INVESTIGATION
REPORT 1/06
1
Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Translation 1.9.2006
10.7.2006
MANAGEMENT OF SAFETY REQUIREMENTS IN SUBCONTRACTING DURING THE
OLKILUOTO 3 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT CONSTRUCTION PHASE
CONTENTS
4. MANAGEMENT OF THE OL3 CONSTRUCTION PROJECT AND QUALITY MANAGEMENT.................. 40
5. STUK'S OPERATION AS REGULATOR OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT CONSTRUCTION...................... 55
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3.
1.
BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES OF INVESTIGATION
The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) concluded in connection with the
construction of the Olkiluoto 3 nuclear power plant that the performance of the
organisations involved in the project and the interaction between the organisations did
not in all respects meet the expectations that STUK has on good safety culture during
the construction phase of a power plant. The identified problems had already impeded
progress of the project and possibly increased schedule-related pressures during the
later stages of the project.
STUK considers important that problems during construction and manufacturing will
not result in impaired quality of the final products, or even in uncertainty about the
achieved quality. For this reason, the performance of the organisations involved in the
construction of the Olkiluoto 3 nuclear power plant unit should be improved. In order to
identify the needs for improvement, STUK appointed an investigation team and asked
the team to present an assessment of the performance of the organisations in the light of
certain case studies that were selected as examples. In addition, STUK asked the
investigation team to present recommendations for improving the performance of the
licensee Teollisuuden Voima Oy (TVO), and the vendor consortium CFS, formed by
Framatome ANP (FANP, currently Areva NP) and Siemens AG. Within the project,
Framatome is responsible for the reactor island and Siemens for the turbine island. As
the construction project proceeds, STUK will assess how these recommendations have
been materialized in the operations of the parties.
The investigation team also analysed the needs for development in STUK's own
operations and issued recommendations for this purpose.
The task given to the investigation team is shown in Appendix 1, and the composition
of the team in Appendix 2. The investigation entailed interviews of persons in different
capacities in organizations (TVO, CFS, FANP, subcontractor, research institute) that
have taken part in the Olkiluoto 3 project, as well as a visit to the Olkiluoto 3
construction site and the concrete batching plant. The investigation programme is
shown in Appendix 3. Appendix 4 contains a description of STUK’s activities as the
regulatory organisation for the nuclear power plant construction project.
2.
PERFORMANCE DEMONSTRATING GOOD SAFETY CULTURE
2.1 Indicators of good safety culture
In safety-critical fields the organisations are expected to possess an ability also to
manage situations that are difficult to predict. The characteristics of organisations
operating with high reliability include a serious attitude towards even small errors, an
overall assessment of situations, emphasis on professional competence over
organisational status, and avoiding over-simplification in the analysis of important
issues [1].
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Within the field of nuclear power, an assessment of the performance of organisations
focuses on attitudes toward safety, and how safety is ensured. Each organisation has its
own perception of the importance of striving to ensure safety, and how safety can be
achieved. These perceptions are usually unconscious and commonly shared, and they
influence practical operations. For this reason they can be referred to as the safety
culture.
The conditions in the Construction Licence, the YVL Guide 1.4 [2], as well as the OL3
project plan prepared by TVO require a high-level safety culture in the design,
construction and operation of the nuclear power plant. In discussions on safety culture
within the nuclear power field, reference is usually made to IAEA's guidance that, since
the Chernobyl accident, has emphasised the safety significance of organisational
factors. IAEA has defined safety culture in the INSAG-4 report [3] as follows:
"Safety
culture is that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organisations and
individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues
receive the attention warranted by their significance."
When assessing whether the safety culture of an organisation is "good" or "bad",
attention is in practice paid at least to the following issues (INSAG-15) [4]:
-
Visible management commitment to safety.
-
Conservative decision-making, i.e. the safer alternative is chosen in uncertain
situations.
-
Compliance with specifications and regulations.
-
Reporting of nonconformancies and the aim to learn from them.
-
Questioning of performance that jeopardise safety.
The indicators of good safety culture can be analysed when assessing both the operation
of a nuclear power plant and the performance of subcontractors involved in the
construction project. The important thing is the attitude towards safety and how it is
shown in practice.
IAEA has suggested that there can be different levels of safety culture [5]. In the most
advanced safety cultures each member of the organisation is considered able to
influence safety. The attitudes and the behaviour of the staff are influenced through e.g.
training, communication and leadership. In advanced safety cultures safety is not
emphasised merely for reasons of publicity and external pressures.
2.2 Safety culture in the construction of a nuclear power plant
The technical and organisational preconditions for the safe operation of a nuclear power
plant are created during the construction phase of the plant.
A basic principle established and proven in the nuclear power industry is “defence in
depth principle” meaning in-depth assurance of safety. The first layer of this principle
is to ensure undisturbed normal operation of the plant. This presupposes that the
reliability and high quality of equipment is ensured for the safety-classified systems as
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well as for the entire process of power production. Good safety culture is characterised
by that work practices at the site are in every respect carefull and consistent, and
without distinction between activities on structures or equipment that are important to
safety or classified non-nuclear. In addition to this, the quality and reliability of safety-
classified equipment is ensured through additional requirements according to the
relevant safety class. The special requirements for such equipment are taken into
consideration e.g. in the dimensioning of structures, the properties of materials, type
tests and the quality control programme.
It should be borne in mind that the culture and the work practices for the future
operation of the plant are at least partly created during the construction stage. In other
words, the construction of the plant and the manufacture of the components for the
plant represent activities that are equally critical to safety as the operation of the plant.
Efficient and reliable operation of individuals and organisations is of crucial importance
in the assurance of safety. The professional competence and the vigilance of
individuals, as well as the ability of organisations to openly deal with matters may
reveal and prevent e.g. deficiencies in design or uncertainty factors involved in
manufacturing. On the other hand, incompetence and hiding of errors made in the
manufacturing process may impair quality in a way that is not easy to detect in the final
product.
The organisation that bears total responsibility for the construction of the nuclear power
plant is obliged to ensure that every organisation and individual involved in the
construction process recognises the quality expectations that apply to their work. It is
unrealistic to expect that all the persons working at the construction site or in the
manufacturing of components understand without explanation the significance of their
own work as a part in ensuring nuclear safety. For this reason training shall be provided
for them on the safety significance of their work and the expectations that apply to
quality.
In construction and manufacturing industry, the safety culture is usually considered to
be connected with occupational safety. In the construction of a nuclear power plant, it is
important that the wider significance of safety and the respective implications for work
practices are recognised. Regardless of their tasks, every employee should be aware of
the properties of the final product that are particularly important in terms of safety. It is
also important that factors relevant to safety in each specific work object are brought
out and explained before work is started. An overall understanding of the principles
followed to ensure safety of a nuclear power plant, and of the work practices adopted in
the nuclear field also help in perceiving the expectations that apply to one's own work.
When building up a safety culture, the basic values familiar to professional workers
have to be emphasised in the training and guidance for the employees: responsibility for
faultless performance of one's own work and professional pride on the skills required to
achieve high quality. In addition, everybody should assume responsibility for necessary
interaction with others involved in the project, to ensure everyone can succeed in his
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own work. It is also important that the principle of openness is made clear to ensure that
any non-conformancies detected in construction or manufacturing are brought up, and
to emphasise the right and duty of everybody involved in the project to react to
non-conformancies. In unclear and unpredicted situations the employees must
comprehend the need to discontinue their work and to eliminate the problems before
resuming work. The general objectives that apply to the construction of a nuclear power
plant are very similar to those during the operation of the plant: the objective is that the
performance of work is designed, implemented and documented as well as possible,
and that indifferent attitudes towards problems or to the quality of the final product are
not tolerated.
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3.
CASE STUDIES
The investigation team assessed the performance of TVO, the plant vendor and STUK
in the light of three case studies selected as examples. The investigation report refers
generally to the performance of the consortium (CFS) that supplies the plant, but also to
the performance of FANP in cases where the investigation team could distinguish
which consortium partner was concerned. The example cases are the concreting of the
base slab, the manufacturing of the steel liner for the reactor inner containment, and the
selection of manufacturer as well as the start of the design process for the polar crane
and the material hatch in the containment. The background and the sequence of events
in these three cases are described below.
3.1 Concrete base slab
3.1.1 Background information on base slab
Parties to the contract responsible for concrete fabrication
The parties to the contract were the plant builder (Framatome ANP, FANP), the
structural designer of the base slab (Finnprima), the concrete supplier (Forssan Betoni
Oy) and the contractor that performed the concreting work (Hartela Oy).
Requirements for and construction of base slab
The reactor building, the safeguard buildings and the fuel building share a common
base slab.
The design requirements used in the dimensioning of the base slab have been defined
by FANP as part of the containment design. The essential safety requirement is that the
slab must withstand not only the expected loads, but also dynamic loads (impacts,
vibration) in conjunction to potential accidents, as well as an internal over-pressure in
the containment. In other words, the design bases of the slab include loads during the
construction stage, loads during plant operation, loads caused by internal accidents or
external collisions against the plant, as well as earthquakes. Security against collapsing
of the entire construction based on the slab as a result of earthquake or collision loads
has also been required. The design requirements have been approved by STUK as part
of the pre-inspection documentation of the containment.
IAEA's safety standard 50-C-QA [6] concerning quality assurance presupposes that a
graded approach during the different phases of the nuclear power plant's life cycle is
used in the definition of requirement levels for functions in the quality management
system of the plant. The level of and the need for quality assurance and control during
construction is determined on the basis of the object's nuclear safety classification and
structural classification based on the building regulations.
The nuclear safety classification of the base slab is SC3 in the parts under the safeguard
buildings and the fuel building, and SC2 in the reactor building. However, pursuant to
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the proposal of TVO, and approved by STUK, the entire concreting and reinforcement
work for the base slab have been carried out and inspected applying the same SC2
requirements to the whole base slab, in compliance with YVL Guide 4.1 [7].
According to the Finnish Building Code Part B4, Concrete Structures, the base slab is
assigned to structural class 1. Structures and structural parts may be assigned to a
certain class, provided the design and work specifications of that class are complied
with. The structural designer and the concrete work supervisor shall possess the
qualifications for the class in question. Structures and structural parts, whose design is
considered to require special qualifications or with which the assurance of structural
functionality requires special care, are implemented in structural class 1.
The base slab is 103.1 m wide and 100.8 m long. The thickness of the slab under the
reactor building is 3.15 m and under the safeguard buildings 1.5 m. The slab is over its
entire area supported on rock (design strength 140 MPa). A ca. 1.5 m thick levelling
concrete is first cast on the excavated rock structure (strength class C32/40 according to
Eurocode 2, K40 according to the Finnish Building Code Part B4). The levelling
concrete and the slab are not anchored to the rock. The strength class of the base slab
concrete is K40-1 (compressive strength 40 MPa, structural class 1), the reinforcement
consists of ribbed bars A500 HW (yield strength, 500 MPa). The design life is 65 years
and the exposure classes are XC2, XS1 and XA1 according to EN 206-1, i.e. resistance
to chemical exposure caused by carbonation, chlorides and sulphates.
Structural design of base slab
Finnprima Oy carried out the detailed design of the structures in compliance with the
requirements of Part B4 of the Finnish Building Code (RakMK) and the Eurocode 2,
prEN 1992-1-1, April 2003, which applies to design of concrete structures. The
fulfilment of the design requirements for the base slab has been verified on the basis of
structural calculations reported by Finnprima and reviewed by STUK. The structural
calculations are based on linear FE structural analyses (compying with the theory of
elasticity). STUK also required that the design calculations shall be verified by means
of non-linear FE analyses (that take into consideration cracks in the structures and
plasticizing of materials).
Special features of base slab in comparison with common concreting projects
The base slab differs from common concrete structures by its massiveness and large
size. Moreover, concreting had to be completed without breaks, as casting joints were
not allowed in the base slab of the reactor building. Continuous concreting of structures
of this size is extremely rare in Finland.
In massive concrete structures, temperatures tend to rise considerably during the curing
process due to hydratation heat, and temperature gradients are usually high. The high
temperature gradient in the concrete may cause cracks in the curing structure, and a
high temperature may result in loss of strength in the concrete. Due to the cracking risk
caused by the high temperature gradient and the loss of strength caused by high
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temperature, measures are usually taken with massive concrete structures to restrict the
temperature rise. In order to limit the increase in temperature, the binder used in the
base slab concrete contains an abundance of furnace slag instead of Portland cement,
since the heat production rate of furnace slag during curing is considerably slower.
Abundant use of furnace slag also improves the chemical resistance of concrete.
The concrete composition used in the base slab is not used in conventional construction
work, and in that sense it is rare. Similar mixes are mainly used only in massive
structures. The type of concrete used in the base slab cannot be considered to pose any
special difficulties in fabrication or concreting, provided the concrete mix has been
validated with sufficient preliminary tests.
3.1.2 Work practices generally followed in construction
Designing concrete composition
The common practice followed in concrete construction is that the structural designer
specifies the requirements for cured concrete. Normal requirements specified by
structural designers include strength (here K40-1) and durability (here XC2, XS1 and
XA1). The requirements have an effect e.g. to the amount of binder (cement and
furnace slag) and to the water-binder ratio of the concrete. The water-binder ratio
affects the strength and the durability properties of concrete.
Requirements on fresh concrete are normally not specified by the structural designer
but by the concreting contractors - in this case Hartela Oy. In some special projects the
structural designer may define additional requirements for concreting. A typical
example is that he defines the maximum temperature that the structure may not exceed
during the curing of the concrete (e.g. 55ÂşC). Most Finnish structural designers do not
possess enough practical expertise in concrete material technology to make them
qualified to design the final composition.
The builder (or the concreting contractor) usually always orders the concrete on the
basis of the specified requirements, with the concrete supplied directly into the
formwork. The supplier of the concrete is responsible for the compliance of the
concrete with the requirements specified by the structural designer and with the
requirements that concern the manufacture (concreting) of the structure, specified by
the builder. Such requirements apply to the pumpability, compactibility, consistency,
setting time, and the rate of strength development, among others.
The final concrete mix is usually designed by the concrete supplier, as they know their
own materials (particularly the aggregate) and have the laboratory facilities for
performance of tests to support the design process. The final mix is always influenced
not only by the requirements specified by the structural designer, but also by
requirements that concern placeability. In order to enable casting and compacting of the
concrete, it must be easily workable, it may not become segregated, and it must be
pumpable as required. Detailed mix design requires knowledge of the aggregate to be
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used, and the additives (e.g. plasticizers and retarders) that need to be used if required
to ensure the desired workability properties.
If the water-cement ratio is relatively low, plasticizers are used to ensure good
pumpability and workability of concrete. Plasticizers reduce friction between the
ingredients of fresh concrete during casting. Plasticizers do not affect the properties of
cured concrete. The amount of plasticizer must be exactly correct to provide the desired
effect. The plasticizers of different manufacturers give the desired effect with different
mixing ratios and, therefore, preliminary tests must be separately carried out for the
plasticizer that will be used.
Plasticizers can, however, be used for affecting pumpability to a limited degree only,
and the effect of too low water-binder ratio cannot be compensated by merely adding
plasticizer. In addition, aggregate has a significant effect on pumpability. Crushed
aggregate is worse from the point of pumpability than natural aggregate.
In demanding construction projects the correctness of the concrete mix has to be
validated by preliminary tests. The mix proportion is changed and fine-tuned as
required on the basis of the test results. If changes are made, the preliminary tests have
to be repeated. The more the composition differs from conventionally used mixes, the
more work and preliminary tests are required to determine the mix proportion. The
determination of the final concrete composition is always an "iteration" process.
Pumpability test is usually conducted last. By then other tests have already been
performed to verify that the properties of the concrete meet the requirements. If
pumping problems are encountered, the mix proportion is changed and tests are
repeated.
If preliminary tests show that the concrete meeting the requirements cannot be
fabricated and poured within the restrictions that concern the concrete mix, the concrete
supplier shall contact the structural designer. The structural designer and the concrete
supplier then together agree on the changes required in the restrictions that concern the
mix proportion.
Quality control for concrete
The quality control tests to be performed during fabrication, as well as their total
number and documentation, are defined in the quality control plan. When the quality
control plan is drawn up the complexity of the concreting process, the size of the
concreted area as well as the conditions need to be taken into consideration. During
concreting, tests are made on fresh concrete according to the quality control plan, both
at the batching plant and on the concreting site. In addition, test specimens are cast for
the tests of the properties of the hardened concrete.
The quality of the concrete in a completed (hardened) structure can always be analysed
by means of samples taken of the structure. The required number of core samples is
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drilled from the structure at desired points. The core samples are used to produce test
specimens for tests of desired properties. The specimens are usually tested in
compliance with standards. If no applicable standard is available, other commonly used
testing methods are employed. The properties that can be determined include e.g.
compressive strength and porosity of concrete.
The internal structure of concrete can be studied by making thin sections of the drilled
samples, and subjecting them to a microscopic analysis.
3.1.3 Division of work and operation at Olkiluoto
Selection of concrete supplier and base slab concreting contractor, and concrete delivery
agreement
The consortium started the process for the selection of concrete supplier in the autumn
of 2004. The person responsible for the matter was an employee of the consortium, who
at the time worked in Germany and later acted on the site as FANP's supervisor of the
batching plant. The call for tenders was sent to four potential concrete suppliers named
in the Main Contract. According to the information received in the interviews, the call
for tenders contained the technical specifications and the YVL Guide 4.1 [7] was
appended. No other requirements were specified in the call for tenders in terms of
requirements concerning quality control in a nuclear power plant construction project
(e.g. the requirement for a laboratory) or any other special requirements, such as
reference to IAEA's safety standard IAEA 50-C-QA.
The consortium FANP-Siemens (CFS) selected Forssan Betoni from the four potential
concrete suppliers apparently on price grounds, although the small size of the company
was considered a risk. However, Forssan Betoni had taken part in some large-scale
construction projects before, such as bridges and power plants, and according to CFS
the company fulfilled the criteria defined for the selection.
At the time the agreement was concluded, Forssan Betoni was not required to have a
valid certified ISO 9001 quality system, although most of the other candidates were
already at the time using an ISO 9000-based quality system. In connection with the
signing of the agreement, the requirement for a quality system to be realised later was
specified. Forssan Betoni declared that they were working on their ISO 9001:2000
certification, and that the certificate would be applied for during the concrete deliveries.
According to the consortium's interpretation the fact that the company was being
inspected by an organisation (SFS-Inspecta) approved by the Finnish Ministry of the
Environment, as referred to in Annex 1 of YVL Guide 4.1, was a sufficient validation
for quality. TVO made no complaints on the selected supplier.
No training related to safety culture was provided to the personnel of Forssan Betoni
before the concreting of the base slab. All the parties (FANP, TVO, Forssan Betoni)
considered the site introduction training and the occupational safety training included in
it, which is required for the granting of an access permit, to be sufficient.
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According to information received from a representative of Forssan Betoni, the
concrete delivery agreement contained the requirement that the order for concrete
would in each situation be sent to the batching plant two weeks before the concreting
was to be started, regardless of the size of the concreting area. For large concreting
jobs, the placing of an order two weeks in advance can be justified, but for smaller
concreting jobs the requirement that FANP specified for itself is unusual. Another
unusual aspect of the agreement was that no responsibility for the pumpability or
castability of the concrete was defined for the concrete supplier. The responsibility for
the pumping and casting into the formwork rested completely with the builder (FANP)
and the contractor it had assigned to carry out the concreting work. These factors
suggest that the persons who concluded the agreement are not very familiar with the
practical aspects of construction projects.
Hartela was chosen by FANP as the concreting contractor from among several
candidates. The selection was strongly influenced by TVO's request to employ Finnish
contractors on the site.
According to TVO's representatives the Main Contract specifies that the responsibility
for the batching plant, the composition of concrete and the concreting work rests solely
with FANP, and TVO merely supervises work in its capacity as the orderer and
licensee.
Batching plants
Forssan Betoni set up three batching plants for concrete deliveries. Batching plants
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 are located in immediate vicinity of the power plant construction site,
and batching plant no. 3 in the area of Interrock. The Olkiluoto 1 and 2 are new plants,
and plant no. 3 was built in 1999. Concrete for the water tunnels and the harbour, where
TVO acted as the builder and Lemcon as the contractor before the construction site was
handed over of the consortium, was delivered from batching plant no. 3.
On 17.92004 SFS-Inspecta Sertifiointi Oy conducted an intial inspection at the batching
plant in the Interrock area and approved it into their inspection programme on
30.9.2004. SFS-Inspecta Sertifiointi Oy conducted on 15.3.2005 an initial inspection at
the new batching plants no. 1 and 2 and approved them into their inspection programme
on 16.3 2005. After the initial approval, SFS Inspecta controls the quality of the plants
by making inspections at the plants a few times every year.
TVO conducted several inspections at batching plants no. 1 and 2 before the concreting
of the base slab. At that time, production at the plants had not yet been started. TVO
was represented in the inspections by the supervisor of concrete fabrication and a
representative of quality control. The inspections were based on check lists that listed
the issues covered in the inspection. Some minor deficiencies and remarks were
recorded in the inspection reports.
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When TVO inspected batching plant no. 1 (29.-30.3.2005) and batching plant no. 2
(11.4.2005), the plant facilities had not yet been finalised, but the deficiencies were not
considered to be so significant that fabrication of concrete could not be started. The
laboratory and the storage facilities for materials and test specimens were still in the
Interrock area. It was noted that there was no camera controlling of the fabrication
process. Water supply had not been connected and the foundation on the buffer water
tank had not been built. As far as quality control was concerned, the quality manual and
the graphic presentation of quality control measurementswere noted to be missing.
TVO sent the inspection reports to FANP by a cover letter on 19.4.2005 for further
actions.
TVO had already before made inspections at batching plant no. 3, which is located in
the Interrock area. In a follow-up inspection conducted in December 2004, the
acceptance of cement was found to deviate from the requirements of Finnish Building
Code of Concrete Structures B4 (RakMK B4, By50). The batching plant operating
records were still under development at the time of the inspection. It was noted in the
inspection that the graphic presentation of the quality control measurements as well as
vibration limit measurement equipment earlier required by TVO were missing from the
plant (the code RakMK B4 does not separately require the measurement of vibration
limit). In a repeated inspection on 20.1.2005, TVO concluded that these deficiencies
had been eliminated and there were no obstacles with respect to the concrete batching
plant to the manufacturing of safety class 3 concrete structures for the inlet and outlet of
the seawater tunnels.
TVO and FANP audited the main office of Forssan Betoni on 4.5.2005. Three critical
non-conformancies were found in the performance of Forssan Betoni, which together
with four minor non-conformancies prove that at the time of the audit the quality
system of the company and compliance of operation with the quality system were partly
still at design stage. A quality management system compliant with ISO 9001 was under
construction, and according to plans was to be certified within a few months.
Deficiencies detected in the recording of documents as well as deficiencies in the
definition of interfaces between Forssan Betoni, the client and the design organisation,
were also defined as critical non-conformancies. The recording of documents received
by Forssan Betoni or submitted by Forssan Betoni to the client or to the subcontractors,
was not included in the document processing routine. Due to deficiencies in the
definition of the interfaces Forssan Betoni was using a concrete specification that had
not been officially approved by FANP.
The minor non-conformancies detected in the audit included the lack of an official
reporting practice related to quality issues between the OL3 batching plant and the head
office of Forssan Betoni in Forssa. Deficiencies were also found in the documentation
of the examination and approval of the results of tests performed by Forssan Betoni.
The quality system of Forssan Betoni did not describe in detail the procedures
regarding the traceability of concrete. The availability of quality records was not
verified and the requirements of IAEA's quality standards were not taken into
consideration in the quality management system.
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Forssan Betoni did not obtain the ISO9001 certificates until after the concreting of the
base slab on 14.2.2006. The Olkiluoto 1 and 2 batching plants have valid NQA
certificate no. 20620/7 and batching plant 3 (in Interrock area) NQA certificate no.
20620/6.
Design of concrete composition, and preliminary tests
The mix of the base slab concrete was designed by a concrete specialist (expert A)
employed by Finnprima and with experience on massive concrete structures. In
addition to the normal strength and durablity requirements he, thus, also specified the
maximum amounts of binders in order to restrict the generation of heat. The design of
the base plate concrete composition was based on the technical and quality
requirements specified for the concrete, including e.g. compressive strength and
exposure class (durability) requirements. The designer specified the binder amounts
that fulfilled the exposure class requirements (cement 80
kg/m
3
, furnace slag
240 kg/m
3
) and the water-binder ratio (0.45). The designer also specified the maximum
amount of binder (320 kg/m
3
). This was specified due to the massiveness of the
structure, where temperatures during curing need to be restricted to restrict thermal
stresses that result in a cracking risk. Forssan Betoni also ensured through their
examinations that heat generation would not be too great. The water-binder ratio of the
concrete was determined taking into account the influence of the ratio on the strength
and the durability properties of concrete. If the designed water-binder ratio is exceeded,
in other words more water is used than specified, the strength and the durability
properties of concrete are impaired.
Expert A did not determine the detailed final composition of the concrete, nor had
FANP ordered it from Finnprima. For instance, expert A could not take pumpability
into consideration, as he did not know the aggregates or the pumping lengths. Expert A
stated in the interviews that his design was not intended as the final composition of the
concrete, he merely gave on the basis of the technical and quality requirements the
conditions (specifications) that the final composition should fulfill. The responsibility
for the detailed design of the concrete composition was left to the concrete supplier.
According to the Project Manager responsible for the operation of the batching plant of
Forssan Betoni (hereinafter the batching plant manager), expert A determined the mix
composition of the concrete in terms of the binders "to the kilogram". In his opinion
Forssan Betoni had in practice no possibility at all to influence the composition of the
concrete. In the interview the batching plant manager, however, questioned the
requirements (primarily those concerning durability) set by expert A on the base slab
and, based on this, he also questioned the whole design. In his opinion the specified
mix proportions made it impossible to reach good pumpability due to the very strictly
set limits.
Expert A admitted in the interview that the water-binder ratio defined by him at 0.45
results with the restricted amount of binder to such a small amount of water in the
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concrete that without a good plasticizer it would be impossible to achieve good
workability for the concrete. According to him the workability and pumpability of the
concrete could have been improved by increasing the amount of both binder and water.
According to Forssan Betoni, however, both expert A and FANP specifically denied
this procedure in several instances. The batching plant manager told in the interview
that he had noticed problems in the workability of the concrete, and had for this reason
contacted expert A, who had said that the plasticizer should be changed.
Forssan Betoni drew up the preliminary test programme and performed the preliminary
tests. The preliminary test programme and the test results were approved by FANP on
25.05.2005 and by TVO on 17.06.2005. In the conclusions of the test result report,
Forssan Betoni has drawn attention to the fact that if the amount of binder is reduced
and the water-binder ratio kept unchanged (0.45), this may result in extremely dry
composition, which will make the concrete very difficult to place and impossible to
pump. The representative of Forssan Betoni told the investigating group that they also
proposed pumpability tests to be arranged but here was no reply to their proposal.
According to Forssan Betoni, they did not have the permission to be in direct contact
with the designer but to deliver all information via FANP.
The test programme and the test results were submitted to STUK for information.
STUK does not issue a separate approval for concrete. STUK approves the start of
concreting in connection with the inspection of readiness for concreting and, according
to the YVL Guide 4.1, the approved composition of concrete may not be changed
during concreting.
As concerns the mix composition of the base slab concrete, TVO asked FANP for
preliminary results of the tests performed on the concrete, for the results of fresh
concrete and for the test results obtained with the new plasticizer. Between June and
September TVO reminded the consortium in writing several times of the YVL Guides
and of STUK's involvement in the approval of concrete. The comments made by TVO
concerned e.g. workability and castability. TVO reminded also the fact that if the
composition of the approved concrete is changed, the preliminary tests have to be
performed again and the results submitted to STUK for information before the
inspection of readiness for concreting is performed.
According to the information that has been received, no external parties were present in
the preliminary tests. External supervision is not a common practice in general.
According to expert B, who was hired by FANP and represented the Polytechnic of
Kymenlaakso (KyAMK), the amount of water in the preliminary tests performed due to
the change of the plasticizer was larger than the amount of water in the designed
composition of the concrete. This opinion is based on the comparison of compressive
strength results from tests performed by KyAMK and Forssan Betoni. In the
compressive strength analyses performed by KyAMK the obtained strengths have
corresponded to the results obtained from the test specimens produced by Forssan
Betoni. The test specimens of KyAMK were produced at the batching plant during the
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concreting of the base slab using premixed fresh concrete, and their water content was
higher than in the designed and approved composition. Expert B determined the
amounts of water in these test specimens on the basis of batch reports and
measurements of the water content of the aggregate.
According to expert B the designed mix composition of concrete has been defined "too
tight". Variation in the quality of the different components has not been taken in
consideration in the preliminary test plans.
According to both FANP's Deputy Site Manager and Finnprima's expert A, Forssan
Betoni did not clearly enough bring up the fact that the designed composition is defined
too "tight" and the required workability and pumpability cannot be achieved without
changes in the mix proportions. The concern expressed by Forssan Betoni is, however,
clearly indicated also in the result report dated 24.5.2005 and delivered to STUK for
information and in the copy of the same report received from Forssan Betoni, where it
is seen crossed out (according to Forssan Betoni FANP had crossed it out).
Observations and course of events prior to concreting of reactor building base slab
Construction works were implemented at several points in the plant area with TVO as
the developer before the consortium started the actual construction of the plant. These
included e.g. construction of water tunnels and the port. Forssan Betoni's batching plant
no. 3 in the Interrock area delivered the concrete for these works. The requirements for
the composition of the concrete were defined by the same expert A employed by
Finnprima, who also took part in the design of the mix composition of the base slab
concrete.
According to TVO's Site Manager initial problems were also encountered with the
pumpability of the concrete in the construction works carried out with TVO as the
developer, and the composition of concrete had to be fine-tuned by regulating the
amount of filler (the finest part of aggregate). The batching plant manager confirmed
this. After the mix composition was fine-tuned, the concreting was completed as
planned.
Levelling concrete of the base was cast before the concreting of the base slab started.
According to FANP's representative the concrete mix composition defined for the base
slab was used for the levelling concrete in March, and at that point a pumpability test
was performed on the base slab concrete. A representative of Forssan Betoni had been
invited to the pumping test. In connection with the placing of the levelling concrete,
variations were detected in the quality (consistency) of the concrete and also
segregation. Hartela's employees who implemented the concreting also brought up on
several occasions the variations in the quality of concrete. FANP believed that after
Forssan Betoni had been contacted and criticism given, the variations in quality would
be eliminated and the quality of the concrete would be as planned. According to
Forssan Betoni, the problems were not, however, specified in a way that would have
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made it possible to correct them, and their written request to FANP for detailing the
presented criticism was not replied.
Due to the variation in the consistency of the concrete, detected in the concreting of the
base slab for fuel building UFA (concreted on 12.-14.8.2005) and safeguard buildings
2-3 UJH/UJK (concreted on 1.-2.9.2005), a new plasticizer was taken in use for the
concreting of the reactor building base slab. The new plasticizer had been proven less
sensitive to the accuracy of batching. In addition, a retarder was introduced to the
composition, in order to prevent the previous concrete layer from setting before the
next layer is concreted. New preliminary tests were performed on 15.9.2005 using the
new plasticizer and the retarder, as required by YVL Guide 4.1. The purpose of the
preliminary tests was to determine compressive strength, consistency and setting time.
No pumpability test was performed.
In the first inspection of readiness for concreting of the reactor plant on 23.09.2005
only 7-day compressive strengths of the concrete were available. At that point TVO
stated that on the basis of the available compressive strength results it was not possible
to assess with certainty that the required strength would be achieved after 91 days, and
thereby readiness for concreting was not sufficient. FANP and TVO decided to conduct
a new inspection on 26.9.2005.
In the inspection on 26.9.2005 FANP assessed on the basis of the additional results the
development of the strength of the concrete and the achievement of the required
strength (91 days). TVO still did not consider the assessment sufficiently reliable.
FANP and TVO agreed to conduct a new inspection on 30.9.2005, when the 15-day
compressive strength values would be available.
STUK granted a concreting permission for the reactor building base slab on 30.9.2005.
The approval of concrete strength was at that point based on 15-day compressive
strength results and on the assessment made on the basis of these results by FANP's
experts of the 28 and 91-day strengths and of the strength variation range.
Concreting of reactor building base slab
The base slab was concreted in three stages as follows:
•
In August, base slab of fuel building UFA, 12.-14.8.2005. Amount of concrete ca.
1500 m
3
•
In September, base slab of safeguard buildings 2-3UJH/UJK, 1.-2.9.2006. Amount
of concrete ca. 2000 m
3
.
•
Base slab of reactor building UJA as well as safeguard buildings 1 and 4UJH/UJK
3.-8.10.2005. Amount of concrete ca. 12 000m
3
.
Variation in the consistency of the concrete between different truck loads was detected
in connection with the concreting of the base slab for fuel building UFA and for
safeguard buildings 2-3UJH/UJK. This variation had also been observed during the
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concreting of the levelling concrete (STUK's memorandum 6.3.2006). The variation
was interpreted to be caused by the plasticizer and the accurate dosing it requires. As a
result, a new plasticizer was taken in use, as described above.
For the concreting of fuel building UFA in August, FANP issued the order to start
concreting with a very short notice time. The two-week notice time specified in the
agreement was not complied with in this case. Considerable difficulties were
encountered in the concreting process, as the contractor (Hartela) did not have enough
time to properly prepare for concreting. The levelling and the steel trowelling of the
slab surface, in particular, were not done properly because the workers were too tired.
This does not, however, have any influence on the strength or durability of the concrete.
In subsequent concreting operations Hartela was prepared for this and had hired extra
workers.
The Polytechnic of Kymenlaakso (KyAMK) controlled the quality of concrete during
the concreting of the base slab of reactor building UJA and safeguard buildings 1 and
4UJH/UJK. The party in charge of the management of construction work of the reactor
building (FANP) had ordered expert C, employed by a German company, to act as
FANP's expert at the batching plant.
According to information received from TVO, the large base slab concreting operation
on 3 October was started using the designed and approved composition of concrete.
TVO's supervisors detected problems in the concreting work on the afternoon of the
first concreting day (3.10.2005 at ca. 16.00). Problems were encountered with the
pumpability of the concrete, resulting in e.g. concrete pumps breaking down. TVO’s
supervisors inquired at the site for possible reasons why the pumps had failed or
become clogged. The next morning, TVO contacted FANP's representatives by e-mail
on 4.10. enquiring whether changes had been made in the composition during the
concreting operation. FANP informed that no changes had been made in the
composition of concrete.
However, Forssan Betoni and expert B have told that expert C, who acted at the
batching plant as FANP's expert, reduced the amount of filler in the aggregate.
Problems persisted, and according to the batching plant manager the composition was
changed again 24 hours later back to almost the original composition. The amount of
filler was still a bit smaller than in the designed composition.
The Site Quality Manager who supervised the concreting operation on behalf of the
consortium also told that expert C had ordered changes to be made at the batching plant
in the composition of the concrete on the basis of the consistency measurements
performed by KyAMK.
According to TVO's Site Manager, the rest of the concreting operation went as planned.
In the Site Manager's opinion the representative of STUK had not been informed about
the change in the composition of concrete.
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After the concreting operation, TVO contacted FANP several times (by e-mail), trying
to find out if the composition of concrete had been changed during the concreting
operation. On 5.10.2005, for example, TVO asked FANP to submit the batch reports
for the concrete fabrication batches. Despite several requests, these reports were not
submitted to TVO.
After the concreting operation, the concreting contractor Hartela drew up two
nonconformity reports. The non-conformance report dated 15.11.2005 (Hartela NCR
0030) reported the disappearance of the compressive strength test specimens for 32UJH
and 33UJH equipment pit. The non-conformance report dated 19.01.2006 (Hartela
NCR 0029) stated that the reference strength of the concrete according to the site test
specimens did not meet the requirement in area 2-3UJH.
Course of events after concreting of the reactor building base slab
Claims for submittal of batch reports of fabrication batches
Since FANP did not, despite several requests, submit the batch reports, TVO conducted
on 14.10.2005 an inspection at the batching plant. Present in the inspection were the
supervisor of concrete fabrication and the quality control expert from TVO, the Site
Quality Manager from the consortium as well as the person responsible for the
supervision of the batching plant for FANP. In this inspection, the representative of
TVO concluded that considerable changes had been made in the composition of
concrete during the concreting of the UJA building. In the inspection, TVO's
representatives asked for copies of the batch reports, but FANP refused to produce
them. It was agreed in the inspection that TVO would send an official request for the
copies to FANP.
FANP informed TVO by an official letter on 20.10.2005 that the batch reports would
not be submitted until in connection with the completion of the plant.
This resulted in active correspondence between TVO and FANP, and on 14.11.2005
FANP agreed to submit the requested batch reports. The reports were delivered to TVO
on 21.11.2005. On the basis of the batch reports TVO concluded that the composition
of concrete had been changed during the concreting operation. TVO prepared a draft
non-conformance report on 23.11.2005. The actual non-conformance report (no. 0593)
was drawn up by TVO on 14.12.2005 and the next day TVO informed STUK by e-mail
of the non-conformance report that had been entered in the Kronodoc folder. Kronodoc
is a system where STUK can in advance read material that will be later provided on
paper.
In a letter dated 20.12.2005, FANP still denied that any changes had been made in the
mix composition of concrete. In addition, FANP refused to accept receipt of the
non-conformance reports and asked TVO to withdraw them.
In a letter dated 5.1.2006 TVO refused to withdraw the non-conformance reports and
asked FANP to make a proposal for action to be taken by 10.1.2006.
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At the end of January (26.1.06) and at the beginning of February (3.2.06 and 8.2.06)
FANP submitted non-conformance reports to TVO for examination, concerning
concrete structures in the base slab of the reactor building. TVO forwarded the
non-conformance reports immediately to STUK for information.
Report by Polytechnic of Kymenlaakso (KyAMK)
The preliminary report by KyAMK (drawn up by expert B) on the tests performed
during the concreting operation was submitted to FANP (to the site) in November
(dated 13.11.2005, received at site on 14.11.2005). The report was preliminary because
the 91-day results for the concrete were missing (the quality assessment age for
concrete is 91 days). The report did, however, show considerable variation in the
water-binder ratio in some batches. Towards the end of the concreting operation, the
water-binder ratio exceeded the designed value, and varied between 0.53 and 0.56. The
highest single value was 0.64.
The site did not forward KyAMK’s preliminary report either to TVO or to STUK.
According to the information that was received the report was not sent to FANP's head
office, either. The report was studied by FANP's Site Manager and his deputy. FANP
also asked the batching plant to provide the batch reports for making more detailed
analyses as, according to them, no conclusions could be drawn without binding results.
According to FANP's Deputy Site Manager the report was not forwarded to the other
parties due to its preliminary nature. FANP had decided to distribute the report only
after the final results were available.
According to the Deputy Site Manager, FANP's perception was that the changes made
in the composition of concrete during the concreting of the reactor building base slab
were not relevant.
The preliminary report by KyAMK (copy) was sent to Forssan Betoni on 20.11.2005.
Forssan Betoni did not comment the report at this point.
The Civil Work Contract Manager of FANP's parent company Areva arrived at the site
in mid-January to settle a contractual problem between FANP and Boygues, the
contractor of the containment. Boygues had informed that they would terminate the
contract because they did not trust the batching plant’s capability to deliver appropriate
concrete. After Hartela had sent a letter (non-conformance report) informing about the
disappearance of the test specimens, the Contract Manager responsible for civil work
had an investigation made by a party independent of the batching plants, the Technical
University of Darmstadt.
Report by the Technical University of Darmstadt
Representatives of the Technical University of Darmstadt visited the batching plant and
recorded several deficiencies (10 findings), but some of them were clearly based on
misunderstanding. According to their inspection aggregates were not stored in silos,
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which resulted in a number of findings: there was no layer at the bottom of the storage
pile to prevent mixing with soil, the particle size fractions had not been properly
marked and the aggregate piles were not covered which, according to the inspectors,
caused a risk of mixing and exposed the piles to rain and snow. In fact, the aggregate
used for the concrete of the base slab was delivered by the supplier directly into silos
without any intermediate storage. The aggregate piles detected in the inspection served
as 2-hour stockpiles, in case transports had been delayed. According to the inspection,
laboratory equipment had not been maintained in regulatory condition. This referred to
the set of sieves, but the bowl that had been inspected was not part of the set.
Deficiencies were also found in the storage of test specimens. According to the
batching plant manager the test specimens were being transferred from one storage pool
to another at the time of the inspection, which is why some of the test specimens were
on a work table, in "dry" condition. The training level and qualifications of the staff
could not be established in the inspection, as no documents concerning this were
available. Nor was the Quality Control Plan for concrete production available.
According to Forssan Betoni, the documents could not be presented because the
inspection was made at a time when the English-speaking project manager of Forssan
Betoni was absent.
Areva's Contract Manager responsible for civil work contacted the batching plant
manager and emphasised in this discussion the critical status of concrete in terms of
safety. He also warned the manager that the operation of the batching plant might have
to be discontinued. A list of corrective action concerning the batching plant was drawn
up (on 17.1.2006). The Contract Manager responsible for civil work also contacted the
Managing Director of Forssan Betoni. Forssan Betoni was not able to implement the
corrective action in the tight schedule demanded by FANP. After this, the Stop Work
Order for the manufacturing of concrete at the batching plant was issued by FANP’s
Site Manager for the first time on 24.01.2006. According to the Civil Work Contract
Manager the discontinuation of operation was specifically based on the Darmstadt
report. The batching plant manager said that in his opinion the report was goal-directed.
FANP informed TVO about the discontinuation of operation at the batching plant by a
letter dated 26.1.2006.
To TVO, the discontinuation of operation at the batching plant came as a surprise and
TVO enquired about the reasons for the discontinuation.
FANP informed TVO on 30.1.2006 that the batching plant had been given a permission
to resume operation.
At the beginning of February, Areva's Civil Work Contract Manager heard for the first
time about the report by KyAMK. He did not know why the report had not been
distributed widely enough for information within the FANP organisation. Having read
the report, he found the problem to be serious. The subject matter content of the report
was examined in Darmstadt. After discussions with several persons concerning
KyAMK's report, the Contract Manager responsible for civil work decided to
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discontinue the operation of the batching plant the second time. Operation was
discontinued again on 6.2.2006.
In a meeting between FANP and TVO on 3.2.2006, FANP informed that the
water-binder ratio had exceeded the design requirements. STUK was informed of the
matter in a meeting held on 9.2.2006.
The report of the Technical University of Darmstadt draws an unfair picture of Forssan
Betoni's operation in terms of the storage of aggregates. The manager of Forssan
Betoni's batching plant did not find the competence of the inspectors very high, either,
as observations were made of matters that had no part in the production process. The
inspection had been carried out in the absence of the batching plant manager.
According to Areva's Civil Work Contract Manager most designed compositions of
concrete are such that they cannot be properly fabricated or poured. New preliminary
tests were performed on the mix compositions in Darmstadt. The Contract Manager
expressed his concern on the attitude of Forssan Betoni and its owner company.
Inspections for the re-start of batching plant
FANP/TVO presented on 28.2.2006 to STUK the investigations that had been
conducted by that time, as well as their opinion of the conditions on which concrete
fabrication could be continued. FANP's representative presented in the meeting the
plans that they had drawn up, and which had been approved by TVO, for short-term
and long-term corrective action.
TVO submitted the following clarifications concerning the batching plant and quality
control at the plant to STUK on 8.3. and 9.3.2006:
•
Clarifications for the development of quality control at the batching plant
•
OL3-specific QA manual of Forssan Betoni, including procedures and
documentation
•
Forssan Betoni, QA manual ISO 9001:2000
•
Clarifications concerning FANP's and TVO's intensified efforts for the control of
the quality of concrete and the batching plant
•
Work specification concerning the batching plant and transports.
•
Quality plan concerning the batching plant and transports.
•
Inspection plan for the batching plant before re-start of operation.
•
Complementing of FANP and TVO organisations for quality control of concrete
and the batching plant.
•
Report of the Technical University of Darmstadt on corrective action implemented
at the batching plant.
In addition, TVO submitted to STUK for approval the corrective actions required by
critical non-conformance reports and the other non-conformance reports for
information.
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An inspection of the readiness for resuming operation was conducted at the batching
plant on Friday 10.3.2006. The inspection was performed in compliance with the
sequence outlined in the specifically prepared plan, CW Inspection & Test Plan,
Fabrication of ready-mix concrete, Re-start of Batching Plant, 6.3.2006.
In the inspection, it was noted that the control and traceability of the water-binder ratio
had still not been arranged in the required manner, despite the fact that the
non-conformancies in the quality of the base slab concrete were primarily due to
variation in the water-binder ratio. It was also concluded that the safety culture training
referred to in the OL3 quality plan of Forssan Betoni had not been provided.
Due to these deficiencies, TVO refused to issue permission for re-starting of the
batching plant. STUK agreed. It was decided that the next re-start inspection would be
performed after the deficiencies had been corrected.
The new re-start inspection of the OL3 mixing plant was conducted at the Olkiluoto
batching plant of Forssan Betoni on Wednesday 15.3.2006. FANP and TVO signed a
report which stated that the required short-term corrective actions had been taken and
the operation of the batching plants of Forssan Betoni could be resumed. STUK's
inspector stated that STUK had no comments to make on the report.
On 28.3.2006 TVO audited Forssan Betoni's Olkiluoto batching plants no. 1 and 2. In
the audit, 10 findings were still made, 4 of them non-conformancies. For example, the
inaccuracy of measurements of furnace slag exceeded the tolerance allowed by the
concrete norms (10 % > permitted 3 %). A positive finding was that the traceability of
the water-binder ratio in the batch report and the delivery note had been sorted out
swiftly and well. One of the three recommendations issued was that special attention
should be paid on motivating the personnel.
3.1.4 Summary of problems that disturbed the concreting of base slab
Selection of concrete supplier, and purchase agreement
The procedure followed in the selection of the concrete supplier for the OL-3 project
did not in all respects meet the requirements of FANP's quality system. At least the
following deviations were found in the selection process:
-
The call for tenders did not specifically state that special requirements are
placed on quality management in the construction of a nuclear power plant.
The requirements for quality management should have been stated so clearly
that the tenderers would have been able to assess the amount of extra work
required to meet them, and later operate without unpredicted cost pressures
due to quality control.
-
The key criterion applied to the comparison of the tenders was the price of
concrete production.
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-
The quality system of Forssan Betoni did not at the selection stage meet the
requirements of ISO 9001.
-
The quality system of the consortium requires that each subcontractor prepares
a quality plan before work is started. However, Forssan Betoni did not receive
the specifications for the preparation of the plan until February 2006, and
prepared their quality plan after that.
The delivery of concrete to the pump is not acommonly used limit. Usually the concrete
supplier is responsible for the concrete properties up to the concreting site (formwork).
Due to the specified delivery limit, the concrete supplier had no interest based on an
agreement to pay sufficient attention to the pumpability of concrete.
For large-scale concreting operations, the required two-week notice time for concrete
orders is justified. FANP did not respect this requirement in the concreting of the base
slab for fuel building (UFA) 12.-14.8.2005, but submitted the notice of the start of
concreting on the day that concreting was started. For this reason, the concreting
contractor Hartela did not have enough time to properly prepare for the operation (did
not manage to acquire a sufficient number of workers) and this influenced the progress
of concreting operation particularly at the finishing stages. On the other hand, the
required two-week notice time that FANP specified for itself is unusual in smaller
concreting operations, and indicates that the persons who concluded the agreement are
not very familiar with the practices followed in construction projects.
The acquisition followed the agreed procedures in main parts. However, the special
features of nuclear power plant construction were not clearly emphasised and no
OL3-specific quality plan, nor inclusion of IAEA's requirements for quality
management in the plan was required of the tenderers at the tendering stage. These
were not required until the audit that TVO carried out in the head office of Forssan
Betoni in the spring in 2005.
Batching plants and their staff
The Olkiluoto batching plants no. 1 and 2 were new plants. The start-up of operation
and the commissioning of new machinery and equipment always takes time, but the
technical conditions for the production of good quality did exist at the time the base
slab was concreted.
Forssan Betoni had no experience in a nuclear power plant construction prior to the
OL3 project and all the quality requirements applied to nuclear power construction
were not brought up at the tendering stage. Also, the special safety requirements in the
nuclear field were not emphasised by FANP in the training of the batching plant staff
before concrete fabrication was started. After the site was handed over, the consortium
and Forssan Betoni discussed the quality requirements and the work practices
repeatedly, and Forssan Betoni felt that requirements outside the agreement were
placed on them.
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The staff at the batching plants possessed the required qualifications. However, several
features in the performance of Forssan Betoni came up during the investigation that are
not in accordance with a high-level quality and safety culture. Practices followed in the
nuclear field, but deviating from practices normally followed in construction work,
were not fully observed. For instance, concrete fabrication was not implemented
according to the specifications and requirements, non-conformancies were not reported
without delay, and there were delays in corrective actions for the reported
non-conformancies.
The responsibility of the batching plant manager for the quality of concrete was not
clear, as experts hired by the consortium assumed a significant role in the determination
of the composition of concrete, and the changes in the composition were also during the
concreting operation made in collaboration with the consortium's expert. In the
interview, the batching plant manager stated that in his opinion the changing of the
composition was not a relevant issue. He mainly considered it to be an inconvenience,
as it resulted in pumps breaking down.
Several of the interviewed persons commented on the difficulties they had in
cooperation with the staff at the batching plants. According to their experience, the staff
at the batching plants did not take variations in the quality of concrete seriously enough
and did not actively try to sort out the problems together with the other parties.
However, it is not right to blame an individual supplier for the poor safety culture, as
the consortium's practices in the selection and guidance of the concrete supplier were
deficient. The consortium should acknowledge the fact that jobs in the nuclear field are
rare and it is therefore to be expected that nuclear safety is not the number one priority
in the subcontracting companies operating in different fields.
Some of the interviewees questioned the professional competence of the staff at the
batching plants with respect to concrete fabrication, and language skills were suspected
of having caused problems, as well. Yet, there are no grounds for these perceptions
concerning the competence and the language skills of the staff, and the negative views
may have been presented to serve a purpose. From the point of the agreement, it is not
justified to make the language skills an issue, as the contract between CFS and Forssan
Betoni defines Finnish as the language to be used at the site.
Forssan Betoni and its parent company Lemminkäinen voiced their outrage on how the
quality of the base slab and the operation of the batching plant were presented in public
after the concreting of the base slab. They emphasised that the concreting was
completed and the quality of the concrete is good. Attitudes of this kind in the
management do not promote the development of a quality and safety oriented
atmosphere in an organisation.
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Preparations for base slab concreting
Variations were detected in the quality of concrete (consistency, segregation,
pumpability) in several contexts before the concreting of reactor building base slab.
Observations were made at least in preliminary tests, the concreting of levelling
concrete, the concreting of base slab for fuel building UFA and the concreting of base
slab for safeguard buildings 2-3UJH/UJK.
In other words, the experts of all the parties were aware of the problems connected with
concreting, but active measures to correct the situation in good time before the
concreting of the reactor base slab were not taken. Attempts to correct the situation
were not started until in the autumn just before the planned start of concreting, when
e.g. the plasticizer was changed and a retarder was added in order to increase the
workability time.
In practice, cooperation between the structural designer and the concrete supplier has
been virtually non-existent. FANP has actually required that all communication be
handled through them. FANP trusted that Forssan Betoni would implement the
corrective action once problems had been occured in previous concreting operations
and the matter had been reminded. FANP did not check whether the corrective actions
had actually been taken.
FANP's Deputy Site Manager hired expert B from the Polytechnic of Kymenlaakso
(KyAMK) as an independent quality controller for the concreting of the reactor
building base slab. The Deputy Site Manager assumed that the factors detected in the
mix composition before the concreting operation had been corrected. Several experts,
including expert A who designed the mix composition, expert B and the German expert
C had seen the composition of concrete, but did not warn about any problems.
Concreting of base slab
According to the information received and the results obtained in the investigation, the
quality control personnel of FANP did not identify serious quality problems during the
work.
The composition of concrete had been changed during the concreting operation, which
is in violation of YVL Guide 4.1. According to FANP the change was not relevant, but
this claim can be questioned as the change exceeded the limits specified in the Finnish
Building Code Part B4, Concrete Structures for weighing accuracy (±3 %). Only
changes within these limits can be interpreted as non-relevant. In all other cases the
influence of the change should be analysed.
During the concreting operation it was not clear to the parties involved, Forssan Betoni
or FANP, who was responsible for the composition of mixes. In this case the quality of
concrete was changed on an order given by FANP.
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Course of events after the concreting of reactor building base slab
Information about the results of the KyAMK report was not distributed widely enough
even within FANP. The relevant results were presented already in the preliminary
report. Leaving the report without forwarding to and the concealing of the results from
TVO and STUK do not reflect an open attitude toward problems which would be in line
with good quality culture.
The disappearance of the compressive strength test specimens made by Hartela
indicates deficiencies in quality control.
Conclusions
The construction of the base slab was impeded by the following factors:
•
No appointed responsible manager at the site unambiguously in charge of the base
slab fabrication, with authority to issue orders that are binding to all parties.
•
The base slab delivery chain did not share a common perception of the safety
significance of the quality of concrete.
•
In the selection of the concrete supplier, the special quality requirements applied in
a nuclear power plant construction were not brought up in the tender invitations,
whereas cost factors were strongly emphasised in the selection.
•
No training was provided to the staff involved in the fabrication of concrete
concerning practices in the nuclear field and the safety significance of their own
work.
•
The division of the concrete supply contract resulted in interfaces, the management
of which failed.
•
In quality control, too much trust was placed on the responsible attitude of the
parties in the elimination of the detected problems.
•
Responsibilities were unclear and problems existed in communication with respect
to the design of the mix composition, fabrication of concrete and quality assurance.
•
The problems observed in previous concreting operations did not result in effective
corrective actions implemented in time.
•
The approved composition of concrete and the concreting specifications were not
adhered to in concrete fabrication.
•
Quality non-conformancies connected with the composition of concrete and
concreting were not handled without delay and in an open manner.
•
The handling of quality problems in the base slab concrete has been characterised
by a search for guilty parties instead of focusing on developing the practices.
3.1.5 Investigation team's assessment of the acceptability of the concrete slab
The water-cement ratio of concrete influences the strength and the durability of
concrete. A higher-than-designed water-cement ratio reduces the compression strength
and impairs the resistance of concrete against environmental impacts.
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Despite the higher water-cement ratio, almost all the 91-day reference strengths
determined for the concrete samples taken of the base slab fulfil the requirement
specified for K40 (C32/49) strength class concrete. The 91-day strength has been below
the value required of strength class K40 only in area 2-3UJH, and even there the value
is only slightly below the required value. None of the additional samples that were
taken were below the required strength class value. STUK has approved the test results.
When assessing the compressive strength of concrete, it should be borne in mind that
the development of strength does not stop at the age 91 days when the quality is
determined, but continues as the age of concrete increases. In addition to age, the
composition of mix and the conditions also influence the development of strength. For
concrete that contains furnace slag, the development of strength continues for a long
time. On the basis of experience gained from previously built structures, the increase in
strength is usually considerable in comparison with the 91-day results.
As a result of what has been presented above, the concrete of the base slab can be
considered to meet the specified requirements for compressive strength.
Concerning durability requirements, the concrete meets the specified requirements in
terms of exposure classes XC2 (carbonation) and XS1 (chlorides).
Due to the higher-than-designed water-cement ratio, the concrete does not meet the
requirement of exposure class XA1 (chemically aggressive substances). Owing to the
high amount of furnace slag, however, the chemical resistance of the concrete is in
practice very good. As the concrete is ageing and its strength is increasing, its density
will also increase, which further improves its chemical resistance.
With respect to durability requirements, it should be noted that they apply to the side
surfaces of the base slab. Damages to the surface parts take place very slowly. The
binder composition that has been used (more than 70% furnace slag) is normally used
in extremely demanding environmental conditions in which chlorides are present, and
where the corrosion risk of the concrete due to other chemical substances is
considerable. Nevertheless, to ensure base slab chemical resitance TVO has announced
that it will in any case require the protection of the base slab against external moisture
and the impurities it will bring along.
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3.2 Containment steel liner
3.2.1 Background information on containment
Contractual parties responsible for the manufacture of steel liner
The parties to the contract were the builder (Framatome ANP, FANP), the structural
designer and supplier of the steel liner (Babcock Noell Nuclear GmbH) and their
subcontractor (= as the manufacturer), a Polish Engineering Works (Energomontaz-
Polnoc Gdynia (EPG)).
Purpose and structure of containment
The nuclear safety related purpose of the containment is to prevent release of
radioactive materials into the environment and to protect the reactor coolant circuit and
the safety systems against external events. The containment is a cylindrical double
containment that is about 60 m high and has a diameter of about 45 m. The walls and
the dome of the inner containment are made of pre-stressed concrete. A steel liner is
installed on the inside of the concrete structure. The inner containment can resist the
over-pressures and the temperatures caused by accident situations, without loosing its
tightness. The outer containment is an extremely massive reinforced concrete structure
that can withstand e.g. airplane crashes.
The reactor and the entire rector coolant circuit (the primary circuit), parts of the steam
and feedwater systems as well as equipment of the safety systems are installed inside
the containment. The containment is normally accessed through a personnel airlock. A
backup airlock is also provided for emergencies. The material hatch of the containment
can be temporarily opened during outages, if required for maintenance purposes. These
airlocks are integral parts of the steel liner and the surrounding concrete.
In an accident situation the inner containment is isolated by closing the exit routes from
the building. This prevents the release of radioactive materials into the environment.
The steel liner including all its penetrations and hatches is assigned to safety class 2.
3.2.2 Manufacturing of steel liner
Method of manufacturing
The steel liner is made of 6 mm thick structural steel. The steel plates are joined
together at the engineering works by welding them into 30-degree segments, the surface
of which is then finished (sandblasting + coating). The segments are transported to the
port and welded into 180-degree sections. At the site, the sections are first joined
together into rings and the rings are then assembled to make up the complete liner as
the construction of the containment progresses.
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According to the welding specification applied to the manufacturing of the steel liner,
the root gap between the plates, which is to be filled with the welding material, is 2-5
mm. The welding procedure have been carried out using this gap size. The use of
ceramic weld support in the welding process has been approved later.
Selection of steel liner supplier
Several potential steel liner suppliers were indicated in the Main Contract. FANP called
tenders for detailed design and manufacturing from four Finnish and five Central
European companies, but only two of them submitted a tender. As the steel liner is a
SC2 steel structure, the manufacturer needs to be approved by STUK. In addition,
STUK performs several construction inspections during the manufacturing of the
structure [8].
Babcock Noell Nuclear GmbH (BNN) was selected as the supplier. The selection
process followed Framatome ANP's standard procedure and was based on both
technical and commercial selection criteria. The division of work between FANP and
the supplier is that FANP performs the required basic design work and lays out the
requirements in the project specification. The supplier is responsible for detailed
design, taking the requirements of the project specification into consideration, and
prepares the detailed construction plan on the basis of these. The steel liner is
manufactured according to the approved construction plan.
Selection of steel liner manufacturer
Babcock Noell Nuclear GmbH selected as their subcontractor (=the manufacturer) the
Polish Engineering Works Energomontaz-Polnoc Gdynia (EPG). The representatives of
FANP told in the interviews that the selection of the manufacturer came as a surprise to
them. The contracts concluded between FANP and various suppliers refer to the use of
subcontractors, but FANP has no real say in their selection. The interviewed
representatives of TVO had also been surprised by the selection of the manufacturer.
The feedback on the selected manufacturer obtained from a Finnish company given as
reference was reasonably good, but emphasised the importance of constant supervision
to ensure that the desired final product would be achieved.
FANP, TVO and STUK audited the Polish manufacturing company on 29-30.3. 2005.
The audit focused on e.g. materials handling, welding, dimensional control,
sandblasting, coating, transport logistics as well as inspection, testing and quality
management procedures. During the audit, 8 non-conformancies were recorded which
required corrective actions. Two of the non-conformancies concerned filler metals used
in welding, for which no handling or storage specifications had been drawn up, and for
which humidity and temperature reports for the storage facility were missing. Weld
inspection procedures were incomplete, and no systematic procedure existed for the
daily control of welding reports. In addition, the usability of the liquids for the
development of X-ray films could not be verified. Deficiencies were also found in the
calibration of micrometers in the DT laboratory.
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TVO had earlier performed a pre-audit in March 2005, in which 11 non-conformancies
had been recorded. Corrective actions had, however, been completed on them by the
time of the actual audit.
An application was submitted to STUK in compliance with YVL Guide 3.4 [9] for the
approval of Energomontaz-Polnoc Gdynia as a manufacturer of nuclear pressure
equipment. The NDT testing organisation of the company was approved according to
YVL Guide 1.3 [10] for the test methods used during manufacturing (radiographic,
ultrasonic, liquid penetrant, magnetic powder, and leakage testing). In terms of welding
technology, the construction is demanding and NDT inspections are really important in
manual welding due to the large number of run-on and run-off points in the welds.
STUK has approved the construction plan of the steel liner and numerous subsequent
additions to it. The steel liner is considered as a nuclear power plant steel structure
according to YVL Guide 4.2 (the bearing steel structures of a reactor containment made
of concrete) [11].
The manufacturing process in Poland is supervised by the quality controllers of FANP
and BNN as specified in the quality control programme of the construction plan. The
quality controllers of TVO also visit the engineering works weekly to supervise
manufacturing. STUK performs construction inspections on prefabricated components
before coating in compliance with YVL Guide 1.15 [8] as the manufacturing
progresses. TVO's representative will also be present in these inspections.
Requirements specified for quality assurance of steel liner manufacturing
In order to ensure the quality of the steel liner, FANP defined the following activities:
1.
Qualitative assessment of the BNN the EPG and the testing organisation based
on documentation, and their comparison with valid (ISO) standards and YVL
Guides.
2.
Verification of fulfilment of requirements by audits performed by TVO and
STUK.
3.
Inspection performed by TVO of construction plan documentation drawn up by
FANP/BNN/EPG and submittal of the construction plan to STUK for approval.
4.
Starting permission for manufacturing.
5.
Maintenance of the quality level of the manufacturer through training (repeated
training events) of the entire personnel, from the top executives to the workers,
based on important/current issues related to manufacturing, and on FANP's
requirements (taking into consideration also the comments made by TVO and
STUK in connection with their control efforts).
6.
Inspection of the manufacturing documentation of FANP/BNN/EPG with
respect to each plate part, segment and the dome.
7.
Starting permissions granted separately for each separate segment and part.
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For the bottom part AS10 of the steel liner (the base plate and the bottom part of the
wall welded to it), FANP defined the control phases as follows:
1.
Prefabrication of segments, conical parts and base parts at the engineering
works under continuous control of FANP, BNN and EPG. Random test type
inspections by TVO and STUK.
2.
Inspection of all welds by FANP, BNN and EPG, as well as by TVO and
STUK, after which coating permission is granted.
3.
Sandblasting of parts to class SA 2½ and 80 µm coating with zinc-silicate paint
under control of the parties referred to above.
4.
Inspection of coating by TVO (and STUK), after which transport permission to
the port of Gdynia for sub-assembly.
5.
Assembly of the base part halves by means of a steel frame under continuous
control of FANP, BNN and EPG. Random test type inspections by TVO and
STUK.
6.
Sandblasting of the halves to class SA 2½ and 80 µm coating with zinc-silicate
paint under control of the parties referred to above.
7.
Inspection of coating by TVO (and STUK), after which shipment permission to
Olkiluoto.
The manufacturing and control phases of the cylinder rings and the dome are
analogous.
3.2.3 Observations made in the manufacturing of steel liner
Deficiencies and problems in manufacturing
Some schedule-related problems were encountered in the submittal of the construction
plan before the start-up of production, due to the obviously incomplete state of the
design. The construction plan submitted to STUK was incomplete and has been later
supplemented on several occasions. This has required extra work from the various
parties and made the approval process difficult (schedules, perception of the whole). In
addition, due to this process the manufacturer has not always known what the most
recent updated version of the design drawings is. For this reason, holes for pipe
penetrations were cut in wrong places as instructed in the old design drawings, and the
holes had to be patched up later.
From controlling point of view, the relatively long "control / supply / production chain"
(STUK->TVO->FANP->BNN->EPG) has proven problematic. It causes delays e.g. in
communication, the handling of critical non-conformance reports, and the
implementation of corrective actions related to production. In addition to the long
"chain", there are also considerable differences in cultural attitudes as well as in
problem handling and solving skills (e.g. "instability" of the arch detected in the stud
welding of anchoring plates) and in the implementation of corrective actions. Unclear
responsibilities are also emphasised in the different parts of the "chain" (e.g. quality
assurance).
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As production has progressed in Poland, TVO and STUK have implemented oversight
activities on a regular basis. For STUK, regulatory control has consisted of construction
inspections of subsections and components, such as penetrations and anchoring plates,
as specified in YVL Guide 1.15. Perhaps the worst deficiency in the performance of
construction inspections has been the fact that the inspection documentation has fallen
way behind production. This makes it very difficult to perform construction inspections
which are required in order to enable the manufacturer to proceed to the next work
stage (=sandblasting + coating) in an optimum production schedule. STUK has made
several admonitions about this to TVO (most recently in February 2006) and TVO has
correspondingly informed FANP on the matter by letter, at least on two occasions. As a
result, the situation has slightly improved lately, although it has not been corrected to
the desired level, yet.
The production conditions at the engineering works of EPG are at a modest level,
considering that safety class 2 components are welded and finished there. Deficiencies
can be found in e.g. lighting, cleanness and temperatures. Manual welding can in a case
like this also be considered quite a primitive choice.
The EPG has experience in the manufacturing of large-scale steel structures for
conventional applications, but no earlier experience in deliveries to nuclear power
plants. For this reason, FANP's requirement for repeated training events to maintain the
quality level of the manufacturer was justified. However, in practice no training was
provided although the requirement is recorded in EPG's Quality Manual. No training on
the promotion of safety culture has been provided, either.
It has also been observed that FANP has left the control of actual production too much
to BNN (at times FANP’s control has appeared to be completely based on random
tests). FANP's performance combined with the limited experience of BNN's supervisor
in this type of manufacturing has resulted in obvious delays in e.g. the handling of
documents, the solving of problems and the implementation of corrective actions. For
these reasons TVO and STUK have in practice had to assume the responsibility of the
plant supplier in carrying out inspections (control). This has been justified to ensure
that corrective actions are initiated without delay, but FANP has failed to react to this
by sufficiently improving its own performance.
The problem is that the manufacturing schedule of EPG is constantly "alive". The EPG
does not manufacture the steel liner according to a steady schedule, but accepts other
orders in-between depending on the market situation and their own production capacity.
This results in production breaks from time to time in the manufacturing of the steel
liner, while at other times the schedule is excessively tight. On the other hand, it has not
always been possible to continue the manufacturing of the steel liner as scheduled, due
to deficient construction plans.
During the manufacturing of the steel liner at EPG, in a regular construction inspection
the inspector of STUK and the quality controller of TVO noticed excessive root gaps in
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the welds between plates. In terms of welding technology, the use of weld support
makes it possible to use larger root gaps, and the manufacturer has started to take
advantage of this in the welding process. The use of a larger root gap in the welding
process does not comply with the original welding specification, qualified by procedure
tests. The problem of an excessive root gap in the welding of the components was
detected twice in the autumn of 2005, and STUK sent a remark of this to TVO. The
inspectors of TVO and STUK stopped production to take corrective action. A non-
conformance report was drawn up and it was assured that the problem would not occur
again.
In connection with a construction inspection performed by STUK in the port of Gdynia
in Poland (on 10.5.), it was noticed that the problem re-appeared in the assembly of the
segment sections. The measured root gap in the horizontal weld was ca. 7.5 mm at its
maximum, instead of specified 2-5 mm. STUK's inspector discussed the problem in
Poland with the representatives of TVO, BNN and the consortium, and later in Finland
with TVO's quality controllers. In TVO's opinion this operation is not acceptable and
TVO is investigating a resolution to the problem.
Errors in the manufacturing of steel liner
The following errors, for example, have occurred in the production, and required
repairs and extra tests:
1.
Root gap exceeded the maximum specified gap of 5 mm in manufacturing at the
Engineering Works (and prior to that the introduction of weld support to the
welding process).
2.
Root gap increased to 7.5 mm in the assembly process carried out in the port
(observed on 10.5.2006).
3.
Use of non-approved welding method for repairs (repairs using electrode
welding, although the only approved welding method is flux cored arc welding).
4.
Holes for pipe penetrations cut in wrong locations (old design drawings)
5.
Defective anchoring plates (deficiencies in stud welding, observed on 15.3.06)
in the steel liner jacket.
Repeated use of an excessive root gap is a clear quality non-conformance to the
officially approved procedure and absolutely unacceptable to this extent. A situation
like this should not be possible in a well functioning quality system. Quality control
based on the welding specification shall be continuous, and every worker must be
responsible for the quality of his own work. In this project the next control step is
defined so that FANP's quality controller controls the compliance of the performance
with specifications and the fulfilment of quality requirements. The inspection following
that is performed by TVO's quality control inspector. STUK is not responsible for
quality control during production, but only for the conduct of of the prescibed
construction inspections. In addition, the quality system requires traceability in a
situation where it is possible that a defective product has passed through quality control
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during production. In this case it is not clear how widely excessive root gaps have been
used in the welding processes.
The acceptability of the welds that do not conform to the welding specification has
been subsequently verified by additional qualification tests. STUK has approved the
programme of the welding procedure test and seen the preliminary results. The result
report has not yet been submitted to STUK for review. According to TVO, the primary
objective will, however, be to improve the accuracy of manufacturing and the
construction practices.
The use of a non-approved welding method (the 3rd non-conformancy above) was
detected in a construction inspection performed by STUK. The manufacturer had
decided to modify their earlier work practices and chose an unqualified method instead
of having recorded and reported a non-conformancy, proposed corrective actions, and
waited for approval before continuing the work. The welds produced using a wrong
method were removed by grinding and re-welded using a qualified method.
The cutting of pipe penetration holes in wrong places was due to the use of non-
approved design documents. Information about changed location of the holes did not
reach the manufacturer before the work was started. The manufacturing of the
respective parts of the steel liner was started with FANP's permission before the design
documents had been approved. The holes were detected in TVO's control inspections.
They were patched up using appropriate methods and the result of the repair was
verified by X-raying.
In connection with the construction inspection of the installation welding of the jacket
(AS 20 ring), defects were detected in the anchoring plates welded to the steel liner.
The stud welding of the anchoring plates had failed in some of the studs welded on the
edges of the plates. This was shown as an inconsistent "collar" at the root of the stud.
The plates had to be removed and new plates with correctly welded studs were joined to
the steel liner.
A clear deviation from specifications is the waviness of the bottom part AS10 of the
steel liner. In its final place, the bottom shold be as flat as possible to minimize the ai
pockets between the liner and the concrete, in order to avoid corrosion of the liner in
the long term. The bottom structure without stiffeners was a choice made by the
designer. The defined waviness tolerance may not have been realistic, taking into
consideration the problems connected with manufacturing (=welding). In order to
evaluate the possible problems caused by waviness, the steel liner was subjected to a
water filling test. In its final location in the containment, concrete will be placed into
the steel liner, and the purpose of the water filling test was to simulate the weight of the
concrete. On the basis of the results of the test, it was concluded that the load
straightens the steel liner, and the waviness exceeding the tolerance is not significant.
Nevertheless, in order to eliminate the possibility of air pockets, concrete will be
injected between the steel liner and the base plate after concreting work inside the steel
liner have proceeded to a suitable point. For the injection work grooves have been
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milled to the surface of the base plate and through them the grout will penetrate the
whole area of the plate.
Conclusions
The following factors have impeded the manufacturing of the steel liner:
•
Responsibility for the selection and control of the manufacturer was left to the
subcontractor.
•
Requirements on quality and the supervision of manufacturing were not
emphasized at the design and tendering stage, and came as a surprise to the
manufacturer.
•
The working practices and equipment used by the manufacturer are outdated for
this type of manufacturing.
•
Permissions have been granted by FANP for the continuation of manufacturing in
situations where the design of the phases and the approval of the design documents
have not been completed.
•
The safety significance of the welds of the steel liner has not been emphasised to
the workers involved in manufacturing, and no training has been provided to
themconcerning quality management practices in the nuclear field.
•
The inspection documentation of the steel liner has not been available in full in
construction inspections.
•
The long supplier chain has slowed down the non-conformance handling process.
•
The quality control implemented by the subcontractor and the plant supplier has
been deficient, and required extra activities from TVO and STUK.
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3.3 Polar crane and material hatch
The deliveries of the polar crane for the reactor hall and the material hatch for the
containment are at the design stage, and their manufacturing has not yet been started.
The common denominator for these deliveries is the same designer and manufacturer.
The background information of both deliveries and the progress of the deliveries so far
are described briefly below.
3.3.1 Background information on polar crane and material hatch
Contractual parties responsible for the manufacturing of polar crane and material hatch
The parties to the contract were the plant vendor (Framatome ANP, FANP) and the
structural designer and manufacturer of the polar crane and the material hatch (Eiffel).
General information on the company
Eiffel is part of the Eiffage Group and employs 1060 people. The company specialises
in the manufacturing of large-scale steel structures, such as bridges, locks, towers and
pressure vessels. Polar cranes represent only a small part of the product range. The
polar crane and the material hatch will be manufactured in Lauterbourg near Strasbourg
and designed in Colombes, Paris.
Requirements specified for polar crane and its construction
A so-called polar crane will be installed in the top part of the reactor hall at the
Olkiluoto 3 nuclear power plant unit. There are tens of cranes in use at the nuclear
power plant, but only the cranes used in the transfer of nuclear fuel or in other safety
significant lifting operations are under special control of STUK. The polar crane is one
of these, and it is assigned to safety class 3.
Due to the circular shape of the reactor hall, the crane construction must also be
designed with a special rotating crane bridge. A rail is mounted in the top part of the
wall construction in the reactor hall, and the crane bridge will rotate on this rail.
Because of the movement that differs from that of a normal gantry crane, cranes of this
type are referred to as polar cranes.
The span of the polar crane bridge is 44.3 m and the maximum capacity of the main
lifting gear is 320 tons. There are two smaller lifting gears in the crane, as well (35 t
and 5 t).
Selection of polar crane designer and manufacturer
Four potential polar crane suppliers were indicated in the Main Contract. FANP invited
tenders for detailed design and manufacturing from three Central European companies
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and one Finnish company. The French company Eiffel was selected as the supplier.
Eiffel is on FANP’s list of approved suppliers.
Eiffel's engineering works in Lauterbourg produces great numbers of large-scale steel
structures, and the manufacturing of a unit the size of polar crane does not differ much
from their production in general. This company has experience in the manufacturing of
polar cranes for nuclear power plants. The most recent delivery was in 1998 to a
Chinese nuclear power plant.
In the call for tender, Eiffel was required to include IAEA's safety requirement 50-C-
QA [6] or the requirements of some other nuclear standard in their quality system or in
the project-specific quality plan, since the polar crane and the material hatch are safety
classified equipments. According to FANP, Eiffel has been qualified pursuant to
FRA/N/100E/OL3. The quality system of the manufacturer carries the ISO 9001:2000
certificate. In addition, nuclear standards are included in project specifications as
requirements.
Progress of the polar crane delivery
The project specification of the polar crane was approved (20.12.2005) by a decision of
STUK, which contained eight admonitions. The admonitions mainly concerned
consideration of standards and regulations, and their updating in the project
specification and in its requirements.
The construction plan of the polar crane was in mid-March 2006 in approval review
between TVO and Framatome, but had not yet been submitted to STUK for approval.
Requirements specified for the material hatch and its construction
The diameter of the material hatch located in the reactor hall is 8.3 m. The lock is
opened by lifting it up along rails. The material hatch is used during annual outages and
repair shutdowns to transport large equipment into or out of the reactor hall. The
material hatch, together with the steel liner as a whole, is assigned to safety class 2.
Selection of material hatch designer and manufacturer
Five potential material hatch suppliers were indicated in the Main Contract. FANP
invited tenders for detailed design and manufacturing from four Central European
companies and one Finnish company. The French company Eiffel was selected as the
supplier.
Progress of the material hatch delivery
TVO audited Eiffel in mid-March 2006, and the questions connected with the material
hatch were dealt with in this context. At the time, the design of the material hatch had
proceeded to almost half way.
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3.3.2 Observations in connection to acquisition of polar crane and material hatch
Quality management implemented by FANP
FANP audited Eiffel's design activities in December 2005 and the factory in March
2006. In other words, in this case FANP audited both the design and the manufacturing
organisation. However, the audits were late, as they were conducted about a year after
the project had started. No significant remarks were made in FANP's audit of the design
activities.
Audits performed by TVO on Eiffel
TVO performed an audit on Eiffel on 14.-15.2.2006. The purpose was to assess Eiffel's
design, manufacturing and quality management activities, and other preconditions for
operation. Activities related to design were assessed in Paris and issues connected with
manufacturing in Lauterbourg.
The audit produced 12 recorded findings and 8 recommendations. The findings and
recommendations were focused primarily on the safety culture, manufacturing methods
and meeting practices.
At the time of the audit, the design organisation had worked on the OL3 project for
about a year. The construction plan for the polar crane was being examined by TVO
and FANP, but has not yet been submitted to STUK for approval. It was also
established during the audit that about half of the design work for the material hatch
had already been completed, but the engineering works did not have reports of design
review meetings available for inspection. Eiffel had understood that independent
reviews of the design activities could be realised by organising weekly meetings of the
technical design team.
IAEA's safety standard 50-C-QA or some corresponding requirement had not been
taken into consideration in the quality system. According to the information received in
the audit, Eiffel had not been informed of the requirement. Two non-conformancies
related to this observation were recorded in the audit; one of them concerned safety
culture training to personnel involved in the OL3 project.
The other non-conformancy that concerned forwarding of safety requirements was that
Eiffel did not have STUK's decision on the project specification (29.12.2005). Also, the
supplier had old versions of YVL Guides 1.4 [2] and 5.8.[12]. In the project
specification, compliance with renewed versions had been required. A recommendation
connected with this was that all the applicable YVL Guides shall be made available to
all the employees in electronic form, e.g. in the company's intranet system.
As factory facilities are not particularly clean, it was recommended that the facility in
which I&C and electrical components are installed should be separated from the other
production facilities due to dirt and dust. The other recommendations concerned
harmonising the acquisition of outsourced components, clarifying the procedures for
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acceptance of incoming material, and including change management procedures in the
quality plan. It was also recommended that Eiffel conduct an internal audit focusing on
the OL3 project.
The audit also revealed several deficiencies in the practices of the engineering works,
such as incorrect use of a hoisting hook for lifting plates. The calibration dates of some
equipment and welding machines had expired. Deficiencies were also found in the
quality control of welding materials and filler metals. Heat treatment specifications
were not available in the heat treatment room.
Eiffel's design and manufacturing organisations have initiated measures to implement
corrective action on the basis of these non-conformancies, and the safety of the nuclear
power plant under construction has not been considered to be endangered in this case.
Conclusions
The result of the audit conducted by TVO on Eiffel confirmed the impression that
TVO's audits are more detailed and produce more findings than FANP's audits. Along
with the other examples, this case also showed that the special requirements that are
applied in the nuclear field are not properly forwarded from the plant supplier to the
subcontractor.
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4. MANAGEMENT OF THE OL3 CONSTRUCTION PROJECT AND QUALITY
MANAGEMENT
4.1 Management systems
The main parties to the OL3 project are the licensee TVO who has ordered the OL3
nuclear power plant unit and the power plant vendor CFS that is a consortium formed
by Framatome ANP (FANP) and Siemens GmbH. The reactor island will be supplied
by FANP. The main focus of this investigation has been on the performance of FANP
with the exception of activities and findings that clearly relate to the whole consortium.
In these cases the whole consortium is referred to in the text.
4.1.1 TVO’s management system and cooperation with FANP
TVO’s role
In the OL3 project plan, TVO defines its own role as follows:
“The OL3 project is
responsible for project management and for coordinating and supervising all the works
and services related to it. Particular effort is directed to safety culture and quality
management”
. TVO as the Construction License holder is responsible for assuring
safety and quality at the power plant under construction.
The OL3 safety and quality culture management process described in the TVO’s
quality system is applied only to TVO’s own organisation. For example, it describes the
assessment of the operations of TVO's own personnel. The creation of safety and
quality culture in the supply chain and in the construction organisation takes place
indirectly, since the plant vendor is responsible for construction and for the selection
and management of the subcontractors that participate in construction.
In the Main Contract, TVO has transferred the responsibility for licensability to CFS,
as well as the implementation of the works, the selection and management of
subcontractors and the site management. In practice this means that after the handover
of the site in February 2005, TVO does not communicate directly with the
subcontractors, except for TVO's audits and control activities. In all other respects TVO
receives information about the progress and the quality of the subcontractors' work
through the consortium, and STUK, in turn, receives this information from TVO.
Quality management
The quality policy of the OL3 project clearly emphasises the key significance of quality
management to the successful implementation of the project.
Quality management in the OL3 project is organised to be a part of the management
activities and it is divided into quality control (QC), on one hand, and quality assurance
(QA), on the other hand.
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There are 12 permanent employees in the quality management unit of the OL3 project;
eight of them are quality assurance engineers. In addition there are external part-time
QA engineers and auditors. Further, the OL3 project QC team for plant technology
engineering consists of altogether nine people, part of them working as inspectors in
the manufacturing locations. The OL3 project QC team for construction technology
engineering comprises 13 people. TVO ensures the quality of construction and the
equipment by means of audits of organisations’ activities performed by the QA staff, as
well as by inspections and quality control of structures and equipment carried out by
the QC officers.
Training
Introduction training organised by TVO is only provided to TVO's own personnel and
consultants employed by TVO on a regular basis. Introduction training and other
guidance provided by TVO is the key channel in providing basic knowledge and safety
culture of the nuclear field to the personnel involved in the OL3 project. Training has
been designed presuming that the personnel employed by TVO for the OL3 project
primarily comes from outside the nuclear field. It takes time before a clear
understanding is reached in the OL3 project of the safety principles to be complied with
in the construction and operation of a nuclear power plant, and of the roles of the
various organisations. Opinions were expressed in the interviews that STUK was at this
stage considered as part of safety assurance mechanisms.
According to the interviews, an important objective in the training provided to TVO's
own OL3 personnel is that CFS and its subcontractors can be supervised in a consistent
manner. On the other hand, safety training directed to the subcontractor's employees
was not emphasised by the OL3 management. On the contrary, some interviewees
expressed opinions that it is impossible to define a training material that all the parties
involved in the project should understand. Furthermore, some interviewees were also of
the opinion that the special characteristics and the rules of the nuclear field are obvious
to all involved and need not to be separately communicated.
Supervising CFS and its subcontractors
Any non-conformancies found as a result of TVO's quality control or quality assurance
or in connection with some other activities are each recorded in a specific
non-conformance report, and reported to CFS. In other words, non-conformance
reporting is the most important tool of the quality system that can be used to deal with
any problems detected in transferring safety requirements or in technical quality.
In the interviews, the OL3 project management was asked what the key mechanisms
are for transferring safety and quality culture to the supply chain and to the construction
organisation. According to the interviewees, the key mechanisms for creating or
transferring safety and quality culture to the plant supplier and its subcontractors
include supervision and reaction to non-conformancies. In other words, TVO's
operating model appears to be based on a belief that CFS and its subcontractors will
during the project learn to fulfil the strict requirements of TVO and the authorities,
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which are specified in various meetings and audits, in the review of design
documentation and in construction inspections.
TVO's participation in selection of subcontractors
The procedures for the selection of suppliers and subcontractors in the OL3 project are
for TVO's part described in Chapter 7.4 of the OL3 quality manual, "Purchasing". The
quality manual is part of TVO's management system. The Main Contract for supplying
the plant concluded between TVO and CFS also discusses issues connected with the
selection of suppliers.
At the subcontractor selection stage, TVO has the opportunity to draw attention to the
requirement that preconditions for fulfilment of quality and safety requirements are
verified in the selection process.
CFS guidelines describe how information is provided to TVO and how TVO can
influence the selection of subcontractors. For minor purchases, CFS informs TVO
about the sending calls for tenders case by case or on TVO’s request. For minor
purchases, TVO may recommend some subcontractors to CFS. CFS takes the
recommended subcontractors into consideration in the tender competition, provided
this does not significantly delay the process. TVO is informed about the selected minor
suppliers in the monthly reports.
For major purchases, CFS informs TVO before the tender invitations are sent to
potential suppliers as well as after the selection of the supplier. TVO is provided the
opportunity to influence the content of the tender invitation and the selection of the
supplier but in certain cases TVO has to pay for the requested change of supplier.
4.1.2 CFS management system
CFS’s role
CFS is responsible for the licensability of the OL3 plant, implementation of the project,
selection and management of subcontractors and site management. Each of the
consortium partners deals with its own area of the scope of the delivery. FANP is
responsible for the reactor island structures and equipment on which this investigation
focuses, and Siemens for the turbine island. CFS is responsible for transferring the
technical safety requirements to its subcontractors. The responsibility for the selection
and management of subcontractors entails that CFS is also responsible for explaining
the safety relevance of their work for all the companies and every individual involved
in the construction of OL3.
Quality management
The quality management model of the OL3 project comprises several steps, starting
with the quality assurance programme of CFS and the quality policy of FANP, and
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ending with the quality management procedures that the subcontractors are required to
follow.
FANP's general quality management system (Plants QEM Manual Rev. F, Jan 2005)
emphasises the particular importance of quality management to the successful
implementation of the project. Quality policy emphasises the independence of the
Quality and Environmental Management Unit of other project units, its authority to
verify compliance with the agreed procedures and its authority in all situations that
might endanger quality.
The quality procedures of CFS that concern purchasing also describe practices for the
monitoring of agreements and deliveries. These procedures specify that the ability of
the supplier to deliver the agreed products is controlled continuously and that any
deficiencies detected are immediately reported to the supplier. All significant
observations are also communicated to TVO. The monitoring of fulfilment of
contractual obligations includes control of e.g. quality, compliance with technical
specifications, compliance with agreed quality assurance procedures, keeping to the
schedule as well as commercial and contractual questions.
Non-conformancies are in terms of their handling divided into technical, contractual
and process non-conformancies. Process non-conformancies are handled following the
procedures presented in the quality assurance programme of the CFS partners.
Quality management at the plant site and its performance are described in the site
procedures.
FANP's quality assurance organization (SE-G) includes about 50 employees, 13 of
whom are involved (perform audits) in the Olkiluoto 3 project. Their practical tools are
the same as those of TVO's corresponding staff; non-conformance reports that call for
corrective actions and that are used to monitor the implementation of such actions.
According to the views expressed by FANP's representatives, safety is created as a
result of good quality, and safety culture refers to compliance with the quality system.
However, a "safety culture programme" has been under development at FANP since
2004. It is a training program targeted at FANP's top managers. Employees involved in
the OL3 project and the site management have not yet been covered by this training
programme.
Training
After the handover of the site, the plant vendor has been responsible for the site
introduction training. The content of this training focuses on occupational safety. The
introduction training has not specifically emphasised the significance of work to the
safety of the nuclear power plant under construction, or the quality and quality control
requirements arising from safety significance, or how it influences the practices. The
general principles to be followed in order to ensure the safety of a nuclear power plant
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have not been presented in the introduction training, either. However, in April 2006 the
content of the introduction training was supplemented with knowledge content
designed to promote safety culture.
Selection of subcontractors
The purchasing procedures followed by CFS in the OL3 project and the practices for
the selection of subcontractors are clearly described in the quality systems of both CFS
consortium partners and in the OL3-specific quality plan.
The criteria defined by CFS for the selection of subcontractors include references from
similar deliveries, experience of the CFS partners of the supplier from previous projects
and contracts (including TVO's experience if available), the CFS partners' own
assessments (based on audits, if necessary), quality certifications, technical expertise
and ability to implement the project, capability for fulfilling safety requirements, and
technical properties of the equipment compared with the technical requirements. CFS
also ensures that the subcontractors apply similar criteria in the selection of their own
subcontractors.
The documents to be included in the tender invitations are defined in the consortium's
guidelines. OL3-specific procurement and delivery terms must be included in the
tender documents. They also describe how subcontractors shall be required to take
nuclear field specific and OL3-specific requirements into consideration, including
relevant YVL Guides.
4.2 Assessment of management and quality management
4.2.1 General observations
Reasons for and consequences of schedule delays
Controlled implementation of the OL3 project and keeping to the schedule have been
hindered by the slow completion of detailed design in relation to how fast the
constructors and the equipment manufacturers could act if the plans were available in
time.
When the Main Contract for the plant supply was signed and the Construction License
was applied for, the basic design of the plant had been completed and the technical
requirements for the systems had been specified. This means that the lay-out of the
buildings, the main features of the systems (e.g. the pressures, temperatures, flows for
process systems, main pipelines and valves, pressure vessel dimensions, and technical
requirements for pumps) and the locations of the systems in the buildings had been
defined almost to the final extent. In other words, design had proceeded so far that it
had been possible to make the required safety analyses and practical preparations for
the construction project could be started, including equipment purchases and site
preparation.
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Detailed design (e.g. dimensioning calculations for determination of required concrete
strengths and reinforcement as well as final site drawings) had not been carried out, and
the time and the amount of work added for accomlishing the design had clearly been
under-estimated. An additional problem was caused by the fact that the plant vendor
was not familiar with the Finnish practices. According to the Finnish requirements, the
detailed design of the safety cassified systems, structures and equipment is inspected
both by TVO and STUK. Designs and plans must be approved by all involved parties
before the manufacturing of equipment and components or structures at site can be
started. The attempts to keep to the schedule, which had been unrealistic from the
beginning, has required extra work and thereby further delayed and impeded the
progress of the project.
According to STUK's experience, the documentation submitted by TVO’s OL3 project
to STUK is sometimes of poor quality and inspectors are invited to perform
construction inspections on systems or structures for which the approval of design
documentation or the quality control documentation has not yet been completed. Even
if the situation has improved as the project has progressed, it still appears that due to
deficient resources and tight schedules TVO is not able to review all the design
documents with a sufficiently questioning attitude.
The incompleteness of detailed design even at the time of the investigation, and the
delaying of the construction schedule primarily for this reason, make the overall
management of the project extremely demanding.
Impact on safety
TVO's representatives emphasised in the interviews that problems in manufacturing of
the equipment and in construction only concern the project schedule, and nuclear safety
has not been endangered because of them. According to TVO’s project management,
the large number of non-conformancies first of all reflects the accuracy of TVO's
control activities. Finnish preciseness and attention to details are of a level, which the
plant vendor did not expect. In other words, this is a cultural difference, a difference in
expectations.
The impression obtained during the investigation about the safety impact of the
non-conformancies is in main parts similar to the view presented by TVO's
representatives. No compromises have been accepted in the required quality level and
the tests and inspections that have been performed have proven that this level has been
achieved, although in some cases only after several corrections.
Safety culture
The case studies seem to indicate that TVO's supervision activities have not reached
their goal to institute a high-level safety and quality culture in the supply chain and the
construction organisation. Although an abundance of technical non-conformancies have
been identified in the manufacturing of different equipment, components, and in
construction as well, and these have been recorded in non-conformance reports, the
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observations made during the investigation show that the plant vendor and its
subcontractors have not essentially improved their working practices or attitudes
toward safety. The striving for performance that is careful and faultless to the extent
possible, as required in the nuclear field, and an open disclosure and prompt
elimination of non-conformancies have not been emphasised in a clear manner in the
supply chain.
The investigation showed that in the OL3 project so far there is no clear and commonly
shared view of what is important at the construction stage for the achievement of the
safety objectives, and how widely and intensively safety awareness should be
promoted. According to the opinions expressed in the interviews by TVO's and FANP's
OL3 project personnel nuclear safety can be ensured by verifying the correct technical
quality of safety class 1 and 2 equipment, components and structures. Activities on the
site are generally considered to be non-safety relevant. The role of TVO's safety
committee has remained quite remote in addressing the non-conformancies found in the
performance of the parties involved in construction and in discussing safety culture
issues.
During the investigation it was noticed that the responsible performance required in the
nuclear field is not self-evident to all employees working on the construction site and in
the manufacturing organisations. Even strive for flawlessness of one's own work can
not always be seen, let alone care for the best possible preconditions for others to
succeed in their work.
Quality management
In general, the supervision of construction work and equipment manufacture seems to
have been implemented in the project as planned, and both TVO and the plant vendor
employ competent persons for this in their organisations. Non-conformancies are
recorded carefully and their correction is being monitored. The independent role of
quality management comes true in this respect. On the other hand, the quality control
organisation's authority, excutive power and courage to immediately intervene in any
detected non-conformancies demanding their timely repair do not appear to be
sufficient.
According to the observations made in the investigation, there is no clear practice for
the handling of products that do not conform to quality requirements. The ISO 9001
standard requires that there is a clear procedure for the dealing with non-
conformancies, and the responsibilities and authorities for that have been defined. In
the OL3 project it is unclear which organisation and person is in different cases
responsible for the approval of a product not conforming to the specification, and how
the approval is issued in practice. According to the quality system the designer defines
the quality requirements for the product, and the production these requirements. In
some cases the designs are submitted to TVO and also to STUK for approval, and if
they are changed, the approval procedure has to be repeated. No evidence was found in
the investigation of this procedure being followed in the case of the bottom part of the
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steel liner. Instead, some interviewees mentioned that "the tolerances specified by the
designer were too tight". According to information received from the consortium's
Quality Manager, in many cases the specified quality cannot be realised in practice and
the specification is changed instead. This may be a realistic procedure and acceptable
as such, but the acceptability of the specification change should still always be proven
and the related documents examined at the same level that granted the original
approval.
An examination of audit reports indicated that TVO's auditors had recorded several
findings concerning safety culture and the lack of related training. No corresponding
findings had been recorded in audits performed by FANP. All in all, there is a
consistent difference in the number of findings made in the audits performed by FANP
and TVO in the same location, with TVO's audits always producing more findings.
Training
The so-called safety culture training to all those participating in the plant delivery, as
stipulated in IAEA regulations and in discussions between STUK and TVO, has in
practice not been provided in most cases. One expert of TVO's quality organisation
stated in the interview that, as far as he knew, this training had not been provided in any
organisation. It has not been defined what the content of the training should be and who
should be responsible for its provision. It has not been defined either what level of
knowledge of the specific requirements of the nuclear field the employees of the plant
vendor and its subcontractors should possess.
Language problems
In practice the project language is as a rule English although in some subcontracting
agreements the language is defined as the language of the subcontracting company. Not
all parties (e.g. subcontractors) are proficient enough in English to make it certain that
everything is fully understood.
4.2.2 Observations concerning TVO
Relationship with plant supplier
The OL3 management emphasised in the interviews that in the assessment of their role,
it should be borne in mind that this is a turn-key delivery whereby they have to trust the
plant supplier and allow it to do things in its own way without too much disturbance. In
the investigation team's opinion this is not the correct attitude. TVO must control that
the plant vendor's obligations are fulfilled and the plant vendor also assures the quality
of the subcontractors' work.
At this stage of construction there has already been many harmful changes in the
vendor’s site personnel and even the Site Manager has retired and replaced. This has
made overall management, as well as detection and handling of problems difficult. The
transfer of responsibilities in such situations has been unclear to all the actors. It is not
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clearly stated neither in the joint documents of the parties nor in the project manuals of
the parties what kind of possibilities TVO has to make certain that appropriate
measures are employed to ensure stability in FANP's site organisation and that the staff
is capable of fulfilling their responsibilities and obligations.
Management and promotion of safety culture
As the holder of the Construction License, TVO is responsible for all issues related to
safety and quality, and cannot assign this responsibility to the plant supplier or any
other party by any kind of contract or agreement. A perception of STUK's key role in
ensuring safety came up in the interviews, but this interpretation must not reduce
TVO's own responsibility for safety.
The principle of continuous improvement of operation and safety has been adopted at
TVO's operating nuclear power plant units, but the OL3 project is somewhat separate
from the operational plants and TVO's traditional culture. TVO's own organization also
includes a large number of personnel in the OL3 project that has come from outside the
nuclear field, and appreciation of the safety culture is not yet complete in the project
organization.
In the OL3 project, TVO's management does not seem to pursue determined
communication to the actors outside their own organisation with the aim of developing
a high-level safety culture in the entire construction project. TVO considers the
responsibility for construction to rest with the plant vendor, with TVO's own focus
being on commissioning and the operating stages after that.
The interviews gave an impression that inside TVO the schedule-related questions
connected with organising construction work are the most important issues in handling
of OL3 project matters. The pressure to keep to the schedule is probably hard for
TVO's technical experts, as the plant vendor's plans are submitted late and the
schedules do not allow enough time for their evaluation. It seems that evaluation of the
design documentation submitted by the plant vendor cannot in all cases be carried out
with the required accuracy and a questioning attitude. As a result, documentation of
poor quality is forwarded to STUK. The investigation showed that problems are easily
multiplied when the plans have been deficient and STUK requires them to be corrected.
This also involves the risk that problems are not detected, or tackling them at a later
stage will cause considerable problems if TVO has approved deficient documentation.
TVO should in situations like this possess enough its own expertise and resources so
that essential unclarities in the designs can be tackled effectively.
Good safety management entails identification of also weak signals and prevention of
problems. In the management of the OL3 project main focus has been on solving
detected problems, however, and no evidence was found of a proactive approach. It
was not clear even to the responsible management what the potential signals could be
that would require initiation of preventive action.
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The prevailing perception in the OL3 project about safety and the actions needed to
ensure safety focuses strongly on the technical quality of safety classified systems,
stuctures and equipment. TVO audits the plant vendor and its subcontractors in a
systematic manner, but the way in which TVO intervenes in problems or forecasts
problems with various parties is not well defined. Within TVO the responsibility for the
handling of deficiencies in the performance of the subcontractors has been distributed
in a complex quality organisation, and the individuals and the committee that are
responsible for safety evaluation do not handle the deficiencies observed in
performance. In the light of the investigated sample cases, issues connected with the
quality and reliability of the performance of the plant vendor and its subcontractors are
handled slowly.
An important factor of safety culture is open disclosure and handling of
non-conformancies and other problems. TVO has not emphasised the principle of
openness outside its own organisation, and therefore information about events has not
in every case been openly communicated to TVO and further to STUK. Only TVO
employees can record non-conformancies in TVO's KELPO system. According to the
interviewees, this anonymous mail box system is mainly designed for situations
endangering occupational safety. The problem with concrete showed that there are no
tools to bring non-conformancies out, unless enough evidence exists for a
non-conformance report.
Dealing of non-conformancies and supervision of subcontractors
TVO has a limited insight of what is happening in the subcontractor network and what
kind of problems are encountered. The audits are TVO's only direct contact with the
subcontractors, otherwise interaction with them takes place through the plant vendor.
Audits are performed both by TVO's own QA and QC engineers and by QC consultants
employed by TVO. Their responsibility is restricted to the recording of non-
conformancies and to the monitoring of the closing of non-conformancies. TVO's
representative reacts to every non-conformancy – whether a major or a minor
non-conformancy – by drawing up a non-conformance report, an NCR report, which is
submitted to the consortium. It is up to the consortium to decide whether the report is
presented to the subcontractors. Not all reports are presented to the subcontractors, so
the procedures for the handling of non-conformancies are deficient in this respect.
On the basis of the interviews, it appears that the quality personnel of TVO has not
understood that in unclear situations they have the right to suspend work and receive
the quality data that they need.
Even in cases where the procedure defined in the quality system for the handling of
non-conformance reports is precisely complied with, it is questionable whether
corrective actions are taken at the stage that from the point of view of the final result
would be the best for their implementation. The reason for this is the large number of
NCR reports and the long time that their distribution and handling takes. During the
investigation there were some 700 open non-conformancies. When a subcontractor is
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found to have a quality problem, the non-conformance report drawn up during the audit
is sent from the TVO's auditor to the plant supplier, who forwards it to the
subcontractor and in many cases it is forwarded still further in the subcontractor chain.
If the observation is made by STUK, yet an additional step is inserted to this path. In
other words, just writing non-conformance reports is not enough, but TVO must in a
determined manner ensure that they lead to corrective actions in time.
A concrete demand made by TVO has been that the quality personnel of the consortium
should be expanded so that the numerous open non-conformancies could be handled
faster. At the time of the investigation the consortium was trying to increase the number
of personnel in quality control by making persons working in other projects available to
the OL3 project.
During the investigation, it turned up that in some cases TVO's quality controllers had
assumed a guiding role in supervising the work of a subcontractor that had displayed
poor quality. This is not the correct procedure, either, as the consortium is responsible
for the guidance and supervision of subcontractors, while TVO is responsible for
ensuring that this obligation is fulfilled.
TVO has not conducted any systematic analyses of non-conformancies, their types and
possible common denominators. However, the management of the OL3 project has paid
attention to the fact that many non-conformancies are repeated from one subcontractor
to the other. For example, the forwarding of the nuclear field specific and technical
safety requirements from the consortium to the consortium's subcontractors has been
deficient in some parts. The consortium seems not to have learned their lesson from
TVO's previous remarks when they start cooperation with a new subcontractor.
All in all, it is unclear what TVO's means are for verifying that the plant vendor
systematically verifies the achievement of the required quality level and that the
performance of subcontractors is of high quality.
Selection of subcontractors
In the case of a fixed-price contract it is to be expected that money becomes the most
important criterion in the selection of a subcontractor. TVO has limited possibilities at
the selection stage of subcontractors to control that quality and safety criteria are given
a sufficient priority. In practice, if the subcontractors that submitted a tender meet the
agreed criteria but TVO refuses to approve the lowest price subcontractor with as
proposed by FANP, TVO has to pay a separate compensation for changing the
subcontractor. On the basis of the investigated sample cases it was obvious that quality
and reliability criteria were not always the first priority in decision-making when
selecting subcontractors.
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4.2.3 Observations concerning FANP
FANP's organisation and its performance in OL3 project
In the organisation of FANP which is an alliance of a French and a German company
the different organisational cultures can still be distinguished. The OL3 project is the
first large joint project for the former competitors. As the project also involves
consortium cooperation between FANP and Siemens the situation is challenging for
these big international companies. It is also a new thing that the plant vendor has
assumed overall responsibility for the project.
Although FANP is an experienced vendor of nuclear power plants, in previous projects
it has assigned the responsibility for construction to other organisations and is therefore
rather inexperienced as a constructor. The logistic layout of the construction site, the
contract boundaries and the control of suppliers differ from equipment and component
supplies. In addition, delays in the construction schedules and the postponement of
works to another season have created significant additional challenges to total
management. The incompetence in the constructor role becomes obvious in the
preparations for concreting of the base slab.
The impression obtained in the interviews was that the structure of the site
organisation, responsibilities and practices are still unestablished. The structure of the
organisation has changed several times and some of its management level employees
have been replaced. Some of the consortium's managers are leased employees. These
factors reflect in the total management of the project in a negative way. There is
confusion both among the consortium's own site personnel and among the
subcontractors about responsibilities.
The weakness of internal communication in the consortium as well as unclear
responsibilities and authorities in tackling non-conformancies have become apparent
particularly during the concreting of the base slab for the reactor building. Even inside
the consortium only a small group was aware of the problems. Despite requests, the
management of the site organisation has been reluctant to submit e.g. the results of
concrete mix analyses to TVO. Neither have they submitted the preliminary quality
control results that indicated non-conformancies to the quality management of the
consortium, nor to the management in Germany that is responsible for the control of
subcontractors.
The consortium has a habit of employing new people for problem solving, which seems
to have resulted in even more confusion about responsibilities. This was the case, for
example, with the regulation of the workability of concrete when the consortium hired
an outside concrete expert to the batching plant to carry out the fine adjustment of the
composition. A new person was also recruited to handle contractual problems, and he
was obviously given the authority to override the decisions of the site management.
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FANP’s safety culture
With FANP's long experience in nuclear engineering, it could be assumed that the
company has a clear safety policy and safety management philosophy. Instead, only
the consortium management is so far being trained in safety culture issues.
FANP tries to meet the safety requirements specified by TVO and STUK, but seems
not to emphasise the fact that nuclear safety should be prioritised already in activities
during construction and manufacturing. In the interviews, representatives of FANP
were of the opinion that safety culture is a new name for an old thing. According to
them, safety and safety culture mean compliance with the quality system.
FANP has not actively and systematically focused efforts on ensuring that the
subcontractors understand the special features of the nuclear field and the resulting
requirements concerning work practices, such as e.g. the striving for the best possible
result, open disclosure of non-conformancies and discontinuation of work if unclarities
that might influence safety are detected. According to the interviewed representatives
of the consortium, responsibility for the training of these matters does not rest with
them. The personnel of the consortium have not proven in their own performance either
that they understand their responsibility for and authority to intervene in problems, nor
have they followed the principle of informing about non-conformancies. The most
serious problem in the handling of non-conformancies revealed in the investigation was
the quality control report that concerned the concreting of the reactor base slab the
results of which were available already in November 2005. Effective actions on the
basis of the report, however, were not taken until in 2006.
There is no clear evidence of TVO's attempts to educate the consortium about the
principles applied to the nuclear field in Finland or about the safety culture that TVO
strives to create. According to the interviews, the perception of the representatives of
FANP concerning management of safety requirements is that they act in this project in
the same way as in all their other projects, and this is their principle. The public debate
on safety culture training, raised up in connection with the re-start inspection of
Forssan Betoni exercised the minds of the FANP representatives. According to the
persons responsible for FANP's quality management, the requirement for a high safety
culture that STUK and TVO had put forward had been surprising. The interviewees
stated, among others, that as safety culture is a concept usually associated with plants
that are in operation, it has been difficult for them to understand what it could mean at
the construction stage.
Due to the problems encountered in the sample cases FANP has made communication
in the non-conformance handling process as a development priority, but sees no reason
to develop in any other way the procedures employed in the selection and supervision
of subcontractors.
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Selection, training and supervision of subcontractors
At times, there have been deficiencies in the forwarding of the nuclear field specific
requirements and technical safety requirements for the OL3 project from FANP to the
subcontractors. Essential requirements that affect quality and the possible additional
costs caused by these requirements have not been clearly communicated to the potential
subcontractors at the call for tender stage. FANP management says that for them the
problem has been that if strict requirements or special requirements are specified for a
delivery, companies are not willing to submit tenders in the present market situation
considering the minor volume of nuclear power construction.
The investigation showed that the procedures described in FANP's quality
specifications for the selection of subcontractors are not always followed in practice.
For example, the consortium has not systematically paid attention to whether the
subcontractors are capable of meeting the requirements of IAEA's safety standard 50-
C-QA. The investigation seems to indicate that the subcontractors' safety and quality
culture has been noted mostly in TVO's audits.
In the case of a fixed-price contract, it is to be expected that the most important
criterion in the selection of a subcontractor is the price. In the case of the steel liner
supplier, for example, price has been a more significant criterion than technical
competence. It appears that the consortium can select a more risky but lower cost
subcontractor, believing that the strict control exercised over the subcontractors during
the project will make them develop their performance. This kind of strategy is in
contradiction with the quality policy described in FANP's guidelines. The
subcontractors' operating cultures change very slowly (just as in all organisations).
However, suppliers that could provide sufficient quality already at the start of
cooperation have not been favoured in the selection of subcontractors.
The interviewed representatives of the consortium made it clear that in their opinion
there was no need to develop the selection procedure of subcontractors because of the
problems encountered, for example, with concrete or with the manufacturing of the
containment steel liner. However, they could not give a clear view of why these cases
involved such a large number of non-conformancies in terms of quality and
performance.
The consortium mainly intervenes in the performance of the subcontractors only if
technical quality problems are detected or if non-conformancies are found in TVO's
audits. It seems that proactive prevention of problems is not working.
The interviews gave an impression that responsibilities in the investigated example
cases were most unclear. It was a repeated feature that the interviewees had presumed
that some other party had noted, dealt with or informed about the problems. Still, the
interviewees did not see any strong need for developing the practices employed for the
management of subcontractors.
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TVO's subcontractor audits have revealed non-conformancies that clearly predict
problems in manufacturing. FANP's ability to eliminate such non-conformancies prior
to the start of manufacturing has been poor. The interviews brought up many reasons
for this:
-
The number of subcontractors is large and FANP is not in practice capable of
exercising true control of the competence and quality of work of all its
subcontractors.
-
Economic objectives are emphasised at the contract stage and quality issues
are usually brought up only after manufacturing has started.
-
FANP relies on TVO and STUK to handle any deficiencies.
-
FANP is not familiar with the characteristic features of construction business.
-
The site organisation of the consortium is confused and authorities to deal with
problems are not clear.
-
Because FANP is experiencing schedule-related pressures the subcontractor's
preconditions to meet the quality requirements are not always subjected to a
critical assessment.
The investigation team got the impression that FANP does not prioritise nuclear safety
over financial and schedule-related objectives. Safety is not the number one guiding
factor in e.g. the selection of suppliers, content of agreements, selection of tools and
materials. When minimum criteria are met, FANP seems to select cheaper suppliers
despite bigger quality risks. FANP does not always enter safety-related requirements in
the supplier's agreements, but tries to deal with them without incurring any costs. Due
to the tight cost limits and delays in schedules subcontractors are not willing to meet
afterwards additional requirements that exceed those specified in their agreements. On
the other hand, delays in schedules result in more financial pressure.
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5. STUK'S OPERATION AS REGULATOR OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT CONSTRUCTION
5.1 Oversight system and implementation
Both the use of nuclear power and the construction of nuclear power plants are subject
to licence. The licence applicant or holder can apply from the Government the Decision
in Principle to launch a nuclear power plant project, the related Construction License
required for its implementation and the Operating Licence required for its operation.
Oversight of safety during the construction and operation of nuclear power plants is
responsibility of the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). Furthermore,
STUK’s duty in each licensing stage is to draw up safety assessment and statement
before the Government grants the respective license.
General safety requirements are given in the Government Degrees, and more detailed
technical requirements are specified in YVL Guides issued by STUK. The YVL Guides
also provide guidelines concerning STUK’s regulatory control, and specify the
obligations of the licence applicant/licensee. YVL Guide 1.1 [13] presents a summary
of STUK's oversight in connection with the review of applications for nuclear facility’s
licences, as well as during the construction and operation of a nuclear facility.
STUK oversees the construction of the plant and the manufacturing of equipment for
the plant. The purpose of this oversight is to ensure that the conditions of the
construction licence, regulations governing pressure equipment, and the plans
submitted to STUK with the application for the construction licence, which STUK has
approved, are complied with, and that the nuclear facility is also in other respects built
in conformity with the regulations of the Nuclear Energy Act.
Appendix 4 presents the stages of the OL3 nuclear plant project, referred to as the FIN5
project at STUK, the licences and license processes required for the implementation
and the organisation of STUK’s project, different stages and inspections. STUK’s
activities in each sample case are not described in more detail, because they were
already discussed in connection with these cases. Besides observations on STUK’s
performance in the sample cases there are also other corresponding examples and
situations that have emerged in the oversight of the OL3 project and have been used as
basis for the observations discussed below.
5.2 Observations on STUK's activities
As the sample cases of the investigation indicate, the regulatory oversight by STUK
control is primarily focused on ensuring the quality and safety of the end products. As
part of its construction oversight, STUK has developed an inspection programme for
assessing TVO’s management and quality management procedures, but corresponding
systematic monitoring is not applied to the activities of other organisations involved in
the OL3 project. Thus, not enough attention has been paid to the common
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organisational background factors of technical problems and their connection to the
recurring problems has not been analysed.
STUK has no systematic procedure for recording, collecting and analysing signals
received from different sources about the performance of organisations. Scattered
signals about weaknesses in the performance of the organisations involved in the
construction project have not always reached the management of the FIN5 project or
the department of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to enable STUK to react to them
effectively.
STUK has required TVO and FANP to define safety culture, and both organisations
have done it in their quality management guidelines. STUK has examined the
dissemination of the requirement on good safety culture to other organisations involved
in the project when participating in audits conducted by TVO. In such instances
STUK’s inspectors have often recorded in their travel reports that the development of
the safety culture has not received enough attention in the audited organisations and
that TVO has given notice of it. However, STUK’s inspectors have not usually
identified the individual deficiencies observed in the safety culture, and STUK has not
required TVO specify them in the notices given as part of the audits to provide the
audited organisation a clearer idea of what is expected from the safety culture.
STUK has repeatedly emphasised the significance of the quality of design documents
and construction inspection documents to TVO and the plant supplier as a prerequisite
for smooth progress of the project and for ensuring adequate quality of the end
products. As the project has advanced, the materials submitted by FANP and some
experienced subcontractors have improved but extending the learning process to the
performance of new subcontractors has generally not succeeded.
STUK’s aim to keep things running on schedule as far as possible has in some casess
made it necessary for STUK to assume responsibility for prompt handling of problems
it has detected, and even to act as part of the quality assurance chain, when other parties
have failed to fulfil their obligations. STUK's strong intervention in the detected
problems in the investigated example cases can be justified in these cases. Although
STUK has on several occasions told the plant supplier and TVO that safety and quality
requirements must be met also without direct intervention from authorities, essential
improvement in this respect has not taken place in the studied cases.
On the other hand, the investigation also revealed that in some cases STUK’s
representatives failed to require correction of problems detected by them when they
should have been corrected without delay to make for easy correction and to avoid new
problems. As the problems observed by STUK’s inspector were recorded in documents
presented to TVO or sometimes only communicated orally and without stressing the
urgency of the measures to be taken, the information was slow to reach the parties who
should have taken the corrective action.
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The FIN5/OL3 project includes a lot of meetings between STUK's own personnel, with
representatives of TVO, and often also with representatives of the plant supplier. The
status of different meetings and possible decisions taken in them seems to be unclear to
some parties outside STUK, although STUK has emphasised that it does not make
formal decisions on the acceptability of technical solutions in the meetings. In the light
of the observations of the investigation team, a systematic method for distribution of
the minutes of the meetings to ensure smooth flow of information has not been defined,
and responsibilities for monitoring the fulfilment of the recorded obligations have
generally not been specified.
6. RECOMMENDATIONS TO FANP, TVO AND STUK
The following recommendations based on the main observations of the investigation
team are made to the plant vendor, the licensee, and the regulatory body.
The recommendations are numbered to facilitate their further processing. The numbers
do not indicate the priority or order of implementing of the actions to be taken.
FANP
1.
FANP should see to it that all design documents it submits to TVO, including those
prepared by the subcontractors are, of the scope and quality that no considerable
amendments or changes are required afterwards.
2.
The site organisation of FANP should be made aware of its definite responsibility
for ensuring the quality of all subcontractors operating on the site. It is particularly
important that a responsible manager is appointed for each work entity at the
construction site, with undisputable authority to give work-related orders.
3.
FANP should intensify the guidance to its subcontractors to ensure that they fulfil
their tasks in the manner expected by FANP and produce acceptable quality.
FANP's management should make it clear to its personnel that they have to inform
the management without delay of the detected quality problems.
4.
An improved practise should be developed for the distribution and dealing of
non-conformance reports, to ensure timely initiation of corrective action.
5.
The principles defined in FANP's own quality procedures should be adhered to in
the selection of subcontractors. In particular, it should be verified that the
subcontractor already at the time of signing the contract is capable of producing the
expected quality and performing in compliance with the requirements of the nuclear
field. Tender invitations and purchase agreements should clearly provide all
information on quality control requirements typical for nuclear power plant
construction and exceeding the conventional standards applied in the branch.
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6.
Site introduction training should include general information about the special
requirements to be met in the construction of a nuclear power plant as well as
guidance on practices for ensuring nuclear safety. Corresponding training should
also be provided for the personnel of manufacturers that fabricate equipment
specifically designed for the nuclear power plant.
7.
The significance of open disclosure of any detected problems and errors made as
well as the obligation to discontinue the conduct of work in unclear situations
should be emphasised at all levels of FANP's own organisation as well as to the
subcontractors.
8.
Remarks made during audits and inspections should be analysed systematically in
order to identify recurring observations. Particular attention should be paid to
observations concerning deficiencies and problems in the performance of the
subcontractors' organisations.
9.
FANP should assess together with TVO why most of the non-conformancies
recorded in TVO's audits have not been noted in FANP's own audits of respective
organizations.
10.
Before starting demanding jobs at site, a thorough pre-job briefing should be
organised for all persons involved. Examples of issues to be covered include the
significance of the job to safety, the responsibilities and authorities of different
actors, the schedule, work stages and critical points, overall coordination of work
and actions to be taken in potential problem situations. In this context the potential
problems foreseen by the persons implementing the work should be discussed. Pre-
job briefing is particularly important for work implemented jointly by several
organisations.
11.
FANP should make it clear which requirements stipulated in IAEA's safety
standards concerning quality systems and safety culture are to be taken into account
when assessing the performance of the organisations involved in the construction of
the plant and the manufacture of components. Special attention should be paid to
these issues in the selection and guidance of subcontractors.
TVO
1.
TVO’s management should communicate clearly to the entire personnel of the OL3
project that, in spite of the turn-key delivery, TVO is ultimately responsible for the
safety of the power plant and that this responsibility cannot be assigned to the
vendor by the terms of supply contract.
2.
The management of TVO should regularly inform the site managers and
supervisors of the consortium CFS and its subcontractors about the safety and
quality objectives of the OL3 project and the related practical operating methods. It
should also be ensured that both TVO's own and the consortium’s site personnel
have understood these objectives and implement them in their work.
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3.
TVO should ensure that its own project personnel strictly follow the general
principles for nuclear power plant safety in their operations. It is of particular
importance that the safety first approach is consistently applied in all decisions and
acts of the project management.
4.
TVO should ensure that the site introduction training provided by CFS gives
everyone coming to the site sufficient basic knowledge of the special requirements
related to the work methods in the construction of a nuclear power plant.
5.
TVO should ensure that the tender invitations sent out by CFS as well as purchase
agreements with subcontractors include information about the quality assurance
requirements for the delivery in question that are normally applied in nuclear plant
construction and exceed the conventional standards applied in the branch.
6.
TVO should emphasise to its own quality control staff the importance of effectively
dealing with detected non-conformancies, and should develop its own practices to
ensure that this staff has sufficient authority and can bring the observations
recorded in non-conformance reports to corrective process without any detrimental
delay.
7.
TVO should together with CFS create practices that ensure open, consistent and
prompt reporting of non-conformancies to both TVO and all other parties expected
to deal with those non-conformancies. TVO should also remind CFS of TVO's right
to discontinue work and receive the desired quality data.
8.
TVO should ensure that the OL3 project has sufficient resources to examine the
design documents submitted by the vendor and to effectively deal with any
concerns raised in the design documentation before it approves start of
manufacturing or submits the documents to STUK for approval.
9.
TVO should systematically analyse the remarks made in audits and inspections in
order to identify any recurring observations.
10.
TVO should together with FANP clearly specify which requirements stipulated in
IAEA's safety standards concerning quality systems and safety culture are to be
taken into account when assessing the performance of the organisations involved in
the construction of the plant and manufacturing of components. The specified
requirements should be clearly communicated to all TVO's experts who take part in
audits and inspections.
STUK
1.
The findings of STUK inspectors should be systematically collected and analysed
with the intent to identify recurring deficiencies. Particular attention should be paid
to observations concerning weaknesses and problems in the management of
organisations. STUK's management should regularly discuss the results of analysis
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with TVO's management to eliminate the identified problems and to improve the
quality of operations.
2.
In case STUK’s inspectors notice during audits that the quality systems and safety
culture of the audited organisation are not on the level required by IAEA safety
standards, they should ensure that TVO’s representatives present the detected
non-conformancies and requirements on corrective actions in the most concrete and
unambiguous manner. For this, STUK’s management should clarify to their
inspectors which requirements concerning quality systems and safety culture,
provided by the IAEA safety standards, should be examined with particular care in
evaluating the performance of organisations that participate in the construction of
the power plant and manufacturing of equipment, and indicate STUK’s
expectations with regard to meeting the requirements.
3.
STUK's inspectors should actively demand TVOs representatives to take immediate
corrective actions for elimination of any detected problems, where prompt actions
are well founded to facilitate correction or to avoid new problems, and other parties
have not taken the necessary action.
4.
If quality deficiencies are detected in structures and equipment during STUK
inspections, the performance of quality control organisations should also be
assessed, in addition to production processes and products. STUK’s management
should ensure that it receives without delay a report and description of any
occasions where the manufacturer or the builder is not producing sufficiently high
quality and the quality control personnel of neither the consortium nor TVO has not
demanded effective corrective action. Significant deficiencies detected in the
performance of organisations should be discussed with TVO’s project management.
5.
STUK should develop a practice that supplements the inspection records and other
reports and allows direct communication of the most important quality problems
and other deficiencies to the project managements of both STUK and TVO so that
corrective actions can be initiated on an optimal schedule.
6.
STUK should together with TVO find a way for improving the quality of all design
and construction inspection documents submitted to STUK to a level that would
eliminate the need of revisions, and repeated handling.
7.
In order to improve communication within STUK one should define the standard
distribution of minutes of various meetings related to the OL3 project, as well as the
obligation to get acquainted with these minutes. Also, a procedure should be
defined for monitoring the implementation of the obligations recorded in the
minutes.
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7. REFERENCES
[1] Weick, K. & Sutcliffe, K. (2001), Managing the Unexpected. Assuring High Performance in an
Age of Complexity. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco.
[2] YVL 1.4 Quality assurance of nuclear power plants, 20.9.1991, renewed draft 3.8.2000 (only in
Finnish).
[3] IAEA Safety series No. 75-INSAG-4 (1991). Safety Culture. International Atomic Energy
Agency, Vienna.
[4] IAEA INSAG-15 (2002). Key Practical Issues in Strengthening Safety Culture. International
Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna.
[5] IAEA Safety Report (1998). Developing safety culture. Practical suggestions to assist progress.
International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna.
[6] IAEA Safety Series No. 50-C-QA (1996). Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Quality
Assurance, Vienna.
[7] YVL 4.1 Concrete structures for nuclear facilities, 22.5.1992.
[8] YVL 1.15 Mechanical components and structures in nuclear installations. Construction
inspection, 19.12.1995 (only in Finnish).
[9] YVL 3.4 Approval of the manufacturer of nuclear pressure equipment, 14.1.2004.
[10] YVL 1.3 Mechanical components and structures of nuclear facilities. Approval of testing and
inspection organisations, 17.3.2003.
[11] YVL 4.2 Steel structures for nuclear facilities, 19.12.2001.
[12] YVL 5.8 Hoisting appliances and fuel handling equipment at nuclear facilities, 5.1.1987.
[13] YVL 1.1 Regulatory control of safety at nuclear facilities, 10.2.2006.
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8. APPENDICES
1. Assignment and objectives of investigation
2. Investigation team and performance of investigation
3. Investigation programme and schedule
4. STUK's operation in control of nuclear power plant construction
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APPENDIX 1.
ASSIGNMENT AND OBJECTIVES OF INVESTIGATION
INVESTIGATION OF OPERATIONAL EVENTS 1/2006
OLKILUOTO 3 – MANAGEMENT OF SAFETY REQUIREMENTS IN CONSTRUCTION
STAGE PURCHASES FOR A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
The quality non-conformancies detected in the concrete used for the base slab of the plant
unit under construction in Olkiluoto brought out the need at the Finnish Radiation and
Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) to investigate the procedures used in selecting
subcontractors, their prerequisites for meeting set requirements and the supervision of their
operation. The subcontracting for Olkiluoto 3 is done by the vendor, FANP. Teollisuuden
Voima Oy (TVO) is informed about the selected suppliers.
The investigation set up by STUK is looking into the management of safety requirements in
subcontracting and in purchases of structures, equipment and components during the nuclear
power plant construction phase. The selection and control of the suppliers of the concrete
base slab and the containment inner steel liner, as well as the the polar crane and the material
hatch, are used as sample cases in the investigation. The tasks of the investigation team are:
•
to determine and assess any negligence in complying with requirements in selecting and
supervising suppliers of safety significant structures, equipment and components
•
to determine and assess any quality management deficiencies in the performance of TVO
or the plant vendor in selecting and controlling suppliers
•
to determine and assess TVO’s and the vendor’s management views and the attitudes on
requirements for the selection and control of suppliers, non-conformancies, inspections
and implementation of corrective actions
•
to establish TVO’s and the vendor’s procedures for tender invitations, selection of
approved suppliers, training of the subcontractors' personnel, supervision of
subcontractors as well as the various parties’ quality management, and practices for
approval of test results
•
to establish the passege of information in the selected sample cases
•
STUK's regulatory oversight.
Investigation manager Mrs. Seija Suksi (STUK) acts as the leader of the investigation team.
Experts in quality management, safety culture and various technical fields from STUK and
outside STUK will be assigned to the team. The investigation team will make its
recommendations by the end of March, and the investigation report will be completed by the
end of April 2006.
Director
Lasse
Reiman
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APPENDIX 2. 1 (2)
INVESTIGATION TEAM AND PERFORMANCE OF INVESTIGATION
Mrs. Seija Suksi, investigation manager (STUK), acted as the coordinator and leader of
the investigation team. The investigation team consisted of the following experts in
quality management, management, safety culture and various technical fields, both
from within and outside STUK:
Expert
Organisation, task
Focal area in investigation
Suksi, Seija
STUK, investigation
manager
Root cause analysis, regulatory control
Koskinen, Kaisa
STUK, development
manager
Quality management
Valkila, Aila
Aila Valkila Oy, managing
director
Quality management
Koivula, Nina
STUK, inspector
Human and organisational factors
Oedewald, Pia
VTT, researcher
Safety culture
Pitkänen, Pertti
VTT, senior researcher
Concrete structures, characteristics of
concrete
The investigation team availed of the services of the following STUK’s experts for the
sample cases:
Expert
Organisation, task
Focal area in investigation
Myllymäki, Jukka
STUK, senior inspector
Concrete structures, construction plans
Lehto, Rauno
STUK, inspector
Mechanical components, lifting
equipment
Cederberg, Mark
STUK, senior inspector
Materials and welding technology,
construction inspection
Conduct of investigation
The input documentation reviewed by the investigation team consists of possible
non-conformance reports or description prepared by the licensee of the event or
non-conformance under investigation, inspection reports by STUK in the area,
memoranda and minutes of meetings as well as other associated documents and
records. The details of the event are looked into on the plant site on the basis of
interviews and by studying the event and its handling, decisions made, correspondence,
contracts, work orders, test reports, procedures, etc.
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Comprehensive background material was collected in support of this study consisting
of the following documents:
-
description of the consortium's organisation as well as descriptions of
management and responsibilities
-
the consortium's procedures related to approval and control of suppliers
-
TVO's project quality manual and, particularly, procedures and descriptions
related to approval and control of suppliers
-
TVO's project plan (including a description of the project organisation and
tasks)
-
STUK's FIN5 project plan
-
Inspection reports on quality management and quality assurance belongin to
STUK's Construction Inspection Programme (RTO), decisions and minutes of
meetings
-
key technical (general) documentation and inspection memoranda for the sample
cases.
The first week of the investigation was spent studying the subject areas through
presentations requested from STUK's experts, the FIN5 project and sub-project
managers, as well as the responsible coordinators of the Olkiluoto 3 project and the
quality and purchasing managers of CFS. People performing various tasks in the
Olkiluoto 3 project (TVO, CFS, FANP, subcontractor, research institute) were
interviewed during the second week, and the investigation team visited the Olkiluoto 3
construction site and the concrete batching plant. Detailed notes were made of all
presentations and interviews. Daily observations were collected onto a form designed
for the purpose and/or during discussions conducted at the end of the day. The writing
of the report and the formulating of recommendations started in the third week. The
investigation programme is shown in Appendix 3.
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APPENDIX 3.
1 (2)
INVESTIGATION PROGRAMME AND SCHEDULE
Week 1 (weeks 12 - 13)
Wed 15/3
Thu 16/3
STUK
STUK
Fri 17/3
STUK
Sat 18/3
Sun 19/3
Mon 20/3
STUK
Tue 21/3
STUK
Investigation areas
Management, QC/QA
Safety culture, HOF
Root cause analysis
Sample cases
•
concrete
•
liner
•
polar crane
Organising
Start-up
Introduction
Planning
Presentations:
-FIN5 project (KiA)
-KOLA (JMo)
Presentations:
RAKE
-concrete
(HSk, JMy)
OL3 project
organisation (TV)
Preparing questions to
TVO and CFS
OL3 project
presentations:
at 9 - 15
Herkko Plit
Markku Pitko
Timo Kallio
Jukka Kangas
Dieter Kreckel
Herbert Scramm
T. Kammerzell
Presentations,
interviews and
discussions
- FIN5 ( PT)
- liner (MC)
Interviews and
discussions
- Polar crane (RLe)
Summary of
observations
Preparing for TVO's
interviews
-list of questions
Safety and risk analyses
Regulatory control
Daily observations (1)
Daily observations (2)
Discussion on
presentations
Daily observations
(3)
Week 2 (weeks 13 - 14)
Wed 22/3
Thu 23/3
STUK
TVO
Fri 24/3
TVO
Sat 25/3
Sun 26/3
Mon 27/3
STUK
Tue 28/3
STUK
Investigation areas
Management, QC/QA
Area-specific
observations /
drafting report
Safety culture, HOF
Root cause analysis
Interviews
At 8 - 16:30
TVO personnel:
H. Plit / NS
M. Pitko NQ/QM
M. Landman N
J. Ala-aho NQ/QA
R. Hiekkanen
NC/QC
Interviews
at 8 - 14:30
TVO personnel
Kervinen NC/QC
Ala-aho (mat.)
Van Graan FANP
Mannola TVO/ns
Levonen NL
Jääskeläinen(mat.)
from 12 on:
Analysing TVO
interviews
Sample cases
concrete
liner
polar crane
Discussion on
interviews
Interviews
at 8 – 17:30
TVO personnel
- Onnela NQ/QA
- Manninen NC/Site
- Visit to site
- Jääskeläinen NC/QC
Forssan Betoni:
- Bergman
- Batching plant
Safety and risk analyses
Regulatory control
Travelling to Rauma
at 18 - 19:30 Discussion
at 15:30 - 20
Travelling to Helsinki
Review of area-
specific summaries /
observations
Teamwork
at 11 - 14:30
Interview of D.
Kreckel
- Analysing the
interview
- Making appoints for
next day interviews
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Week 3 (weeks 14 - 15)
Wed 29/3
Thu 30/3
TVO
STUK
Fri 31/3
STUK
Sat 1/4
Sun 2/4
Mon 3/4
STUK
Tue 4/4
STUK
Investigation areas
Management, QC/QA
Safety culture, HOF
Root cause analysis
Writing report
Sample cases
•
concrete
•
liner
•
polar crane
Safety and risk analyses
Regulatory control
Interviews
FANP personnel:
-
H. Beaumont
-
W. Ă–rtel
-
Heudes
-
H. Sinisalo
-
L. Sikiö
KymAmkk
- S. Matala
Draft report
- writing
-verifying facts and
observations
Draft report
- writing
- compiling
at 14 -15:30
Interview of Aki
Meuronen
Key observations
Drafts of focal areas to
team members for
reading
Review of draft report
Summary
- Key observations
(Recommendations)
Agreeing on reporting
of preliminary results
Week 4 (weeks 15 - 16)
Wed 5/4
Thu 6/4
STUK
STUK
Fri 7/4
STUK
Sat 8/4
Sun 9/4
Tue 25/4
STUK
Mon 5/6
STUK
Investigation areas
Preliminary results
reported:
JL, LR, MlJ, PT
Management, QC/QA
Safety culture, HOF
Root cause analysis
Sample cases
•
concrete
•
liner
•
polar crane
TVO's clarification:
(for information)
Additional material for
investigation team
- description
- causes
- corrective action
- further analyses
Review of TVO's
clarification
SSu, KaK, NiK,
PP, PO
Impact on
conclusions drawn in
investigation
Draft report
Review of draft
report
AVa, PO, KaK, NiK,
MC, SSu,
JL
writing report: during
26.4. to 22.5.
22.5. –draft version
to OL3 project and
STUK management
Going through draft
report
AVa, PP, PO, KaK,
NiK, MC, JMy
JL
Finalising draft report
Safety and risk analyses
Regulatory control
22.5.2006
preliminary draft for
comments: TVO,
STUK
8.6.2006 draft for
comments:
TVO, STUK
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APPENDIX 4.
1 (9)
STUK AS REGULATOR OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT CONSTRUCTION
Licenses and safety regulation stibulated in the Nuclear Energy Act
Starting a project for constructing a major nuclear facility necessitates a Decision in
Principle made by the Government and ratified by Parliament. As the next step, a
Construction Licence is required for the implementation of the project, and the
operation of a nuclear power plant requires an Operating Licence granted for a
specified period of time. The Operating Licence can be renewed by application. The
licensing process and the responsibilities and obligations of the involved parties are
stipulated in the Nuclear Energy Act and the Nuclear Energy Decree. The licenses are
granted by the Government. The licensing process is administered by the Ministry of
Trade and Industry. For each license,, the Ministry has to request a statement from
STUK which includes a safety assessment.
General safety requirements are given in Government Decrees, and more detailed
technical requirements are specified in YVL Guides published by STUK. The YVL
Guides also provide instructions concerning nuclear safety oversight by STUK and
specify the obligations to the licence applicant/licensee. YVL Guide 1.1 [13] presents a
summary of STUK's oversight activities in connection with the review of applications
for nuclear plant licences, as well as during the construction and operation of a nuclear
facility.
After the Construction Licence has been granted, STUK conducts regulatory oversight
of the construction of the plant and the manufacture of equipment for the plant. The
purpose of this oversight is to ensure that the conditions of the Construction Licence,
the regulations in force for the pressure equipment, and the plans reviewed and
approved by STUK are complied with, and that the nuclear facility also in other
respects is built in conformity with regulations based on the Nuclear Energy Act. A
particular objective of oversight is to ensure that the work methods applied during
construction produce high quality.
Control stages of plant project
In November 2000, Teollisuuden Voima Oy submitted an application for a Decision in
Principle (DiP) on the construction of a new nuclear power plant. Even before this, an
Environmental Impact Assessment had been completed as stipulated by the
environmental legislation. Concurrently with the Environmental Impact Assessment
process, started early 1998, STUK had at TVO's request assessed the key safety
features of the proposed plant alternatives. On the basis of this extensive preliminary
work, STUK was able to produce the required safety assessment and a statement on the
application for the Ministry of Trade and Industry after a short period of preparation
already in February 2001. The safety assessment was supplemented in January 2002
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with respect to external threats such as airplane crashes, due to the terrorist attacks that
had taken place in the United States in September 2001.
The Government made a Decision in Principle on the construction of a new nuclear
power plant on 17.1.2002. The decision included a statement where the Government
indicated that it expects the new nuclear power plant to be built in compliance with
stringent safety requirements. Subsequently, the DiP was submitted to Parliament for
ratification. STUK's experts were heard by several parliamentary committees, along
with many other invited experts, during the deliberation process. The Parliament
ratified the Government resolution in May 2002.
The DiP made it possible for TVO to call for tenders for the delivery of the plant.
Tenders were called in September 2002 and submitted in March 2003. In December
2003 TVO concluded an agreement with the consortium formed by Framatome ANP
and Siemens on turn-key delivery of an 1600 MW nuclear power plant. TVO submitted
an application for a Construction License to the Government on January 8. 2004.
TVO started submitting the documents specified in the Nuclear Energy Decree to
STUK on the same day the Construction License application was submitted to the
Ministry. STUK started examining the documents immediately. Supplementary
documentation was submitted throughout the year as requested by STUK, and matters
were discussed in numerous meetings between TVO, the plant vendor and STUK's
experts. As a result of the review, STUK prepared a statement and an attached safety
assessment, and submitted these to the Ministry of Trade and Industry in January 2005.
The Government granted a Construction License for the plant on February 17. 2005.
Since the launching of the construction project, STUK has reviewed detailed design
documents and conducted regulatory oversight of the manufacture of equipment as well
as construction activities.
STUK's preparation for the project
STUK had maintained its preparedness for the control of a new plant project
continuously since the existing Finnish nuclear power plants went online at the
beginning of the 1980s. This preparedness included studying the development of light
water reactors, updating the safety requirements specified in the YVL Guides according
to most recent developments, and interaction with power utilities in order to
consistently improve the safety of existing nuclear power plants. When the Finnish
utilities applied jointly for a Decision in Principle on a new nuclear facility at the
beginning of the 1990s, STUK assessed in the course of about three years plant
alternatives, which were the predecessors of certain plant types considered for the
current project.
Once the current project took shape, STUK studied the proposed plant alternatives and
took part in the environmental impact assessment process.
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An essential task before launching the project was to update the regulations of the YVL
Guides concerning safety and regulatory control. Updating of the Guides continued
until the main contract on the new plant was ready to be signed. TVO was provided
information about the status of the Guides and about planned new requirements on a
regular basis.
The preparations intensified after the Parliament ratified the Decision in Principle made
by the Government. In the summer of 2002, the Nuclear Reactor Regulation (YTO) of
STUK set up a special project group referred to as FIN5. The team consists of the
Project Manager and sub-project managers for various sub-projects. The total number
of sub-projects is 11, and each represents a specific field of technology. The project
team is responsible for the planning and implementation of regulatory control of the
plant project, and for the monitoring of the progress of oversight activities. The project
team also assesses and inspects the quality of the licence applicant's and the plant
vendor's project management. The project team is responsible for ensuring that the
work of the YTO personnel proceeds as planned at different stages of the project. Team
members also parcipated assessment and inspections in their respective technical fields.
The project plan that covers STUK's duties from the preparation stage to the granting of
the operating licence was completed in January 2003. It describes the different parties
involved in the project and their duties, the steering of the project, the division of the
project into stages, and the key tasks in implementing oversight at different stages, as
well as the interaction with various stakeholders.
Before the application for the Construction License was submitted, STUK's activities
focused on the preparation of plans for oversight activities, as well as on contacts with
the license applicant to ensure a smooth process. Sub-project plans identified and
prioritised the most important tasks in terms of the Construction License process and
the resources required for the work. The plans also paid attention to the interfaces
between the sub-projects to ensure comprehensive oversight. In addition, the sub-
projects specified the needs for external support in control activities. Discussions were
conducted and experiences exchanged with authorities in other countries concerning
nuclear power plant licensing procedures, requirements for different plant alternatives
and experience in the construction of plants. The availability of international
consultants was also investigated for areas where Finnish expertise is limited or a third
party assessment is possibly required. The discussions were related to such topics as
automation, accident analyses and control room design.
One of the project group's key tasks was to develop requirement management for
systematic control of the implementation of safety requirements during the entire
project. In addition to development work, this involved the conversion of the most
significant YVL Guides influencing the design of the plant into a requirement
management system. The system is used to monitor fulfilment of the requirements and
control of fulfilment at the plant construction and commissioning stage.
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Discussions were conducted with TVO about the detailed requirements of the content
of the licence documents and about their submittal schedule, as well as about the time
STUK needed for their review. STUK and TVO also organised an extensive seminar
where discussions were held separately with each plant supplier about the interpretation
of safety requirements for the plant alternative in question. At TVO's request, several
separate meetings were also organised between STUK and the experts of the plant
suppliers that had submitted a tender.
The plant supplier that was finally selected had already before the conclusion of the
supply contract ordered the reactor pressure vessel at their own risk. At TVO's request,
STUK started inspecting the design, manufacture and quality control of the pressure
vessel. The manufacturing process of the reactor pressure vessel continues for several
years, and inspections of the manufacturing process have continued uninterrupted since
the granting of the Construction License.
Review of the application for a Construction License
During 2004 STUK reviewed the application for the Construction License and prepared
its safety assessment. TVO submitted the documents related to the Construction
License to STUK at the beginning of January 2004. Technical documentation was
supplemented during 2004 as design progressed, and the designs were modified to
some extent on the basis of issues raised by STUK. STUK also reviewed the quality
management system of the project as part of the safety assessment.
The review of documentation, which was mainly implemented by STUK’s own
experts, formed the basis for the assessment of the plant’s safety. Independent reference
analyses were ordered from external experts, concerning e.g. plant behaviour in
transients and accidents, and the radiation effects of potential transients and accidents.
STUK also supplemented its own review by an external expert statement on the design
of the reactor coolant circuit, as well as by an external investigation on how to consider
airplane crashes in design. Expert statements were also requested on e.g. automation
systems, emergency core cooling systems, the water chemistry of reactor coolant, the
design of plant buildings, fire safety and protection against weather and
electromagnetic phenomena. Moreover, STUK had analyses and tests performed
concerning the management of severe accidents and the assessment of the impact of
airplane crashes. Plans connected with emergency and security arrangements as well as
fire safety were examined in collaboration with other authorities.
As a result of the review, STUK prepared a statement supported by an attached safety
assessment, and submitted these to the Ministry of Trade and Industry in January 2005.
The submittal also included a separate statement of the Advisory Committee on
Nuclear Safety. STUK's conclusion was that the new nuclear power plant can be built
as a safe plant. However, in order to meet Finnish safety requirements, STUK's
statement called for some changes in the design of the plant. The changes concerned
improvement of the reliability of safety functions. STUK's statement also required that
as the detailed design of the plant continues during the construction project, the
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continuation of STUK's inspections and control has to be ensured and sufficient time
shall be reserved for them. STUK also pointed out that TVO must ensure sufficient
expertise of its personnel. The concern was expressed as follows:
”TVO shall ensure
that sufficient expertise is maintained also during future operation of the plant. Due to
the characteristic features of the new plant and the technologies utilised in it, TVO
should ensure that its organisation reinforced during the construction period retains
sufficient expertise also when entering the commissioning stage, particularly in the
fields of nuclear safety, mechanical technology and automation technology.”
STUK’s statement, safety assessment and the statement of the Advisory Committee on
Nuclear Safety can be read in their entirety on STUK’s Web pages (www.stuk.fi).
Oversight of plant project during construction
Regulatory control of plant technology
As the first thing, STUK reviews the design of systems, which specify the requirements
and the boundary conditions for the design of structures and components. The
subsequent review of the design of structures and components used in a safety
classified system cannot be started until STUK has found that the information provided
on the system in question is sufficient and acceptable. The extent of regulatory control
and the specified requirements are determined considering the safety class of structures
and components.
The regulatory control of safety-critical buildings as well as concrete and steel
structures entails e.g. review of the design documents of structures, inspections of
readiness for starting of work on site, manufacturing inspections, construction
inspections of steel structures, and commissioning inspections. In lower safety classes,
inspections of concrete and steel structures can also be performed by certified experts
employed with organisations authorized by STUK.
Regulatory control of pressure equipment and other mechanical equipment used in
nuclear power plants entails review of design documentation for the equipment,
approval of manufacturers, manufacturing inspections, construction inspections and
commissioning inspections. STUK may authorise separate inspection and testing
companies to perform certain inspections in lower safety classes.
Furthermore, STUK oversees the design, manufacturing and installation of electrical
and automation equipment used in nuclear power plants, as well as the design,
manufacturing, transport, storage, handling and use of nuclear fuel.
Conduct of OL3 design review
The acceptability of the main features of the plant's basic design and the systems was
assessed in connection with the review of the application for the Construction License.
STUK started the review of detailed design of process systems at the beginning of 2005
which also continues in 2006.
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So far, the review of detailed equipment design has focused on the reactor and its
coolant circuit. STUK has reviewed the design documents and manufacturing and
quality control plans of the reactor pressure vessel, the steam generators, the
pressurizer, the reactor coolant pumps and the control rod mechanisms before the
manufacturing of the equipment was started. respective documents of the internals of
the reactor pressure vessel and the steam generators have also been reviewed.
As far as the design of concrete and steel structures is concerned, STUK has reviewed
the design documentation of safety class 2 classified parts of the containment and the
safeguard buildings. STUK also reviewed the detailed design documents for the base
slab under the containment and the safeguard buildings before the concreting was
started. In the case of steel structures, review has focused on the design documents and
manufacturing plans of the inner containment steel liner.
Regulatory control of manufacturing and construction
The purpose of a construction inspection is to verify that the component or structure
has been manufactured and its quality has been controlled in compliance with the
approved construction plan. The construction inspection is usually performed on an
individual component after manufacturing, before the component is installed. However,
for parts that cannot be inspected easily after manufacturing, inspections are performed
as manufacturing and assembly proceeds. The construction inspection covers the
records of manufacturing and quality control, as well as witnessing the pressure, load,
tightness, or performance tests, depending on the component type.
As far as the main components of the reactor coolant circuit are concerned, STUK
controlled the manufacturing of forgings for the reactor pressure vessel and the steam
generators at Japan Steel Works (JSW). The completed forgings were subjected to
construction inspections, after which STUK gave permission for the shipment of the
reactor pressure vessel parts to Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) in Japan and of the
steam generator parts to the Chalon plant in France. The last forgings were completed
and shipped from the JSW plant in the spring of 2005. The welding of the first steam
generator parts started at the Chalon plant in September 2004 under a conditional
permission granted by STUK, as the inspection of the plant's design bases had not yet
been completed at the time. MHI commenced the manufacturing of the reactor pressure
in January 2005 after STUK granted permission for it. STUK's inspectors have
observed the manufacturing of the reactor pressure vessel and the steam generators as
well as the internals of these components by means of regular inspection visits to the
manufacturing sites. STUK has also observed the manufacturing of other primary
components (pressurizer, reactor coolant pumps, reactor coolant piping and control rod
mechanisms) by visits to the manufacturing sites. The total number of inspections
performed by STUK for the Olkiluoto 3 project in 2005 was almost 300.
Before manufacturing started, STUK audited the manufacturers of the main
components of the reactor coolant circuit and the connecting parts in order to verify
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fulfilment of the requirements of YVL Guides. Based on the Nuclear Energy Act,
STUK has upon TVO's application approved two manufacturers of main nuclear
components and almost 40 other manufacturers of nuclear pressure equipment. In
relation to the manufacturing of the primary components, STUK has on TVO's
application approved 130 testing organisations to perform destructive and non-
destructive tests on mechanical components and structures. STUK has further on TVO's
application approved three inspection organisations to perform tasks related to the
approval of the design and manufacturing of mechanical components and structures
falling under safety classes 3 and 4. STUK has also audited the manufacturers, testing
and inspection organisations approved by it and verified that their performance meets
the requirements of YVL Guides 3.4 [9] and 1.3 [10].
STUK observed the preparatory work made on the plant site by performing inspections
of excavated rock faces and by overseeing the construction of seawater intake and
discharge structures. STUK approved the plans for the construction of these structures
in July 2004. The approvals were at the time conditional as the review of the plant's
design basis was still under way. STUK also inspected the coupling of the so-called
technical ring running round the Olkiluoto 3 site with the construction site. The
technical ring contains e.g. electricity supplies, firewater supplies and drain connections
for the construction site.
STUK has conducted regulatory oversight of the construction of the plant by means of
regular visits to the plant site. STUK has inspected the readiness for all concreting
operations that are relevant to safety, and issued permissions for starting the concreting
operations. In 2005, STUK performed 4 inspections of readiness for concreting. As far
as steel structures are concerned, STUK's oversight has focused on the manufacturing
of the steel liner.
Assessment of performance of organisations involved in construction
Assessment of TVO's operation
The assessment of TVO's performance at the preparation and Construction License
stage was based on an assessment of TVO's quality management system, the quality of
documents prepared by TVO and the review of the results of safety assessments
prepared by TVO. At the Construction Licence stage STUK also audited TVO's project
activities in Olkiluoto. The audits focused the project management and resources,
handling of safety issues and project management procedures, quality management and
management of documents. As a result of the audits, STUK required more specific
procedures particularly in the assessment of safety and handling of safety issues, such
as identification of safety issues, their handling within the organisation and decision-
making. STUK also reviewed the safety provisions of the operating units (OL1 and
OL2) against any possible risks arising from the construction of Olkiluoto 3. TVO has
taken appropriate measures to improve its operations as suggested by STUK.
At the construction stage, corresponding audits will be performed regularly as part of
the Construction Inspection Programme.
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Assessment of plant vendor and its subcontractors
The assessment of the performance of the plant vendor started already at the
Construction License stage and has continued during the construction stage. The
assessment is based on the review of the quality management systems, quality plans
and manuals describing the activities, on audits to verify activities as well as on
interaction with the plant supplier in meetings.
At the Construction License stage STUK participated in almost all TVO audits of the
activities of the plant vendor. The purpose of the audits was to verify the competence of
the plant vendor to provide high-quality design and construction. The audits focused on
quality management, procedures of project management and design activities in various
fields of technology.
STUK also performed its own audits of the design activities of the plant vendor in the
autumn of 2005. These covered the plant vendor's requirements management, handling
of design changes, management of interfaces between different technological fields,
layout design, and radiation safety, as well as the utilisation of the probabilistic safety
analysis in support of detailed design. Certain development needs were identified in the
audits and the plant vendor started improvement of the work processes in compliance
with issued recommendations.
STUK participated already at the Construction License stage as an observer in audits of
the plant vendor's main safety-related subcontractors. In the construction stage, STUK
has by March 2006 participated in about 30 audits conducted by TVO of equipment
suppliers. The purpose of the audits has been to verify the competence of the suppliers
to participate in the new plant project. Need of development has been found in the
performance of several equipment suppliers. In order to correct the situation, suppliers
have, for instance, been required to prepare special Olkiluoto 3-specific quality plans.
Construction Inspection Programme
In early 2005, STUK started an inspection programme for the construction stage. The
inspection programme is prepared every six months, and it focuses on the assessment
of TVO's activies in order to ensure the high quality of the new nuclear power plant
project. The programme is focused on the project's main functions, such as
management, quality management, project management, and handling of safety issues,
as well as quality assurance, training and radiation safety. Various fields of technology
are also inspected.
As a result of the Construction Inspection Programme, STUK has been able to get a
concrete and realistic visio of TVO's project management, resources, handling of safety
issues and quality management, as well as its activities that support these main
functions. The performance of TVO has been found satisfactory in terms of
management, although some development needs have been identified. For example,
STUK has required that the internal audit activities of the project shall be further
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developed and that TVO must verify that the quality systems of subcontractors who
manufacture safety-critical components meet the quality management requirements
specified in IAEA's safety standard. On the basis of inspections of the leadership
system, TVO has been required to improve its handling of safety issues and the control
of construction. TVO has submitted plans for corrective actions on the basis of the
comments made as a result of inspections.