Philosophy of Mind > Philosophy of Consciousness > Consciousness and Materialism > Zombies and the Conceivability Argument
Zombies and the Conceivability Argument
Edited by David Chalmers (New York University)
About this topic
Summary | Philosophical zombies are physical and behavioral duplicates of normal conscious humans, without consciousness. The conceivability argument against materialism runs roughly as follows: (1) Zombies are conceivable; (2) If zombies are conceivable, zombies are possible; (3) If zombies are possible, materialism is false; therefore (4) Materialism is false. |
Key works | Zombies are introduced under that name by Kirk 1974 (Campbell 1970 discusses them under the name "imitation man"). Versions of the conceivability argument are mounted by these authors and developed further using two-dimensional semantics by Chalmers 1996. Critics who respond by saying that zombies are not conceivable include Dennett 1995, Thomas 1998, Braddon-Mitchell 2003, and Kirk 2005. Critics who respond by saying that conceivability does not entail possibility include Balog 1999, Frankish 2007, Hill 1997, and Yablo 1999. Chalmers 2009 responds. |
Introductions | Kirk 2003; Polger 2001. |
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Related categories
Siblings:
- The Knowledge Argument (348)
- Kripke's Modal Argument Against Materialism (82)
- Arguments from Disembodiment (58)
- Other Anti-Materialist Arguments (63)
- Qualia and Materialism (165)
- Consciousness and Materialism, Misc (109)
- Phenomenal Concepts (238)
- Mind-Body Problem, General (625)
- The Explanatory Gap (218)
- `Hard' and `Easy' Problems (233)
- Conceptual Analysis and A Priori Entailment (65)
- Phenomenal Concepts (238)
- Absent Qualia (53)
- Two-Dimensionalism about Content (26)
- The Knowledge Argument (348)
- Kripke's Modal Argument Against Materialism (82)
- Arguments from Disembodiment (58)
- Other Anti-Materialist Arguments (63)
- Two-Dimensional Semantics (119)
- Conceivability, Imagination, and Possibility (180)
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Editorial team
General Editors:
David Bourget (Western Ontario) David Chalmers (ANU, NYU) Area Editors: David Bourget Gwen Bradford Berit Brogaard Margaret Cameron David Chalmers James Chase Rafael De Clercq Ezio Di Nucci Barry Hallen Hans Halvorson Jonathan Ichikawa Michelle Kosch Øystein Linnebo JeeLoo Liu Paul Livingston Brandon Look Manolo Martínez Matthew McGrath Michiru Nagatsu Susana Nuccetelli Gualtiero Piccinini Giuseppe Primiero Jack Alan Reynolds Darrell P. Rowbottom Aleksandra Samonek Constantine Sandis Howard Sankey Jonathan Schaffer Thomas Senor Robin Smith Daniel Star Jussi Suikkanen Lynne Tirrell Aness Webster Other editors Contact us Learn more about PhilPapers |