USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT 

 
 
 
 
 
 

Comparing Strategies of the 2d Punic War:   

Rome’s Strategic Victory Over the Tactical/Operational Genius, Hannibal Barca  

 
 

 

by 

 

 
 

LTC James Parker 

US Army 

 

 
 

 

 

 

 
 

 

COL Harry A. Tomlin 

Project Advisor 

 
 
 

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the 
author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the 
U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies. 
 

 

 
 

 
 

 
 

U.S. Army War College 

CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013 

 

 ii

ABSTRACT 

 

AUTHOR: James 

Parker 

 
TITLE: 

Comparing Strategies of the 2d Punic War:  Rome’s Strategic Victory Over the 
Tactical/Operational Genius, Hannibal Barca  

 
FORMAT: 

Strategy Research Project 

 
DATE:  

10 April 2001   

  PAGES: 47   

CLASSIFICATION:  Unclassified 

 
 
The period of time, 225-202 BC, in the Western Mediterranean, was a crucial turning point in the 

history of the Western World.  The Roman Republic defeated its greatest rival, Carthage, and 

set the stage for Rome’s 600 years domination of the Western World.  It determined which 

culture, Greek/Roman or Semitic/Phoenician, would dominate the development of the Western 

World.   This paper will focus on the strategic failure of Carthage and its military leader, 

Hannibal, during the Second Punic War.  It will compare and contrast the national strategies 

employed by both Rome and Carthage.  Carthage failed to effectively employ all aspects of 

national power into a national strategy, which doomed Carthage when confronted with the more 

coherent Roman strategy.  Hannibal's unparalleled tactical/operational successes in Italy were 

rendered irrelevant to the war's conclusion. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 iii

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

 

ABSTRACT.................................................................................................................................................. III

 

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS .........................................................................................................................VII

 

SOURCES ............................................................................................................................. 2

 

STRATEGIC SETTING - THE CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN, 220 BC .............................. 3

 

EVENTS LEADING TO SECOND PUNIC WAR ................................................................... 4

 

EVENTS OF THE 2D PUNIC WAR ....................................................................................... 6

 

CARTHAGINIAN STRATEGY FOR 2D PUNIC WAR......................................................... 12

 

ROMAN STRATEGY FOR 2D PUNIC WAR....................................................................... 14

 

FACTORS IN ROMAN VICTORY ....................................................................................... 16

 

LESSONS FOR TODAY’S STRATEGISTS ........................................................................ 17

 

1.   ALL ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER..................................................................... 18

 

Diplomatic Power...............................................................................................................18

 

Economic Power ................................................................................................................19

 

Informational Power ..........................................................................................................20

 

Military Power.....................................................................................................................21

 

 

v

 vi

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 

 
 

 vii

 

 viii

COMPARING STRATEGIES OF THE 2D PUNIC WAR:  ROME’S STRATEGIC VICTORY OVER THE 

TACTICAL/OPERATIONAL GENIUS, HANNIBAL BARCA  

 

Hannibal Barca, general of Carthage during the 2d Punic War with Rome, 218-202 BC, 

has few peers in the annals of military history.  He invaded the homeland of his enemy and 

remained there, undefeated, for fifteen years.  He soundly defeated every Roman army that 

dared to risk battle with him while in Italy.  The military historian Trevor N. Dupuy named 

Hannibal, the "Father of Strategy."

1

  Carthage, however, lost the 2d Punic War decisively and 

survived less than a century more; Hannibal was a strategic failure.   If so, why did he fail?  The 

failure was certainly not at the tactical or operational level of war.  Hannibal won every major 

battle against the Romans in Italy.  He formed and reformed successful armies without 

reinforcement from his strategic base.  Hannibal's lone failure on the tactical battlefield occurred 

at Zama after he had already been forced to leave Italy and no longer threatened Rome.   

In the final analysis Rome’s national level strategy was superior to that of Carthage.  

What were the strategic factors that allowed Rome to absorb repeated body blows and to 

endure an enemy army in its homeland for more than a decade without succumbing?  The 

answers to these questions provide the key to understanding Carthage’s failure in the 2d Punic 

War. 

 

A close examination of the 2d Punic War reveals many lessons at the strategic level of 

war that endure to this day.  Hannibal and Carthage failed when their inherent strategic 

weakness was confronted by the more robust and resilient Rome.  Roman strategy effectively 

combined all elements of national power into a coherent, war winning strategy.   

A national strategy should be directed at the enemy’s strategic center of gravity.  In both 

opponents the strategic center of gravity was the political will of the respective governments, the 

Roman Senate and the Carthaginian oligarchy.  Rome successfully attacked the Carthaginian 

center of gravity while the Carthaginians pursued a more peripheral strategy aimed at the allies 

of Rome.  Carthaginian strategy focused almost solely on its military strategy, committed to war 

with Rome by a general unable to muster the strategic resources to win.  Carthage never 

effectively employed its naval forces in concert with its land forces.  Hannibal’s successes point 

out the importance of training and experience in senior leaders.  The strategic assumptions of a 

campaign plan must be valid for that plan to succeed.  Hannibal’s campaign was based on the 

invalid assumption that Rome’s allies would defect following defeat of Roman armies in the field.  

Finally successful campaigns consist of operations linked in space and time.  Rome succeeded 

in linking their widely separated operations in Italy, Sicily, Greece, Iberia, and eventually North 

Africa.  These lessons are explored later in this paper. 

 

This paper looks at the 2d Punic War at the strategic level and attempts to answer 

question of why one of the “great captains” of military history failed so completely.  This paper  

avoids the attraction of examining Hannibal's tactical and operational prowess except where 

those events provide an insight into strategic factors.  A description of the rival strategies is 

followed by an analysis of why one succeeded and the other failed.  The paper  concludes with 

lessons a modern strategist can extract from the failures and successes of both Carthage and 

Rome during the 2d Punic War.  

SOURCES 

 

Any examination of the Punic Wars must include a cautionary note on the sources 

available.   Rome, as the winner, wrote the history of the Punic Wars.  The modern reader only 

views Carthage and Hannibal through this Roman filter.  The complete destruction of Carthage 

in 146 BC and the hegemony of Rome following the Punic Wars limited the survival of 

competing viewpoints.  The two main sources that survived are Polybius and Livy.  Both authors 

had access to primary sources contemporary to the 2d Punic War that have not survived.  This 

includes books written by Greek "war correspondents" who marched with Hannibal.  One of 

these, Sosilos, taught Hannibal Greek and wrote his biography.

2

   

 

The reader of a modern source should always check to ascertain whether the writer 

relies more on Polybius or Livy.  Polybius is clearly the more reliable source compared to Livy 

and meets a more strict criterion of honesty and truthfulness.  Polybius was the son of a rich 

Greek landowner and rose to rank of general in the Achaean League.  In 168 BC he was taken 

to Rome as a hostage.  Polybius became very close to Roman nobility and was in fact adopted 

into the Cornelius Scipio family.  He traveled extensively with his Roman hosts, walked the 

actual battlefields of the 2d Punic War only 40 years after they took place, and talked with 

surviving participants, including Numidian King Masinissa and Scipio Africanus’ confidant 

Laelius.

3 

 Polybius accompanied Publius Scipio to Africa and witnessed the fall and destruction 

of Carthage that concluded the 3d Punic War.  He later became a respected statesman in 

Greece and wrote extensively although many of his books have been lost.

4

  Livy, on the other 

hand, wrote more than a hundred years after Polybius and was clearly a Roman writing for 

Romans; highlighting the greatness of Rome.   

 

 

 

2

STRATEGIC SETTING - THE CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN, 220 BC 

Rome and Carthage emerged as the predominant powers in the central Mediterranean 

in the 100 years prior to the 2d Punic War.  Carthage was the older, more developed state at 

that time.  Carthage was founded in 814 BC as a colony of the wide-ranging Phoenicians from 

the city of Tyre in today’s Lebanon.  Carthage gained her freedom from Tyre in the fifth century 

BC.  Carthage eventually established a powerful maritime, commercial empire unrivaled in the 

western Mediterranean.  Described as the “London of Antiquity” and the richest city in the 

world,

5

 Carthage established trading posts and colonies throughout the islands of the western 

Mediterranean, North Africa and Spain. Carthage tapped the rich trade routes of Egypt and 

Africa and also sailed to Britain and Senegal.  Carthage, however, was more a carrier than a 

producer of goods.

6

  Carthage was ruled by an oligarchy of the powerful commercial families. 

Rome gradually developed from a small, agrarian, city-state into the predominant land 

power on the Italian peninsula.  Rome had few contacts outside Italy during this period and 

confined most of its attention to consolidating power in Italy.  Rome had assimilated several 

conquered peoples and established Roman colonies to form a Latin Confederation, the “allies of 

the Latin name.”  Additional conquered Italian peoples, such the Etruscans, the Samnites, and 

the Lucanians, among others, were established as Italian “allies” of Rome.  Rome fought a 

series of wars with the Gauls, a warlike Celtic people, located in the Po Valley (Cisalpine Gaul) 

in northern Italy as well as across the Alps in modern day France (Transalpine Gaul).  The 

Gauls were of particular concern to the Romans.  Only a century prior to the Punic Wars the 

Gauls had attacked and sacked the city of Rome; the last to do this prior to the barbarian 

invasions that ended the Roman Empire 600 years later.  In a war from 225-222 BC the 

Romans destroyed Gallic armies at the battles of Telamon and Clastidium.

7

 Following these 

defeats the Gauls never again crossed the Apennine Mountains to threaten Rome, except as 

part of Hannibal’s army.  The Romans subsequently campaigned into the Po River Valley and 

by 220 BC the Gauls had been subdued.  Rome’s victory over the Gauls allowed placement of 

two important Latin colonies, Placentia and Cremona, in northern Italy.  These two colonies 

blocked the major advances on Rome from the Po Valley and became a problem for Hannibal a 

few years later.

8

 

Rome and Carthage had had diplomatic contacts for hundreds of years prior to the Punic 

Wars.  The first recorded treaty was signed between the two states in 508 BC and another in 

318 BC.

9

  The treaties established the maritime trading rights of Carthage and allowed Rome 

free rein in Italy.  The two states were nominal allies when, in 282 BC, Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, 

 

3

invaded Italy in support of the city of Tarentum, a Greek colony in southern Italy, against the 

Romans and subsequently threatened Carthaginian interests in Sicily.

10

  Rome and Carthage 

first went to war over Sicily in 264 BC in the 1

st

 Punic War.  The 1

st

 Punic War ended in a 

decisive victory for Rome.   

The other key actors in the Mediterranean during this time period were the three 

descendants of Alexander the Great’s generals who ruled remnants of his empire:  Ptolemy in 

Egypt, the Seleucids in Syria, and the Antigonid rulers in Macedonia.  The Macedonians were of 

immediate concern to the Romans.  In 229 BC, at the invitation of Greek city-states, Rome 

eradicated Illyrian pirates from the Adriatic Sea.  The Romans subsequently established a 

protectorate over the Kingdom of Illyria, modern day Albania.  Macedonia’s ambitious young 

King Philip V resented the Roman incursion directly adjacent to his border. Rome also assisted 

Greek city-states that the Macedonians believed rightfully belonged in the Macedonian sphere 

on influence. Greece itself remained a collection of city-states loosely banded into the 

contending Aetolian and Achaean Leagues.  Historically both the Romans and Carthaginians 

had fought wars with the Greeks, mainly over Greek colonies in both Italy and Sicily.  Carthage 

however was viewed as a traditional maritime rival by the sea going Greeks while Rome was 

not.   

EVENTS LEADING TO SECOND PUNIC WAR 

The First Punic War between Rome and Carthage lasted over twenty years, 264-241 

BC.  It was mainly a naval war with limited land engagements in Sicily and North Africa.  The 

Romans were victorious and destroyed the heretofore Carthaginian naval supremacy forever.  

The terms of the peace treaty gave Rome the island of Corsica; all of Sicily, except the 

independent Greek colony of Syracuse; and imposed ten years of large annual war reparations 

payments on Carthage.  Shortly after the conclusion of war the largely mercenary Carthaginian 

army revolted in North Africa.  During Carthaginian preoccupation with this revolt Rome 

annexed the Carthaginian island of Sardinia. 

Hannibal’s father, Hamiclar Barca, was one of the few Carthaginian generals to emerge 

with an intact reputation from the 1st Punic War.

11

  Hamiclar defeated the mercenaries in North 

Africa in 238 BC.  In 236 BC, accompanied by his young son Hannibal, Hamiclar led a 

Carthaginian army to conquer Iberia (modern day Spain and Portugal).  The Romans were told 

this Carthaginian expansion was necessary to pay off the reparations due Rome.  Hamiclar’s 

son in law, Hasdrubal, succeeded Hamiclar following his death in 228 BC.  He established 

Iberia as a rich colony for Carthage.  Iberia became the primary source of Carthaginian financial 

 

4

wealth and manpower for Carthaginian mercenary armies.  Hasdrubal also concluded a treaty 

with the Romans that agreed on a northern border for Carthaginian expansion in Iberia. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

New Carthage 

CorsIca 

Illyria

Macedon 

Aetolian 
League 

Massilia

Cannae 

Lake T.

Metaurus 

Achaean League 

Carthage 

Rome 

Iberia 

Mediterranean 

Sea 

Sicily

Sardinia 

Transalpine 
Gaul 

Numidia 

Saguntum 

Gades 

Cisalpine 

Gaul 

Genua

Capua

Tarentum 

Balearic Islands

Ebro River 

Utica

Baecula 

Ilipia 

Zama

Significant Cities 

Major Battle 

Trebia

Syracuse 

FIGURE 1.   WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN, 2D PUNIC WAR  

 

Hannibal succeeded the assassinated Hasdrubal as the leader of Carthaginian forces in 

Iberia in 222 BC at the age of 26.  Hannibal quickly conducted two successful campaigns 

against outlying Iberian tribes to consolidate Carthaginian rule in Iberia.  In 219 BC he attacked 

the city of Saguntum, an ally of Rome.  Rome demanded Carthage halt the siege and surrender 

Hannibal to them.  Carthage refused, Saguntum fell, and Rome declared war. 

 

 

5

•Mutiny of Carthaginian 
mercenaries in Africa 
 
•Hamiclar CINC Carthage, 
defeats mercenaries 
 

                                          

Other 

 •Rome conquers Illyran 

pirates 
 

                                          

•Hamiclar begins conquest of 
Iberia 
•Hamiclar dies, Hasdrubal 
assumes command 
 
•Ebro Treaty W/ Rome 
 
 
 
•Hasdrubal assassinated, 
Hannibal assumes command 
 
 
•Hannibal completes conquest of 
Iberia 

Italy 

•242/1 BC 
 
                        
•238 BC 
 
 
•236 BC 
 
 
•229/8 BC 
 
•226 BC 
 
•225 BC 
 
 
•222 BC 
 
 
•221 BC 
 
•220 BC 
 

Year 

  

•Battle of Aegate Islands, 1

st

 

Punic War ends 
 
•Rome annexes Sardinia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
•Roman victory over Gauls at 
Telamon/Clusium 
•Romans defeat Gauls, 
establish colonies in Cisalpine 
Gaul 
 
 
 
 
•Hannibal’s envoys meet with 
Gauls 

Iberia 

 

FIGURE 2.   TIMELINE, EVENTS BETWEEN 1

ST

 AND 2D PUNIC WAR 

EVENTS OF THE 2D PUNIC WAR 

 

In 218 BC Hannibal began his epic march from Iberia to Italy.  He bypassed the Roman 

allied, Greek colony of Massila (modern day Marseilles) to the north.  Roman consul Publius 

Scipio, father of Scipio Africanus, landed one of Rome’s armies at Massila and barely missed 

intercepting Hannibal west of the Alps.  Scipio sent his army on to Iberia, its initial objective, 

while he returned to Cisalpine Gaul to confront Hannibal when he emerged from the Alps.  

Scipio assumed command of troops left in Northern Italy to keep watch on the recently defeated 

Gauls.  Hannibal’s celebrated march over the Alps cost him tens of thousands of veteran troops 

lost to both the elements and unfriendly mountain tribes.  The other Roman consular army was 

in Sicily preparing to invade North Africa.   

 

In the first battle of the 2d Punic War, a minor cavalry engagement, Scipio was defeated 

and badly wounded in at the Ticinus River.  The other Roman consular army was rushed to the 

Po Valley where it suffered a crushing defeat to Hannibal at the battle of Trebia.  Hannibal 

wintered his army in Cisalpine Gaul and recruited reinforcements from the Gauls. The Romans 

 

6

fell back to their colonies to block the two main roads through the Apennines from northern Italy 

to Rome. 

 

In the spring of 217 BC, Hannibal executed the first conscious turning movement in 

military history

12 

by crossing the Apennines and crossing the supposedly impassable Arnus 

marshes.  This movement placed the Carthaginian army between the two Roman armies.  

Gaius Flaminius, the newly elected Roman consul rushed south with his army from the Po 

Valley.  Hannibal trapped the Roman army while it was still in march order in a defile beside 

Lake Trasimene and destroyed it, killing Flaminius as well.  No Roman army existed between 

Hannibal and Rome following the battle.  Hannibal, however, moved to southern Italy where he 

hoped to induce Roman allied cities to defect to Carthage. 

 

Rome appointed Fabius Maximus as temporary dictator and followed his strategy of 

refusing open battle with Hannibal while placing several Roman armies in Hannibal’s vicinity to 

limit his movement. Roman forces were more successful in Iberia where they won a naval 

engagement and pushed south along the Mediterranean coast as far as Saguntum.  In 216 BC 

Roman leaders bowed to political pressure to abandon Fabian tactics.  Hannibal drew a Roman 

army of 16 legions to battle at Cannae.  He literally destroyed the Roman army and killed one of 

the two commanding consuls in a battle that military historians describe as “tactical 

perfection.”

13

  Sixty-thousand Romans lay dead and Rome was shaken to its foundations.  

Shortly thereafter yet another Roman army of two legions under Postrimus Albinus was 

ambushed in northern Italy near Moderna and massacred by the Gauls.

 14

  

In the aftermath of Cannae several Roman allies defected to Hannibal, including Capua, 

the second largest city in Italy.  Phillip V of Macedon also concluded an alliance with Hannibal 

against Rome.  Most Roman allies, however, remained loyal and two hastily recruited legions 

were marched south to bolster Roman prestige.  These forces successfully prevented Hannibal 

from seizing the important city of Nola.  Roman forces were still successful in Iberia where 

Hannibal’s brother Hasdrubal was defeated near the Ebro River.  Hannibal appealed to 

Carthage for reinforcements to finish off Rome.  He sent his brother Mago to Carthage, along 

with several baskets of signet rings from the dead Roman nobles, to directly appeal to the 

oligarchy for the needed resources.  Most Carthaginian resources, however, were sent to Iberia 

in the hopes of stemming the tide of Roman success there.   

The war in Italy settled into a strategic stalemate in the years following Cannae.  

Hannibal marched at will throughout southern Italy closely followed by Roman armies.  Hannibal  

now had to garrison the towns of his newly acquired allies.   The Romans attacked and  

 

 

7

 

Apulia 

Tarentum 

Metaurus

Capua

Nola

Cannae 

Lake 

Trasimene

Genua 

Picenum 

Locri 

Carthage 

Mediterranean 

Sea 

Sicily 

S
a 
r 
d 
I 
n 
I 
a

C
o 
r 
s  
I  
c 
a 

Transalpine 
Gaul 

C

Trebbia 

isalpine 

Gaul 

Massilia 

Zama 

Rome 

I 
l 
l
y
r 
i
a

Syracuse 

Moderna

Ticinus

B 
r 
u 
t  
t   
I   
u
m 

Samnium 

Liguria 

Telamon

Po River

Arnus 

Marshes

Adriatic Sea 

Mediterranean 

Sea 

Etruria 

Latin Ally/Colony

Major Battle

Campania 

Latium 

Croton 

FIGURE 3.   2D PUNIC WAR IN ITALY 

 

  

 

8

retook many of these towns.  The war outside Italy expanded to include theaters in Macedonia, 

Greece, Sardinia, and Sicily as well as Iberia.   

In 211 BC, as the Romans were on the verge of retaking Capua, Hannibal marched on 

Rome for the first and only time.  Hannibal attempted to relieve the Roman siege by drawing off 

besieging forces by marching his own army on Rome.  The Romans did not panic and 

maintained their siege of Capua.  After demonstrating near Rome Hannibal retreated once more 

to southern Italy and Capua fell to the Romans.  

Rome Carthage 

Hamiclar

 – Father of Hannibal, Carthaginian Army 

Cdr, died in Iberia 

                                            

Hasdrubal

 – Succeeds Hamiclar in Iberia, signed 

treaty with Rome, assassinated in Iberia                   

Hannibal

 – Commander Carthaginian military in  2d 

Punic War                                                                  

Hasdrubal Barca

 – Hannibal’s brother, 

commanded in Iberia, killed at Metaurus                   

Mago 

 – Hannibal’s brother, commanded in Iberia, 

invaded N. Italy, died of wounds                                

Hanno

 – Leader of Peace Party, opponent of war  

Bomiclar

 – Admiral, failed to reinforce Syracuse      

Hasdrubal Gisgo 

 – General defeated in Africa by 

Scipio               

Syphax

 – Numidian prince who defected to Rome 

& later returned to Carthage                                    

Philip V

 – Antigonid king of Macedonia, sided with 

Carthage in 2d Punic War                                     
 

Q

. Fabius

 – Consul/Dictator, Architect of Fabian 

Strategy 

                                              

Marcellus

 – Gifted Roman consul; killed in 

ambush                                                                

P. Scipio

 

(Elder)

 – Consul, Cdr at Ticinus, killed 

in Iberia                                                                  

C. Scipio

 – Consul, brother to Elder, 

commanded & killed in Iberia                                

Sempronius

 – Consul defeated at Trebia      

Flaminius

 – Consul defeated/killed at Lake 

Trasimene                                                     

Varro

 – Consul, Roman Cdr at Cannae                

A. Paulus

 – Consul killed at Cannae                    

Nero

 – Gifted Roman consul, made epic march, 

victor at Metaurus                                                  

P. Scipio(Africanus)

 – Roman victor in Iberia & 

at Zama                                                            

Masinissa

 – Numidian prince who defected to 

Rome                              

FIGURE 4:  KEY LEADERS OF 2D PUNIC WAR 

The Roman capture of Capua was a major turning point in the war.  In losing Capua, 

Hannibal lost his most important Italian ally and one he had pledged to defend.  Capua was also 

located in Campania, the most fertile and productive area of Italy.  In the same summer the 

Romans completed the conquest of Syracuse and destruction of a Carthaginian army in Sicily.

15

 

Rome shortly thereafter pacified Sicily and entered into an alliance with the Aetolian League to 

counter Phillip.  The combination of these events marked the end of Carthaginian success in 

Italy.  The only Carthaginian success during this time period was in Iberia where Hasdrubal 

defeated two Roman armies and killed the elder two Scipios.   

Publius Cornelius Scipio, who would eventually earn the cognomen, Africanus, replaced 

his dead father and uncle the following year in Iberia.  Scipio quickly reversed Roman fortunes 

 

9

there, soundly defeating every Carthaginian army sent against him.  Scipio’s capture of New 

Carthage, capitol of the Carthaginian empire in Iberia, deprived Carthage of her finest harbor in 

Iberia and gateway to the most lucrative source of power and wealth in the west.

16

  In 208 BC 

Hasdrubal abandoned Iberia to the Romans and marched his army towards Italy hoping to join 

his forces with Hannibal’s. Carthaginian rule in Iberia ended with the victories of Scipio.   

In 207 BC Hasdrubal arrived in Cisalpine Gaul hoping to unite with his brother in 

southern Italy.  Roman consul Nero intercepted Hasdrubal’s messengers after two sharp fights 

in Apulia with Hannibal at Grumentum and Venusia.  These two stalemated battles prevented 

Hannibal from moving north.  Nero then led a picked Roman force on an epic 240 mile forced 

march to unite with the other consular army confronting Hasdrubal.

17

  Hasdrubal was killed and 

his army destroyed at the battle of the Metaurus River in northern Italy before he could link up 

with Hannibal.  Following Metaurus, Hannibal retreated into Bruttium in the toe of Italy and 

remained there until he was recalled to Africa.

18

 

Hannibal’s brother, Mago, was ejected from Iberia by Scipio in 206 BC.  Mago moved to 

the Balearic Islands where he recruited a small army for the purpose of invading Northern Italy.  

He landed his force near Genua and attempted to rally the Gauls and Ligurians against the 

Romans.  The Gauls and Ligurians did not rally to the Mago’s banner in the same manner they 

had to Hannibal’s.  Mago also attempted to subvert Roman rule in Rome’s northern allies, most 

notably, the Etruscans.  Mago was defeated and mortally wounded in battle the following year. 

Scipio invaded North Africa in force in 204 BC.  Scipio’s initial campaign in Africa was to 

establish his new ally, Masinissa, as king of Numidia.

19

   Scipio had turned Masinissa from the 

Carthaginian cause while campaigning in Iberia.  Scipio‘s alliance with Masinissa provided the 

superb Numidian cavalry, backbone of Hannibal’s army, to assist the Romans and denied it to 

the Carthaginians.   

Scipio defeated a series of Carthaginian armies, culminating with Hasdrubal Gisgo’s at 

the Battle of Great Plains, and the Carthaginian senate considered peace.  During a negotiated 

armistice period the armies of Hannibal and Mago were simultaneously recalled and returned to 

North Africa.  Upon Hannibal’s return the Carthaginians broke off negotiations.  Carthage 

formed a new army centered on Hannibal’s Italian veterans.  In 203 BC Scipio defeated and 

destroyed Hannibal’s army at the battle of Zama.  The political will of the Carthaginian senate 

was broken.  Carthage sued for peace on Roman terms

20

 and this ended the 2d Punic War. 

 10

•Mago recruits army in 
Balearic Islands  

•Peace of Phoinike, 
Philip out of war  

•Scipio lands in N. Africa

•Scipio complete conquest 

•Minor ops in Bruttium 

•Scipio wins at Orongis; 
Hasdrubal leaves Iberia 

•Scipio wins at Baecula 

•Scipio takes New 
Carthage 

•Young Scipio assumes 
command 

•Hasdrubal defeats & kills 
2 Scipios 

•Hasdrubal defeated 

•Hasdrubal defeated 

•C. Scipio defeats 
Hasdrubal at Ebro, 
advances to Saguntum 

•C. Scipio arrives in Iberia 

Year 

Other 

•Philip V signs alliance 
with Hannibal 

Iberia 

•Hannibal takes 

Saguntum

 

Italy 

•Scipio defeats Hannibal 
at Zama, 2d Punic War 
ends 

•Scipio wins battle of 
Great Plains; Carthage 
sues for peace 

•Philip raids Aetolia 

•Rome signs treaty with 
Aetolian League 

•Philip fights A.L.; Rome 
pacifies Sicily 

•Philip wins at Lamia; 
Carthaginian fleet in 
Greece 

•Carthaginian fleet leaves 
Greece 

•Romans defeat Philip, 
burns his fleet 

•Carthage lands army in 
Sardinia, Rome destroys it

•Roman victories at Castulo, 
Munda, Aurinx 

•Carthage lands army in 
Sicily 

•Negotiations with 
Aetolian L.; Marcellus 
takes Syracuse 

•Rome captures Saguntum 

•Romans defeated at Lake 
Trasimene 

•Hannibal in S. Italy 

•Minor ops in Bruttium 

•Mago lands in Genua, Rome 
retakes Locri 

•Hannibal & Mago recalled to N 
Africa, Mago dies enroute 

•219 BC 
 
•218 BC    
 
•217 BC 
 
 
•216 BC 
 
•215 BC 
 
•214 BC 
 
•213 BC 
 
 
•212 BC 
 
•211 BC 
 
•210 BC 
 
 
•209 BC 
 
•208 BC 
 
•207 BC 
 
•206 BC 
 
•205 BC 
 
•204 BC 
 
•203 BC 
 
•202 BC 
 

•Romans retake Tarentum; 12 
Latin allies refuse to provide 
troops 

•2 Roman consuls killed in 
ambush 

•Hasdrubal & army die at 
Metaurus 

•Romans take towns in S. Italy 

•Hannibal marches on Rome, 
Romans take Capua 

•Hannibal takes Tarentum, 
Romans besiege Capua 

•Hannibal in S. Italy 

•Hannibal in S. Italy 

•Romans defeated at Cannae; 
Capua & S. Italy defects 

        

•Romans defeated at Ticinus

 

& 

Trebia

 

•Hannibal arrives in Italy 

FIGURE 5: TIMELINE OF 2D PUNIC WAR 

 

 

 11

CARTHAGINIAN STRATEGY FOR 2D PUNIC WAR 

The Carthaginian strategy for the 2d Punic War was neither a war of annihilation nor 

initially a war of attrition.  Hannibal stated, “I am not carrying on a war of extermination against 

the Romans.  I am contending for honor and empire.”

21

  Hannibal openly disclaimed pursuing a 

war of annihilation in his treaty with Phillip V of Macedon.  Hannibal obviously envisioned a 

Rome existing after the war.

22

  The centerpiece of Carthaginian strategy was military and almost 

exclusively landpower.  The desired ends of Carthaginian strategy was to replace Rome as the 

preeminent military power in the western Mediterranean, to regain the status Carthage had lost 

in the 1

st

 Punic War.  The ways of Carthaginian strategy were the overland invasion of the 

Italian homeland of Rome while protecting the strategic bases of Iberia and North Africa.  The 

means of effecting this strategy were the mercenary armies led by Carthaginian officers 

financed by Carthaginian holdings in Iberia.   

The goal of Hannibal’s military strategy was to persuade Roman allies to leave Rome.

23

  

Carthaginian military strategy in Italy contained three phases:  1) Defeat Roman field armies    

2) Move south and separate allies  3) Invade Latium and besiege Rome.

24

  Central to Hannibal’s 

strategy was to defeat Roman armies in the field to weaken Rome’s credibility with its Italian 

allies and concurrently diminish Rome’s manpower advantage.  After Lake Trasimene, Hannibal 

stated, “I have not come to fight Italians, but on behalf of the Italians against Rome.”

25

  Hannibal 

made the strategic assumption that Rome’s allies would defect following Rome’s repeated 

defeats on the tactical battlefield. Hannibal always freed allied prisoners following battles without 

ransom in hopes of building good faith and weaken allied ties with Rome.

26

 

Hannibal invaded Italy and relied on the anti-Roman fervor of the Gauls in northern Italy 

to replenish and reman his depleted army.  Hannibal had sent diplomatic envoys to the Gauls 

on both sides of the Alps as early as two years before his invasion.

27

  Hannibal, however, could 

not remain in northern Italy living off land of Gauls for an extended period.

28

  He invaded the rich 

lands of southern Italy hoping to separate the Roman allies from Rome.  Moving into southern 

Italy targeted some of the most important Roman allies as well as potentially securing sea LOCs 

to North Africa.

29

   

The Carthaginians also sought to protect both North Africa and especially Iberia, the 

primary source of Carthaginian financial wealth.  Hannibal’s initial deployment of forces 

detached a large part of his army under the command of Hasdrubal to secure Iberia.  Hannibal 

also sent a force composed mostly of Iberians to North Africa, both as a defense against Roman 

invasion and as hostages for Iberian loyalty to Carthage.

30

  Hannibal’s invasion of Italy was 

 12

clearly aimed at preventing a Roman invasion of both of these areas by tying Roman armies to 

Italy to confront a major threat to Rome itself.   

Outside of Italy, the Carthaginians attempted to obtain military support from Macedonia.  

Hannibal concluded a treaty with Phillip against Rome following Cannae. 

31

  After Hannibal’s 

initial successes in Italy Carthaginian strategy diverged.  The Carthaginian Senate did not 

reinforce Hannibal to pursue his third phase of marching on Rome.  Carthage shifted to a more 

peripheral strategy.  Roman success in Iberia required vigorous reinforcement of Carthaginian 

armies there.  Carthage also unwisely landed forces in Sardinia as well as Sicily.  Phillip V 

attacked Roman interests in Illyria while the Greek cities in Sicily were induced to revolt against 

Roman domination.

32

  The Carthaginians also tried to pry Greek colonies, located in Italy, away 

from Rome.  They succeeded only in the case of Tarentum. 

Hannibal, thwarted in obtaining the requisite military power to march on Rome, 

successfully obtained an alliance with newly crowned King Hieronymous of Syracuse, the most 

important city in Sicily.  The king was assassinated shortly thereafter but Carthaginian agents 

were able to install a pro-Carthaginian king and Rome was forced to fight.

33

  Carthage moved to 

secure Sicily once Syracuse defected from the Roman cause.  Hannibal needed Sicily as a 

secure base to his south. The stalemate in Italy could have been broken by a Carthaginian 

victory in Sicily. 

34

  Carthage landed an army of nearly 30,000 there but this force was eventually 

destroyed outside Syracuse by the Romans under Marcellus.

35

   

With Marcellus’ victory in Sicily Rome regained possession of the strategic harbor of 

Syracuse and effectively isolated the sea lines of communications to southern and western Italy.  

Any reinforcement of Hannibal now had to come overland from Iberia.

36

  Hasdrubal attempted 

this.  Hasdrubal’s goal after leaving Iberia was to join his army with Hannibal’s by marching over 

the Alps and then to southern Italy.  He failed and his army was destroyed at the battle of 

Metaurus.   

Carthage’s later strategy, having lost the tactical initiative, was to have Hannibal hold on 

in Italy to preclude a Roman invasion of North Africa.  Mago’s late invasion of north Italy was not 

only aimed at rallying Gauls and Ligurians.  He used bribes to subvert the Etruscan allies of 

Rome.  This led to series of investigations by Rome and the condemnation of Etruscan nobles.  

At this point in the war this was the real aim of Mago, not to join his forces with Hannibal.

37

  The 

Carthaginians thus maintained their mostly futile efforts aimed at Roman allies to the very end of 

the war. 

 13

ROMAN STRATEGY FOR 2D PUNIC WAR 

Roman strategy evolved as events dictated changes to initial plans.  The ends of Roman 

strategy were to limit the resurgent power of Carthage fueled by Carthaginian conquests in 

Iberia and to maintain Rome’s preeminent military status in the western Mediterranean.  The 

ways of Rome’s strategy were sea launched land attacks against both the North African 

homeland of Carthage and the financial center of the Carthaginian empire, Iberia.  The two 

Roman consuls leading armies were to invade Iberia and North Africa, respectively.  Scipio the 

Elder sailed for Iberia while Semporonius, the other consul, was to launch an invasion of North 

Africa from Sicily.  The means were the senate directed military, the preeminent Roman navy 

and the legions of the Roman army. 

Central to Roman strategy was the critical advantage of Roman sea supremacy.  Their 

ability to control the sea lines of communication of central and western Mediterranean enabled 

them to move and resupply large forces at will.  The Romans maintained this advantage 

throughout the war and they were quickly able to respond to problems arising in distant areas.  

This stands in marked contrast with Carthaginian naval efforts.  Carthage possessed a potent 

naval force but never successfully deployed it against the Romans. 

Roman strategy first changed when Scipio the Elder, enroute by sea to Iberia, learned of 

Hannibal’s movement towards the Alps while resupplying his invasion force at Massila.  Scipio 

failed in his attempt to intercept Hannibal west of the Alps but did make the critical operational 

decision to send his army on to Iberia.  Scipio returned to Italy to confront Hannibal with forces 

left to control the Gauls in northern Italy.  Sempronius cancelled the North African invasion and 

moved his consular army to northern Italy as well.   

Roman military strategy changed again after repeated tactical defeats.  The Romans 

concluded they could not beat Hannibal on the tactical battlefield of his choosing and the war in 

Italy became one of survival for the Romans.  They adopted the policy of Fabius Maximus to 

rely on their walled cities and road network to shadow Hannibal’s army in Italy, limit his ability to 

forage for supplies, and prevent his reinforcement.  Fabian military strategy acknowledged that 

Roman defeats would weaken the hold of Rome on allies.

38

   Rome focused on removing Iberia 

as a source of wealth and manpower for Carthage.  The success of Romans in Iberia convinced 

the Carthaginian oligarchy, despite Roman losses at Cannae, to divert reinforcements planned 

for Hannibal to Iberia.  Rome reinforced successful efforts in Iberia and Sicily and thwarted 

Carthaginian attempts to regain Sardinia.   

The Romans also quickly reacted to the Macedonian threat.  Roman praetor, Laevinius, 

moved a force across the Adriatic, defeated Philip, and forced him to burn his fleet and 

 14

withdraw.  Phillip waited in vain for support from the Carthaginian fleet while the Romans used 

diplomacy to conclude an alliance with the Aetolian League.  These Greek states were quickly 

joined by the additional Greek city-states of Elis, Messina, Sparta, Pergamum, Thrace and Illyria 

against Macedonia.  Rome not only diverted help from Hannibal but the war in Greece was 

shifted to Greek shoulders.

39

  This was clearly an economy of force theater for the Romans who 

through skillful diplomacy got the Greeks to fight the Macedonians and prevented significant 

Carthaginian support to Philip by dominating the Adriatic Sea LOCs.  

The Romans were also skillful in the use of information warfare to maintain their hold on 

allies.  The Carthaginians were labeled as outsiders who did not share the Italian traditions and 

religion.  When Capua fell to the Romans they executed the surviving Hannibalic supporters.  All 

other Capua citizens, except artisans and the poor, were sold into slavery and all property 

confiscated. 

40

  On the other hand, cities who came back to Rome freely were treated well.  The 

Romans also successfully painted Semetic Carthage as a traditional commercial rival and 

enemy of the Greeks. 

Roman strategy changed once again with Scipio the Younger’s victory in Iberia and the 

destruction of Hasdrubal’s army at Metaurus.  Hannibal was now isolated in Bruttium and no 

longer posed a significant threat to the survival of Rome.  Mago was likewise isolated in 

northern Italy with an operationally insignificant force. 

Scipio and Fabius differed over Roman strategy at this point.  Fabius preferred a typical, 

Republican Roman, agrarian strategy of continuing to isolate Hannibal in Italy and only 

undertaking an invasion of Cisalpine Gaul to remove the Gauls as allies of Carthage.  Fabius 

did not want to undertake an invasion of North Africa while Hannibal remained in Italy.  Scipio 

provided Rome with its first imperial vision, to take the fight to North Africa.

41

  Scipio’s famous 

answer to Fabius during the senatorial debate on Roman military strategy was:  “I shall meet 

Hannibal, Quintus Fabius, but I shall pull him after me; not let him hold me back.  I shall force 

him to fight in his own country and the prize will be Carthage, not the half ruined hill forts of the 

Brutii.”

42

  Scipio called for the invasion of North Africa to turn the tables on Hannibal, to separate 

Carthaginian allies there and to draw both Hannibal and Mago back to North Africa.  The 

Roman Senate agreed to Scipio’s plan. 

Scipio prepared the invasion force in Sicily from the surviving legionnaires from Roman 

disasters at Cannae and Herdonea.

43

   Once in North Africa he successfully separated the 

Numidians from Carthage and obtained the formidable Numidian cavalry for his army.  Hannibal 

was drawn back to North Africa and defeated at Zama.  Defeat at Zama was compounded as 

Hannibal had been lured into an area where there was no fort to fall back on and prevent the 

 15

annihilation of his army.  The result was the bloodless surrender of Carthage.

44

 

 

FACTORS IN ROMAN VICTORY   

 

There were eight major strategic limiting factors that together contributed to Carthage’s 

defeat: 

1.  

The war had to be a ground war.  Carthage refused to employ its naval 

resources to confront Rome. 

2.  

The main theater of war had to be fought in Italy. Fighting Rome elsewhere 

would not threaten Roman political will. 

3.  

Hannibal’s invasion of Italy had to be over land due to lack of naval support.   

4.  

Hannibal had to find replacements for combat losses in Italy.  Carthage did 

not possess the means or will to resupply or reinforce Hannibal. 

5.  

Hannibal had to reduce Rome’s manpower advantage through battle or 

politics.  Rome had to be willing to fight Hannibal on the battlefield and the 

manpower resources of the Roman allies had to be induced away from 

Rome. 

6.  

Rome had to be prevented from striking directly at Iberia or Carthage.  

Roman armies had to remain in Italy unable to strike at the center of 

Carthaginian wealth, Iberia, or the political center of the Carthaginian Empire, 

North Africa. 

7.  

 All of Rome’s armies could not be defeated.  The political will of Roman 

Senate was Rome’s center of gravity.  Breaking that will could lead to a treaty 

advantageous to Carthage.  The repeated defeat of Roman armies could lead 

to loss of political will in Senate.

45

   

8.  

Carthage’s armies were not as numerous or resilient as Rome’s, they could 

be and were defeated.  The political will of the Carthaginian ruling oligarchy 

was Carthage’s center of gravity.  Attacking the source of financial wealth, 

Iberia, and threatening Carthage in North Africa could and did break it.   

The Carthaginians also failed to maintain the strategic initiative Hannibal had seized by 

failing to reinforce him.  They wasted their more limited resources on fringe activities, such as 

an invasion of Sardinia and repeated reinforcement of Iberia while Hannibal; their most 

successful effort, was required to support himself from Italian resources.  The Carthaginians 

 16

were never able to fully leverage their Macedonian allies.  Macedonia could not reinforce 

Hannibal in Italy due to Roman domination of the Adriatic Sea.  Carthage had the means in the 

way of ships and certainly the tradition to challenge Rome as sea but never did. 

Roman strategy was superior to Carthaginian strategy in its execution for several basic 

reasons.  The Romans combined all elements of national power that eventually evolved into a 

coherent national strategy.  The Romans dominated the sea lines of communication.  The 

Romans had superior strategic resources.  The Romans had superior strategic endurance.  The 

Romans reinforced success as opposed to failure.  The Romans also treated their allies and 

friends much better than the Carthaginians did theirs.   

Carthage had been erstwhile competitors, especially for the Greek colonies of the 

western Mediterranean, and was oppressive in dealing with subject peoples.  Roman rule 

provided better roads, civic infrastructure, secure trading routes, and a great deal of local 

autonomy.  Carthaginian rule was based on cruelty and was very heavy handed.  Carthaginian 

politics were based on wealth and avarice.  Loyalty to Carthage never ran very deep.

46

  This ran 

counter to the Carthaginian goal of luring Roman allies away.  Rome was savage in punishing 

former allies who resisted Rome, such as Capua.  Former allies, who returned voluntarily, even 

with a Roman army at its gate, were treated much more evenly.   

LESSONS FOR TODAY’S STRATEGISTS 

As stated earlier, there are numerous lessons for the modern strategist in the conduct of 

the 2d Punic War:   

1. 

All elements of national power should be welded into a cohesive 

national policy.  Diplomatic skill can obtain what force cannot.  

Informational power and economic power should be leveraged in 

concert with military power to achieve political goals.  Military strategy 

should not lead political policy.

47

 

2. 

A nation’s strategic endurance is a central calculation for success in 

warfare.  Popular support for the war as well as the strategic resources 

to prosecute the war are needed.  Rome clearly possessed greater 

strategic endurance than Carthage.   

3. 

In order to succeed you must successfully attack the enemy’s strategic 

center of gravity. At the strategic level this is often the political will of 

the enemy.  Rome’s political will never wavered through many defeats 

while Carthage’s crumbled following tactical defeat at Zama. 

 17

4. 

Strategic assumptions must be valid or a plan is doomed to failure.    

Carthage assumed Rome’s Italian and Latin allies would defect and 

therefore rob Rome of its significant manpower advantage.  This 

assumption proved invalid and doomed the Carthaginian strategy. 

5. 

Theater strategy is executed through campaigns that consist of 

operations synchronized in time and space.  Rome successfully linked 

their operations in Iberia, Sicily, Macedonia, and eventually North 

Africa into a war winning campaign. 

6. 

Military power is most effective when exercised in a synergistic joint 

manner; Carthage never leveraged naval power.  A maritime power 

that cannot control the sea will cease to be a power.   

7. 

It is important to reinforce success at the strategic level; to build on the 

opportunities successes present.   Rome consistently reinforced 

successes in outlying theaters, successfully diverting Carthaginian 

resources from Hannibal.  

8. 

Coalition warfare is difficult but also has the potential to provide 

significant advantages.  Hannibal’s matchless army was a coalition of a 

wide range of nationalities.  Rome successfully blunted Macedonian 

efforts with cooperation with the Aetolian League. 

9. 

Strategic leaders require training and experience.  Military brilliance, as 

evidenced by Hannibal, can compensate for shortages in strategic 

resources. 

1.   ALL ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER 

The elements of national power:  military, diplomatic, economic, and informational 

should be employed in a comprehensive national strategy aimed at the political goals of the 

nation.  It is here that Roman policy was clearly superior to that of Carthage and Hannibal. 

Diplomatic Power 

Roman diplomacy resulted in obtaining grain from Egypt when Italy ceased to produce 

enough due to Hannibal’s operations in southern Italy.  In 210 BC, Valerius concluded an 

alliance with the Aetolian League which kept Philip busy maintaining his own territory instead of 

helping Hannibal in Italy.

48

 The good will generated by Rome’s removal of Illyrian pirates set the 

stage for successful diplomacy with the Aetolian League.  Rome, in subduing the Kingdom of 

 18

Illyria and its nests of pirates, established a buffer against Macedon and secured trade routes 

and commerce for the Greeks as well.

49

  The Greek colonies in the Western Mediterranean 

were historical rivals of the Carthaginians and their Phoenician predecessors.  These Greek 

colonies applied for help to Rome.

50

 The allies and Greek cities’ mercantile citizens preferred 

the security offered by Rome and they saw Carthage as a traditional rival.

51

 

Scipio Africanus was successful in separating nearly all of Carthage’s allies while 

operating in Iberia

52

and

 

 was particularly successful in separating the valuable Numidians from 

Carthage.  Syphax, king of Numidia and his rival, Masinissa were convinced to switch sides by 

Scipio in Iberia.

53 

 Carthage won Syphax back with marriage to daughter of Hasdrubal Gisgo, 

Sophonisba; Scipio then turned to Masinissa.  After arriving in North Africa Scipio sent 

Masinissa to Rome to confirm his kingship over Syphax, cementing this alliance.

54

  Roman 

envoys were also sent to Africa throughout the war to stir up trouble for Carthage.

55 

  

The negotiated Peace of Phoinike ended the war with Macedonia well before the end of 

the 2d Punic War, and it was advantageous to Philip in that it allowed him to retain some of his 

gains in the Balkans at Roman expense.  However, the peace treaty represented a triumph of 

Roman diplomacy in the context of its struggle with Carthage.  With a minimum effort Rome had 

frustrated any possibility of Macedonian aid for Hannibal and maintained a presence, albeit 

smaller, on the eastern Adriatic shore.  Rome would return at a later date to finish Macedonia.

56

 

Carthage sent a delegation to the negotiations urging an invasion of Italy.  Macedon eventually 

only sent a small Macedonian force to North Africa where it was destroyed as part of Hannibal’s 

army defeated at Zama.

57

  Roman diplomacy achieved the military goal of preventing 

reinforcement of Hannibal. 

Economic Power 

Carthage missed several opportunities to wield its significant economic power against 

Rome.  In North Africa, Libya produced large amounts of grain for Carthage and for export to 

Greece for hard currency.

58

  Rome was not so fortunate.  Italian farms were not producing due 

to Hannibal’s activities in southern Italy.  There would have been a famine if not for grain bought 

from Egypt and grown in Sicily following the Roman victory there.  Carthage never interdicted 

the flow of grain from Egypt either diplomatically or militarily.   

In 215 BC the war was such a strain on Roman economy that soldiers went unpaid and 

a heavy property tax was levied to finance war.  Even the sacred treasuries of Roman temples 

were utilized to finance the war effort.   In a patriotic gesture, aristocrats refused to accept pay.

59

 

 19

Roman currency was debased.  In 209 BC, 12 of 30 Latin allies refused to provide yearly men 

and money.

60

  Once again Roman strength of will overcame a Carthaginian opportunity for 

success. 

 The 2d Punic War revolved around the mineral wealth of Iberia.  This money was 

needed to pay the mercenary armies of Carthage.  Hamiclar conquered Iberia to replenish 

Carthaginian treasury following the 1st Punic War.  Mineral wealth from Iberia emboldened 

Carthage to support Hannibal’s attack of Rome.

61

  When Scipio captured the Carthaginian fleet 

in the New Carthage harbor, it included a siege train meant for Hannibal, military supplies, and 

significant mineral wealth.  The wealth seized replenished the strained coffers of Rome.

62

 

Informational Power 

The Romans used information operations as their best weapon against Hannibal’s prime 

objective of separating the Roman allies.  The Romans painted the Carthaginians as foreigners 

and severely punishing Capua and other cities that did not remain loyal.  The fall of Tarentum to 

Romans under Fabius and the harsh treatment of Tarentines was yet another blow to 

Hannibal’s prestige with potential allies.

63

 In 209 BC Fabius raided into Samnium, a Hannibalic 

stronghold, while Hannibal was in lower Italy.  Samnite towns, left without support, surrendered 

themselves and their Carthaginian garrisons.  Surrendering towns are treated with moderation 

and thereafter a number of other towns in Lucania and even in Bruttium negotiated with Rome.

64

  

The Romans were able to thwart the main thrust of the Carthaginians strategy aimed at 

separating allies from Rome by their tempered treatment of former allies who did not resist 

returning to the fold.  

In 205 BC the twelve Latin allies who refused service in 209 BC were forced to provide 

double the yearly quota, all from the wealthy classes.  These troops were then sent overseas on 

hardest service.

65

 Since the 1st Punic War the Romans pursued a very smart policy with their 

Italian allies, colonizing, building roads, fortresses, and wise government policy that allowed the 

allies to share in profits and glory of Rome.

66

  It was these walled cities that formed the pivots of 

Roman strategy.  The Roman armies shadowing Hannibal’s army always had secure bases to 

withdraw into.  The walled cities of the loyal allies were connected by roads and could be readily 

resupplied.  Hannibal’s field army could not take them.

67

 

Hannibal was a true master of informational warfare.  Hannibal ordered that Fabius’ 

estates be left alone while others around it were devastated, undermining politically the most 

effective Roman strategist.

68

 Hannibal was very careful in his attempts to woo allies.  Allied 

 20

prisoners were always returned home without ransom.  When taking Tarentum by subterfuge 

Hannibal carefully ensured Tarentine houses were spared while Roman houses were 

plundered.

69

  

Military Power 

The most important lesson a modern strategist can take from the failure of Carthage is 

the danger of allowing the military strategy to drive national policy.  Political objectives should 

direct politico-military strategy, not the reverse.  Carthage was committed to war with Rome by 

Hannibal’s attack on Saguntum.  Carthage allowed Hannibal to set national policy with his 

attack on this Roman protected city.

70

  Hannibal’s disposition of Carthaginian forces obviously 

indicated he was, at least initially, entrusted with overall command of the Carthaginian military.

71

 

Hannibal however could not, and certainly did not, direct Carthaginian military strategy once he 

arrived in Italy.  Isolated in Italy by Roman domination of the sea LOCs to North Africa, Hannibal 

was reduced to a spectator in the allocation of Carthaginian military resources.  The 

Carthaginian oligarchy directed military operations outside of Italy.  The Carthaginian rulers 

were more interested in maintaining Iberia as the source of their wealth instead of targeting the 

greatest threat to that source, Rome, with their most potent weapon - Hannibal.  Hannibal 

attempted to raise allies in both Macedonia and Syracuse but was thwarted by Carthaginian 

inability to provide the required resources to benefit from these alliances.   

In Rome, the Roman senate always directed policy.  Roman military leaders were 

selected from the ranks of the senate.  Roman military leaders had to convince the Roman 

senate of their planned operations.  The debate between Scipio and Fabius is an example of the 

primacy of the senate in determining the direction of military operations.  The political objectives 

of the Roman senate directed the operations of the roman military to its eventual victory over 

Carthage. 

2.  STRATEGIC ENDURANCE  

Strategic endurance is defined as political will combined with the strategic resources to 

sustain a nation’s effort in a war.  A nation must have the strategic endurance to win before and 

while a major war is prosecuted.  Strategic endurance is a result of political will, social 

organization, and the ability to leverage strategic resources.

72

  Rome’s strategic endurance was 

clearly superior to Carthage’s.  Rome’s political will remained constant in the face of the 

devastating defeats early in the war and throughout Hannibal’s stay in Italy.  Carthage’s political 

will evaporated when confronted with a Cannae-like scenario following Zama.  

 21

Rome’s political will was most at risk following the defeat at the battle of Cannae.  

Roman consul Varro, the prime architect of disaster at Cannae, however was greeted warmly by 

Roman citizens following the battle and thanked for not losing heart in the Roman Republic.  It 

was this flexibility, the sheer strength and vitality of Rome’s political institutions that proved so 

formidable for Hannibal to overcome.

73

  In another example following Cannae, ten captured 

Romans and a Carthaginian envoy named Carthalo, went to Rome to ransom the numerous 

patrician prisoners from the battle.  The Senate refused the ransom and ordered Carthalo and 

his prisoners to be clear of Roman territory by nightfall.

74

  The Roman Senate went into 

continuous session after Cannae to demonstrate that leaders had not abandoned the city and 

were tending to public business.  When Hannibal finally marched on Rome there was not a 

severe panic.  The land upon which Hannibal was camped outside Rome was sold at public 

auction for full price.

75

   

Carthaginian political will was embodied in the ruling oligarchy.  While there was a 

Carthaginian Senate, the real power in Carthage was with the inner “Council of Thirty” and the 

board of judges known as “The Hundred.”

76

  These two bodies consisted of the wealthy, 

commercial families of Carthage.  Two political factions operated in Carthage: the war party, 

also known as “the Barcids” (Hannibal’s family name) and the peace party led by Hanno.

77 

 

Hanno was instrumental in denying Hannibal’s requested reinforcement following Cannae.  

Hannibal had started the war without the full backing of Carthaginian oligarchy.  His attack of 

Saguntum presented the oligarchy with a choice of war with Rome or loss of prestige in Iberia.  

The oligarchy and not Hannibal controlled the strategic resources of Carthage.

78

  Hannibal 

constantly sought reinforcement from either Iberia or North Africa.  Hannibal’s combat losses 

were replaced with less well-trained and motivated Italian or Gaullish mercenaries.  The 

commercial interests of the Carthaginian oligarchy dictated the reinforcement of Iberia instead of 

Hannibal throughout the war. 

Carthage could never match the political will and strategic resources of Rome.  Carthage 

could only field 100 to 120 thousand soldiers and needed to defend both Iberia and North 

Africa.

79

  In contrast, Rome could muster 700 thousand trained soldiers per year.  All Roman 

male citizens between the ages of 17 and 46 were liable for military service.  The privilege of 

Roman citizenship entailed military service. 

80

  Carthaginian armies were always composed of 

mercenaries.  Carthaginians served only in Africa or as officers in Carthaginian armies deployed 

overseas.

81

  Any time Hannibal chose a war of attrition he was fated to fail.  Rome, on the other 

hand, successfully engaged Carthage on several fronts and still confronted Hannibal in Italy.

82

   

 22

A key Roman strategic resource that Hannibal readily appreciated was the manpower 

and money provided to Rome by her allies.  More than half of any Roman army and most of its 

cavalry consisted of allied troops.  Roman domination was generally acceptable in colonies and 

allies due to the extension of Roman citizenship to the allies and that no tribute was 

demanded.

83

  Following Cannae, the low point of Roman prestige, the heartland of the Roman 

confederacy:  Latium, Etruria, Umbria, and Picenum remained loyal and even in Capua  

dominated Campania there remained loyal allies.

84

 

 

(Hannibal) 

Commanding 

General 

Rome Carthage* 

•

300 Members 

•

Office for life 

•

Former magistrates 

•

Decided where 

military operated, 
who commanded and 
overall military 
strategy 

•

Controlled finances, 

relations with allies & 
foreign relations 

•

Could extend 

“imperium” of consuls 
to command armies 
 

SENATE 

Advise

Consuls

•

2 elected each 

year  

•

Office for 1 year 

•

Commanded 

Roman military 

•

Alternate days in 

command when 
co-located w/ other 
consul 

•

Highest ranking 

Roman magistrate

*Little knowledge survives on government of Carthage 

The Hundred   

(Board of Judges

) 

Council of 30 

•

Drawn from 

Carthaginian Senate

•

Council of 30 & 

Board of Judges 
ruled as oligarchy 

•

Appointed military 

commanders 

•

Controlled strategic 

resources 

•

Negotiated foreign 

relations 

•

Appointed for specific 

task 

•

No time limit 

•

Determined military 

strategy 

•

Also negotiated foreign 

relations 

? 

 

FIGURE 6:  POLITICAL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS 

 

In the final analysis Rome just refused to give up when a less robust nation would surely 

have succumbed.  Carthage and Hannibal did not adequately appreciate the recent lesson of 

the 1

st

 Punic War.  In the 1st Punic War, a mainly naval war, Rome repeatedly lost its fleet, 

either in action or to storms.  Over 100,000 men and thousands of ships were lost.  Each time 

the Romans rebuilt the fleet and regained control of the seas from the historically superior 

maritime power - Carthage.

85

   

 23

3.  ATTACK THE ENEMY’S STRATEGIC CENTER OF GRAVITY 

The Roman strategic center of gravity was the political will of the Roman Senate.  

Carthaginian strategy however was aimed at separating Roman allies.  Once allies were 

separated, such as in Southern Italy, Hannibal proved incapable of providing the garrisons 

needed to defend them when his army was not in their immediate vicinity.   

Carthage’s best opportunities for attacking the will of the Roman Senate were following 

Hannibal’s decisive victories at Lake Trasimene and Cannae.  No Roman army stood between 

Hannibal and Rome in both cases.  One of his lightening advances on Rome might have broken 

the will of the Senate.

86

  Instead he chose to concentrate on southern Italy and consolidate his 

newly acquired allies.  Hannibal probably could not have taken Rome by storm as he lacked a 

siege train.  Hannibal had taken eight months to reduce the minor city of Saguntum, his only 

successful siege operation.  However, a march on Rome following Cannae might have forced 

the Romans to a negotiated peace with Rome in a position of weakness.  Hannibal’s only march 

on Rome occurred from a position of weakness.  It was a desperate attempt to relieve the 

Roman siege of the key city of Capua and it failed miserably when the Romans recognized it as 

such.

 87

  

The Romans very clearly went after the Carthaginian strategic center of gravity – the 

political will of the Carthaginian oligarchy.  Their strategy aimed at both the home city of 

Carthage and the financial heart of the very commercial Carthage – Iberia.  Forced to fight for its 

survival in Italy, Rome was still able to maintain pressure on Carthage through operations in 

Iberia.  Once Iberia was secured Rome moved directly against the North African homeland of 

Carthage.  Scipio’s presence outside the walls of Carthage forced the oligarchy to recall 

Hannibal to North Africa.  Hannibal’s defeat at Zama broke the political will of the Carthaginians. 

4.  STRATEGIC ASSUMPTIONS 

Strategic assumptions must be valid or a plan is doomed to failure.  Carthage assumed 

Rome’s Italian and Latin allies would defect following Roman battle losses.  This would rob 

Rome of its significant manpower advantage and Hannibal could then dictate terms to a 

defeated Rome.  Hannibal had a relatively contemporary lesson that should have provided him 

an insight into the validity of this assumption.  Pyrrhus also tried to influence Italian tribes to 

leave their alliance with Rome.  Rome was defeated several times in battle but remained 

resilient and the allies remained loyal.  Rome refused to yield while the Epiran army was being 

destroyed in a series of bloody battles.  This took place at a time when Rome’s allies were even 

less tied to Rome, where such a strategy would have had a greater chance of success.  

 24

Romans forced Pyrrhus to defend and garrison the towns he had already taken.  These were 

very similar tactics to those that eventually defeated Hannibal.

88

 

Carthage’s strategy collapsed when very few of the Italian allies and none of the Latin 

allies defected from Rome despite the Roman debacles at Trebia, Lake Trasimene, and 

Cannae.  Hannibal was forced to garrison the few allies he did gather with veteran troops he 

could not afford to spare.  The Romans picked off these garrisons once Hannibal moved his 

army from their locale.  The invalidity of the base assumption of the Carthaginian plan forced 

Hannibal to fight a war of attrition he could not win against a foe with the superior resources 

Rome possessed.     

5.  CAMPAIGNS CONSIST OF LINKED OPERATIONS 

Theater strategy is executed through campaigns that consist of operations synchronized 

in time and space.  Rome successfully linked their operations in Italy, Iberia, Sicily, Macedonia, 

and eventually North Africa.  Roman operations in Iberia and Sicily drew off reinforcements 

meant for Hannibal while Hannibal was isolated in southern Italy by surrounding Roman armies.  

Rome quickly moved an army across the Adriatic to smash Phillip’s fleet and then used the 

Aetolian League to tie Phillip down in Greece instead of assisting Carthage in Italy.  Finally, 

Rome was not distracted by Hannibal’s weakened army in Bruttium nor Mago’s small force in 

Cisalpine Gaul prior to Scipio’s invasion of North Africa.  Rome launched its final operation 

aimed at the heart of Carthage, which resulted the recall of the two Carthaginian armies 

operating in Italy.    

Carthage was less successful.  A large Carthaginian force was sent to Sardinia at a time 

when Hannibal was in position to threaten the existence of Rome had he been provided with 

this force.  The Romans destroyed this army shortly after it arrived.  The Carthaginians did 

attempt to link their operations by deploying a large force to Sicily to assist the newly acquired 

ally of Syracuse.  Rome successfully countered this move however and Carthaginian Admiral 

Bomiclar’s naval failure off Sicily doomed Syracuse.  A similar Carthaginian failure to link 

operations was the destruction of Hasdrubal’s army at the Metaurus.  Hannibal’s army failed to 

fight north to link up with Hasdrubal.   This allowed the Romans under Nero to destroy 

Hasdrubal’s army while Hannibal remained in camp in southern Italy. 

6. IMPORTANCE OF JOINT OPERATIONS   

All major battles of 2d Punic War were fought on land but sea power played a pervasive 

role.  The Romans effectively leveraged their land and naval forces into a coherent grand 

 25

strategy.  Rome used its fleet to transport its land forces to several different theaters and 

maintain them once deployed.  The Roman alliance with Massila combined with possession of 

Corsica and Sardinia allowed the Romans to control the northern half of western 

Mediterranean.

89

  Carthage was never able to penetrate Adriatic and assist Phillip and therefore 

the alliance of Carthage and Macedon never reached full potential.   

Carthage, on the other hand, was a major regional power engaged in a war far from her 

shores and conceded control of the seas to their enemy.  This prevented strategic surprise by 

large movements of troops; resupply, reinforcement and evacuation were also difficult.  The 

Romans could easily disrupt Carthaginian trade and the North African shore was open to 

Roman raids.

90

  There is evidence that Carthage had the means to effect a naval strategy.  Five 

hundred Carthaginian warships were burned as part of the peace settlement ending the 2d 

Punic War.

91

  Carthage successfully moved a large army to Sicily.  They also moved large 

forces to Sardinia and repeatedly to Iberia.  A Carthaginian fleet spent two years in Greek 

waters without significantly assisting their most potent ally, Philip, before withdrawing.  Late in 

the war they still had the ability to move Mago’s small army as far as Genua in northern Italy.  

The Carthaginian allies of Syracuse and Tarentum also had significant naval assets.  Carthage 

had the resources and certainly a strong naval tradition but had lost the will.  During the Roman 

siege of Syracuse the Carthaginian admiral Bomiclar had superior, in number, warships and yet 

he retreated at the appearance of a smaller Roman fleet.

92

 Scipio seized a substantial 

Carthaginian fleet still moored to its docks when he took New Carthage in Iberia.  The existing 

records do not adequately explain why Carthage failed to employ its naval assets. 

Sea power played a critical role in defeating Hannibal.  It conditioned his strategy of 

invading Italy.  He was forced to take the long, costly overland move vice a maritime move.  The 

overland move from Iberia through the Alps cost Hannibal tens of thousands of veteran soldiers.  

Roman sea power consistently prevented adequate reinforcements from reaching Hannibal.  

Hannibal was only able to evacuate Italy during an “armistice” period with Scipio already in 

Africa.  Roman success underlines the importance of a “Fleet in Being.”

93

   

7.  REINFORCE SUCCESS 

The Romans pragmatically reinforced success while minimizing the risk associated with 

their failures.  Following Cannae they refused to meet Hannibal on the tactical battlefield of his 

choosing.  Roman armies always covered Rome and its most important provinces.  Hannibal 

was kept in view and his power cut down when opportunities presented themselves.

94

  The most 

 26

effective Carthaginian army was therefore systematically reduced in effectiveness without 

risking a full battle. 

Elsewhere, Rome’s unceasing activity served to isolate Hannibal and forced him to fight 

alone.

95

 Rome employed forces throughout the western Mediterranean where they experienced 

success against less talented Carthaginian commanders.  Carthaginian armies were defeated 

and destroyed in Sardinia, Sicily, and most importantly, Iberia.  Carthage had the strategic 

initiative early with a dominant position in the main theater only to lose it due to Roman 

successes in these other theaters. 

8.  COALITION WARFARE 

Coalition warfare presents numerous difficulties, most notably in the unity of effort and 

purpose.  For that reason, when considering the composition of the Carthaginian army, 

Hannibal certainly ranks as one of the great commanders of history. He successfully welded 

Iberians, Gauls, Libyans, Numidians, and Italians into an army Rome could not match.  Hannibal 

returned to North Africa with an army composed almost entirely of Italians and Gauls.

96

  The 

only large-scale desertion from Hannibal’s army was 1200 Spanish and Numidian cavalry who 

defected after the drawn battle of Nola.

97

  This is in marked contrast to other Carthaginian 

armies where the Romans were successful in securing the defection of Carthaginian 

mercenaries.  Hannibal did have his problems coordinating the actions with the volatile Gauls.  

The revolt of the Boii was obviously too early; Hannibal hoped to have it coincide with his 

descent from the Alps.  He crossed the Alps to find Roman armies and colonies planted near 

the Po Valley.

98

   

The Romans were also successful in coalition warfare.  Their use of the Aetolian League 

against the Macedonians was masterful.  The Aetolian League ground forces engaged Philip 

while the Roman navy controlled the Adriatic and central Mediterranean.  Greek colonies, 

Rome’s “naval allies,” provided the backbone of Roman fleet, and for most part remained 

loyal.

99

  Scipio’s invasion of North Africa depended on obtaining Numidian cavalry.  He had co-

opted Numidian kings Syphax and Masinissa while in Iberia.

100

  Scipio’s first actions in North 

Africa were to secure Masinissa on the Numidian throne.  Masinissa’s arrival and support of 

Scipio was a key event for the Roman victory at Zama.  

 

 

 27

9.  TRAINING OF STRATEGIC LEADERS  

“Carry on offensive war like Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, 
Turenne, Prince Eugene, and Frederick; read, re-read the history of their eighty-
eight campaigns; model yourself after them - that is the only means of becoming 
a great captain and acquiring the secret of the art of war; your genius, thus 
enlightened, will reject such principles as are opposed to those of these great 
men” - Napoleon

101

  

Study of the profession of arms and the training of strategic leaders is a key to strategic 

success.  Good generalship matters.  Hannibal nearly triumphed in the 2d Punic War despite 

the serious strategic disadvantages he was faced with.  Hannibal was trained in the art of war 

from his earliest days riding at the side of his father, Hamiclar.  At the age of nine, he 

accompanied Hamiclar on his invasion of Iberia and remained with the army as a subordinate 

commander under his uncle, Hasdrubal.  Hannibal obviously made a name for himself as the 

soldiers acclaimed him commander of the army and the confirmation was approved by the 

Carthaginian oligarchy.  As noted above, Hannibal forged an effective army out of widely 

dissimilar peoples.

102

  

The amateurish efforts of the senior Roman commanders early in the war compare 

poorly with this.  The Roman custom of electing two consuls each year and entrusting them with 

military strategy was flawed when incompetent leaders were elected.  The Romans paid the 

price at Trebia for Sempronius, at Lake Trasimene for Flaminius, and most notably at Cannae 

for Varro.  As with all things in the 2d Punic War, the Romans adjusted.  Hannibal trained a 

series of Roman commanders through their experience fighting him.  Fabius, Nero, and 

Marcellus became adequate if certainly not equal to Hannibal.  Hannibal’s most apt pupil was 

clearly Scipio Africanus.   Scipio had direct experience fighting Hannibal having served in the 

Roman armies at Ticinus, Trebia, and Cannae.  Scipio’s generalship in Iberia and North Africa 

was very similar to Hannibal’s in Italy.  

The Romans also modified their practice of entrusting all military matters to the annual 

consuls.  The senate eventually extended the “imperium” or command of armies to gifted 

commanders.  Marcellus, Nero, and Fabius were continued in command of Roman legions after 

they achieved some success in battles with Hannibal.  Most notably, Scipio’s consulship had 

ended by the time he invaded North Africa but he was kept in command through the end of the 

war. 

 28

CONCLUSIONS 

Hannibal is one of the most fascinating characters in military history.  He captures the 

imagination of many for his exploits at the tactical and operational level.  At those levels he has 

rarely, if ever, been matched.  However a close examination of the 2d Punic War reveals the 

weakness of the Carthaginian strategic concept.  Hannibal and Carthage were thinking out of 

date; they kept expecting Rome to surrender.  Rome had learned that defeat in battle does not 

equal strategic defeat.

103

 A plan must be resourced to win.   Hannibal’s plan in invading Italy 

had been based on the assumption that Rome’s Latin and Italian allies would join him.  However 

not a single Latin ally nor a majority of the Italian allies ever came over to him. 

The real strategic level lessons to be gleaned from the 2d Punic War come from the 

Roman side.  Their skillful combination of different elements of national power combined with 

incredible resilience and endurance provide ample education to the modern strategist.  Strategic 

endurance became a major characteristic of interstate war following the Punic Wars.  Prior to 

Hannibal’s time, most wars were decided in one or two major battles, all or nothing affairs.  

Behind the Roman Senate’s successful prosecution of the war was the stability of the Roman 

political institutions.  Despite disagreements there was never any bloodshed, revolution, or 

suspension of citizens’ rights.

104

Carthage’s political disputes led to a dilution of military focus 

and their eventual defeat. 

The blame for Carthage’s defeat may be placed in the hands of the Carthaginian ruling 

oligarchy that failed to support Hannibal’s concept once they were committed to war due to 

Hannibal’s actions.  Hannibal was pragmatic to the last and immediately recognized how 

defenseless Carthage was following Zama.  He emphatically persuaded the Carthaginian 

senate of the need for peace, even on Roman terms.  Hannibal subsequently became one of 

the leading political leaders of post-war Carthage.  He was instrumental in rebuilding 

Carthaginian prestige following the war to the point he was forced to flee by a nervous Rome.  

He remained in the eastern Mediterranean where he eventually ended his own life steps ahead 

of apprehension by the Romans.    

“The man himself eludes us, just as he eluded so many during his 
lifetime….Hannibal, the boy from North Africa who grows up to dominate 
European history for sixteen years, seems to vanish like the mist rising off Lake 
Trasimene on that fateful day; or like the south wind, the sun, and the dust that 
blinded the Romans at Cannae”  - Ernle Bradford.

105

 

WORD COUNT = 10,391 

 29

 30

ENDNOTES 

 

1

 Trevor N.Dupuy, The Military Life of Hannibal, Father of Strategy.  (NY:  Franklin 

Watts, 1969). 

2

  Leonard Cottrell,  Hannibal, Enemy of Rome, (NY:  Holt, 1961), 6. 

3

 Polybius, The Rise of the Roman Empire, (London: Penguin Books, 1979), 34. 

4

 Ibid, 12-15. 

5

 Theodore A. Dodge, Hannibal:  A History of the Art of War Among the Carthaginians 

And the Romans Down to the Battle of Pydna, 168 BC, With a Detailed Account of the Second 
Punic War,  (Boston:  Houghton, 1896), 4. 
 

6

 H.H. Scullard, A History of the Roman World 753-146 BC, (NY: Metheun & Co, Ltd, 1980), 

163. 

 

7

 R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History.  (New York:  

Harper & Row Publishers, 1986), 61. 226BC, Gauls: Boii, Insurbanes, Lingones, Taurini, 
Gaesati gathered against Rome.  Huge battle fought after Gauls marched on Rome; Gauls 
trapped between 2 Roman armies and destroyed.   

8

 Scullard, 189-190. 

 

9

 Cottrell, 9. 

10

 Dodge, 108. 

11

 Dupuy and Dupuy, 61.   Hanno, the Carthaginian general who lost the decisive battle of 

the Aegate Islands to the Romans, was crucified upon his return to Carthage. 

12

 Ibid, 64. 

13

 Ibid, 66. 

14

 T.A. Dorey, and D.R. Dudley,  Rome Against Carthage,  (New York:  Doubleday and 

Company, Inc., 1972), 69. Postrimus Albinus’ skull was used by Boii as a drinking cup. 

 

15

 Ibid, 79. 

16

 Ernle D. Bradford, Hannibal,  (NY:  McGraw-Hill, 1981), 158. 

17

 Dorey and Dudley, 83. 

18

 Ibid, 86. 

19

 Daniel A. Fournie, “Clash of Titans at Zama,” Military History, (Feb 00), 26. 

20

 Dodge, 610.  The Roman terms for peace: 

 31

 

1.  

Reparations for breaking truce. 

2.  

Delivery of all warships, except 10, and all elephants. 

3.  

Delivery of all POWs and Roman deserters. 

4.  

No war outside Africa and inside Africa only with Roman approval. 

5.  

Masinissa recognized as King of Numidia. 

6.  

Provide for Roman army for 3 months. 

7.  

Annual payment of 200 talents for 50 years. 

8.  

 100 hostages selected by Rome 

21

 Cottrell, 150. 

22

 Dorey and Dudley, 37. 

23

 Dodge, 639. 

24

 Dupuy, 48. 

25

 J.F.C. Fuller,  A Military History of the Western World, (New York:  Funk & Wagnalls 

Company, 1954), 124. 

 

26

 Dodge, 398. 

27

 Dodge, 157. 

28

 Cottrell, 99. 

29

 Bradford, 96 

30

 Dorey and Dudley, 38 

31

 Polybius, 358-359. Treaty between Hannibal and Phillip: 

1.  

Macedonians protect Carthaginians. 

2.  

Carthaginians protect Macedonians. Lists Cisalpine Gaul and Liguria as 

allies. 

3.  

No plots or ambushes. 

4.  

Enemies of each other are their enemies. 

5.  

Allied against Rome. 

6.  

Any peace treaty will include Macedonia and will return Illyrian possessions. 

7.  

If Rome ever makes war against one, the other will help. 

8.  

Any other who attacks is also an enemy of both. 

 32

 

9.  

 No changes to treaty unless both agree. 

32

 Scullard, 211 

33

 Dodge, 413 

34

 J.F. Lazenby, Hannibal’s War (Norman, OK:  University of Oklahoma Press,  

1998), 106. 
 

35

 Bradford, 140. 

36

 Ibid, 143. 

37

 Dorey and Dudley, 89. 

38

 Cottrell, 116 

39

 Scullard, 215-216 

40

 Dodge, 490. 

41

 Dorey and Dudley, 87. 

42

 Ibid, 87. 

43

 Dodge, 578. 

44

 B.H. Liddell Hart,  Strategy, 2d Revised Edition, (New York:  Frederic Praeger Publishers,  

1967), 53. 

45

 Richard A. Gabriel and Donald W. Boose, Great Battles of Antiquity, ( Westport, Conn:   

Greenwood Press, 1994), 287-8. 

46

 Ibid, 287. 

47

 Ibid, 315. 

48

 Dodge, 494. 

49

 Scullard, 193 

50

 Cottrell, 6-7. 

51

 Bradford 97. 

52

 Dodge, 520. 

53

 Ibid, 447 

 33

 

54

 Bradford, 193. 

55

 Dodge, 500. 

56

 Lazenby, 168. 

57

 Dodge, 576 

58

 Gabriel and Boose, 284 

59

 Cottrell, 158 

60

 Dodge, 507. 

61

 Bradford, 166-7 

62

 Ibid, 160 

63

 Dorey and Dudley, 80. 

64

 Dodge, 514-15. 

65

 Ibid, 577.  The tribes were:  Nepete, Sutrium, Cales, Alba, Curseoli, Sora, Suessa, Setia, 

Circeii, Narnia, and Interamma 

66

 Walter Krueger,  The Conditions of Success in War:  Illustrated by Hannibal’s  

Campaigns in Italy, (Washington Barracks, DC: AWC, 1923), 4. 

67

 Fuller, 129. 

68

 Dodge, 335. 

69

 Cottrell, 170 

70

 Gabriel and Boose, 315. 

71

 Bradford, 46 

72

 Gabriel and Boose, 280. 

73

 Bradford, 117. 

74

 Bradford, 118. 

75

  “The Second Punic War,” available from history.idbsu.edu/westciv/punicwar/htm, 

accessed 11 Nov 00. 

76

 Lazenby, 4-5. 

 34

 

77

 Dodge, 143. 

78

 Ibid, 571. 

79

 Gabriel and Boose, 284. 

80

 Lazenby, 9-10. 

81

 Scullard, 162 

82

 Gabriel and Boose, 286 

83

 Dorey and Dudley, xvi. 

84

 Ibid, 70 

85

 Ibid, 131. 

86

 Gabriel and Boose, 311. 

87

 Dodge, 483 

88

 Ibid, 108. 

89

 Dorey and Dudley, 148-149. 

90

 Ibid, 286 

91

 Lazenby, 16. 

92

 Ibid, 117-118. 

93

 Ibid, 152. 

94

 Ibid, 634. 

95

 Scullard, 237. 

96

 Dodge, 592 

97

 Dupuy, 82 

98

 Bradford, 74. 

99

 Ibid, 120 

100

 Ibid, 185. 

101

 Francis V. Fitzgerald, “Campaigns of Hannibal.”  QM Review 77 (Sep Oct  

 35

 
1931), 23. 

102

 Dodge, 620. 

103

 Bradford, 120 

104

 Ibid, 237. 

105

 Ibid, 212. 

 36

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