Drug Abuse: Iran’s “Thorniest Problem”
Winter/Spring 2003 – Volume IX, Issue 2
283
A. W
ILLIAM
S
AMII
Senior Regional Analyst
Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty Inc.
Drug Abuse:
Iran’s “Thorniest Problem”
A
ccording to the Supreme Leader’s representative in Gilan Province, drug
abuse and trafficking is Iranian society’s “thorniest problem,” and
contribute to theft, murder, suicide, violence, and divorce.
1
Widespread
availability of drugs may be one reason for drug abuse among Iranians. After
all, Afghanistan—Iran’s eastern neighbor—is the world’s biggest producer of
opium, and Europe is the main market for Afghan narcotics. Supply, however,
is not the only thing driving demand; the availability of cocaine and synthetic
drugs is increasing too. This article will describe the state of opium cultivation
in Afghanistan. Then it will examine, from the perspective of drug users and
from the perspective of the people trying to end this scourge, why drug abuse
has become so prevalent in Iran. It also addresses the response to the problem
and how victims are being helped. Finally, this article describes the main factors
hindering Iran’s war on drugs: bureaucratic disputes over funding and strategy,
corruption, and ethnic and regional cleavages.
As the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) warns, “Reports
about cultivation, production, smuggling, consumption of drugs, and government
anti-drug efforts come primarily from Iranian officials and it is difficult to
independently corroborate Iranian reports.”
2
I have tried to overcome this problem
with multi-sourcing. The sources for this article include interviews with U.S.
counter-narcotics officials, United Nations drug control personnel based in
Tehran and Vienna, and Iranian physicians, mental health professionals, and
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A. William Samii
journalists. I also used DEA documents secured through the Freedom of
Information Act, U.S. State Department reports, and UN reports. News reports
from and about Iran were used as well.
Where Does it Come From?
About nine million people, or two-thirds of the world’s opiate abusers, consumed
illicit substances from Afghanistan. Until the year 2000, Afghanistan was “the
main source of the illicit opium and heroin produced, trafficked, and consumed
in the world.”
3
This situation changed abruptly in July 2000, when Taliban leader
Mullah Omar banned opium cultivation. Afghan opium production fell by 94
percent from 3,276 tons in 2000 to 185 tons in 2001.
4
During the 2001 season
there was a 91 percent reduction in the land used to cultivate opium poppy in
Afghanistan (7,606 hectares in 2001, compared to 82,172 hectares in 2000).
For Iran, the initial effect of the ban was to increase opium prices, which
were matched by drops in the price and purity of street heroin as suppliers tried
to make their stockpiles last. In the words of the United Nations Drug Control
Program (UNDCP) spokesman:
One possibility is that, with the lack of opium supply, you will have the same amount
of heroin in the market, but at a very much lower grade of purity. Heroin is mixed with
aspirin, with fish scales, with talcum powder, with all sorts of rubbish. It could be that
the shortfall in supply will be compensated for by the criminal organizations who deal
with this by an increase in impurity.
5
Over time it appeared that the cultivation ban was having a real impact
in Iran. The UNDCP chief in Tehran said in September 2001 that seizure rates
for opium, heroin, and morphine dropped substantially in the first seven months
of the year (1 January - 31 July 2001), when compared to the same time frame in
2000.
6
Table 1:
Drug Seizures in Iran
Source: UN Office on Drugs and Crime
Drug
heroin
morphine
opium
Seizures, 2001
2,644
4,002
51,063
Seizures, 2000 (kg)
3145
11778
109738
Percentage Change
-18.9%
-66%
-54%
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That trend changed after the Taliban told Afghan farmers that they could resume
opium poppy cultivation if American forces attacked the country in retaliation
for the 11 September terrorist attacks in the United States. The immediate effect
of this was a reduction in opium prices and the value of stockpiled narcotics,
and farmers began replanting. The victorious anti-Taliban Northern Alliance
(United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan) promised that under its
rule opium production and sales would be eliminated.
7
The new Afghan
leadership also issued a counter-narcotics decree.
8
All countrymen, especially peasants and farmers, are informed that from now on, the
cultivation, manufacturing, processing, impermissible use, smuggling, and trafficking
of opium poppy and all its derivatives is declared illegal...Violators will be dealt with
severely.
There were grounds for skepticism about the Northern Alliance’s sincerity.
Opium cultivation and production in areas under the Northern Alliance’s control
skyrocketed when the Taliban’s opium ban went into effect.
9
In northeastern
Badakhshan Province, cultivation increased from 2,458 hectares in 2000 to
6,342 hectares in 2001 (an almost 260 percent increase), making the province
responsible for 83 percent of the national poppy area.
Moreover, some of the individuals who seized control after ousting the
Taliban have a discouraging record of involvement with the narcotics trade.
The UNDCP chief in Kabul said that he was under orders not to name names,
but he emphasized that the relevant individuals would be approached “in order
to ensure that whatever is related to drug trafficking is put to an end.”
10
He
continued, “We know that Afghanistan is [a country where], unfortunately, some
permanent figures in some areas have been involved in, or encouraged, drug
trafficking in a certain way.” Nur Zai tribal leader Haji Sultan said that before
they came to power officials in the current Afghan government “made it clear”
that if the southern provinces ended their support of the Taliban, “the
government would look the other way if opium was grown.”
11
Iran and the rest of the international community promoted crop
substitution in Afghanistan. It made no inroads with the Taliban, but Tehran
has a much closer relationship with the post-Taliban leadership in Afghanistan.
Tehran offered in mid-December 2001 to discuss crop substitution with the
Afghan leadership, and in the following month an Iranian Foreign Ministry official
said during a visit to Kabul that Iran has already implemented several poppy
substitution projects in the regions bordering Iran.
12
This topic was formalized
in February 2002 via a memorandum of understanding signed by Iranian Minister
of Agriculture Jihad Mahmud Hojjati and Afghan Minister of Agriculture Hussein
Anwari.
13
An Iranian newspaper recommended that Tehran guarantee that it
would purchase these substitute products so the farmers would be confident of
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A. William Samii
an income.
14
Tehran reiterated its readiness to provide funds for the crop
substitution plan in May.
15
The Afghan administration offered to compensate farmers for not planting
poppies, including rewards for destroying the crops (about $350 per jerib or
2,000 square meters). Yet farmers could earn much more by harvesting the
opium, and the amount of money offered by the government did not match the
cost of fertilizer, seeds, water, and labor (about $800 per acre in total). Another
major disincentive is that farmers accumulate debts that they pay off through
the sale of opium. In reaction to the eradication drive, furthermore, opium
prices increased tenfold.
Arif Khan, a farmer in Wardak Province, described the difficult choice
he and other farmers faced in 2002. Arif Khan said that because of the long-
running drought there is not enough water for the apples, wheat, and potatoes
that he used to grow, and he must grow opium to reimburse the narcotics traders
from whom he borrowed money.
16
In his words:
All Afghans are against the cultivation of poppies and we know that this is
against Shariah and against humanity, but the farmers of this region are very
vulnerable and very needy people because we have been deprived of water,
there’s no water in the river and so that all the orchards have withered and the
people are very poor and the money they had they have spent drilling wells and
now people have no money to run the generators for the water pumps. There’s
no work for the people here and you can’t find most of the inhabitants of this
area.
Corruption and ineptitude also affected the compensation scheme.
17
The
scheme to compensate farmers who destroyed their crops was not uniformly
enforced. Some received compensation even when their crops were hardly
touched, while others got nothing when their crops were destroyed—and officials
pocket the money instead. Thousands of kilograms of opium seized in a raid on
the opium bazaar in Qani Khel, Jalalabad Province, went missing.
The head of Iran’s Drug Control Headquarters (DCHQ) said he expected
the 2002 opium harvest in Afghanistan to be in the range of 3,500 to 4,000
tons.
18
His estimate was pretty close. The UN annual
Afghanistan Opium Survey
released in October 2002 described a considerable level of opium production:
3,400 metric tons. This was less than the amount produced in 1999 (4,581
metric tons), but it was in excess of the crops in 2000 (3,276 metric tons) and
2001 (185 metric tons).
Alternatives to Opiates
Consumption habits in Iran have changed since 2000, partially because of the
Taliban ban on opium cultivation. The UNDCP chief in Tehran said that hashish
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was being used in the place of opium.
19
Hashish seizures increased 50 percent
in the first seven months of 2001 (1 January to 31 July 2001), when compared
to the same time frame in the previous year (15,303 tons in 2000 and 23,000 in
2001).
The head of Iran’s Drug Control Headquarters noted in October 2001
that the overall consumption of natural narcotics had decreased, but the use of
synthetic drugs had moved upward.
20
On the other hand, the officer in charge
of Iran’s police counter-narcotics effort denied the actual discovery of any
synthetic or manufactured drugs although he acknowledged reports of the
presence of such substances.
21
He suggested that Iranians who travel to the
West purchase synthetic drugs for personal use, but the amount is not significant
enough to warrant official concern. Asked about club drugs such as ecstasy and
hallucinogens such as LSD, the police officer said his subordinates are trying to
locate such substances but so far they have been unsuccessful. The official
warned that discussion about such topics should be avoided because curious
young people could create a demand for them.
There also have been some cocaine seizures in Iran, but these are
relatively insignificant when compared to the traffic in opiates. A Tehran Province
police official said in August 2000 that in the previous five months one kilogram
of cocaine was seized in the capital.
22
450 kilograms of cocaine smuggled in
from Colombia, Peru, and Russia was seized at the Tehran airport in February
2001.
23
The Tehran police chief said in September 2001 that his force had seized
one kilogram of cocaine in the previous six months, and he “expressed worry at
this first instance in Iran of seizure of cocaine.”
24
Why Get High?
After the narcotics shipments cross the Iranian border they usually are broken
up into smaller units so they are more difficult to intercept. 60 percent of the
drugs that enter Iran pass on into Turkey, the Caucasus, and the Persian Gulf.
The remaining 40 percent stays in the country. The number of people using
drugs—from addicts to casual users—is estimated to be around 2 million,
although the head of the Drug Control Headquarters believes that the real figure
could be much higher because most drug abusers want to avoid the stigma of
being identified as addicts.
25
The average age of users is falling. A Gilan Province
official says the average addiction age has fallen to 10-19, whereas it used to be
25-29, and the head of the Drug Control Headquarters ascribed the increase in
young drug abusers to the country’s population explosion.
26
Drug abuse has led to a growing prison population. Forty percent of all
crimes in Iran are drug-related felonies.
27
The head of the Prisons, Security, and
Correction Organization said in July 2001 that out of the 170,000 prisoners
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A. William Samii
under his supervision, some 68,000 are incarcerated for drug trafficking and
another 32,000 are imprisoned for drug addiction.
28
He also said that drug-
related arrests (of dealers, smugglers, and consumers) had increased the overall
prison population by 25 percent.
29
Some 150-200 petty dealers and users are
arrested in Tehran every day, but some are released because of the shortage of
prison space.
30
A related problem is the rise in HIV/AIDS transmitted through the
sharing of needles for intravenous drug use. Between 19,000 and 20,000 Iranians
suffer from AIDS, and almost 3,500 are HIV-positive. Approximately 65 percent
of all the recorded cases are transmitted through the sharing of needles, the
remainder are through sexual contact (10 percent), contaminated blood products
(less than ten percent), or from mother to infant.
31
In 1995, 146 out of 400
inmates in a Kerman jail were found to be HIV-positive.
32
And the number of
imprisoned addicts is on the rise, with a Health Ministry official saying that 56
percent of the cases in the corrections system come from sharing needles.
33
The economy, and especially the high rate of joblessness, tops the list
of reasons given by Iranians for drug abuse. Unemployment stands at 14 percent
officially and is estimated by outside experts to be in the 25 percent range.
34
This grievance combines with general boredom and a lack of options. A young
man in the town of Islamshahr explained, “We’re all jobless. We have nothing to
do. We try to do a little bit of business
here and there and we get arrested
as troublemakers. That’s why there
are so many drug addicts here. It’s
the despair.”
35
Another addict said
that he had been in combat for forty
months during the Iran-Iraq War, but
when he returned the regime abandoned him.
36
He supported his drug habit
with odd jobs and charity, and he warned, “The youth are becoming drug addicts.
We have no freedom, no jobs, nowhere to go and have fun. So we are all addicts.”
National and community leaders are aware of the relationship between
jobs and drug abuse. Young people turn to drugs because of “unemployment,
depression, and neglect,” a parliamentary representative said, adding that “no
hope for the future or social joy” are contributory factors.
37
A Friday prayer
leader said that unemployment and poverty are among the root causes of drug
abuse, and he urged the government to create job opportunities.
38
The availability of drugs also makes an impact. In the words of an
individual who deals with addiction treatment and prevention at the Welfare
Organization, “the purchase of heroin has become easier than the purchase of
a bottle of milk. To buy bread, we are forced to wait in a line for a long time, but
to purchase drugs, no problem exists.”
39
When a war veteran who was describing
“We have no freedom, no
jobs, nowhere to go and have
fun. So we are all addicts.”
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the lack of alternatives to taking or dealing drugs complained that the local
park only has four trees, an opium addict chimed in, “Instead of trees in our
parks, all you find are drug dealers.”
40
There are also other factors contributing to drug abuse in Iran. A member
of parliament who also happens to be secretary of the Antidrugs Society
attributed drug abuse to the way individuals are treated in society: “In our society,
human beings are not looked upon with dignity and respect, otherwise people
who are socially accepted would not turn to drugs.”
41
Another parliamentarian
explained that culture is behind the demand for drugs: “Today, the youth are
bored with what they have and wish for things they haven’t got. This is rooted
in Western culture and should be confronted with the use of cultural tools.”
42
A
supervisor at Tehran University’s Cultural Center said that culture—not enough
sports, depressing and overcrowded dormitories—is a significant reason for the
prevalence of drug abuse.
43
There also are the kinds of reasons one expects to
hear from Iranian officials. One cleric said that weak religious faith is the main
reason why people are attracted to drugs.
44
Another cleric said that Iran’s enemies
are encouraging the youth to consume drugs.
45
Interdiction and Treatment
The Iranian government’s primary approach to the narcotics threat is interdiction.
Iran shares a 936 kilometer border with Afghanistan and a 909 kilometer border
with Pakistan, and the terrain in the two eastern provinces—Sistan va Baluchistan
and Khorasan—is very rough. The Iranian government has set up static defenses
along this border. This includes concrete dams, berms, trenches, and minefields.
In addition to the static defenses, personnel from Iran’s Law Enforcement
Forces, Islamic Republic of Iran Ground Forces (the regular army), Islamic
Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC), and the paramilitary Basij Resistance Forces
conduct operations in the border regions. Iran’s police chief announced in
December 2001 the creation of an “anti-drug regiment” that would cover the
area from the Sea of Oman to the Caspian Sea, and he said that this unit would
“complete the missing ring in the national security chain.”
46
The IRGC created
village-level Basij units in mid-2000 by arming villagers and giving them
rudimentary military training. These units went from a purely defensive role to
conducting offensive operations.
These government measures may seem excessive, but smugglers are well
armed and have employed sophisticated equipment such as night-vision goggles,
global positioning systems, and satellite communications devices. Narcotics are
smuggled via camels, four-wheel drive vehicles, and even Afghan refugees. The
Iranian government claims that over 3,000 of its personnel have been killed
battling the smugglers.
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A. William Samii
Iranian security measures came to be part of the international
community’s effort after countries gave up trying to work with the Taliban to
contain Afghanistan’s opium production. The UN has encouraged Afghanistan’s
neighbors to strengthen their anti-smuggling efforts and to create what would in
effect be a cordon around Afghanistan. The current Afghan government, with
whom Tehran has a strong relationship, also favors such an approach. An official
from Iran’s Khorasan Province said in December 2001 that security along the
eastern border was at a favorable level and drug smuggling had dropped since
the Northern Alliance took control of the neighboring Herat Province, and he
praised the efforts of Herat Province Governor Ismail Khan.
47
In April 2002,
furthermore, the Afghan Anti-Drug Commission chief said that Iran had suffered
many losses in the fight with drug traffickers, and he called for a “security belt”
to protect the shared border.
48
The legal penalties for drug-related offenses have been changed as well.
In 1979-1980, revolutionary courts headed by Ayatollah Sadeq Khalkhali carried
out many executions, and although reliable statistics are unavailable it is known
that in 1979 there were about 18,000 people imprisoned in connection with
narcotics.
49
This phase of the counter-narcotics campaign ended because of a
debate over whether an unarmed smuggler is “at war with God” (
muharib ba
Khoda
, which entails capital punishment) or “corrupt on earth” (
mufsid fil arz
,
which does not necessarily require a death sentence). The beginning of the
Iran-Iraq War also diverted attention, and until the war ended in 1988 counter-
narcotics received little notice.
After the war Iran’s leaders became cognizant of the drug problem facing
them. A January 1989 law required the death penalty for addicts and traffickers
possessing more than five kilograms of opium or 30 grams of heroin, and
executions were carried out quickly and publicly after hasty trials presided over
by an intelligence officer.
50
The U.S. State Department expressed concern that
the law was being used to execute political dissidents.
51
An official who was
involved with the Iranian counter-narcotics effort at the time described the
legislation as the result of a “superficial and simplistic” attitude that called for
eliminating the problem in six months.
52
Iran has executed over 10,000 narcotics traffickers in the last decade,
usually by hanging, and some 800 people are on death row for narcotics offenses.
Sometimes the penalties are carried out in public to serve as a deterrent. By
1999 it was obvious that harsh penalties were not having the desired effect.
Capital punishment for smugglers continues, but drug abusers are treated less
harshly now.
Addiction to drugs has come to be seen as something treatable. Iranian
newspapers carry advertisements by treatment specialists and Narcotics
Anonymous—brought over from Los Angeles in the mid-1990s—is increasingly
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important. There is a privately funded drug hotline named “Tehran Call.” Some
86 treatment centers have helped about 50,000 addicts so far.
53
A psychiatrist
who treats addicts at one of the government-funded rehabilitation centers in
Tehran said that treatment comes in two phases—two weeks of detoxification
followed by long-term group therapy.
54
Treatment at some government facilities,
which are similar to penal “boot camps” of the United States, often requires
forced labor and religious indoctrination.
Methadone treatment is legal, too, and the Outpatient Clinic for the
Treatment of Addictive Behavior at the Zahedan Psychiatric Hospital is one
place that has tried this approach.
55
In June 2002 Tehran hosted a UN- organized
workshop on methadone treatment, and the workshop’s facilitators came from
Australia, Poland, and the United States. An American facilitator said that there
were just a handful of methadone treatment specialists in Iran, but he estimated
that by the end of 2002 there would be dozens. He noted that the Iranian
government is “absolutely, firmly committed to making treatment available to
everyone who needs it.”
56
Many who quit using drugs, however, resume their addictions because
of the country’s bleak realities and because of the lack of alternatives.
57
The ex-
addicts are rejected by their families and cannot get good jobs if they have
served prison time, even though work centers have been created for them. As a
result, they fall back in with drug users. A psychiatrist who works with addicts
concurred that many who supposedly are cured resume their habits, because the
focus is on curing what causes addiction, rather than on really curing the addict.
58
Hindrances to Counter-Narcotics Success
Bureaucratic disputes over funding and strategy, corruption, and ethnic/regional
problems hinder Iranian counter-narcotics efforts. The 1989 law created a new
Drug Control Headquarters (DCHQ) to centralize counter-narcotics efforts.
Iran’s president is the acting chairman, and the secretary of the DCHQ serves
as the country’s “Drug Czar.” Other members of the DCHQ are the Ministry of
the Interior, Ministry of Intelligence and Security, Ministry of Education, Ministry
of Health, Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance, the Prosecutor General,
the chief of the Law Enforcement Forces, the Prisons Organization, Islamic
Republic of Iran Broadcasting, the head of the Tehran Courts, and the Basij.
There also are DCHQ offices in the country’s 28 provinces. Until November
2001 the DCHQ depended on revenues secured through the confiscation and
auctioning of smugglers assets and the fines levied against them.
59
After that
date the Management and Planning Organization was tasked with funding the
DCHQ.
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A. William Samii
This unwieldy structure has led to difficulties. The DCHQ chief
complained about the lack of cooperation he received from other branches of
the government because his was not a cabinet-level organization, while they
complained about him and the counter-narcotics strategy. This situation peaked
in February 2001, when British Cabinet member Mo Mowlam visited Iran to
attend a counter-narcotics event, sign a memorandum of understanding, and
pledge money to the DCHQ. DCHQ chief Mohammad Fallah was supposed to
be Mowlam’s host, but Vice-President Mohammad Hashemi had to escort her
because Fallah had just resigned due to policy differences.
60
President Mohammad
Khatami had to persuade him later to resume his post.
Complaints related to the lack of institutional cooperation continued
after Fallah got back to work. The official in charge of the police counter-
narcotics effort said that state broadcasting, the prisons organization, and the
Ministries of Islamic Culture and Guidance and of Education had not made a
contribution to the state’s efforts.
61
Fallah himself said that just trying to seal
the borders was superficial, that highly-publicized drug sweeps were ineffective,
and the law gives judges too much leeway in sentencing addicts to prison, whereas
imprisonment should be the last resort.
62
The law-and-order approach, of course, has its advocates. The police
chief called last year for “more effective law enforcement.”
63
The head of the
Judiciary said, “Drug traffickers and sellers must no longer benefit from any
amnesty—on the contrary they must be severely repressed.”
64
And a Deputy
Interior Minister complained in June 2001 about the number of executions:
“Some 15,869 drug traffickers deserved death, but only 1,735 were meted capital
punishment. The death sentence against 400 convicts was upheld, but finally
only 233 were sent to the gallows.”
65
The officer in charge of the Law
Enforcement Force’s counter-narcotics effort announced in August 2002 the
creation of a special headquarters with representatives from the Judiciary, the
Prisons Organization, and the police that would hand out harsher punishments,
and he said that captured drug smugglers and dealers would be sent to a special
camp south of Tehran.
66
Seyyed Mahmud Alizadeh-Tabatabai, who served in the DCHQ during
the presidencies of Ayatollah Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani (1989-1997) and
Mohammad Khatami (1997-2001), gave a possible explanation for the emphasis
on law enforcement. He said, “In the government budget no funds are allocated
for agencies that have a cultural mission in this area and the revenues of the
headquarters is not to the extent that it can fund the programs of the agencies,
therefore, one cannot carry out cultural work with a slogan.”
67
He also said that
President Khatami only attended one DCHQ meeting a year, so none of the
cabinet-level officials bothered attending the meetings.
68
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Parliamentary observers also registered their unhappiness with the official
approach to drug control. In March 2001 the parliament summoned the Ministers
of Intelligence and Security, of Foreign Affairs, of the Interior, and of Defense
so they could explain the reasons for increased insecurity along the country’s
eastern borders.
69
One parliamentarian said that “limiting the campaign to military
campaigns against the bandits is not sufficient and to better secure the border,
there should be political, economic, and even diplomatic efforts.”
70
A member
of parliament from Kashmar, an area where many smuggling-related incidents
occur, also called for a clear-cut counter-narcotics strategy, because, “Under
the present circumstances, each of our security, law enforcement, and military
forces are acting in their own separate and independent ways.”
71
The same parliament, however, is at times reluctant to provide the
necessary funding. In January 2001 the parliament slashed the proposed 200
billion rial (about $25 million at the market rate) budget for eastern security
measures to only 50 billion rials, which led to complaints from the Khorasan
Province police commander.
72
A parliamentarian from Khorasan Province
suggested that money was not the solution, because only 3 billion of the 200
billion rials allocated in 2000 for security in Khorasan were spent, and if anything,
the security situation worsened.
73
Eastern villagers pressed into service in Basij
units demanded financial compensation, too, because participation in military
activities prevented them from farming.
74
In May 2002 the legislature again
approved a 200 billion-rial budget for controlling the eastern borders.
75
President Mohammad Khatami on 7 July 2002 appointed Ali Hashemi—
formerly of the Ministry of Intelligence and Security and the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs—as the new head of the Drug Control Headquarters. Hashemi announced
two months after his appointment that a new anti-narcotics plan would go into
effect in 2003, and he modified his statement a month later, when he said that
there would be a new plan for the next year, but the really comprehensive plan
would go into force in 2004.
76
Corruption has hampered the Iranian counter-narcotics effort at all levels.
Real estate deals are used in a remittance system similar to the hawala system
and could be used for money laundering disguised as legitimate remittances.
77
The real estate transactions would be made in Iran but the funds would be
exchanged overseas.
Former DCHQ official Seyyed Mahmud Alizadeh-Tabatabai said that
his first encounter with drug-related corruption occurred in 1986, when he was
with the Plan and Budget Organization and was tasked with allocating a budget
for the Revolutionary Committee’s drug control activities.
78
Alizadeh-Tabatabai
said, “We were quite aware of the existence of underground and Mafia
organizations that had part of their activities here [in Iran] and were at the same
time connected with outside organizations,” and a colleague told him that, “the
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A. William Samii
profits that accrued from the sale of narcotics went to certain places that were
connected with sources of power, and we were unable to deal with them.”
People purchased rugs with the profits from selling narcotics, and they smuggled
the rugs overseas.
Alizadeh-Tabatabai questioned how the activities of the terrorist
Mujahedin-i Khalq Organization (MKO) could be eliminated while the drugs
problem persists. He explained, “Efforts to limit or eradicate the transit and
trade in narcotics will endanger the economic interests of some people. However,
the eradication of a movement such as that of the Hypocrites [the MKO] does
not cause economic loss to anybody.”
79
In 1995 the U.S. State Department described “intermittent reports that
drug-related corruption is endemic…extensive bribing of border
guards…traffickers are sometimes set free upon payment of a bribe.”
80
A police
commander later admitted, “Traffickers sometimes persuade police personnel
to take bribes. In the province so far this year [March 1999-January 2000] there
have been 47 such cases.”
81
A parliamentary deputy from the southeastern town
of Minab said that the local Law Enforcement Forces “have put the city’s people
under heavy pressure, beat them, and kill them in the name of fighting drug
trafficking. Further, the [police] are taking bribes, while people who suffer from
hunger and poverty are accused of illicit drug trade.”
82
A Western journalist
noted that official reports do not mention corruption, while in Tehran “street
dealers pay police patrols $15 a day to turn a blind eye.”
83
Security officials are
poorly paid. They can earn finders’ fees for confiscating narcotics, but smugglers
can offer them much more money. The chief of police specifically mentioned
the problem of low salaries when he complained about inadequate financial
resources for drug interdiction.
84
The ethnic mix of the Iranian population also hinders counter-narcotics
efforts. Many of the people in southeastern Sistan va Baluchistan Province,
which borders Pakistani Baluchistan, and some of the population in the Khorasan
Province, which borders Afghanistan, are ethnic Baluchis who practice Sunni
Islam, whereas Shia Islam is the state religion and is practiced by the Persian
majority.
85
The provincial people, therefore, may have more in common with
co-religionists and co-ethnics from across the border than they do with the state
leadership. An indication of this situation appeared when a police official had
to ask the locals not to give incorrect information about the “bandits” they
were pursuing: “People’s non-cooperation leads to the failure of the operations
and even martyrdom of the security forces’ members.”
86
Sistan va Baluchistan Province is the least developed in the country,
and a long-running drought has made the situation worse. Earning a living through
smuggling has a long tradition, as locals do not have many other options. In the
words of a street dealer from the provincial city of Zahedan, “Life here is a
Drug Abuse: Iran’s “Thorniest Problem”
Winter/Spring 2003 – Volume IX, Issue 2
295
disaster. Only smuggling is worthwhile. The rest is useless. We can’t do anything
else.”
87
Conclusion
Iranian officials and news media frequently complain that their country is paying
a heavy price for being between opium supplies in Afghanistan and opiate
consumers in Europe. They therefore demand that Western states help shoulder
that burden. Indeed, France, Spain, the United Kingdom, and some other
European states have provided financial assistance or counter-narcotics
equipment, such as drug-sniffing dogs and bulletproof vests. Moreover, Tehran
has signed counter-narcotics related memoranda of understanding with
Afghanistan, Armenia, Australia, Cyprus, France, Georgia, Great Britain, Greece,
Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, Spain,
Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, and Turkmenistan.
Tehran also is part of several multilateral drug-control activities. As a
member of the Economic Cooperation Organization,
88
Iran is involved with its
Drug Control Coordination Unit. The 6+2 group—China, Iran, Pakistan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, as well as Russia and the United
States—also addressed drug control. The UN Drug Control Program opened its
Tehran office in 1999. Tehran is a signatory to the 1988 UN Convention Against
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and the 1961 UN
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.
The real solution to Iran’s drug abuse problem lies closer to home. From
the supply side, opium cultivation in Afghanistan must be wiped out in what
must be an international effort. Unfortunately, it could take up to three years for
the elimination of opium cultivation as a key source of revenue in Afghanistan.
89
From the demand side, the Iranian government must provide jobs—the
Minister of Labor and Social Affairs described an unemployment crisis with 3.2
million jobless people currently and the expectation that 5.5 million high-school
graduates would join the unemployed in the next four years.
90
The government
says that it wants to create 760,000 jobs annually, but in an October 2002
speech President Khatami said that in the previous two years they created only
410,000 (in the year starting March 2000) and 460,000 (in the year starting
March 2001) new jobs.
91
Yet to create all the necessary jobs would require
dramatic and painful changes in the oil-dependent, state-run economy.
The resolution of Iran’s economic problems also could result in bigger
paychecks for police officers, which would make them more resistant to bribery.
It is impossible to predict whether or not this would affect higher-level corruption.
Economic development could benefit the denizens of Sistan and Baluchistan
Province and give them alternatives to smuggling. A final point is that drug
The Brown Journal of World Affairs
296
A. William Samii
abuse is unlikely to disappear, but it can be greatly reduced if the Iranian
government confronts its problems realistically.
Notes
1. Rasht Friday Prayer leader Ayatollah Zeinolabidin Qorbani, cited by Islamic Republic News
Agency (IRNA), 31 May 2002.
2. U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, Intelligence Division, Europe, Asia, Africa Unit
(NIBE),
Iran — Drug Situation Report
, May 2000, (secured through the Freedom of Information
Act).
3. United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNODCCP),
Global Illicit
Drug Trends 2002:
11.
4. UNODCCP,
Afghanistan
Annual Opium Poppy Survey 2001
, October 2001.
5. UN Drug Control Program (UNDCP) spokesman Sandro Tucci, cited in
RFE/RL Iran Report
,
Vol. 4, No. 20 (28 May 2001)
.
6. Antonio Mazzitelli, the UNDCP chief in Tehran, told
RFE/RL Iran Report
, Vol. 4, No. 37
(
1
October 2001).
7. Northern Alliance Interior Minister Yunis Qanuni promised that opium would not reappear;
Guardian
, 26 November 2001. Law and order ministry official Sohrab Qadri, on the other hand,
said that “the top authorities have not yet decided whether to let the farmers continue cultivating
poppies,”
New York Times
, 26 November 2001.
8. An official Afghan statement read out by UNDCP official Bernard Frahi in Kabul on 16
January 2002; see
New York Times
, 17 January 2002.
9. UNODCCP,
Afghanistan
Annual Opium Poppy Survey 2001
, October 2001.
10. UNDCP official Bernard Frahi, cited in Ron Synovitz, “Kabul Continues To Struggle With
Poppy Cultivation, Drug Trade,”
RFE/RL Weekday Magazine
, 26 June 2002.
11.
The Financial Times
, 10 April 2002.
12. Agence France Presse, 19 December 2001. Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Mohsen Aminzadeh
in a meeting with Afghan Interior Minister Yunis Qanuni, IRNA, 3 January 2002.
13. IRNA, 26 February 2002.
14.
Resalat
, 2 March 2002.
15. IRNA, 7 May 2002.
16. Askold Krushelnycky, “Afghan Farmers Face Choice of Poppies or Poverty,”
RFE/RL Weekday
Magazine
, 22 April 2002.
17. See, for example, the
London Times
, 25 April 2002.
18. Ali Hashemi, cited by Guy Dinmore, “Iran says Afghan opium yield increasing,”
Financial
Times
, 15 October 2002.
19. Antonio Mazzitelli, the UNDCP chief in Tehran, told
RFE/RL Iran Report
, Vol. 4, No. 37 (1
October 2001).
20. Mohammad Fallah at a 17 October gathering of provincial counter-narcotics officials, cited by
Aftab-i Yazd
, 18 October 2001.
21. Brigadier General Mehdi Aboui in an interview published by
Resalat
, 29 August 2002, and
Iran
, 29 August 2002. In English-language sources, the Iranian national police force usually is
referred to as the Law Enforcement Force (LEF) and in Persian it is called
Niru-yi Entezami-yi
Jomhuri Islami
(NAJA). Throughout this article the word “police” will be used for this organization.
22. Tehran Province police drug control campaign director Colonel Nasser Aslani, cited by IRNA,
23 August 2000.
W
A
Drug Abuse: Iran’s “Thorniest Problem”
Winter/Spring 2003 – Volume IX, Issue 2
297
23. IRNA, 22 March 2001.
24. Brigadier General Mohsen Ansari, cited by IRNA, 27 September 2001.
25. DCHQ chief Mohammad Fallah, cited by IRNA, 1 July 2002.
26. Welfare Department official Mohammad Reza Parsi, cited by
Tehran Times
, 15 May 2001.
DCHQ chief Mohammad Fallah, cited by IRNA, 15 May 2002.
27. Deputy police chief for intelligence Brigadier General Mohammad Nuri, cited by IRNA, 8
October 2002.
28. Prisons, Security, and Correction Organization head Seyyed Mahmud Bakhtiari, cited by
IRNA, 2 July 2001. Only a small proportion of Iran’s prison population is under Bakhtiari’s
purview. Members of parliament discovered in October 2000 the existence of several unknown
prisons. It eventually was discovered that the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, the national
police, individual police precincts, the Armed Forces Judicial Organization, the Islamic Revolution
Guards Corps, the Judiciary, and the Revolutionary Courts all had their own confinement facilities.
See
RFE/RL Iran Report
, v. 4, n. 3 (22 January 2001).
29. IRNA, 3 October 2001.
30. Colonel Mehdi Aboui, cited by IRNA, 27 June 2002.
31. Statistics from the Blood Transfusion Organization, Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
Network 1, 16 October 2002; Blood Transfusion Organization adviser Mariam Zadsar, IRNA, 22
July 2002; and Tehran Medical Sciences University Professor Minoo Moharez,
Noruz
, 13 April 2001.
32.
Iran News
, 28 July 2002.
33. Deputy Health Minister Ali Akbar Sayyari, cited by Reuters, 30 October 2000.
34. Tehran Province Management and Planning Organization chief Javad Farshbaf Maherian
said that the unemployment rate is 14 percent; IRNA, 6 August 2002. The United Nations described
an unemployment rate of 16 percent; IRNA, 23 July 2002. The economic correspondent of RFE/
RL’s Persian Service, Fereydoun Khavand, said on 9 July 2002 that the real unemployment rate
exceeds 25 percent.
35. Elaine Sciolino,
Persian Mirrors
, (New York: The Free Press, 2000): 320.
36. Ibid.
37. Sanadaj parliamentary representative Bahaedin Adab, cited by
Abrar
, 2 December 2000.
38. Dorud, Luristan Province, Friday Prayer leader Hojatoleslam Qasem Musavi, cited by IRNA,
1 July 2002.
39. Behruz Meshkini, cited by
Kar va Kargar
, 2 December 2000.
40. Neil MacFarquhar, “Iran Shifts War Against Drugs, Admitting It Has Huge Problem,”
New
York Times
, 18 August 2001.
41. Tehran parliamentarian Soheila Jelodarzadeh, cited by IRNA, 19 January 2002.
42. Savojbalaq parliamentarian Jafar Golbaz, cited by
Resalat
, 20 July 2002.
43. Dr. Bolhari, who supervises Tehran University’s Student Center, cited by
Azad
, 2 July 2002.
44. Hojatoleslam Mohammad Rezai, the Friday prayer leader in Delfan township, Luristan
Province, cited by IRNA, 3 November 2001.
45. Tabriz Friday Prayer leader Ayatollah Mohsen Mujtahid-Shabestari, cited by IRNA, 30
September 2002.
46. Brigadier General Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, cited by IRNA, 10 December 2001.
47. Khorasan Province Deputy Governor-General Hussein Zare-Sefat, cited by IRNA, 1 December
2001.
48. Afghan Anti-Drug Commission chief Abdol Hai Elahi, cited by Mashhad Voice of the
Islamic Republic of Iran in Dari, 16 April 2002.
49. Interview with Seyyed Mahmud Alizadeh Tabatabai, in
Siyasat
, 9 December 2000.
50. Reza Afshari,
Human Rights in Iran
, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001): 41.
The Brown Journal of World Affairs
298
A. William Samii
51. Exiles and human rights monitoring groups confirmed these concerns; U.S. Department of
State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
International Narcotics
Control Strategy Report
, April 1994.
52. Interview with Seyyed Mahmud Alizadeh Tabatabai, in
Siyasat
, 9 December 2000.
53. Welfare Organization chief Mohammad Reza Rahchamani, cited by IRNA, 1 September
2002.
54. Dr. Arash Minabzadeh, cited by Azam Gorgin and Charles Recknagel, “Doctor Describes
Drug Addiction Treatment,”
RFE/RL Weekday Magazine
, 17 November 2000.
55.
The
New York Times
, 18 August 2001.
56. Robert Newman, M.D., director of a chemical dependency institute of the Continuum
Health Partners in New York City; interview with author, 1 November 2002.
57. Tehran academic Davar Sheikhavandi told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Persian Service;
RFE/RL Iran Report
, v. 4 n. 41, (29 October 2001).
58. Dr. Arash Minabzadeh, cited by Azam Gorgin and Charles Recknagel, “Doctor Describes
Drug Addiction Treatment,”
RFE/RL Weekday Magazine
, 17 November 2000.
59. DCHQ chief Mohammad Fallah, cited by IRNA, 17 November 2001.
60.
Financial Times
, 26 February 2001.
61. Brigadier General Mehdi Aboui, cited by IRNA, 28 April 2001.
62. IRNA, 24 June 2001.
63. Police chief Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, cited by IRNA, 23 April 2001.
64. Judiciary chief Ayatollah Mahmud Hashemi-Shahrudi, cited by IRNA, 27 June 2001.
65. Deputy Interior Minister for Security Affairs Qolam Hussein Bolandian, IRNA, 26 June
2001.
66. Mehdi Aboui, cited by IRNA, 31 August 2002.
67.
Kayhan
, 13 February 2001.
68.
Siyasat
, 9 December 2000.
69. IRNA, 5 March 2001.
70. Tehran representative Mohsen Armin, cited by IRNA, 2 May 2001.
71. Mohammad Reza Khabbaz, cited by
Qods
, 13 December 2000.
72. IRNA, 17 January 2001. Khorasan Province police commander Javad Hamed, cited by
Iran
,
18 January 2001.
73. Sabzevar parliamentarian Hassan Seyyedabadi, cited by
Khorasan
, 28 January 2001.
74. Hussein Abbasi, the Basij commander
in
Sir village, cited by
Hamshahri
, 25 January 2001.
75.
Siyasat-i Ruz
, 15 May 2002.
76. IRNA, 1 September 2002. Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Network 2, 12 October
2002.
77. U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, Intelligence Division, Europe, Asia, Africa Unit
(NIBE),
Iran — Drug Situation Report
, May 2000, (secured through the Freedom of Information
Act).
78.
Siyasat
, 9 December 2000.
79.
Siyasat
, 9 December 2000.
80. U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
International
Narcotics Control Strategy Report
, March 1995.
81. Police commander Shabani, cited by
Fath
, 23 January 2000.
82. Seyyed Ali Mir-Khalili, cited by
Hamshahri
, 6 January 2000.
83. Cedric Governeur, “Iran Loses Its Drugs War,”
Le Monde Diplomatique
, March 2002.
84. Police chief Brigadier General Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf during a press conference in Rasht,
cited by IRNA, 18 June 2001.
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Winter/Spring 2003 – Volume IX, Issue 2
299
85. See A.W. Samii, “The Nation and Its Minorities: Ethnicity, Unity, and State Policy in Iran,”
Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East,
Vol. XX, No. 1 & 2 (June 2000).
86. Hojatoleslam Qolam Heidar Heidari, the ideological-political deputy of the police’s Salman
Tactical Base in Birjand, cited by
Ava-yi Birjand
, 1 November 2000.
87.
Financial Times
, 10 January 2002.
88. Comprised of Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan,
Turkey, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
89. White House drug policy chief John Walters, cited by
Washington Times
, 16 April 2002.
90. Minister of Labor and Social Affairs Seyyed Safdar Husseini, cited by IRNA, 22 July 2002.
91. Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Network 1, 20 October 2000.