53

Chapter Six

IMPACT ON FOREIGN POLICY

Iran’s foreign policy is too complex for simple description and pre-
diction.  However, the fundamental sources and security institutions
described earlier shape both its direction and its application.  The di-
rection of Iran’s foreign policy is hardly consistent:  At times, the
revolutionary imperative dominates; at other times, concerns over
ethnic fragmentation or economic relations predominate.  Never-
theless, patterns do emerge that can be described in some detail.

The armed forces and intelligence services will play an essential role
in many of these decisions, particularly with regard to how Iran can
best meet its security challenges.  Although these institutions often
play, at most, a limited role in formulating Iran’s objectives, their
decisions shape the means used to pursue these ends.

This chapter first notes the issues over which the security institutions
have the most influence.  It then describes the factors that shape
Iran’s relations with its neighbors, key regional countries, and the
United States.  It concludes by assessing factors that shape Iran’s
decisionmaking for other vital security concerns, such as support for
insurgents abroad and Iran’s military posture.

For these various objectives, this chapter notes both Iran’s overall
behavior and the specific agendas of its security institutions.  The
discussion emphasizes the perspectives of the IRGC and the Artesh,
though other institutions and organizations are also often important.

54

Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era

WHERE THE SECURITY INSTITUTIONS MATTER MOST

The Artesh has a wide remit in terms of assessing and advising on
national security issues, so in this sense its influence is far more
functional and institutional than geographic.  The Artesh’s influence
is most directly felt in weapons acquisition, training and military
exercises, and the annual round of budget negotiations.  It cannot,
however, choose its military suppliers and is guided in this regard by
Tehran’s political calculations and budgetary constraints.

The IRGC, largely due to its revolutionary origins and ties to the
Supreme Leader’s office, is influential in the broad area of Islamic
revolution abroad.  According to the IRGC’s commander, Yahya
Rahim Safavi, “The IRGC has no geographical border.  The Islamic
revolution is the border of the IRGC.”

1

  It has an extensive network of

contacts across the Muslim world, with a particular emphasis on
Lebanon, Iraq, the Gulf region, and the wider Arab world in general.
Thus, geographically speaking, the IRGC’s realm is the Middle East
and North Africa, including the two Muslim countries to Iran’s east,
Afghanistan and Pakistan.  The IRGC is far weaker with regard to
Europe and to the West in general.

The IRGC’s influence over foreign affairs is declining.  It is good at be-
ing reactive, and sometimes even good at being proactive, but it is
less of a player in the patient game of statecraft, foreign policy build-
ing, and conducting Iran’s external affairs.  The regime’s confidence
in the IRGC to conduct a long war has declined.

2

In general, hard-and-fast rules as to which institutions govern which
policy offer little insight.  The large number of actors important to
Iranian decisionmaking and the conflicting forces that push Iran in
different ways lead to policies that often vary by country, by issue,
and by the issues of the day in Tehran.  Key individuals often change
institutions, and their responsibilities and networks go with them.
Perhaps most important, different regime priorities lead to the rise
and fall of different institutional agendas.

______________

 

1Salam, June 3, 1998.
2Buchta, Who Rules Iran? p. 147.

Impact on Foreign Policy

55

RELATIONS WITH REGIONAL STATES AND OTHER
IMPORTANT POWERS

As the discussion above indicates, Iran’s foreign policy varies consid-
erably.  The factors noted in Chapter Two—Islam, nationalism,
geopolitics, ethnicity, and economics—all play roles in shaping pol-
icy.  So too do the particular agendas and concerns of Iran’s security
institutions.  Thus, to gain a full understanding of Iran’s security
policy, it is necessary to assess Iran’s behavior on a country-by-
country basis.

Iraq

Although Iraq remains Iran’s gravest security concern and most bit-
ter foe, Tehran is cautious with regard to encouraging unrest in Iraq.
Iran favors the containment of Iraq in general, but it opposes any ac-
tion that might fragment its neighbor.

Both in and out of Iran’s security establishment, Iraq is viewed as the
greatest threat to Iran’s security.

3

  The eight-year war with Iraq

haunts Iran today.  Iraq remains hostile, and discoveries about its
extensive WMD programs have alarmed Tehran.  Iraq’s regime is
viewed as highly revisionist, with designs on controlling the Shatt al-
Arab and Arab-populated parts of Iran.  The immediacy of concerns
has abated somewhat in the last decade, however, as the U.S.-led
containment of Iraq has sapped Baghdad’s military and economic
strength.  Nevertheless, Iraq is Iran’s leading short-term as well as
long-term security threat.

Both Iran and Iraq also harbor each other’s political opponents.  Iran
supports a Shi’a opposition force in Iraq (the Supreme Council of the
Islamic Revolution in Iraq, or SCIRI) to gain leverage over Baghdad.
Iraq does the same with Iran by supporting the Mujahedin-e Khalq
Organization (MKO), a Marxist and nominally Islamist movement.
Policies toward these groups can be seen as barometers of relations:
Assassinations and unrest are actively encouraged when relations
between the two countries are poor, and the groups are reined in
when relations are improving.

______________

 

3Private discussions with Iranian officials.

56

Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era

Iran also seeks to exploit Kurdish hostility toward Baghdad while
preventing that hostility from becoming a strong force that could
spill over into Iran itself.  This tactic began well before the Islamic
revolution, when Iran used Iraq’s Kurdish opposition under Mustafa
Barzani to pressure Iraq, dropping support for the Kurds in 1975 after
Iraq agreed to Iran’s terms on their disputed border.  Today, Iran en-
courages the reconciliation of the Mas’ud Barzani–led Kurdish
Democratic Party (KDP) with the Talibani-led Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK) in the hopes of keeping the forces viable as a major
irritant to Saddam’s regime.

4

Iran’s policy toward Iraq and the Kurds is indicative of its concern for
regional stability.  Despite Iran’s hostility toward Saddam’s govern-
ment and repeated backing of the Kurds, Iran opposes any arrange-
ment that might embolden the Iraqi Kurds to set up their own
government or state.  Iran has supported measures to reconcile the
various Kurdish factions in Iraq.

5

Concerns over restive minorities and regional instability have even
led Iran to limit its support for Iraqi Shi’as in recent years—a dra-
matic change from the early days of the revolution, when Ayatollah
Khomeini and other regime leaders called on Iraqi Shi’as to revolt.
Iran has not extended large-scale support for the Shi’as in Iraq, even
when Baghdad engaged in massive repression, as in 1991.  Baghdad’s
violence against the Shi’a leadership evokes criticisms, and Iraqi
Shi’as are permitted to demonstrate in Tehran, but more concrete

______________

 

4James Blitz, “D’Alema Seeks Positive Solution to Ocalan Dilemma,” Financial Times,
November 18, 1998.
5On the fighting between the Kurds and the Turkish government, former president
Hashemi Rafsanjani’s comments are indicative:  “The fighting in northern Iraq gives
Iran a headache and causes many problems.  Large groups that flee the fighting are
taking refuge in Iran, bringing scores of problems with them.  These groups smuggle
weapons into Iran.  The animals they bring with them sometimes cause epidemics.
Naturally, in order to avoid such problems we want peace to reign in Iraq.  We expect
Turkey to understand our problems.” Canal-7  (Istanbul, in Turkish), June 16, 1997,
BBC ME/2949 MED/11-12, June 19, 1997.  See also Alan Phillips, “Iranians Watch and
Wait as Shi’ite Cousins Suffer,” Sunday Telegraph, February 28, 1999, p. 21, and Saideh
Lotfian, “Iran’s Middle East Policies Under President Khatami,” The Iranian Journal of
International Affairs, vol. X, no. 4, Winter 1998-1999, p. 431.

Impact on Foreign Policy

57

measures are lacking.

6

  Iran has initiated a limited dialog with Iraq

that is intended to facilitate pilgrimages by Iranian Shi’as to holy
places in Iraq.

A minority view in Iran calls for a reconciliation with Iraq.  Some
leaders argue that it is in Iran’s long-term interest to improve Iran-
Iraq relations, particularly while Baghdad remains vulnerable and
under international sanctions.  Such a relationship, they argue,
would give Iran a bigger say in Iraq’s future, provide it with leverage
over the current regime, and weaken the U.S. presence in the area.
But the proponents of the pro-Iraq policy are still a small minority in
Iran.  Most Iranians, including large segments of the IRGC and the
Basij, abhor President Saddam Hussein’s regime and feel that they
owe it to the martyrs of the war to help bring about the regime’s end.
Indeed, the martyrs factor is the most effective barrier against a new
opening toward Iraq, despite Baghdad’s repeated offers.

Despite the emotion and bitterness that characterize Iranians’ sen-
timents toward the Baath regime, Tehran is willing to act pragmati-
cally to advance its interests.  Iran and Iraq have fitful diplomatic
contact.  Tehran has, for a price, helped Iraq smuggle oil and other-
wise evade international restrictions, even as Iran’s leaders have kept
a wary eye on Iraq’s military and WMD capabilities.

Iraq’s position in the Iranian consciousness is also unique for histor-
ical and religious reasons.  Iraq is, in essence, a second Shi’a home-
land.  Two of the great pilgrimage shrines and centers of Shi’a
religious learning—the cities of Najaf and Karbala—are in Iraq, as are
many lesser but important places of veneration.  Many Iranian reli-
gious leaders studied in Iraq, and contacts between the communi-
ties, though cut significantly since Saddam Hussein consolidated
power, have historically been strong.

Agendas of Iran’s Security Institutions

Iraq remains at the center of Iran’s security concerns for both the
Artesh and the IRGC.  In general, the Artesh focuses on the conven-

______________

 

6For an example of Iran’s weak reaction after the assassination of  Muhammid Sadiq
Sadr and his two sons in Najaf in February 1999, see IRNA, February 23, 1999, BBC
ME/3648 MED/8, February 25, 1999.

58

Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era

tional threat Iraq poses, relying on defensive measures to ensure that
Iran is prepared to face a resurgent Iraq.  The IRGC is more focused
on anti-MKO operations and on working with the Iraqi Shi’as, both
of which demand offensive measures.  In practice, however, the
duties of the Artesh and the IRGC overlap considerably.

The  Artesh remains fearful of the Iraqi regime’s posturing toward
Iran and has contingency plans for renewed Iraqi provocations over
the Shatt al-Arab border issue.  Although the Artesh calculates that
Iraq’s remaining SSM (surface-to surface missile) force does not give
it the capability to strike at Tehran, the Artesh does not rule out the
possible deployment of SSMs against Iran’s urban and industrial
centers nearer the border.

7

An associated concern is the resurgence of Iraq’s WMD capability,
which Artesh leaders think can be restored in the absence of interna-
tional inspectors.  To deter Iraq, Iran has been developing its own
counterforce, which includes a large SSM capability and the deploy-
ment of Russian-supplied long-range strike aircraft.  It has also been
building up its air defense systems around strategic targets.

The cross-border military operations of the MKO are a cause of con-
cern for the Artesh and the IRGC alike.  Iranian armed forces regu-
larly attack MKO facilities (with aircraft and missiles) deep inside
Iraq, a pattern that, in the absence of a formal peace treaty between
Tehran and Baghdad, is likely to continue.

The IRGC sees itself as a defender of the Iraqi Shi’as.  The IRGC is
heavily engaged in training and maintaining the military wing of
Iraqi Islamic insurgent groups such as the SCIRI and Al-Da’wa.  The
Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) assists it in these activi-
ties.  The IRGC has prepared itself for swift action should Baghdad
become more vulnerable in the south, or should its worsening situa-
tion require greater Iranian intervention.  The IRGC’s Iraqi Shi’a al-
lies are actively engaged in anti-MKO operations, penetrating Iraqi
territory.

______________

 

7Iran News, February 6, 1998.  Key targets will include Iran’s nuclear infrastructure
and its oil industry, both within easy reach of Iraqi aircraft and SSMs.

Impact on Foreign Policy

59

In contrast to its situation in many other policy areas, the defense es-
tablishment has considerable influence over Iran’s policy toward
Iraq.  Tehran develops its Iraq strategy through the intelligence, and
clandestine operations that the IRGC, military intelligence, and the
MOIS conduct in Iraq, and through the information that the Iran-
based Shi’a opposition groups bring.  Thus, despite the recommen-
dation of several radical elements in Tehran that Iran should throw
its lot in with Iraq and form an anti-U.S. front with Syria and Iraq, the
military institutions’ threat assessment of Iraq and their calculations
about the negative impact on Iran’s national security of such an al-
liance continue to hold sway.  The Artesh regards any alliance with
Iraq as pure adventurism, a term also used by President Khatami
himself.

Russia

Russia’s relations with Iran have become friendly, if hardly close, de-
spite Russia’s history of imperialism and past attempts to annex
Iranian territories.  Moreover, relations have improved despite
Moscow’s brutal war against Muslims in Afghanistan and two wars
against Muslim Chechens.

The explanation for this closeness is pragmatic necessity.  Iran’s cul-
tivation of the Soviet Union and then Russia started during the war
with Iraq.  Soviet-manufactured arms took the place of U.S. and
other embargoed Western arms.  This created a link, especially with
regard to aircraft, which Iran has sought to tighten.

8

  Nuclear tech-

nology embargoed by the United States and its allies was also sup-
plied by Russia, which professes to see no proliferation threat from
Iran.  Thus, Russia, while certainly not the supplier of choice, has be-
come the supplier of necessity.

The relationship is businesslike rather than based on shared interests
or warm intergovernment relations.  The technology transfers and
training that Moscow supplies remain strictly tied to Iran’s capacity

______________

 

8The first supplies of Soviet-type equipment came from North Korea and China, fol-
lowed by direct arms agreements with Moscow.  A similar pattern emerged with Scud
missiles.  Iran first received Scud missiles and technology from Syria and Libya.  Later,
North Korea and China filled the gap, after which Iran received technology transfers
from Russia.

60

Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era

to pay.  This was evident in the transfer of the three Kilo-class sub-
marines, whose delivery was staggered accordingly.  This feeling is
mutual and suggests that Tehran does not have any illusions that it
has gained in terms of reliability or sophistication in exchanging the
United States for Russia as a supplier of technology.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Iran also has cultivated Russia to
offset U.S. dominance.  Iran, like Russia, China, and India, sees the
emergence of a unipolar world as troubling enough to encourage at
least thinking about offsetting geopolitical axes.  This effort, however,
has produced little actual cooperation, and Moscow remains suspi-
cious of Iran’s regional ambitions and support for Muslim move-
ments.

As it has in general regarding restive minorities, Iran has tried to fos-
ter stability rather than encourage unrest in areas of mutual interest
to Russia.  Iran first signaled this preference in 1989 when it sought,
unsuccessfully, to use its influence in the Muslim parts of the Soviet
Union to discourage unrest that might contribute to the breakup of
the state.  Since then, Iran has avoided excessive criticism of Russian
repression of the Muslim parts of the former Soviet Union.  In ex-
change for technology and stability, the Islamic Republic has been
willing to swallow its principles and abandon Muslim solidarity.

Chechnya illustrates Iran’s hard-nosed realpolitik policy toward
Russia.  Although making polite noises about human rights, Iran has
avoided harsh and open condemnation of Russia, despite the deaths
of thousands of Muslim civilians.  Iranian leaders have consistently
referred to Chechnya as an “internal matter.”

9

Iran’s and Russia’s interests may overlap in regard to wanting re-
gional stability, opposing U.S. hegemony, and conducting a mutually
beneficial arms trade, but the two are more likely to be rivals on other
fronts.  A resurgent Russia with a revived nationalism is not likely to
be an easy or desirable neighbor.  The Caucasus and Central Asia
remain potential areas of conflict.  Iran and Russia both seek to pre-
vent U.S. influence in the Caucasus from growing but are far from
agreeing on their respective roles.  It is not in Iran’s interest that

______________

 

9Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Iran Report, vol. 2, no. 45, December 15, 1999
(electronic version).

Impact on Foreign Policy

61

Russia dominate the former southern Soviet republics.  Nor do Iran
and Russia share economic or energy interests.  Iran would like to be
the principal energy route for exports from the region, whether via
the Persian Gulf or across Iran to South Asia.  So too would Russia.

Agendas of Iran’s Security Institutions

The concerns of the Artesh are important factors in shaping Iran’s
policy toward Russia, while those of the IRGC—which are far more
ambivalent—play less of a role.

The  Artesh views Moscow as a possible, though hardly dependable,
ally against U.S. pressure and as an important source of military
hardware and software.  Some officers, while complaining about the
Russian suppression of the Chechen rebels, speak positively of
Russia’s role in helping the Iranian armed forces and stabilizing
Central Asia, particularly with regard to countering the Taliban’s in-
fluence.  The Artesh looks to Russia for training and also for the sup-
ply of spares and technical know-how.  The Artesh hopes to gain
from the transfer of Russian satellite and space technologies and of
Russian airframe materials, technologies, and avionics.  The Artesh
also hopes that improved political relations with Russia and India
will mean that it can pursue tripartite military exchanges and exploit
India’s vast experience in Soviet military hardware and technologies
for its own military R&D purposes.

10

The IRGC is far more critical of Russia, but it swallows its concerns
for realpolitik reasons.  The IRGC is a close observer of Russia’s bru-
tal strategy in the Caucasus and is more critical of its military opera-
tions in Chechnya.  There have even been unconfirmed reports that
the IRGC had intended to send volunteers and to provide training for
Chechen fighters.  It sees Russia as a decadent, weak, and corrupt
society, which colors its perspective on Iranian-Russian relations.
The IRGC’s concern, however, is tempered by its reliance on Russia
for many weapons systems and support technology.

______________

 

10Iran has also been pursuing a parallel tripartite military tie-up based on a partner-
ship among itself, China, and India.

62

Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era

The focus of Iran’s intelligence agencies is on locating Russian mili-
tary secrets and identifying key Russian personnel who can help
Iran’s military and other industries.

China

In the past decade, China has had more-extensive military relations
with Iran than with any other country except Pakistan and possibly
North Korea.  Beijing has sold to Iran thousands of tanks, artillery
pieces, and armored personnel carriers; more than 100 fighters; and
dozens of small warships.  Beijing has also sold to Iran an array of
missile systems and technology, including air-to-air missiles, sur-
face-to-air missiles, and anti-shipping cruise missiles.  Most worri-
some has been China’s transfer of ballistic missile technology and its
assistance with Iran’s WMD programs.  China’s transfers include a
range of items that helped Iran build its WMD infrastructure, im-
prove the expertise of its scientists and technicians, and otherwise
develop its WMD capabilities.  Cooperation in these areas continued
at a robust pace until at least October 1997, when China, in part due
to U.S. pressure, agreed to suspend or curtail transfers of WMD-
related items and anti-shipping missile systems and technology

11

and to provide no new assistance to Iran’s nuclear programs.  In
January 1998, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen received an
assurance from Chinese President Jiang Xemin that China would not
transfer additional anti-shipping cruise missiles or technology to
Iran or help it with indigenous production.

12

The commercial benefits of China’s sales to Iran have been consider-
able, particularly during the Iran-Iraq war.  China sold billions of
dollars to the Islamic Republic during the 1980s, and these sales pro-
vided Beijing with much-needed foreign currency and an important
source of exports.  Since the end of the Iran-Iraq war, the volume of
Beijing’s sales to Iran has fallen considerably—while China’s overall
trade has skyrocketed—but export earnings are still an important

______________

 

11For a complete review of China’s arms transfers, see Daniel L. Byman and Roger
Cliff, China’s Arms Sales: Motivations and Implications (Santa Monica, CA:  RAND,
1999).
12Shirley A. Kan, Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Current Policy
Issues (Washington, DC:  Congressional Research Service Brief, March 23, 1998), p. 6.

Impact on Foreign Policy

63

source of income for some of China’s cash-strapped defense in-
dustries.

China’s arms sales to Iran are made for foreign policy reasons and for
commercial reasons, however.  Until recently, China had a strong
strategic and political interest in close ties to Iran, as China’s leaders
considered Iran a bulwark against Soviet expansion in the region.
Even today, Beijing appreciates Tehran’s attempts to avoid aligning
closely with Russia or the United States.

13

  And because most re-

gional oil-producing states are close allies of the United States,
Beijing seeks to ensure at least a modicum of influence in the region
by maintaining good relations with Tehran.

Beijing also recognizes that preventing Iran from improving its mili-
tary is a U.S. priority, and it may exploit U.S. sensitivity on this issue
to attempt to influence U.S. policies in other areas.  For example,
after the United States announced it was selling F-16s to Taiwan,
China revived a proposed transfer of M-11 missiles to Iran that had
earlier been canceled due to U.S. pressure.

14

  Ties to Iran thus pro-

vide Beijing with additional leverage in negotiations with the United
States.

Chinese interest in maintaining the flow of oil has so far led Beijing to
cultivate relations with Tehran, though this could change in the
coming years.  China’s dependence on imported oil has grown
steadily since 1994, and it is likely to do so in the future.  Thus, China
seeks allies in key oil-producing regions, such as the Persian Gulf.  In
a crisis, these countries would not likely sell China oil on preferential
terms, but Chinese analysts believe that maintaining good relations
with leading oil-exporting nations such as Iran is important to
China’s future energy security.

15

  The United States, however, has

attempted to convince Beijing that Iranian-backed instability threat-
ens to interrupt the free flow of oil from the Gulf, which could drive
up the price of oil and jeopardize China’s economic growth.  U.S.
officials claimed that China’s promises to cut nuclear cooperation

______________

 

13Bates Gill, Silkworms and Summitry: Chinese Arms Exports to Iran (New York: The
Asia and Pacific Rim Institute of the American Jewish Committee, 1997), p. 7.
14Gill, Silkworms and Summitry, p. 21.
15Interviews conducted with Chinese security analysts of the Institute of West Asian
and African Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, June 1998.

64

Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era

with Iran made at the October 1997 summit occurred in large part
because China recognized this danger.

16

Iran, for its part, sees China as an important political partner and as a
source of weapons systems.  China, with its UN seat and resistance to
U.S. hegemony, was one of the few major powers willing to maintain
strong and cordial relations with Tehran even during the more heady
days of the revolutionary regime.  Perhaps more important, Tehran
greatly appreciated Beijing’s willingness to support Iran’s missile and
nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) programs.  Moreover, since
Iran, like China, seeks to avoid import dependence, Beijing is often a
preferred partner because it has been willing to transfer knowledge,
expertise, and critical subsystems as well.  This has enabled Iran to
produce its own variants of Chinese cruise and ballistic missile sys-
tems.

In recent years, China’s relations with Iran appear to have cooled,
and the transfer of arms has fallen in turn.  The ending of the Iran-
Iraq war and the low price of oil mean that Iran no longer has the
need or the ability to buy large quantities of Chinese arms.  U.S.
sanctions and Iran’s economic mismanagement have caused grave
economic problems for the Islamic Republic, forcing it to reduce its
defense budget.  For its part, China no longer sees Iran as a vital bul-
wark against Russian expansion.  Indeed, China often cooperates
with Russia against the West.  U.S. pressure and China’s desire to be
seen as a responsible power make Iran a potentially costly friend.
U.S. pressure played a major role in Beijing’s October 1997 decision
to curtail military cooperation with Iran.

Agendas of Iran’s Security Institutions

Iran’s security institutions appear to share the broader regime’s goals
of cultivating China as a way of balancing the United States.  In addi-
tion, they recognize that China can act as an important arms sup-
plier, particularly for missiles and nonconventional systems.

______________

 

16“A New China Embracing Nuclear Nonproliferation,” International Herald Tribune,
December 11, 1997, p. 1.

Impact on Foreign Policy

65

China, however, is not Iran’s preferred partner for most conventional
systems.  The U.S. success in Desert Storm had highlighted to Tehran
the importance of advanced weaponry.  After the Persian Gulf war,
Tehran bought advanced submarines, fighter aircraft, tanks, and sur-
face-to-air missiles from Russia:  The Chinese systems, while
cheaper, were clearly inferior.  Only after 1995, when Russia pledged
that it would not make further arms contracts with Iran, did Tehran
resume looking to China for conventional arms.  In addition, Iranian
military officials have shown little faith in the quality of Chinese
weapons:  During the Iran-Iraq war, they sought to avoid using
Chinese systems whenever possible during important battles.

Turkey

During much of the Cold War, Tehran and Ankara cooperated with
the West and with each other against the Soviet Union.  Each state
felt that Moscow was expansionist—both had faced possible Russian
occupation of parts of their territories in the immediate aftermath of
World War Two—and decided to swap neutrality for the safer pos-
ture of alignment with the West.  As non-Arab states that had not
been colonized, Iran and Turkey found that they often shared per-
spectives on the world’s problems.

Since the revolution, Iran has had an uneasy relationship with
Turkey.  Ankara found Iran’s support for Turkey’s Islamist elements
in the 1980s and 1990s provocative.  Iran, for its part, avoided close
relations due to Turkey’s ties to the West and avowed secularism.
Nevertheless, their mutual anti-Soviet sentiment and the legacy of
previous cooperation contributed to polite relations.  However, the
potential for volatile relations remains high given the two countries’
strategic competition and differing world views.

In general, Iran and Turkey share goals with regard to Iraq.  Both op-
pose Saddam Hussein’s regime.  Moreover, both balance this hostil-
ity with a concern for massive instability in Iraq.  In the wake of the
war, together with Syria, they consulted to ensure a coordinated ap-
proach in the event Iraq was to fragment.  Iran has opposed Turkey’s
periodic incursions into Iraq in search of Kurdish Workers’ Party
(PKK) elements that have sought sanctuary there.  Yet this opposition
appears token at most.  Both countries fear a strong Iraqi Kurdish
movement that might embolden minorities in their own countries.

66

Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era

(Of course, Iran’s anti-Kurdish policies at home have not led it to cut
its ties to the PKK, which Iran sees as necessary for leverage with
Ankara.)

The prediction that Iran and Turkey would inevitably compete for
influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia has not come to pass.
Iran, however well situated geographically, lacks capital and is re-
garded by the governments in the region with caution and skepti-
cism.  The U.S.-led embargo has also handicapped Iran’s diplomacy
in the region.  Accordingly, Iran has trimmed down whatever ambi-
tions it may have had to ensuring its national interests and empha-
sizing its cultural and historical connections, rather than the Islamic
element, with the Caucasian and Central Asian states.  Turkey, by
contrast, has benefited from U.S. support, generally and with regard
to the construction of a pipeline to bring Caspian oil to the market.
Turkey, however, is handicapped by geography in that it has little
direct access to the Caucasus–Central Asia region, and the region
provides few immediate economic prospects.  If anything, Iran and
Turkey share common interests in containing conflicts and limiting
Russian influence.  As a result of this combination of mutual interests
and prudence, rivalry between Iran and Turkey is low-key and re-
strained.

Turkey’s membership in NATO and its cooperation with Israel raise
the most difficulties for Iran.  In recent years, both the Artesh and the
IRGC have worried about the burgeoning Israeli-Turkish alliance and
the access to Iran’s borders that this alliance might offer Israel.  Iran’s
leaders have expressed their fears to Ankara, drawn closer to Syria,
and broadened their regional contacts by working more closely with
rivals of Turkey, such as Greece, Armenia, and Georgia.  Of more
concern to Turkey, Iran recently increased support for the PKK—
support that led to a direct, if very small, clash between the two mili-
taries in July 1999.

17

______________

 

17Iran claims that Turkish troops in July 1999 attacked sites in Iran as part of their
anti-PKK campaign.  Turkey claims that these were sites in northern Iraq and ques-
tions the presence of Iranians there.  A joint commission to discuss security was revi-
talized, and a parliamentary friendship group was created.  Iran assured Turkey that
its eastern border would remain safe and secure.  See the comments of Hojjat el Eslam
Hasan Rowhani, Vice-Speaker of the Majles, IRNA (in English), BBC ME/3700 MED/7,
November 24, 1999.  See also the brief report on the incident in Le Monde, July 20,
1999, p. 7.

Impact on Foreign Policy

67

Tehran’s residual support for Islam abroad causes problems for
Turkey as well.  Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit has accused
Iran of seeking to export its ideology to Turkey.  As long as Iran per-
ceives Turkey’s cooperation with Israel as aimed at itself, its support
for the PKK, and perhaps Turkish Islamist groups, will continue.

Despite these irritants, the prognosis for better relations—or for at
least no major downturn—remains positive.  Iran and Turkey have
no disputed borders, no notable historical resentments, and no other
sources of disagreement.  Both share common, or at least not con-
flicting, goals in Central Asia and in Iraq.  Moreover, there is consid-
erable scope for economic cooperation between the two states.  Iran
has oil and gas that it can export to energy-thirsty Turkey, and Iran
can act as a transit route of energy exports from Turkmenistan and
Kazakhstan.  Close cooperation, however, awaits the resolution of
Iran’s problems with the United States, which has strongly protested
Ankara’s cooperation with Tehran.

Agendas of Iran’s Security Institutions

The Artesh views Turkey as a powerful neighbor with a large military
machine, strong security and military ties with the West, and a sub-
stantial presence on Iran’s western (in northern Iraq) and northern
(in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan) borders.  Despite Turkey’s
politico-military superiority, in recent years Iranian leaders have
taken a series of potshots at its secular leadership, which has an-
noyed Ankara and forced it to respond in kind.  This has also in-
creased the pressure on the Artesh to plan for a possible escalation in
political hostilities.  In response, the Artesh has strengthened its mili-
tary facilities in Iranian Azerbaijan and has reinforced several of its
border posts on the Iran-Turkey border.

The tense border military exchanges between Iran and Turkey and
Turkey’s free hand in Iraqi Kurdistan have increased the Artesh’s
fears of instability in Iranian Kurdish regions.  In addition, some offi-
cers voice the opinion that Turkey’s Pan-Turanists are looking for a
land corridor through Iran to Azerbaijan and that Iran should put in
place a defense plan along its western territories.  But a Pan-Turkic
onslaught is not seen as a serious threat to Iran.  The Artesh is more
worried about the security impact of Azeri-Turkish relations in the

68

Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era

context of Baku’s anti-Persian propaganda and its campaign to di-
vorce Iranian Azerbaijan from Iranian territory.

The  Artesh is particularly worried about the growing relationship
between Turkey and Israel.  Artesh leaders see this partnership as
posing a possible direct threat to the country’s security and exposing
Iran’s vital western and central territories (the country’s most impor-
tant regions economically and demographically) to the Israeli armed
forces and intelligence-gathering services.  It is believed in Tehran
that the Turkish-Israeli partnership gives Israel the opportunity to
spy on the Iranian border and enables the two countries to train
Iran’s Kurds while also enabling Turkey to suppress the PKK in east-
ern Turkey.  Tehran also believes that Turkish intelligence has given
the Mossad access to information about Iran and about Iranian resi-
dents in and visitors to Turkey.

The Artesh does not want a military confrontation with a NATO
member and close ally of the United States.  Some Artesh strategists
are also concerned that a confrontation with Turkey will adversely
affect Iran’s relations with the European Union, Iran’s main trading
partner and a possible future source of military hardware and exper-
tise.

The military tensions with Turkey in the summer of 1999 suggest the
Artesh’s caution.  Clearly, the Artesh was suffering from wounded
pride when Turkish forces struck at Iranian-backed PKK elements—
hence the air force’s maneuvers on the Iran-Turkey border in mid-
August.  Tehran, however, returned the two captured Turkish sol-
diers and chose not to escalate the situation by retaliating against the
Turkish military’s provocation.  This incident raised the Artesh’s
threat assessment of Turkey and its level of preparedness in western
Iran.  However, the Artesh advised caution in the internal debate
about the border incursion, arguing that after a show of force the sit-
uation should be contained.

The IRGC is engaged in the Turkish debate for domestic security rea-
sons.  The core reason is the Israeli connection:  The IRGC sees its
role as conducting counterintelligence activities vis-à-vis the Israelis
in Turkey on the one hand, and pressing Turkey to limit its relation-
ship with Israel on the other.  The latter, Turkish sources allege, is
being done through increased Iranian (IRGC and MOIS) support for

Impact on Foreign Policy

69

the Kurdish separatists and development of links with Turkey’s bur-
geoning Islamist movement.

The IRGC is also concerned by Turkey’s secularism and close ties to
the West.  Ankara embodies a direct challenge to the ideals of the
Islamic revolution, and its economic success and foreign policy
influence challenge the model offered by Iran.

The MOIS’s interest in Turkey stems from Turkey’s contacts with the
West.  The MOIS also monitors the presence of a large Iranian com-
munity living and working in the country whose members can enter
Turkey without a visa and often transit Turkey to and from Syria.

Afghanistan

Afghanistan is a difficult and dangerous issue for Iran’s rulers.  The
flow of drugs, the problem of kidnapping, and the threat of Islamic
instability emanating from Afghanistan are viewed as major threats
in Iran.  There is agreement that, perhaps next to Iraq, the Taliban
pose the most serious threat to Iran’s security today—but the nature
of that threat is amorphous.

18

  Like Iraq, Iran feels a certain affinity

and responsibility for the Shi’a population located in the Hazarajat
province.  And, also like Iraq, Iran has found itself unable to act ef-
fectively as that Shi’a population’s protector.  Iran hosts around 2
million Afghan refugees, many of whom have resided in Iran for over
20 years.  Afghanistan is also a major source of illegal drugs that enter
Iran.  Finally, the Taliban have provided a haven and support to the
MKO and to Sunni radicals who oppose the regime in Tehran.  Un-
like with Iraq, however, the Taliban do not pose a threat to Iran’s
territorial integrity, and their military forces are weak.  Iran’s leaders
believe they can contain the Taliban by fostering their own loyal
proxies among Afghanistani Shi’a and by working with the Taliban’s
other enemies.

Tehran is particularly alarmed by the Taliban’s consolidation of
power in Afghanistan.  The Taliban are virulently anti-Shi’a and have
cracked down brutally on the Shi’as of the Hazarajat.  Moreover, the
Taliban are primarily Pashtun and have subjugated Persian-speaking

______________

 

18Private discussions with Iranian officials.

70

Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era

Tajiks.  The Taliban’s leadership is hostile to Iran, seeing it (quite
rightly) as a supporter of its Shi’a foes and of its opponents in gen-
eral.

A direct conflict almost occurred after the Taliban overran Mazar-e
Sharif in mid-1998.  In attacking and then massacring large numbers
of Shi’as, including a number of Iranian diplomats, the Taliban chal-
lenged Tehran directly.  Iran mobilized its forces and reinforced its
frontier, warning of serious consequences.  But Iran was unwilling to
get involved in the Afghan civil war.  Iran could only repeat the need
for a solution that transcended ethnic divisions.

Tehran has abandoned its revolutionary goal of creating a pro-
Iranian Islamic state.  Iran’s preferred outcome is to preserve some-
thing close to the status quo:

19

 no redrawing of the map or re-

configuration of the power balance between state and minorities.
The risk of fragmentation in Afghanistan has underscored Iran’s
stake in regional order.  Iran has in recent years sought to promote a
formula for peace in Afghanistan that includes all major ethnic
groups in a national coalition.

20

______________

 

19As former president Rafsanjani observed: “Because of the multiethnic nature of
Afghanistan, the issue cannot be settled by force, or by the supremacy of one group.
That is a recipe for continued conflict.”  He went on to say:  “We are against the
Talibans or Afghans or seminarians.  We are opposed to their belligerent ideas, war-
mongering, and their unprincipled acts.  For us there is no differences [sic] between
Tajiks and Pashtuns.”  Hashemi Rafsanjani, Vision of IRI, Network 1 (Tehran), BBC
ME/3304 MED/1-5, August 15, 1998.  Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamene’i took the
same line:  “Of course there was discord, tribal strife.  However, it was not serious and
was not coupled with the use of religious, tribal, and nationality prejudices.
Unfortunately, it is like this now.”  Voice of IRI (Tehran), September 15, 1998, BBC
ME/3334 MED, September 17, 1998.  An Iranian radio commentary aired the prevail-
ing Iranian view:  “The fact must be accepted that the Afghan community is a multi-
ethnic, and although it is possible for one group to extend its dominance over the
whole of Afghanistan through military power, it will not mean the ending of the crisis.”
Voice of IRI, August 9, 1998, BBC ME/3302 MED/21, August 11, 1998.
20Tehran may be shifting its policy and recognizing the Taliban’s dominant position.
As the Taliban have extended their power, Iran has moved to recognize the inevitable
and to deal pragmatically with it.  See Pamela Constable, “Afghan Town Praises Iran
as Nearby Border Opens to Trade,” International Herald Tribune, December 23, 1999,
p. 1.

Impact on Foreign Policy

71

Agendas of Iran’s Security Institutions

For the Artesh, instability in Afghanistan and adventurism by the
Taliban pose a potential threat.  The Artesh also worries that further
suppression of the Shi’a minority in Afghanistan might force Iran to
take more direct action in their defense and get the military em-
broiled in an open-ended conflict in Afghanistan.  The Artesh’s
agenda, therefore, is to contain the Taliban threat and deter it by
show of force.

21

  Artesh leaders do not, however, believe that there

exists a military solution to the Afghan problem.

The  Artesh’s views are shared among Iran’s political leadership.
Despite the urging of the IRGC, the Artesh did not support an attack
on Afghanistan after the Mazar-e Sharif slaughter, because such a
move was seen as a dangerous, open-ended commitment—Iran
might fail to gain a victory.  In addition, it would have been a risky
undertaking for the regime when oil prices were low, as they were in
1998, and thus would not have been a popular war.

For the IRGC, on the other hand, the situation in Afghanistan has a
direct bearing on the health of the Islamic Republic.  The IRGC fa-
vored at least a punitive strike in Afghanistan in response to the
killing of Iranian diplomats in 1988.  The Taliban’s repression of the
Shi’a is a challenge to the IRGC’s role as defender of the faithful, and
its support of anti-regime radicals challenges the IRGC’s mandate to
protect the revolution.  The IRGC, charged with reducing and even-
tually eliminating the opium trade from Afghanistan, holds the
Taliban directly responsible for the opium trade and its impact on
Iranian society, which is devastating the youth (with some estimates
in excess of 2 million young addicts in Iran).

The IRGC is engaged in almost daily shoot-outs with smugglers from
Afghanistan and is taking heavy casualties, perhaps as many as a few
hundred a year.  Its response has been to bid for more military hard-
ware and better monitoring and intelligence-gathering equipment.
It has been active in the barrier- and fence-building programs on the
Iran-Afghanistan border.  The IRGC is also concerned about the
Taliban’s smuggling of arms into Iran and its support for anti-Iran

______________

 

21Tehran Times, September 22, 1998.

72

Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era

terrorist groups.  The IRGC is probably involved in the transfer of
arms and money to anti-Taliban groups.

The MOIS’s core activities have been to observe the Taliban, to aid
the anti-Taliban forces in the north, and to monitor Taliban-Pakistan
links.  Little more is known of the MOIS’s operations in Afghanistan,
but the MOIS does fulfill an important anti-sabotage role in eastern
Iran, where the Taliban have been active and where it is possible that
the MKO has been able to infiltrate through Afghanistan.  The MOIS
probably is involved in facilitating the transfer of arms to anti-
Taliban Afghan groups in the north.

Pakistan

Pakistan and Iran have long had close relations, but the health of this
relationship is declining.  During the Cold War, both countries feared
the growth of Moscow’s power in the region and backed different
anti-Soviet groups in Afghanistan.  The regular armed forces of both
countries have long maintained good working relationships, and the
defense establishments have conducted limited joint research.

In recent years, these strong ties have begun to fray.  Afghanistan has
gone from a source of unity to an issue of contention.  Pakistan’s re-
cent nuclear sabre rattling also highlighted for Iran its own relative
weakness regarding WMD.  Elements within the IRGC openly worry
about Pakistan’s support for the Taliban.  Iran also blamed Pakistan
for the death of Iranian diplomats in Afghanistan in August 1998.

22

In addition, as anti-Shi’a violence in Pakistan has escalated in recent
years, fears are growing that Pakistan may become virulently anti-
Shi’a.  Many forces in Islamabad, particularly its security establish-
ment, have forged close ties with anti-Shi’a forces in Saudi Arabia.
Pakistan’s Shi’a community feels threatened by the prospective in-
troduction of Sharia law.  If sectarian incidents continue, an exodus
of the Shi’a community seems likely.

23

______________

 

22Buchta, Who Rules Iran? p. 147.
23Farhan Bokari, “Pakistan’s Shias Live in Fear of Further Massacres,” Financial
Times, January 11, 1999.

Impact on Foreign Policy

73

Even more worrying for Iranian security agencies has been the
Pakistani government’s inability to rein in anti-Iranian activities.
Such acts as the 1999 murder of an Iranian diplomat in Multan, the
attack on Iran’s cultural center in Lahore in 1997, and the murder of
five IRGC officers in Rawalpindi in September 1997 have forced the
Iranian security forces to develop a more concerned line on Pakistan.

Agendas of Iran’s Security Institutions

The Artesh is keen to contain problems with Islamabad and capital-
ize on the existing relationship between the two countries’ armed
forces in order to strengthen Iran’s R&D efforts in military fields.
Furthermore,  Artesh commanders are not yet convinced that Pak-
istan poses a direct threat to Iran and its regional interests.  The
Artesh does, however, worry about the security fallout of the nuclear
arms race in the Indian subcontinent.  Officers have said in private
that Iran may have little option but to develop its own nuclear option
as a deterrent.

The IRGC is more concerned about Pakistan’s politico-military role
in the area.  First, there is the continuing violence against the Shi’a
community there.  The IRGC sees it as its mission to provide some
protection for this minority.  Second, the IRGC, along with the MOIS,
monitors the links between the Pakistani intelligence services and
the Taliban.  The IRGC and MOIS have also been known to wage
counterintelligence operations against the Pakistan-based MKO and
even to engage in murders of its members there.  In recent years,
though, this aspect of their operations in Pakistan has been less sig-
nificant.

The anti-Iranian activities in particular could lead to an increase in
tension.  The fear of the Artesh is that murders in Pakistan will lead to
an escalation of tensions between the two neighbors and may force
conventionally armed Iran to challenge its nuclear neighbor for the
first time.  At the other end of the scale, the IRGC has wanted revenge
for these deaths.

74

Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era

The Gulf States

Since the revolution, Iran’s relations with Saudi Arabia and the tradi-
tional Arab sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf have been troubled at best.
Immediately after the revolution, Iran sought to export its Islamist
revolutionary model to the Gulf states.  Tehran denounced Gulf
leaders as corrupt apostates and backed Shi’a radicals in the Gulf
states.  In the late 1980s and early 1990s, even as its revolutionary
ardor waned, Iran still competed with Saudi Arabia for leadership of
the Muslim world.  Iran forged ties to Sunni Muslim radicals, whom
the Gulf states viewed as a grave threat.

Since 1996, however, Iran has courted the Gulf states with some suc-
cess.  Saudi Arabia has been Tehran’s primary target.  The two coun-
tries’ defense ministers have met several times, and Iranian naval
vessels have visited the Saudi Red Sea port of Jeddah.  Iran has also
sought to improve its relations with Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait.  The
Iranian military has been planning joint exercises with its Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) neighbors, area military commanders
have visited one another’s capitals, and Iran has announced plans for
confidence-building measures in the Gulf.

24

The warming of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia is indicative
of a genuine pragmatism on the part of Iran.  Even a few years ago,
the possibility of a rapprochement appeared remote.

25

  Iran has had

to soften its claims to Muslim leadership and its campaign against
Saudi Arabia’s “corrupt” and “American” Islam.  Iran has curbed its
rivalry with the Saudis to the extent of relinquishing its customary
practice of staging demonstrations during the Hajj.  Moreover, Iran
has made sure that its opposition to the Taliban did not affect its
rapprochement with Saudi Arabia, which has often favored the
Taliban.

______________

 

24For example, the commander of the Iranian navy, Admiral Abbas Mohtaj, observed
that Iran and Oman had already sent delegations to monitor each other’s exercises
and looked to others to follow suit.  IRNA (Tehran, in English), September 4, 1999, BBC
ME/3632 MED/13, September 6, 1999.
25Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, “Iran-Saudi Relations and Regional Order,”
Adelphi Paper, no. 304 (London: IISS, 1996).

Impact on Foreign Policy

75

Iran’s improved relations have borne fruit.  Saudi Arabia and Iran, to
the surprise of many observers, have cooperated with regard to oil
production in OPEC, with little or no cheating.  Tehran also seeks to
cool the UAE’s hostility regarding mutual claims to Abu Musa and
the Tunb Islands, working with the other Gulf states to isolate the
UAE.  In practice, Iran has abandoned its demands that the Gulf
states stop supporting Western troops and is now seeking to use mili-
tary cooperation to reassure the Gulf states.

The rapprochement with Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states ex-
emplifies the increasing importance of economics in Iran’s foreign
policy.  The need to improve coordination in OPEC in the face of
declining oil prices overcame Iran’s religious and nationalist convic-
tions.  Iran has been able to reverse its policies in the Gulf without
serious internal opposition or dissent, which suggests that most
elites recognize the need for better relations with the Gulf states.

Iran shares several other interests with the GCC states that con-
tribute to better relations.  Iran, like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, sees
Saddam’s Iraq as aggressive and highly dangerous.  Both Iran and the
GCC states seek stability of the waterway to ensure the flow of oil.
Iran also wants to exploit and manage the resources of the region
when feasible.  Thus, it supplies water to Qatar and is working with it
to develop their shared natural gas reserves.

Relations are not harmonious in all areas.  Tehran is troubled by the
close ties the Gulf states have to Washington and their support for
the U.S. military presence in the region.  More generally, Iran seeks
to be recognized as the preeminent regional power—a goal in keep-
ing with its nationalist ambitions.  To this end, it wants the Gulf
states to respect its wishes and interests.  In the past, it also has pur-
sued its claim to Abu Musa and the Tunb Islands aggressively, even
though these are also claimed by the UAE.

Tehran still regards Saudi Arabia as an ideological rival, in Central
Asia and in west Asia, and as a close ally of the United States.  Riyadh
is conscious of the latent threat Iran poses to its interests in the
Persian Gulf and beyond, but is more keen at present to develop the
friendship with the pragmatic Iranian leadership and carve for itself
the role of a mediator in Iranian-American exploratory discussions.

76

Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era

Agendas of Iran’s Security Institutions

The Artesh has welcomed better relations with Saudi Arabia and has
pushed an agenda of confidence-building measures.  The Artesh has
worked with Iran’s Foreign Ministry to ensure that its voice is heard.
Since 1997, this strategy has been the dominant line out of Tehran.
Military realism, designed to reduce tensions, explains the high-level
military exchanges between Tehran and Riyadh and the less hostile
posture that the Iranian navy has been adopting toward the U.S. Fifth
Fleet in recent years.

Minister of Defense Admiral Ali Shamkhani has championed im-
proved relations with the GCC states as an effective way of blunting
the United States’ political attacks on Iran and removing any pretexts
for U.S. intervention against Iran, or indeed the continuing military
presence in the Persian Gulf.

26

  He and his Artesh advisors have been

instrumental in the development of military ties with Oman, going as
far as engaging in token exercises and joint patrolling of the Straits of
Hormuz.

27

The  Artesh seeks to detach its dispute with the UAE over Abu Musa
and the Tunb Islands from its broader relations with the Gulf states.
The  Artesh is of the view that it has to defend the disputed three is-
lands as part of Iranian territory, making it unlikely that the country
can reach a satisfactory accommodation with the UAE.  The Artesh
does not, however, want to see its show of force or government in-
transigence leading to an open confrontation with the UAE and the
GCC, which could invite the U.S. Fifth Fleet to take up position
against Iran.

______________

 

26Shamkhani’s calls for new Persian Gulf security arrangements have been adopted
by the political leadership and been built on by the Khatami administration.  It was
Shamkhani who said in 1997 that the Persian Gulf littoral states “should seriously opt
for formulation of a stable and coordinated strategy to reach sustainable security
without foreign involvement.”  Ettela’at International, January 9, 1997.
27The Artesh’s enthusiasm for a collective security pact in the Persian Gulf and the
lengths it is prepared to go to make this Iran’s declared Gulf policy were again high-
lighted in May 1999, during the official visit of Prince Sultan Bin Abdul Aziz, Saudi
Arabia’s Defense Minister, to Tehran.  Upon Prince Sultan’s arrival at Mehrabad air-
port, Shamkhani broke protocol, entering into a one-to-one exchange with the prince
in which he pushed the Persian Gulf collective security issue before his political mas-
ters had had the chance to enter into any discussions with the prince.

Impact on Foreign Policy

77

The IRGC has been told by Iran’s senior political leadership to reduce
its support for anti-regime Shi’a groups in the GCC, as is evident
from the apparent withdrawal of Iranian support for the Bahraini
opposition.  The MOIS, likewise, has a minor role to play in the GCC
context, except, wherever it can, to monitor the activities of Western
personnel and the Iranian community in these countries.

The IRGC, however, has played a leading role in preparing for con-
tingencies against the United States.  It has developed a denial doc-
trine, procuring weapons systems and training its forces as part of an
overall strategy to deter the United States from anti-Iranian actions
and, if necessary, impose costs on U.S. forces if they choose a con-
frontation.  The Artesh contributes to these efforts.

Central Asia and the Caucasus

The collapse of the Soviet Union offered tremendous potential bene-
fits to Iran.  Tehran looked at the newfound independence of the
states in the north as a diplomatic opportunity to break out of the
containment imposed by the United States.  Iran has cultural and
historical ties with the Caucasian states to its northwest and the
Central Asian states to its northeast (none more so than Persian-
speaking Tajikistan).  Furthermore, it shares with these states an in-
terest in nurturing their independence from Russia.

Geography favors Iran.  Most of these states are landlocked.
Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan have access to the
Caspian, but this is a closed, inland sea.  Quite apart from trade with
Iran, gaining access to the open waters of the south is important to
these states for securing markets in the Middle East and beyond.
Iran’s natural link from the Caspian to the Gulf and, through it, to the
Indian Ocean thus constitutes a potentially important asset for Iran
in its relations with these states.  Iran’s own economy stands to
benefit from such relations, from the viewpoint not just of transit
fees or even swap arrangements but also of markets for goods that
Iran itself produces.

28

______________

 

28Amir Houshang Amini, “Iran’s Standing in the Regional Geo-Economic Equation,”
Iran Commerce (Iran Chamber of Commerce, Industries and Mines), vol. 4, no. 2,
Autumn 1997, pp. 20-24.

78

Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era

As a result of poor relations with the United States, however, few of
these potential advantages have been realized.  U.S. sanctions, pres-
sure against projects with Iran, and inducements for alternative
schemes have closed this avenue for Iran’s economic development.
Given the parlous state of Iran’s economy, finding ways to benefit
from this area is likely to remain a priority.

The Caspian itself is an issue, both of cooperation and of rivalry.
Iran, like Russia, seeks a share of Caspian resources greater than the
share it is entitled to based on its coastline.  Tehran also seeks re-
gional stability to encourage trade and the development of resources.
In addition, the Caspian is an important training base for Iran’s navy.

Concerns About Communal Unrest

This enthusiasm for the economic opportunities Central Asia offers is
tempered in practice by a real conservatism with regard to existing
borders and support for the rights of minorities.  In general, Tehran
has sought stability.  When conflict has arisen, Iran’s preferred stance
has been as mediator, offering its good offices and suggesting peace
formulas.  It has sought (not always successfully) to avoid identifica-
tion with one side.

29

  Tehran fears that the disintegration of neigh-

boring states and the assertiveness of their ethnic groups could cre-
ate models for Iran’s own potentially restive communities.  Given the
location of Iran’s minorities on its periphery and adjacent to these
areas, the risks of spillover and imitation would be profound.  Hence,
Iran has eschewed opportunism or activism:

•

In June 1989, on a visit to the USSR, President Rafsanjani advised
Azerbaijan to stay within the USSR.

•

Iran, in contrast to Turkey, reluctantly and belatedly recognized
the breakup of the USSR.

______________

 

29See inter alia the articles of:  Hanna Yousif Freij, “State Interest vs. the Umma:
Iranian Policy in Central Asia,” Middle East Journal, vol. 50, no. 1, Winter 1996, pp. 71-
83; Adam Tarock, “Iran’s Policy in Central Asia,” Central Asian Survey, vol. 16, no. 2,
1997, pp. 185-200; Mohiaddin Mesbahi, “Tajikistan, Iran and the International Politics
of the ‘Islamic Factor,’” Central Asian Survey, vol. 16, no. 2, 1997, pp. 141-158. See also,
“Iran’s Relations with the States of Central Asia and Transcaucasia,” Background Brief
(London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, August 1998).

Impact on Foreign Policy

79

•

In Persian-speaking Tajikistan, Iran offered a formula for peace
based on the inclusion of all factions, despite its cultural ties and
the strength of the Islamist movement there.

•

Iran has worked closely with Christian Armenia, supporting it
tacitly in its conflict with Shi’a Muslim Azerbaijan.

•

During Russia’s wars with Muslim Chechnya, Iran referred to the
matter as an “internal” issue.

Azerbaijan has great potential to destabilize Iran, but both govern-
ments have adopted cautious and pragmatic policies toward each
other.  Even though there is little support for Azeri separatism in Iran,
Tehran is particularly sensitive to any threat to its ethnic harmony
and has sought the extradition of Iranian Azeri separatists from Baku.
Fortunately for Iran, there is little evidence that Baku seeks to pro-
mote unification of the two Azerbaijans.  Iranian Azeri separatist in-
clinations are limited and dormant.  Groups such as the New Union
Organization, headed by Mohammed Ali Galibi, do not appear to
enjoy mass support.  Preoccupied with unstable politics, a succes-
sion problem, the conflict with Armenia, and pipeline politics,
Azerbaijan cultivates Iranian support.  This fits in with Iran’s priori-
ties—to emphasize state-to-state relations and common interests.

30

Given the instability in the region, Iran has both mediated disputes
and used its muscle to prevent any dramatic change in the status
quo.  Iran has tried to mediate the Nagarno Karabakh dispute, but
when Azerbaijan was threatened by an Armenian offensive in mid-
1993, which produced a steady stream of refugees across the Iranian
border, Iran threatened Armenia with direct intervention.  For Iran,
balancing rather than taking sides is not always easy.  Domestic
politics and Pan-Shi’a sympathy argued for a tilt in favor of the
Azeris.  Pragmatic national interest, however, argued for an approach
that left Iran with influence with Armenian, particularly as Turkey
has favored Baku.

______________

 

30President Khatami, after referring to the common historical, religious, and cultural
bonds shared by the two countries, observed:  “What’s important is that the fates of
the two countries are linked together.”  Mohammed Khatami, IRNA, December 1,
1998.

80

Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era

Iran has cultivated Turkmenistan, with which it shares a border of
1,500 kilometers.

31

 A friendship treaty was signed in 1992.  In 1996,

the Bandar Abbas-Tedzhen railway line opened communications be-
tween Turkmenistan and other Central Asian states and Iran and
Turkey.  Border trade is growing.  Iran’s Turkoman population shows
no sign of restiveness or a desire to link up with their nomadic
cousins of the north.

Agendas of Iran’s Security Institutions

Neither the Artesh nor the IRGC focuses considerable attention on
Central Asia or the Caucasus.  The Artesh does monitor the Afghani-
Tajik border and the flow of arms to pro-Taliban forces in Central
Asia.  It has not developed a coherent policy toward instability in
Central Asia and, since the departure of the Kazakh nuclear war-
heads, does not regard Central Asian states as major threats to Iran.
The  Artesh has been directed to strategize about a possible joint
American-Turkish–sponsored military move into Central Asia and
the use of Central Asian territories as launching pads for operations
against Iran.  It is not known how the Artesh’s strategic thinking on
these matters has been unfolding.  The IRGC and MOIS have an al-
most invisible role there and, since the Tajik civil war in the early
1990s, have not been engaged in any known operations there.

Three issues underpin the Artesh’s thinking about Azerbaijan and
Armenia:  the danger that renewed fighting will lead to an influx of
refugees to Iran, increased outside involvement in the area, and con-
cern about the militarization of the Caspian as a consequence of oil
exploration.  The Artesh, already preparing a strategy for develop-
ment of Iran’s naval presence and facilities in the Caspian, is anxious
to portray these moves as defensive measures designed to protect
Iran’s Caspian interests.  The Turkish-Israeli dimension rears its
head here as well, as the Artesh’s political masters see the two coun-
tries bolstering Azerbaijan’s position vis-à-vis Iran.

______________

 

31Turkmenistan is a desert fiefdom of 5 million run by an authoritarian ruler.  There
are 800,000 Turkomans in the northeastern Iranian province of Khorasan.
Turkmenistan has proclaimed itself officially neutral.  It remains poor and landlocked,
with its potential wealth from gas so far unrealized.  Turkmenistan’s political devel-
opment matches its economy, which is archaic and primitive.

Impact on Foreign Policy

81

Neither the IRGC nor the MOIS plays a prominent role with relation
to Azerbaijan and Armenia.  The IRGC seeks to win over the sympa-
thies of its only Shi’a-dominated neighbor, but the regime limits the
scope of its activities.  The MOIS’s interest is in containing any sepa-
ratist campaigns across the border in Iranian Azerbaijan.  Neither,
however, is willing to challenge the existing tilt toward Yerevan.

Syria and Lebanon

Iran and Syria have close relations that are entirely geostrategic in
origin.  For the two decades after the revolution, both nations
shunned the West, rejected peace with Israel, and opposed Saddam
Hussein’s regime in Baghdad.  Moreover, the ’Alawi regime in Syria is
anathema to Sunni radicals, as is Iran’s Shi’a regime.  Both countries
sought to use Lebanon’s Shi’a population to harass Israel.  While al-
most the entire Arab world supported Iraq in its war with Iran,
Damascus sided with Tehran.

Iran’s relations with Lebanon have long been close, if unusual.  In
contrast to its course in the states along its border, Tehran has long
worked at a subnational level in Lebanon and has fostered instability
in the country.  In 1982, Iran deployed a 1,500-man contingent of the
IRGC to Baalbak in Lebanon that helped organize, train, supply, and
support Hezballah.

32

  Many Lebanese Shi’a religious leaders studied

in Iran.  Indeed, an older generation of religious leaders of both
countries studied in theological seminars in Iraq.

Iran has cut back its support for Hezballah, but ties remain strong.
In the 1990s, the IRGC’s presence was cut to roughly 150 fighters.
Hezballah, for its part, has moved away from parroting the line of the
Iranian government and focuses far more on the narrower concerns
of Lebanon’s Shi’a community.  Since 1992, Hezballah has partici-
pated in Lebanon’s parliamentary politics, further leading the
movement to moderate its agenda.  Hezballah’s leaders have also re-
frained from recognizing Ayatollah Khamene’i as their source of

______________

 

32Augustus Richard Norton, “Walking Between Raindrops: Hizballah in Lebanon,”
Mediterranean Politics, vol. 3, no. 1, Summer 1998, p. 86.

82

Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era

emulation, further straining ties.

33

  Iran, however, continues to arm

Hezballah and encourages it to maintain a significant military ca-
pability.

So far, Iranian and Syrian interests have operated in relative har-
mony, but Iran’s policy toward Lebanon will depend heavily on the
status of Syrian-Israeli relations.  The impact of the Israeli with-
drawal from southern Lebanon remains unclear.  Iran’s initial re-
sponse was to send officials to try to preserve its influence over
Hezballah’s agenda.  Many Hezballah members, however, probably
have little enthusiasm for cross-border attacks into Israel.

34

Agendas of Iran’s Security Institutions

In contrast to most of Iran’s important relationships, in the case of
Lebanon, the IRGC, rather than the Artesh, has more influence on the
agenda.  Artesh leaders see the involvement in Lebanon as offering
few benefits to Iran, particularly now that Israel has withdrawn.
They question the resources devoted to Lebanon, which they believe
could be better used for other purposes.  Artesh officials are enthusi-
astic about ties to Syria, which they see as necessary to balance Iraq
and Israel.

However, the IRGC is committed to maintaining influence in
Lebanon, perhaps more than in any other country.  Many IRGC offi-
cials, having acted as midwife for Hezballah, believe that its success
is in large part due to Iran’s efforts.  Yet even the IRGC has tempered
its ambitions regarding Lebanon.  Most officials appear content with
Hezballah influence in the country and recognize that an Islamic
state along the Iranian model is not likely.

The IRGC regards its presence in Lebanon as having been a great
success for Iran and is keen to learn from this experience.  It sees its
Lebanon presence as providing it with the expertise to provide guid-
ance in other circumstances where it could play an active role in
training, educating, and motivating Shi’as under siege.  The IRGC has

______________

 

33Norton, “Walking Between Raindrops,” pp. 86-100.  See also Magnus Ranstorp, “The
Strategy and Tactics of Hizballah’s Current ‘Lebanonization Process,’” Mediterranean
Politics, vol. 3, no. 1, Summer 1998, p. 118.
34Norton, “Walking Between Raindrops,” p. 99.

Impact on Foreign Policy

83

tried, and will try again, to apply lessons learned in Lebanon to some
of the problems of Shi’as in other beleaguered countries.

Israel

Israel and its over-the-horizon ally, the United States, take up much
of the national security debate in Iran.  The rhetoric is constant.
Supreme Leader Khamene’i’s recent call for the “annihilation” of
Israel is typical rather than exceptional.

35

  With regard to Israel, there

is almost universal agreement that the Jewish state is an active re-
gional rival bent on checking Iran’s political and military power and
undoing Iran’s achievements.

36

  Military leaders and their political

masters seem to be convinced that Israel is planning a confrontation
with Iran.  Thus, as Israeli diplomacy and economic force reach the
shores of the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea, Tehran sees further
concrete evidence of Israel’s encirclement strategy.

For the past two decades, Islamic Iran has championed the Pales-
tinian cause as the means to assert its claim to Muslim leadership.
Iran’s rejection of a diplomatic solution as necessarily adverse to
Muslim interests, its depiction of the United States as the evil genius
behind Israeli strategy, and its implacable opposition to any com-
promise have been a means for Iran to widen its support among
Muslims beyond its otherwise limited Shi’a constituency.  Tehran
depicts its refusal to countenance any “sellout” of Muslim rights as
evidence of its moral superiority to the lackey regimes elsewhere.
Iran’s stance on this issue has made it the leader of the rejectionist
camp and given it a certain amount of leverage as spoiler.  When the
peace process is moving, Iran can move to sabotage it; when it is
frozen, Tehran can point to the wisdom of withholding support from
a bankrupt process.

Iran has supported Palestinian terrorist groups, for both opportunis-
tic and ideological reasons, despite assurances from President

______________

 

35Afshin Valinejad, “Iran Leader Calls for Israel’s Annihilation,” Boston Globe, January
1, 2000, p. 4.
36“Roundtable: New Geopolitical Developments in the Region and Iranian National
Security,” Middle East Studies Quarterly (Tehran), vol. 5, nos. 1-2, Summer and Fall
1998, pp. 5-54.

84

Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era

Khatami to the United States, Arafat, and others.  The Palestinian
authority has blamed Iran and Iranian-backed groups for bombings
in Israel.

37

  Several explanations for this are possible:

•

Iranian and U.S. views of what constitutes a terrorist group differ.

•

Iran does not consider financial support of Hamas or other radi-
cal Palestinian groups irresponsible or out of bounds, perhaps
because the Gulf states and their citizens provide considerable
support for these groups with little public U.S. criticism.

•

Khatami may not yet be in a position to control all aspects of
policy or all arms of his decentralized government.  Militant
groups may report to the IRGC and the Iranian ambassador in
Lebanon and bypass the president.  More likely, as the discussion
below indicates, Khatami is aware of militant group activities and
exercises some control over them.

•

Some Iranian leaders prefer to use this issue as leverage against
the United States.

•

Iran does not believe that the United States can find a “smoking
gun” that will link it directly to those who commit terrorist acts.
By working through front groups or the Lebanese Hezballah, Iran
seeks to maintain denial of responsibility.

Relations with Palestinian groups, however, are lukewarm at best.
Many Palestinian fundamentalists are hostile to Iran’s Shi’a leader-
ship and ideology.  In addition, Palestinian groups have few illusions
about the depth of Iran’s commitment.  This tepid relationship
makes it unlikely that Iran would continue to actively champion the
Palestinian cause should the Palestinians embrace peace with Israel.

Another aspect of Iran’s relations with Israel is linked to Tehran-
Washington relations.  This stems from Iran’s recognition that Wash-
ington places a high price on the success of the peace process and,
indeed, cites Iran’s opposition as one of the  principal obstacles to
normal relations.  Some in the Iranian leadership clearly find contin-
ued militancy on this issue a useful way of both exerting pressure on

______________

 

37Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Iran Report, vol. 2, no. 45, December 15, 1999
(electronic version).

Impact on Foreign Policy

85

Washington—forcing the United States to pay a price to Iran to desist
from its spoiler role—and, if that fails, preventing any normalization
of relations.

38

Iran and Israel are both highly concerned about the other’s nuclear
and missile programs.  Israel sees Iran’s potential nuclear program as
one of the greatest threats to its security, particularly as Tehran has
recently tested missiles that can reach Israeli territory.  Many
Iranians, for their part, see Israel as an implacable enemy and believe
that its nuclear capability is a threat to Iran’s security.

The picture is not immutable.  Iran has no specific or direct dispute
with Israel.  Both countries are hostile to Iraq and concerned about
Sunni radicalism.  Under the Shah, a shared rivalry with the Arab
world led to a close strategic alliance.  However, no one in the de-
fense establishment questions Iran’s political line on Israel and the
Arab-Israeli peace process.  Some have expressed an interest in try-
ing to find a modus vivendi with Israel, if for no other reason than to
buy more time for Iran; theirs is not a very loud voice.

Iran, however, has also paid a considerable price with the United
States for its high-profile rejection of the peace process.  Some
Iranians now ask why they should pay for the causes of others, par-
ticularly when those most concerned wish to arrive at a diplomatic
settlement.  Iran’s leadership is thus under a certain degree of pres-
sure internally not to get too involved or to pay too high a price for a
continued role in the Arab-Israeli issue.

Agendas of Iran’s Security Institutions

All of Iran’s security institutions view Israel as a hostile country with
the means, power, and resources to pose a serious security threat to
Iran.  More broadly, the military establishment is fearful of the
growing Turkish-Israeli partnership.  IRGC and Artesh leaders have
spoken out against the partnership and have warned of its conse-

______________

 

38It is noteworthy that Iran became more intractable and more militant on this issue
in the wake of the 1991 Gulf war, when Washington, in Tehran’s view, reneged on an
implied commitment to include Iran in a Gulf security arrangement.  Instead, Wash-
ington froze Tehran out through dual containment; Iran’s response, this view runs,
was to increase support for the rejectionist front.

86

Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era

quences for Iran and the Arab world.  Although both the IRGC and
the Artesh favor developing a deterrent force against Israel through
long-range missiles and bombers, they fear that Iran’s forces will not
be able to deter or defend Iran against an Israeli attack.

The IRGC’s agenda toward Israel has been shaped by its long pres-
ence in Lebanon and the military aspects of the Syrian-Iranian-
Hezballah triangle.  The unilateral withdrawal of Israeli forces from
southern Lebanon and the death of Hafez Al-Assad, however, are
forcing the IRGC to rethink its support for Hezballah’s attacks on
Israel.

Europe

Iran’s relationship with Europe has always been better than its rela-
tionship with the United States.  Many European countries main-
tained diplomatic ties and commercial relations with Iran even dur-
ing the heady days of the revolution.  Since 1992, Europe has engaged
Iran in a “critical dialog,” which has done little to influence Iranian
behavior.  Ties to Europe have warmed significantly since Khatami
became president in 1997.  In 1999, Khatami visited several European
countries, and European leaders declared that Iran was no longer
committing terrorism abroad and was cooperating on WMD issues.

39

Britain reestablished diplomatic ties at the ambassadorial level in re-
sponse to Iran’s rejection—only at the official level—of government
support for the assassination of Salman Rushdie.

Good relations with Europe are vital for Iran’s economic develop-
ment.  Tehran needs both investment and financial credit to shore
up its troubled economy.  European participation is particularly nec-
essary given continued U.S. hostility to Iran.

Iran has sought to divide Europe from the United States by offering
the Europeans access to its market, which Iranians believe is irre-
sistible.  The assumption behind this policy is that the greedy for-

______________

 

39de Bellaigue, “The Struggle for Iran,” p. 57.

Impact on Foreign Policy

87

eigners are basically in competition, which gives Iran some leverage.
The reverse side is that Iran wants to cultivate Europe (and Japan) to
isolate the United States.

40

Agendas of Iran’s Security Institutions

Relations with Europe are not a major concern for either the Artesh
or the IRGC.  Both institutions believe that European powers are no
longer a force in the Middle East in general and the Persian Gulf in
particular.  The Artesh’s main interest in Europe is as a possible
source of advanced weapons.  As such, Iran can do business with
European countries, and the armed forces may be able to benefit
from broadening contacts with the core members of the European
Union.

41

  At present, the MOIS is more interested in monitoring the

expatriate community in Europe than in masterminding any cam-
paigns against them.  This strategy is very much in keeping with the
Khatami administration’s foreign policy agenda and attitude toward
the large expatriate community.

The United States

In contrast to most of Iran’s relationships, its ties to the United States
are clouded by ideology, nationalism, and occasional paranoia.
Continuing U.S. sanctions and refusal to accept Iran as a legitimate
state rankle Iran’s leadership.  (The degree to which Iran’s own
actions are responsible for this is minimized.) Iran’s historical
grievances—U.S. support for the coup against Mosaddeq, subse-
quent U.S. backing of the Shah, and the long-term U.S. support for
Israel—nurture its perception that the United States sided with Iraq

______________

 

40Roula Khalaf, “World Bank May Resume Iran Loans,” Financial Times, January
29/30, 2000, p. 3.
41Tehran’s view of France as a NATO country and independent actor from the United
States has fed into the military’s thinking about this European country.  While Artesh
accepts that Iran has not had a close military partnership with France in the past, it
hopes that it can use French expertise in military R&D, military air transport, naval
technology, and upgrades of its aging missile systems.

88

Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era

during its war with Iran and its general sense that Washington seeks
to undermine Iran.

42

Broadly speaking, most Iranians would agree with the following crit-
icisms of the United States:

•

The United States is arrogant and bullies lesser powers.  It uses
its power in a discriminatory and punitive fashion.

•

The United States is a cultural threat to Islamic civilization.

•

The United States finds it difficult to have normal relations with
states that disagree with it.  Independence and good relations
with the United States are often incompatible.

•

U.S. policy in relation to sanctions and especially technology
denial is an example of U.S. hypocrisy and unwillingness to share
power with other states.

43

•

The U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf is a provocation
and should be reduced.

In general, Iran’s leaders are likely to view any U.S. actions, even
those intended as conciliatory gestures, with suspicion.

Prospects for Better Relations

Iran’s complaints about the United States are not shared throughout
the elite.  Many Iranians recognize that American help in renovating
Iran’s tattered oil infrastructure would be invaluable.  Some argue
that the U.S. presence in the Gulf is necessary to ensure the imple-
mentation of UN resolutions, the containment of Saddam’s Iraq, and
even the reassurance of the GCC.  The utility of the United States as
an enemy, the need, as it were, for a Great Satan, has diminished
within Iran.  Despite its efforts, the clerical leadership finds this issue
without great resonance in Iran today.  Official anti-Americanism,

______________

 

42Jerrold D. Green, “Iran: Limits to Rapprochement,” statement before the House
Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs, May 1999.
43Ali Asghar and Keivan Hosseini, “The US and the Technological Ban on Iran,” The
Journal of Defence Policy (Siyasat–e Defa’i), vol. 7, no. 1, Winter 1998/1999, pp. 49-68.

Impact on Foreign Policy

89

such as government-sponsored demonstrations to protest U.S. poli-
cies, is considered by many Iranians to be almost comical.  Attempts
to blame the United States for the student protests in June 1999 simi-
larly were seen as a transparent attempt to shift blame from the
regime.

Iran’s geopolitical differences with the United States are not abso-
lute.  Interests overlap in the Caucasus and Central Asia, Afghanistan,
and even in the Gulf, regarding Iraq.  Iran’s quest for status need not
threaten U.S. interests.  Iran is not a territorially revisionist state in
the Gulf or elsewhere, and Iran can live comfortably with the Gulf
states.

A climate for improved relations is developing in Iran, though even
reformers do not see close relations with the United States as a pri-
ority.

44

  Many Iranians appear to like Americans, if not U.S. govern-

ment policy.  The allure of American popular culture is also strong.
Khatami’s January 1998 interview with CNN symbolized the ability of
Iranian elites to discuss, at least tentatively, the prospect of improved
relations with Washington.  The issue of a resumption of relations
with the United States is no longer taboo, though it alarms many
conservatives who feel that contact with the United States will lead to
Westernization.  Reportedly, Iran’s senior security-making body se-
cretly voted to establish ties with Washington, though Supreme
Leader Khamene’i vetoed this decision.

45

  Attempts by the hard-

liners to prosecute reformers such as Abdullah Nouri for advocating
the renewal of relations with the United States have demonstrated
the degree to which the subject has escaped the control of the
authorities.

Agendas of Iran’s Security Institutions

Most military commanders acknowledge the overwhelming power of
the United States and caution against adventurist policies that might
lead to conflict with Washington or with its regional allies.  They
would like to see U.S. forces leave the Persian Gulf (though they

______________

 

44Gasiorowski, “The Power Struggle in Iran.”
45Scott Peterson, “Iran Opens Door—a Little—to U.S.,” Christian Science Monitor,
February 25, 2000, p. 1.

90

Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era

avoid the question of whether this would allow the Iraqi threat to
grow) and curtail military support for the Arab Gulf states, but they
now recognize that this would happen only if Washington’s GCC al-
lies were convinced of Iran’s friendship.

The Artesh’s perceptions of the United States are shaped by the
Iranian navy’s confrontation with the U.S. navy in the late 1980s and
by the performance of the U.S. armed forces in the 1990-1991 Kuwait
crisis.  Artesh  leaders viewed the U.S. ability to bring some 500,000
personnel to the region and quickly defeat Iraq with amazement.
The large and varied U.S. presence is also viewed with concern and
considered an important planning challenge.

Several current U.S. proposals also concern the Artesh.  The Artesh is
anxious about the U.S. military’s use of over-the-horizon weapons,
such as cruise missiles, and is thinking about how to counter this
strength.  The Artesh leadership also fears that the U.S. proposal for
the extension of a defensive shield around the GCC states would
challenge Iran’s defense and security capabilities and embolden the
Gulf states to take a less conciliatory line toward Iran.

The Artesh seeks to avoid any direct confrontation with U.S. forces in
the Persian Gulf.  Some Artesh leaders recognize the role the United
States plays in containing Iraq.  In addition, some leaders recall the
greater status and strength the Artesh enjoyed during the days of the
Shah, when it cooperated closely with the U.S. military.

The Artesh, however, is also hedging against a possible confrontation
by trying to create a credible deterrent against the U.S. navy, by de-
ploying (or helping the IRGC to deploy) anti-ship systems, radar, and
new platforms for aggressive maneuvers in the Gulf.  The military
forces’ strategy seems to be based on raising the cost to the United
States of naval operations against Iranian forces.  Iran’s armed forces
would aim to do this through a strategy of denial, where they would
blockade the Straits of Hormuz and engage in naval operations to ha-
rass the U.S. Fifth Fleet.

46

  Iran would probably also target the instal-

lations of U.S. oil companies in the Gulf.  Since the Khobar Towers
bombing in 1996, the military establishment as a whole has been on

______________

 

46Iran News, April 28, 1997.

Impact on Foreign Policy

91

higher alert, where the political leadership has openly talked of a
possible revenge U.S. attack on Iran.

The IRGC’s agenda toward the United States is more ideological than
practical.  It sees the United States as heading a cultural invasion of
the country and responds to the elite’s desire to combat this inva-
sion.  The IRGC, however, also regards the United States as a military
threat.  As Brigadier General Baqr Zolqadr, deputy IRGC commander,
has put it:  “Today, the United States is the only enemy we take as a
main threat in our strategy.  None of the regional countries are at a
level to be a threat against Iran’s security.  We have organized our
forces and equipment to counter the U.S. threats, and our exercises
and maneuvers have been arranged on the basis of these threats.”

47

The  Artesh, however, tries to restrict the IRGC’s actions in the Gulf,
preventing it from challenging the U.S. naval presence in an open
fashion and trying to limit the IRGC’s sphere of operations during
exercises.

Impact of U.S. Policies on Iran’s Military

Washington’s “dual containment” policy has hampered the Iranian
military’s drive to develop its armed forces but has not stopped it al-
together.  Washington’s impact is best understood by recognizing
what has not occurred.  Western states, which in general produce the
most sophisticated military equipment, have hesitated to sell arms to
the clerical regime.  The United States has also used its diplomatic
and economic muscle to prevent or curtail sales by China and Russia
to Iran.  As a result, Iran’s forces have poor equipment, which is often
not interoperable, and receive little training.  Nevertheless, Tehran
has been able to secure some arms deals, technology transfers, and
training from these sources, with a primary constraint on its pur-
chases being financial.

U.S. policies and rhetoric have strengthened the position of the mili-
tary in Iran.  The anti-Iran vitriol common in some Washington cir-
cles, the establishment of the U.S. Fifth Fleet in the Persian Gulf, U.S.
military exercises with Iran’s GCC allies, and U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM) military planning changes have all tended to strengthen

______________

 

47Kayhan, December 10, 1996.

92

Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era

the hand of the military establishment and its relations with the
political elite.  The extension of CENTCOM’s Area of Responsibility
north of the Iranian border to Central Asia, particularly when
combined with NATO discussions with states in the Caucasus,
contributes to the perception that the United States is trying to
squeeze Iran and prevent it from exercising its proper influence in
the region.

KEY TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES

Iran’s policies on cross-regional issues, such as support for coreli-
gionists abroad and their attempts to proliferate, are shaped by the
domestic factors, international context, and security institutions of
the specific countries.

Support for Islamic Radicals

Iran’s once-close relations with Islamist movements around the
world have been declining in both their scope and their scale in re-
cent years.  After the Islamic revolution, Tehran actively supported
radical groups, particularly radical Shi’as, in many Muslim countries.
In Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, and elsewhere,
Iran helped organize radical Shi’a groups, encouraged them to fight
against their governments, and at times armed and trained them.
Tehran forged particularly close ties to the Lebanese Hezballah.
After the Persian Gulf war, Iran also stepped up ties to radical Sunni
groups.  Playing on growing disgruntlement toward the United
States, Tehran established ties and provided limited financial sup-
port to Hamas, Palestine Islamic Jihad, and other radical Sunni
movements.

In recent years, however, Tehran has become less active in its sup-
port for radical Islamists.  The fate of Shi’a communities outside Iran
is no longer a major concern of Iran’s leadership.  Tehran rarely plays
the Islamic card in Central Asia and has thrown its lot in with the
anti-Taliban Northern Alliance in Afghanistan.  In the Arab world,
contacts with the Islamists remain, particularly in Lebanon and with
pro-Syrian Palestinian groups.  Tehran has cut ties, or at least re-

Impact on Foreign Policy

93

duced the visibility of relations with, Islamic radicals in the GCC,
Egypt, Jordan, Sudan, and North Africa.

48

  With regard to Iraq, Iran

maintains an active Islamist front based in Iran.  Yet even here it has
not exploited much of the civil unrest to the degree that outside ana-
lysts expected.

Iran’s ties to radical Palestinian groups, however, remain strong and
may be growing stronger.  Iran has stepped up shipments of
weapons to Hamas in recent years.  Ties to Hamas have grown in
part because U.S. pressure has led supporters in Arab countries, par-
ticularly in the Persian Gulf, to reduce their contributions, making
Hamas more willing to work with Tehran.  Tehran has also coordi-
nated groups working against Israel.  Thus, it has trained Hamas and
Hezballah members in Iran and in Lebanon, in cooperation with the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command, a
small but extremely violent Palestinian rejectionist group.

49

Pakistan has suffered an increase in Iranian-backed subversion and
terrorism.  The oppression and brutalization of Pakistan’s Shi’a
community may have inspired Iran to become more active.
Moreover, as the West evinces little interest in the violence in
Pakistan, Iran’s activities there do little to harm its image.

50

In general, arguments that Iran’s support for terrorism occurs with-
out official sanction and without the knowledge of the senior leader-
ship have proven incorrect.  Terrorist acts overseas usually require
the coordination of various government ministries and revolutionary
organizations, coordination that would be difficult without support
from Iran’s senior leadership.

51

  In 1997, a German court ruled that

the murder of four Iranian Kurdish opposition figures in a café in
Berlin in 1992 was authorized by a committee that included Iran’s

______________

 

48See “Iran: Wrapping Up the Networks?” Gulf States Newsletter, vol. 25, no. 629,
February 7, 2000, p. 2, for an optimistic report of Iran’s reduced support for radicalism
in the Gulf.
49John Lancaster, “U.S.: Iran’s Terrorism Role Grows,” Washington Post, December 4,
1999, p. 1 (electronic version).
50Michael Eisenstadt, “Dilemmas for the U.S. and Iran,” Policywatch, no. 414, October
8, 1999 (electronic version).
51Eisenstadt, “Dilemmas for the U.S. and Iran.”

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Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era

Supreme Leader, President, and Intelligence and Foreign Ministers,
among others.

Agendas of Iran’s Security Institutions

The IRGC is the party most actively engaged in the defense of the
Shi’a communities outside Iran.  Because it sees the Shi’as of
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan as most endangered and belea-
guered, it is actively engaged in providing material support for them,
including training wherever necessary.  In all three cases, however,
the military establishment believes that Iran’s interests can best be
served through the adoption of those policies that can help to ensure
the territorial integrity of these countries.  Iran’s role, therefore, with
regard to its coreligionists in these crisis countries can best be
summed up as defensive diplomacy.

Although relations with most GCC states, particularly Saudi Arabia,
have improved dramatically in recent years, the IRGC retains an in-
terest in the Shi’a communities of Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia,
as well as in the Iranian émigré population in the UAE.  At present,
the IRGC does not seem to be pursuing a disruptive or rear-guard
action in relation to Iran’s coreligionists in the Persian Gulf region.
Nevertheless, it almost certainly maintains ties to a range of groups
and could reactivate a network if necessary.

Commitment to WMD and Missiles

Almost all Iranian leaders see the possession of long-range missiles
as vital for Iran’s security.  Missiles have certain advantages over air-
craft for Iran today.  Lacking access to spare parts from the West, Iran
must turn to Russia or China for advanced aircraft.  China’s aircraft,
however, are often of poor quality and of limited sophistication.
While Russia possesses state-of-the-art aircraft, it requires Iran to
train on Soviet systems rather than on Western ones, to which Iran’s
air force is accustomed.  Moreover, advanced aircraft are costly and
need constant support—a particularly daunting problem when the
supplier’s reliability is in doubt.

In contrast, missiles are relatively easy to manufacture domestically,
which helps Iran meet its goal of self-reliance.  What they lack in

Impact on Foreign Policy

95

flexibility (for example, recalling them once in flight or reusing them)
they make up for in their relatively low cost, their ease of conceal-
ment, the assurance of penetration, and the lack of the need to train
pilots.  Both the Artesh and the IRGC see missiles as useful for
deterring Israel from attacking Iran or even those countries friendly
with Iran.  Missiles also are high-prestige items that demonstrate
Iran’s technical sophistication.

Missiles, however, raise a number of issues:

•

Because missiles are conventionally armed, largely inaccurate,
and carry a relatively small payload, their only useful function,
many argue, is as terror weapons, attacking enemy population
centers in the event of a crisis.  However, missiles are particularly
valuable because they can deliver WMD.

•

Emphasis on missiles may prompt a response from Iran’s rivals,
given their virtually assured penetration, and especially as Iran
develops longer-range missiles.  Israel is likely to be alarmed, for
instance. Because of Israel’s historical experience and its sensi-
tivity to civilian casualties, it will have to treat any oncoming
missiles as if they had WMD warheads.

•

The use of missiles for the most ordinary contingencies (for ex-
ample, Iran’s use against MKO camps in Iraq in mid-1999) can
reduce any general barriers to their use in the region.

Many of the reasons that might lead Iran to seek long-range missiles
also give it incentives to seek WMD.  Iran is seeking to develop its
nuclear infrastructure in order to design and produce nuclear
weapons—a goal shared widely among Iran’s current elite.

52

Iran seeks WMD for several reasons.  First, Iran has plausible geopo-
litical reasons for a nuclear weapons option.  Iraq’s intentions and
behavior are by no means predictable, particularly if sanctions are
lifted.  Even a post-Saddam Iraq may be hostile to Iran.  Pakistan and
India and uncertainties about the evolution of the states in the Cau-

______________

 

52Seth Carus and Michael Eisenstadt, “Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Status and
Implications,” Policywatch, no. 444, March 8, 2000  (electronic version).

96

Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era

casus and Central Asia provide other causes for concern.

53

  Second,

WMD—particularly nuclear weapons—are a guarantee of status,
forcing states to pay attention to Iran and treat it as an equal.  Third,
WMD serve as equalizers, diminishing the gap between the military
capabilities of weak states such as Iran and the advanced military ca-
pabilities of states such as the United States and Israel.  Fourth, as
noted above, WMD maximize the impact of Iran’s missile forces.
There is no sign, however, that Iran has made the acquisition of a
nuclear capability an urgent priority.

54

Artesh leaders believe Iran does not immediately need WMD but that
it should have the technology and know-how for developing various
types of WMD, particularly nuclear weapons.  The Artesh and its lo-
gistics division continue to explore the potential of know-how and
expertise from Russia, Ukraine, and other former Soviet republics in
such fields.

55

  In conversation, retired officers speak of the geopoliti-

cal tensions surrounding Iran and say that to be able to deter aggres-
sion and contain threats to its security, Iran should pursue the
nuclear option.  Serving officers and other officials maintain the gov-
ernment line that Iran will not follow the nuclear path.

The IRGC’s position on WMD is more ideological and rooted in its
rather political understanding of national security.  It does not nec-
essarily rule out deployment of nonconventional weapons if Iran is
threatened by the same—as it already is by Iraq and Israel.  Elements
within the IRGC still oppose Iran’s full compliance with international
arms control regimes.  The commander of the IRGC, Yahya Rahim
Safavi, for instance, who was selected by President Khatami himself,
declared at a heated meeting of the Supreme Council for National
Security (SCNS):  “Is it possible to stop the U.S. threats and domina-
tion goals by the policy of détente? Is it possible to save the Islamic
Republic from threat of the U.S. and international Zionism by con-
cluding agreements for prohibiting chemical and nuclear weapons

______________

 

53See, for example, “India’s Emerging Nuclear Threat to Persian Gulf Security,”
Iranfile, vol. 1, no. 5, February/March 1999, pp. 8-9.
54Nor is there a clear or enunciated notion of what use nuclear weapons would have
in Iran’s overall strategic doctrine.  This is not surprising, as Iran is not permitted, and
denies seeking, nuclear weapons.
55Douglas Jehl, “Rage Rises in Iran over Killing,” International Herald Tribune,
September 12, 1998, p. 9.

Impact on Foreign Policy

97

and international conventions?”

56

  His own answer to these ques-

tions was an emphatic no, advocating that Iran should defend its in-
dependence and revolution by any means possible and leave its
WMD options open.

The limits of the security institutions’ influence are suggested by
Iran’s ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).  In
the run-up to Iran’s submission of information to the Technical
Secretariat of the Convention in November 1998, reports circulated
that the Artesh and the IRGC had argued against full ratification
without assurances that Iran’s neighbors would follow its example.
These objections were overruled by the SCNS.  During the inspector
team’s visit to the country in 1999, Iran chose to destroy some of its
known chemical weapons facilities in front of the visiting team.
Iran’s decision to portray itself as complying with the CWC was
based on its risk assessment about deployment of chemical weapons
in the region and on its decision that maintaining the option would
be a risky alternative.  Outright noncompliance would inevitably in-
crease proliferation and add to Iran’s national security threats.  Its
show of compliance may also reflect confidence in Iran’s ability to
conceal its weapons programs and deceive the international com-
munity.

______________

 

56Jameah, April 29, 1998.