A Global Forum for Naval Historical Scholarship
International Journal of Naval History
Volume 1 Number 1
April 2002
Without a Hangman, Without a Rope:
Navy War Crimes Trials After World War II
Jeanie M. Welch, University of North Carolina at Charlotte
Abstract
Little has been written about the trials of accused Japanese war criminals that were
conducted by the U. S. Navy after World War II. Trials were held on Guam and
Kwajalein by the War Crimes Branch of the Pacific Fleet from 1945 through 1949.
These trials were part of over 2,000 war crimes trials held under the aegis of SCAP--the
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Major war criminals (political and military
leaders) were tried by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo in
Tokyo. Other war crimes trials were held throughout the areas invaded and occupied by
the Japanese. Trials were held for the mistreatment of prisoners of war and for the
executions of captured Allied airmen (including beheading and cannibalism.). The Navy
also investigated alleged war crimes committed at sea and interrogated “holdouts”
(stragglers)—Japanese military personnel who had gone into hiding and did not surrender
until long after Japan’s official surrender. There were over 100 convictions in trials of
Imperial Japanese Navy personnel and other Japanese military personnel (including
members of the Imperial Japanese Army). Defendants were provided with defense
counsel, a provision made for all accused war criminals tried by Allied war crimes
tribunals and commissions. The Navy conducted executions or sent convicted war
criminals sentenced to incarceration to Sugamo Prison in Tokyo to serve their sentences.
Some accused and convicted war criminals chose suicide rather than face trial,
imprisonment, or execution. This paper discusses the organization of Navy trials, several
Navy trials conducted on Kwajalein and Guam, evaluations of the Navy’s conduct of war
crimes trials (including the philosophical questions of practicing “victor’s justice” and the
legal questions of the status of such trials in international law), and the availability of
official records on these trials compiled by the Office of the Judge Advocate General
(Navy).
Introduction
One of the lesser-known responsibilities of the U. S. Navy in the immediate postwar era
was the conducting of war crimes trials in the Asia-Pacific region. The Allies justified
conducting the Asia-Pacific war crimes trials because Japan accepted the Potsdam
Declaration when it surrendered. The Potsdam Declaration specifically stated that
military and government officials were subject to trial as war criminals. These trials were
held under the auspices of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) which
A Global Forum for Naval Historical Scholarship
International Journal of Naval History
Volume 1 Number 1
April 2002
oversaw war crimes trials in Japan and throughout the Asia-Pacific region until 1951.
SCAP oversaw over 2,000 trials for over 5,000 accused war criminals. Investigations into
alleged war crimes were held under the auspices of the United Nations War Crimes
Commission, headquartered in London with a subcommission in China. These trials were
similar to the Nuremberg trials of accused German war criminals. Major accused war
criminals (class “A”--political and military leaders) were tried by the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East, also known as the Tokyo Trial. Other war crimes
trials for alleged class “B” war criminals were held in the countries and territories
invaded and occupied by the Japanese. The U.S. Navy had jurisdiction over such trials in
the Marianas Islands, the Marshall and Gilbert Islands, Palau Islands, Bonin Islands, and
the Caroline Islands after Japan surrendered. Although almost forgotten today, from
1945 through 1949 the U. S. Navy conducted dozens of trials of over 100 accused
Japanese war criminals on the islands of Guam and Kwajalein. Accused collaborators
were also tried.
[1]
Prior to this time the U. S. Navy had never held war crimes trials. Admiral John D.
Murphy, a lawyer who had risen through the ranks from enlisted man, served as War
Crimes Director. Naval trials were conducted by the Office of the Judge Advocate
General (Navy) under the Navy Division of the War Crimes Office. The War Crimes
Office was a central agency in the War Department to junction for the Departments of
State, War, and the Navy. According to an official Navy press and radio release, the War
Crimes Office was responsible for investigation of alleged war crimes, organization of
evidence and preparation of files, draft charges and trial briefs, assisting in trials, and
organizing the carrying out of sentences.
[2]
Investigations into alleged war crimes were conducted by U. S. Navy personnel, and
decisions to prosecute were based on SCAP directives, international law (e.g., the Hague
and Geneva Conventions), and military law and procedures as stated in the 1937 edition
of U. S. Courts and Boards. The courts were known as military commissions; the military
commissions consisted of five to seven U. S. military officers (either active duty or
reserve). The accused were tried for class “B” war crimes such as murder, ill-treatment of
prisoners, etc. The Navy tried personnel of both the Imperial Japanese Navy and the
Imperial Japanese Army. The accused were afforded defense counsel (both Allied and
Japanese counsel). Rules of evidence were relaxed in these war crimes trials. Summaries
of trials were regularly submitted to the Japanese government via SCAP memoranda.
These reports included the names of the accused, their ranks, and sentences.
The war crimes trials involved some of the most heinous charges imaginable, including
mass murder of prisoners of war and cannibalism. Japanese convicted and sentenced to
prison were transferred to Sugamo Prison in Tokyo for incarceration after the sentences
had been reviewed and approved by the Convening Authority Commander of the
Marshalls-Gilberts Area. Those sentenced to death were either executed by a firing
squad or by hanging; death by hanging was considered by the Japanese to be a
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International Journal of Naval History
Volume 1 Number 1
April 2002
particularly dishonorable way to die. The condemned has access to a Buddhist priest or
Christian minister or priest before execution. Several accused Japanese committed
suicide rather than face trial or sentencing. [N.B. At the beginning of these trials
Admiral Murphy did not consider the Navy to be adequately prepared to conduct
executions by hanging. The U. S. Army's official hangman, a master sergeant, was
assigned to train Naval personnel to serve as hangmen. At the beginning of the trials, the
Navy also lacked the proper type of rope to fashion the nooses used in executions.]
The Jaluit Atoll Case
Many war crimes trials were conducted for the mistreatment of downed Allied flight
crews. Allied flight crews were especially hated by the Japanese. When captured they
were often separated from other prisoners of war and subjected to summary trials and
executions. One of the most famous cases concerning the treatment of Allied airmen was
the Jaluit Atoll Case.
[3]
This case includes several of the elements common to Asia-
Pacific war crimes trials. Rear Admiral Nisuke Masuda and four other members of the
Imperial Japanese Navy were tried for murder by a U. S. Military Commission on
Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands from 7 December - 13 December 1945. In February,
1944, a crew of U. S. airmen was forced to land near Jaluit Atoll in the Marshall Islands;
three crewmen were captured and held on Emidj Island, site of the Japanese Naval
Garrison Force Headquarters (commanded by Rear Admiral Masuda). In March, 1944,
without a trial the airmen were executed by shooting and stabbing with a sword, most
likely the kitana--the samurai sword carried by Japanese officers who prided themselves
on skill in its use. They were executed in a cemetery on Aineman Island near Jaluit Atoll;
their bodies were cremated. Rear Admiral Masuda was accused of ordering the
executions of the airmen. He committed suicide before the trial began. In his suicide note
he confessed that he had ordered the executions. The other defendants were a lieutenant,
two ensigns, and a warrant officer who were charged with either participating in the
executions or delivering the airmen for execution. They were accused of murdering the
three U. S. airmen in violation of "the dignity of the United States of America, the
International rules of warfare and the moral standards of civilized society." The
defendants pleaded not guilty.
The prosecution's case stated that the executions were in violation of the 1907 Hague and
1929 Geneva Conventions on treatment of prisoners of war. The defense built its case on
two principles: the Military Commission held no jurisdiction and that the accused wished
to be tried by a civil tribunal and the defense of superior orders (i.e., an order from a
superior officer was an order from the Emperor himself). [At the time of the trial
Emperor Hirohito had not yet disclaimed his divinity.] The prosecution countered that:
the Military Commission had the power to conduct such trials based on the executive
power of the U. S. President, statute laws dating back to 1929 and “laws of humanity …
set back as far as civilisation,” the Commission following SCAP rules, and the trial being
held close to the scene of the alleged crimes. On the defense of superior orders the
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International Journal of Naval History
Volume 1 Number 1
April 2002
prosecution contended that U. S. military law had the precedent that a soldier is “bound
to obey only the lawful orders of his superiors. If he receives an order to do an unlawful
act, he is bound neither by his duty nor by his oath to do it.” So far from such an order
being a justification, it makes the party giving the order an accomplice in the crime.
SCAP rules reiterated this rejection of the defense of superior orders.
The evidence presented consisted of witnesses who were the legal officer who
investigated the allegations, an islander who witnessed the airmen's capture, and Japanese
personnel who had interrogated the prisoners, transported them for execution, conducted
the cremations, or authenticated or translated documents. The three Imperial Japanese
Navy personnel who conducted the executions testified; the warrant officer who turned
the airmen over for execution supplied a written statement. All defendants were found
guilty. The three officers who conducted the executions were sentenced to death by
hanging. The warrant officer was sentenced to ten years in prison.
The Wake Island POWs
An example of a war crimes trial for mass murder was the trial for the mass execution of
98 Allied POWs on Wake Island in October, 1943.
[4]
The story of the siege of Wake
Island is well known as U. S. military personnel held out against overwhelming odds.
When Wake Island finally fell 1,603 Americans (both military and civilian) were
captured. Most were sent by ship to a prison camp in Shanghai, China. 98 prisoners of
war remained on Wake Island, kept alive to run heavy equipment to build fortifications.
In October, 1943, Wake Island was under siege by an Allied carrier force. On October 7,
1943, Rear Admiral Shigematsu Sakaibara, then a captain and commander of Japanese
forces on Wake Island, ordered the execution of the 98 prisoners of war without trial.
The POWs were marched to a northern beach, blindfolded, and shot. [One POW
managed to elude execution, was hunted down, and was executed with a sword by
Sakaibara himself.] In 1947 Rear Admiral Sakaibara and a subordinate, Lieutenant
Commander Tachibana, were tried, found guilty, and sentenced to death. [Tachibana's
sentence was later reduced to life in prison.] Rear Admiral Sakaibara was executed on 18
June 1947 on Guam. At the end he maintained: "I think my trial was entirely unfair and
the proceeding unfair, and the sentence too harsh, but I obey with pleasure."
Cannibalism
In some instances precedent in military or international law failed to cover alleged
crimes. One such instance is accusations of cannibalism. Lieutenant General Joshio
Tachibana, Imperial Japanese Army, and 11 other Japanese military personnel were tried
for the beheadings of two American airmen in August, 1944, on Chichi Jima in the Bonin
Islands.
[5]
They were beheaded on Tachibana's orders. One of the executed airmen, a U.
S. Navy radioman third class, was dissected and his "flesh and viscera" eaten by Japanese
military personnel. The U. S. also tried Vice Admiral Mori and a Major Matoba for
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International Journal of Naval History
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April 2002
murder in the deaths of five U. S. airmen, in February, 1945. Major Matoba confessed to
cannibalism. However, military and international law had no provisions for punishment
for cannibalism per se. They were accused of murder and "prevention of honorable
burial."
Dr. Chisano Ueno and Admiral Shimpei Asano
Dr. Chisano Ueno was a military doctor who was tried and found guilty of war crimes
committed on the island of Truk in Micronesia. In June, 1944, five U. S. airmen were
shot down over Truk. Two airmen were captured and taken to the Japanese first aid unit
that was under Dr. Ueno's command where he was ordered to "dispose of the two
persons" by Admiral Asano. He performed surgical procedures on one of the prisoners.
In 1947 Dr. Ueno was arrested and tried on Guam. Dr. Ueno's defense was that: he had
be demobilized and therefore was not under the military commission's jurisdiction, the
charges were vague, contradictory, and illegal, he was obeying superior orders, and the
operations were medically justified. Both men were found guilty and executed by
hanging on March 31, 1947.
[6]
The Peleliu Case
The Peleliu Case demonstrates the zeal that defense counsel brought to U. S. war crimes
trials.
7
In 1949 Lieutenant General Sadae Inoue, commander of the Palau Islands group,
and his chief of staff, Colonel Tokuchi Tada, were tried for the execution of three U. S.
POWs on the island of Peleliu. General Inoue admitted ordering the executions. Colonel
Tada's defense was that he had argued against these executions and had treated American
POWs humanely in the past. His defense counsel, U. S. Navy Reserve Commander
Martin Carlson, managed to find an American journalist, Gwen Dew Buchanan, who had
been a POW of the Japanese in Hong Kong when Colonel Tada was stationed there. She
wrote of Colonel Tada's humane acts toward POWs in Hong Kong; Colonel Tada was
released.
[7]
Conclusion
According to summaries of these trials, the Navy conducted 47 trials for 123 defendants.
113 convictions and 10 were attained. There were 30 death sentences and 10 executions,
all for murder convictions.
[8]
At the beginning of the trials, Rear Admiral Thomas L.
Gatch, Judge Advocate General (Navy), stated this purpose:
Bringing to justice international gangsters and their underlings has al-
ways been a special concern of the United States Navy. … The Navy
has always been a principal instrument in maintaining international
law and order. We believe in justice. We shall do everything within
our power to see that the evidence collected is true evidence and that
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International Journal of Naval History
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April 2002
the trials will be just.
[9]
When the trials were concluded, Admiral Murphy provided this view of the Navy war
crimes trials:
In conclusion, I believe the Navy military commissions convened in the
Pacific have demonstrably acted in harmony with the highest traditions
of judicial dignity and impartiality. I also believe the Navy's proof has
measured up to the magnitude of its accusations, and that the spirit of its
concept has been matched by the industry of its research and that its op-
portunity to make international law a guardian of individuals deserving
of protection has not failed by default.
[10]
However, historians have not been kind to the Asia-Pacific war crimes trials. The trials
themselves were largely forgotten by the 1950s, overshadowed by the Nuremberg trials
and the escalating Cold War. The Tokyo Trial lasted for over two years, and interest in
its outcome waned, even on the part of the Japanese. But events such as the Vietnam
War and the international war crimes tribunal held at The Hague for atrocities committed
in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda have revived interest in these trials. The
accusations of victor's justice—trials motivated by revenge or racism--and accusations of
the lack of punishment for U. S. wartime actions (e.g., the dropping of the atomic bomb)
were raised again and are debated to this day.
Records of Navy war crimes trials are housed with the Modern Military Records at the
National Archives Depository Branch in College Park, Maryland. These records include
the “Final Report of Navy War Crimes Program” and Judge Advocate General (Navy)
reports that are part of Record Group 125. Summaries of Navy trials were also sent to
SCAP in the form of memoranda and are part of SCAP records which are found in
Record Groups 238 and 331. The “Final Report”
[11]
is the most important primary
source and includes maps of locations investigated for alleged war crimes and
photographs of accused war criminals and the site where they were incarcerated during
investigations and trials.
[12]
[1]
For summaries of these trials, see Erickson, George E. “United States Navy War
Crimes Trials (1945-1949),” Washburn Law Journal 5 (1965): 89-111, and Piccigallo,
Philip Rocco. “United States Naval Trials: The Pacific Islands.” In The Japanese on
Trial: Allied War Crimes Operations in the East, 1945-1951 (Austin, Tex.: University of
Texas Press, 1979): 74-83.
[2]
“Navy Department Participation in the Prosecution of War Crimes,” Journal of
Criminal Law and Criminology 36 (May 1945): 40.
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April 2002
[3]
United Nations War Crimes Commission. "The Jaluit Atoll Case." In Law Reports of
Trials of War Criminals.(London: Published for the United Nations War Crimes
Commission by His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1947): vol. 1, 71-80.
[4]
See Junghans, Earl A. "Wake's POWs," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings 109 (2)
(1983): 43-50, and Maga, Timothy P. “Justice on Guam: Justice under the Palms.” In
Judgment at Tokyo: The Japanese War Crimes Trials (Lexington, Ken.: University Press
of Kentucky): 104-106.
[5]
See Erickson, op. cit., 106-108, and Maga, op. cit., 97-104.
[6]
Addison, Paul. "Forgotten War-Crimes Trials," World Press Review 41 (7) (July
1994): 45.
[7]
Say, Harold B. "'Satisfactory' Not Enough," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings90 (7)
(1964): 82-87.
[8]
Piccagallo, op. cit., 82.
[9]
“Navy Department Participation in the Prosecution of War Crimes,” op. cit., 39.
[10]
Erickson, op. cit., 110.
[11]
National Archives Depository Branch, College Park, Md. Records of the Judge
Advocate General (Navy) (RG 125). “Final Report of Navy War Crimes Program:
Submitted by the Director, War Crimes, U.S. Pacific Fleet, to the Secretary of the Navy,
1 December 1949.”
[12]
National Archives Depository Branch, College Park, Md.. Records of the Judge
Advocate General (Navy) (RG 125). “War Crimes Branch Case Files of Pacific Area
War Crimes Trials, 1944-1948.”
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