Iran on the Eve of the Presidential Elections

Iran on the Eve of the Presidential Elections

Mohsen Sazegara

Visiting Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Journalist and Politician, Iran

The following is a commentary edited by Mohsen Sazegara and based on his presentation at the
Wilson Center on May 23, 2005. The opinions expressed here are those of the author and in no
way represent the views or opinions of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

The first Islamic republic started with the victory of the revolution and ended with Khomeini’s
death. The second republic is the republic of the absolute

velayat-e faqih

. The third republic is

the republic of reform that started with Khatami and the reform movement. The third republic
ended with the last parliamentary elections. More than 2000 candidates running for parliament
were rejected by the Council of Guardians. The reformist members of parliament organized a sit-
in to protest their disqualification by the Council of Guardians and didn’t get much support from
the people. The fourth republic is starting now but the end of the third republic depends on the
upcoming presidential elections. The turnout, I believe, is important to accelerate the process
towards the new republic. The new republic will not be Islamic; it will be secular.

The Council of Guardians eliminated more than 1000 candidates who registered to run in the
presidential elections, including Mostafa Moin, and now we have only six finalists competing for
the presidency (two days later by a letter from the leader to the Council of Guardians Mr. Moin
and Mohsen Mehralizadeh were added to the list and we had 8 candidates). Among the eight
candidates two are clergymen.

Please reference Table 1 below on page 3.

The first column in the table represents the front supporting Khamenei. The front has about 10 to
15 percent of the voters. The 1

faction of this front is the Kayhan faction (evening paper in

Tehran known for its radicalism). The 2

faction is Haghani, a theological school in Qom. A

number of post-revolutionary well-known officials graduated from Haghani. They have a lot of
influence in the security forces. Haghani people mostly serve either in the security forces or in
the military. The 3

faction is the Revolutionary Guard. 126 of their former members are in

parliament and they form the majority in the seventh parliament. The 4

faction is the

Foundations. They are important economically.

The 5

faction is the Islamic Coalition Councils. They have about 90 seats in parliament and are

not happy with the results of the 7

parliamentary election. The 6

faction is the Combatant

Clerics of Tehran, and the 7

faction is the Society of Preachers of Tehran. The 8

faction is the

Scholars of Elmiyeh School in Qom. These three traditional clergy associations are related to the
Islamic Coalition Council. Altogether, they can get 10 to 15 percent of the votes in any elections.

If factions 5-8 continue supporting Ali Larijani, they will provide him with their vote. The
situation now shows that it’s important to form coalitions. (Ten days later, this faction was
divided. The 5

faction supported Larijani and got only 3 percent of the votes in the first round

of the election. Factions 6-8 supported Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani in the first round).

There are problems inside the military forces, because they can not agree on one candidate. The
security forces will not support Rafsanjani, but they can not agree over the other candidates
either. As I have pointed out, this 10-15 percent of voters who will follow Khamenei are divided

into different factions. This was not the case in the last parliamentary elections. (Later they
agreed on Mr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and supported him).

The second column in the table represents the faction supporting Rafsanjani. Number 9 in this
column is the group known as the Executive of Construction, and the majority of this group are
members of Rafsanjani’s family. Rafsanjani has two cards to play, but I doubt whether he can
play both. First, Rafsanjani wants to tell people that if he comes to power he will solve the
problem with the U.S. Second, he wants to attract the intellectuals. So far he has not succeeded
in playing either of these two cards. As to the first point, the engagement policy with the U.S.
was proposed by Mr. Zbigniew

Brzezinski last summer in a report for the Council on Foreign

Relations (CFR). As for attracting the intellectuals to his camp, it is even worse than his first
point, since the majority of intellectuals have announced that they will boycott the election. We
must remember that Akbar Ganji, the man who wrote a book about Rafsanjani, is still in jail.  As
long as he is in jail, the people won’t forgive Rafsanjani. People still believe Rafsanjani is the
bad guy.

In the fourth column of the table, we see the opposition groups. Number 16 in that column is the
University Student’s Office of Consolidation.  Almost all university students support a
referendum for a new constitution.

Iran is a land of great contradictions and unexpected events. I believe the turnout for the election
will be about 30 percent according to polls in Iran.  From that turnout, 10-15 percent will be
among the supporters of Ayatollah Khamenei, who could not agree on a candidate. Rafsanjani
might have 7 or 8 percent from within the people who will vote. Rafsanjani is trying to attract the
people who will not vote. So far, there is no sign that the majority of the Iranians eligible for
voting will decide to vote. If they don’t show up on Election Day, the battle will be amongst the
20 percent who will vote and I doubt that Rafsanjani will win. But if he can attract the outsiders
by playing his two cards, he may win.

I think the main winner will be the opposition groups. They have to work hard to mobilize the
70-80 percent of people who back the referendum in Iran. Since last December, a majority of the
opposition groups inside and outside Iran are for a referendum on the constitution under
supervision of the international organizations.

Postscript:

A parameter that was not present in this analysis and later happened was the cheating

and a sham election. The militarists intervened in the elections and changed the results of the
ballot boxes. According to some of the candidates like Mr. Mehdi Karrubi, in some cities like
Birjand, the votes counted were more than the eligible voters; and in the second round of the
election, the campaign offices of Mr. Rafsanjani delivered more than 400 complaints about
cheating. Many people believe that the ninth presidential election was the worst election of the
Islamic Republic of Iran so far.

The Front Supporting

Mr. Khameini

The Front Supporting

Mr. Hashemi Rafsanjani

The 2

of Khordad

Front (May 23

Front)

Other Groups

1. Kayhan (a.k.a. home-

grown fascists).

2. Haghani School.

3. The Revolutionary Guard

and the Militaristic
Circles.

4. The Foundations and

the institutions of the
Leadership (Mostazefan
Shaheed, The Imam’s
Circle 8 Council, etc.),
the Aid Committee.

9. The Executive of

Construction.

11. The Participation

Front.

12. The Mujahadeen

Organization of the
Islamic Revolution.

14. The groups

comprising the 2

Khordad Front

(Solidarity Party, The
Islamic Association of
Teachers).

5. Islamic Coalition

Councils.

6. The Combatant Clerics

of Tehran Association.

7. The Society of Preachers

of Tehran.

8. The Scholars Elmiyeh of

Qom.

10. The Worker’s House.

13. The Militant Clerics

Society of Tehran.

15. Iran Freedom

Movement.

16. University Student’s

Office of
Consolidation.

17. National-Religious

[Melli-Mazhabi]
Organizations.

18. The Parties

Comprising
[supporters of the]
Proclamation of 565
(The National Front,
the Writers’
Association).

19. Opposition abroad

(Monarchists,
Republicans, The
National Front,
individualists, etc.).

Table 1

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