convert

Foreword

Predictions about the future are always risky. Admittedly, no one has a crystal ball. Regardless, if we do not try

to forecast the future, there is no doubt that we will be caught off guard as we strive to protect this experiment

in democracy that we call America.

The Joint Operating Environment (JOE) is our historically informed, forward-looking effort to discern

most accurately the challenges we will face at the operational level of war, and to determine their inherent

implications. We recognize that the future environment will not be precisely the one we describe; however, we

are sufficiently confident of this study’s rigor that it can guide future concept development. While no study can

get the future 100 percent correct, we believe it’s most important that we get it sufficiently right, and that the

daunting challenge of perfection not paralyze our best efforts. When future war comes, our concept developers

across the Armed Services should have the fewest regrets if today they study, challenge, and implement solutions

to the security implications defined here in the JOE. In our line of work, having the fewest regrets defines

success when the shocks of conflict bring the surprise that inevitably accompanies warfare.

America retains both the powers of “intimidation and inspiration.” We will continue to play a leading role in

protecting the values that grew out of the wisdom and vision of our nation’s original architects. We must be

under no illusions about the threats to our shared values, but we must also recognize the military as only one,

albeit critical aspect of America’s strength. This strength must specifically recognize the need to adapt to the

security challenges we face, whether or not the enemy chooses to fight us in the manner that we would prefer.

America’s military cannot be dominant yet irrelevant to our policy makers’ requirements.

As the JOE goes to print, we face a challenging set of circumstances. The JOE maintains a longer term view

and avoids a preclusive vision of future war. Any enemy worth his salt will adapt to target our perceived

weaknesses, so the implications contained in this study cannot be rank ordered. But the implications do serve

as the basis of the companion Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO), which outlines how the Joint

Force will operate in the future. If the JOE serves as the “problem statement,” the CCJO serves as the way the

Joint Force will operate in the future to “solve” the problem. These two documents should be seen as two parts

of the whole.

In a field of human endeavor as fraught with uncertainty as war, it is essential that we maintain an open mind in

our approach. Our responsibility is to turn over this military to our successors in better condition than we who

serve today received it. We encourage criticism of our work. We plan to update the JOE routinely in response

to your input. Creativity in technological development, operational employment, and conceptual framework is

necessary, and it’s our intent that the JOE inspires an openness to change so urgently needed when both high-

and low-intensity threats abound.

J. N. MATTIS

General, U.S. Marine Corps

Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command

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Foreword

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Challenges and Implications for the Future Joint Force

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CONTENTS

Introduction

Part I: The Constants

A. The Nature of War

B. The Nature of Change

The Challenge of Disruptions

Grand Strategy

Part II: Trends

Influencing The World’s Security

Demographics

B. Globalization

Economics

D.Energy

Food

Water

Climate Change and Natural Disasters

Pandemics

I. Cyber

Space

Conclusion

Part III: The Contextual World

A. Competition and Cooperation Among Conventional Powers

B. Potential Challenges and Threats

1. China

2. Russia

3. The Pacific and Indian Oceans

4. Europe

5. Central and South America

6. Africa

7. The Center of Instability:

The Middle East and Central Asia

Weak and Failing States

The Threats of Unconventional Power

E. The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Technology

The Battle of Narratives

Urbanization

Part IV: The Implications for the Joint Force

A. War in the Twenty-first Century

B. Preparing for War

C. The Conduct of Military Operations in the Twenty-first Century

Professional Military Education

Part V: Some Leading Questions

A. Defense Economics and Acquisition Policies

B. The Personnel System

Part VI: Concluding Thoughts

Introduction

The next quarter century will challenge U.S.

joint forces with threats and opportunities ranging from

regular and irregular wars in remote lands, to relief and

reconstruction in crisis zones, to sustained engagement

in the global commons. During this time, the causes

of conflict will vary from rational political calculation

to uncontrolled passion. Our enemy’s capabilities will

range from explosive vests worn by suicide bombers to

long-range precision-guided cyber, space, and missile

attacks. The threat of mass destruction – from nuclear,

biological, and chemical weapons – will likely expand

from stable nation-states to less stable states and even

non-state networks.

It is impossible to predict precisely how

challenges will emerge and what form they might take.

Nevertheless, it is absolutely vital to try to frame the

strategic and operational contexts of the future, in order

to glimpse the possible environments where political and

military leaders will work and where they might employ

joint forces. The value of such efforts lies not so much

in the final product, but much more in the participation

of senior leaders and decision-makers in the discussion.

Only by wrestling with the possibilities, determining the

leading indicators, and then reading the signposts of the

times will the Joint Force have some of the answers to

the challenges of the future. The alternative, to focus

exclusively on the here and now or to pass this mission

to the bureaucracy, will certainly result in getting caught

flat-footed, reacting to near-term crises as they arise, at

great cost in blood and treasure.

Thinking about the future requires an

understanding of both what is timeless and what will

likely change. As Thucydides suggested in the fifth

century BC, “the events which happened in the past…

(human nature being what it is) will at some time or other

and in much the same way be repeated in the future.”

Many features will not change. The challenges of the

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future will resemble, in many ways, the challenges that

American forces have faced over the past two centuries.

In spite of the current intellectual climate in much of the

developed world, conflict will not disappear. War has been

a principal driver of change over the course of history and

there is no reason to believe that the future will differ in

this respect. Neither will the fundamental nature of war

change. War will remain primarily a human endeavor.

In contrast, changes in the strategic landscape,

the introduction and employment of new technologies,

and the adaptation and creativity of our adversaries will

alter the character of joint operations a great deal. Here

too, the past can suggest much about the future – the

nature of change, its impact on human societies, and the

interplay among human societies in peaceful and warlike

competition. While much will stay the same, change will

also continue to be a driving force in human affairs.

One cannot rule out the possibility that U.S.

military forces will be engaged in persistent conflict over

the next quarter century. In the next twenty-five years,

there will continue to be those who will hijack and exploit

Islam and other beliefs for their own extremist ends. There

will continue to be opponents who will try to disrupt the

political stability and deny the free access to the global

commons that is crucial to the world’s economy. In this

environment, the presence, reach, and capability of U.S.

military forces, working with like-minded partners, will

continue to be called on to protect our national interests.

Merely sustaining the health of the Joint Force, never mind

adapting and transforming, is far more complicated in a

period of persistent conflict, with its toll on equipment,

people, and national will.

The nature of the human condition will guarantee

that uncertainty, ambiguity, and surprise will dominate

the course of events. However carefully we think about

the future; however thorough our preparations; however

coherent and thoughtful our concepts, training, and

doctrine; we will be surprised. Even the wisest of statesmen

have found their assumptions about the future confounded

by reality. The eighteenth century British leader, William

Pitt, the Younger, declared in a speech before the House

of Commons in February 1792: “Unquestionably there

1. Sun Tzu,

The Art of War

, trans. and ed. by Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford,

1963), p. 63.

2. Thucydides,

The History of the Peloponnesian War

, trans. by Rex Warner

(London: Penguin Books, 1954), p. 48.

Introduction

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“War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life or death; the

road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied.”

Sun Tzu

has never been a time in the history of our country when,

from the situation in Europe, we might more reasonably

expect fifteen years of peace, than we have at the present

moment.”

Within a matter of months, Britain would

become embroiled in a conflict that would last nearly a

quarter of a century and would kill more Europeans than

any other war in history up to that time.

In the broadest sense, the

Joint Operating

Environment

examines three questions:

What future trends and disruptions are likely to affect

the Joint Force over the next quarter century?

How are these trends and disruptions likely to define

the future contexts for joint operations?

What are the implications of these trends and contexts

for the Joint Force?

By exploring these trends, contexts, and

implications, the

Joint Operating Environment

provides a

basis for thinking about the world over the next quarter

century. Its purpose is not to predict, but to suggest ways

leaders might think about the future.

If war at its essence is a human endeavor, then it

follows that one of the most effective ways to understand

human nature is by a close consideration of history. As

such, rather than futuristic vignettes, the

Joint Operating

Environment

uses history as a principal way to gain insight

into the future. The discussion begins with the enduring

nature of war, the causes and consequences of change and

surprises, and the role of strategy. Part II then describes

some trends, discontinuities and potential trouble spots

that joint forces may confront. Part III analyzes how these

trends and disruptions may combine into contexts that

will likely define joint operations over the next quarter

century. Part IV describes the implications of these

contexts for the Joint Force as it confronts an uncertain

future. This section also suggests how senior leaders might

think about creating a force that is suited to address the

challenges that these contexts will present. This is the

unique contribution of the

Joint Operating Environment

to the broader discussion about the future. Before

concluding, Part V offers some “leading questions” about

topics that may fall outside the traditional purview of this

study, but that nonetheless have important implications

for the future Joint Force.

We will find ourselves caught off guard by

changes in the political, economic, technological,

strategic, and operational environments. We will find

ourselves surprised by the creativity and capability of our

adversaries. Our goal is not to eliminate surprise – that is

impossible. Our goal is, by a careful consideration of the

future, to suggest the attributes of a joint force capable

of adjusting with minimum difficulty when the

surprise inevitably comes. The true test of military

effectiveness in the past has been in the ability of a force

to diagnose the conditions it actually confronts and then

quickly adapt. In the end, it will be our imagination and

agility to envision and prepare for the future, and then to

adapt to surprises, that will determine how the Joint Force

will perform over the next twenty-five years. The agility to

adapt to the reality of war, its political framework, and to

the fact the enemy also consists of adaptive humans, has

been the key component in military effectiveness in the

past and will continue to be so in the future.

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3. Quoted in Colin Gray,

Another Bloody Century

, (London: Penguin

Books, 2005), p. 40.

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A. The Nature of War

We cannot predict exactly what kind of war, or for

what purposes, the armed forces of the United States will

find themselves engaged in over the next quarter century.

We can only speculate about possible enemies and the

weapons they will bring to the fight. But we can state

with certainty that the fundamental nature of war will not

change. In a democracy such as the United States, political

aims, pressures, and hesitations have always conditioned

military operations – and will continue to do so. “When

whole communities go to war... the reason always lies in

some political situation.”

War is a political act, begun

for political purposes. In the twenty-first century war

will retain its political dimension, even when it originates

in the actions of non-state and transnational groups.

The Joint Force will operate in an international

environment where struggle predominates. While the

origins of war may rest on policy, a variety of factors has

influenced the conduct of that struggle in the past and will

do so in the future. The tension between rational political

calculations of power on one hand and secular or religious

ideologies on the other, combined with the impact of

passion and chance, makes the trajectory of any conflict

difficult if not impossible to predict. In coming decades,

Americans must struggle to resist judging the world as if

it operated along the same principles and values that drive

our own country. In many parts of the world, there are

no rational actors, at least in our terms. Against enemies

capable of mobilizing large numbers of young men and

women to slaughter civilian populations with machetes

or to act as suicide bombers in open markets; enemies

eager to die, for radical ideological, religious, or ethnic

fervor; enemies who ignore national borders and remain

unbound by the conventions of the developed world;

there is little room for negotiations or compromise. It

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can become a matter of survival when human passion

takes over. Such a world has existed in recent history – in

World War II on the Eastern Front and on the islands of

the Pacific, in Africa in the Rwandan genocide, and to

some extent in Iraq. In a world where passions dominate,

the execution of rational strategy becomes extraordinarily

difficult.

War more than any other human activity

engages our senses: at times providing a “rush” of fear,

horror, confusion, rage, pain, helplessness, nauseous

anticipation, and hyper-awareness. It is in these vagaries

that imponderables and miscalculations accumulate to

paralyze the minds of military and political leaders. In

the cauldron of war, “It is the exceptional [human being]

who keeps his powers of quick decision intact.”

There are other aspects of human conflict that

will not change no matter what advances in technology

or computing power may occur: fog and friction will

distort, cloak, and twist the course of events. Fog will

result from information overload, our own misperceptions

and faulty assumptions, and the fact that the enemy will

act in an unexpected fashion. Combined with the fog

of war will be its frictions - that almost infinite number

of seemingly insignificant incidents and actions that

can go wrong, the impact of chance, and the horrific

effect of combat on human perceptions. It will arise

“from fundamental aspects of the human condition and

unavoidable unpredictabilities that lie at the very core of

combat processes.”

It is the constant fog and friction of war that turn

the simple into the complex. In combat, people make

mistakes. They forget the basics. They become disoriented,

ignoring the vital to focus on the irrelevant. Occasionally,

incompetence prevails. Mistaken assumptions distort

situational awareness. Chance disrupts, distorts, and

6. Carl von Clausewitz,

On War

, translated and edited by Michael Howard

and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 113.

7. Barry D. Watts,

Clausewitzian Friction and Future War

(Washington,

DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1992), pp. 122-123.

4. Thucydides,

History of the Peloponnesian War

, trans. by Rex Warner

(London: Penguin Books, 1954) p. 80.

5. Carl von Clausewitz,

On War

, translated and edited by Michael Howard

and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 87.

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In the late fifth century BC, Athenian negotiators, speaking to their Spartan competitors,

with whom they were soon at war, staked out their rationale for their refusal to abandon their

position as Greece’s other great power: “We have done nothing extraordinary, nothing contrary

to human nature in accepting an empire when it was offered to us and then in refusing to give it

up. Three very powerful motives prevent us from doing so – security, honour, and self interest.

And we were not the first to act in this way. Far from it.”

Thucydides

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confuses the most careful of plans. Uncertainty and

unpredictability dominate. Thoughtful military leaders

have always recognized that reality, and no amount of

computing power will eradicate this basic messiness.

Where friction prevails, tight tolerances, whether

applied to plans, actions, or materiel are an invitation

to failure – the more devastating for being unexpected.

Operational or logistical concepts or plans that make no

allowance for the inescapable uncertainties of war are

suspect on their face – an open invitation to failure and

at times defeat.

Still another enduring feature of conflict lies

in the recurring fact that military leaders often fail to

recognize their enemy as a learning, adaptive force. War

“is not the action of a living force upon a lifeless mass...

but always the collision of two living forces.”

Those

living forces possess all the cunning and intractable

characteristics human beings have enjoyed since the

dawn of history.

Even where adversaries share a similar historical

and cultural background, the mere fact of belligerence

guarantees profound differences in attitudes,

expectations, and behavioral norms. Where different

cultures come into conflict, the likelihood that adversaries

will act in mutually incomprehensible ways is even more

likely. Thus, “if you know the enemy and know yourself

you need not fear the results of a hundred battles.”

The conduct of war demands a deep understanding of

the enemy – his culture, history, geography, religious

and ideological motivations, and particularly the huge

differences in his perceptions of the external world. The

fundamental nature of war will not change.

B. The Nature of Change

If war will remain a human endeavor, a conflict

between two learning and adapting forces, changes in

the political landscape, adaptations by the enemy, and

advances in technology will change the character of war.

Leaders are often late to recognize such changes. Driven

by an inherent desire to bring order to a disorderly,

chaotic universe, human beings tend to frame their

thoughts about the future in terms of continuities and

extrapolations from the present and occasionally the

past. But a brief look at the past quarter century, to

say nothing of the past four thousand years, suggests

the extent of changes that coming decades will bring.

Twenty-five years ago the Cold War encompassed

every aspect of the American military’s thinking and

preparation for conflict – from the strategic level to the

tactical. Today, that all-consuming preoccupation is

an historical relic. A quarter century ago, the United

States confronted the Soviet Union, a truculent,

intractable opponent with leaders firmly committed to

the spread of Marxist-Leninist ideology and expansion

of their influence. At that time, few in the intelligence

communities or even among Sovietologists recognized

the deepening internal crisis of confidence that would

lead to the implosion of the Soviet Empire. The

opposing sides had each deployed tens of thousands of

nuclear weapons, as well as vast armies, air forces, and

navies across the globe. Soviet forces were occupying

Afghanistan and appeared on the brink of crushing an

uprising of ill-equipped, ill-trained guerrillas. In El

Salvador, a Soviet-backed insurgency was on the brink

of victory.

Beyond the confrontation between the United

States and Soviet Union lay a world that differed

enormously from today. China was only emerging

from the dark years of Mao’s rule. To China’s south,

India remained mired in an almost medieval level of

poverty, from which it appeared unlikely to escape.

To the sub-continent’s west, the Middle East was as

plagued by political and religious troubles as today.

But no one could have predicted then that within 25

years the United States would wage two major wars

against Saddam Hussein’s regime and commit much

of its ground power to suppressing simultaneous

insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The differences between the culture and

organization of the American military then and now

further underline the extent of the disruptions with

the past. The lack of coordination among the forces

involved in overthrowing the “New Jewel” movement

in Grenada in October 1983 reminds us that at the time

jointness was a concept honored more in the breach

than observance. That situation led to the Goldwater-

Nichols Act in 1986.

In terms of capabilities, stealth did not yet exist

outside of the research and development communities.

The M-1 Tank and the Bradley Fighting Vehicle were only

starting to reach the Army’s forward deployed units. The

Global Positioning System (GPS) did not exist. The training

ranges of the National Training Center, Twenty-Nine Palms,

8. Carl von Clausewitz,

On War

, translated and edited by Michael Howard

and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976) p. 77.
9. Sun Tzu,

Art of War

, translation by Samuel B. Griffth (Oxford

University), p.84.

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Fallon, and Nellis were just beginning

to change U.S. preparations for war.

Precision attack was largely a matter for

tactical nuclear weapons.

One might also note how

much the economic and technological

landscapes outside of the military

have changed. Economically, in 1983

globalization was in its first stages

and largely involved trade among the

United States, Europe, and Japan. The

tigers of Southeast Asia were emerging,

but the rest of the world seemed caught

in inescapable poverty. Just to give one

example: in 1983 the daily transfer of

capital among international markets

was approximately $20 billion. Today,

it is $1.6 trillion.

On the technological side,

the internet existed only in the

Department of Defense; its economic

and communications possibilities

and implications were not apparent.

Cellular phones did not exist. Personal

computers were beginning to come into

widespread use, but their reliability was

terrible. Microsoft was just emerging

from Bill Gates’ garage, while Google

existed only in the wilder writings

of science fiction writers. In other

words, the revolution in information

and communications technologies,

taken for granted today, was largely

unimaginable in 1983. A revolution

had begun, but its implications

remained uncertain and unclear. Other

advances in science since 1983, such as

the completion of the human genome

project, nano technologies, and

robotics, also seemed the provenance

of writers of science fiction.

In thinking about the world’s

trajectory, we have reason to believe that

the next twenty-five years will bring

changes just as dramatic, drastic, and

disruptive as those that have occurred

in the past quarter century. Indeed,

the pace of technological and scientific

Strategic Estimates in the Twentieth Century

1900

If you had been a strategic analyst for the world’s leading power, you would have

been British, looking warily at Britain’s age old enemy: France.

1910

You would now be allied with France, and the enemy would now be Germany

1920

Britain and its allies had won World War I, but now the British found themselves

engaged in a naval race with its former allies the United States and Japan.

1930

For the British, naval limitation treaties were in place, the Great Depression had

started and defense planning for the next five years assumed a “ten year” rule -- no

war in ten years. British planners posited the main threats to the Empire as the

Soviet Union and Japan, while Germany and Italy were either friendly or no threat.

1936

A British planner would now posit three great threats: Italy, Japan, and the worst, a

resurgent Germany, while little help could be expected from the United States.

1940

The collapse of France in June left Britain alone in a seemingly hopeless war with

Germany and Italy with a Japanese threat looming in the Pacific. America had

only recently begun to scramble to rearm its military forces.

1950

The United States was now the world’s greatest power, the atomic age had

dawned, and a “police action” began in June in Korea that was to kill over 36,500

Americans, 58,000 South Koreans, nearly 3,000 Allied soldiers, 215,000 North

Koreans, 400,000 Chinese, and 2,000,000 Korean civilians before a cease-fire

brought an end to the fighting in 1953. The main opponent in the conflict would be

China, America’s ally in the war against Japan.

1960

Politicians in the United States were focusing on a missile gap that did not exist;

massive retaliation would soon give way to flexible response, while a small

insurgency in South Vietnam hardly drew American attention.

1970

The United States was beginning to withdraw from Vietnam, its military forces in

shambles. The Soviet Union had just crushed incipient rebellion in the Warsaw

Pact. Détente between the Soviets and Americans had begun, while the Chinese

were waiting in the wing to create an informal alliance with the United States.

1980

The Soviets had just invaded Afghanistan, while a theocratic revolution in Iran

had overthrown the Shah’s regime. “Desert One” -- an attempt to free American

hostages in Iran -- ended in a humiliating failure, another indication of what

pundits were calling “the hollow force.” America was the greatest creditor nation

the world had ever seen.

1990

The Soviet Union collapses. The supposedly hollow force shreds the vaunted Iraqi

Army in less than 100 hours. The United States had become the world’s greatest

debtor nation. No one outside of the Department of Defense has heard of the

internet.

2000

Warsaw is the capital of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nation.

Terrorism is emerging as America’s greatest threat. Biotechnology, robotics,

nanotechnology, HD energy, etc. are advancing so fast they are beyond forecasting

2010

Take the above and plan accordingly! What will be the disruptions of the next 25

years?

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single person, to determine the course of events. One may

well predict that human beings will act in similar patterns of

behavior in the future, but when, where and how remains

entirely unpredictable. The rise of a future Stalin, Hitler,

or Lenin is entirely possible, but completely unpredictable,

and the context in which they might reach the top is

unforeseeable.

The interplay of economic trends, vastly

different cultures and historical experiences, and

the idiosyncrasies of leaders, among a host of other

factors, provide such complexity in their interactions

as to make prediction impossible. Winston Churchill

caught those complexities best in his masterful history

of World War I:

One rises from the study of the causes of the

Great War with a prevailing sense of the

defective control of individuals upon world

fortunes. It has been well said, ‘there is always

more error than design in human affairs.’ The

limited minds of the ablest men, their disputed

authority, the climate of opinion in which they

dwell, their transient and partial contributions

to the mighty problem, that problem itself so

far beyond their compass, so vast in scale and

detail, so changing in its aspects – all this must

surely be considered…

Thus, individuals, their idiosyncrasies, genius,

and incompetence, are major actors in these disruptions.

Perhaps the worst president in American history, James

Buchanan, was followed by the greatest, Abraham

Lincoln. Individuals invariably remain the prisoners of

their cultural and historical frame of reference, which

makes the ability to understand, much less predict, the

actions of other states and other leaders difficult. But

we should not allow this to discourage us from gaining

as deep an understanding as possible of the historical

influences of potential political and military leaders at the

strategic, operational, and tactical level.

Clearly, not all disruptions occur through the

actions of individual leaders. Great events, involving the

overthrow of regimes, the collapse of economic systems,

natural disasters, and great conflicts within or among

states have taken the flow of history and channeled it

into new and unforeseen directions. Such singularities

10. Winston S. Churchill,

The World Crisis

(Toronto: MacMillan, 1931), p. 6.

change is increasing. Changes will occur throughout

the energy, financial, political, strategic, operational, and

technological domains. While some change is foreseeable,

even predictable, future joint force planning must account

for the certainty that there will be surprises. How drastic,

how disruptive they might be is at present not discernible

and in some cases it will not even be noticed until they

happen.

The interplay between continuities and disruptions

will demand a joint force that can see both what has

changed and what endures. The force must then have

the ability to adapt to those changes while recognizing the

value of fundamental principles. That can only result from

an historically-minded mentality that can raise the right

questions.

C. The Challenge of Disruptions

Trends may suggest possibilities and potential

directions, but they are unreliable for understanding the

future, because they interact with and are influenced by

other factors. The down turn of Wall Street after the crash

of 1929 might well have remained a recession, but passage

of the Smoot-Hawley tariffs destroyed American trade with

other nations and turned the recession into a catastrophic

global depression. In considering the future, one should

not underestimate the ability of a few individuals, even a

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The Fragility of History – and the Future...

The patterns and course of the past appear relatively straight-

forward and obvious to those living in the present, but

only because the paths not taken or the events that might

have happened, did not. Nothing makes this clearer than

the fates of three individuals in the first thirty plus years

of the twentieth century. Adolf Hitler enlisted in the 16th

Bavarian Reserve Regiment (the “List” Regiment) in early

August 1914; two months later he and 35,000 ill-trained

recruits were thrown against the veteran soldiers of the British

Expeditionary Force. In one day of fighting the List Regiment

lost one third of its men. When the Battle of Langemark was

over, the Germans had suffered approximately 80% casualties.

Hitler was unscratched. Seventeen years later, when Winston

Churchill was visiting New York, he stepped off the curb

without looking in the right direction and was seriously

injured. Two years later in February 1933, Franklin Roosevelt

was the target of an assassination attempt, but the bullet aimed

for him, hit and killed the mayor of Chicago. Can any one

doubt that, had any one of these three individuals been killed,

the history of the twentieth century would have followed a

fundamentally different course?

are truly unpredictable, except that we can be sure that

they will happen again. They will twist the future into

new and unexpected directions. Here, the only strategy

that can mitigate the impact of surprise is a knowledge of

the past, an understanding of the present, and a balanced

force that is willing and able to adapt.

D. Grand Strategy

As in a building, which, however fair and beautiful the

superstructure, is radically marred and imperfect if the

foundations be insecure -- so if the strategy be wrong, the

skill of the general on the battlefield, the valor of the soldier,

the brilliancy of victory, however otherwise decisive, fail of

their effect.

Mahan

Future joint force commanders will not make

grand strategy, but they must fully understand the ends it

seeks to achieve. They will have a role to play in suggesting

how the Joint Force might be used and the means necessary

11. Robert Heinl,

Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations

(U.S. Naval

Institute Press, 1976), p. 311.

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for the effective use of joint forces to protect the interests of

the United States. Thus, their professional, nuanced advice

as military leaders is essential to the casting of effective

responses to strategic challenges.

In the twentieth century the relationship in the

United States between political vision and military leaders

responsible for the execution of policy proved crucial

in winning two world wars and the Cold War. Yet the

dialogue and discourses between those responsible for

casting grand strategy and those responsible for conducting

military operations has always involved tension, because

their perspectives of the world inevitably differ. In the

future, joint force commanders must understand the ends

of strategy in order to recommend the forces required (the

means) to achieve those ends. And policy makers must be

clear as to the strengths, limitations, and potential costs of

the employment of military forces. The relationship between

ends and means drives the logic of joint operations. Only

clear and unfettered military advice from commanders to

policy makers can provide the understanding required to

employ the Joint Force effectively.

Engage people with what they expect; it is what they are able to discern and confirms their projection. It settles

them into predictable patterns of response, occupying their minds while you wait for the extraordinary moment

-- that which they cannot anticipate.

Sun Tzu

Trend analysis is the most fragile element of

forecasting. The world’s future over the coming quarter

of a century will be subject to enormous disruptions and

surprises, natural as well as man-made. These disruptions,

and many other contiguous forces, can easily change

the trajectory of any single trend. The

Joint Operating

Environment

recognizes that many, if not all, of the trends

and trajectories of the future will be non-linear. But for

the purpose of analysis, it has used a traditional approach

to examine many of the trends and utilized conservative

estimates. For instance, demographically, it has used

estimates from sources such as the U.S. Census Bureau.

Economically, the

Joint Operating Environment

assumes

growth rates for developed countries of 2.5% and 4.5%

for developing countries, including China. It is in this

manner that this study considers the trends below. In the

final analysis, the value of the trends lies not in accurately

predicting them, but in intuiting how they might combine

in different ways to form more enduring contexts for future

operations. Trend analysis can also help in identifying

some indicators or signposts that one can use to “check”

the path that the world takes into the future and make

adjustments as necessary. Nevertheless, the resource and

strategic implications of even a conservative and linear

rate of increase possess consequences that suggest a dark

picture of the future.

A. Demographics

A good place to begin the discussion of

trends is demographics, because what is happening

demographically today, unless altered by some

catastrophe, has predictable consequences for the

populations of regions and states. Equally important, it

possesses implications for future strategic postures and

attitudes. In total, the world will add approximately 60

million people each year and reach a total of 8 billion

by the 2030s. Ninety-five percent of that increase will

occur in developing countries. The more important

point is that the world’s troubles will occur not only in

the areas of abject poverty, but also to an even greater

extent in developing countries, where the combination of

demographics and economy permits populations to grow,

but makes meeting rising expectations difficult. Here, the

performance of the global economy will be key in either

dampening down or inflaming ethnically or religiously-

based violent movements.

The developed world confronts the opposite

problem. During the next 25 years population growth

in the developed world will likely slow or in some cases

decline. In particular, Russia’s population is currently

declining by 0.5% annually, and given Russian health

and welfare profiles, there is every prospect that decline

will continue, barring a drastic shift in social attitudes or

public policy. As a recent Center for Strategic International

Studies (CSIS) report suggested, “Russia needs to cope

with a rate of population decline that literally has no

historical precedent in the absence of pandemic.”

Russia’s west, a similar, albeit less disastrous situation

exists. Over all, European nations stopped replacing their

losses to deaths in 2007, and despite considerable efforts

to reverse those trends, there is little likelihood their

populations will significantly increase by the 2030s. This

raises serious concerns about the sustainability of economic

growth in that region. It also has serious implications for

the willingness of European societies to bear the costs

involved in lives and treasure that the use of military force

inevitably carries with it.

Likewise, Japan’s population will fall from 128

million to approximately 117 million in the 2030s, but

unlike the case of Russia this will result not from any

inadequacy of Japanese medical services, which are among

the world’s best, but from the collapse of Japan’s birth

rate. The Japanese are taking serious steps to address their

demographic decline, a fact which explains their major

research and development efforts in the field of robotics as

well as their shift to a capital-intensive economy.

Over the next quarter century, China’s

population will grow by 170 million, but its population

will age significantly because of strict enforcement of

the government’s edict of one child per family. An

13. Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS), “The Graying of the

Great Powers,” (Washington, DC), p. 7.

12. Sun Tzu,

The Art of War

, translated and edited by Samuel B. Griffith

(Oxford, 1963), p. 92.

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additional

demographic

factor, which may impact

on Chinese behavior, is the

choice of many families to

satisfy that limitation with

a male child. How the

resulting imbalance between

young males and females

will play out by the 2030s in

China’s external and internal

politics is impossible to

predict, because there are

few historical analogues.

Nevertheless, there are some

indications of an increasing

predilection to violence

among Chinese youth, while

there have been exuberant displays of nationalistic

feeling among the young in response to criticisms of

China’s behavior in Tibet.

By the 2030s the U.S. population will climb

by more than 50 million to a total of approximately

355 million. This growth will result not only from

births in current American families, but also from

continued immigration, especially from Mexico and

the Caribbean, which will lead to major increases in

America’s Hispanic population. By 2030 at least 15%

of the population of every state will be Hispanic in

origin, in some states reaching upwards of 50%. How

effective Americans prove in assimilating these new

immigrants into the nation’s politics and culture will

play a major role in America’s prospects. In this regard,

the historical ability of the United States to assimilate

immigrants into its society and culture gives it a distinct

advantage over most other nations, who display little

willingness to incorporate immigrant populations into

the mainstream of their societies.

India will grow by 320 million during the next

quarter of a century. The tensions that arise from a

growing divide between rich and poor in a nation

already driven by a multiplicity of races and religions

could seriously impact on its potential for further

economic growth. Exacerbating tensions will be the

divide between the sub-continent’s huge middle class

and those in the villages mired in poverty, as well as the

divide between Muslims and Hindus. Nevertheless,

India’s democratic system gives some latitude for

political changes to accommodate society’s poor.

The continued population growth across the

Middle East and in Sub-Saharan Africa has only

recently begun abating, but not fast enough to forestall a

demographic crisis, where economic growth fails to keep

pace with population growth. In areas of abject poverty,

continued growth among the youth has significance for

the employment of U.S. forces called upon to feed the

starving and mitigate the suffering. Where economic

growth fuels but does not satisfy expectations, the

potential for revolution or war, including civil war, will

be significant.

Even as the developing world copes with its youth

bulge, the developed world will confront its acute aging

problem. By the 2030s the number of elderly people

in developed countries will double. In Japan there will

be 63 elderly for every 100 workers, with Europe not

far behind with 59 per 100. The United States will

be slightly better off with 44 elderly per 100 workers.

Even China will see its ratio of elderly to working

population double (from 12 to 23 per 100 workers)

as a result of better diet and improved medical care.

Such demographic trends will make it less likely that

nations in the developed world will sacrifice their youth

in military adventures, unless extraordinary threats

appear. Regions such as the Middle East and Sub-

Saharan Africa, where the youth bulge will reach over

50% of the population, will possess fewer inhibitions

about engaging in conflict.

Around the world, humanity is on the move,

with Muslims and Africans moving to Europe, ethnic

Chinese moving into Siberia, Mexicans and other

Lessons from the History of Globalization

How can one best define globalization? Some might delineate it in terms of increased

international trade, limited restrictions on the movement of peoples, and light regulation on the

flow of capital. At least that was how politicians and pundits defined it at the start of the twentieth

century. At that time, Europeans did not require passports to travel from one country to another on

the continent, a situation restored only in the late 1990s. By 1913 the value of international trade

as a percentage of world GDP had reached a level the global economy would not replicate until

the last decade of the twentieth century. The economies of the United States and the German Reich

were expanding at unheard of rates. Western merchants were queuing up to supply China’s teeming

masses, as that country opened its markets for the first time in centuries. Furthermore, the largest

migration – and a peaceful one at that – in history was taking place, as 25 million Europeans left

home, most immigrating to the United States.

The world also saw technological and scientific revolutions unequaled in history, which

in turn spawned revolutions in travel and communications. Travel across the Atlantic was now

a matter of days rather than weeks or months. Telegraph cables linked the continents for near

instantaneous communications. Railroads allowed travelers to cross continents in days rather

than months. The internal combustion engine was already impacting on travel by land, while

the appearance of the aircraft in 1903 suggested even greater possibilities. A complex web of

international agreements, such as the International Postal Union and the International Telegraph

Conventions, welded these changes together. Again as with today, many were not content to leave

the direction of the new world order to governments. In the first decade of the century activists

formed 119 international organizations and 112 in the second decade.

For much of humanity, this was a time of hope and optimism. As early as the mid-

nineteenth century, John Bright, a British industrialist, argued that “nothing could be so foolish as

a policy of war for a trading nation. Any peace was better than the most successful war.” In 1911

a British journalist, Norman Angell, published a work titled

The Great Illusion

, which became an

international best seller. In it, he argued the expansion of global commerce had changed the nature

of wealth, which no longer would depend on control of territory or resources.

For Angell, the belief that military strength was the basis for security represented a dangerous

illusion. As for war itself, it represented a futile endeavor incapable of creating material wealth,

while putting much at risk. His arguments boiled down to a belief that the interlocking networks

of global trade made war impossible. In 1913, he published an improved edition to even greater

acclaim. Yet, within a year the First World War had broken out. The result of that conflict in

political and economic terms was to smash globalization for the next seventy years. Angell had

been right about the absolute destructive effects of modern war. He had been wrong about human

nature and its passions.

Why is this important? Because these same arguments have regained currency. For

many, particularly in the West, the interlocking trading and communications networks of the

twenty-first century with their benefits have made war, if not impossible, then at least obsolete.

Accordingly, any future war would cost so much in lives and treasure that no rational political

leader would ever pursue it. The problem is that rationality, at least in their terms, does not exist

in much of the world outside Europe, the United States, and Japan. Saddam Hussein managed to

invade two of Iraq’s six neighbors in the space of less than ten years and sparked three wars in the

period he ruled. The first of his wars against Iran resulted in approximately 250 thousand Iraqi

deaths and half a million Iranian dead, while his wars against his own people killed upwards of 100

thousand. In historical terms, globalization is not the norm for human affairs.

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Latin Americans moving north to the United States

and Canada, and citizens of the Philippines and India

providing the labor and small commercial backbones

of the economies of the Gulf States. Equally important

are the migrations occurring in war torn areas in Africa

in areas like the Sudan, Somalia,

Darfur, Rwanda. Such migrations

disrupt patterns of culture, politics,

and economics and in most cases

carry with them the potential of

further dislocations and troubles.

Everywhere, people are

moving to cities. Skilled workers,

doctors, and engineers are leaving

the undeveloped world as fast as

they can to make a living in the

developed world. Increasingly,

these global diasporas connect

through the internet and telephone

to their home countries. Often,

the money they send back to their

families forms major portions of the

local economies back in their home

communities.

B. Globalization

For the most part, the

developed world recognizes that it

has a major stake in the continuing

progress of globalization. The same

can be said for those moving into

the developed world. Nevertheless,

one should not ignore the histories

and passions of popular opinion

in these states as they make their

appearance. One should not confuse

developed world trappings for an

underlying stability and maturity

of civil societies. A more peaceful

cooperative world is only possible if

the pace of globalization continues.

In particular, this means engaging

China and other nations politically

and culturally as they enter into the

developed world.

The critics of globalization

often portray its dark side in

the inequality of rich and poor. In some worst-case

scenarios, they portray the rise of resentment and

violence throughout the world as a direct result of

globalization. Not surprisingly, the future is likely to

contain both good and bad as globalization accelerates

the pace of human interaction and extends its reach.

Given these projections, those living in extreme

poverty would fall from 1.1 billion to 550 million, while

those living on $2 a day would fall from 2.7 billion to 1.9

billion. Currently, only six countries in the developing

world possess populations of over 100 million people

and a GDP of at least $100 billion (China, Russia,

India, Indonesia, Brazil, and Mexico). By the 2030s

Bangladesh, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, and

Vietnam will have joined that group. Thus, in terms

of the developing world alone, there would be 11 states

with the population and the economic strength to build

military forces possessing the ability to project significant

military power in their region.

As more young enter the work force, the

developing world will need to increase employment by

nearly 50 million jobs per year. China and India alone

need to create 8 to 10 million jobs annually to keep pace

with the numbers entering the work force every year. If

economic growth suffices to provide such employment,

it would go far to reduce international tensions and

the endemic troubles inherent in youth bulges. While

poverty has rarely been a driving force for revolutionary

movements and wars, rising expectations often have.

And in a world covered by media reports and movies from

around the globe, rising expectations will increasingly

be a driving force of politics, war, and peace, however

The disparity between Growth and GDP

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The processes propelling globalization over the

next two decades could improve the lives of most of

the world’s population, particularly for hundreds of

millions of the poorest. Serious violence, resulting from

economic trends, has almost invariably arisen where

economic and political systems have failed to meet

rising expectations. A failure of globalization would

equate to a failure to meet those rising expectations.

Thus, the real danger in a globalized world, where

even the poorest have access to pictures and media

portrayals of the developed world, lies in a reversal or

halt to global prosperity. Such a possibility would lead

individuals and nations to scramble for a greater share

of shrinking wealth and resources, as occurred in the

1930s with the rise of Nazi Germany in Europe and

Japan’s “co-prosperity sphere” in Asia.

Admittedly, some will also be left behind

by globalization, either through the misfortunes of

geography, culture (much of sub-Saharan Africa),

or design (North Korea and Burma). Many of these

nations will be weak and failing states and will require

an international array of economic, diplomatic, and

military resources to establish or sustain stability.

In a globalized world of great nations, the

United States may not always have to take the lead in

handling the regional troubles that will arise. By the

2030s, every region of the world will likely contain

local economic powers or regional organizations capable

of leadership. In any case, the United States will often

find it prudent to play a cooperative or supporting

role in military operations around the world. In most

cases the assisting of, or intervention in, failing states

will require a cooperative engagement between the

United States and regional powers. Again, the skills of

a diplomat in working with other people and military

organizations from different cultures must be in the tool

kit of commanders, staffs, and personnel throughout the

Joint Force.

C. Economics

Using a base line of 2.5% growth for the

developed world and 4.5% growth for the developing

world, including China and India (a figure that grossly

understates the present growth trajectory of these two

nations), the world economy would double by the

2030s from $35 trillion to $72 trillion. Global trade

would triple to $27 trillion.

well individual economies may perform.

In contrast, real catastrophes may occur if

economic growth slows or reverses either on a global

scale or within an emerging power. Growing economies

and economic hopes disguise a number of social ills and

fractures. The results of a dramatic slowdown in China’s

growth, for example, are unpredictable and could

easily lead to internal difficulties or aggressive behavior

externally. That is precisely what happened in Japan in

the early 1930s with the onset of the Great Depression.

Even within the most optimistic economic scenarios,

there will be major areas of the world left behind – the

bottom billion. Between now and the 2030s, many

of these areas will likely lie in sub-Saharan Africa and

the Middle East (excluding the oil boom countries).

Although both regions have maintained impressive

growth rates over the past several years, those rates have

not been sufficient to decrease unemployment.

If economic stability and growth continue

unabated up to the 2030s, there would be sufficient

The Volatility of Trends

Economic estimates rest on trend lines easily disputed both in the present and the future. For instance, were one to employ the same

methodology used to compute the chart on the previous page in 1935, to predict future national GDPs in 1955, the results would be

off by an

order of magnitude.

This chart presents the equivalent of a central scenario. Nevertheless, a word of warning is in order. In 1928 most economists

would have given far rosier prospects for the American and world economies. Four years later, they would have given a far darker picture. That
is the nature of change in economics as well as in very other human endeavor. Wide variations in either direction are not just feasible – they are
likely.

As the

Joint Operating Environment

goes to print the world is in the midst of the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression.

While the final resolution is not yet in sight, the authors are of the opinion that the proactive measures taken by world governments (adding huge
amounts of liquidity, recapitalizing the financial system and purchasing bad assets) will ensure that a global economic meltdown will not occur.
Yet, it is almost certain that there will be a rather nasty global recession of indeterminate length. Recessions, while painful, are part of the natural
business cycle and are unlikely to have a major impact on the trends outlined in this document.

Nevertheless, the long-term strategic consequences of the current financial crises are likely to be significant. Over the next several

years a new international financial order will likely arise that will redefine the rules and institutions that underpin the functioning, order, and
stability of the global economy. There is one new watchword that will continue to define the global environment for the immediate future –
interconnectedness.

Until a new structure emerges, strategists will have to prepare to work in an environment where the global economic picture can change

suddenly, and where even minor events can cause a cascading series of unforeseen consequences.

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global resources to provide support for failing and

failed states -- that is, providing the political will is

there. A broken economy is usually a harbinger of

social collapse and anarchy, or ruthless despotism.

Neither is attractive, but if the United States chooses

to intervene in such situations, political and military

leaders should keep in mind that they should only

insert professional military forces if they are willing

to sustain and inflict casualties which could result on

both sides, as the experiences of the intervention in

Somalia in 1993 underline.

A central component of America’s global

military posture is its massive economic power. This

power is predicated on a financially-viable, globally

connected domestic economy. Should this central

feature of American power be weakened, it is highly

likely that military capabilities will be diminished or

otherwise degraded as a result.

D. Energy

To meet even the conservative growth rates

posited above, global energy production would need

to rise by 1.3% per year. By the 2030s, demand

would be nearly 50% greater than today. To meet that

demand, even assuming more effective conservation

measures, the world would need to add roughly the

equivalent of Saudi Arabia’s current energy production

every seven years.

Unless there is a major change in the relative

reliance on alternative energy sources, which would

require vast insertions of capital, dramatic changes

in technology, and altered political attitudes toward

nuclear energy, oil and coal will continue to drive

the energy train. By the 2030s, oil requirements

could go from 86 to 118 million barrels a day

(MBD). Although the use of coal may decline in

the Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development (OECD) countries, it will more than

double in developing nations. Fossil fuels will still

make up 80% of the energy mix in the 2030s, with

oil and gas comprising upwards of 60%. The central

problem for the coming decade will not be a lack of

petroleum reserves, but rather a shortage of drilling

platforms, engineers and refining capacity. Even were

a concerted effort begun today to repair that shortage,

it would be ten years before production could catch

up with expected demand. The key determinant here

would be the degree of commitment the United States

and others would display in addressing the dangerous

vulnerabilities the growing energy crisis presents.

That production bottleneck apart, the potential

sources of future energy supplies nearly all present their

own difficulties and vulnerabilities as shown here:

None of the above provides much reason for

optimism. At present, the United States possesses

approximately 250 million cars, while China with its

immensely larger population possesses only 40 million.

Non-Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil:

New sources (Caspian Sea, Brazil, Colombia, and new portions of

Alaska and the Continental shelf) could offset declining production

in mature fields over the course of the next quarter century. But

without drilling in currently excluded areas, they will add little

additional capacity.

Oil Sands and Shale:

Production from these sources could increase

from 1 MBD to over 4 MBD, but current legal constraints, such

as U.S. law forbidding importation of oil from Canada’s tar sands,

discourage investment.

atural Gas:

Production from this energy source could increase to

the equivalent of 2 MBD, with half coming from OPEC countries.

Biofuels:

Production could increase to approximately 3 MBD–

equivalent, but starting from a small base, biofuels are unlikely

to contribute more than 1% of global energy requirements by the

2030s. Moreover, even that modest achievement could curtail

the supply of foodstuffs to the world’s growing population, which

would add other national security challenge to an already full

menu.

Renewable:

Wind and solar combined are unlikely to account for

more than 1% of global energy by 2030. That assumes the energy

from such sources will more than triple, which alone would require

major investments.

Nuclear:

Nuclear energy offers one of the more promising

technological possibilities, given significant advances in safety

since the 1970s. In particular, it could play a major role in

replacing coal–fired plants, and a greater supply of cheap electricity

could encourage electric–powered transportation. Nevertheless,

expanding nuclear plants confronts considerable opposition

because of public fears, while the disposal of nuclear waste

remains a political hot potato. Moreover, construction of nuclear

power plants in substantial numbers will take decades.

OPEC:

To meet climbing global requirements, OPEC will

have to increase its output from 30 MBD to at least 50 MBD.

Significantly, no OPEC nation, except perhaps Saudi Arabia,

is investing sufficient sums in new technologies and recovery

methods to achieve such growth. Some, like Venezuela and

Russia, are actually exhausting their fields to cash in on the

bonanza created by rapidly rising oil prices.

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The Chinese are laying down approximately 1,000

kilometers of four–lane highway every year, a figure

suggesting how many more vehicles they expect to

possess, with the concomitant rise in their demand for

oil. The presence of Chinese “civilians” in the Sudan

to guard oil pipelines underlines China’s concern for

protecting its oil supplies and could preview a future

in which other states intervene in Africa to protect

scarce resources.

The implications for future conflict are ominous.

If the major developed and developing states do not

undertake a massive expansion of production and refining

capabilities, a severe energy crunch is inevitable. While it

is difficult to predict precisely what economic, political,

and strategic effects such a shortfall might produce, it

surely would reduce the prospects for growth in both

the developing and developed worlds. Such an economic

slowdown would exacerbate other unresolved tensions,

push fragile and failing states further down the path

Although the world depends on oil, existing capacities and the

development of existing reserves cannot keep up with demand.

Massive investments in enhanced oil recovery techniques, non-

conventional oil reserves such as oil shale, and large scale new

finds will be required to meet anticipated future oil demand.

In summary:

To generate the energy required worldwide by the 2030s would

require us to find an additional 1.4 MBD every year until then.

During the next twenty-five years, coal, oil, and natural gas

will remain indispensable to meet energy requirements. The

discovery rate for new petroleum and gas fields over the past two

decades (with the possible exception of Brazil) provides little

reason for optimism future efforts will find major new fields.

At present, investment in oil production is only beginning to

pick up, with the result that production could reach a prolonged

plateau. By 2030, the world will require production of 118

MBD, but energy producers may only be producing 100 MBD

unless there are major changes in current investment and drilling

capacity.

By 2012, surplus oil production capacity could entirely

disappear, and as early as 2015, the shortfall in output could

reach nearly 10 MBD.

To avoid a disastrous energy crunch, together with the economic

consequences that would make even modest growth unlikely, the

developed world needs to invest heavily in oil production. There

appears to be little propensity to consider such investments.

Although as oil prices increase, market forces will inexorably

create incentives. But the present lack of investment in this area

has created major shortages in infrastructure (oil rigs, drilling

platforms, etc.) necessary for major increases in exploration and

production.

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toward collapse, and perhaps have serious

economic impact on both China and

India. At best, it would lead to periods

of harsh economic adjustment. To what

extent conservation measures, investments

in alternative energy production, and

efforts to expand petroleum production

from tar sands and shale would mitigate

such a period of adjustment is difficult to

predict. One should not forget that the

Great Depression spawned a number of

ferocious totalitarian regimes that sought

economic prosperity for their nations by

ruthless conquest, while Japan went to

war in 1941 to secure its energy supplies.

One other potential effect of an

energy crunch could be a prolonged U.S.

recession which could lead to deep cuts in defense

spending (as happened during the Great Depression).

Joint force commanders could then find their

capabilities diminished at the moment they may have

to undertake increasingly dangerous missions. Should

that happen, adaptability would require more than

preparations to fight the enemies of the United States,

but also the willingness to recognize and acknowledge

the limitations of America’s military forces. The

pooling of U.S. resources and capabilities with allies

would then become even more critical. Coalition

operations would become essential to protecting

national interests.

E. Food

Two major factors drive food requirements: a

growing global population and prosperity that expands

dietary preferences. While food shortages still occur

today, they are more likely to reflect politically-inflicted,

rather than natural causes. Several mitigating trends

could diminish the possibility of major food shortages.

For starters, any slowdown in the world’s

population growth may reduce overall demand for food

and thus ease pressure to expand and intensify agriculture.

On the other hand, increased animal protein use in

countries with rapidly rising income levels is placing

considerable pressure on the world’s food supply, since

animal production requires much greater input for

calories produced. Opposition to genetically modified

foods is dissipating. As a result, there is a reasonable

chance of sparking a new “green revolution” that would

expand crop and protein production sufficiently to meet

world requirements. The main pressures on sufficient

food supplies will remain in countries with persistently

high population growth and a lack of arable land, in

most cases exacerbated by desertification and shortages

in rainfall.

In a world with adequate global supply but

localized food shortages, the real problems will stem

from how food is distributed. How quickly the world

reacts to temporary food shortages inflicted by natural

disasters will also pose challenges. In such cases, joint

forces may find themselves involved in providing lift,

logistics, and occasionally security to those charged with

relief operations.

Natural disease will also have a say in the

world’s food supply. The Irish potato blight was not an

exceptional historical event. As recently as 1954, 40%

of America’s wheat crop failed as a result of black-stem

disease. There are reports of a new aggressive strain of

this disease (Ug99) spreading across Africa and possibly

reaching Pakistan. Blights threatening basic food crops

such as potatoes and corn could have destabilizing effects

on nations close to the subsistence level. Food crises have

led in the past to famine, internal and external conflicts,

the collapse of governing authority, migrations, societal

collapse, and social disorder. In such cases, many people

in the crisis zone may be well-armed and dangerous,

making the task of the Joint Force in providing relief

that much more difficult. In a society confronted with

starvation, food becomes a weapon every bit as important

as ammunition.

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population during the next quarter century. However, in

some regions the story is quite different. The Near East and

North Africa use far more than the global average of 70%

of available water dedicated to irrigation. By the 2030s, at

least 30 developing nations could use even more of their

water for irrigation.

In recent times, the increasing unreliability of an

assured supply of rainwater has forced farmers to turn more

to groundwater in many areas. As a result, aquifer levels are

declining at rates between one and three meters per year.

The impact of such declines on agricultural production

could be profound especially since aquifers, once drained,

may not refill for centuries.

Within a quarter century, water scarcity could affect

approximately 3 billion people.

One should not minimize the prospect of wars

over water. In 1967, Jordanian and Syrian efforts to dam

the Jordan River was a contributing cause of the Six-Day

War between Israel and its neighbors. Today, Turkish dams

on the upper Euphrates and Tigris Rivers, the source of

water for the Mesopotamian basin, pose similar problems

for Syria and Iraq. Turkish diversion of water to irrigate

mountain valleys in eastern Turkey already reduces water

downstream. Even though localized, conflicts sparked by

water scarcity easily could destabilize whole regions. The

continuing crisis in Sudan’s Darfur region, now spreading

to Chad, is an example of what could happen on a wider

scale between now and the 2030s. Indeed, it is precisely

along other potential conflict fault lines that potential crises

involving water scarcity are most likely.

Whether the United States would find itself

drawn into such conflicts is uncertain, but what is certain

is that future joint force commanders will find conflict

over water endemic to their world, whether as the spark

or the underlying cause of conflicts among various racial,

tribal, or political groups. Were they called on to intervene

in a catastrophic water crisis, they might well confront

chaos, with collapsing or impotent social networks and

governmental services. Anarchy could prevail, with armed

groups controlling or warring over remaining water, while

the specter of disease resulting from unsanitary conditions

would hover in the background.

The latter is only one potential manifestation of

a larger problem. Beyond the problems of water scarcity,

will be those associated with water pollution, whether from

uncontrolled industrialization, as in China, or from the

human sewage expelled by the mega-cities and slums of

the world. The dumping of vast amounts of waste into the

world’s rivers and oceans threatens the health and welfare

of large portions of the human race, to say nothing of the

affected ecosystems. While joint forces rarely will have

to address pollution problems directly, any operations in

polluted urban areas will carry considerable risk of disease.

Indeed, it is precisely in such areas that new and deadly

pathogens are most likely to arise. Hence, commanders

may be unable to avoid dealing with the consequences of

chronic water pollution.

G. Climate Change and Natural

Disasters

The impact of global warming and its potential

to cause natural disasters and other harmful phenomena

such as rising sea levels has become a prominent—and

controversial—national and international concern. Some

argue that there will be more and greater storms and

natural disasters, others that there will be fewer.

many respects, scientific conclusions about the causes and

potential effects of global warming are contradictory.

Whatever their provenance, tsunamis, typhoons,

hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes and other natural

catastrophes have been and will continue to be a concern

of joint force commanders. In particular, where natural

disasters collide with growing urban sprawl, widespread

human misery could be the final straw that breaks the back

of a weak state. In the 2030s as in the past, the ability

of U.S. military forces to relieve the victims of natural

disasters could help the United States’ image around the

world. For example, the contribution of U.S. and partner

forces to relieving the distress caused by the catastrophic

Pacific tsunami of December 2006 reversed the perceptions

of America held by many Indonesians. Perhaps no other

mission performed by the Joint Force provides so much

benefit to the interests of the United States at so little cost.

H. Pandemics

One of the fears haunting the public is the

appearance of a pathogen, either man–made or natural,

able to devastate mankind, as the “Black Death” did in the

Middle East and Europe in the middle of the fourteenth

century. Within barely a year, approximately one–third of

14.

Kerry Emanuel, Ragoth Sundaraarajan, and John Williams, “

Hurricanes and

Global Warming

,” Bulletin American Meteorological Society, March 2008, pp. 347-

367.

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Europe’s population died. The second- and third-order

effects of the pandemic on society, religion, and economics

were devastating. In effect, the Black Death destroyed the

sureties undergirding Medieval European civilization.

It is less likely that a pandemic on this scale will

devastate mankind over the next two decades. Even though

populations today are much larger and more concentrated,

increasing the opportunities for a new pathogen to spread,

the fact that mankind lives in a richer world with greater

knowledge of the world of microbes, the ability to enact

quarantines, a rapid response capability, and medical

treatment, suggests that authorities could control even the

most dangerous of pathogens. The crucial element in any

response to a pandemic may be the political will to impose

a quarantine.

The rapid termination of 2003’s Severe Acute

Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) pandemic does provide hope

that current medical capabilities could handle most pandemic

threats successfully. In the five months after initial reports

from East Asia in February of an atypical respiratory disease,

medical authorities reported more than 8,000 cases in 30

different countries. The disease itself was highly contagious

and life-threatening: almost 10% of reported cases died.

However, once doctors identified the disease, the combined

efforts of local, national, and international authorities

contained it. Newly reported cases increased rapidly in

March and April 2003, peaked in early May, and thereafter

rapidly declined.

The SARS case suggests that the risk of a global

pandemic is not as great as some fear. That does not mean

that it is nonexistent. A repetition of the 1918 influenza

pandemic, which led to the deaths of millions world-wide

would have the most serious consequences for the United

States and the world politically as well as socially. The

dangers posed by the natural emergence of a disease capable

of launching a global pandemic are serious enough, but

the possibility also exists that a terrorist organization might

acquire a dangerous pathogen.

The deliberate release of a deadly pathogen, especially

one genetically engineered to increase its lethality or virulence,

would present greater challenges than a naturally occurring

disease like SARS. While the latter is likely to have a single

point of origin, terrorists would seek to release the pathogen

at several different locations and it would spread faster. This

would seriously complicate both the medical challenge of

bringing the disease under control and the security task of

fixing responsibility for its appearance.

The implications for joint forces of a pandemic

as widespread and dangerous as that of 1918 would be

profound. American and global medical capabilities would

soon find themselves overwhelmed. If the outbreak spread

to the United States, the Joint Force might have to conduct

relief operations beyond assisting in law-enforcement and

maintaining order when legal prerequisites are met, as

currently identified by the National Strategy for Pandemic

Influenza. Even as joint force commanders confronted an

array of missions, they would have to take severe measures

to preserve the health of their forces and protect medical

personnel and facilities from public panic and dislocations.

Thucydides captured the moral, political, and psychological

dangers that a global pandemic would cause in his description

of the plague’s impact on Athens: “For the catastrophe was so

overwhelming that men, not knowing what would happen

next to them, became indifferent to every rule of religion or

of law.”

I. Cyber

Perhaps the most important trend in the area of

science and technology is the continuing information

and communications revolution and its implications.

Although many pundits have touted the ability of

information to “lift the fog and friction of war,” such

claims have foundered on the rocks of reality.

Key to understanding information technology

in the 2030s is the fact that the pace of technological

change is accelerating almost exponentially. Because

most individuals tend to view change in a linear

15. Thucydides,

History of the Peloponnesian War,

trans. by Rex Warner

(London: Penguin Books, 1954) p. 155.

•

An iPod today can hold some 160 gigabytes of data, or

160,000 books. The iPod of 2020 could potentially hold

some 16 terabytes of information – essentially the entire

Library of Congress.

•

Connectivity to the home (or node in military networks)

grows by 50% a year. Therefore by 2030, people will have

about 100,000 times more bandwidth than today.

•

The computing capacity available to the average home

will be a computer that runs at a rate of one million

times faster than a computer today (2.5 petabytes vs. 2.5

gigabytes). A typical home computer would be capable of

downloading the entirety of today’s Library of Congress (16

terabytes), in 128 seconds – just over two minutes’ time.

The technical capacity of the telegraph in 1900, was some

2 bits per second across continental distances, meaning

that same Library of Congress would have required a

transmission time of 3,900 years.

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fashion, they tend to overestimate what is achievable

by technology in the short term, while dramatically

underestimating and discounting the power of scientific

and technological advances in the long term.

If the pace of technical advances holds true,

greater technological change will occur over the next

twenty years than occurred in the whole of the twentieth

century. In many ways the world of 2030 will be nearly

as strange as the

world of 2000

would have been

to an observer from

1900. The advances

in communication

and information

t e c h n o l o g i e s

will

significantly

advance

the

capabilities

the Joint Force.

Nevertheless, those

same

advances

will be available

America’s

opponents

and

they will use those

advances to attack,

degrade, and disrupt

communications

and the flow of

information. Indeed, our adversaries have often taken

advantage of computer networks and the power of

information technology not only to directly influence

the perceptions and will of the United States, its

decision-makers, and population, but also to plan and

execute savage acts of terrorism. It is also essential that

joint forces be capable of functioning in an information-

hostile environment, so as not to create an Achilles’ heel

by becoming too network dependent.

J. Space

In 2007 the Chinese used an interceptor missile to

destroy a satellite in space. In that single act, they made

clear their belief that space was a potential theater of conflict

and that they aimed to possess the capability to fight in that

environment. As with the profusion of inexpensive precision

weapons, technological advances and increasing wealth will

place the ability to conduct military operations in space

within the reach of an increasing number of players.

Over the past several decades the United States

has enjoyed an unchallenged dominance over the dark

realm beyond the atmosphere. However, the increasing

proliferation of launch and satellite capabilities ,as well as the

development of anti-satellite capabilities, has begun to level

the playing field. Other countries are leveraging the benefits

of space for both commercial and defense applications,

and the United States

already

confronts

increased competition

over its use. This will

increasingly be the case

over coming decades.

The implications are

clear: the Joint Force is

going to have to be in a

position to defend the

spaced-based systems

on which so many of

its capabilities depend.

As well, the Joint Force

must anticipate the

inevitable attack and

know how to operate

effectively when these

attacks degrade those

systems.

K. Conclusion

The previous discussion outlined just some of the

trends that are likely to influence the security environment

for the next quarter century. These individual trends,

whether they adhere to predictions or not, will combine

together in ways to form more broad and robust contexts

that will define the world in which the Joint Force will

operate in the future. By understanding the trends

and resultant contexts, joint force leaders have a way to

appreciate their implications, and to identify some key

indicators to watch along the way. This provides a means

of assessing our assumptions and predictions, and our

progress towards building and operating the Joint Force

to meet the future. What follows then is a discussion of

the contextual world of the 2030s.

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Contexts of conflict and war are the environment created by the

confluence of major trends. Contexts illuminate why wars occur and

how they might be waged .

Colin Gray

A. Competition and Cooperation

Among Conventional Powers

Competition and conflict among conventional

powers will continue to be the primary strategic

and operational context for the Joint Force over

the next 25 years. For the purpose of the

Joint

Operating Environment

, a “conventional power” is an

organization that is governed by, and behaves according

to, recognized norms and codes – conventions. Such

institutions may be political (the state), financial,

judiciary, business and economic, academic, and

many more. Conventions may include the Geneva

Convention, the Law of Armed Conflict, United

Nations Resolutions, National and International Law,

international trade agreements, diplomatic alliances,

monetary and banking conventions, and many more.

These are groups that are broadly recognized as being

legitimate actors, behaving according to broadly

recognized rule sets.

The state will continue to be among the most

powerful conventional institutions. It has become

popular to suggest that the era of states is coming to

an end. In fact states, in one form or another, have

been the order of most of human affairs since the dawn

of history in almost all cultures. The chaos in places

such as Somalia, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, and Iraq,

where the state’s structure has been dysfunctional for

periods of time, is further testimony to the utility of

a working state.

This is not to say that states will not vary from

culture to culture, region to region. As well, the state

will undoubtedly change in response to the influences

of politics, geography, migration, economics and

other factors. But though it will mutate and adapt to

the international environment’s changing conditions,

the state will continue to survive as a centralized

mechanism through which power is organized and

which provides the internal and external security

required by its citizens. Some aspects of globalization,

and the related rise of non-state powers, will pose

difficulties to states in their efforts to preserve their

status, but the state will endure as a major power

broker into the 2030s.

In the next 25 years, the relative balance of

power between states will shift, some growing faster

than the United States and many states weakening

relative to the United States. The variables that

affect the growth of states range from wars, to the

effectiveness of political leaders, economic realities,

ideological preconceptions, and ethnic and religious

forces. All will to one extent or another influence

the course of future events. Recognizing that reality,

present trends suggest that the era of the United States

as the sole superpower may be coming to an end. The

charts on page 25, highlighting potential growth in

various nations between 2008 and the 2030s, suggest

much about the nature of the emerging international

arena.

While China’s rise represents the most

significant single event on the international horizon

since the collapse of the Cold War, it is not the only

story. Steady, if not rapid economic growth appears

to be the norm for much of the world over the coming

decades, provided sufficient energy remains available

to fuel that growth. Russia and India are both likely

to become richer, although Russia’s strength is fragile,

resting as it does on unfavorable demographic trends, a

single-commodity (oil) economy, and a lack of serious

investment in repairing its crumbling infrastructure.

As the figures at right suggest, based on a GDP per

capita basis, a number of countries will be able to field larger

conventional militaries over the course of coming decades.

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16. Colin Gray, “

Sovereignty of Context

”, Strategic Studies Institute, (2006)

same countries make up the European Union and could

field forces as large and capable as those of the United

States, but again they lack the will. Since the end of the

Cold War, many European nations have engaged in what

could be classified as disarmament. The great question

confronting Europeans is whether this trend will continue,

or whether some impending threat – an aggressive and

expansionist Russia, the internal stress of immigration, or

radical Islamic extremism – will awaken them.

It is also conceivable that combinations of regional

powers with sophisticated regional capabilities could band

together to form a powerful anti-American alliance. It is

not hard to imagine an alliance of small, cash-rich countries

arming themselves with high-performance long-range

precision weapons. Such a group could not only deny

U.S. forces access into their country, but could also prevent

American access to the global commons at significant

ranges from their borders.

Not all conventional organizations will be states.

Many transnational organizations will also behave

according to a recognized set of conventional rules. Samuel

Huntington describes the activity of these groups in this

way:

Transnational organizations try to ignore [sovereignty]. While

national representatives and delegations engage in endless debate

at U.N. conferences and councils, the agents of transnational

organizations are busily deployed across the continents, spinning

the webs that link the world together.

In this environment, the U.S. must strive to use

its tremendous powers of inspiration, not just its powers

of intimidation.

How America operates in this world

of states and other conventional powers will be a major

factor in its ability to project its influence and soft power

beyond the long shadow cast by its raw military power.

It will remain first among equals due to its military,

political and economic strengths. But in most endeavors

it will need partners, whether from traditional alliances

or coalitions of the willing. Thus, the United States will

need to sharpen its narrative about the unique vision we

offer to the world and to inspire like-minded partners

to strive and sacrifice for common interests. Alliances,

partnerships, and coalitions will determine the framework

in which joint force commanders operate. This will require

17. Samuel Huntington, quoted in Joseph Nye (with Robert Keohane),

Power in the Global Information Age: From Realism to Globalization

(London, 2004) p. 172.

18. John Hamre, President, Center for Strategic and International Studies.

(June 2007)

diplomacy, cultural and political understanding, as well as

military competencies. Here, the example that Dwight

Eisenhower displayed as overall commander of Allied

Forces that invaded Europe is particularly useful for future

U.S. military leaders.

B. Potential Challenges and

Threats

1. China

The Sino-American relationship represents

one of the great strategic question marks of the

next twenty-five years. Regardless of the outcome –

cooperative or coercive, or both – China will become

increasingly important in the considerations and

strategic perceptions of joint force commanders.

The course that China takes will determine

much about the character and nature of the twenty-

first century - whether it will be “another bloody

century,”

or one of peaceful cooperation.

The Chinese

themselves are uncertain as to where their strategic path

to the future will lead. Deng Xiaoping’s advice for

China to “disguise its ambition and hide its claws” may

represent as forthright a statement as the Chinese can

provide. What does appear relatively clear is that the

Chinese are thinking in the long term regarding their

strategic course. Rather than emphasize the future

strictly in military terms, they seem willing to see how

their economic and political relations with the United

States develop, while calculating that eventually, their

growing strength will allow them to dominate Asia and

the Western Pacific.

History provides some hints about the

challenges the Chinese confront in adapting to a

world where they are on a trajectory to become a great

power. For millennia, China has held a position of

cultural and political dominance over the lands and

people on its frontiers that has been true of no other

civilization. The continuities of Chinese civilization

19. The title of Colin Gray’s book on the future of war in the twenty-first

century.

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Sour
ce: D

epar
tment of D

efense

reach back to a time when the earliest civilizations in

the Nile and the Mesopotamian valleys were emerging.

But those continuities and the cultural power of

China’s civilization have also provided a negative side:

to a considerable extent they have isolated China from

currents and developments in the external world.

China’s history for much of the twentieth century

further exacerbated that isolation. The civil wars

between the warlords and the central government

and between the Nationalists and Communists, the

devastating invasions of the 1930s and 1940s by the

Japanese, and the prolonged period of China’s isolation

during Mao’s rule further isolated China.

Yet, one of the fascinating aspects of China’s

emergence over the past three decades has been its

efforts to learn from the external world. This has not

represented a blatant aping nor an effort to cherry pick

ideas from history or Western theoretical writings on

strategy and war, but rather a contentious, open debate

to examine and draw lessons from West’s experience.

Two historical case studies have resonated with the

Chinese: the Soviet Union’s collapse and the rise of

Germany in the late nineteenth and early twentieth

centuries. These case studies, written in a series of

books, were also made into documentary films and

form one of the most popular shows on Chinese

television.

In the case of the Soviets, the Chinese have

drawn the lesson that they must not pursue military

development at the expense of economic development

– no traditional arms race. That is the path Deng

laid out in the late 1970s and one which they have

assiduously followed. Indeed, if one examines

their emerging military capabilities in intelligence,

submarines, cyber, and space, one sees an asymmetrical

operational approach that is different from Western

approaches, one consistent with the classical Chinese

strategic thinkers.

There are interesting trends in the People’s

Liberation Army (PLA). The Party has ceded

considerable autonomy to the military, allowing the

PLA’s generals and admirals to build a truly professional

force, rather than one constantly hobbled by the party’s

dictates. This has led to a renaissance in military

thinking; one that draws not only from the classics of

Chinese writings, but on an extensive examination of

Western literature on history, strategy, and war. The

internal consensus seems to be that China is not yet

strong enough militarily, and needs to become stronger

over the long term. But the debate also extends to

issues on China’s strategic and operational choices:

Should it be offensive or defensive? Should it have a

continental or maritime focus, or a mixture of the two?

How can the PLA best protect the nation’s emerging

global interests?

Above all, the Chinese are interested in the

strategic and military thinking of the United States. In

the year 2000, the PLA had more students in America’s

graduate schools than the U.S. military, giving the

Chinese a growing understanding of America and its

military. As a potential future military competitor,

China would represent a most serious threat to the

United States, because the Chinese could understand

America and its strengths and weaknesses far better than

Americans understand the Chinese. This emphasis is

not surprising, given Sun Tzu’s famous aphorism:

Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred
battles you will never be in peril. When you are
ignorant of the enemy, but know yourself, your
chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant
both of your enemy and of yourself, you are certain
in every battle to be in peril.

In the Second World War and the Cold War,

victory by the allies was achieved in part by the thorough

understanding of their opponents, who remained

relatively ignorant of the United States and its strengths.

The Chinese are working hard to ensure that if there is a

military confrontation with the United States sometime

in the future, they will be ready.

In regard to a potential military competition

with the United States, what is apparent in Chinese

discussions is a deep respect for U.S. military power.

There is a sense that in certain areas, such as submarines,

space, and cyber warfare, China can compete on a near

equal footing with America. One does not devote the

significant national treasure required to build nuclear

submarines for coastal defense. The emphasis on

nuclear submarines and an increasingly global Navy

in particular, underlines worries that the U.S. Navy

possesses the ability to shut down China’s energy imports

of oil – 80% of which go through the straits of Malacca.

As one Chinese naval strategist expressed it:

“the straits

of Malacca are akin to breathing itself -- to life itself.”

20. Quoted in Robert Debs Heinl, Jr.,

Dictionary of Military and Naval

Quotations

(Annapolis, MD, 1967), p.320.

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Chinese writers on military and strategic subjects

seem to be in agreement that there is a window of opportunity

that will last out to the 2020s, during which China can focus

on domestic economic growth and expanded trade with the

world to make it a truly great power. China is investing

significantly in human and physical capital. Indeed, skilled

Chinese engineers, technicians, and scientists are deeply

involved in scientific discovery around the world, and in

building the infrastructure upon which its future prosperity

and global integration might be built. Above all, however,

the Chinese are objective about their own weaknesses as well

as strengths and prospects for the future.

What then are the potential courses that

China might follow? The challenges that Chinese

leadership confronts at present are enormous, and an

unsuccessful China is perhaps more worrisome than a

prosperous one. A serious global economic down turn

might force China in dangerous directions, as was the

case with the Japanese in the 1930s. On the other

Thinking About China’s Potential Military Power

If GDP alone directly translated into military power, in the 2030s China would have the capacity to afford military

forces equal or superior to current U.S. capabilities. And while one must temper such calculations by per capita measures,

even by conservative calculations it is easily possible that by the 2030s China could modernize its military to reach a level

of approximately one quarter of current U.S. capabilities without any significant impact on its economy. There are some

important historical excursions to keep in mind.

First, throughout the Cold War the United States sustained military spending levels, as a percentage of GDP, at

about twice current levels, or roughly 8% of GDP, without damaging the economy. If China increased spending to the

same level that the United States maintained for decades during the Cold War (8% of GDP) and if U.S. defense spending

remained steady as a percent of GDP, China would spend an amount equal to roughly half of America’s outlays for defense.

During that period, the Soviet Union proved that a nation can maintain substantially higher rates of military

spending for some time before serious economic consequences ensue – the Soviet Union’s collapse was due more to the

nature of its economic system than to defense expenditures. A similar effort by China could see the Chinese equal U.S.

defense expenditures for a multi-decade period. Such an effort would quickly come to the attention of Western analysts,

but to what effect? Historically, a more obvious massive military buildup such as that taken by Nazi Germany in the years
before the Second World War, did not incite the Western powers to respond.

21. Christopher Pherson, “

Meeting the Challenge of China’s Rising Power

,”

Carlisle Papers in Security Strategy, July 2006.

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war (5-8 million), man-made famines

(6-7 million), purges (2-3 million), and

World War II (27 million), accompanied

by sixty years of “planned” economic

and agricultural disasters. The 1990

implosion of the Soviet Union marked a

new low point, one that then-President

Vladimir Putin decried as “the greatest

geopolitical catastrophe of the century.”

With the collapse of the Soviet

Union, Russia lost the lands and

territories it had controlled for the

better part of three centuries. Not only

did the collapse destroy the economic

structure that the Soviets created, but

the weak democratic successor regime

proved incapable of controlling the

criminal gangs or creating a functioning

economy. Moreover, the first attempt

by the Russian military to crush the

rebellion in Chechnya foundered

in a sea of incompetence and faulty

assumptions. Since 2000, Russia has

displayed a considerable recovery based

on Vladimir Putin’s reconstitution of rule

by the security services - a move most

Russians have welcomed - and on the

influx of foreign exchange from Russia’s

production of petroleum and natural

gas. How the Russian government

spends that windfall over the long term

will play a significant role in the kind of

state that emerges.

The nature of the current

Russian regime itself also carries significant concerns. To

a considerable extent its leaders have emerged from the

old KGB. Thus, their education and bureaucratic culture

have inculcated them with a ruthlessness that recalls their

predecessors, but without their ideological fervor. This

suggests that the strategic perspectives of the regime and

its zero-sum focus on security bear watching.

At present, Russian leaders appear to have chosen

to maximize petroleum revenues without making the

long-term investments in oil fields that would increase oil

and gas production over the long term. With its riches in

oil and gas, Russia is in a position to modernize and repair

its ancient and dilapidated infrastructure and improve

the welfare of its long suffering people. Nevertheless, the

current leadership has displayed little interest in such a

course. Instead, it has placed its emphasis on Russia’s great

power status. For all its current riches, the brilliance of

Moscow’s resurgence, and the trappings of military power,

Russia cannot hide the conditions of the remainder of the

country. The life expectancy of Russia’s male population,

59 years, is 148

in the world and places the country

somewhere between East Timor and Haiti.

Perhaps more than any other nation Russia has

reason to fear the international environment, especially

considering the invasions that have washed over its

lands. There are serious problems: in the Caucasus

with terrorists; in Central Asia where the stability of the

new oil-rich nations is seriously in question; and in the

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east where the Chinese remain silent, but increasingly

powerful, on the borders of eastern Siberia. In 2001,

Russia and China agreed to demarcate the 4,300

mile border between them. However, demographic

pressures across this border are increasingly tense

as ethnic Russians leave (perhaps as many as a half-

million in the 2000-2010 time frame, or 6% of the

total population) and ethnic Chinese immigrate to the

region. Estimates of the number of ethnic Chinese in

Siberia range from a low of about 480,000 (or less than

six percent of the population) to more than 1 million

(or nearly 12%). Russia must carefully manage this

demographic transition to avoid ethnic tensions that

could erupt into a cross border conflict with China.

Russia is playing a more active, but less

constructive role across the Black Sea, Caucasus, and

Baltic regions. Russian involvement in each of these

areas has its own character, but they have in common

a Russia that is inserting itself into the affairs of its

much-smaller neighbors. In each, Russia plays on

ethnic and national tension to extend its influence in

its “near abroad.”

In the Caucasus region, especially Georgia and

its Abkhazian and South Ossetian provinces, Russia has

provided direct support to separatists. In other cases,

such as the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan

or in the Trans-Dnestrian region of Moldova, Russia

provides indirect support to keep these conflicts

simmering. These conflicts further impoverish areas

in dire need of investment and productive economic

activity. They lay astride new and vulnerable routes to

access the oil of the Caspian Basin and beyond. They

encourage corruption, organized crime, and disregard

legal order and national sovereignty in a critical part

of the world. In the future, they could exacerbate the

establishment of frameworks for regional order and

create a new “frontier of instability” around Russia.

Indeed, while many of its European neighbors

have almost completely disarmed, the Russians have

begun a military buildup, in part to redress the

desperately lean years of the 1990s, when the collapse of

the post-Soviet economy devastated its military forces.

Since 2001, they have quadrupled their military budget

with increases of over 20% per annum over the past

several years. In 2007, the Russian parliament, with

Putin’s enthusiastic support, approved even greater

military appropriations through 2015. Russia cannot

recreate the military machine of the old Soviet Union,

but it may be attempting to make up for demographic

and conventional military inferiority by modernizing

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its nuclear forces, including warheads, delivery

systems, and doctrines. It is also exploring and fielding

strategic systems based on what it terms “new physical

principles” including novel stealth and hypersonic

technologies. With their vast and increasingly capable

nuclear arsenal, the Russians remain a superpower in

nuclear terms, despite their demographic and political

difficulties.

One of the potential Russias that could emerge

in coming decades could be one that focuses on

regaining its former provinces in the name of “freeing”

the Russian minorities in those border states from

the ill-treatment they are supposedly receiving. The

United States and its NATO allies would then confront

the challenge of summoning up sufficient resolve and

deterrence to warn such a Russia off.

At present there is a dangerous combination

of paranoia - some of it justified considering Russia’s

history - nationalism, and bitterness at the loss of what

many Russians regard as their rightful place as a great

power. It was just such a mixture, along with a series

of unfortunate events that drove Nazi Germany on its

ill-thought-out course.

3. The Pacific and Indian Oceans

The rim of the great Asian continent is already

home to five nuclear powers: China, India, Pakistan,

North Korea, and Russia. Furthermore, there are

three threshold nuclear states, South Korea, Taiwan,

and Japan, which have the capacity to become nuclear

powers quickly. While the region appears stable on the

surface, political clefts exist. There are few signs that

these divisions, which have deep historical, cultural,

and religious roots, will mitigate. China and Korea

hold grudges against Japan. Neither China nor Japan

have forgotten the seizure of what they regard as their

legitimate territory by the Russians. If one includes

the breakup of the British Raj in 1947-1948, India

and Pakistan have fought three brutal wars, while a

simmering conflict over Kashmir continues to poison

relations between the two powers. The Vietnamese

and the Chinese have a long record of antipathy, which

broke out into heavy fighting in the late 1970s. And

China’s claim that Taiwan is a province of the mainland

obviously represents a flashpoint.

Geographically, there are a number of areas in

dispute. The continuing dispute between India and

Pakistan over Kashmir is the most dangerous, in this

case between two nuclear armed powers. The Chinese

have backed up their claims to the Spratleys, which

Vietnam and the Philippines also claim, with force.

The Kurile Islands, occupied by the Soviets at the end

of World War II, remain a contentious issue between

Russia and Japan. The uninhabited islands south of

Okinawa are in dispute between Japan and China, both

obviously drawn to the area by the possibility of oil.

Much of the Yellow Sea remains in dispute between

the Koreas, Japan, and China, again because of its

potential for oil. The straits of Malacca represent the

most important transit point for world commerce, the

closure of which for even a relatively short period of

time would have a devastating impact on the global

economy.

There is at present a subtle, but sustained

military buildup throughout the region. India could

more than quadruple its wealth over the course of the

next two decades, but large swaths of its population

will likely remain in poverty through the 2030s. Like

China, this will create tensions between the rich and

the poor. Such tension, added to the divides among

its religions and nationalities, could continue to have

implications for economic growth and national security.

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Nevertheless, its military will receive substantial

upgrades in the coming years. That fact, combined

with its proud martial traditions and strategic location

in the Indian Ocean, will make India the dominant

player in South Asia and the Middle East. Like India,

China and Japan are also investing heavily in military

force modernization, particularly with an emphasis

in naval forces that can challenge their neighbors for

dominance in the seas surrounding the East and South

Asian periphery. The buildup of the navies by the

powers in the region has significant implications for

how the United States develops its strategy as well as

for the deployments of its naval forces.

4. Europe

The European Union has solidified Europe

economically to a degree not seen since the Roman

Empire. For the next quarter century, Europe will

exercise considerable clout in economic matters. The

Union’s economy as a whole by the 2030s will likely

be greater than that of the United States. From a

security standpoint, the NATO alliance will have

the potential to field substantial, world-class military

forces and project them far beyond the boundaries of

the continent, but this is currently a relatively unlikely

possibility.

The massive disarmament that occasioned

Europe’s shift to a “post-conflict” mindset as a reaction

to the end of the Cold War will eventually halt, but

many European nations have already largely disarmed.

The fact that at present only few Europeans have been

willing to place their forces in harm’s way in support

of the NATO commitment in Afghanistan to any

significant extent indicates that many Europeans

question the idea that lethal military force has a

significant role to play in international affairs

Perhaps this will change with the recognition

of a perceived threat. The next 25 years will provide

two good candidates: Russia and continued terrorism

fueled by global Islamic extremism. Russia has already

been discussed. The Baltic and Eastern European

regions will likely remain flashpoints as a number of

historical issues such as ethnicity or the location of

national boundaries, that have in the past led to conflict,

continue to simmer under the surface. Russian efforts

to place the gas pipeline to Western Europe through

the Baltic rather than through Eastern Europe suggests

a deliberate aim to separate the Central and Western

European NATO countries from the Baltic and Eastern

European members of NATO.

Continued terrorist attacks in Europe might

also spark a popular passion for investing in military

forces. Should violent extremists persist in using this

tactic to attack the European continent with increasing

frequency and intensity, there might a response that

includes addressing this threat on a global scale rather

than as an internal security problem.

5. Central and South America

The military problems that arise in South America

and Central America will likely arise from within.

Many currently plague the continent, particularly drug

cartels and criminal gangs, while terrorist organizations

will continue to find a home in some of the continent’s

lawless border regions.

Nevertheless, South America’s improving

economic situation suggests the region could be in a

better position to deal with these problems. Brazil, in

particular, appears set on a course that could make it

a major player among the great powers by the 2030s.

Chile, Argentina, Peru and possibly Colombia will

also most likely see sustained growth, if they continue

prudent economic policies.

The potential major challenges to the status quo

at present are Cuba and Venezuela. The demise of the

Castros will create the possibility of major changes in

Cuba’s politics. The future of Venezuela is harder to read.

The Chavez regime is diverting substantial amounts of

its oil revenues to further its anti-American “Bolivarian

Revolution,” while at the same time consolidating his

regime’s hold on power by distributing oil wealth to his

supporters. By trying to do both it is shortchanging

investments in its oil infrastructure, which has serious

implications for the future. Unless its current regime

changes direction, it could use its oil wealth to subvert

its neighbors for an extended period while pursuing anti-

American activities on a global scale with the likes of

Iran, Russia, and China, in effect creating opportunities

to form anti-American coalitions in the region.

Brazil will become a superpower in regional terms.

No country in South America is likely to approach its

economic power, which will rapidly grow stronger due

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to its resources in biofuels. The oil fields that have been

found off in the Brazilian coast represent a resource that

will add to Brazil’s economic and political power.

A serious impediment to growth in Latin America

remains the power of criminal gangs and drug cartels to

corrupt, distort, and damage the region’s potential. The

fact that criminal organizations and cartels are capable of

building dozens of disposable submarines in the jungle

and then using them to smuggle cocaine, indicates the

enormous economic scale of this activity. This poses a real

threat to the national security interests of the Western

Hemisphere. In particular, the growing assault by the

drug cartels and their thugs on the Mexican government

over the past several years reminds one that an unstable

Mexico could represent a homeland security problem of

immense proportions to the United States.

6. Africa

ub-Saharan Africa presents a unique set of

challenges, including bad governance, interference

by external powers, and health crises such as AIDS.

Even pockets of economic growth are under pressure

and may soon regress.

Some progress in the region

may occur, but it is almost certain that many of these

nations will remain on any list of the poorest nations

on the globe. Exacerbating their difficulties will be the

fact that the national borders, drawn by the colonial

powers in the nineteenth century, bear little relation

to tribal and linguistic realities.

The region is endowed with a great wealth of

natural resources, a fact which has already attracted

the attention of several powerful states. This could

represent a welcome development, because in its

wake could come foreign expertise and investment

for a region in dire need of both. The importance

of the region’s resources will ensure the great powers

maintain a vested interest in the region’s stability and

development. If this engagement goes beyond “aid”

to become true “investment,” then true stability and

security may emerge. Until that happens, the main

driver for joint force involvement in Africa will be to

avert humanitarian and genocidal disasters as African

states and sub-state tribal groups struggle for power and

control among themselves. Relatively weak African

states will be very hard-pressed to resist pressure by

powerful state and non-actors who embark on a course

of interference. This possibility is reminiscent of the

late nineteenth century, when pursuit of resources and

areas of interest by the developed world disturbed the

affairs of weak and poverty stricken regions.

7. The Center of Instability: The

Middle East and Central Asia

On current evidence, a principal nexus of

conflict will continue to be the region from Morocco

to Pakistan through to Central Asia. Across this part

of the globe exist a number of historical, dormant

conflicts between states and nations over borders,

territories, and water rights, especially in Central Asia

and the Caucasus. Radical Islamists will present the

first and most obvious challenge. The issue here is not

terrorism per se, because terrorism is merely a tactic

by which those who lack the technology, weapons

systems, and scruples of the modern world can attack

their enemies throughout the world. Radical Islamists

who advocate violence – and not all do – constitute

a transnational, theologically-based insurgency which

seeks to overthrow regimes in the Islamic world. They

bitterly attack the trappings of modernity as well as the

philosophical underpinnings of the West despite the

fact their operations could not be conducted without

the internet, air travel and globalized financial systems.

At a minimum radical Islam seeks to eliminate U.S.

and other foreign presence in the Middle East, a region

vital to U.S. and global security, but only as a first step

to the creation of a Caliphate stretching from Central

Asia in the East to Spain in the West and extending

deeper into Africa, overwhelming Christian and

indigenous religions and ensuring that “Islam’s bloody

borders” remain inflamed.

The problems in the Arab-Islamic world stem

from the past five centuries, during which, until

recently, the rise of the West and the dissemination

of Western political and social values paralleled a

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concomitant decline in the power and appeal of their

societies. Today’s Islamic world confronts the choice

of either adapting to or escaping from a globe of

interdependence created by the West. Often led by

despotic rulers, addicted to the exports of commodities

which offered little incentive for more extensive

industrialization or modernization, and burdened by

cultural and ideological obstacles to education and

therefore modernization, many Islamic states have

fallen far behind the West, South Asia, and East Asia.

The rage of radical Islamists feeds off the lies of their

often corrupt leaders, the rhetoric of radical imams,

the falsifications of their own media, and resentment of

the far more prosperous developed world. If tensions

between the Islamic world’s past and the present were

not enough, the Middle East, the Arab heartland of

Islam, remains divided by tribal, religious, and political

divisions, in which continued instability is inevitable.

Combining Islamic dogma with the internet,

intricate financial networks, and the porous borders

of weakly governed states, radical Islamists have

created a networked organization with global reach.

The movement is similar to most insurgencies in the

fanaticism of its leaders. But the ability to employ

advanced technologies with the aim of causing

maximum destruction represents a dangerous new

trend in the international environment.

No one should harbor the illusion that the

developed world can win this conflict in the near

future. As is true with most insurgencies, victory will

not appear decisive or complete. It will certainly not

rest on military successes. The treating of political,

social, and economic ills can help, but in the end will

not be decisive. What will matter most will be the

winning of a “war of ideas,” much of which must come

from within the Islamic world itself.

The economic importance of the Middle

East with its energy supplies hardly needs emphasis.

Whatever the outcome of the conflicts in Iraq and

Afghanistan, U.S. forces will find themselves again

employed in the region on numerous missions ranging

from regular and irregular war, relief and reconstruction,

to engagement operations. The region and its energy

supplies are too important for the U.S., China, and

other energy importers to allow radical groups to gain

dominance or control over any significant portion of

the region.

C. Weak and Failing states

Weak and failing states will remain a condition

of the global environment over the next quarter of a

century. Such countries will continue to present strategic

and operational planners serious challenges, with human

suffering on a scale so large that it almost invariably spreads

throughout the region, and in some cases possesses the

potential to project trouble throughout the globalized

world.

Yet, there is no clear pattern for the economic

and political troubles that beset these states. In some cases,

disastrous leadership has wrecked political and economic

stability. In others, wars among tribal groups with few

cultural, linguistic, or even racial ties have imploded states.

This was the case in Africa and the Middle East, where in the

nineteenth century the European powers divided frontiers

between their colonies on the basis of economic, political,

or strategic necessity and paid scant attention to existing

linguistic, racial, or cultural patterns of the tribal societies.

These dysfunctional borders have exacerbated nearly every

conflict in which our forces have been involved in these

regions.

Many, if not the majority, of weak and failing states

will center in Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, the Middle

East, and North Africa. A current list of such states much

resembles the lists of such states drawn up a generation ago,

suggesting a chronic condition, which, despite considerable

aid, provides little hope for solution. There have been a

number of nations that have escaped poverty – their successes

resulting from intelligent leadership and a willingness to

embrace integration into the global system. To date, the

remaining weak and failing nations have chosen other

paths.

There is one dynamic in the literature of weak and

failing states that has received relatively little attention,

namely the phenomenon of “rapid collapse.” For the most

part, weak and failing states represent chronic, long-term

22.

Samuel Huntington, T

he Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of

World Order,

(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996)

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problems that allow for management over sustained periods.

The collapse of a state usually comes as a surprise, has a rapid

onset, and poses acute problems. The collapse of Yugoslavia

into a chaotic tangle of warring nationalities in 1990 suggests

how suddenly and catastrophically state collapse can happen

- in this case, a state which had hosted the 1984 Winter

Olympics at Sarajevo, and which then quickly became the

epicenter of the ensuing civil war.

In terms of worst-case scenarios for the Joint Force

and indeed the world, two large and important states bear

consideration for a rapid and sudden collapse: Pakistan and

Mexico. Some forms of collapse in Pakistan would carry

with it the likelihood of a sustained violent and bloody

civil and sectarian war, an even bigger haven for violent

extremists, and the question of what would happen to its

nuclear weapons. That “perfect storm” of uncertainty alone

might require the engagement of U.S. and coalition forces

into a situation of immense complexity and danger with no

guarantee they could gain control of the weapons and with

the real possibility that a nuclear weapon might be used.

The Mexican possibility may seem less likely, but the

government, its politicians, police, and judicial infrastructure

are all under sustained assault and pressure by criminal gangs

and drug cartels. How that internal conflict turns out over

the next several years will have a major impact on the stability

of the Mexican state. Any descent by the Mexico into chaos

would demand an American response based on the serious

implications for homeland security alone.

The Threats of

Unconventional Power

While states and other conventional powers

will remain the principal brokers of power, there is an

undeniable diffusion of power to unconventional, non-

state, or trans-state actors. While these groups have “rules”

of their own, they exist and behave outside the recognized

norms and conventions of society.

Some transnational organizations seek to operate

beyond state control and acquire the tools and means to

challenge states and utilize terrorism against populations

to achieve their aims. These unconventional transnational

organizations possess no regard for international borders

and agreements. The discussion below highlights two

examples: militias and super-empowered individuals.

Militias represent armed groups, irregular

yet recognizable as an armed force, operating within

ungoverned areas or in weak failing states. They range

from ad hoc organizations with shared identities to more

permanent groups possessing the ability to provide goods,

services, and security along with their military capabilities.

Militias challenge the sovereignty of the state by breaking

the monopoly on violence traditionally the preserve of

states. An example of a modern day militia is Hezbollah,

which combines state-like technological and warfighting

capabilities with a “substate” political and social structure

inside the formal state of Lebanon.

One does not need a militia to wreak havoc.

Pervasive information, combined with lower costs for

many advanced technologies, has already resulted in

individuals and small groups possessing increased ability to

cause significant damage and slaughter. Time and distance

constraints are no longer in play. Such groups employ niche

technologies capable of attacking key systems and providing

inexpensive countermeasures to costly systems. Because of

their small size, such groups of the “super-empowered” can

plan, execute, receive feedback, and modify their actions,

all with considerable agility and synchronization. Their

capacity to cause serious damage is out of all proportion to

their size and resources.

The global effort against terrorist organizations will

continue into the 2030s with varying degrees of intensity

over time. It will most likely remain at the forefront of

U.S. security concerns. At present, the evidence suggests

that U.S. efforts have largely decimated the al Qaeda that

attacked the United States in 2001. However, the threat

has not disappeared, as new radical cadres have formed.

These new terrorist groups have learned from al Qaeda’s

shortcomings and mistakes. Moreover, the ability of

terrorist organizations to utilize the internet and other

means of communications to pass the experiences, tactics,

and best training methods will result in a constant flow of

relatively sophisticated new volunteers to the fight. The

ability of terrorists to learn from their predecessors and

colleagues will not confront the hindrance of having to

process adaptations and innovations through bureaucratic

barriers.

E. The Proliferation of Weapons of

Mass Destruction

A continuing challenge to American security will

be the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Throughout the

Cold War, U.S. planners had to consider the potential use

of nuclear weapons both by and against the Soviet Union.

For the past twenty years, Americans have largely ignored

issues of deterrence and nuclear warfare. In the 2030s,

they will no longer have that luxury.

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Since 1998, India and Pakistan have created

nuclear arsenals and delivery capabilities. North Korea

has tested a nuclear weapon and has produced sufficient

fissile material to create more such weapons. At present,

the Iranians are pressing forward aggressively with their

own nuclear weapons program. The confused reaction in

the international community to Iran’s defiance of external

demands to terminate its nuclear development programs

is an incentive for others to follow in their path.

In effect, there is a growing arc of nuclear powers

running from Israel in the west through an emerging

Iran to Pakistan, India, and on to China, North Korea,

and Russia in the east. Both Taiwan and Japan have the

capability to develop nuclear weapons quickly, should

their political leaders decide to do so. Unfortunately, that

nuclear arc coincides with areas of considerable instability

- regions that because of their economic power and energy

resources are of enormous interest to the United States.

Moreover, some in the region might not view

nuclear weapons as weapons of last resort. It is far from

certain that a state whose culture is deeply distinct from

that of the United States, and whose regime is either

unstable or unremittingly hostile (or both), would

view the role of nuclear weapons in a fashion similar to

American strategists. The acquisition of nuclear weapons

by other regimes throughout this arc, whether they were

hostile or not, would disrupt the strategic balance further,

while increasing the potential for the use of nuclear

weapons. Add to this regional complexity the fact that

multiple nuclear powers will very likely have the global

reach to strike other states around the world. The stability

of relations among numerous states capable of global

nuclear strikes will be of central importance for the Joint

Force. Assured second-strike capabilities and relations

based on mutually-assured destruction may mean greater

stability, but may effectively reduce access to parts of the

world. On the other hand, fragile nuclear balances and

vulnerable nuclear forces may provide tempting targets

for nuclear armed competitors.

Any discussion of weapons of mass destruction

must also address the potential use of biological weapons by

sovereign states as well as non-state actors. By all accounts,

such weapons are becoming easier to fabricate – certainly

easier than nuclear weapons – and under the right conditions

they could produce mass casualties, economic disruption,

and terror on the scale of a nuclear strike. The knowledge

associated with developing biological weapons is widely

available, and the costs for their production remain modest,

easily within reach of small groups or even individuals.

F. Technology

Advances in technology will continue at an

exponential pace as they have over the past several decades.

Some pundits have voiced worries the United States will

lose its lead as the global innovator in technology or that

an enemy could make technological leaps that would give it

significant advantages militarily. That is possible, but by no

means a foregone conclusion.

It is clear that technology, distinct from weapons

of mass destruction (WMD), will proliferate. As anyone

who has purchased a home computer knows, technological

advances drive down the overall cost of ever-greater capability.

The weapons market is no different. More advanced

weaponry will be available to more groups, conventional

and unconventional, for a cheaper price. This will allow

relatively moderately funded states and militias to acquire

long-range precision munitions, projecting power farther

out, and with greater accuracy, than ever before. At the

high end, it has already been seen that this reach extends

into space with the public demonstration of anti-satellite

weapons. Furthermore, the market for advanced weaponry

potentially empowers any small actor or group, as long as

they have the cash. Whether a small oil-rich nation or a

drug cartel, cash will be able to purchase lethal capabilities.

If manpower is a limiting factor, the advances in robotics

provide a solution for those who can afford the price. This

has the sobering potential to further amplify the power of

the “super-empowered guerilla.”

In the globalized, connected world of science and

technology, there is less chance that major technological

advances could catch American scientists by surprise. In

the past, the real issue with technology has not been simply

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that a particular nation has developed

weapons far superior to those of its

opponents. Rather, in nearly every

case the major factor has been how

military organizations have integrated

technological advances into their

doctrinal and tactical system. It has

been the success or failure in that regard

that has resulted in battlefield surprise

and success. In 1940 French tanks

were superior in almost every respect to

those of the Germans. What gave the

Wehrmacht its unique advantage was

the fact that the Germans integrated

the tank into a combined arms team.

The real surprise of Blitzkrieg lay in the

inability of the French to imagine how

the Germans might exploit battlefield

success with the new technologies

available. It was the development of

decentralized, combined-arms tactics

by the Germans that led to their

overwhelming victory, not new, more

sophisticated weapons systems.

Thus, what has been

unquestionably crucial is the degree

of imagination military organizations

have displayed in incorporating new

technologies into their doctrine and

concepts. The fact that the speed of

technological change and invention

proceeds exponentially will make

the ability to adapt new technologies

into the larger framework of military

capability even more critical in coming

decades.

A current example of the kind

of technological surprise that could

prove deadly would be an adversary’s

deployment and use of a disruptive

technology, such as electro-magnetic

pulse (EMP) weapons against a force

without properly hardened equipment.

The potential effects of an electro-

magnetic pulse resulting from a

nuclear detonation has been known

for decades. The appearance of non-

nuclear EMP weapons could change

Technology, Doctrine, and Successful Adaptation

Nothing more clearly illustrates the importance of imagination and an

understanding of war in the incorporation of technology into military institutions

than the utilization of radar over the course of the first two years of World War II.

It was not until the 1930s that scientists in the major powers turned their attention

to the possibility radio waves could spot the flight of aircraft or the movement

of ships at sea. The looming threat posed by enemy bombers in a period of

worsening international tensions instigated investigations into such possibilities.

By the late 1930s scientists in Britain, Nazi Germany, and the United States had

all developed workable capabilities for identifying the height, direction, and speed

of aircraft, as well as the number of aircraft.

Not surprisingly, the Germans, given their technological prowess,

developed the most sophisticated radars, but the incorporation of that

technological capability into their weapons systems lagged behind that of the

British. It would be in the Battle of Britain that German failure in imagination

would show to the greatest extent. The Luftwaffe had incorporated radar into its

capabilities in the late 1930s, but only as a series of ground control intercept sites,

each of which operated independently with no direct tie to a larger air defense

system. It would not be until the catastrophe of Hamburg in summer 1943 that the

Luftwaffe would create an air defense system in which radar formed in integral

part of a holistic approach to an air warning system of defense. But the British

were already using such a system in 1940. As the scientific intelligence officer,

R.V. Jones, recalled in his memoirs:

[The] German philosophy of [air defense] ran roughly along

the lines that here was an equipment which was marvelous in

the sense that it would enable a single station to cover a circle

of a radius 150 kilometers and detect every aircraft within that

range…. Where we had realized that in order to make maximum

use of radar information the stations had to be backed by a

communications network which could handle the information

with the necessary speed, the Germans seemed simply to have

grafted their radar stations on to the existing observer corps

network which had neither the speed nor the handling capacity

that the radar information merited…. The British approach…

was entirely different. The British radar stations formed the eyes

of a systematic approach to the air defense of the British Isles,

so that RAF commanders could use their information to guide

large numbers of Hurricanes and Spitfires against German

bomber formations.

As Churchill noted in his memoirs about the Second World

War, “it was the operational efficiency rather than novelty of equipment

that was the British achievement.”

23.

R.V. Jones,

The Wizard War,

British Scientific Intelligence, 1939-1945 (New York, 1978), p. 199.

24. Winston Churchill,

The Second World War, vol. 1, The Gathering Storm

(Boston: Houghton

Mifflin, 1948), p. 156

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operational and technological equations. They are being

developed, but are joint forces being adequately prepared to

handle such a threat? The impact of such weapons would

carry with it the most serious potential consequences for the

communications, reconnaissance, and computer systems on

which the Joint Force depends at every level.

Finally, it is by no means certain that the United

States and its allies will maintain their overall lead in

technological development over the next 25 years. America’s

secondary educational system is clearly declining in a relative

sense when compared to leading technological competitors,

for instance India and China. America’s post-graduate

educational programs and research laboratories remain

the world’s most advanced - magnets for some of the best

scientific minds in the world. However, although many

foreign students remain in the United States, significant

numbers are now returning home. Without substantive

changes to improve its educational system, the United States

will pay a heavy price in the future.

G. The Battle of Narratives

Modern wars are fought in more than simply the

physical elements of the battlefield. Among the most

important of these are the media in which “the battle to

win the narrative” will occur. Our enemies have already

recognized that perception is as important to their

success as the actual event. For terrorists, the internet

and mass media have become forums for achieving their

strategic and political aims. Sophisticated terrorists

emphasize the importance of integrating combat

activities (terrorist attacks) into a coherent strategic

communications program. Radical groups are not the

only ones who understand the importance of dominating

the media message. A major state synchronizing

military operations with a media offensive was on display

during Russia’s invasion of Georgia. Within days of the

invasion, a small coterie of Russians, well known in the

West, was placing editorials in major newspapers in the

United States and Europe.

The battle of the narrative must involve a

sophisticated understanding of the enemy and how he

will attempt to influence the perceptions not only of his

followers, but the global community. His efforts will

involve deception, sophisticated attempts to spin events,

and outright lies. As Joseph Goebbels, the evil Minister

of Propaganda for the Third Reich, once commented,

the bigger the lie, the greater its influence. No matter

how outlandish enemy claims may seem to Americans,

those charged with the responsibility for information

operations must understand how those who will receive

the message will understand it. In this regard, they should

not forget that the KGB’s efforts at the end of the Cold

War to persuade Africans that the CIA was responsible

for the spread of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome

(AIDS) throughout their continent are still reverberating

in parts of Africa. Information has been, is, and will

continue to be a strategic and political weapon. Its power

will only increase as communications technology and the

density of global media become more pervasive. At the

end of the day, it is the perception of what happened that

matters more than what may actually have happened.

Dominating the narrative of any operation,

whether military or otherwise, pays enormous dividends.

Failure to do so undermines support for policies and

operations, and can actually damage a country’s reputation

and position in the world. For example, in the aftermath

of Hurricane Katrina, America’s global standing fell

sharply, while many Americans remain convinced their

government’s reaction was at best inept and at worst a

reflection of latent racism. In truth, at the end of the

first week after the disaster 38,000 federal troops were

supporting the National Guard and local authorities.

They were already caring for approximately 100,000

displaced citizens, had fed over a million meals, and had

provided medical care to tens of thousands.

Compare the reaction to Katrina to the reaction

to the nation’s previous most destructive storm, Hurricane

Andrew. At the end of the first week after Andrew, not

a single federal soldier had gone to work, and less than

1,500 had deployed. Yet, the federal government’s

reaction to Andrew is graded a success, while the much

larger, and infinitely more efficient response to Katrina

is almost universally judged a failure. The reason for

such perceptions lies in the fact that an inept strategic

communications operation lost control of the narrative.

In the battle for the narrative, the United States

must not ignore its ability to bring its considerable soft

power to bear in order to reinforce the positive aspects

of joint force operations. Humanitarian assistance,

reconstruction, securing the safety of local populations,

military-to-military exercises, health care, and disaster

relief are just a few examples of the positive measures that

we offer. Just as no nation in the world can respond with

global military might on the scale of the United States,

so too are we unmatched in our capacity to provide help

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and relief across thousands of miles. All of these tools

should be considered in this battle to build trust and

confidence.

In the future, influencing the narrative by

conveying the truth about America’s intent, reinforced

with supporting actions and activities, will become

even harder. As communications technologies become

more widely available, an ever-wider array of media will

influence global public opinion. The U.S. government

and its joint forces will always be held to a much higher

standard in this area than our adversaries. Joint force

commanders already wrestle with how to deal with a

pervasive media presence, widespread blogging, almost

instantaneous posting of videos from the battlefield,

e-mail, and soldiers who can call home whenever they

return to base. In the future they will be confronted with

a profusion of new media linked to unimaginably fast

transmission capabilities. Just as we have already begun

to think of every Soldier and Marine as an intelligence

collector, we will also have to start considering them as

global communications producers. Today, commanders

talk about the strategic corporal, whose acts might

have strategic consequences if widely reported. This

still remains a hit or miss affair, less often requiring the

presence of the media representative to attract a global

reaction.

Even in the past, the success of combat operations

has not always been judged on the battlefield. In 1968

the Tet Offensive was smashed by the American military,

but the narrative reported in the United States served

to undermine support for the war effort. U.S. weapons

employment in this battle of the narratives must be in

consonance with the message, even if it means sometimes

bypassing tactical targets. Winning the battle has always

been important, but in the pervasive and instantaneous

communications environment expected in future decades,

it will be absolutely crucial. For commanders not to

recognize that fact could result in the risking of the lives

of young Americans to no purpose.

H. Urbanization

By the 2030s, five of the world’s eight billion

people will live in cities. Fully two billion of them will

inhabit the great urban slums of the Middle East, Africa,

and Asia. Moreover, while at present half of the world’s

poorest 10% live in Asia, that share will decrease to one

fifth, while Africa’s will rise from one–third to two–thirds.

Most mega-cities and cities will lie along the coast or

in littoral environments. With so much of the world’s

population crammed into dense urban areas and their

immediate surroundings, future joint force commanders

will be unable to evade operations in urban terrain. The

world’s cities with their teeming populations and slums

will be places of immense confusion and complexity,

physically as well as culturally. They also will provide

prime locations for diseases and the population density

for pandemics to spread.

There is no historical precedent for major cities

collapsing, even in the eighteenth and nineteenth

centuries, when the first such cities appeared. Cities

under enormous stress, such as Beirut in the 1980s

and Sarajevo in the 1990s, nevertheless managed to

survive with only brief interruptions of food imports

and basic services. As in World War II, unless contested

by an organized enemy, urban areas are always easier to

control than the countryside. In part, that is because

cities offer a pre–existing administrative infrastructure

through which forces can manage secured areas while

conducting stability operations in contested locations.

The effectiveness of that pre-existing infrastructure may

be tested as never before under the stress of massive

immigration, energy demand, and food and water stress

in the urban sprawl that is likely to emerge. More than

ever before, it will demand the cultural and political

knowledge to utilize that infrastructure.

Urban operations will inevitably require the

balancing of the disruptive and destructive military

operations with the requirements of humanitarian,

security, and relief and reconstruction operations. What

may be militarily effective may also create the potential

for large civilian casualties, which in turn would most

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Splendor amid squalor: Modern Rio de Janeiro

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In an uncertain world, which will inevitably contain

enemies who aim to either attack the United States directly

or to undermine the political and economic stability on

which America, its allies, and the world’s economy depend,

the nation’s military forces will play a crucial role. Yet, war is

an inherently uncertain and costly endeavor. As the United

States has discovered in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is no such

thing as a rapid, decisive operation that does not generate

unforeseen second and third order effects.

While the most important mission of the American

military has been the ability to fight and win the nation’s

wars, the ability of U.S. forces to deter conflict has risen to

equal footing. Preventing war will prove as important as

winning a war. In fact, the two missions are directly linked

in a symbiotic relationship. The ability to deter a potential

adversary depends on the capabilities and effectiveness of

U.S. forces to act across the full range of military operations.

Deterrence also depends on the belief on the part of the

adversary that the United States will use its military power in

defense of its national interests.

Since the fall of the Iron Curtain, the United States

has planned for a global repositioning effort, removing forces

from forward basing and garrisoning much of its military

force structure at home. Instead, the Joint Force has found

itself in near-constant conflict abroad, and now forces based

at home find themselves in heavy rotation, projecting forward

into the Middle East and elsewhere around the world. After

protracted action in Afghanistan and Iraq, the force now faces

a period of reconstitution and rebalancing which will require

significant physical, intellectual, and moral effort that may

take a decade to complete. During this time, our forces may

be located significant distances from a future fight. Thus, the

Joint Force will be challenged to maintain both a deterrent

posture and the capacity and capability to be forward engaged

around the world, showing the flag and displaying the ability

to act in ways to both prevent and win wars.

A. War in the Twenty-First Century

As the discussion of trends and contexts above has

suggested, the roles and missions of the Joint Force will

include the protection of the homeland, the maintenance

of the global commons, the deterrence of potential enemies,

and, when necessary, fighting and winning conflicts that

may occur around the world. Such challenges are by

themselves daunting enough, but they will occur in a

period characterized by radical technological, strategic, and

economic change, all of which will add to the complexities

of the international environment and the use of military

force. America’s position in the world, unprecedented in

almost every respect, will continue to present immense

challenges to its military forces.

Rapidly changing trends within the contexts

described in the previous section will have profound

implications for the character of war itself and the

methods by which the Joint Force will wage it. Yet, the

nature of war will remain closer to Agincourt than to

Star Trek. At its heart, war will always involve a battle

between two creative human forces. Our enemies are

always learning and adapting. They will not approach

conflicts with conceptions or understanding similar to

ours. And they will surprise us. No amount of technology,

conceptualization, or globalization will change those

realities. Moreover, the employment of military force

will continue to be conditioned by politics -- not only

those of the United States and its allies, but by those of its

opponents. Above all, joint force commanders, their staffs,

and their subordinates must have a clear understanding of

the strategic and political goals for which they conduct

military operations. In almost every case, they will find

themselves working closely with partners, a factor which

will demand not only a thorough understanding of U.S.

political goals, but coalition goals as well.

It is in this political-strategic environment that the

greatest surprises for Americans may come. The United

States has dominated the world economically since 1915

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Order or disorder depends on organization; courage or cowardice on circumstances;

strength or weakness on dispositions…Thus, those skilled at making the enemy move do

so by creating a situation to which he must conform; they entice him with something he is

certain to take, and with lures of ostensible profit they await him in strength. Therefore

a skilled commander seeks victory from the situation and does not demand it of his

subordinates.

Sun Tzu

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25.

Sun Tzu,

The Art of War

, trans. and ed. by Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford,

1963), p.93.

and militarily since 1943. Its dominance in both respects

now faces challenges brought about by the rise of powerful

states. Moreover, the rise of these great powers creates

a strategic landscape and international system, which,

despite continuing economic integration, will possess

considerable instabilities. Lacking either a dominant

power or an informal organizing framework, such a

system will tend toward conflict. Where and how those

instabilities will manifest themselves remains obscure and

uncertain.

Between now and the 2030s, the military forces

of the United States will almost certainly find themselves

involved in combat. Such involvement could come in the

form of a major regular conflict or in a series of wars against

insurgencies. And as this document has suggested, they will

certainly find themselves engaged not only against terrorist

organizations, but against those who sponsor them. One

of the great problems that confronts American strategists

and military planners is the conundrum of preparing for

wars that remain uncertain as to their form, location, level

of commitment, the contribution of potential allies, and

the nature of the enemy. The only matter that is certain is

that joint forces will find themselves committed to conflict

against the enemies of the United States and its Allies, and

in defense of its vital interests.

B. Preparing for War

There are two ominous scenarios that confront

joint forces between now and the 2030s. The first and

most devastating would be a major war with a powerful

state or hostile alliance of states. Given the proliferation

of nuclear weapons, there is the considerable potential

for such a conflict to involve the use of such weapons.

While major regular war is currently in a state of

hibernation, one should not forget that in 1929 the

British government adopted as its basic principle of

defense planning the assumption that no major war

would occur for the next ten years. Until the mid-1930s

“the ten year rule” crippled British defense expenditures.

The possibility of war remained inconceivable to British

statesmen until March 1939.

The one approach that would deter a major

conflict involving U.S. military forces, including a

conflict involving nuclear weapons, is the maintenance

of capabilities that would allow the United States to

wage and win any possible conflict. As the Romans so

aptly commented, “if you wish for peace, prepare for

war.” Preventing war will in most instances prove more

important than waging it. In the long-term, the primary

purpose of the military forces of the United States must

be deterrence, for war in any form and in any context

is an immensely expensive undertaking both in lives

and national treasure. When, however, deterrence fails,

then, the military effectiveness of those forces will prove

crucial. Here the efforts that have gone into preparing

U.S. forces for conflict at their various training centers

must continue to receive the same support and attention

in the future that they have over the course of the past 30

years. As the Japanese warrior/commentator Miyamoto

Musashi noted in the seventeenth century:

There is a rhythm in everything, but the

rhythms of the art of war are especially difficult

to master without practice…. In battle, the

way to win is to know the opponent’s rhythms

while using unexpected rhythms yourself,

producing formless rhythms from the rhythms

of wisdom.

The second ominous scenario that confronts the

Joint Force is the failure to recognize and fully confront

the irregular fight that we are in. The requirement to

prepare to meet a wide range of threats is going to prove

particularly difficult for American forces in the period

between now and the 2030s. The difficulties involved in

training to meet regular and nuclear threats must not push

preparations to fight irregular war into the background,

as occurred in the decades after the Vietnam War. Above

all, Americans must not allow themselves to be deluded

into believing their future opponents will prove as inept

and incompetent as Saddam Hussein’s regime was in

1991 and again in 2003. Having seen the capabilities

of U.S. forces in both regular and irregular war, future

opponents will understand “the American way of war”

in a particularly detailed and thorough way.

In Iraq and Afghanistan our opponents have

displayed considerable capacity to learn and adapt in

both the political and tactical arenas. More sophisticated

opponents of U.S. military forces will certainly attack

American vulnerabilities. For instance, it is entirely possible

that attacks on computers, space, and communications

systems will severely degrade command and control of

U.S. forces. Thus, those forces must possess the ability to

operate effectively in degraded conditions.

26. Quoted in Thomas Cleary,

The Japanese Art of War

, Understanding the

Culture of Strategy (Boston, 1992), p. 38.

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In planning for future conflicts, joint force

commanders and their planners must factor two important

constraints into their calculations: logistics and access. The

majority of America’s military forces will find themselves

largely based in North America. Thus, the first set of

problems involved in the commitment of U.S. forces will

be logistical. In the 1980s many defense pundits criticized

the American military for its supposed over-emphasis

on logistics, and praised the German Wehrmacht for its

minimal “tooth to tail” ratio in the Second World War.

What they missed was that the United States had to project

its military forces across two great oceans, then fight massive

battles of attrition in Europe and in East Asia. Ultimately,

the logistical prowess of U.S. and Allied forces, translated

into effective combat forces, defeated the Wehrmacht on

the Western Front, crushed the Luftwaffe in the skies over

Germany, and broke Imperial Japan’s power.

The tyranny of distance will always influence the

conduct of America’s wars, and joint forces will confront

the problems associated with moving forces over great

distances and then supplying them with fuel, munitions,

repair parts, and sustenance. In this regard, a measure

of excess is always necessary, compared to “just in time”

delivery. Failure to keep joint forces who are engaged in

combat supplied could lead to disaster, not just unstocked

shelves. Understanding that requirement represents only

the first step in planning, but it may well prove the most

important.

The crucial enabler for America’s ability to project

its military power for the past six decades has been its

almost complete control over the global commons. From

the American standpoint, the Battle of the Atlantic that

saw the defeat of the German U-boat menace in May

1943 was the most important victory of the Second World

War. Any projection of military power in the future will

require a similar enabling effort, and must recognize that

the global commons have now expanded to include the

domains of cyber and space. The Joint Force must have

redundancy built in to each of these areas to ensure that

access and logistics support are more than “single-point

safe” and cannot be disrupted through a single enemy

point of attack.

In America’s two recent wars against Iraq, the

enemy made no effort to deny U.S. forces entry into

the theater. Future opponents, however, may not prove

so accommodating. Hence, the second constraint

confronting planners is that the United States may not

have uncontested access to bases in the immediate area

from which it can project military power. Even in the best

case, allies will be essential to providing the base structure

required for arriving U.S. forces. But there may be other

cases where uncontested access to bases is not available for

the projection of military forces. This may be because the

neighborhood is hostile, or because smaller friendly states

have been intimidated. Hence, the ability to seize bases by

force from the sea and air could prove the critical opening

move of a campaign.

Given the proliferation of sophisticated weapons in

the world’s arms markets - potential enemies - even relatively

small powers will be able to possess and deploy an array of

longer-range and more precise weapons. Such capabilities

in the hands of America’s enemies will obviously threaten

the projection of forces into a theater as well as attack the

logistical flow on which U.S. forces will depend. Thus, the

projection of military power could become hostage to the

ability to counter long-range systems even as U.S. forces

begin to move into a theater of operations and against an

opponent. The battle for access may prove not only the

most important, but the most difficult.

One of the major factors in America’s success in

deterring potential aggressors and projecting its military

power over the past half century has been the presence of

its naval forces off the coasts of far-off lands. Moreover,

those forces have also proven of enormous value in relief

missions when natural disasters have struck. They will

continue to be a significant factor in the future. Yet, there

is also the rising danger with the increase in precision and

longer range missiles that presence forces could be the first

target of an enemy’s action in their exposed positions.

C. The Conduct of Military Operations in

the Twenty-First Century

The forms of future war will each present peculiar

and intractable challenges to joint forces. The U.S. will

always seek to fight and operate with partners, leading

where appropriate, and prepared to act alone when

required to support our vital national interests. However,

there is every likelihood that there will be few lines of

delineation between one form of conflict and another.

Even in a regular war, potential opponents, engaged in

a life and death struggle with the United States, may

engage U.S. forces across the spectrum of conflict. Thus,

the Joint Force must expect attacks on its sustainment,

its intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)

capabilities, and its command and control networks. The

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Joint Force can expect future opponents to launch both

terrorist and unconventional attacks on the territory of

the continental United States, while U.S. forces moving

through the global commons could find themselves

under persistent and effective attack. In this respect, the

immediate past is not necessarily a guide to the future.

Deterrence of aggression and of certain forms

of warfare will remain an important element of U.S.

national security strategy, and the fundamentals of

deterrence theory will apply in the future as they have

for thousands of years of human history. Deterrence

operations will be profoundly affected by three aspects

of the future joint operating environment.

First, U.S. deterrence strategy and operations

will need to be tailored to address multiple potential

adversaries. A “one-size-fits-all” deterrence strategy will

not suffice in the future joint operating environment.

Deterrence campaigns that are tailored to specific threats

ensure that the unique decision calculus of individual

adversaries is influenced.

Second, the increased role of transnational non-

state actors in the future joint operating environment

will mean that U.S. deterrence operations will have to

find innovative new approaches to “waging” deterrence

against such adversaries. Non-state actors differ from state

actors in several key ways from a deterrence perspective.

It is often more difficult to determine precisely who

makes the key decisions one seeks to influence through

deterrence operations. Non-state actors also tend to

have different value structures and vulnerabilities. They

often possess few critical physical assets to hold at risk,

and are sometimes motivated by ideologies or theologies

that make deterrence more difficult (though usually not

impossible). Non-state actors are often dependent on the

active and tacit support of state actors to support their

operations. Finally, our future deterrence operations

against non-state actors will likely suffer from a lack of

well established means of communications that usually

mark state-to-state relations.

Third, continued proliferation of weapons of

mass destruction will make the U.S. increasingly the

subject of the deterrence operations of others. As such,

the U.S. may find itself in situations where its freedom

of action is constrained unless it can checkmate the

enemy’s deterrent logic.

U.S. nuclear forces will continue to play a critical

role in deterring, and possibly countering, threats to our

vital interests in the future joint operating environment.

Additionally, U.S. security interests will be advanced to

the degree that its nuclear forces are seen as supporting

global order and security. To this end, the U.S. must

remain committed to its moral obligations and the rule

of law among nations. It must provide an example

of a responsible and ethical nuclear power in a world

where nuclear technology is available to a wide array of

actors. Only then will the existence of powerful U.S.

nuclear forces, in support of the global order, provide

friends and allies with the confidence that they need

not pursue their own nuclear capabilities in the face of

growing proliferation challenges around the world.

Unfortunately, we must also think the

unthinkable – attacks on U.S. vital interests by

implacable adversaries who refuse to be deterred could

involve the use of nuclear weapons or other WMD.

For both deterrence and defense purposes our future

forces must be sufficiently diverse and operationally

flexible to provide a wide range of options to respond.

Our joint forces must also have the recognized

capability to survive and fight in a WMD, including

nuclear, environment. This capability is essential to

both deterrence and effective combat operations in the

future joint operating environment.

If there is reason for the joint force commander

to consider the potential use of nuclear weapons

by adversaries against U.S. forces, there is also the

possibility that sometime in the future two other

While we continue to bin the various modes of war into neat and convenient categories, it should be recognized that future adversaries

do not have the same lens or adhere to our Western conventions of war. In fact, there is a great amount of granularity across the spectrum of

conflict, and a greater potential for “hybrid” types of war. This assessment acknowledges the blending of regular and irregular forms of warfare.

It has also identified a convergence between some terrorist organizations and transnational crime. Some have postulated a further blurring of

these various modes of conflict and challenges to governance as part of the future operating environment. To the historically minded, in fact,

there is nothing new in such an approach. The Southern campaigns of the American Revolutionary War, the advanced European weapons and

tactics exploited by the Boers at the turn of the 20th century, and General William Slim’s Burma campaign provide evidence regarding the results

that can be obtained by combining the diffuse nature of irregular methods with modern weaponry. Wars of the twenty-first century will similarly

see no clear distinction between the methods used to achieve victory. Future opponents will exploit whatever methods, tactics, or technologies

that they think will thwart us.

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warring states might use nuclear weapons against each

other. In the recent past, India and Pakistan have

come close to armed conflict beyond the perennial

skirmishing that occurs along their Kashmir frontier.

Given India’s immense conventional superiority, there

is considerable reason to believe such a conflict could

lead to nuclear exchanges. As would be true of any

use of nuclear weapons, the result would be massive

carnage, uncontrolled refugee flows, and social collapse

-- all in all, a horrific human catastrophe. Given 24/7

news coverage, the introduction of U.S. and other

international forces to mitigate the suffering would

seem to be almost inevitable.

Nuclear and major regular war may represent

the most important conflicts the Joint Force could

confront, but they remain the least likely. Irregular

wars are more likely, and winning such conflicts will

prove just as important to the protection of America’s

vital interests and the maintenance of global stability.

A significant component of the future operating

environment will be the presence of major actors which

are not states. A number of transnational networked

organizations have already emerged as threats to order

across the globe. These parasitic networks exist because

communications networks around the world enable

such groups to recruit, train, organize, and connect.

A common desire to transcend the local regional, and

international order or challenge the traditional power of

states characterizes their culture and politics. As such,

established laws and conventions provide no barrier to

their actions and activities. These organizations are also

becoming increasingly sophisticated, well-connected,

and well-armed. As they better integrate global media

sophistication, lethal weaponry, potentially greater

cultural awareness and intelligence, they will pose a

considerably greater threat than at present. Moreover,

unburdened by bureaucratic processes, transnational

groups are already showing themselves to be highly

adaptive and agile.

Irregular adversaries will use the developed

world’s conventions and moral inhibitions against

them. On one hand the Joint Force is obligated to

respect and adhere to internationally accepted “laws of

war” and legally binding treaties to which the United

States is a signatory. On the other hand, America’s

enemies, particularly the non-state actors, will not find

themselves so constrained. In fact, they will likely use

law and conventions against the U.S. and its partners.

That said, in the end irregular war remains

subject to the same fundamental dynamics of all wars:

political aims, friction, human frailties, and human

passion. Nevertheless, the context within which they

occur does contain substantial differences. As Mao

suggested, the initial approach in irregular war must

be a general unwillingness to engage the regular forces

they confront. Rather, according to him, they should

attack the enemy where he is weakest, and in most

cases this involves striking his political and security

structures. It is likely that the enemy will attack those

individuals who represent the governing authority or

who are important in the local economic structure:

administrators; security officials; tribal leaders; school

teachers; and business leaders among others, particularly

those who are popular among the locals. If joint forces

find themselves engaged in such situations, a deep

understanding of the local culture and the political

situation will be fundamental to success.

What past irregular wars have suggested is that

military organizations confronted by irregular enemies

must understand the “other.” Here, the issue is to

understand not just of the nature of the conflict, but

the “human sea,” to use Mao’s analogy, within which

the enemy swims. The great difficulty U.S. forces will

confront in facing irregular warfare is that such conflicts

require a thorough understanding of the cultural,

religious, political, and historical context within

which they are being fought, as well as a substantial

commitment of “boots on the ground” for sustained

periods of time. There are no “rapid decisive operations”

in irregular warfare that can achieve swift victory.

Instead of decisive campaigns, U.S. forces can only

achieve victory by patient, long-term commitments to

South Lebanon 2006: Hezbollah rockets Israel

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a consistent, coherent strategic and political approach.

This coherent approach must also take

into account the capabilities of other elements of

government. Often, interagency cooperation is difficult

because of the relative imbalance of resources between

the Department of Defense and other agencies. For

this reason, the Joint Force can expect tension to exist

between tasks that must be completed to accomplish

the mission, and enabling the interagency community

to engage effectively. Ultimately, war against irregular

enemies can only in the end be won by local security

forces. Moreover, the indices of success are counter

intuitive: fewer engagements, not more; fewer arms

captured, not more; fewer enemy dead, not more.

What is of critical importance in irregular war

is the ability to provide security to the local population

with the purpose of denying the enemy the ability to

survive among the people, allowing local police and

military forces to build up sufficient strength to control

their area of responsibility. Moreover, the Joint Force

should contribute to the development of political

legitimacy so that local police and military forces are

acting with the support of the local population and not

against it. The security side of the mission requires a

deep understanding of local culture, politics, history,

and language. In all cases the use of firepower will

be a necessary feature, but balanced with non-lethal

activities. Equally important will be the provision of

high quality advisors to indigenous forces. Ultimately,

U.S. forces can neither win a counterinsurgency,

nor ensure that indigenous forces are regarded as the

legitimate governing authority; only the locals can put

in place the elements guaranteed to achieve lasting

victory.

The current demographic trends and population

shifts around the globe underline the increasing

importance of cities. The urban landscape is steadily

growing in complexity, while its streets and slums

are filled with a youthful population that has few

connections to their elders. The urban environment is

subject to water scarcity, increasing pollution, soaring

food and living costs, and labor markets, in which

workers have little leverage or bargaining power. Such

a mixture suggests a sure-fire recipe for trouble.

Thus, it is almost inevitable that joint forces

will find themselves involved in combat or relief

operations in cities. Such areas will provide adversaries

with environments that will allow them to hide, mass,

and disperse, while using the cover of innocent civilians

to mask their operations. They will also be able to

exploit the interconnections of urban terrain to launch

attacks on infrastructure nodes with cascading political

effects. Urban geography will provide enemies with a

landscape of dense buildings, an intense information

environment, and a complexity all of which makes

defensive operations that much easier to conduct. The

battles of Leningrad, Stalingrad, Seoul, and Hue with

their extraordinarily heavy casualties all offer dark

testimony to the wisdom of Sun Tzu’s warning: “The

worst policy is to attack cities. Attack cities only when

there is no alternative.”

If there is no alternative than to fight in urban

terrain, joint force commanders must prepare their

forces for the conduct of prolonged operations involving

the full range of military missions. They should do so

cognizant that any urban military operation will require

a large number of troops and that actual urban combat

could consume manpower at a startling rate. Moreover,

operations in urban terrain will confront joint force

commanders with a number of conundrums. The very

density of building and population will inhibit the

use of kinetic means, given the potential for collateral

damage as well as large numbers of civilian casualties.

Such inhibitions could increase U.S. casualties. On the

other hand, any collateral damage carries with it difficulties

in winning the “battle of the narrative.” How crucial the

connection between collateral damage and disastrous

political implications is suggested by the results of a remark

an American officer made during the Tet offensive that

American forces “had to destroy a village to save it.” That

comment reverberated throughout the United States and

was one of the contributing factors to the erosion of political

support for the war.

The ability of terrorists to learn from their

predecessors and colleagues will not confront the hindrance

of having to process adaptations and innovations through

bureaucratic barriers. One must also note the growing

convergence of terrorist organizations with criminal cartels

like the drug trade to finance their activities. Such cooperative

activities will only make terrorism and criminal cartels more

dangerous and effective.

Operations against terrorists will keep Special

Forces busy, with conventional forces increasingly active in

supporting and complementary roles. If the Middle East

27. Sun Tzu,

The Art of War

, As translated by Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford,

1963), p. 78.

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continues on its troubled path, it is likely the war on terrorism

will not continue on its current levels, but could actually

worsen. Where an increase in terrorist activity intersects with

energy supplies or weapons of mass destruction, joint force

commanders will confront the need for immediate action,

which may require employment of significant conventional

capabilities.

Finally, we should underline that persistent media

coverage, coupled with changing Western attitudes about

the use of force, will influence and be influenced by U.S.

military operations. What will be of great importance in the

situations where force is being employed will be the narrative

that plays on the world’s stage. The joint force commander

must understand that he should place particular emphasis

on creating and influencing that narrative. Moreover, he

must be alert and ready to counter the efforts of the enemies

of the United States to create and communicate their own

narratives. The enemy’s ability to operate within the local

cultural and social fabric will complicate such efforts. This

puts at a premium the ability of Americans to understand

the perceptual lenses through which others view the world.

D. Professional Military Education: The

Critical Key to the Future

The future Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of

the 2030s and the Service Chiefs of Staff are already on active

duty in the rank of Captain or Lieutenant. The Combatant

Commanders and all the future flag and general officers of

the U.S. military in the 2030s are currently on active duty.

The Command Sergeants Major and Command Master

Chiefs of the Joint Force in 2030 are in uniform. In other

words, preparation of the senior military leaders of the 2030s

has already begun!

High Tech Guerrilla command post: Hezbollah position

South Lebanon 2006 with off-the-shelf sensors

As Sir Michael Howard once commented, the military

profession is not only the most demanding physically, but

the most demanding intellectually. Moreover, it confronts a

problem that no other profession possesses:

There are two great difficulties with which the

professional soldier, sailor, or airman has to

contend in equipping himself as commander.

First, his profession is almost unique in that he

may only have to exercise it once in his lifetime,

if indeed that often. It is as if a surgeon had to

practice throughout his life on dummies for one

real operation; or a barrister only appeared

once or twice in court towards the close of his

career; or a professional swimmer had to spend

his life practicing on dry land for the Olympic

Championship on which the fortunes of his entire

nation depended. Secondly the complex problem

of running a [military service] at all is liable to

occupy his mind so completely that it is easy to

forget what it is being run for.

While the preparation of these young officers

and NCO’s must begin with their training as military

professionals, it must also include their intellectual education

to confront the challenges of war, change, and differing

cultures. In the space of twenty-five years, they must master

the extraordinarily difficult tasks of their military specialties as

well as those required by joint warfare. But equally important,

they must prepare themselves for the challenges presented by

war and the projection of military force.

The recent experiences of Afghanistan and Iraq have

made clear that in war, human beings matter more than

any other factor. There are other dimensions, including

technology, that are important, but rarely decisive. Above

all, officers who hold the senior positions in the American

military in the 2030s must develop a holistic grasp of their

professional sphere and its relationship to strategy and policy.

At this level of leadership, the skills for building trust that will

serve as the foundation for harmonious teams is as important

as tactical or operational prowess - maybe more so. The

future Joint Force must have leaders who can form and lead

effective coalitions. Such a preparation will take a lifetime

of intellectual preparation, because it demands an ability to

understand the “other” in his terms, historically, politically,

culturally, and psychologically.

The world of the 2030s will demand more than

28. Sir Michael Howard, “The Uses and Abuses of Military History,”

Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 107 (1962), p. 6.

Sour
ce: J
oint Center for O

perational Analysis

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mastery of the technical and operational aspects of war. The

nature of the decentralized operations required by many of

the challenges described thus far will require that NCOs

must also understand the fundamental nature of war as well

as other cultures and peoples – as they will undoubtedly

confront challenges equivalent to those faced by today’s mid-

grade officer. Both officers and enlisted leaders will find

themselves participating in coalitions, in which the United

States may or may not be the leading actor, but in which

partners will invariably play an important part. All military

leaders must be equipped with the confidence to decide and

act in ambiguous situations and under conditions where

clear direction from above may be lacking or overcome by

changing conditions.

This is the fundamental challenge the U.S. military

will confront: providing the education so that future leaders

can understand the political, strategic, historical, and cultural

framework of a more complex world, as well as having a

thorough grounding in the nature of war, past, present, and

future. Admiral Stansfield Turner, initiator of the intellectual

revolution at the Naval War College in the early 1970s,

best expressed the larger purpose of professional military

education:

War colleges are places to educate the senior officer

corps in the larger military and strategic issues

that confront America… They should educate these

officers by a demanding intellectual curriculum to

think in wider terms than their busy operational

careers have thus far demanded. Above all the

war colleges should broaden the intellectual and

military horizons of the officers who attend, so

that they have a conception of the larger strategic

and operational issues that confront our military

and our nation.

The complexity of the future suggests that the

education of senior officers must not remain limited to staff

and war colleges, but should extend to the world’s best graduate

schools. Professional military education must impart the

ability to think critically and creatively in both the conduct of

military operations and acquisition and resource allocation.

The services should draw from a breadth and depth of

education in a range of relevant disciplines to include history,

anthropology, economics, geopolitics, cultural studies, the

‘hard’ sciences, law, and strategic communications. Their best

officers should attend such programs. Officers cannot master

all these disciplines, but they can and must become familiar

with their implications. In other words, the educational

development of America’s future military leaders must not

remain confined to the school house, but must involve self

study and intellectual engagement by officers throughout

their careers.

Part IV: The Implications for the Joint Force in 2030s

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Despite the uncertainties and ambiguities

involved in the future security environment there are two

specific areas where the U.S. military can better prepare

its forces and its future leaders to meet the challenges

that will come. As this study suggested at the beginning,

perhaps the most important cultural attributes military

organizations require are the ability to innovate in

peacetime and adapt in war to the actual realities of

the battlefield. Unfortunately the present culture and

bureaucratic structures of the Department of Defense

place major hurdles in the path of future innovation and

adaptation.

One can encapsulate those obstacles in simple

words or phrases. What needs reform is obvious, but the

actual execution, the important “how to,” of any effective

reform will require sustained efforts against comfortable,

deeply entrenched bureaucracies, sub-cultures within

the military, and the demands of the present. Two areas

that demand change are acquisition and the personnel

systems.

A. Defense Economics and Acquisition

Policies

The

Joint Operating Environment

has spoken

thoroughly about the asymmetric application of power by

potential enemies against U.S. military forces. There is also

an asymmetry with respect to the “defense spending” of

the United States and its potential opponents, particularly

in irregular contexts. One only need to consider the

enormous expenditures the United States has made to

counter the threat posed by improvised explosive devices

(IED). The United States has spent literally billions to

counter these crude, inexpensive, and extraordinarily

effective devices. If one were to multiply this ratio against

a global enemy, it becomes unexecutable. While this

asymmetry is most dramatic against the low-end threat,

it applies to more sophisticated threats as well. Current

economics indicate that China likely spends far less than

the United States for the same capability. For instance,

because of its labor market, the cost of many of the raw

materials, and the savings gained by reverse engineering

technologies, the Chinese space program costs an order of

magnitude less than that of the United States.

There have been justified calls for acquisition

reform for decades, and while a number of groups

have produced clear, forthright, and intelligent studies,

little actual reform has taken place. This is no longer a

bureaucratic issue – it is having strategic effects. Given the

potential for disruptive technologies in the near future,

the crucial issue will not be whether the United States

possesses such technologies, but how affordably, how

quickly, and how effectively joint forces can incorporate

those technologies not only into their concepts, doctrine,

and approach to war, but actually into the units and

commands that will have to use those technologies on

future battlefields.

Without a thorough and coherent reform of the

acquisition processes, there is the considerable prospect

an opponent could incorporate technological advances

more affordably, quickly, and effectively – with serious

implications for future joint forces.

B. The Personnel System

Perhaps the greatest difficulty confronting the

Joint Force in preparing future leaders has to do with

a personnel system that derives its philosophical and

instrumental basis from reforms conducted between 1899

and 1904 and laws passed by Congress in 1947, 1954,

and 1986. To a considerable degree, these reforms and

laws still drive Service approaches to recruiting, training,

promoting, and eventually retiring their personnel.

The current personnel and leader development

system has its roots in long outdated mobilization systems

for mass armies in world wars. And while the United

States has had an all-volunteer force for 35 years, the

bureaucracy still “thinks” and “acts” from an industrial-

age, mobilization-based leader development paradigm.

That approach continues to shape how the services

approach training and education, often confusing the

two. That state of affairs must change.

If we expect to develop and sustain a military

that operates at a higher level of strategic and operational

understanding, then the time has come to address the

recruiting, education, training, incentive, and promotion

systems so that they are consistent with the intellectual

requirements for the future joint force.

Part V: Some Leading Questions

Part V: Some Leading Questions

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The ability to innovate in peacetime and adapt

during wars requires institutional and individual

agility. This agility is the product of rigorous education,

appropriate applications of technology and a rich

understanding of the social and political context in

which military operations are conducted. But above all,

innovation and adaptation require imagination and the

ability to ask the right questions. They represent two

of the most important aspects of military effectiveness.

The former occurs during peace, when there is time

available to think through critical issues. However, in

peacetime, military organizations cannot replicate the

actual conditions of combat, when a human opponent is

trying his best to destroy U.S. forces. Thus, there must be

a premium on studying the military - from an evidence-

based perspective, using history, current operations,

wargames, and experiments - to better understand the

present and future. There must be a connection between

those in the schools and those involved in experimentation.

Above all, there must be rigorous, honest red teaming and

questioning of assumptions. “All the objectives were met”

is a guarantee of intellectual dishonesty as well as a recipe

for future military disaster.

Adaptation provides little time for reflection

because of the immediate demands of combat. Here

the patterns of thought developed in peacetime are

crucial, because adaptation requires the questioning of

the assumptions with which military organizations have

entered the conflict. In the past, military organizations

which have ruthlessly examined and honestly evaluated

29. As quoted in Robert B. Asprey,

War in the Shadows, The Guerrilla in

History

, vol. 1 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1975), p. 270.

Do make it clear that generalship, at least in my case, came of understanding, of hard study and

brain-work and concentration. Had it come easy to me, I should not have done [command] so well.

If your book could persuade some of our new soldiers to read and mark and learn things outside

drill manuals and tactical diagrams, it would do a good work. I feel a fundamental crippling in

curiousness about our officers. Too much body and too little head. The perfect general would know

everything in heaven and earth.

So please, if you see me that way and agree with me, do use me as a text to preach for more study of

books and history, a greater seriousness in military art. With two thousand years of example behind

us, we have no excuse, when fighting, for not fighting well…

T.E. Lawrence to B.H. Liddell Hart, 1933

their assumptions in peacetime have done the same in

war. Those which have not, have invariably paid a terrible

price in lives. Those, whose commanders have listened

and absorbed what their subordinates have had to say,

were those which recognized what was actually happening

in combat, because they had acculturated themselves to

learning from the experiences of others.

The defining element in military effectiveness in

war lies in the ability to recognize when prewar visions

and understanding of war are wrong and must change.

Unfortunately in terms of what history suggests, most

military and political leaders have attempted to impose

their vision of future war on the realities of the conflict in

which they find themselves engaged, rather than adapting

to the actual conditions they confront. The fog and friction

that characterize the battle space invariably make the task

of seeing, much less understanding what has actually

happened, extraordinarily difficult. Moreover, the lessons

of today, no matter how accurately recorded and then

learned, may no longer prove relevant tomorrow. The

enemy is human and will consequently learn and adapt

as well. The challenges of the future demand leaders who

possess rigorous intellectual understanding. Providing

such grounding for the generals and admirals, sergeants

and chiefs of the 2030s will ensure that the United States

is as prepared as possible to meet the threats and seize the

opportunities of the future.

Part VI: Concluding Thoughts

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Part VI: Concluding Thoughts