GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Addressees

NASA

Commercial Partners
Are Making Progress,
but Face Aggressive
Schedules to
Demonstrate Critical
Space Station Cargo
Transport Capabilities

June 2009

GAO-09-618

What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

ighlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

June 2009

NASA

Commercial Partner

Are Makin

Pro

, but Face

ive

chedule

to Demon

trate Critical

pace

tation Car

o Tran

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Highlights of

GAO-09-618

, a report to

congressional addressees

After the planned retirement of the
space shuttle in 2010, the National
Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) will face a
cargo resupply shortfall for the
International Space Station of
approximately 40 metric tons
between 2010 and 2015. NASA
budgeted $500 million in seed
money to commercial partners to
develop new cargo transport
capabilities through its Commercial
Orbital Transportation Services
(COTS) project. NASA used its
other transaction authority to
award agreements to commercial
partners. These agreements are
not federal government contracts,
and are therefore generally not
subject to federal laws and
regulations that apply to federal
government contracts.

GAO previously reported concerns
about whether COTS vehicles
would be developed in time to meet
the shortfall. Subsequently, GAO
was directed by the explanatory
statement accompanying the
Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2008, to examine NASA’s
management of the COTS project
and its expenditures. In addition,
GAO was asked to examine
(1) NASA’s reliance on commercial
partners to meet the space station’s
cargo resupply needs; and
(2) progress or challenges in
developing commercial space
transport capabilities.

GAO analyzed NASA reports,
briefings, and other information
and held interviews with NASA and
commercial partner officials. NASA
concurred with GAO’s findings.

During the course of our review, we found NASA’s management of the COTS
project has generally adhered to critical project management tools and
activities and the vast majority of project expenditures were for milestone
payments to COTS partners. NASA has established fixed-price, performance-
based milestones in its agreements with commercial partners and partners are
only paid once the milestone has been successfully completed. NASA has also
taken several steps since the beginning of the COTS project to ensure that
risks were identified, assessed, and documented, and that mitigation plans
were in place to reduce these risks.  NASA has communicated regularly with
its partners through quarterly and milestone reviews and provided them with
technical expertise to assist in their development efforts and to facilitate
integration with the space station. As of the end of fiscal year 2008, NASA has
spent $290.1 million, with 95 percent of project funding spent on milestone
payments to COTS partners.

The vehicles being developed by commercial partners Space Exploration
Technologies Corporation (SpaceX) and Orbital Sciences Corporation
(Orbital) through the COTS project have become essential to NASA’s ability to
fully utilize the space station after its assembly is completed and the space
shuttle is retired in 2010.  NASA estimates that it will need a total of 82.7
metric tons of dry cargo delivered to the space station between 2010 and 2015
to meet crew needs and to support maintenance and scientific experiments.
Commercial partners’ vehicles will transport almost half of this cargo and are
scheduled to fly more cargo delivery missions than the space shuttle and
international partners’ vehicles combined—including 14 of the last 19
missions. Delays in the availability of commercial partners’ vehicles to fill the
cargo resupply gap would result in diminished usage of the space station.

While SpaceX and Orbital have completed most of the development
milestones required thus far on time, both companies are working under
aggressive schedules and have recently experienced schedule slips that have
delayed upcoming demonstration launch dates by several months. SpaceX
successfully completed its first 14 development milestones on time and is in
the process of testing, fabricating, and assembling key components. However,
a schedule slip in the development of its launch vehicle has contributed to
anticipated delays of 2 to 4 months in most of its remaining milestones,
including upcoming demonstration missions. Its first demonstration mission
has been delayed from June 2009 to no earlier than September 2009, and its
third demonstration mission has been delayed from March 2010 to no earlier
than May 2010. NASA is currently evaluating the effect of potential further
delays.  Orbital has successfully completed 7 of 19 development milestones
thus far, but has experienced delays in the development of its launch vehicle.
Orbital and NASA have recently amended their agreement to demonstrate a
different cargo transport capability than had been originally planned, delaying
its demonstration mission date from December 2010 until March 2011.

View GAO-09-618 or key components.

For more information, contact Cristina
Chaplain at (202) 512-4841 or
chaplainc@gao.gov.

Page i

GAO-09-618

Contents

Letter

Background 3
NASA Has Adhered to Critical Project Management Tools and

Project Expenditures Track Closely with Achieved Milestones

NASA Will Rely on Commercial Partners to Meet Much of the

Space Station Cargo Resupply Needs

Commercial Partners Are Making Progress, but Face Challenges

Meeting Aggressive Development Schedules

Concluding Observations

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Appendix II

Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration

Appendix III

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

Tables

Table 1: COTS Project Funding, Obligations, and Expenditures

through Fiscal Year 2008

Table 2: SpaceX’s Progress Completing COTS Development

Milestones 19

Table 3: Orbital’s Progress Completing COTS Development

Milestones 25

Figures

Figure 1: Key Events in the Commercial Orbital Transportation

Services Project

Figure 2: COTS Project Expenditures to Partners and Project

Operations through Fiscal Year 2008

Figure 3: NASA’s Strategy for Meeting Space Station Usable Dry

Cargo Needs—2010 to 2015

NASA's COTS Project

Abbreviations

ATK

Alliant Techsystems, Inc.

CDR

critical design review

COTS Commercial

Orbital

Transportation Services

CRS

Commercial Resupply Services

DOD

Department of Defense

FAA

Federal Aviation Administration

NASA

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Orbital

Orbital Sciences Corporation

PDR

preliminary design review

RpK Rocketplane

Kistler

SLC-40

Space Launch Complex 40

SpaceX

Space Exploration Technologies Corporation

USAF

U.S. Air Force

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the
United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety
without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain
copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be
necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

Page ii

GAO-09-618 NASA's COTS Project

Page 1

GAO-09-618

United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548

June 16, 2009

Congressional Addressees

After the planned retirement of the space shuttle in 2010, the United States
will lack a domestic capability to send crew and cargo to the International
Space Station. As a consequence, the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) faces a cargo resupply shortfall of 40 metric tons
(approximately 88,000 pounds) between 2010 and 2015 that cannot be met
by international partners’ space vehicles.

To fill the gap, NASA plans to

rely on vehicles being developed by the private sector through NASA’s
Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) project. However, we
previously reported concerns about whether these vehicles will be
developed in time to address the shortfall.

GAO was directed through the explanatory statement accompanying the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 to review NASA’s management of
the COTS project and its expenditures, the first objective of this report.

Subsequently, you asked us to cover two additional objectives: examine
the extent to which (1) NASA is reliant on commercial partners to meet
the space station’s cargo resupply needs, and (2) commercial partners
have made progress or experienced challenges in developing cargo
transport capabilities.

To examine NASA’s management of the COTS project and its
expenditures, we interviewed NASA and company officials and analyzed
project documentation, including agreements between NASA and its
commercial partners, NASA’s guidance for implementing these
agreements, development milestone and quarterly reviews and other
briefings, and project funding and expenditures data. We also evaluated
NASA’s management of the COTS project by comparing COTS
management activities with critical project management tools and

The 40 metric ton shortfall refers to usable cargo, which does not include the mass of any

required packing materials and/or flight support equipment. Usable cargo combined with
packing materials and/or flight support equipment is referred to as customer cargo.

GAO,

NASA: Challenges in Completing and Sustaining the International Space Station

GAO-08-581T

(Washington, D.C.: April 24, 2008).

See Explanatory Statement, Cong. Rec. H 15471, 15821 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2007) and the

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, § 4 (2007).

NASA's COTS Project

activities identified in NASA guidance and in prior GAO work on NASA
projects with similarities to COTS.

To determine the extent to which NASA is reliant on commercial partners
to meet the space station’s cargo resupply needs, we interviewed NASA
officials and reviewed International Space Station program office
documentation on the space station’s cargo resupply needs and risks,
NASA’s plans to meet its cargo resupply needs between 2010 and 2015, and
international and commercial partners’ vehicle capabilities. We also
reviewed NASA studies that assessed the impact of the COTS project on
NASA’s cargo resupply strategy.

To determine the extent to which commercial partners have made
progress or experienced challenges in developing cargo transport
capabilities, we reviewed each partner’s agreement with NASA,
commercial partners’ supporting documentation submitted for each
milestone, partners’ development schedules and technical risks, NASA’s
requirements for integrating with the space station, commercial
transportation space regulations, launch safety requirements, and prior
GAO work. We also conducted field visits and interviewed commercial
partners to determine partners’ progress against performance milestones
and to identify development challenges.

We conducted this performance audit from July 2008 to June 2009 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
based on our audit objectives.

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GAO-09-618 NASA's COTS Project

Since the 1980s, U.S. law and policy have directed NASA to encourage
growth and promote opportunities within the commercial space industry.

NASA’s Authorization Act of 2005 directed NASA to work closely with the
private sector to encourage entrepreneurs to develop new means to
launch satellites, crew, or cargo, and to contract for crew and cargo
transport services to the space station.

In accordance with its long-term

goals, NASA plans to retire the space shuttle upon completing assembly of
the space station in 2010. NASA plans on using a mixed fleet of vehicles,
including those developed by international partners, to service the space
station.

However, international partners’ vehicles alone cannot fully

satisfy the space station’s cargo resupply needs. Without a domestic cargo
resupply capability to augment this mixed fleet approach, NASA faces a 40
metric ton (approximately 88,000 pounds) usable cargo resupply shortfall
between 2010 and 2015.

Background

In November 2005, NASA established the Commercial Crew and Cargo
program office at Johnson Space Center to challenge the commercial
space industry to establish capabilities and services that can open new
space markets and support the space station’s crew and cargo
transportation needs. NASA directed the program office to establish the
COTS project and budgeted $500 million for fiscal years 2006 through 2010
for the development and demonstration of cargo transport capabilities.

National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-

361, § 110 (c), (1984) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2451) declared that the general
welfare of the United States requires that NASA seek and encourage, to the maximum
extent possible, the fullest commercial use of space. The Commercial Space Act of 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-303, § 101, directed NASA to identify opportunities for the private sector to
play a role in servicing the International Space Station. Following the Space Shuttle
Columbia disaster in 2003, President George W. Bush’s

A Renewed Spirit of Discovery: The

President’s Vision for U.S. Space Exploration

called for the shuttle’s retirement in 2010

upon completing space station assembly, and for pursuit of commercial opportunities for
providing transportation and other services. The August 2006 U.S. National Space Policy
also directed departments and agencies to encourage innovation in the commercial space
sector.

National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-

155, § 101.

International partners’ vehicles include the Russian Federal Space Agency’s Progress

(cargo) and Soyuz (crew), the European Space Agency’s Automated Transfer Vehicle
(cargo), and the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency’s H-II Transfer Vehicle (cargo),
which is currently in development.

The 40 metric ton shortfall includes 36.9 metric tons of dry usable cargo and 3.1 metric

tons for water, propellant, and atmospheric gases. Dry usable cargo includes food, spare
parts, and materials to support scientific experiments.

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GAO-09-618 NASA's COTS Project

NASA structured the COTS project as a partnership with the commercial
space industry, sharing the risks, costs, and rewards of developing new
space transportation capabilities. NASA expected commercial partners
participating in the project to develop their own technology solutions to
meet NASA’s crew and cargo needs and raise additional funding to
demonstrate their solutions. Once the capabilities have been
demonstrated, NASA and other customers would be able to purchase
space transportation services directly from commercial partners.

The COTS project was originally intended to be executed in two sequential
phases: (1) private industry development and demonstration of cargo and
crew transport capabilities in coordination with NASA and (2)
procurement of commercial resupply services to the space station once
cargo transport capabilities had been successfully demonstrated. NASA
asked commercial partners to meet the following cargo transport
capabilities: capability A—external cargo delivery (unpressurized) and
disposal; capability B—internal cargo delivery (pressurized) and disposal;
capability C—internal cargo delivery and return to Earth; and capability
D—crew transportation. The COTS project is initially focused on
developing cargo transport capabilities because NASA has identified cargo
transport as a more pressing need and incremental step toward crew
transport. Furthermore, the Commercial Crew and Cargo program office
reported that it has not yet received funding for crew transport capability
development.

NASA designed the COTS project to be a technology development and
demonstration effort. To implement the COTS project, NASA issued Space
Act agreements utilizing its “other transaction authority” under the
National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958.

Generally speaking, other

transaction authority enhances the government’s ability to acquire cutting-
edge science and technology, in part through attracting companies that
typically have not pursued government contracts because of the cost and
impact of complying with government procurement requirements. These
types of agreements are not federal government contracts, and are

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.

110-422, § 101 authorized $100 million for COTS demonstration of a crew transport
capability, but the COTS program office has not yet received any funding for this capability.

Pub. L. No. 85-568, § 203 (1958). This act is commonly referred to as the Space Act and

agreements signed utilizing NASA’s other transaction authority are known as Space Act
agreements.

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GAO-09-618 NASA's COTS Project

therefore generally not subject to those federal laws and regulations that
apply to federal government contracts. Consequently, agreements formed
using other transaction authority permit considerable latitude by agencies
and companies in negotiating agreement terms. NASA has established
guidance on how to implement agreements under this authority.

In August 2006, NASA competitively awarded Space Act agreements to
two commercial partners, Space Exploration Technologies Corporation
(SpaceX) and Rocketplane Kistler (RpK), to develop and demonstrate end-
to-end transportation systems, including the development of launch and
space vehicles, ground and mission operations, and berthing with the
space station. SpaceX was awarded a $278 million agreement to develop
and demonstrate the three COTS cargo capabilities. The agreement was
amended in February 2008 to reschedule milestones, including the three
demonstration flights to occur from June 2009 through March 2010.

NASA’s agreement with SpaceX includes an option for SpaceX to
demonstrate crew transport capabilities. RpK was awarded a $207 million
agreement, but the agreement was terminated in October 2007 after RpK
had missed financial and technical milestones. NASA held a second
competition and awarded Orbital Sciences Corporation (Orbital) a $170
million agreement in February 2008 to develop two of the COTS cargo
capabilities (unpressurized and pressurized cargo delivery and disposal),
culminating in an unpressurized demonstration flight scheduled for
December 2010. In March 2009, Orbital and NASA amended this
agreement, removing its unpressurized cargo demonstration and replacing
it with a pressurized demonstration, scheduled for March 2011.

Each

partner proposed its own development milestone schedule in their
respective agreements, which were then negotiated and agreed to by
NASA. NASA conducts milestone reviews to determine whether the
milestone has been met and payment only occurs if the partner has
successfully completed the milestone. Five additional companies signed
nonreimbursable agreements with NASA, but these partners have either

SpaceX officials reported to NASA in January 2009 that they expected a 2- to 4-month

delay for most of the remaining milestones, including the first and third demonstration
flights.

This amendment was made because NASA awarded a commercial resupply services

contract to Orbital in December 2008 in which NASA ordered pressurized cargo delivery
and disposal services rather than unpressurized cargo delivery and disposal services. The
commercial resupply services contract was a separate procurement from NASA’s February
2008 Space Act agreement with Orbital.

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GAO-09-618 NASA's COTS Project

terminated their agreements or made limited progress due in part to
difficulty attracting external investment.

In order to demonstrate cargo transport capabilities, commercial partners
must comply with NASA and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
requirements or regulations, and SpaceX must satisfy U.S. Air Force
(USAF) requirements since it is launching from Cape Canaveral Air Force
Station.

•

Space Station Integration.

The International Space Station program

office manages the process of integrating COTS vehicles with the space
station. Before COTS partners’ vehicles may approach and berth with the
space station, they must provide verification that all of the technical
requirements described in NASA’s International Space Station to
Commercial Orbital Transportation Services Interface Requirements
Document have been met and NASA must approve each requirement’s
closure.

The partners must also pass three rounds of review by the

International Space Station program office’s Safety Review Panel.

•

Launch Range Safety.

The USAF 45th Space Wing manages, monitors,

and enforces launch range safety requirements for users, including
SpaceX, at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station. SpaceX must demonstrate
that its operations meet the 45th Space Wing’s launch range safety
requirements or that it can provide an equivalent level of safety.

USAF

launch range safety requirements may be modified by users to meet the
specifications of a given launch, with the USAF’s approval of the changes.
Orbital’s demonstration launch is planned to take place at Wallops Flight

NASA’s International Space Station to Commercial Orbital Transportation Services

Interface Requirements Document defines the applicable physical and functional interface
requirements between COTS partners’ visiting vehicles and space station systems.

The purpose of the International Space Station Safety Review Panel is to independently

identify and track all critical hazards that visiting space vehicles may pose to the space
station and its crew and to evaluate plans to mitigate these hazards. The Safety Review
Panel is comprised of NASA and contractor personnel from across the agency. The panel
holds three reviews that generally correspond with COTS partners’ preliminary design
review, critical design review, and fabrication and testing activities. COTS partners must
complete all three phases of the Safety Review Panel process before they are allowed to
berth with the space station.

The USAF 45th Space Wing’s Range Safety Office is responsible for ensuring the public’s

safety both within and beyond the launch range user’s complex and the safety of nearby
range sites. The launch range safety requirements are published in U.S. Air Force Space
Command Manual 91-710.

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GAO-09-618 NASA's COTS Project

Facility, Virginia, where launch range safety requirements are overseen by
NASA.

•

Launch Licensing.

The FAA’s Office of Commercial Space

Transportation has the authority to issue licenses for commercial launches
and reentries and launch and reentry site operations.

The FAA reviews

and makes a decision on an application within 180 days of receiving a
complete application.

Prior to accepting the application, the FAA can

review draft applications and provide feedback to the applicant.

Prior to the successful demonstration of COTS cargo transport
capabilities, NASA put the International Space Station program office in
charge of procuring commercial resupply services to the space station
rather than the Commercial Crew and Cargo program office. The
International Space Station program office awarded, under a separately
competed procurement from COTS, two commercial resupply services
contracts in December 2008 to SpaceX and Orbital to deliver at least 40
metric tons (approximately 88,000 pounds) to the space station between
2010 and 2015.

NASA’s current plan estimates that commercial partners

will transport 36.9 metric tons (approximately 81,400 pounds) of usable
dry cargo and 3.1 metric tons (approximately 6,800 pounds) of water,

NASA’s top-level launch range safety requirements are set by NASA Procedural

Requirements, NPR 8715.5, under the responsibility of NASA’s Office of Safety and Mission
Assurance. Vehicles launched from NASA’s Wallops Flight Facility must also comply with
the Range Safety Manual for Goddard Space Flight Center / Wallops Flight Facility (RSM-
2002 Rev. B).

FAA issues several commercial space licenses, including (1) launch license (for

expendable launch vehicles), (2) a reusable launch vehicle mission license, (3) a re-entry
license, and (4) a launch or re-entry site operator license. FAA requires a launch license for
SpaceX’s Falcon 9 launch vehicle and a re-entry license for its Dragon space vehicle.
Orbital must obtain a launch license for its Taurus II launch vehicle and a re-entry license
for its Cygnus space vehicle.

Commercial Space Launch Act, Pub. L. No. 98-575, § 9 (1984) (as amended), codified at 49

U.S.C. § 70105.

These contracts also include a clause guaranteeing a minimum of 3 metric tons in return

cargo downmass.

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GAO-09-618 NASA's COTS Project

propellant, and atmospheric gas.

SpaceX was awarded 12 cargo resupply

missions for approximately $1.6 billion and Orbital was awarded eight
cargo resupply missions for approximately $1.9 billion. Figure 1 provides a
timeline of key events in the COTS project.

billion. Figure 1 provides a

timeline of key events in the COTS project.

Figure 1: Key Events in the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services Project

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011-2015

Commercial
Orbital
Tran

portation

ervice

(COT

) Project

Commerci

Crew

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progr

m office

(Nov. 2005)

A i

ssu

fir

t COT

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for propo

n. 2006)

greement

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RpK
(A

g. 2006)

termin

greement with

RpK

fter it

ed fin

nci

nd technic

mile

tone

(Oct. 2007)

A i

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econd COT

nno

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(Oct. 2007)

greement to

(Fe

. 2008)

ceX to

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COT

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ion

nd Nov. 2009)

ceX to

cond

ct third

COT

demon-

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ion

r. 2010)

l to cond

COT

demon-

tion mi

ion

r. 2011)

Commercial
Re

upply

ervice

(CR

) Contract

A i

ssu

req

for propo

(Apr. 2008)

contr

(Dec. 2008)

ceX to

deliver c

rgo

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ion

By 2011, NA

nticip

commerci

rtner

will

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rgo to the

tion

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contr

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of NA

A d

NASA reported in February 2009 that SpaceX plans to delay its first demonstration flight from June

2009 to no earlier than September 2009.

NASA also reported in February 2009 that SpaceX plans to delay its third demonstration flight from

March 2010 to no earlier than May 2010.

NASA and Orbital amended the original agreement to replace Orbital’s unpressurized cargo

capability demonstration milestones with pressurized ones and changed the date of the
demonstration mission from December 2010 to March 2011.

NASA awarded SpaceX and Orbital indefinite-delivery / indefinite-quantity contracts,

which provide for an indefinite quantity, within stated limits, of supplies or services during
a fixed period. The contracts contain firm-fixed-price contract line items, where a specified
price is paid regardless of the contractor’s costs, thereby minimizing the financial risk to
the government. NASA issues orders under these contracts for cargo resupply missions.
Each mission is divided into a series of performance milestones with set payments. NASA
may withhold milestone payments due to non performance. To earn the full amount for
each mission, a partner must complete all milestones, including the successful delivery of
cargo to the space station.

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GAO-09-618 NASA's COTS Project

NASA Has Adhered to
Critical Project
Management Tools
and Project
Expenditures Track
Closely with Achieved
Milestones

NASA’s Use of Critical
Project Management Tools
Has Enabled It to Monitor
Partners’ Development
Efforts

Undertaking ambitious, technically challenging efforts like the COTS
project—which involves multiple contractors and technologies that have
yet to be fully developed and proven—requires careful oversight and
management. Due to the COTS project’s emphasis on partnering with the
private sector, NASA served in a supervisory or advisory role rather than
being in charge of developing the COTS project’s space and launch
vehicles. In this capacity, for example, NASA was responsible for
reviewing milestone documentation, including risk assessments, making
associated milestone payments, and sharing technical expertise. NASA’s
Space Act Agreements Guide and prior GAO work have identified several
critical project management tools and activities which NASA generally
followed, including (1) developing program planning documentation; (2)
establishing performance-based, fixed-price milestones; (3) developing
risk management plans; and (4) facilitating communication and
coordination between NASA and its partners. Our prior work on NASA
development programs with similarities to COTS, such as the X-33

Page 9

GAO-09-618 NASA's COTS Project

program, has shown that not carefully implementing such project
management tools and activities is a recipe for failure.

Due to NASA’s use of its other transaction authority for the COTS project
and because it did not intend to take ownership of any flight or ground
systems, it was not required to follow its program management
requirements, which included developing program authorization and
planning documentation. Nonetheless, NASA used these management
requirements as a guide to ensure that it had the proper program
authorization and planning documentation in place for the COTS project.
Such plans help define realistic time frames, identify responsibility for key
tasks and deliverables, and provide a yardstick by which to measure the
progress of the effort. NASA developed a program authorization document
that outlined NASA’s management structure, project objectives,
acquisition strategy, project scope, funding profile, and planned program
reviews. In addition, the first performance milestone in NASA’s
agreements with its commercial partners required the partners to develop
a program or project management plan that included the overall project
schedule with milestones and described how the partner would manage
the development process and identify and mitigate risks. Each commercial
partner successfully passed this milestone.

Program Planning
Documentation

NASA has established fixed-price, performance-based milestones in its
agreements with commercial partners that include entrance and success
criteria, payment amounts, and specific due dates. NASA reviews the
documentation submitted for each milestone—which includes design
documentation, risk identification and mitigation strategies, development
schedules, and test plans and results—and only pays its partners once it
has determined the milestone has been successfully completed. Our prior
work has emphasized the importance of developing performance-based
milestones with fixed payments in order to minimize financial and

Performance-Based Milestones

GAO,

Space Transportation: Critical Areas NASA Needs to Address in Managing Its

Reusable Launch Vehicle Program

GAO-01-826T

(Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2001). The X-

33 program was part of an effort to build a full-scale, commercially developed, reusable
launch vehicle reaching orbit in one stage. NASA’s goal was to reduce payload launch costs
from $10,000 per pound on the space shuttle to $1,000 per pound by using innovative design
methods, streamlined acquisition procedures, and creating industry-led partnerships with
cost sharing to manage the development of advanced technology demonstration vehicles.
The program did not adhere to critical project management tools and activities and was
terminated due to significant cost increases.

Page 10

GAO-09-618 NASA's COTS Project

performance risks.

NASA’s use of performance-based milestones has

enabled it to minimize these risks. For example, NASA modified its
agreement with SpaceX in February 2008 to include several milestones
that were focused on conducting tests of critical hardware, such as the
space vehicle’s thrusters and the launch vehicle’s first-stage engines.
SpaceX passed these milestones on time, successfully demonstrating the
maturation of key technologies. In another instance, NASA terminated an
agreement with RpK when it failed to meet financial and technical
milestones. NASA paid RpK only for the milestones that it completed
($32.1 million) and was able to award the remaining funding—$170
million—to Orbital approximately 4 months later.

Although NASA has held partners responsible for their own risk
management planning, it has taken several steps since the inception of the
COTS project to ensure that risks were identified, assessed, and
documented, and that mitigation plans were in place to reduce these risks.
Our prior work has highlighted the importance of risk management plans,
which identify, assess, and document risks associated with cost, schedule,
and technical aspects of a project and determine the procedures that will
be used to manage those risks.

These plans help ensure that a system will

meet performance requirements and be delivered on schedule and within
budget. In our prior work, we found that NASA did not prepare risk
management plans for both the X-33 and X-34 programs until several years
after they were initiated. Both programs were subsequently terminated
because of significant cost increases caused by problems developing the
necessary technologies and flight demonstration vehicles. Through the
COTS announcement for proposal process, NASA required companies to
identify programmatic and technical risks and strategies for mitigating
each risk. After each partner had been awarded an agreement, NASA
required them to develop program or project management plans that
outlined each partner’s risk management approach and identified key
project risks and mitigation efforts. Furthermore, the Commercial Crew
and Cargo program office has continued to monitor these risks through
quarterly and milestone design reviews with its partners. The program
office has also ensured that these project and program office-specific risks

Risk Management Plans

GAO,

Department of Homeland Security: Improvements Could Further Enhance Ability

to Acquire Innovative Technologies Using Other Transaction Authority

GAO-08-1088

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 23, 2008).

GAO-01-826T

Page 11

GAO-09-618 NASA's COTS Project

and mitigations have been reported to senior NASA management through
program management reviews.

NASA and its partners have successfully fulfilled their respective
responsibilities as outlined in the agreements, which has helped to
facilitate communication and coordination between the parties. Our prior
work has found that ambitious, technically challenging efforts require a
high level of communication and coordination.

For example, in the case

of the X-33 program, ineffective communication between NASA and its
contractor regarding concerns about the X-33’s fuel tank design
contributed to its failure. The COTS partners’ agreements outline several
responsibilities that are directly related to fostering communication and
coordination, such as holding quarterly and milestone reviews and
providing partners with technical expertise to assist with their
development efforts and to facilitate integration with the space station. In
addition, NASA and SpaceX have amended their agreement to define how
they will collaborate to integrate critical communications hardware into
the space station and to test a relative navigation sensor. NASA has
worked closely with SpaceX, as these items will be flown on an upcoming
space shuttle flight. Another example of NASA’s efforts to facilitate
communication and coordination with its partners is through the creation
of the Transportation Integration Office within the International Space
Station program office. This office has streamlined the requirements for
integrating with the space station and provided access to critical space
station integration technologies, such as the grapple fixtures, Common
Berthing Mechanism design, and Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency’s
proximity operations communications system.

NASA has also assigned a

project executive for each partner to provide day-to-day oversight of the
partners’ development efforts and to coordinate technical assistance.

Facilitating Communication
and Coordination

GAO-01-826T

Proximity operations refer to maneuvers by vehicles visiting the space station that are

conducted in close proximity to the space station. These operations include maneuvers to
properly position the space vehicle in relation to the space station so that it can be
captured by the space station’s robotic arm prior to berthing.

Page 12

GAO-09-618 NASA's COTS Project

As of the end of fiscal year 2008, 95 percent of project funding had been
spent on milestone payments, 3 percent on project operations, and the
remaining 2 percent had been obligated, but not yet expended.

NASA’s

Administrator budgeted $500 million in 2005 for the development and
demonstration of cargo transport capabilities between fiscal years 2006
and 2010.

For fiscal year 2009, NASA requested $173 million in funding

for the COTS project and plans to request $31.3 million for fiscal year 2010.
See table 1 below for COTS project funding, obligations, and expenditures
through fiscal year 2008.

Vast Majority of Project
Expenditures Are for
Milestone Payments to
COTS Partners

Table 1: COTS Project Funding, Obligations, and Expenditures through Fiscal Year
200

Dollars in millions

Fiscal year

Project funding

Obligations

Expenditures

2005

$22.

N/A

2006 51.3

63.6

39.1

2007 91.1

99.0

93.7

200

130.5

133.1

157.3

Total $295.7

$295.7

$290.1

Source: NASA.

NASA did not obligate fiscal year 2005 funding until fiscal year 2006. Therefore, fiscal year 2005

funding was included in all fiscal year 2006 calculations.

Figure 2 illustrates how the $290.1 million in project expenditures have
been divided between COTS partners’ milestone payments and project
operations from fiscal years 2006 to 2008.

COTS project operations expenditures include funding for civil service labor; civil service

travel; technical assistance provided to COTS partners; and procurement activities, which
consist of technical and business support, information technology, and safety and mission
assurance.

The International Space Station program office’s Transportation Integration Office has

estimated that it will spend an additional $56 million to support COTS partners’ space
station integration efforts.

Page 13

GAO-09-618 NASA's COTS Project

Figure 2: COTS Project Expenditures to Partners and Project Operations through
Fiscal Year 200

32.1

199

rce: NA

Project oper

tion

Rocketpl

ne Ki

tler

ceX

Doll

in million

In fiscal year 2009, SpaceX has received an additional $35 million for
completing two milestones, bringing its total milestone payments to date
to $234 million.

SpaceX could potentially earn an additional $44 million in

future milestone payments. Orbital has been paid $30 million for
completing three milestones in fiscal year 2009, increasing its total
milestone payments to date to $80 million.

Orbital has $90 million

remaining in potential milestone payments.

SpaceX completed milestone 13, Demo 2 / Demo 3 System Critical Design Review, in

December 2008 ($25 million) and milestone 14, its third and final financial milestone, in
March 2009 ($10 million).

NASA paid Orbital for milestone 6, Pressurized Cargo Module Preliminary Design Review,

in November 2008 ($10 million); milestone 8, Instrumentation Program and Command List,
in March 2009 ($10 million); and milestone 9, Completion of International Space Station
Phase 1 Safety Review, in March 2009 ($10 million).

Page 14

GAO-09-618 NASA's COTS Project

The vehicles being developed by commercial partners have become
essential to NASA’s ability to fully utilize the space station after the
retirement of the space shuttle in 2010. NASA’s 2006 Strategic Plan
established a goal of supporting a crew of six astronauts on the space
station by the end of 2009 in order to fully utilize the space station’s
research capabilities. NASA is in the process of installing the necessary
equipment to support a six-person crew, and has estimated that the space
station’s final construction cost will be $31 billion.

NASA estimates that it

will need 82.7 metric tons (approximately 182,000 pounds) of usable dry
cargo delivered to the space station between 2010 and 2015 to meet crew
needs and to support maintenance and scientific experiments. NASA plans
to transport this cargo using several vehicles, including the space shuttle
and commercial and international partners’ vehicles.

Between 2010 and

2015, commercial partners’ vehicles will transport almost half of this cargo
and are scheduled to fly more cargo delivery missions than the space
shuttle and international partners’ vehicles combined—including 14 of the
last 19 missions. Furthermore, after the retirement of the space shuttle,
SpaceX’s space vehicle will be the only vehicle capable of safely returning
significant amounts of cargo to Earth—which is an essential capability to
accomplish NASA’s scientific research program.

Figure 3 outlines

NASA’s strategy for meeting the space station’s usable dry cargo resupply
needs between 2010 and 2015, identifies which vehicles are capable of
returning cargo to Earth, and highlights NASA’s increasing relianc
commercial partners’ vehicles. Figure 3 does not include the amount of
propellant, water, and atmospheric gas to be delivered to the space station
between 2010 and 2015 nor does it depict the maximum cargo mass
delivery capacities of each vehicle, which range from more than 17 metric

NASA Will Rely on
Commercial Partners
to Meet Much of the
Space Station Cargo
Resupply Needs

e on U.S.

Equipment necessary to support a six-person crew includes systems for oxygen recycling,

removal of carbon dioxide, and transforming urine into water. NASA plans to install a new
module, known as Tranquility (formerly Node 3), in February 2010 and it will hold some of
this equipment. In addition to the $31 billion for the space station’s construction, NASA
expects sustainment costs through the space station’s planned retirement in fiscal year
2016 to total $11 billion.

The European Space Agency’s Automated Transfer Vehicle successfully completed its

first demonstration mission to dock with the space station in April 2008. The Japan
Aerospace Exploration Agency has yet to attempt a demonstration mission for its H-II
Transfer Vehicle. The first demonstration mission is planned for September 2009.

SpaceX’s Dragon is designed to return up to 2.5 metric tons (approximately 5,500 pounds)

to Earth, but will likely be limited by volume constraints to about 1.7 metric tons (3,748
pounds). The international partners’ vehicles and Orbital’s Cygnus do not provide this
capability. NASA could use the Russian crew transport vehicle to carry a small amount of
cargo (50 kg) to Earth, but this vehicle cannot bring experiments to Earth for assessment.

Page 15

GAO-09-618 NASA's COTS Project

tons for the space shuttle to as little as 2 metric tons for Orbital’s space
vehicle in its standard configuration.

Figure

: NASA’s Strategy for Meeting Space Station Usable Dry Cargo Needs—2010 to 2015

2010

pace vehicle

(number of

ion

planned)

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Total: 82.7

metric ton

car

o ma

Total: 38
mi

ion

planned

rgo mi

ion to the

tion

Commercial
partner

s’

vehicle

pace

huttle

European
Automated
Tran

fer

Vehicle

ian

Pro

Japane

H-II Tran

fer

Vehicle

Undetermined
vehicle

rce: GAO

of NA

A d

36.9

9.8

4.0

6.6

24.0

1.4

Car

o ma

be delivered

(metric tons)

Capable of

returnin

car

o to earth

✔

(20)

(4)

(

)

(4)

(6)

(1)

Note: This figure reflects NASA’s November 200

estimate of the space station’s projected usable dry

cargo needs and identifies which vehicles are capable of returning cargo to Earth. Propellant, water,
and atmospheric gas are not included in these figures. The exact cargo mix for a particular mission is
not determined until several months prior to launch and the cargo mass to be delivered for a
particular mission may therefore be subject to change.

Of the two commercial providers, only SpaceX’s Dragon space vehicle is designed to return cargo to

Earth.

The International Space Station program office has reported that the vehicle that will be used for this

2015 mission has not been determined, and it will depend on what is needed to decommission the
space station in late 2015 or early 2016.

Page 16

GAO-09-618 NASA's COTS Project

Other options for transporting cargo to the space station are limited. NASA
has purchased the equivalent of three Russian Progress vehicles for use in
2010 and 2011, but it has no plans to purchase any additional vehicles
beyond 2011.

According to NASA officials, there is a 24- to 30-month lead

time to manufacture the Progress should NASA decide to procure
additional vehicles. NASA plans to use six Japanese H-II Transfer Vehicles
for missions between 2010 and 2015 and four European Automated
Transfer Vehicles between 2010 and 2013. NASA officials told us that the
Japanese and European space agencies have no plans to manufacture
additional vehicles beyond their current commitments. In addition,
NASA’s new crew exploration and launch vehicles, Orion and Ares I,
designed to replace the space shuttle, are not expected to be available
until 2015.

Delays in the availability of commercial vehicles to fill the cargo resupply
gap would result in diminished usage of the space station. The
International Space Station program office has identified the 40 metric ton
(approximately 88,000 pound) cargo resupply shortfall as a top program
risk, and its risk summary report states that a delay in 2010 in the
availability of commercial partners’ vehicles would lead to a significant
scaling back of NASA’s use of the space station for scientific research. If
there were a delay in 2011, NASA could no longer maintain a space station
crew of six astronauts and its ability to conduct scientific research would
be compromised.

Space Station program officials told us that they expect Russia to launch six Progress

flights each year between 2009 and 2011. They stated the NASA cargo will be spread across
four Progress flights in 2009 and will represent the equivalent cargo capacity of a single
Progress (1.4 metric tons). NASA will be procuring the equivalent of two Progress vehicles
in 2010 and one Progress vehicle in 2011.

These vehicles were designed to implement President George W. Bush’s

A Renewed

Spirit of Discovery: The President’s Vision for U.S. Space Exploration

, which included a

return to the moon and future exploration of Mars. NASA had also planned to utilize these
vehicles to transport cargo to the space station as early as 2011. However, schedule and
technical setbacks have delayed the anticipated availability of these vehicles until 2015.

Page 17

GAO-09-618 NASA's COTS Project

While SpaceX and Orbital have completed most of the development
milestones required thus far on time, both companies are working under
aggressive schedules and have recently experienced schedule slips which
have delayed upcoming demonstration launch dates by several months.
SpaceX successfully completed its first 14 development milestones on
time and is in the process of testing, fabricating, and assembling key
components. However, a schedule slip in the development of its launch
vehicle’s second-stage engine components has contributed to anticipated
delays of 2 to 4 months in most of its remaining milestones, including
upcoming demonstration missions. NASA is currently evaluating the effect
of potential further delays. Orbital has successfully completed 7 of 19
development milestones thus far, including several preliminary design
reviews (PDR), but has experienced delays in the development of its
launch vehicle’s first-stage engine components. Orbital and NASA recently
amended their Space Act agreement to conduct a pressurized cargo
delivery and disposal demonstration mission instead of an unpressurized
mission, delaying its demonstration mission date by 3 months, from
December 2010 until March 2011.

Commercial Partners
Are Making Progress,
but Face Challenges
Meeting Aggressive
Development
Schedules

Space development programs are by nature complex and rife with
technical obstacles that can easily result in development delays. In our
recent report on selected large-scale NASA projects, we found that 10 of
the 13 projects that we reviewed had experienced significant cost and/or
schedule growth from their project baselines.

Commercial partners must

develop and demonstrate new launch and space vehicles, launch and
mission operations capabilities, and achieve integration with the space
station in a 3- to 4-year period.

SpaceX Has Made Progress
Completing Milestones as
Scheduled, but Challenges
Are Likely to Delay
Demonstration Missions

SpaceX completed its first 14 development milestones on time, and has
made progress developing its space transport capabilities; however,
several schedule and regulatory challenges are likely to delay upcoming
demonstration missions by at least 2 to 4 months. SpaceX’s agreement
with NASA established 22 development milestones that SpaceX must
complete in order to successfully demonstrate COTS cargo capabilities.
Although it completed its first 14 COTS development milestones on

GAO,

NASA: Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects

GAO-09-306SP

(Washington,

D.C.: Mar. 2, 2009). For purposes of our analysis, significant cost and schedule growth
occurs when a project’s cost and/or its schedule growth exceeds the thresholds established
for Congressional reporting.

See

42 U.S.C. § 16613. Of the projects that we reviewed with

launch delays, delays ranged from 5 months to as many as 26 months.

Page 18

GAO-09-618 NASA's COTS Project

schedule, SpaceX experienced a delay completing the fabrication,
assembly, and integration of its launch vehicle’s second-stage components,
and delayed its first demonstration mission readiness review (milestone
15) from March 2009 until no earlier than June 2009. In addition, SpaceX
has a significant amount of work remaining to complete technical
requirements for integrating its space vehicle with the space station.
SpaceX must also obtain required licenses and approvals from the FAA
and the USAF before its scheduled demonstration mission launch dates.
SpaceX has informed NASA that its first demonstration mission will be
delayed from June 2009 until no earlier than September 2009, and its third
demonstration mission is likely to be delayed from March 2010 to no
earlier than May 2010.

NASA reported it has yet to modify SpaceX’s

agreement to reflect these changes, but it is closely monitoring SpaceX’s
activity and is consulting with SpaceX to ascertain the cause of SpaceX’s
failure to meet milestone 15 in the timeframe identified in the current
agreement.

SpaceX has received $234 million in milestone payments thus

far, with $44 million yet to be paid. Table 2 describes SpaceX’s progress
meeting the COTS milestones in its agreement with NASA.

Table 2: SpaceX’s Progress Completing COTS Development Milestones

Milestone
number

Milestone description

Scheduled
completion date

Completed
on time

Payment

amount

(millions)

Project Management Plan Review

Sept. 2006

$23.1

Demo 1 System Re

uirements Review

Nov. 2006

Demo 1 Preliminary Design Review

Feb. 2007

Financing Round 1

Mar. 2007

Demo 2 System Re

uirements Review

Mar. 2007

31.1

Demo 1 System Critical Design Review

Aug. 2007

Demo 3 System Re

uirements Review

Oct. 2007

22.3

Demo 2 Preliminary Design Review

Dec. 2007

21.1

Draco Initial Hot-Fire

Mar. 200

SpaceX has not announced plans to delay to its second demonstration mission, scheduled

for November 2009.

According to NASA’s agreements with the partners, should either partner fail to meet

milestones, NASA and the partner must meet to determine why the failure occurred and
whether it is in the best interests of the parties to continue the agreement. NASA may
terminate the agreement 30 days after providing written notification to the partner that it
has failed to perform.

Page 19

GAO-09-618 NASA's COTS Project

Milestone
number

Milestone description

Scheduled
completion date

Completed
on time

Payment

amount

(millions)

Financing Round 2

Mar. 200

Demo 3 Preliminary Design Review

Jun. 200

Multi-engine Test

Sept. 200

Demo 2/Demo 3 System Critical Design Review

Dec. 200

Financing Round 3

Mar. 2009

Demo 1 Readiness Review

Mar. 2009

Communications Unit Flight Unit Design, Accept, Delivery

May 2009

Demo 1 Mission

Jun. 2009

Demo 2 Readiness Review

Sept. 2009

Demo 2 Mission

Nov. 2009

Cargo Integration Demonstration

Jan. 2010

Demo 3 Readiness Review

Jan. 2010

Demo 3 Mission

Mar. 2010

Total:

$27

million for

the completion of

all milestones

$234 million paid

to date

Source: NASA and SpaceX.

Note: SpaceX did not complete milestone 15 in March 2009 as scheduled. NASA reported that
SpaceX has delayed delivery of milestone 15 from March 2009 until no earlier than June 2009. In
addition, SpaceX has informed NASA that it anticipates a 2 to 4 month delay in most of its remaining
milestones; including a delay in its first demonstration mission (milestone 17) from June 2009 until no
earlier than September 2009, and a delay in its third demonstration milestone (milestone 22) from
March 2010 until no earlier than May 2010.

To accomplish its COTS objectives, SpaceX is developing a medium-class
launch vehicle (Falcon 9) and a space vehicle (Dragon), which is designed
to ferry crew and cargo to and from the space station.

The Falcon 9

launch vehicle is a two-stage rocket that uses nine liquid-fueled engines for

SpaceX’s Technical Approach
and Development Status

SpaceX’s technical approach is intended to meet each of the four COTS capabilities:

capability A—unpressurized cargo delivery and disposal, capability B—pressurized cargo
delivery and disposal, capability C—pressurized cargo delivery and return to Earth, and
capability D—crew transportation. SpaceX’s Space Act agreement includes an option to
demonstrate crew transportation. COTS project officials told us that they have not yet
received funding for crew transport capability development.

Page 20

GAO-09-618 NASA's COTS Project

its first-stage booster and one similar engine for its second-stage booster.

The Falcon 9 is designed to lift payloads, such as the Dragon spacecraft,
into various orbits—including low-Earth orbit where the space station is
located. On a single mission, the Dragon spacecraft is designed to deliver
and dispose of 3 metric tons (approximately 6,600 pounds) of cargo
distributed between its pressurized and unpressurized cargo carriers.
Dragon is designed to return up to 2.5 metric tons (approximately 5,500
pounds) of pressurized cargo mass to Earth, but will likely be limited by
volume constraints to about 1.7 metric tons (3,748 pounds).

SpaceX

reported that it is developing and manufacturing almost all of the
components for the Falcon 9 and Dragon in-house to keep development
costs low and to remove dependencies on external suppliers. For example,
SpaceX is developing a thermal protection system to enable the Dragon to
safely re-enter the Earth’s atmosphere, and its own hardware and software
components to enable the Dragon to integrate with the space station. A
summary of SpaceX’s progress developing its COTS system is provided
below.

Launch vehicle.

SpaceX has made progress developing and testing the

first-stage engines on its Falcon 9 launch vehicle; however, it has
experienced a schedule slip in the development, assembly, and integration
of the Falcon 9’s second-stage engine components. From the beginning of
the COTS project, SpaceX has tracked the development of its nine first-
stage engines as a significant technological risk and has conducted several
multi-engine tests at the company’s Texas testing facility to reduce this
risk. SpaceX reported that it successfully completed a 178-second test of

The Falcon 9’s first- and second-stage engines are derived from engines used in SpaceX’s

Falcon 1 launch vehicle, which had its first successful orbital launch in September 2008.
The Falcon 1 uses one Merlin 1C engine for its first-stage booster, while the Falcon 9 uses
nine similar engines for its first-stage and a single engine modified to operate in a space
environment for its second-stage booster. The Merlin engines are fueled by liquid oxygen
and rocket propellant grade kerosene. SpaceX plans to retrieve its first- and second-stage
engines after launch and refurbish them for use in other missions.

The Dragon will be propelled by 18 “Draco” thruster engines which are fueled by nitrogen

tetroxide and monomethylhydrazine hypergolic fuels. Because the Dragon is yet to be fully
qualified and flown, the ultimate cargo capacity of this vehicle is yet to be known. SpaceX
estimates the upmass cargo capacity of the vehicle may be as high as 3.3 metric tons
(approximately 7,300 pounds). The Dragon’s cargo capacity for a given mission will also
vary depending on the density and volume of the cargo and how it is packed. SpaceX
estimates that the Dragon is likely to carry about 2.55 metric tons (approximately 5,620
pounds) of cargo on a typical mission. To demonstrate this capability, SpaceX plans to
carry 1.7 metric tons (3,748 pounds) of pressurized and 0.85 metric tons (1,874 pounds) of
unpressurized simulated cargo on its third demonstration mission.

Page 21

GAO-09-618 NASA's COTS Project

its nine engines intended to simulate operations during a typical COTS
launch. SpaceX also reported that it completed qualification testing of
these engines in December 2008; however, NASA’s Commercial Crew and
Cargo program manager reported that NASA has yet to review the
documentation for these and other qualification tests conducted by
SpaceX, but plans on doing so during milestone 15, SpaceX’s first
demonstration mission readiness review. This review has been delayed
from March 2009 until no earlier than June 2009, in part to provide SpaceX
with more time to address issues with the fabrication, assembly, and
integration of the Falcon 9’s second stage components. For example,
SpaceX experienced a 3-month delay in the delivery of the domes that go
on top of its second-stage booster, which delayed its ability to integrate
these components as scheduled. Although SpaceX recently reported that it
completed a 6-minute firing of its second-stage engine, additional testing
remains before the Falcon 9 second-stage engine components can be
qualified for flight and integrated with the corresponding tanks and
structures.

Space vehicle.

SpaceX has made progress developing key components

for its Dragon space vehicle; however it faces an aggressive schedule
completing technical requirements to integrate the Dragon with the space
station. SpaceX reported that it has completed 120 hot-fire tests of the
Dragon’s engines—including a 15-minute firing in a vacuum chamber
designed to simulate orbital firing operations. According to NASA, SpaceX
considers these engines sufficiently qualified for SpaceX’s first
demonstration mission, which does not include integration with the space
station. However, NASA reported that SpaceX must modify the design of
its thruster valves and will need to requalify these engines before it can
attempt its third demonstration mission, when it will first attempt to
integrate with the space station. SpaceX is also manufacturing its own
heat-shield tiles for the Dragon’s thermal protection system, and reported
that it has completed qualification testing and analyses of its material at
NASA’s Ames Research Center.

Before SpaceX can attempt its third demonstration mission, it must
demonstrate that it has met all of the technical requirements in NASA’s
International Space Station to COTS Interface Requirements Document.
For example, SpaceX must develop and test new hardware and software
components designed to enable the Dragon to share positioning data and

Page 22

GAO-09-618 NASA's COTS Project

communicate with the space station.

SpaceX and NASA have made

arrangements to fly the two components on separate space shuttle
missions scheduled this summer in order to conduct development tests on
them prior to SpaceX’s second demonstration mission, scheduled for
November 2009. SpaceX and NASA have set a goal for SpaceX to
demonstrate compliance with 75 percent of NASA’s space station interface
requirements by the second demonstration mission, with the remaining 25
percent to be completed before the third demonstration mission. NASA
officials reported that SpaceX’s schedule to complete its space station
integration activities is aggressive and that all aspects of integrating a new
space vehicle with the space station are technically challenging.

Launch readiness.

Before SpaceX may launch its first demonstration

mission from the USAF’s Space Launch Complex 40 (SLC-40), it must
receive the approval of the 45th Space Wing Commander that its launch
infrastructure and operations meet the USAF’s launch range safety
requirements. SpaceX has cited the range safety approval process as a
significant risk that could result in schedule slips. SpaceX has made
progress addressing many of the USAF’s requirements, and it has installed
launch infrastructure at SLC-40—including components of the Falcon 9
fueling system and the hangar structure where the Falcon 9 stages will be
integrated and mated with the Dragon space vehicle.

However, officials

from the 45th Space Wing expressed concerns that SpaceX’s aggressive
schedule may not give SpaceX sufficient time to submit its requests to
modify USAF range safety requirements or give the USAF sufficient time
to review, validate, and approve SpaceX’s facilities and launch operations
before upcoming demonstrations. USAF officials reported that SpaceX has
yet to submit its requests to modify Dragon fueling requirements, which

The two components in development by SpaceX to enable these operations are its relative

navigation sensor, known as DragonEye, and its COTS ultra high frequency
communications unit. SpaceX is equipping its Dragon with three DragonEye units to create
a redundant system for the Dragon to share positioning data with the space station during
proximity operations. The ultra high frequency communications units will be installed in
both the Dragon and the space station to transmit telemetry data during proximity
operations.

The Falcon 9 fueling system includes tanks and distribution systems for liquid oxygen and

rocket propellant grade kerosene, helium, and nitrogen. SpaceX reported that the hangar is
operational for the integration of its launch and space vehicles; however, the hangar has
yet to be approved for Dragon fueling. SpaceX reported that it has also fabricated,
assembled, and successfully completed a dry-run test of its transporter erector system,
which will be used to transport the integrated Falcon 9 and Dragon from the hangar and
erect it for launch.

Page 23

GAO-09-618 NASA's COTS Project

the USAF considers to be a potential public safety hazard, and subject to
its review and approval. SpaceX reported that it intends to submit its
requests to modify these requirements in the summer of 2009. SpaceX
plans to conduct independent tests to demonstrate that its launch facilities
meet USAF requirements for a launch safety critical design review (CDR)
that will also be held in the summer of 2009.

Prior to its first demonstration mission, SpaceX must also receive from the
FAA a launch license for the Falcon 9 and a re-entry license for the Dragon
space vehicle. FAA reported that SpaceX has yet to submit a sufficiently
complete launch license application for the Falcon 9 for SpaceX’s first
COTS demonstration mission.

However, in April 2009 FAA accepted a

sufficiently complete re-entry license application from SpaceX for the
Dragon space vehicle. FAA must decide within 180 days after accepting a
license application whether to approve it. FAA officials reported that they
do not anticipate making a determination much sooner than 180 days after
acceptance of SpaceX’s applications. Although it remains to be seen when
SpaceX will deliver and the FAA will accept its Falcon 9 launch license
application for the first COTS demonstration, there appears to be little
margin for SpaceX to obtain its FAA-required licenses in time for its
September 2009 COTS demonstration mission.

Orbital Has Completed
Several Preliminary Design
Reviews, but Faces
Challenges Completing
Development in Time for
Its Demonstration Mission

Orbital—which entered the COTS project about 18 months after SpaceX—
has successfully completed 7 of 19 required milestones thus far, including
several preliminary design reviews for its systems, but challenges lie ahead
in its efforts to complete its recently revised milestone schedule. Orbital’s
February 2008 agreement with NASA required it to conduct a single
mission demonstrating the capability to deliver unpressurized cargo to the
space station. Although Orbital was preparing a preliminary design of a
pressurized cargo module, it was not required in its agreement with NASA
to demonstrate this capability. However, in December 2008 NASA awarded
Orbital a commercial resupply services contract calling for eight
pressurized cargo missions, but no unpressurized missions. Subsequently,
in March 2009, Orbital and NASA amended their COTS demonstration

FAA reported that SpaceX has submitted and FAA has accepted a sufficiently complete

launch license for a separate, non-COTS Falcon 9 mission. SpaceX intends to attempt an
inaugural Falcon 9 demonstration mission prior to attempting its first COTS demonstration
mission. NASA officials reported that they did not have a firm launch date for this inaugural
Falcon 9 mission, but said that SpaceX is working toward a launch in late summer or early
fall 2009.

Page 24

GAO-09-618 NASA's COTS Project

agreement and replaced the unpressurized demonstration with a
pressurized one. This required adding several new milestones to
demonstrate this capability and delaying existing milestones, including
Orbital’s single demonstration mission from December 2010 until March
2011. Orbital has completed a PDR for its pressurized cargo capability and
other development milestones for its Taurus II launch vehicle.

However,

Orbital reported that it has experienced delays completing design reviews
for the first-stage engine components for its launch vehicle, which have
resulted in further compressing its already aggressive development
schedule. In addition, NASA reported that Orbital faces an aggressive
schedule to complete the technical requirements to integrate its space
vehicle with the space station. Orbital has received $80 million in
milestone payments thus far, with $90 million yet to be paid (see table 3).

Table

: Orbital’s Progress Completing COTS Development Milestones

Milestone
number

Milestone description

Scheduled
completion date

Completed
on time

Payment amount

(millions)

Program Plan Review

Mar. 200

$10

Demo Mission System Re

uirements Review

Jun. 200

Unpressurized Cargo Module Preliminary Design Review Jul. 200

COTS System Preliminary Design Review was milestone
4, but it has been renumbered as milestone 10

No longer applicable

No longer
applicable

No longer applicable

COTS Integration/Operations Facility Review

Sept. 200

Pressurized Cargo Module Preliminary Design Review

Oct. 200

DELETED: Unpressurized Cargo Module Critical Design
Review

No longer applicable

No longer
applicable

No longer applicable

Instrumentation

Program and Command List

Feb. 2009

Completion of ISS Phase 1 Safety Review

Mar. 2009

COTS System Preliminary Design Review

Apr. 2009

DELETED: Unpressurized Cargo Module Fabrication
Started

No longer applicable

No longer
applicable

No longer applicable

Pressurized Cargo Module Critical Design Review

Jul. 2009

Cygnus Avionics Test

Aug. 2009

Completion of ISS Phase 2 Safety Review

Aug. 2009

COTS System Critical Design Review

Sept. 2009

Generally speaking, most of the Taurus II development milestones are not included in

Orbital’s agreement with NASA. However, Orbital has invited NASA officials to participate
in several Taurus II design reviews. Orbital has completed several other development
milestones for its Taurus II launch vehicle.

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GAO-09-618 NASA's COTS Project

Milestone
number

Milestone description

Scheduled
completion date

Completed
on time

Payment amount

(millions)

Service Module Core Assembly Completed

Dec. 2009

7.5

Service Module Test Readiness Review

Apr. 2010

7.5

Service Module Initial Comprehensive Performance Test Jul. 2010

Launch Vehicle Stage 1 Assembly Complete

Oct. 2010

2.5

Cargo Integration Demonstration

Dec. 2010

2.5

Mission Readiness Review

Feb. 2011

2.5

System Demonstration Flight

Mar. 2011

2.5

Total:

$170 million for

completion of all

milestones

0 million paid to

date

Source: NASA and Orbital.

Note: When Orbital amended its agreement with NASA in March 2009, it deleted milestones 7 and
11, and moved milestone 4 to become milestone 10. These changes are indicated in this revised
schedule.

Orbital submitted its milestone documentation for milestones 2 and 3 about 2 weeks later than

originally planned; however, NASA approved both milestones. Orbital’s demo mission system
re

uirements review (milestone 2) was completed in July 200

and its unpressurized cargo module

preliminary design review (milestone 3) was completed in August 200

Milestone 5 (COTS integration/operations facility review) was originally scheduled for October 200

but was accelerated to September 200

as re

uested by Orbital. Milestone 6 (pressurized cargo

module preliminary design review) was also accelerated 1 month at Orbital’s re

uest from November

200

to October 200

Orbital is developing a new, medium-class launch vehicle (Taurus II) and a
modular visiting vehicle (Cygnus), which is designed to transport
pressurized cargo to and dispose of trash from the space station.

Orbital

has teamed with several external space companies to develop the Taurus
II and serves as its prime integrator.

The first-stage engines, known as

AJ26-62s, are being developed by Orbital and Aerojet and are derived from
Russian NK-33 engines. Orbital’s Ukrainian subcontractor Yuzhnoye/
Yuzmash is responsible for the development of the first-stage fuel tanks.
The Taurus II’s second-stage motor, known as the Castor-30, is being

Orbital’s Technical Approach
and Development Status

Orbital’s amended technical approach is designed to meet one of the four COTS

capabilities, pressurized cargo delivery and disposal (capability B).

The Taurus II is a two-stage rocket with two liquid-fueled engines for its first stage and a

single solid rocket motor for its upper stage. The first stage engines are fueled by rocket
propellant grade kerosene and liquid oxygen. Orbital reported that it is also developing an
optional liquid-fueled third stage engine that will not be used for COTS and commercial
resupply services missions.

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GAO-09-618 NASA's COTS Project

developed by Alliant Techsystems, Inc. (ATK), which has developed solid
rocket motors used by the space shuttle and Japan’s H-IIA launch vehicle.
The Cygnus space vehicle uses a service module to provide propulsion and
power to deliver a pressurized cargo module to the space station.

The

service module draws from the avionics systems of NASA’s Dawn
spacecraft, developed by Orbital, and propulsion and power systems from
its flight-proven STAR GEO communications satellites.

To develop its

pressurized cargo module, Orbital has teamed with Thales-Alenia Space—
which was the prime contractor of several pressurized logistics modules
currently used by the space shuttle to transport cargo to the space
station.

A summary of the progress made by Orbital in developing its

COTS system follows.

Launch vehicle.

Orbital has completed several early design reviews of its

Taurus II launch vehicle; however, delays in the development of first-stage
tanks and ongoing development tests of first-stage engine components
have compressed Orbital’s already aggressive development schedule.
Orbital began Taurus II development as an independent research and
development project in 2007 and completed a Taurus II system
requirements review and PDR in July 2007 and February 2008,
respectively. Orbital officials reported that since joining the COTS project,
it has completed separate subsystem design reviews with its partners: in
October 2008, Orbital completed a CDR of the first-stage engine assembly
with Aerojet, a PDR of the first-stage tanks with Yuzhnoye, and a CDR of

Orbital’s Cygnus visiting vehicle is not designed to return cargo to Earth, although it can

dispose of trash from the space station. Orbital estimates that Cygnus will be able to
deliver or dispose of about 2 metric tons (approximately 4,400 pounds) of pressurized
cargo on a single mission. Because the Cygnus is yet to be qualified and flown, the final
cargo capacity of the Cygnus is yet to be known. Once development is completed, Orbital
estimates that in an enhanced configuration, its pressurized cargo module could provide as
much as 2.7 metric tons (approximately 5,950 pounds) of cargo delivery and disposal in a
given mission. The Cygnus’s cargo capacity for a given mission will vary depending on the
density of the cargo and how it is packed.

Orbital is working with Draper Laboratory to develop guidance, navigation, and fault

tolerant computer support, and plans to use hardware and software developed by Japan
Aerospace Exploration Agency for the H-II Transfer Vehicle to facilitate proximity and
berthing operations with the space station.

Thales-Alenia Space was the prime contractor to NASA and the Italian Space Agency in

the development of the three multipurpose pressurized logistics modules used by the space
shuttle to ferry pressurized cargo to and from the space station. Thales-Alenia Space was
also the prime contractor to the European and Italian Space Agencies for the development
of Nodes 2 and 3 of the space station. COTS vehicles are intended to berth with the space
station at Node 2 during their COTS demonstrations.

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GAO-09-618 NASA's COTS Project

the second-stage motor with ATK in March 2008. However, Orbital
reported that it has experienced schedule slips for other Taurus II
development milestones. Orbital’s joint CDR with Aerojet and Yuzhnoye
for the first-stage engine and tanks slipped 4 months from November 2008
until March 2009.

Orbital also delayed a separate CDR with Yuzhnoye for

the first-stage tanks 6 months from February 2009 to August 2009 to
address issues with the engine feed lines and fuel tank mass.

Although Orbital has moved its COTS demonstration date 3 months, from
December 2010 until March 2011, Orbital’s schedule to complete Taurus II
first-stage development appears to provide little margin to respond to
future technical issues, should they arise. Orbital is tracking the delivery of
its first-stage engine components as a significant Taurus II risk. Its Taurus
II risk summary report indicates that given the compressed schedule for
developing these components, there is a possibility that the Taurus II
program schedule for its COTS demonstration mission may not be met. In
addition, Orbital and Aerojet are in the process of conducting development
tests of components from heritage NK-33 rocket engines that will be used
to produce the Taurus II first-stage engines. Orbital reported that the NK-
33 engines have been in storage since 1972 and tests are being done to
ensure that components have not degraded over time.

Space vehicle.

Orbital has completed several early design reviews of key

components for its Cygnus space vehicle; however, technical and schedule
obstacles must be overcome before Orbital may attempt its COTS
demonstration. Orbital completed a system requirements review for its
demonstration mission in July 2008, a PDR for its pressurized cargo
module in October 2008, and the first of three space station Safety Review
Panel reviews in March 2009. Orbital also reported that procurement of
long-lead systems for the Cygnus has begun, with production scheduled to
begin before the end of 2009 and integration tests scheduled to begin in
February 2010. However, NASA officials reported that Orbital had a late
start in developing its capabilities to integrate its space vehicle with the
space station. According to NASA officials, this is due, in part, to Orbital’s
late entry to the COTS project and because there was some question over
whether Orbital would demonstrate a pressurized or unpressurized cargo
delivery capability in its COTS demonstration mission.

This slip was due, in part, to difficulties establishing and negotiating testing and delivery

requirements with Yuzhnoye for the development of the first-stage tanks.

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GAO-09-618 NASA's COTS Project

Orbital’s aggressive schedule could present challenges with completing
requirements in NASA’s International Space Station to COTS Interface
Requirements Document in time for its March 2011 demonstration mission
launch date.

To help address the technical challenges of integrating with

the space station, Orbital plans to use hardware and software developed
by Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency for the H-II Transfer Vehicle to
facilitate proximity and berthing operations. NASA officials reported that
Orbital may benefit from its partnerships with experienced
subcontractors, such as Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency and Thales-
Alenia Space, but a significant amount of work remains to be done under a
compressed development schedule before Orbital can be certified to
integrate with the space station.

Launch readiness.

Orbital has begun the development of its COTS launch

site at the Mid-Atlantic Regional Spaceport in Wallops Island, Virginia, but
more work remains to be done to complete NASA’s launch safety
requirements and acquire FAA launch licenses. As required by its
agreement, Orbital completed an initial review of the launch site facilities
to be developed and prepared a concept of operations for its launch
activities. To support its COTS demonstration mission, Orbital and the
Mid-Atlantic Regional Spaceport intend to construct several new facilities,
including a horizontal integration facility (to integrate the Taurus II with
the Cygnus); a launch pad, mount, and ramp; and separate fueling facilities
for the Taurus II and the Cygnus. Orbital’s construction schedule indicates
that its launch pad, mount, and ramp will be completed by the end of 2009.
Orbital reported that construction of the horizontal integration facility is
planned for completion in May 2010, and the Cygnus space vehicle fueling
facility is planned to be completed by October 2010. Before it may attempt
its demonstration mission, Orbital must receive NASA’s approval that its
new launch site facilities in development meet NASA’s range safety
requirements, which apply at the Mid-Atlantic Regional Spaceport. These
requirements are scheduled for completion by Orbital’s demonstration
mission readiness review, scheduled for February 2011. Orbital must also
submit applications to the FAA for a launch license for the Taurus II and a
re-entry license for the Cygnus space vehicle. A draft of its launch license

NASA’s International Space Station to COTS Interface Requirements Document requires

COTS vehicles to have two-fault tolerant systems to mitigate against catastrophic hazards
that could occur during integrated operations with the space station. Orbital reported that
it typically builds its components with one-fault tolerance and has cited the development
and verification of hardware and software needed for space station rendezvous and
proximity operations as a high risk.

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GAO-09-618 NASA's COTS Project

application is required as part of its COTS System CDR, scheduled for
September 2009.

With the approaching retirement of the space shuttle in 2010, NASA faces
the difficult challenge of securing sufficient and reliable cargo
transportation capabilities to the space station from 2010 to 2015. NASA
has taken several steps recently to finish its $31 billion investment in the
construction of the space station, which include installing the necessary
equipment to support a crew of six astronauts and to fully utilize the space
station’s research capabilities. While commercial partners have made
progress in developing cargo transportation capabilities, they have
recently fallen behind their development schedules. Furthermore, the
most critical steps lie ahead, including successfully launching new
vehicles and completing integration with the space station. The impending
retirement of the space shuttle leaves NASA with little margin to address
future COTS development delays. Should commercial partners suffer
future delays or be unable to provide cargo resupply services when
anticipated, NASA will be unable to fully utilize the space station as
intended.

Concluding
Observations

We provided a copy of the draft report to the Department of Defense
(DOD), FAA, and NASA for comment. We also gave SpaceX and Orbital an
opportunity to comment on the findings related to their development
efforts. DOD and FAA did not submit comments. In commenting on a draft
of our report, NASA found it to be “thorough, objective, and helpful in
addressing commercial crew and cargo demonstration efforts.” NASA’s
written comments appear in appendix II. NASA, SpaceX, and Orbital also
provided technical comments which we have incorporated as appropriate.

Agency Comments
and Our Evaluation

We will send copies of the report to NASA’s Administrator and interested
congressional committees. The report will be available at no charge on the
GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

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GAO-09-618 NASA's COTS Project

Should you or your staffs have any questions on matters discussed in this
report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may
be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key

Cristina Chaplain

contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.

Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management

Page 31

GAO-09-618 NASA's COTS Project

List of Congressional Addressees

The Honorable Barbara A. Mikulski
Chairman
The Honorable Richard C. Shelby
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science,
and Related Agencies
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate

The Honorable Alan B. Mollohan
Chairman
The Honorable Frank R. Wolf
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science,
and Related Agencies
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives

The Honorable Gabrielle Giffords
Chairwoman
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics
Committee on Science and Technology
House of Representatives

The Honorable Mark Udall
United States Senate

Page 32

GAO-09-618 NASA's COTS Project

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To examine the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA)
management of the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS)
project and its expenditures, we analyzed project documentation,
including the Space Act agreements NASA entered into with its
commercial partners, NASA’s guidance for implementing these
agreements,

development milestone and quarterly reviews and other

briefings, and project funding and expenditures. We evaluated NASA’s
management of the COTS project by comparing COTS management
activities with critical project management tools and activities identified in
NASA’s Space Act Agreements Guide and in prior GAO work on NASA
projects with similarities to COTS.

We also analyzed NASA budget and

funding documentation, confirmed this data with relevant milestone
payment documentation, and evaluated the processes used for validating
expenditures. In addition, we interviewed NASA and company officials to
assess NASA’s management of the project and to verify project funding
and expenditures.

To determine the extent to which NASA is reliant on commercial partners
to meet the space station’s cargo resupply needs, we reviewed
International Space Station program office documentation on the space
station’s cargo resupply needs and risks, NASA’s plans to meet its cargo
resupply needs between 2010 and 2015, and international and commercial
partners’ vehicle capabilities. We interviewed officials at NASA’s
Commercial Crew and Cargo and International Space Station program
offices to confirm NASA’s cargo resupply plans and to verify cargo
resupply needs and risks and vehicle capabilities. We also reviewed NASA
studies that assessed the impact of the COTS project on NASA’s cargo
resupply strategy.

NASA Advisory Implementing Instruction (NAII) 1050-1A is also known as NASA’s Space

Act Agreements Guide.

GAO,

Space Transportation: Critical Areas NASA Needs to Address in Managing Its

Reusable Launch Vehicle Program

GAO-01-826T

(Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2001).

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GAO-09-618 NASA's COTS Project

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

requirements for integrating with the space station,

and prior GAO

reports. We also reviewed the commercial transportation space
regulations of the Federal Aviation Administration’s Office of Commercial
Space Transportation

and U.S. Air Force Space Command’s range safety

requirements

to evaluate commercial partners’ progress in obtaining

required licenses and in developing their launch sites and operations
procedures. We conducted field visits and interviewed commercial
partners to determine partners’ development progress against
performance milestones and to identify technical and schedule challenges.
In addition, we interviewed officials at NASA’s Headquarters, Johnson
Space Center, and Wallops Flight Facility; the Federal Aviation
Administration’s (FAA) Office of Commercial Space Transportation;
Patrick Air Force Base and Cape Canaveral Air Force Station; and Mid-
Atlantic Regional Spaceport. Our review did not attempt to independently
identify risks and challenges or assess whether a partner successfully
accomplished a particular milestone. We relied on the commercial
partners’ assessments of the technical challenges they faced and NASA’s
determination that a milestone had been successfully completed.

The International Space Station to Commercial Orbital Transportation Services Interface

Requirements Document (SSP 50808) provides interface and performance requirements
between the space station and COTS partners, performance and design requirements for
the COTS ground systems supporting COTS vehicle flights to space station, and design
requirements on the COTS vehicle to ensure safe integration with the space station.

The commercial space licensing regulations are outlined at 14 C.F.R. §§ 413-437 (2009).

The range safety requirements are published in U.S. Air Force Space Command Manual

91-710, which is divided into seven volumes.

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GAO-09-618 NASA's COTS Project

Appendix II: Comments from the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration

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GAO-09-618 NASA's COTS Project

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff
Acknowledgments

Cristina Chaplain, (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov

In addition to the individual named above, Jim Morrison, Assistant
Director; Matt Barranca; Greg Campbell; Brian Hartman; Jeff Hartnett;
Arturo Holguin; Kenneth E. Patton; Tim Persons; and Alyssa Weir made
contributions to this report.

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GAO-09-618 NASA's COTS Project

GAO Contact

Acknowledgments

(120765)

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