course of 2007, 418 individuals were tried
on  terrorism  charges  in  the  member  states,  in  a
total of 143 proceedings. No consistent informa-
tion  was  available  regarding  the  time  that  had
elapsed between arrests, trial and date of convic-
tion but, in general, it can be stated that the con-
victions  relate  to  events  which  occurred  before
2007.

Of the 418 individuals, 34 were women. The vast
majority of these were charged in relation to sepa-
ratist terrorism.

NEU

22%

Unknown

69%

Figure 4: Citizenship of arrested suspects in 2007

In the 2007 statistical data, the gender of only 8.5 percent of the arrested remained unknown, compared to 17

percent in 2006.

The total number of 419 individuals tried (instead of 418) is caused by the fact that one individual was tried in

both Italy and Spain.

Member state

2006

2007

Belgium

Denmark

France

Germany

Greece

Ireland

Italy

Spain

154

231

Sweden

the Netherlands

Total

241

419

Figure 5: Number of individuals tried for terrorism

charges per member state

TE-SAT

2008

SITUA

TION

2007

The large difference in the number of individuals
tried for terrorism charges in 2006 and 2007 can
partly be explained by underreporting from the
member states in 2006. Only eight member states
contributed data in 2006, as opposed to ten mem-
ber states in 2007.

Also  noteworthy  is  the  fact  that  trials  with  large
groups of defendants took place in several coun-
tries in 2007. This was the case in Spain where 52
individuals were indicted in one trial. The trial con-
cerning  the  2004  Madrid  bombings  involved  29
defendants. In Italy, a court case involving 14 indi-
viduals  came  to  its  conclusion  in  December.  In
France,  there  were  two  cases  against  16  and  11
individuals  respectively,  whilst  all  17  individuals
reported by Greece were tried in the same case.

Of a total of 143 court proceedings in 2007, 54
percent were related to separatist terrorism, whilst
38 percent were related to Islamist terrorism. Only
one trial in 2007 concerned right-wing terrorism.
This trial confirmed the sentence imposed on an
individual previously convicted of the bombing of
the Bologna railway in 1980.

The court proceedings resulted in 449 verdicts. The
number of verdicts does not correlate directly to
the number of suspects tried for terrorism charges
as some suspects received more than one sentence
in separate court proceedings. This applies in par-
ticular to Spain where 231 suspects received a total
of 255 verdicts. These verdicts were mainly related
to Basque separatist terrorism.

All verdicts reported by Belgium, Germany and
the UK were related to Islamist terrorism. In Italy,
this was the case for 44 of 47 reported verdicts.

Of the total of 449 verdicts in 2007, 331 were con-
victions.  Eight  of  the  thirty-four  women  tried  for
terrorism charges were acquitted. The percentage
of acquittals increased from 15 percent in 2006 to
26 percent in 2007. This increase may be explained
by  law  enforcement  authorities  working  to  dis-
rupt  terrorist  plots  at  an  early  stage  in  order  to
avoid  casualties  or  destruction  of  infrastructure
and  properties.  Individuals  planning  attacks  and
promoting terrorist crimes may have been brought
before  court  before  they  were  able  to  reach  the
stage of carrying out a successful terrorist attack.
It is generally more difficult to produce evidence
in court for intent, propaganda and planning than
for the execution of attacks. See figure 7.

Court proceedings in relation to Islamist terrorism
have the highest acquittal rate: 31 percent of the
defendants were found not guilty. Left-wing and
separatist terrorism both have an acquittal rate of
approximately 20 percent.

The Council of Europe has adopted a convention
on the prevention of terrorism. Such an instru-
ment is lacking at the EU level, and national legis-
lations are still being developed in this regard. An
overview of the current state of legislation in the
EU member states which had court cases in 2007
is provided in Annex 3.

Figure 6: Number of verdicts for terrorism charges in 2007 per member state and affiliation

Member state

Islamist

Separatist

Left Wing

Right Wing

Not

Specified

Total

Belgium

Denmark

France

Germany

Greece

Ireland

Italy

Spain

184

255

the Netherlands

Total

198

214

449

TE-SAT

2008

SITUA

TION

2007

Several interesting investigations and prosecution
cases came to a conclusion in 2007. On 31 October
2007,  the  sentences  in  the  trial  against  the  sus-
pected perpetrators of the 11 March 2004 attacks
in  Madrid  were  pronounced.  The  Spanish  high
court,  the  Audiencia  Nacional,  convicted  three
main defendants on charges of mass murder with
a  terrorist  intent  and  other  charges.  In  total,  21
persons were found guilty of participating in the
Madrid bombings. For one of the convicted indi-
viduals,  the  sentences  imposed  added  up  to
42,952 years. However, the maximum time to be
served in prison in Spain is 40 years.

The year 2007 also saw the conviction of four per-
sons in relation to the failed bomb attacks on the
London  transport  system  on  21  July  2005.  The
four individuals were sentenced to life imprison-
ment which in the UK means 40 years. The UK also
had  its  first  conviction  in  relation  to  terrorism
propaganda. The three men convicted had been
found in possession of materials suggesting that
they were involved in the production of terrorist
propaganda. The suspects were also in possession
of  information  on  how  to  cause  explosions  or
build bombs. On trial, the defendants admitted to
having  urged  British  Muslims  to  wage  violent

jihad

against all non-believers. They were sen-

tenced to six, eight and twelve years’ imprison-
ment, respectively.

In November 2007, the Danish high court convict-
ed three persons for planning a terrorist attack in
Denmark. The investigation showed that the men
procured fertiliser and chemicals which could be
used for producing peroxide-based primary explo-
sives.  Members  of  the  group  gathered  large
amounts of information on the Internet regarding
the manufacturing of explosives and bombs. Two
of the accused were sentenced to 11 years’ impris-
onment, while the third received a four-year sen-
tence.  The  prosecution  subsequently  appealed
the  sentences  to  the  Danish  supreme  court  in
order to get the sentences increased.

In  Belgium,  a  network  of  intermediaries  for  al-
Qaeda  was  successfully  prosecuted  in  2007. The
prosecutors  made  use  of  a  judicial  decision  in
Italy: in 2007, the Italian supreme court held that
the impact of individual terrorist actions needs to
be  seen  in  the  wider  criminal  plan  of  a  terrorist
organisation. Sentences in Italy amounted to nine
and six years; in Belgium, the five individuals were
sentenced to up to ten years in early 2008.

Figure 8 provides an overview of the average penal-
ty per convicted individual in the ten member
states. In 2006 and 2007, several convictions in
Spain resulted in long cumulative sentences. For the
purpose of this overview, Eurojust counted 40 years
for all sentences exceeding this period of time.

Figure 7: Number of verdicts, convictions and acquittals per member state in 2007

Member state

Convicted

Acquitted

Total Verdicts

Acquitted %

Belgium

Denmark

France

Germany

Greece

Ireland

Italy

Spain

181

255

the Netherlands

Total

331

120

449

Throughout the report referred to as the use of violence or violent struggle, allegedly in defence of Islam.

TE-SAT

2008

SITUA

TION

2007

The large difference in average penalty between
2006 and 2007 is mainly due to the fact that the
number of contributing member states has
increased. Another factor is that a number of very
serious cases were successfully concluded in the
UK. Although this prevents a general comparison,
it is still possible to compare the mean average for
2006 and 2007.

As  in  2006,  the  relatively  high  average  for  Spain
can be explained by the fact that a majority of the
defendants were convicted of murder or of “collat-
eral” fatalities. In average, membership of a terror-
ist  organisation,  taken  as  an  offence  in  its  own
right, has resulted in sentences amounting to five
to  ten  years. The  average  sentence  in  Spain  has
gone down slightly from 2006 to 2007.

In the UK, of the 33 convicted individuals, twelve
received a full 40 year sentence. These included
the four individuals connected to the failed July

2005 London transport bombing. Thus, the aver-
age sentence imposed in the UK has increased
compared to the year 2006.

The  relatively  low  sentences  in  the  Netherlands
may be due to the fact that individuals suspected
of planning attacks and promoting terrorist crimes
were  brought  before  the  court  before  reaching
the  stage  of  successfully  executing  a  terrorist
attack.

In  Greece,  very  high  sentences  were  passed  for
one group of individuals jointly tried for different
crimes.  Almost  all  individuals  were  convicted  of
criminal association, in addition to causing explo-
sions,  attempted  murder,  robberies  and  carrying
weapons. One individual received 17 lifetime sen-
tences  and  another  11.  All  these  sentences  have
been  recalculated  to  count  as  25  years  which,
according to Greek law, is the maximum term to
be spent in prison.

Figure 8: Average penalty per convicted individual per member state in 2007

Greece

Spain

Denmark

Italy

Germany

Belgium

France

Ireland

the

Netherlands

2007 AVERAGE YEARS

Mean 2007
Mean 2006

TE-SAT

2008

SITUA

TION

2007

It quickly emerged that the attacks in London and
Glasgow  were  linked.  Three  men  were  arrested
and  charged  in  relation  to  these  attacks.  One  of
the men was charged with withholding informa-
tion  about  a  terrorist  offence. The  other  two  are
accused  of  conspiracy  to  cause  explosions.

The

trial is expected to start in October 2008.

Attempted attack – germany

Three men — a 28-year-old Turkish national and
two  German  nationals  aged  22  and  28  —  were
arrested on 4 September 2007, suspected of plan-
ning several coordinated bomb attacks in Germany
with the aim to cause mass casualties. At the time
of their arrest, the three men were in the process
of making highly powerful explosives using hydro-
gen  peroxide  and  military  detonators.  Although
the targets had not yet been definitively selected,
the  investigation  revealed  that  possible  targets
included US military facilities in Germany. Had the
suspects  succeeded  in  building  the  bombs,  they
would have had a higher explosive effect than the
bombs  used  in  the  2004  attacks  in  Madrid

where 191 people were killed and 1,841 injured.

The suspects had acquired the know-how to build
the bombs mainly through specialised explosives
training courses in training camps in Pakistan, run
by the

Islamic Jihad Union

(IJU). Instructions for

building similar bombs are also available on the
Internet. The IJU, which originates from Uzbekistan,
was founded in March 2002 by former members
of the

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

(IMU). It is

believed to have close links to al-Qaeda.

On 11 September 2007, the IJU posted a claim in
Turkish on a Turkish

jihadist

Internet site in which

they referred to the arrested suspects as members
of the IJU. They also claimed responsibility for the
attempted attack in Germany, naming the US Air
Base at Ramstein and the US and Uzbek consu-
lates-general in Germany as the intended targets.
According to the message, the aim of the attack
was to force the closure of the German Air Base at
Termez in Uzbekistan.

Attempted attack – Denmark

In  the  so-called  Glasvej  case,  on  4  September
2007, the Danish police arrested eight people on
suspicion of planning an attack in Denmark. The
arrested individuals were between 19 to 29 years
of  age.  Two  of  the  arrested—a  Pakistani-born
Danish  citizen  and  an  Afghan  citizen  living  in
Denmark—are expected to be charged with plan-
ning the attack.

The  Pakistani-born  main  suspect  is  alleged  to
have gone through training in Pakistan. After his
return  to  Denmark,  he  manufactured  and  tested
tricycloacetone  triperoxide  (TATP).  He  also  made
extensive  use  of  the  Internet  for  various  opera-
tional purposes. The police investigation revealed
links  between  the  suspects  and  people  abroad.
The trial is expected to start in summer 2008.

On  11  November  2007,  police  arrested  an  addi-
tional  person  in  connection  with  the  case.  The
individual  is  suspected  of  planning  to  kidnap
Danish citizens abroad. Allegedly, the plan was to
pressurise  the  Danish  authorities  into  releasing
the suspects arrested in the Glasvej case.

5.2. Arrested Suspects

For  2007,  the  member  states  reported  a  total  of
201 suspects arrested for Islamist terrorist offenc-
es.  In  2006,  the  number  of  arrested  suspects
reported  was  257.  This  decrease  can  mainly  be
explained  by  a  34  percent  decrease  in  arrests  in
France.  Despite  the  small  number  of  failed  and
attempted terrorist attacks reported for 2007, 25
percent of all suspects were arrested for offences
relating to Islamist terrorism. The number of mem-
ber states which reported arrests increased from
nine in 2006 to fourteen in 2007.

The  majority  of  the  arrests  took  place  in  France,
Italy and Spain. As in 2006, the majority of those
arrested came from North African countries, such
as Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. France, however,
also reported a high number of arrests of French
nationals.  In  Austria,  Bulgaria,  Belgium  and
Germany, the  majority of those arrested had the

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: UK.

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Germany.

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Eurojust.

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Germany.

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Denmark.

TE-SAT

2008

lAMIST

ERRORISM

citizenship of the country of arrest. This may indi-
cate an increase in the number of home-grown
terrorists.

As in 2006, the vast majority of the arrested sus-
pects  in  the  UK  were  in  relation  to  Islamist
terrorism.  However,  since  these  arrests  were  not
reported as affiliated to any type of terrorism, they
were  not  included  in  the  statistics.  For  2007,  the
arrests in the UK increased by 30 percent.

As in 2006, the arrested suspects originating from
North Africa were often loosely affiliated with
North African terrorist groups, such as the

Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group

(GICM) and

al-

Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

(AQIM).

The percentage of women among all arrested sus-
pects remains low. In 2007 fifteen women were
arrested for Islamist terrorist offences. This repre-

sents seven percent of the total number of those
arrested  for  Islamist  terrorism.  As  in  2006,  no
women  were  arrested  for  planning,  preparing  or
executing  an  attack.  Furthermore,  no  women
were reported arrested for recruitment or training.
Three women were arrested for an offence related
to propaganda.

The statistics of offences reported for 2007 include
propaganda as a new category for Islamist terror-
ism.  Six  percent  of  the  arrested  were  accused  of
offences related to the production and spreading
of propaganda. At the same time, the UK had its
first  convictions  in  relation  to  the  spreading  of
propaganda  on  the  Internet.  In  July  2007,  three
men  were  found  guilty  of  using  the  Internet  to
incite  murder.  The  men  had  distributed  films  of
beheadings and published bomb-making instruc-
tions  as  part  of  al-Qaeda’s  propaganda
campaign.

Figure 10: Percentage of arrested suspects for Islamist terrorism per offence in 2006 and 2007

100

Membership Terr

Organisation

Facilitation

Attack Related

Offences

Financing

Recruitment

Propaganda

Training

tage

2006
2007

“Trio fuelled al-Qaeda propaganda”,

BBC News

, 4 July 2007.

TE-SAT

2008

lAMIST

ERRORISM

As in 2006, almost half of the suspects arrested in
2007--  45  percent--were  arrested  for  membership
of a terrorist organisation. Another 13 percent were
arrested  for  attack-related  offences,  such  as  plan-
ning, preparing and/or executing an attack. These
arrests  took  place  in  Austria,  Cyprus,  Denmark,
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain.

The average age of the arrested suspects was 33
years. Two thirds of the arrested were between 23
and 43 years old. The pattern described in TE-SAT
2007 regarding the correlation between age and
type  of  offence  continues  to  be  observed  in  the
data for 2007: arrested suspects aged between 31
and 40 were linked to financing of terrorism and
handling  of  false  documents  to  a  greater  extent
than  those  under  30.  Activities  such  as  recruit-
ment  and  facilitation,  on  the  other  hand,  were
more frequently linked to arrested suspects aged
between 17 and 30. All suspects arrested in rela-
tion  to  the  publication  and  spreading  of  propa-
ganda were younger that 31.

The vast majority of suspects arrested for an
offence relating to an attack were between 26 and
30. By contrast, suspects arrested for offences
related to training were mainly found in the age
category 41 to 50.

The arrests in relation to financing of Islamist ter-
rorism decreased slightly compared to 2006. In
2007, France arrested six people suspected of pro-
viding financial support to AQIM. In Denmark, two
members of the

al-Aqsa Association

in Denmark

were charged with financing of terrorism. The sus-
pects were accused of sending money to the mili-
tary branch of

Hamas

. Both suspects were acquit-

ted in the city court. The case has been appealed
to the high court.

The number of suspects arrested for recruitment
increased in 2007. Twenty-nine individuals were
arrested in four member states: Belgium, Rumania,
Spain and Sweden. The majority of those arrested
were suspected of recruitment for

jihad

in Iraq.

One of the suspects was arrested for recruitment
on behalf of AQIM.

In December, the French security services arrested
one Algerian and one French national suspected
of shipping material—binoculars, maps, tele-
phones, portable computers, radios and navigat-
ing systems—to AQIM. The filming equipment
was intended to be used for filming future attacks.
One of the suspects planned to join the organisa-
tion on location in Algeria.

In May 2007, a French citizen of Algerian descent
was  arrested  after  contacting  AQIM  via  the
Internet.  He  had  identified  potential  American
and French military, political and civilian targets in
France  and  Luxembourg,  and  made  reconnais-
sance videos. A number of bomb-making compo-
nents were found in his possession.

5.3. Terrorist Activities

Radicalisation and Recruitment

The member states continue to report on EU
nationals and residents who are being recruited
for

jihad

in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2007, Iraq

attracted the largest number of recruits from EU
member states. In Belgium, an investigation into
the  recruitment  of  suicide  bombers  for  Iraq
revealed a network of intermediaries for al-Qaeda
spread  across  Europe  and  the  Middle  East.  The
investigation  started  in  2005  after  a  Belgian
woman became the first European female suicide
bomber in Iraq.

Routes  and  logistics  to  smuggle  recruits  from
France,  Spain  and  Italy  to  Iraq  continue  to  be
dominated  by  North  African  Islamists.

North

African cells in Europe were also found to be
recruiting young EU nationals for training in North

or West Africa. In June 2007, three Moroccans
were arrested in Spain attempting to transfer
recruits to training camps in the Sahel region.

Dutch authorities reported an increasing number
of Dutch nationals and residents willing to
participate in

jihad

outside the EU. In the

Netherlands as well as in France, the country’s
military participation in Afghanistan—but also

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: France, Denmark.

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: France.

“Nancy: le d

jihad

iste avait décidé de passer à l’action”,

Le Figaro

, 14 October 2007.

“Spanish police arrest 6 suspected

jihad

recruiters”, Associated Press, 28 May 2007.

“Spain arrests three al Qaeda suspects in Barcelona”, Reuters, 26 June 2007.

TE-SAT

2008

lAMIST

ERRORISM

in Lebanon—is a motivating factor for the

jihadists

In  France,  police  and  intelligence  services  found
increasing  evidence  that  Somalia  is  becoming  a
new  alternative  destination  for  people  willing  to
fight

jihad

In early 2007, UK authorities estimat-

ed that British passport holders fighting with the
Islamists in Somalia were “in their dozens”.

There

are also indications that terrorist training and
planning of attacks—with a focus on the UK—is
taking place in Somalia.

In the past few years, a number of terrorist groups
have pledged allegiance to

al-Qaeda

and its lead-

ers. Two groups have been confirmed as part of
the organisation by its leadership:

al-Qaeda in

Mesopotamia

in Iraq in September 2004 (now part

of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq) and the
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat in Algeria
in September 2006 (now

al-Qaeda in the Islamic

Maghreb

). In addition, former leading personali-

ties of the

Egyptian Islamic Group

and the

Libyan

Islamic Fighting Group

have, in 2006 and 2007

respectively, committed themselves to the ideals
of  al-Qaeda.  However,  the  relationship  between
these  groups  and  networks  and  the  al-Qaeda
leadership  is  characterised  by  different  levels  of
autonomy,  sophistication  and  motivation.
Nevertheless, this expansion of the “al-Qaeda fran-
chise”  has  the  potential  to  constitute  a  threat  to
the  EU’s  security.  It  could  provide  al-Qaeda  with
access  to  new  centres  of  support  which  it  can
motivate and exploit.

Over the last five years, much of the command,
control and inspiration for planning attacks came
from al-Qaeda’s remaining core leadership in the
tribal areas of Pakistan. In the UK, the plans often

included the use of young, radicalised British citi-
zens to mount the actual attacks.

The foiled

attacks in Germany and Denmark in 2007 demon-
strated that contacts between networks in the EU
and al-Qaeda-affiliated groups in the Pakistan-
Afghanistan region are not a problem for the UK
alone.

The  UK  reported  a  significant  and  increasing
number  of  suspects  that  are  under  investigation
on  suspicion  of  Islamist  terrorism.  At  the  time  of
the 11 September 2001 attacks in the US, approx.
250 Islamists were under investigation on charges
of terrorism in the UK. Since then, there has been
a  major  increase  in  numbers:  from  500  people
under  investigation  in  July  2004,  the  figure
reached 1,600 by the end of 2006.

In November

2007, the British Security Service was looking at
no fewer than 2,000 individuals posing a direct
threat to national security.

Some of these individuals, both British and for-
eign, were involved in planning attacks. However,
a still larger proportion provides support through
financing of terrorism and making ideological and
military training available.

Propaganda

Terrorist propaganda aims at providing a coherent
interpretation of the world which justifies terrorist
activities as acts of war or self-defence. It is an
important tool for attracting resources and recruits
to terrorist groups and networks.

The al-Qaeda leadership used the year 2007 for an
unprecedented public relations campaign. In
September 2007, Osama bin Laden appeared in a
video tape for the first time since 2004. The video

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: the Netherlands, France.

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: France.

“Backed by British money and men”,

The Times

, 10 January 2007.

“Intelligence counter terrorism and trust”, speech by the director general of the British Security Service,

5 November 2007, www.mi5.gov.uk

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: UK.

ibid.

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Denmark, Germany.

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: UK.

“Intelligence counter terrorism and trust”, speech by the director general of the British Security Service, 5

November 2007, www.mi5.gov.uk.

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: UK.

TE-SAT

2008

lAMIST

ERRORISM

was followed by several audio messages.

At the

same  time  and  throughout  2007,  Ayman  al-
Zawahiri  continued  to  issue  a  great  number  of
prepared  speeches  and  interviews  through  al-
Qaeda’s  media  wing

al-Sahab Media Production

Company

Since mid-2006,

al-Sahab

has become the exclu-

sive label of multimedia and multilingual propa-
ganda for al-Qaeda leading figures. The speeches
published by

al-Sahab

are often accompanied by

English subtitles. Where the speaker uses English,
Arabic subtitles have been added.

Al-Sahab

has

also started to use other languages such as Pashto
and, very recently, German.

Propaganda material is also produced by support-
ers of Islamist terrorism who act on the Internet
without necessarily being members of a particular
terrorist group. Much of the material is published
in several languages under the name of the

Global

Islamic Media Front

(GIMF). The GIMF first appeared

in 2002 and was initially only publishing material
in Arabic. Today, it produces documents in various
languages, including English, French and German.
In 2007, the German-speaking GIMF published
two videos, threatening Austria and Germany
with attacks unless they pulled their troops out of
Afghanistan.

The recent investigation in the UK which led to the
conviction of three men for using the Internet to
incite murder shows how the Internet can facilitate
the

jihadists’

activities. The investigation revealed a

large international network of people who jointly
provided support to

jihadist

movements on a glo-

bal scale without ever having met in person.

Videos and films calling on Muslims to take part in
the global

jihad

continue to play a significant role

in the recruitment process. The ongoing conflicts
in the Middle East and South Asia are dominant
issues for al-Qaeda and affiliated groups in rela-
tion to propaganda. The increasingly sophisticat-
ed methods of promoting this agenda, in particu-
lar using the Internet and other electronic media,
have been identified as factors contributing to the
increasing number of Islamist terrorists.

In Bulgaria, four persons were arrested for distri-
bution of Islamist terrorist propaganda on the
Internet. Two of the arrested were female con-
verts. The four suspects had, among other things,
translated material from Chechen sites and posted
it onto their website.

Law  enforcement  agencies  in  Luxembourg  have
identified a group of Islamist extremists who are
radicalising  young  Muslims.  Both  self-produced
videos  and  propaganda  obtained  from  other
groups are used for this purpose.

In  Denmark,  a  Moroccan-born  Danish  citizen  was
sentenced to three years and six months in prison in
April  2007  for  distributing  Islamist  terrorist  propa-
ganda  with  the  purpose  of  instigating  terrorism.
The man owned his own publishing company which
he used for disseminating terrorism propaganda.

In November 2007, the European Commission pre-
sented to the European Council a proposal to amend
the 2002 Council Framework Decision on combat-
ing terrorism with a view to criminalising the use of
the Internet to provide terrorist training.

Training

An increasing number of EU nationals attended
training in Pakistan and were later involved in, or
suspected of, terrorist offences in the EU. The

Guido Steinberg, “The Return of al-Qaeda”, SWP Comments 22, December 2007.

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Austria.

“UK terrorism convictions”,

Jane’s Terrorism & Security Monitor

, 12 September 2007.

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: UK.

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Bulgaria

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Luxembourg.

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Denmark.

“Justice and Home Affairs: Commission adopts counter-terrorism package”, Europe Information Service, 8

November 2007; “Proposal for a Council Framework Decision amending Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on
combating terrorism”, Communication of the European Commission (COM (2007) 650 final), 6 November 2007.

TE-SAT

2008

lAMIST

ERRORISM

majority  of  the  arrested  suspects  in  the  foiled
attacks  in  Germany  and  Denmark  had  received
some  form  of  training  in  Pakistan.

The trial, in

2007, of the perpetrators of the failed attack in
London on 21 July 2005 revealed that they had
received training both in Pakistan and in the UK.

In  2007,  Italian  police  arrested  three  Moroccans
accused  of  providing  terrorist  training  at  a  small
mosque  in  central  Italy.  The  training  allegedly
consisted of the use of arms, explosives and toxic
substances in terrorist operations. During a house
search, Italian counter-terrorism police found bar-
rels of chemicals and instructions on how to pilot
a  Boeing  747.

The suspects had contacts with

the members of the GICM arrested in Belgium in
2005.

logistical support

A  majority  of  the  member  states  continue  to
report  on  EU-based  suspects  providing  logistical
support  to  terrorist  groups  and  networks  based
outside  the  EU.  The  logistical  support  generally
consists  of  providing  material,  funds,  and  false
identity documents. These types of terrorist activi-
ties are also frequent in member states which oth-
erwise  reported  a  general  low  risk  from  Islamist
terrorism.

Although for 2007 the member states reported
fewer arrests in relation to financing of terrorism
than for 2006, financing activities are still frequent
within the EU. Recent terrorist cases show that
organisations or individuals involved in financing
of terrorism use a great variety of methods to raise
funds. In Italy, nine people suspected of ties with
AQIM were arrested in June.

Allegedly, the cell’s

high revenues mostly originated from drug deal-

ing and counterfeiting money. Other counter-ter-
rorism operations in Europe uncovered the use of
front companies in the real estate sector, as in
Spain,

or the transfer of funds to aid terrorist

organisations, as in France

or Germany.

Financing  of  terrorism  does  not  only  imply  the
transfer  of  money  but  also  of  material  goods
which, upon arrival at the final destination, can be
sold and converted into money. This was noted in
the investigation into a Moroccan network oper-
ating in southern Portugal and Spain. The network
was  involved  in  the  theft  of  high  value  vehicles
which were then shipped to North African coun-
tries and sold in order to fund local Islamist terror-
ist groups.

Besides financial support, European-based terror-
ist networks provide other logistical support to
Islamist terrorists travelling to, from or within the
EU. In France, Islamist terrorists were found to pro-
vide logistical support to AQIM.

Italy reported on

logistical support in the form of providing false
documents for terrorist operations outside Italy.

Member states, such as Finland, Hungary, Poland,
Slovakia and Slovenia, which reported a generally
low  threat  from  Islamist  terrorism,  nevertheless
highlighted  the  risk  that  their  country  may  be
used  as  a  logistical  base  for  terrorists  operating
outside of the EU. The majority of these countries,
together with Romania and Estonia, also reported
on  the  potential  risk  that  their  countries  may  be
used  as  transit  countries  by  terrorists  trying  to
enter  other  EU  countries.  Romania  reports  an
increase in the number of individuals attempting
to  enter  the  country  illegally  from  Pakistan  with
the  aim  of  continuing  to  other  member  states.
Pakistani  individuals  in  Romania  with  links  to

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Denmark, Germany.

“Europeans get terror training in Pakistan”,

International Herald Tribune

, 10 September 2007; “Pakistan to Europe:

a pipeline of terror”,

Boston Globe

, 17 October 2007; “Danish intelligence said to hold pictures of terrorist suspect

at training camp”,

Politiken

, 18 January 2008.

“Italy’s underground Islamist Network”,

Jamestown Terrorism Monitor

, 16 August 2007.

“Italy holds 3 on terror charges”, Associated Press, 21 July 2007.

“Al-Qaeda-linked cell was planning attacks in Milan”, Adnkronos International, 7 June 2007.

“Detenidos dos presuntos islamistas que reinían dinero para financiar atentados”,

La Vanguardia

, 25 July 2007.

“13 Kurds arrested in France over terror financing”, Agence France Presse, 5 February 2007.

“German prosecutors charge man founding terror group”, Associated Press, 16 May 2007.

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Portugal.

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: France.

TE-SAT

2008

lAMIST

ERRORISM

Islamist extremism were involved in such activi-
ties. Lithuania reported an increasing number of
individuals with suspected links to Islamist terror-
ism transiting the country in 2007.

5.4. Situation outside the EU

In 2007, French and Spanish and German nation-
als were killed in terrorist attacks outside the EU.
On 2 July, eight Spanish nationals were killed in a
terrorist attack in Yemen. Yemeni government
officials believe that the attack was carried out by
al-Qaeda.

French nationals were the target of

two separate terrorist attacks: one in Saudi Arabia
on 26 February and one in Mauritania on 24
December. Both attacks claimed four fatalities
each.

In Mauritania, local prosecutors announced

that they believed the suspected perpetrators of
that attack belonged to AQIM.

In August 2007,

three police officers working at the German
Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, were killed in an
attack which was claimed by the Taliban.

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic

Maghreb (AQIM)

In  2007,  AQIM  further  adapted  its  tactics  and
propaganda  to  the  model  of  al-Qaeda  in
Mesopotamia,  Iraq.  It  committed  several  suicide
attacks  with  high  numbers  of  causalities.  AQIM
demonstrated  the  threat  it  poses  to  Europe  by
specifically targeting European citizens and inter-
national  bodies  in  Algeria.  In  April  2007,  AQIM
claimed an attack which, according to its claim of
responsibility,  targeted  the  Interpol  office  in
Algiers.  French  nationals  in  Algeria  were  specifi-
cally targeted and injured on 21 September when
a  vehicle  convoy  of  a  French  company  was
attacked.

Europeans were also amongst the

fatalities and casualties of AQIM’s attack on UN
offices in Algiers in December 2007.

On 29 December 2007, AQIM published a state-
ment in which they criticised the Mauritanian

government for their support of the Dakar Rally,
referring to it as a “collaboration with the
Crusaders”. In view of the possible threat against
the event, the Dakar Rally 2008 was cancelled.

AQIM, which until 24 January 2007 was known as

the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat

(GSPC),

has received massive international publicity since
changing  its  name  and  adopting  al-Qaeda’s
modus operandi. Whilst the Algerian government
and  France  remain  AQIM’s  principal  propaganda
targets,  2007  saw  increased  AQIM  media-output
identifying  all  Western  nations  as  potential  tar-
gets.  In  2007,  direct  threats  were  made  by  both
AQIM and al-Qaeda towards the Spanish autono-
mous  cities  of  Ceuta  and  Melilla  in  North  Africa.
Both  AQIM  and  al-Qaeda  were  also  advocating
attacks against US, French and Spanish interests in
North Africa.

So far there has been little indication that radical-
ised Islamists seek to travel from Europe to join
AQIM as part of the wider

jihad

against the West.

Nonetheless, as indicated by the 2007 arrests in
France, there is evidence to suggest that radical-
ised individuals may offer to act on behalf of AQIM
to attack European targets.

Pakistan/Afghanistan

Al-Qaeda  and  affiliated  pro-Taliban  groups  in
Pakistan  and  Afghanistan  are  increasingly  recog-
nised as one of the main drivers of Islamist extrem-
ism  and  terrorism  in  the  EU.  In  2007,  terrorism
investigations  in  at  least  three  countries  showed
links to groups in this region.

The tribal areas of Pakistan host a number of ter-
rorist training camps operating in support of the
Afghan Taliban, pro-Taliban Pakistani groups and
foreign

mujahideen

. Both Germany and Denmark

reported that several suspects in the attempted
terrorist attacks in 2007 had received training in
Pakistan.

“Muere la turista española que quedó ingresada en Yemen tras el atentado”,

La Vanguardia

, 2 July 2007.

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: France.

“Two held over Mauritanian killings”,

BBC News

, 11 January 2008.

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Germany.

“French open probe on Algeria attack that injured two French”, Associated Press, 25 September 2007.

“UN raises toll in Algeria bombing to 17 dead”, Associated Press, 14 December 2007.

“El ‘número dos’ de Al Qaeda incita otra vez a atacar a España”,

El País

, 4 November 2007.

TE-SAT

2008

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ERRORISM

Afghan Taliban and pro-Taliban groups in Pakistan
have links to the increasingly active core-structure
of al-Qaeda that is currently based in the Pashtun
tribal areas in western Pakistan. There it is believed
to have reorganised and rebuilt its capabilities as
well as its command and control functions.

Terrorist attacks in both Afghanistan and Pakistan
increased significantly in 2007, compared to 2006.
These attacks were mainly directed at foreign
troops in Afghanistan and government troops in
Pakistan. In the course of 2007, Afghanistan saw
an increase in the use of IEDs and suicide bomb-
ers. Statistics on terrorist attacks in Pakistan show
a three-fold increase from 2006 to 2007.

In July 2007, the frequency of attacks in Pakistan
more than doubled and remained high through-
out the rest of the year. This shift happened virtu-
ally overnight and coincided with the storming by
Pakistani security forces of the besieged complex
of Lal Masjid, the Red Mosque, in the capital
Islamabad on 11 July, during which the pro-
Taliban militants inside the complex were defeat-
ed.

The same day, al-Qaeda issued a statement

calling for

jihad

against the Pakistani government

as a response to the siege of Lal Masjid.

Immediately afterwards, an unprecedented wave
of suicide bombings struck the capital and other
parts of the country, mainly targeting the Pakistani
armed forces and intelligence services.

Fighting

escalated in the Pakistani tribal areas, especially in
Waziristan, where Pashtun militants clashed with
government troops as well as with Uzbek foreign
fighters.

Afghanistan  and  Pakistan  in  general,  and  the
Pashtun areas in particular, are of utmost impor-
tance to EU counter-terrorism. In the past, terrorist
links  between  Pakistan  and  the  EU  were  almost
exclusively  focused  on  the  UK. The  foiled  plot  in
Germany, related to an Uzbek group based in the
Pakistani tribal areas, and recent cases in the UK
and  Denmark  indicate  an  increasingly  assertive
and efficient Pakistani-based command and con-
trol of Islamist terrorism in the EU.

Somalia

In 2007, leaders of militant Islamists in Somalia, as
well as the leadership of al-Qaeda, renewed the
call for

jihad

against Ethiopian forces in Somalia

and  the  internationally  recognised  Transitional
Federal  Government  of  Somalia.  In  the  EU,  the
former  spokesman  of  the  proscribed  UK  group

al-Muhajiroun

posted a statement on the Internet

calling followers to join the

jihad

in Somalia.

January 2007, the US launched air strikes in the
south of the country, targeting senior al-Qaeda
operatives. This provoked agitation by the Islamist
group

Hizb-ut-Tahrir

on the streets of London.

Greece, the far-left militant group Revolutionary
Struggle claimed responsibility for a rocket-pro-
pelled grenade attack against the US embassy in
Athens in response to US intervention in Somalia
and elsewhere.

The success of the Somali Islamists in 2006 attract-
ed some foreign fighters to join, but the new calls
to

jihad

likely engaged additional volunteers from

abroad. More than 90 suspected foreign Islamist

“Intelligence counter terrorism and trust”, speech by the director general of the British Security Service, 5

November 2007, www.mi5.gov.uk.

Approx. 10 percent of the attacks are attributed to the non-Islamist Balochistan separatist movements. “Country

statistics: Pakistan”,

Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre

Ibid.

“The Aggression Against Lal Masjid”, audio speech by Ayman al-Zawahiri, 11 July 2007.

There were a total of 56 suicide bombings in Pakistan in 2007, 36 of which targeted the military and intelligence

services. See: Abbas, Hassan, “A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan”,

CTC Sentinel

, Vol. 1, Issue 2, January 2008;

“Suicide Attacks Spread to Islamabad”,

Terrorism Focus

, Vol. 4, Issue 25, 31 July 2007.

Richards, Julian, “Terrorists in the Tribal Areas: Endgame for Musharraf?” Pakistan Security Research Unit, 22

September 2007; “Open borders and the militant Uzbeks of Pakistan”,

Jane’s Intelligence Digest

, 25 January 2008.

“UK preacher in secret web call for

jihad

”,

Sunday Times

, 14 January 2007.

“Islamists use raid to stir up UK Somalis”,

Sunday Telegraph

, 14 January 2007.

“Greek militants claim US Embassy attack responsibility”,

Dow Jones International News

, 25 January 2007.

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insurgents were reported captured or killed during
2007; among them were five Swedish and five
British nationals.

The  Islamist  insurgents  employ  guerrilla  tactics
against military targets as well as acts of terrorism
against  civilian  targets.  The  frequent  suicide
bombings, perpetrated by both men and women,
are a new phenomenon in Somalia suggesting a
foreign,  al-Qaeda-driven,  influence  from  other
scenes of global

jihad

Iraq

The  overall  security  situation  in  Iraq  improved
during  2007.  Although  ethno-sectarian  violence
continues to be of concern, civilian casualties and
attacks  with  IEDs  decreased.  The  number  of
attacks with IEDs fell from 1,700 in June 2007 to
less than 700 in December. The number of report-
ed  security  incidents  is  now  down  to  the  same
level as in 2005. Targets of terrorist activity in Iraq
include  Iraqi  civilians  as  well  as  foreigners
employed by private businesses.

Since 2005, 14 of the 667 suicide attacks have been
committed by women. Although the overall number
of attacks decreased, the number of women
involved in suicide attacks increased in 2007.

Kidnappings of foreign nationals in Iraq continue
to be frequent. In May 2007, five British nationals
were kidnapped by an Iraqi group who demanded
the withdrawal of all British armed forces from
Iraq.

A German national and her son were taken

hostages  in  Iraq  in  2007.  While  the  woman  was
later released, her son is still missing. An Austrian
national  kidnapped  in  2006  is  also  still  missing.
A video  of  this  hostage  was  disseminated  by  his
captors in January 2007.

Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia

, under the umbrella of

the

Islamic State of Iraq

, remains a major and direct

obstacle to peace and stability in Iraq. However,
the terrorist organisation appears to face increas-
ing opposition across Iraq from armed groups led
by tribal leaders. There are strong indications that
its military capabilities and its ability to fund oper-
ations have been significantly affected.

By the end of 2007, the majority of

al-Qaeda in

Mesopotamia’s

leadership and many of its fighters

were foreign-born. Likewise, over 90 percent of
suicide bombers were foreign terrorists.

As the

security situation improves, foreign terrorists may
leave Iraq or relocate their

jihadist

activities to

other regions, including the EU.

5.5. Key findings

In 2007, the EU saw two failed and two

•

attempted attacks related to Islamist terror-
ism; 201 suspects were arrested.

The failed and attempted attacks in the mem-

•

ber states aimed at causing indiscriminate
mass casualties by means of detonating a
main charge composed of home-made explo-
sives. In two cases the suspects attempted to
produce TATP.

Manuals on how to build bombs, together

•

with Islamist terrorist propaganda, are increas-
ingly spread on the Internet. In 2007, al-Qaeda
launched an unprecedented media campaign.
Islamist terrorist propaganda is increasingly
available in European languages.

Al-Qaeda’s remaining core leadership in the

•

tribal areas of Pakistan is exercising command
and control on and inspiration for planning

“Four Swedes arrested in Somalia”,

CNN

, 20 February 2007; “Official says Western

Jihad

ists killed in Somalia”,

Reuters, 3 June 2007; “Secret SAS mission to Somalia uncovers British terror cells”,

Daily Mail

, 23 June 2007.

“Foreign Fighters Face Obstacles Joining the Somali

Jihad

”,

Terrorism Focus

, 24 July 2007; “Veiled Threats”,

Washington Post

, 12 August 2007.

“Increase in female bombers raises concern”,

CBS News

, 4 January 2008.

“Briton held in Iraq for 8 months is put on TV”,

Times online

, 27 February 2008.

“DoD News Briefing with Lt. Gen. Odierno from Iraq”, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs),

U.S. Department of Defense, 17 January 2008.

“Al-Qaeda in Iraq Update”, press conference with Rear Admiral Gregory Smith, Multi-National Force-Iraq’s

Communication Division, Baghdad, 20 January 2008.

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attacks were reported as successfully executed.
Basque separatist terrorists in Spain mainly attack
governmental

and business

targets. Twelve

percent of the attacks were directed at critical
infrastructure

and the vast majority of these

were attributed to Taldes Y. The majority of the
attacks in Spain were carried out in the Basque
region.

In France, two regions were targeted by separatist
terrorist groups: the Basque region and Corsica. In
the Basque region, thirty-three percent of the
separatist terrorist attacks targeted private prop-
erty

, a decrease compared to 2006. Forty-one

percent of the attacks were directed at business

targets.

In Corsica, fifty-five percent of separatist

terrorist attacks targeted private property such as
private holiday apartments. Only sixteen percent
were directed towards governmental interests, a
small decrease compared to 2006. See figure 13.

In Corsica, 31 percent of the attacks carried out
were attributed to FLNC or FLNC UDC. Two attacks
were attributed to ARMATA CORSA 1774. The
remaining 154 attacks either were not claimed or
could not be attributed to a particular group.

Germany reported fifteen separatist terrorist
attacks for 2007. Fourteen were claimed by the

Kurdistan Workers’ Party

(PKK/KONGRA-GEL).

The

Governmental targets in Spain include government offices, court houses, and political parties.

Business targets in Spain include ATMs, bank branches, real estate agencies.

Critical Infrastructure in Spain includes highways and railways.

Private property includes holiday apartments and cars.

Business targets in France include real estate agencies and the tourist sector.

Figure 12: Number of Taldes Y attacks and attacks by ETA in Spain in 2006 and 2007

Num

ber

Month Year

2006

2007

Jan

Mar

May

July

Sept

Nov

Jan

Mar

May

July

Sept

Nov

ETA

Taldes Y

Ceasefire

24/03/2006

End of ceasefire

06/06/2007

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remaining  attack  was  not  claimed  by  PKK/
KONGRA-GEL,  but  has  been  attributed  to  the
organisation  by  German  authorities.  The  attacks
took  place  in  February  and  March  2007.  Most  of
them were arson attacks, directed at Turkish inter-
ests  in  Germany,  such  as Turkish  travel  agencies,
banks  and  mosques  in  Bottrop,  Dortmund  and
Hagen.

6.2. Arrested Suspects

For 2007, eight member states reported the arrest
of a total of 548 people suspected of separatist
terrorism offences. Fifty-seven percent of the
arrests took place in France, followed by thirty-six
percent in Spain.

The total number of suspects arrested for separa-
tist  terrorism  in  2007  increased  by  over  100  per-
cent  compared  to  2006.  This  is  caused  by  an
increase  in  arrests  related  to  both  Basque  and
Corsican  separatist  terrorism.  In  Spain,  sixty  per-
cent of the arrested suspects were linked to ETA
and nine percent to ETA’s youth organisation SEGI.
France  reported  an  increase  of  eight  percent  in
arrests related to Basque separatist terrorism com-
pared to 2006. The majority of the arrested were
linked to ETA. Seven percent of the arrested sus-
pects were linked to SEGI.

In France, the increase in arrested suspects linked
to Corsican separatist terrorism can been explained
in part by the numerous arrests carried out after

Figure 13: Targeting of separatist terrorist groups in France and Spain in 2006 and 2007

Not Specified
Critical Infrastructure
Private Property/Individuals
Government
Business

tage

100

2006

2007

2006

2007

2006

2007

Year

Basque separatist terrorism

Spain

Basque separatist terrorism

France

Corsican separatist terrorism

France

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Yvan Colonna, a prominent figure within Corsican
separatist terrorism, was sentenced to imprison-
ment. After Colonna’s conviction, the youth of the
island, considering him a hero, mounted a wave of
violent protests. Several of the protesters were
arrested.

Twelve percent of all suspects arrested for separa-
tist terrorism were women. For ETA the figure is
eighteen percent, which is the single highest per-
centage for all terrorist groups in the member
states, regardless of affiliation.

Suspects arrested for Basque separatist terrorism
are  generally  younger  than  those  arrested  for
Corsican separatist terrorism. Fifty-five percent of
those  arrested  for  Basque  separatist  terrorism  in
France and Spain were younger than 30 compared
to  only  thirty-one  percent  under  30  for  Corsican
separatist terrorism. This may be explained by the
fact that most reported suspects arrested relating
to  Basque  separatist  terrorism  were  linked  to

Taldes Y

attacks.

In Spain, just over 70 percent of the suspects were
arrested for membership of a terrorist organisa-
tion. This high percentage may be explained by a
ruling of the Spanish supreme court determining
that three or more acts of collaboration with a ter-
rorist organisation automatically are to be consid-
ered as membership of a terrorist organisation. By
contrast, in France, the majority of suspects arrest-
ed for Corsican separatist terrorism were arrested
for attack-related offences.

In 2007, 38 persons were reported arrested in rela-
tion to PKK/KONGRA-GEL in five member states:

Belgium,  France,  Germany,  the  Netherlands  and
Slovakia. The majority of all suspects were arrest-
ed for attack-related offences. The arrests caused a
series  of  protests  amongst  the  Kurdish  popula-
tions  in  several  of  these  countries.  Although  the
majority  of  the  protests  were  peaceful,  in  some
instances  violence  erupted,  mainly  directed
towards  Turkish  interests.

In February, Belgian

authorities arrested the EU leader of PKK/
KONGRA-GEL on suspicion of financing terrorism
via drug trafficking.

In Ireland, the number of arrested suspects went
up from four in 2006 to twenty-four in 2007. The
majority of the arrested suspects were members
of the

Irish National Liberation Army

(INLA). The

arrests were linked to an increase in criminal activ-
ity by this group in 2007. The majority of the
arrested were charged with membership of an
unlawful organisation.

French  law  enforcement  arrested  a  total  of  25
members of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, LTTE
during 2007. All arrested suspects were men. The
vast  majority  of  the  suspects  were  arrested  on
suspicion  of  financing  terrorism  through  extor-
tion. Seventy-two percent of the arrested were Sri
Lankan citizens.

The LTTE has a vast global net-

work of ethnic Tamils and associates in the diaspo-
ra, with structures of fundraising, procurement
and propaganda firmly in place.

One of the core

activities of the LTTE in the EU is the collection of
funds from the Tamil diaspora on a monthly basis
to finance military and military-related
procurement.

Contribution to the TESAT 2008: France.

Zwischenbericht 2007: Entwicklungen und Analysen des Extremismus in Nordrhein Westfalen

, North Rhine-

Westphalia Office for the Protection of the Constitution, September 2007.

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Belgium.

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Ireland.

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: France.

“Funding the “Final War”: LTTE Intimidation and Extortion in the Tamil Diaspora”

, Human Rights Watch, Vol. 18,

No. 1(C), March 2006.

“Feeding the Tiger – How Sri Lankan insurgents fund their war”,

Jane’s Intelligence review

, 1 August 2007.

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6.3. Terrorist Activities

For the second half of 2007, Portugal reported an
unusual increase in the number of ETA activities in
Portugal. The activities seemed to be confined to
renting vehicles that were later used in ETA opera-
tions.  This  may  be  an  attempt  by  ETA  to  avoid
detection  from  law  enforcement  agencies  in
France  and  Spain.  Portuguese  and  Spanish  law
enforcement  agencies  responded  by  creating
joint investigation teams.

Traditionally, ETA carries out its activities in Spain,
France and, to a lesser extent, in other EU coun-
tries. France is mainly used as an operational rear
base from which ETA develops its logistic means.
It is also used for housing and training ETA reserve
activists.

In the course of 2007, Spanish authorities noted a
decrease in the use of commercial explosives in
ETA-related attacks. In the past, ETA mainly used a
combination of commercial explosives and home-
made explosives (HMEs). Recent attacks, however,
have been based mainly on HMEs.

This change

in tactics may be the result of increased security
measures taken by the French authorities to pro-
tect explosive factories, depots and explosives
transportation, which prevents ETA from getting
access to commercial explosives.

In summer 2007, ETA released several versions of
a recruitment video which showed some of their
activities. The videos were released just after ETA
had called off the ceasefire. The aim was proba-
bly to encourage young people to join ETA. This
method of recruitment has rarely been seen in

the past and may indicate a new modus operan-
di for ETA.

Financing of terrorism by extortion is reported in
relation to Corsican and Basque separatist terror-
ism as well as the LTTE. According to open sources,
extortion  is  an  important  source  of  income  for
ETA.  In  2007,  Spanish  media  reported  on  several
extortion  campaigns  directed  at  businessmen  in
the Basque region and Navarre.

Fourteen of the

arrests reported by France in relation to extortion
were linked to Corsican separatist terrorism. The
majority of the arrested suspects were members
of FLNC, targeting private businesses such as real
estate agents.

In Ireland, law enforcement authorities witnessed
an increase in the number of terrorism-related
arrests in 2007 compared to 2006. This, however,
is mainly due to an increase in criminal activity by
INLA. Based on capability and intent, the threat
from the Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)
and Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) is estimated
to be moderate to substantial.

The  year  2007  saw  great  strides  forward  in  the
political process in Northern Ireland, including the
restoration  of  full  power  to  the  Northern  Ireland
Assembly in May. An important milestone was the
announcement by the nationalist party, Sinn Fein,
that  it  would  recognise  and  support  the  Police
Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and participate
in policing bodies.

In view of this historical deci-

sion, the dissident terrorist group RIRA vowed to
continue attacks against Police and British forces
until a full withdrawal of troops.

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Spain, Portugal.

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Spain.

Evaluation of the Cosmetics and Explosives Directives: Final report (Explosives)

, submitted to DG Enterprise and

Industry, European Commission, by the E E C (GHK, Technopolis), 21 September 2007.

“ETA amenaza en nuevas cartas a los empresarios con ‘tomar medidas’ si no pagan”,

El Mundo

, 5 August 2007.

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: France.

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Ireland.

“Power-sharing begins in Northern Ireland”,

International Herald Tribune

, 8 May 2007.

“‘Attacks on police will go on in New Year’—Real IRA”,

Derry Journal

, 8 January 2008.

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In Germany, unidentified individuals attacked rep-
resentatives of a private company which produces
naval ships for private and military use. In
Hamburg, high-value company cars of two man-
agers were damaged. One of the cars was set on
fire. In addition, the attackers vandalised the
house of one of the managers. In the past, similar
attacks were linked to left-wing terrorism.

Italy reported an increased threat from left-wing
groups and individuals using the same strategies
and ideologies as the

Brigate Rosse

(Red Brigades).

These  groups  mainly  target  high-ranking  Italian
businessmen  and  politicians.  The  arrests  in
February  2007  leading  to  the  dismantlement  of
the

Partito Comunista Politico-Militare

(PCP-M)

sparked a series of incidents in solidarity with the
arrested. Italian authorities reported that these
incidents brought together several rival groups
adhering to different ideologies. One such exam-

ple is the

Fronte Rivoluzionario per il Comunismo

(Revolutionary Front for Communism), which sup-
ports a revolution based on armed struggle.

On 5 March 2007, the

Fronte Rivoluzionario per il

Comunismo

attempted an attack in Milan.

100

home-made explosive device was found in front of
an unoccupied police station. The

Fronte

Rivoluzionario

per il Comunismo

claimed responsi-

bility for the attempted attack, stating that it was in
retaliation for recent arrests.

101

The

Partito Comunista Combatente

(PCC), a smaller

left-wing group with the same ideology as the

Red

Brigades

, claimed two attacks in 2007.

102

The PCC

justifies its attacks as blows against imperialism
within Italian economic policy and Italy’s “contri-
bution to the NATO strategy”.

103

Italian authorities have also noted a revival of anar-
chist revolutionary ideologies, particularly among
groups and individuals united under the banner of
the

Federazione Anarchica Informale

(FAI).

104

In Austria, on 12 March 2007, a device looking like
a pipe bomb was found in the underground park-
ing of a bank. The pipe bomb later turned out to
be a dummy. A message attached to the device
demanded amnesty for members of the

Red Army

Fraction

(RAF) imprisoned in Germany.

105

Extremism

In  the  second  semester  of  2007,  extremist  anar-
chist activities in Greece mainly took the form of
arson attacks against low-profile targets. The main
targets were bank branches, vehicles and political
party  offices.  The  number  of  attacks,  however,
decreased  significantly  compared  to  the  first
semester  of  2007.  The  activities  appeared  to  be
isolated and decentralised. The targets seemed to
be  randomly  chosen.  As  in  previous  years,  the
attacks only caused material damage.

106

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Germany.

100

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Italy.

101

Alvanou, M., “Left Wing Terrorist groups in European countries, a threat still alive”, ITSTIME, May 2007.

102

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Italy.

103

Alvanou, M., “Left Wing Terrorist groups in European countries, a threat still alive”, ITSTIME, May 2007.

104

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Italy.

105

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Austria.

106

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Greece.

100

tage

Business

Private property/

Individuals

Government

Target

2006
2007

Figure15: Targeting of left-wing and anarchist

terrorist groups in 2006 and 2007

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In  Estonia,  extremist  left-wing  groups  were
responsible  for  extensive  vandalism  and  mass
riots  in  relation  to  the  relocation  of  a  Soviet-era
war  memorial,  the  Bronze  Soldier,  in  Tallinn  in
April 2007. The Estonian embassy in Moscow was
also attacked and vandalised. Four persons were
charged  with  organising  the  riots.  The  trial  is
ongoing.

107

7.2. Arrested Suspects and

Terrorist Activities

Forty-eight individuals were arrested for left-wing
and anarchist terrorism in five member states:
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain.
Spain and Italy reported a total of twelve suspects
arrested for anarchist terrorism. All other arrests
were reported as left-wing.

The vast majority of the arrests were made in Italy
and Spain. As for all other affiliations, the vast
majority of the suspects were arrested for mem-
bership of a terrorist organisation. Twelve percent
of the suspects were arrested for arson attacks.

Six  of  the  arrested  suspects  were  women.  Only
one  woman  was  arrested  for  an  attack-related
offence: she was linked to anarchist terrorism and
was  involved  in  an  arson  attack. This  is  the  only
attack-related offence for which a female suspect
was reported arrested, regardless of affiliation.

Extremism

In 2007, the G8 summit was held in Heiligendamm
in Germany. G8 meetings traditionally attract large
crowds of left-wing and anarchist activists from all
over the world. Demonstrations against the sum-
mit occasionally turned violent.

108

Both Belgium

and  Sweden  reported  the  arrest  of  a  number  of
their  nationals  during  the  meeting.  Germany
reported  two  investigations  relating  to  left-wing
extremist  groups  planning  attacks  against  the
summit in 2007.

In 2007, Italy observed a merger of anarchist ter-
rorist  groups  and  single-issue  extremist  groups
linked  to  e.g.  anti-militarism,  immigration,  envi-
ronmentalism and social rights. This merger may
eventually  mean  that  single-issue  groups,  which
to date have only been involved in social protest,
will  change  their  activities  and  become  more
involved in subversive activities.

109

In  Belgium,  anarchist  extremists  took  part  in
actions  organised  by  animal  rights  extremists.  In
the  course  of  these  activities,  the  anarchists
engaged  in  acts  of  vandalism. The  principal  left-
wing  extremist  group  present  in  Belgium  is  the

Secours Rouge

(APAPC), which contains former

members of the

Cellules Communistes Combattantes

(CCC). The activities of the

Secours Rouge

are

mostly  related  to  public  order.  Nevertheless,  it
should  be  noted  that  former  CCC  members
released  from  prison  publicly  declared  that  they
continue  to  believe  that  armed  struggle  is
necessary.

110

Sweden reported on activities by extremist auton-
omous  groups  prepared  to  use  violence  as  a
means to achieve their political goals. Several dif-
ferent  ideological  currents  exist  within  this  envi-
ronment  with  anarchism  being  most  prominent.
Both  men  and  women  are  active  within  these
groups.  The  majority  are  under  30  years  old.
Swedish  authorities  have  reported  that  activists
belonging to these groups are willing and able to
use incendiary bombs against symbolic targets.

111

107

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Estonia.

108

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Germany.

109

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Italy.

110

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Belgium.

111

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Sweden.

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One  right-wing  terrorist  attack  was  reported  for
2007.  The  attack  took  place  in  Portugal  where
right-wing terrorists vandalised a Jewish cemetery
in  September  2007. The  attack  on  the  cemetery
seems  to  have  been  part  of  an  initiation  rite  by
self-proclaimed

Hammerskin Friends

for the pur-

pose of pleasing and impressing the leaders of the
Portuguese branch of the

Hammerskins

112

A total of 44 suspects were arrested for right-wing
terrorism in Austria, the Netherlands and Portugal.
Of these, 31 were arrested in Portugal as part of
the operation against the Portuguese section of
the

Hammerskins

. Twenty-seven of the suspects

were arrested for possession of illegal weapons,
racial discrimination, promotion of racial hatred
and Nazi propaganda. The Portuguese investiga-
tion also revealed a European network of sympa-
thisers communicating via the Internet.

113

With one exception, all arrested suspects for right-
wing terrorism were male. The female suspect was
arrested in the Netherlands for possession of ille-
gal firearms. The arrested were between 18 and 30
years of age, except for two suspects who were 40
and 42 years old. This means that, generally speak-
ing, suspects arrested for right-wing terrorism are
relatively young.

Extremism

Reported incidents relating to right-wing extrem-
ist continued to increase in a number of member
states. Dutch authorities report an increase in
reports of right-wing extremism in 2007, but esti-
mate that the level of violence remains fairly
stable.

114

Poland has reported a slight increase in right-wing
extremist activity. The groups are mainly active on
the Internet, where they have established interna-
tional contacts. The most active right-wing group
is

Blood and Honour

and its fighting unit

Combat 18

115

In the course of 2007, Italy observed an increase in
activity by right-wing extremists. This increase
manifested itself mainly in acts of vandalism and
attacks against left-wing parties and organisa-
tions.

Forza Nuova

is the most prominent right-

wing extremist group active in Italy.

116

Swedish  authorities  reported  an  increase  in  vio-
lent  clashes  between  various  left-wing/anarchist
movements  and  extreme  right  groups  during
2007. The increase in violence is thought to mainly
be the work of the right-wing extremist groups.

117

8. RIghT-wINg TERRORISM

112

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Portugal.

113

ibid.

114

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: the Netherlands.

115

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Poland.

116

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Italy.

117

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Sweden.

TE-SAT

2008

In Germany, the Saxony Minister of the Interior
banned the right-wing group

Sturm 34

on the

basis that it is in opposition to the constitutional
order  and  that  its  objectives  and  activities  run
counter  to  criminal  law.  The  group  consists  of
approx. 40 to 50 members and 100 sympathisers.
Members  of  the  group  stated  that  they  consid-
ered violence as a means of reaching their objec-
tives.  In  June  2007,  right-wing  extremists  in
Germany  attacked  and  physically  assaulted  five
persons who suffered severe facial injuries.

118

UK  authorities  reported  that  the  number  of  inci-
dents  involving  right-wing  extremists  linked  to
explosives,  weapons  or  prohibited  items  has
increased  in  the  last  ten  years.  In  2007,  the  UK
authorities  reported  a  total  of  seven  right-wing
extremists arrested for a range of explosives-relat-
ed offences. During various house searches, police
found CS gas canisters and explosive pyrotechnics
but also training manuals, a downloaded Internet
article  on  the  recovery  of  home-made  explosive
devices and a recipe for a simple hydrogen perox-
ide/chapati flour explosive mixture.

In  October  2007,  UK  police  found  a  quantity  of
nail bombs during a house search into the home
of  a  right-wing  extremist.  Documents  recovered
at  the  address  indicate  that  he  was  planning  to
attack mosques in the area.

In the UK, a number of the arrested individuals
could be classified as “lone-wolves”. These individu-
als share an ideological or philosophical identifica-
tion with an extremist group, but do not communi-
cate with the group they identify with. While the
lone wolf’s actions aim to advance the group’s goal,
the tactics and methods are conceived and direct-
ed without any outside command or direction.

In the UK, most of the groups involved in right-
wing extremism have a relatively small member-

ship base and many individuals are members of a
number of like-minded groups. Thus, successful
prosecutions are likely to have a ripple effect and,
in the short term, diminish the ability of the vari-
ous groups to engage in street demonstrations
and protests.

Both the UK and the Netherlands reported on
increased hostility against Muslim communities
from right-wing extremists.

119

The failed car bomb-

ings in June 2007 by Islamic extremists fuelled the
right-wing  extremists  in  the  UK  and  resulted  in
protest activity. However, according to UK authori-
ties, these attacks were generally not coordinated
by  any  right-wing  organisation  but  rather  the
result  of  individual  acts  of  racism  and
criminality.

120

8.1. Key findings

For 2007 the member states reported one

•

right-wing terrorist attack and 48 arrested
related to right-wing terrorism.

Suspects arrested for right-wing terrorism are

•

generally younger than arrested suspects in
other types of terrorism.

A majority of member states reported right-

•

wing activities as extremism and not as
terrorism.

Activities from right-wing extremist groups

•

are increasing.

In the UK, an increasing amount of right-wing

•

extremists are involved in activities linked to
explosive devices and home-made explosives.

A few member states reported increased hos-

•

tility towards Muslim communities from right-
wing extremists.

118

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Germany.

119

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: UK and the Netherlands.

120

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: UK.

TE-SAT

2008

T-

wIN

TERRORISM

One single issue terrorist attack was reported for
2007. The attack took place in Portugal and was
committed against a transgenic corn field. Over
100 people took part in the attack; more than one
hectare of the field was destroyed.

121

Extremism

In an incident in February, environmental extrem-
ists in Bulgaria sent letters to a number of news-
papers claiming to have placed explosive devices
in several locations throughout the ski resorts in
Bansko. The unknown perpetrators demanded an
end to “the destruction of the nature in the
area”.

122

Italy reported an increase in activity from environ-
mental extremist groups against governmental
infrastructure projects. This includes vandalism
and sabotage of critical infrastructure.

123

In  2007,  European  animal  rights  extremists  were
involved in arson attacks, letter bombs, and prod-
uct contamination, as well as wide-spread acts of
vandalism.  Threats  against  employees,  and  their
family  members,  of  companies  which  are  per-
ceived to be involved in the mistreatment of ani-
mals  are  commonplace.

124

The same applies to

academic research institutions, such as universi-
ties, scientists, university staff and students.

125

In May 2007, European law enforcement arrested
30 animal rights extremist activists in a joint oper-
ation involving law enforcement agencies in five
EU countries. The operation was part of an investi-
gation into Europe-wide

Stop Huntingdon Animal

Cruelty

(SHAC) activities, led by SHAC leaders in

the UK. Those arrested were suspected of conspir-
acy  to  blackmail  Huntingdon  Life  Sciences  (HLS)
and associated companies. The blackmail consist-
ed  of  a  concerted  effort  by  extremists,  including
criminality  against  target  premises  and  other
modi operandi to achieve their ambition to close
HLS. The arrests took place mainly in the UK.

SHAC was founded in 1999, with the sole aim to
force the closure of the contract research organi-
sation  HLS.  SHAC  targets  include  suppliers,  cus-
tomers and financial institutions linked to HLS. In
the  EU,  SHAC  is  currently  known  to  have  a  pres-
ence  in  Belgium

126

, Austria, Finland, France,

Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Poland, Spain,
Sweden and the UK.

127

UK government officials stated that animal rights
extremism is a serious concern and that activists

9. SINglE ISSUE TERRORISM

121

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Portugal.

122

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Bulgaria.

123

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Italy.

124

“Resisting the Animal Avengers”,

Spiegel Online,

19 November 2007; “Animal rights militants charged after police

operation”,

Financial Times

, London, 4 May 2007;

125

“Resisting the Animal Avengers”,

Spiegel Online,

19 November 2007; “Animal activists plant bombs at Oxford col-

lege”,

Daily Telegraph

, 27 February 2007.

126

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Belgium.

127

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: UK.

TE-SAT

2008

could be charged under the Terrorism Act 2000, if
appropriate.

128

UK animal rights extremists are per-

ceived to hold a pivotal role in the animal rights
scene in the EU and UK activists are frequently tak-
ing part in extremist activities throughout Europe.

In 2007, UK law enforcement recorded 229 crimi-
nal  incidents  relating  directly  to  animal  rights
extremism. The  pharmaceutical  industry  remains
the  main  target.  The  majority  of  the  incidents
were  recorded  as  criminal  damage.  These  were
often directed against targets that have also been
the subject of suspicious incidents, and threaten-
ing communications in the form of letters, e-mails
and telephone calls.

Since  August  2007,  in  the  UK  there  have  been  a
number  of  serious  offences  connected  with  ani-
mal  rights  extremists.  A  series  of  six  claims  of
product contamination targeting pharmaceutical
companies with links to HLS also affected France,
Spain and Austria.

129

In November 2007, two improvised incendiary
devices (IIDs) destroyed the vehicles of two Oxford
University professors. They were targeted by ani-
mal rights extremists. An additional IID was placed
under a third vehicle, but failed to ignite.

In January 2007, the

Animal Liberation Front

(ALF)

organised  a  tour  through  various  cities  in  Italy.
This was a campaign against chain stores believed
to sell furs and companies accused of conducting
animal  experiments.  In  October  2007,  ALF  also
claimed responsibility for breaking into a labora-
tory  and  releasing  several  animals,  as  well  as  for
the criminal damage caused to the buildings.

130

According to the statistics published on animal
rights extremist websites, the member states most

targeted by animal rights extremists, besides the
UK, are Italy, France, Spain and Sweden. In 2007,
Estonia was included on the websites as a target
country.  Nevertheless,  this  data  originates  from
animal  rights  extremist-owned  websites.
Therefore,  it  may  not  be  representative  of  the
actual problem experienced by a particular mem-
ber  state.  In  October  2007,  a  French  ALF  cell
claimed  responsibility  for  a  fire  bomb  in  the
Netherlands.  This  type  of  attacks  confirms  that
animal rights extremists are not limited by nation-
al boundaries.

131

Making  threats  via  the  Internet  is  likely  to  be  a
method  increasingly  favoured  by  animal  rights
extremists, due to the high level of anonymity and
reduced  levels  of  financial  requirement  and  per-
sonal risk.

132

9.1. Key findings

Portugal reported one single issue terrorist

•

attack linked to environmentalist terrorism.

A majority of all member states reported sin-

•

gle issue activities as extremism and not as
terrorism.

The UK animal rights extremists are perceived

•

to hold a pivotal role in the animal rights scene
in the EU. UK activists frequently take part in
extremist activities throughout the EU.

Attacks by single issue extremist groups main-

•

ly targeted private property and individuals
linked to targeted companies.

Italy reported an increased activity of environ-

•

mental extremist groups targeting govern-
mental infrastructure projects.

128

www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cn200607/cmhansrd/cm070129/text/70129w0024.htm, 9 March 2008.

129

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: UK.

130

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: Italy.

131

Contribution to the TE-SAT 2008: UK.

132

Ibid.

TE-SAT

2008

SIN

ISSUE

ERRORISM

10. TRENDS

The number of terrorist attacks in the EU is
increasing.

During 2007, 583 terrorist attacks

were  committed  in  the  EU.  Of  these,  91  percent
were  perpetrated  by  separatist  terrorists.  As  in
2006, the vast majority of all attacks were commit-
ted by Basque and Corsican separatist terrorists in
Spain and France. Separatist terrorist attacks con-
tinue to mainly cause material damage. However,
ETA  continues  to  specifically  target  Spanish  law
enforcement and governmental officials. This was
evidenced by the fatal attack on the two Spanish
Guardia Civil officers in France in 2007.

The number of suspects arrested for terrorism
in the EU is increasing.

The number of arrested

suspects has increased from 706 in 2006 to 1044
in  2007.  As  for  the  increase  in  attacks,  this  can
partly  be  attributed  to  the  increased  activity  of
Corsican and Basque separatist terrorism groups.
This trend is also reflected in the statistics report-
ed  by  Eurojust:  in  2007,  54  percent  of  all  court
cases  were  related  to  separatist  terrorism.
However, the general increase in arrests can also
be explained by the 30 percent increase in arrests
in the UK. The vast majority of these arrests were
in relation to Islamist terrorism.

The use of home-made explosives in terrorist
attacks is increasing.

In the vast majority of all ter-

rorist attacks carried out by means of explosive
devices, the main charge was composed of home-
made explosives.

As in 2006, this continues to be

the main type of explosive used by Islamist terror-
ists.  For  2007,  however,  this  was  also  noticed  in
relation  to  separatist  terrorism,  especially  in  the
case of ETA. As in 2006, investigations into attempt-
ed attacks in the member states revealed the use of
TATP,  a  highly  volatile  explosive  which  requires  a
certain level of expertise in handling. This corrobo-

rates the information that several of the EU sus-
pects received training in bomb-making.

More terrorism propaganda is being produced
and distributed over the Internet than ever
before.

Propaganda continues to be an important

tool  for  terrorists  in  order  to  attract  new  recruits
and  give  logistical  support.  Manuals  on  how  to
build bombs, together with ideological propagan-
da,  are  increasingly  spread  on  the  Internet.  For
2007, propaganda is also a new offence reported
by  the  member  states  in  relation  to  arrested
Islamist  terrorist  suspects. The  unprecedented  al-
Qaeda  media  campaign  during  2007  produced
propaganda in a number of European languages,
indicating  increasing  efforts  to  reach  non-Arabic
speaking Europeans. Although propaganda mate-
rial is available in increasing quality and quantity,
there is no proof that this in itself leads to increas-
ing  radicalisation  of  the  targeted  audience.  The
availability  of  great  quantities  of  propaganda
material,  easily  accessible  through  the  Internet,
however, does facilitate the tasks of propagandists
and recruiters and may lead to a general increase
in the number of Islamist terrorists in the EU.

Islamist terrorism in the EU continues to aim at
causing indiscriminate mass casualties.

Most

investigations into failed and foiled Islamist terror-
ist attacks in the EU in 2007 showed that Islamist
terrorists  continue  to  aim  at  causing  indiscrimi-
nate mass casualties. This is not only observed in
the choice of targets but also in the methods and
explosives  used.  In  the  failed  attack  in  London,
nails added to the IED would have assured a maxi-
mum  number  of  casualties.  In  the  attempted
attack  in  Germany,  the  suspects  tried  to  build  a
bomb with a higher explosive effect than the ones
used  in  the  Madrid  attacks  in  2004,  the  attack

TE-SAT

2008

which has so far caused the highest number of
causalities and fatalities in the EU.

Islamist  terrorism  in  the  EU  is  increasingly
influenced  by  Pakistani-based  al-Qaeda-affili-
ated  groups  and  networks.

In 2007, member

states  observed  an  increasing  number  of  plots
confined to a single member state but with links
to al-Qaeda-affiliated groups based in Pakistan. In
the past, terrorist plots linked to groups/networks
operating in Pakistan have been almost exclusive-
ly concentrated on the UK. In 2007, investigations
into  attempted  terrorist  attacks  indicated  an
increasing  influence  of  this  region,  and  even
Pakistani-based command and control on Islamist
terrorism  in  the  EU.  The  attempted  attack  in
Germany  also  showed  the  emergence  of  a
Pakistani-based  group  with  links  to  al-Qaeda,
which had not previously been involved in attacks
within the EU, able to provide logistical support to
Islamist terrorists in member states.

The conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have a
large impact on the security environment of
the EU.

As seen in the statements posted by the

German-speaking GIMF, member states are threat-
ened  with  violence  in  an  attempt  to  influence
national  policies  on  the  engagement  in  conflict
areas.  The  recruitment  of  EU  nationals  and  resi-
dents for participation in

jihad

in Afghanistan and

Iraq is still significant. Iraq remained the main des-
tination for

jihadists

in 2007. As in 2006, reports

suggest that Somalia is becoming a new addition-
al destination for

jihadists

. Member states that

have military presence in Lebanon also note that
Islamist terrorist groups increasingly focus on this
aspect. This indicates that the number of theatres
of

jihad

is increasing.

Youths continue to be responsible for the vast
majority of Basque separatist terrorist attacks.

The vast majority of attacks in relation to Basque
separatist terrorism are

Taldes Y

attacks. The per-

petrators  are  generally  linked  to  ETA’s  youth
organisation SEGI and are younger than arrested
suspects relating to other forms of separatist ter-
rorism.  With  the  exception  of  two  attacks,  all
attacks  on  critical  infrastructure  were

Taldes Y

attacks. The two remaining attacks were claimed
by ETA and SEGI, respectively. It is also noteworthy

that

Taldes Y

attacks continued throughout the

ceasefire. All arrests in relation to

Taldes Y

attacks

were reported by Spain.

Basque separatist terrorists continue to use
France as a logistical base.

Although ETA showed

some activity in Portugal during 2007, France con-
tinues  to  be  the  main  logistical  base  for  Basque
separatist  terrorism.  There  is  a  noticeable  differ-
ence in the choice of targets attacked by Basque
separatist  terrorists  in  France  and  Spain.  While
Spain only reports a very small number of Basque
separatist  terrorist  attacks  directed  towards  pri-
vate  interests,  this  is  one  of  the  main  targets  for
Basque separatist terrorism in France. In addition,
private  interests  continue  to  be  the  main  target
for Corsican separatist terrorists. As evidenced by
the ETA attack in France in December, Spanish law
enforcement  officials  are  nevertheless  targeted
both in France and in Spain.

The Kurdish-Turkish conflict has an impact on
the security situation in the EU.

In Germany,

separatist  terrorist  violence  continues  to  be  per-
petrated  mainly  by  Kurdish  separatist  terrorist
groups.  The  development  in  the  Kurdish-Turkish
conflict in 2007 had an impact on the security sit-
uation  in  the  EU. This  was  demonstrated  by  the
increasing number of attacks against Turkish inter-
ests  in  Germany,  following  the  escalation  in  the
conflict in 2007.

Left-wing and anarchist terrorist attacks in the
EU are decreasing.

Spain and Italy continue to be

more  affected  by  left-wing  terrorism  than  other
EU member states. In 2007, the number of terror-
ist attacks perpetrated by left-wing and anarchist
terrorists  decreased.  The  recent  increase  in  the
threat  from  left-wing  groups  inspired  by  ideolo-
gies of the

Red Brigades

in Italy, however, may lead

to an increase in attacks in 2008.

Activities by right-wing terrorists and extrem-
ists in the EU are increasing.

Investigations into

right-wing  extremist  and  terrorist  activities  have
shown  international  contacts  which  indicate  a
European  network  of  right-wing  activists.  A  few
member  states  have  also  reported  a  general
increase  in  hostility  towards  Muslim  immigrant
communities.

TE-SAT

2008

10.

TRENDS

Annex 1

Abbreviations

ALF

Animal Liberation Front

APAPC

Association des Parents et Amis des Prisonniers Comministes Secours Rouge
Association of Parents and Friends of Communist Prisoners Red Aid

AQIM

al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

BR-PCC

Brigate Rosse per la Costruzione del Partito Communista Combattente
Red Brigades for the Construction of the Fighting Communist Party

CCC

Cellules Communistes Combattantes

CIRA

Continuity Irish Republican Army

DHKP/C

Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi/Cephesi
Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front

ETA

Euskadi Ta Askatasuna
Basque Fatherland and Liberty

FAI

Federazione Anarchia Informale
Informal Anarchist Federation

FATF

Financial Action Task Force

FLNC-22 Octobre Front de Liberation Nationale de la Corse du 22 Octobre

National Front for the Liberation of Corsica of 22 October

FLNC-UDC

Front de Liberation Nationale de la Corse - Union des Combattants
National Front for the Liberation of Corsica - Union of Combatants

GIMC

Groupe Islamic Combattant Marocain
Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group

GIMF

Global Islamic Media Front

GRAPO

Grupos de Resistencia Antifascista Primero de Octubre
Antifascist Resistance Groups October First

GSPC

Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat

HME

Home Made Explosives

IED

Improvised Explosive Device

IID

Improvised Incendiary Device

IJU

Islamic

Jihad

Union

IMU

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

INLA

Irish National Liberation Army

IRA

Irish Republican Army

JHA

Justice and Home Affairs

LDRs

Light Dependent Resistors

LTTE

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

NGO

Non-Governmental Organisation

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2008

Annex 3

Implementation of the EU Framework Decision
on Combating Terrorism in member states
which provided Eurojust with information on
convictions.

belgium

At the start of 2007, a Royal Decree entered into
force making it easier for the financial administra-
tive authorities to freeze the assets of individuals
involved in terrorist offences, as described in the
19  December  2003  Act  on  Terrorism.  A  second
new  bill  was  published  on  15  May  2007  on  the
insurance  against  damage  caused  by  terrorist
acts. This new law supports the victim of a terror-
ist  act  in  receiving  compensation.  Also,  a  Royal
Decree of October 2006 entered into force on 15
June  2007,  allowing  a  check  of  financial  transac-
tions,  in  order  to  fight  money  laundering  and
financing of terrorism.

Denmark

After  the  introduction  of  the  first  anti-terrorism
package on 31 May 2002, the Danish Parliament
passed  an  updated  package  on  2  June  2006.  In
the Criminal Code, the definition of the concept of
terrorism  has  been  laid  down  in  Section  114.
Recruitment  for  terrorism,  as  well  as  training,
instruction  and  teaching  have  been  criminalised
in Sections 114c and 114d. Aiding and abetting to
terrorism is punishable with up to 6 years in prison
according to Section 114d. Through amendments
to the Administration of Justice Act, investigative
powers have now been strengthened for both the
police  and  the  intelligence  service.  The  amend-
ment in 2006 also allowed a less restricted access
to exchange of information between the Security
Intelligence Service and the Defence Intelligence
Service.  In  September  2007,  a  new  provision  of
the  Administration  of  Justice  Act  entered  into
force, allowing for the storage of Internet and tel-
ecommunications data for an one-year period.

france

Since 9 September 1986, the French law has pro-
vided for the possibility that the prosecution,
investigation and judgement of terrorist offences
take place in Paris. In practice, all terrorist cases
are centralised in Paris. Since then, the French leg-

islation concerning incrimination of terrorist acts
(including financing of terrorism) as well as rules
governing  the  criminal  proceeding  have  been
regularly amended, most recently in January 2006.
Terrorist acts are defined by Articles 421-1 to 422-
7 of the Penal Code. French law refers in particular
to existing offences that are qualified as terrorist
acts “where  they  are  committed  intentionally  in
connection with an individual or collective under-
taking the purpose of which is seriously to disturb
public  order  through  intimidation  or  terror”. The
law also provides for the participation in a group
or association in order to prepare any act of terror-
ism.  Concerning  the  criminal  proceedings,  it
should  be  noted  that,  since  2004,  specific  provi-
sions  have  applied  to  terrorist  offences.  They
mainly  concern  surveillance,  infiltration,  custody,
searches,  interception  of  telecommunications,
taking  of  audio  recordings  and  visual  images  in
specified  vehicles  and  places,  and  measures  to
freeze property.

germany

At the end of 2003, the Criminal Code was updat-
ed  to  implement  the  2002  Council  Framework
Decision.  In  September  2007,  new  provisions  in
criminal law were proposed to extend the crimi-
nalisation  of  preparatory  terrorist  acts  (falling
under Sections 129 a and b of the Criminal Code),
and punish with up to 10 years in prison instead of
6  months.  With  these  proposals,  training  and
receiving of training will be criminalised. Also, the
manufacturing or possession of weapons or fluids
and  gasses  which  can  be  used  for  preparing  to
commit  terrorist  acts  will  be  criminalised.  A  fur-
ther  provision  will  be  introduced  criminalising
incitement  to  terrorism  on  the  Internet  and
penalising this crime with up to 3 years in prison.

greece

Article 187a of the Greek Criminal Code contains
some of the provisions implementing the Council
Framework  Decision.  In  this  section,  threats  to
commit terrorist acts are criminalised, when they
are serious enough and cause terror. Also, the set-
ting up and membership of a structured organisa-
tion of more than three persons, acting together
and  planning  to  commit  terrorist  acts  is  made
punishable  with  up  to  10  years’  imprisonment.
Article 187 provides that perpetration of the acts

TE-SAT

2008

mentioned in article 187a may carry up to a life
sentence. After serving 25 years, the convicted
person can be released from prison on the basis of
article 105 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Special
investigation techniques are allowed under article
253a of the Criminal Procedure Code. Prosecutions
on the basis of article 187a are brought before the
Council of the Court of Appeal.

Ireland

Terrorist  acts  are  prosecuted  under  the  Offences
Against the State Acts 1939 to 1998, in combina-
tion with the Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences)
Act 2005. The Criminal Justice Act 2005 provides
for  Ireland’s  compliance  with  the  Council
Framework Decision of 2002. The Offences Against
the  State  Acts  provide,  amongst  others,  for  the
offences  of  membership  of,  providing  assistance
to,  and  directing  un  unlawful  organisation.  The
Criminal  Justice  Act  strengthens  the  possibilities
to deal with international terrorism and regulates
that  groups  that  engage  in,  promote  or  encour-
age  the  commission  of  a  terrorist  activity  are
unlawful organisations under the Offences Against
the  State  Acts. Terrorist  offences  are  tried  at  the
Special  Criminal  Court  which  was  established
under the Offences against the State Acts.

Italy

Terrorism  is  defined  under  Article  270  of  the
Criminal Code; the definition dates back to 1980.
An  amendment  in  2001  extended  the  definition
of  terrorism  to  include  violence  against  interna-
tional organisations and foreign States. On 31 July
2005, a new definition and new offences (such as
recruitment and training) were introduced reflect-
ing elements of the Council Framework Decision
of  2002.  New  measures  to  prevent  and  combat
financing  of  terrorism  were  introduced  in  2007,
according  to  Directive  2005/60/CE.  On  29
December,  new  measures  concerning  expulsion
in case of terrorism were adopted.

Spain

In October 2007, the government of Spain passed
a law in accordance with the Directive 2006/24/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council of
15 March 2006: Law 25/2007 on Electronic

Communications. The object of the law is the reg-
ulation of the providers of public electronic com-
munications  services  (fixed  network  telephony,
mobile  telephony  and  Internet)  concerning  their
obligations with respect to the retention of data
while providing a service, as well as the possibility
to  make  that  data  available  to  the  persons  in
charge of an investigation (with the permission of
a judicial authority). The law will apply to the traf-
fic and localisation of both legal entities and natu-
ral  persons  and  to  the  related  data  necessary  to
identify the subscriber and registered user. It will
not  apply  to  the  content  of  the  electronic  com-
munications or to the information consulted using
an electronic communications network. The pro-
vider will have to keep the data for a year, with a
possibility  to  extend  the  period  to  2  years  or  to
reduce it to 6 months. The companies will have 6
months  after  this  law  has  entered  into  force  (7
November  2007)  to  prepare  the  equipment
required to comply with the law.

the Netherlands

A bill allowing increased possibilities for investiga-
tion and prosecution of terrorist crimes came into
force on 1 February 2007. The new law penalises
the establishment of a new terrorist organisation,
as well as participation to or leadership of a terror-
ist organisation. Conspiracy to commit terrorist
crimes and recruitment for the

Jihad

is also specif-

ically criminalised. Further preventative measures
have  been  introduced  in  the  criminal  procedure
law. On the basis of a Decision on investigation of
terrorist offences, of the same date, further execu-
tive measures may be proscribed by special legis-
lation. Finally, at the end of 2006, a new bill was
introduced  allowing  witnesses  protected  by  the
intelligence services to testify in court, thus facili-
tating  the  use  of  intelligence  materials  in  terror-
ism proceedings.

United Kingdom

The UK is one of the countries where anti-terror-
ism legislation has been in place for many years.
The Terrorism Act of 30 March 2006 put in place a
number  of  new  offences,  including  preparatory
acts,  training,  encouragement  to  terrorism  and
dissemination  of  terrorist  publications.  In  2007,
new  proposals  were  put  forward  to  change  the

TE-SAT

2008

Annex 4: failed, foiled and successfully executed attacks in

2006

133

and 2007 per member state and affiliation.

Member State

Islamist

Separatist

Left Wing

Right Wing

Single

Issue

Not

Specified

Not

Specified Total

Total

2006 2007 2006 2007 2006 2007 2006 2007 2007

2006

2007

2006 2007

Austria

Belgium

Bulgaria

–

Czech Republic

Cyprus

Denmark

Estonia

Finland

France

283

253

294

267

Germany

Greece

–

Hungary

Ireland

Italy

Latvia

Lithuania

Luxembourg

Malta

Poland

Portugal

Romania

–

Slovakia

Slovenia

Spain

136

264

145

279

Sweden

the Netherlands

–

Total

424

532

472

583

133

Excluding disputed data concerning attacks in Belgium and Greece for 2006.

TE-SAT

2008

Annex 5: Arrests in 2006 and 2007 per member state and

affiliation

Member State

Islamist

Separatist

Left Wing

Right Wing

Single

Issue

Total

2006

2007

2006

2007

2006

2007

2006

2007

2006

2007

Austria

Belgium

Bulgaria

–

Czech Republic

Cyprus

Denmark

Estonia

Finland

France

139

188

315

342

409

Germany

Greece

Hungary

Ireland

Italy

Latvia

Lithuania

Luxembourg

Malta

Poland

Portugal

Romania

–

Slovakia

Slovenia

Spain

196

261

Sweden

the Netherlands

–

156

203

Total

257

201

226

548

706

1044

TE-SAT

2008