Soldier wounded by artillery fire (canister).
Faddei Bulgarin from Russian uhlans described a
French soldier he met near Heilsberg, who had his
face shott off by canister. No skin, no eyes, no jaws,
only tongue was left in the throat of this sufferer.
Bulgarin wrote that the entire night his every dream
was about this poor lad.

.

Shell or grenade.
A shell bursted into tens of splinters
and was dangerous within a radius of 10-30 meters.

Howitzers were usually used for indirect fire with shells (properly called "grenades"). The procedure was slow, for the shell had to be lit while it was in the gun barrel, and misfires were pretty frequent.

The spherical shell came disassembled and was filled with powder and equipped with a fuse for explosion at distances of 600-1200 meters, whose burst was dangerous within a radius of 10-30 meters. According to Prussian officer Sharnhorst, "7pdr shell burst into 24 splinters."

In 1814 at Arcis sur Aube a "smoking" shell fell near Napoleon. It killed his horse, "which dragged the Emperor to the ground amid a cloud of dust and smoke. He got up without a wound, mounted another horse and rode off to align the other battalions of the Guard." (Houssaye - "Napoleon and the campaign of 1814" pp 251-252, publ. in London 1914)

At Borodino in 1812 the commander of Russian Second Western Army, General Prince peter Bagration, was mortally wounded. "The greatest casualty, however, was Prince Bagration himself. As the attack developed a shell splinter struck Bagration's left leg, smashing his shinbone. For a few minutes he made a valiant effort to conceal his wound, in order to prevent panic or discouragement among his troops. Yet he bled profusely and began to slip from his saddle. His adjutants bore him away ... In the midst of the battle, Bagration was carried to the surgeons at a nearby station." (Mikaberidze - 'The battle of Borodino' pp 116-117)

In 1813 at Reichenbach, the Russian artillery fired many shells. Chlapowski of the Old Guard Lancers writes, "We were promptly ordered back to our original position, facing Miloradoich's [Russian] guns. ... a hail of balls and shells came in our direction ... One shell exploded between me and Cpt Jankowski. A fragment struck his lip ... and another hit me with more force on the right shoulder. But I was able to stay on my horse, and only dismounted when the fighting was over."

The fuse was 8-9 cm long and it burned for approx. 3 seconds before causing an explosion.
- but if the fuses were cut too long, the shells instead of bursting above the target, landed among enemy or/and burried themselves in the ground. Their fusses were "snuffed out" and the shells didn't explode.
- if the fuse was cut too short the shell bursted far too early and causing no damage. Actually only minority of shells did a real damage. The shells if hurriedly produced proved unreliable. In 1813 at the Battle of Lutzen approx. 1/3 of the French shells fired failed to explode ! (Elting - "Swords Around a Throne" p 263)

Bursting shell or grenade and the
Prussian 1st Foot Guards at Lutzen 1813.
Picture by Knotel.

Opinions on shells varied.
For some military men, the explosive shell had the theoretical potential to destroy a body leaving nothing for anybody. Wenzel Krimer (senior surgeon of Jagow's Prussian brigade) recalled his experience in 1813 at Leipzig. "The shelling of our line started at about 8 AM. ... I had dismounted and, wrapped in my broad cloak, was standing at the back of the column beside Kpt. von Pogwisch. ... a shell came over from ahead of us, exploded instantly, smashed an officer and a sergeant in the chest and head, and broke the legs of 12 men in the column. I fell backwards to the ground, convinced that I had been hit. Von Pogwisch grabbed me by the arm and tried to help me up. ... On closer inspection it transpired that a shell fragment had whizzed between my legs and, because its velocity was already much reduced, had got caught in the cloak, pulled me to the ground, and struck into earth behind me. ... a second shell came over, carried off the whole upper part of the adjutant's body and decapitated 3 men."

Some military men, however, considered the shell (grenade) as not very destructive weapon. It fragmented into few pieces so that although any given splinter might carry for 20-40 m, you had to be unlucky to get in the way of one. Napoleon demonstrated this to a unit of panicky conscripts in 1814 at the battle of Arcis by riding his horse over a shell which was fizzing on the ground before it exploded. The horse was killed, but Napoleon wasn't.

Prinz Eugen (Russian II Corps) shelled at Leipzig.
His horse was killed and several men were wounded.
Another example of horse being killed by the exploding shell while the man was unhurt
comes from the battle of Laon in 1814. "In the heat of the engagement the horse of one of
(Prussian) General von York's officers was struck by a shell; it entered near the shoulder
and was buried in the body ; the animal made a convulsive spring upwards and threw
the rider, the fragments of the shell were projected on all sides, and the torn limbs of the
the horse lay scattered round, whilst the man remained unhurt."
(Steffens - "Adventures on the road to Paris during the campaign of 1813-14")

The explosion created terror.

• A British soldier wrote that "during shelling my comrade looks like a boy who is beginning an illness with shivering attacks, and in the frankest way he will tell you he is just petrified by the business." He added that the bursting shells had frightened more men away from the line than anything else.
  
• In 1812 at Borodino, a Polish uhlan noticed that whenever a shell exploded dozens of Westphalian infantrymen threw themselves on the ground and covered their heads with hands. "Not a whisper was heard" - he wrote.
  
• In 1813 at Dresden, an Austrian shell landed in a redoubt defended by French and Westphalian artillery and infantry. At the instant it chased out majority of the defenders.
  
• According to Quistorp, in 1812 at Hagelberg, shell fired by French howitzer exploded among ranks of the advancing II Battalion of 7th Kurmark Landwehr. The men immediately "turned around." Two other Landwehr battalions halted. Fortunately the French gunners withdrew as soon as they saw another Prussian column advancing against them.
  
• In 1815 at Waterloo, a single French shell exploded near Wellington and "blew several grenadiers in nearby square to pieces."

  The loudly bursting shells frightened the horses.
  

• Chlapowski of Napoleon's Old Guard Lancers, describes his experience with shells in 1812 near Smolensk in Russia. He wrote, "Coming up out of the ditch on the far side, I deployed the squadron in a single line, as I expected the enemy to shoot at us from the walls. Sure enough, they fired a number of howitzer shells, one of which exploded in the middle of the squadron. A few men were wounded, and some horses broke ranks in fright, so the Cossacks seized the moment to charge us."

  Shells were also used to set villages on fire.
  

• In 1815 at Ligny, a Prussian battery of 12pdrs fired several shells and "in less than 2 minutes" a village was in flames. But a French battery (in the same battle) was less lucky, they hoped to set the village of St. Amand on fire but were "unable to get the buildings burn."
  
• In 1813 at Leipzig, a Saxon battery fired on the village of Paunsdorf and soon the buildings were in flames.
  
• Chlapowski describe similar situation during the battle of Aspern-Essling (1809). "Howitzer shells had set light to a dozen or so houses and nearly all the roofs were burning, but most of the houses and outbuildings were made of brick and so still provided good shelter for the [French] infantry." (Chlapowski, - p 69)
  
• In 1813 a pontoon bridge at Gorlitz was set afire by a French battery.

Ammunition wagons and caissons.
Napoleon habitually wanted a double standard load
of ammuntion with each cannon and howitzer.

"The bulk of [French] ammunition was carried in caissons, designed by Gribeauval to hold the new 'fixed' ammunition, i.e. projectile and propellant made up into one. The caisson was an 11-foot long, narrow-bodied wagon with a sloping lid hinged to open, the interior being divided into compartments for the assembled rounds. Powder and matches were also carried in the caisson, as were shovels and a pick (fastened to the sides), a detachable tool-box at the front and a spare wheel ...
A light caisson was also produced (presumably for horse artillery use) only 7'6" long and without either spare wheel or tool box." (Wise and Hook - "Artillery Equipment of the Napoleonic Wars" p 7)

The French used two kinds of wagons designed to carry a supply of ammunition:
- ‘caisson à munition’ (ammunition caisson)
- ‘charette-caisson’ (ammunition wagon).
The French caissons and wagons were painted in olive-green,
metal and wooden parts, including the wheels.

There was also a small "coffer" attached to each gun's trail. The ammo in French "coffer" (Gribeauval System) consisted of: 9 12pdr cannonballs, 15 8pdr cannonballs, 18 4pdr cannonballs, 4 6.4 inch howitzer canisters, ? 5.5 inch howitzer canisters

Ammunition wagon. Diorama of Battle of Leipzig 1813.
Courtesy of Wolfgang Meyer, Germany.

Russian artillery with ammunition wagons in the battle of Leipzig 1813.
Courtesy of Wolfgang Meyer, Germany.

Comparison of ammunition (cannonballs, shells, canister) allocated per gun:
12pdr cannon:
- - - - - - - - - French - 222
- - - - - - - - - Austrian - 150-210
- - - - - - - - - Russian - 172
- - - - - - - - - Prussian - 114
The number of projectiles for the heavy 12pdr cannon shows the difference in attitude towards the use of this type/caliber of gun. The French used the heavy pieces often and for this reason they allocated plenty of ammunition for them. The Prussians on another hand used the heavy pieces more cautiously.
6pdr cannon:
- - - - - - - - - Austrian - 210-230
- - - - - - - - - French - 212
- - - - - - - - - British - 194
- - - - - - - - - Prussian - 167
- - - - - - - - - Russian - 154
This comparison shows that the Austrian, French and the British considered the artillery support as very important for their infantry. The Russians allocated much less ammunition per gun but they had the most numerous artillery in Europe.
Howitzer:
- - - - - - - - - French new 5.5 inch howitzer - 234
- - - - - - - - - French old 6.4 inch howitzer - 164
- - - - - - - - - Austrian 7pdr howitzer - 140-160
- - - - - - - - - British 12pdr howitzer - 136
- - - - - - - - - Prussian 7pdr howitzer - 105
The data shows that the French artillery used their howitzers extensively. There was plenty of ammunition but not enough howitzers, especially against Wellington's troops in Spain known for using the reverse slope
tactics.

Napoleon habitually wanted a double standard load of ammuntion with each gun. That required: 2 caissions for each 4-pounder, 3 caissons for a 6- or 8-pounder, and 5 caissons for a 12-pounder. > (Elting - "Swords Around a Throne" pp 258-259)

The French ammunition wagons were placed approx. 50 m behind the line of cannons and limbers. This distance varied between armies and situations on the battlefield. If it was only possible the ammunition wagons were given every protection: hollow ground, trees, buildings etc.
Approx. 50 m behind the first line of wagons was the second line. If the guns were of heavier caliber there was also third line of wagons, placed 100 m behind the second.

The Russian caissons were positioned 30-40 meters from the guns.
According to their regulation, no more than 2 gunners were to remain next to a caisson during battle. According to Mark Conrad, 3 horses were harnessed to the cart with a caisson box. One horse was between the two shafts while the other two were on either side of it. The gun crew was not carried on the caisson, but a mounted man sat on the left horse. The powder wagon required 3 horses.

Deployment of the French foot battery in battle.
K e v i n K i l e y on the deployment of the caissons in combat:
"only one caisson per gun was kept with the battery in action.
The rest of the caissons were used in a running shuttle service
between the firing battery and the artillery parks when in
action" Kiley-"Artillery of the Napoleonic Wars 1792 -1815" p 110

The ammunition wagons were part of the artillery train.
"The artillery train also hauled the equipment in the different artillery parks at corps and army level.
The corps park consisted of spare guns, vehicles, and equipment maintained there to replace material lost in action. Usually there was 1 spare gun for every 10 assigned to the infantry divisions or the corps artillery.
The army artillery park, known as the Grand Parc, was divided into a mobile park, which accompanied the army in the field, and the fixed park, which established depots and arsenals maintained by artillery park system that ammunition was continuously sent forward to the artillery companies, with the divisions, corps, and army artillery reserve using the artillery train. Every artillery train battalion assigned to the army was under the authority of a general of brigade, as noted in the Decree of 3 January 1800, who carried the imposing title Inspector General of the Artillery Train. (...)
Train personnel were not artillerymen: they were drivers and horse handlers. Their mission was to drive and take care of the horses that pulled the artillery's guns and vehicles. They were also responsible for the considerable amount of horse harness that equipped the horse teams. They had all of the problems and headaches the cavalry had with their horses.
In addition to that, the train troops usually had to be able to 'make bricks without straw.' Horse pairs and teams had to be carefully matched. Harnesses had to be continually adjustated to take into account the weight lost by the horses on campaign.
Teams also had to be carefully trained, the best and strongest (and also, usually, the steadiest) being in the wheel pair, nearest the limber. (...) The lead teams also had to be well chosen, and the middle team for the 12-pounders, called a swing team, had to be even-tempered to be placed between two other teams.
All in all it was a hard business, and the runaway artillery team, of which undoubtedly there were many, especially in combat, was almost impossible to stop, unless the horses were shot, run over a cliff, or came up against an obstacle they could neither run over nor run through." (Kiley - "Artillery of the Napoleonic Wars 1792-1815" pp 109-110)

French artillery at Wagram. Diorama made by Cesar Yudice.
Photo by Alejandro Albanez. Thank You !

.

Artillery's accuracy in tests.
The accuracy of artillery fire
is of far more importance than quickness.

The basic tenets of an effective artillery unit rest on achieving good speed and accuracy in their deployments and delivery of fire. The accuracy of fire depended on several factors: crew's training, cannon's or howitzer's quality, and weather conditions. The accuracy and effectivenness of artillery fire varied from army to army, and from situation to situation.

In 1782 the Prussian artillery conducted series of tests
for infantry muskets and artillery canister at 300 paces.
The target was a line 1.9m tall and 30 m long.
- 25 % accuracy for muskets
- 14 % accuracy for 12pdr cannon
- 13 % accuracy for 6pdr cannon

In Müller's test the target was 6' height x 100' long
for artillery canister at a distance of 400 yards.
- 41 % accuracy for 6pdr cannon

.

Artillery's accuracy in combat.
The average casualty-rate per shot
was many times lower in battle
than during tests.

Contemporary accounts contain horrifying stories of dozens of men struck down by a single cannonball; but whilst it is possible that, very occasionally, a dozen or perhaps even 20 men might fall to one shot, the average casualty-rate per shot was many times less. A cannonball hitting a battalion-line from front could at most knock over 2 or 3 individuals; hitting a column could do the most terrible carnage.

In 1762 in Invalides (Paris) an inspection was done and the results were quite interesting;
- 69 % of the wounded were wounded by musket balls
- 14 % by sabers
- 13 % by artillery
- 2 % by bayonets
The 13 % of wounded by artillery is a pretty mediocre result but we have to keep on mind that cannonballs more often killed than wounded. Thus majority of those struck by cannnonballs didn't even make it to Paris. - - - - - Canister however resulted in many wounded and only few killed.

Wounded Russian soldiers in 1812

The accuracy of artillery fire in battle varied.

• At Pultusk in Decembver 1806, the Russian artillery smashed the attacking columns of French infantry. "Gazan's division now stood in the front line and here it was subjected to a mericless bombardement from the powerful Russian artillery numbering about 70 guns. According to the Journal of Military Actions: 'all our batteries opened fire at the enemy columns advancing at our center [and] they were stopped and overthrown by successful actions of these batteries.' The artillery fire was so effective that throughout the battle neither Gazan's regiments nor Suchet's reserve, the 40th Ligne, came close enough to the Russian position to fire their muskets. The French gunners struggled manfully to suppress the Russian artillery but they had no noticeable effect." (Arnold - "Crisis in the Snows" p 165)
  
• In 1809 in the Battle of Wagram, the Austrians suffered 30.000 casualties. Approx. 6,000 were prisoners, so it leaves us with 24,000 killed and wounded. If we take 13 % as being inflicted by artillery, we get 3,120 casualties suffered from artillery fire. The French artillery fired 96.000 rounds at Wagram, so it gives us approx. 31 rounds to inflict 1 casualty. (This is pretty much a guesswork as we assume that the rate of 13 % is also for the killed.)
  
• "At the battle of Sacile, an Austrian gun carried off a file of 3 men in each of three successive shots, but in its subsequent fire hit nothing. In 1807 at Konigsberg, 13 men were hit by a single roundshot, and at Hanau in 1813, nine. Against this, on the other hand, we have the case of Wagram where regiments bombarded all day by the full weight of the French artillery lost only 1/8 of their strength." (Griffith - "French Artillery" pp 13-14)
  
• In 1812 at Polotzk 3 French guns fired "upon a Russian battalion for several hours. The Russians suffered only 3 casualties because they conducted a series of small movements to the left and to the right."
  
• In 1813 at Leipzig a Prussian battalion lost approx. 200 men and 5 officers within 1 hour of artillery fire.
  
• In 1812 at Borodino a French chasseur regiment stood under Russian artillery fire for 8 hours and lost only 97 out of 280 men. In the same year, at Smolensk, 12 Russian guns inflicted 120 casualties on four squares of French infantry. It took only 3 minutes for the gunners to inflict this kind of carnage.
  
• In 1814 at Craonne, the French 14th Voltigeurs of Young Guard lost 30 out of its 33 officers. They "were mown down like a field of corn" under close fire of Russian artilelry.
  
• In 1807 at Friedland the 3rd Battalion of Russian Lifeguard Ismailovsk Regiment was bombarded by 30 French guns and was virtually wiped out. They lost 400 out of 520 men ! (Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, "Campaigns of 1806-1807").
  
• In 1805 at Austerlitz, the Russian horse battery advanced against French infantry formed up across the road to Blaziowitze. The French stood motionless under the fire of 8 guns firing directly at them. Within moments 400 soldiers were either killed or wounded. General Cafarelli wrote: "Our soldiers, motionless, endured this fire with the greatest intrepidity."
  
• In 1815 after the the Battle of New Orleans, the Americans confirmed that the Scots of I/93rd Regiment of Foot (Sutherland Highlanders) stood like statues under a murderous fire of American artillery and died in their ranks. By the end of the battle on the following day they had lost 75 % of their strength.
  
• In 1812 at Borodino, the Russian infantry adwanced in "dense masses" (according to de Segur) and were hit by French cannonballs. The missiles made wide and long holes in the dense formations. The columns halted for a moment before their officers and NCOs put some order in the ranks. The French gunners redoubled their fire.
  The columns kept coming in steady pace until canister shattered their front ranks. The leading officers and grenadiers fell down killed or wounded and the columns again halted. The French poured more canister and the attackers broke and fled but not before another attempt to restore the order was made.
  
• In 1815 at Waterloo, when a French shell fell into the column of British 15th Hussar Regiment, the swords and scabbards were flying in the air and wounded men and horses fell on the ground. The trumpeters sounded to lie down. The hussars dismounted and lay facedown on the wet earth while French cannonballs whizzed over their heads and their horses.
  
• At Borodino the French 30th Line took "numerous hits from artillery as it advanced against the Raievski Redoubt." Despite the destruction of several files the French continued their advance.
  
• In August 1813 at Katzbach, several cannonballs hit the advancing Prussian battalion of landwehr under Major von Hiller. It threw the battalion into disorder and despite the best efforts of officers the mob moved back and tried to push through other battalions. They were halted only when Major von Hiller directed several guns at them and shouted "I would have fire on them if the rout continued." The order was restored, they formed a square and even repulsed cavalry attack. They held their ground even when another cannonball struck them and killed 14 men at once !

Foot Artillery of the Imperial Guard.
Author ?

.

The deadly "oblique shot"
The oblique, flanking fire was
the most effective.

The oblique, flanking fire was the most effective. Oblique - a battery which formed an angle of 20 degrees or more with the object against which it was directed. "Cross fires and enfilades were for ever foremost in gunners' minds, and in the Napoleonic Wars the French became expert at achieving them." (Griffith - "French Artillery" p 28)

• On the third day of the battle of Leipzig, at 4:30 PM Dabrowski's 4 battalions of Polish infantry stood just north of the Halle suburbs. Pacthod's 1st Young Guard Division stood in the Halle suburbs and behind the river. Sacken's Russian XI Corps moved south of Gohlis. The Prussian I Corps under von Yorck was as a reserve in the second line on the height near Gohlis.
  One of Sacken's three infantry divisions (27th under Neverovski) attacked Dabrowski. Outnumbered 2 to 1 the Poles withdrew behind the Parthe River taking up positions to defend the bridge. They were supported by a single company of Baden infantry. The loss of the Halle suburb meant disaster to Napoleon and his army. George Nafziger writes; "Gourgaud, one of Napoleon's ADCs, recognized the danger, and reassured by Dabrowski that he would die before abandoning his position, hurried to advise Napoleon of the threat. Pacthod's 1st Young Guard Division (12 battalions and 3 batteries) was sent from Thonberg at the double, to support Dabrowski. Pacthod moved his division forward and deployed his artillery in the Rosenthal Woods, on the west bank of the Pleisse." "... Sacken's attack with Neverovski's 27th Division was now supported by Lieven's 10th Division, which was posted to Neverovski's left rear. Neverovski sent forward 5 battalions, supported by 13th Position and 35th Light Battery ...
  However, the flanking fire from Pacthod's artillery and infantry, standing behind the Pleisse in the Rosenthal Woods, was devastating and broke the attack. Rachmanov's 4 battalions ... already terribly under strength, were severely punished and forced to withdraw back to Gohlis. ... By 3 PM Sacken's forces were once again pushing forward towards Pfafendorf, where the French Young Guard batteries in the Rosenthal Woods once again showered them with shot and shell. The battle degenerated into a skirmish fight with one jager battalion pushing across the Pleisse, in an attempt to strike the artillery of the Young Guard there. ... The Russian soldiers had fought with tenacity and many Russian officers and men fell in this battle. Neverovski, Huene, Rachmanov, all fell as did many staff officers. All their sacrifices were in vain." The Young Guard held the Pleisse River, while the Poles still controlled the Halle suburbs and the gate.

• In 1813 at Hanau the French army (60,000-90,000 men under Napoleon) in retreat from Leipzig fought its way through a road block of 30,000-45,000 Bavarians, Austrians and Cossacks under General Wrede. The French infantry was unable to make progress in some woods, but when Drouot arrived with the Guard Artillery his preliminary reconnaissance showed him a profitable line of attack. The Guard Cavalry moved forward against the enemy cavalry on the left flank. Nansouty's first line wheeled left to attack the infantry in the center. Friant and Cambronne cleared the woods with 2 battalions of the Old Guard in skirmish order, then Drouot defiled through them with 15 guns and deployed in such a position as to take enemy's artillery in flank.
  "Behind this screen the reminder of the Guard Artillery deployed, making a total of 50 pieces. When these guns had begun to throw the enemy into confusion the Guard Cavalry completed the rout. The Bavarian cavalry then counterattacked, but Drouot held his own cavalry in front of the guns until the very last minute. When the enemy had arrived at close range the French cavalry then wheeled away to reveal the massed battery, which proceeded to make very short work of the Bavarians." (Griffith - "French Artillery" p 46)
  Once clear of the wood they blew apart the static Bavarian troops holding that part of the battlefield. They also dimounted 28 of the enemy's guns.
  "As Wrede was sending infantry and cavalry reinforcements to the threatened sector, Sebastiani charged and broke the enemy horse, but was in turn driven back to Drouot's grand battery by recently arrived Bavarian cavalry. However the Bavarian success was short-lived. The Guard Cavalry spearheaded by the Old Guard Horse Grenadiers counterattacked. The "Gods", the Polish lancers, and the Honor Guard cut their way through the outmatched Bavarian lighthorsemen. Meanwhile, the Guard Dragoons charged and broke three battalion squares of enemy infantry as the Old Guard Chasseurs broke and captured two entire Bavarian battalions. The impetus of the Guard's Cavalry's charge disintegrated Wrede's entire command of the left bank of the Kinzig." (Bowden - "Napoleon's Grande Armee of 1813" p 197)
  
• In 1807 at Eylau, the entire Russian division under Tolstoi was reduced to 2.000-3.000 men due to Davout's artillery's and infantry's flanking fire.
  
• In 1813 at Bautzen "The fine maneuver of (Marshal) Ney on Preititz was neutralized by a few pieces of Kleist's Russian artillery, which took his columns in flank, checked them and decided the marshal to deviate from the excellent direction he was pursuing. A few pieces of light artillery, thrown at all hazards upon enemy's flank, may produce most important results..." (Jomini - "The Art of War")
  A Russian officer of this battery wrote in more detail about this action. "I managed to find an advantageous position to place our battery. I led it and placed it on a small rise with a marshy valley in front of it, that protected us from any cavalry charge... Just as our 12 guns took the position, a caisson in the enemy battery exploded from our second shot. In a few minutes, we silenced 8 French guns and forced them to draw back...
  (Prussian) General Blucher, having seen the successful action of our battery, sent his ADC to our colonel-lieutenant with acknowledgements. Encouraged by such attention from the foreign general, we started to fire obliquely at enemy columns ...
  Marshal Ney, worried by the actions of our battery, and fearing that our troops, after the taking of the wood, would be able to outflank him, sent his infantry there.
  The French rushed into the woods at a run, dodging and falling from our cannonballs and shells; also he sent cavalry against us, but the marshy valley prevented them from attacking our battery. Then he placed a strong battery, and a hot cannonade started again."
  
• In 1812 at Smolensk, one Russian cannonball hit obliquely a unit of charging French cavalry. The unit became very confused and fled back in great disorder. (Muraviev - Memoirs in 'Russkii Arkiv" Book III)
  In this battle, von Suckow sees "One platoon of a battalion which had presented its flank to the Russians, we'd noticed, had lost an entire rank from a single cannonball - 22 men falling to the same shot."
  
• A French sergeant-major describes the effects of flanking artillery fire: "... a cannonball came down the valley and took off the heads of 5 voltigeurs in the third rank ... I was so covered with blood and brains that I could scarcely see. I had the bodies taken to the rear and went down to the to clean up my uniform as best I could."

Battle of Vyazma, 1812.
During the retreat from Russia in 1812, when Napoleon's army reached Viazma (Vyazma),
the Russians attacked its rear guard under Davout. Eugene and Poniatowski turned back
to free Davout . The Frenchmen , Poles , and Italians broke through the Russian lines and
continued their march towards Viazma. Miloradovich has ordered his artillery to reposition
themselves parallel to the road. Davout, Poniatowski and Eugene found themselves under
flanking artillery fire.
French artillery was unable to respond effectively to the Russian heavy fire , and p a n i c
broke out among Davout's infantry. Sir Robert Wilson writes , "Miloradovich renewed the
attack under protection of a superior , and admirably served artillery . " The French at the
cost of 8,100 killed, wounded and prisoners managed to break through.
The Russians suffered only 2,100 casualties.

Although the generals discouraged their gunners from counter-battery fire, it was observed that for artillery to respond to enemy fire in kind was practically an automatic reflex.
- Frederick the Great:
"... two capital mistakes which almost all the artilleries makes, i.e.:
1) That they preferably like to direct their fire on opposing artillery ...
2) That they choose the highest heights of the battlefield in order to
secure a longer range. Regarding the first subject, you must pay all
your attention to direct your fires exclusively at the lines of infantry
in order to disorder them, break them and put obstacle to their advance,
in order to prevent them by this means of carrying out their movements
with order and co-ordinated. Once this goal is reached, the infantry
will promptly be defeated and the enemy batteries will fall silent
successively and will fall soon in our hands."
- Napoleon:
"When artillerymen are under attack from enemy battery, they can never
be made to fire on massed infantry. It's natural cowardice, the violent
instinct of self-preservation: men immediately defend themselves from
their attackers and try to destroy them, in order to avoid being destroyed
themselves."
- Wellington:
"They [British gunners] received the order not to shoot against the enemy's
guns, only against his troops. It was difficult to get them to follow this
order."
- Kosciuszko of Polish artillery:
"The use of artillery in battle is not against the artillery, for that would
be a waste of powder, but against the enemy in a diagonal direction when
it is destructive in the extreme."

Changing the wheel of damaged in counter-battery fire
Prussian 6pdr cannon.

.

Infantry's methods of lessening
casualties from artillery fire.
"... standing to be cannonaded,
and having nothing else to do,
is about the most unpleasant thing
that can happen to a soldier ..."
- Leeke of British 52nd Foot Regiment

The sound of guns alone was thought to encourage or frighten the men. According to research done by USA Army during and after WW2 "Combat fatigue occured the most in situations where the men were subjected to heavy artillery fire." Being subjected to heavy and long artillery fire was more testing than anything else on the battlefield.
Leeke, the Color-bearer of British 52nd Foot at Waterloo writes, "... standing to be cannonaded, and having nothing else to do, is about the most unpleasant thing that can happen to a soldier ..."
Coignet of Guard Grenadiers described the effect of massed artillery fire against troops formed in line at Essling: "To the left of Essling the enemy (Austrians) planted 50 guns in front of us. I felt an urgent call to relieve nature, but it was strictly against orders to move a step towards the rear. ... Imagine the agony we endured in such a position, for I can never describe it. ... The cannonballs fell among our ranks, and cut down our men three at a time; the shells knocked the bearskin caps 20 feet in the air. ... The losses became very heavy. We had to place the Guard all in one rank so as to keep up the line in front of the enemy."

I.
There were several methods of lessening the casualties from artillery fire.
One of them was deploying from 3-rank deep line into a thinner formation.

• In 1812 at Borodino, while under artillery fire, part of the Russian Guard
  infantry deployed from 3 to 2 ranks.
  
• In 1809 at Wagram, the French Guard infantry while being under fire
  from 50 Austrian guns deployed from 3 into 1-rank deep line.
  
• In 1809 at Raab, "A 12-gun Austrian battery dominated the field.
  To confront it, the French infantry formed 'in a single line with
  3 pace intervals supported at some distance by 10-man platoons
  commanded by an officer.' Few units could emulate such modern,
  open-order tactics." (Arnold - "Napoleon Conquers Austria" p 113)

  I I.
  Already in 1759 it was recommended that infantry sit down
  while under heavy artillery fire. A sitting soldier was smaller
  target than the standing one.
  

• In 1812 at Borodino the infantry of Polish Vistula Legion sat down
  when the Russian guns fired on them. Only all their officers remained
  standing (- according to Kirkor after Brandt).
  
• In 1815 at Ligny part of Prussian infantry had been allowed to sit
  down (for example the battalions of 23rd Infantry Regiment.)

  I I I.
  There were also numerous cases of keeping the troops behind ridges,
  villages and woods or in the hollow ground (ravines, ditches etc.)
  Some military men felt it very undignified to hide behind obstacles like a coward
  while under artillery fire. For example in the battle of Leipzig in 1813,
  Ltn. Krukowski of Polish 12th Infantry Regiment, asked his commander to allow
  the entire battalion to step back 15 paces, on a reverse slope so they could
  avoid casualties from Russian artillery. His commander however ridiculed him
  in front of the battalion saying "I won't do that, not even an inch, but if you fear
  then go, even to Leipzig itself !"
  Most troops however had no objections to taking cover :-)
  

• Wellington kept his infantry screened from artillery fire behind a ridge.
  By placing the ridge between his own infantry and his opponent's, and having
  his troops lie down, Wellington was able to surprise the French by having his
  troops leap up at the last moment and deliver volleys of musketry at close range.
  
• In 1809 at Wagram, Austrian jäger battalion took cover in a drainage ditch
  100 paces in front of a village. Approx. 2.000 Austrians were sheltered behind
  the earthen dike surrounding the village. In the safety of dry moat around the tower
  near Neusiedel, General Radetzky kept hundreds of his white-clad infantrymen.
  
• In 1812 at Borodino, several Russian columns used depressions and ravines
  as shelter from French artillery fire. N.E.Mitarevski wrote that his gunners
  "couldn't see friendly infantry, but when it was necessary, they appeared as if
  from out of the ground." (Zhmodikov - "Tactics of the Russian Army ..." Vol. II)
  
• In 1815 at Ligny, 24-36 battalions of Prussian infantry were deployed in
  dead ground and several battalions were in tall crops and unvisible to guners'
  eyes. Some Prussian battalions had been allowed to sit down (for example 23rd
  Regiment.)

  I V.
  Another method was to throw themselves flat on the ground. This method,
  while practical, was not considered by some as exactly manly. Major Friccius
  of Prussian Landwehr battalion writes: "Bulow stopped about 100 paces to our
  right and saw what a perilous position we were in. He sent an officer over to
  us who shouted loudly that, on the orders of the commanding general, the
  battalion was to lie down. Some of the men actually did so, but as more and
  more voices shouted 'We don't duck !' they got up again and everyone stood
  to attention as if on parade."
  

• Keeping low under heavy artillery fire was used on numerous occassions
  by the British, Portuguese and German infantry in Peninsula, and by the British
  Netherland and German infantry during the Waterloo Campaign.
  
• Part of French infantry in the battle of Friedland (1807) and Ligny (1815
  Waterloo Campaign) laid in tall grass and wheat-fields to avoid artillery fire.
  
• In 1809 at Wagram the Austrian 47th Regiment laid down on the ground,
  safe from artillery fire and waiting for the French infantry columns to come.
  
• In 1812 at Borodino, several Westphalian battalion-columns stood near
  the Shevardino Redoubt when shells (grenades) exploded over their heads
  and cannonballs ploughed deep holes. At the instant entire columns flung
  themselves down flat "on their stromachs". They stayed in this position
  for some time before were ordered to march.
  
• In 1812 at Polotzk, Russian 26th Jager Regiment was ordered to lay down
  on the ground to save them from the French artillery fire.
  
• In 1813 at Katzbach, 6.000-7.000 Prussian infantrymen and landwehr of
  7th Brigade laid quietly behind the heights near Christianhohe, watching
  the 8th Brigade fight and waitinng for their turn to enter the combat.
  
• In 1815 at Waterloo, columns of the French 1st Light advanced against
  Hougoumont when they were hit by British and German cannonballs. Their
  officers ordered them down into a little lane-sunken that ran right along
  their front, and started sending small troops into the wood, where their
  skirmishers already exchanged shots with the enemy.
  
• "The same terrifying [Austrian] artillery discharge had carried off 21 men
  of the 5th Company's front rank. Each instant we were obliged to lie down to
  avoid the shell fragments." (- Girault, French infantryman in 1792 )
  
• In 1812 at Borodino, the infantry of French IV Army Corps was ordered to lay
  down on the ground to avoid artillery fire. According to several eyewitnesses,
  in the last stages of this battle the artillery fire was so intense that all French
  infantry threw themselves flat upon their faces or took cover in the woods and
  hollows.

British infantry under French fire. Picture by Keith Rocco, USA.

General Dorsenne and the Old Guard under artillery fire at Wagram 1809.
"He could turm his back to the enemy under the heaviest fire and give
his orders cooly, without concern for what went on behind him."
When cannonballs killed his 3rd horse and 3rd time he picked himself up
he spat out "Bunglers !" dusted himself off , and mounted his next horse.
Despite his pleasant appearance Dorsenne was so hard that the toughest
veterans jumped to please him and dreaded his strictness.He died in Paris
in 1812 after a trepanning operation. After his death, Friant took over the
Old Guard Grenadiers.

.

Cavalry's methods of lessening
casualties from artillery fire.
To be made to stand still under artillery fire
"must be one of the most unpleasant things
cavalry can be called on to do ..."
- von Schreckenstein of Saxon cavalry

Von Schreckenstein of Saxon cavalry wrote that to be made to stand still under artillery fire "must be one of the most unpleasant things cavalry can be called on to do ..." At Borodino in 1812, the line of Russian artillery was extended "as far as eye could see" and its terrifying fire continued until evening. The Westphalian infantry found themselves under heavy bombardement and were shouting "We are not staying here ! We are not staying here !" [Wir bleiben nicht hier !] Soon there was not much infantry standing around, the French, Polish and German foot soldiers took cover in the ravines, woods, and folds of terrain.
Murat's cavalry however stood in the open and protected the long line of French artillery. Benedikt Peter from the Wurttemberg Jäger-Regiment zu Pferd König No 4, wrote that Murat’s cavalry stood behind the artillery. The French were under heavy cannonade from the Russian guns and looked like “smashed battleship of which only separate and broken parts are seen on the water.”
Alexander Mikaberidze writes [the French cavalry] "... remained exposed to the Russian artillery for the best part of 3 hours. Polish Colonel Malachowski [from Polish 14th Cuirassier Regiment] lamented that: 'our cavalry was exposed to the fire, without taking any precautions against it. ... a hail of cannon-balls reaped men and horses from our lines. The gaps were filled in with new soldiers, who assumed places of their fallen comrades.'
Griois was amazed at the sight of 'cannon-balls, bullets, shells and canister raining down from every direction and creating large gaps in our [French] cavalry, which remained exposed and motionless for several hours.' He could see that 'the plain was covered with the wounded men making their way back to ambulances and of riderless horses galloping around in disorder. I noticed a Wurttemberg (Westphalian ?) cuirassier regiment, which was particularly hard hit with the enemy cannon-balls and their helmets and cuirasses kept flying apart in shattered fragments.'
Combe complained that 'The enemy redoubt directed its main fire against the artillery deployed on our right flank but some of its guns also targeted us. Cannon-balls hit us and ricocheted through our ranks, as we stood at attention with our sabres raised to our epaulettes. We remained in this terrible position for 6 hours.'
The [horse] carabiniers of the II Cavalry Corps bitterly complained at having to suffer these casualties. At one moment, the exasperated Sergeant-Major Ravat shouted, 'Either we charge or we leave the field !' but was quickly silenced by Captain du Barail's response: 'One more word and I will break your gob ..." (Mikaberidze - "The battle of Borodino")

Cavalryman mounted on a horse presented a larger target than infantryman. To lessen casualties from artillery fire the cavalry made small movements to the left or right, or back and forth, to escape the artillery fire. The cavalry could be placed behind a ridge or wood, in a hollow ground or sunken road.

• In 1815 at Waterloo the French infantry (Foy's division) and horse carabiniers
  came under long range artillery fire. The cannonballs had little velocity left but
  were a nuisance: "Behind us in reserve was the brigade of carabiniers on which
  the cannonballs which passed over us went to fall. To get out of their range, this
  this brigade moved to their left, which provoked General Foy to laugh, 'Ha ! Ha !
  The big boots don't like the rough stuff'. We received the cannonballs standing
  firm ... for many of the projectiles buried or muffled themselves while rolling
  along this muddy soil." (- Major Lemonnier-Delafosse, ADC to GdD Foy)
  
• In 1812 at Borodino, the Saxon heavy cavalry had spent 2-3 hours coursing back
  and forth in an effort to escape the Russian artillery fire. This however did not
  bring all the expected results as the ground was flat and the artillery numerous.
  
• In 1813 "At Leipzig, on the 16th of October, Sébastiani, commanding the II Cav.
  Corps, having placed his three divisions between the villages of Wachau and
  Liebertwolkwitz, and indicated to each divisional general roughly the position
  he should occupy, [Gen.] Exelman found himself placed on undulating ground
  intersected, as a result, by small ridges and hollows. ... I took advantage of the
  hollows in the ground where our brigade was positioned to conceal my regiment
  which though formed up and ready for action, saw the greater part of the day
  pass without losing a single man, for the cannon-balls went over their heads
  while neighbouring corps suffered considerable casualties." ( - Baron de Marbot)
  
• In 1812 near Smolensk, officer Chlapowski of Old Guard Lancers "... deployed
  the squadron in a single line, as I expected the enemy to shoot at us from the
  walls. Sure enough, they fired a number of howitzer shells, one of which
  exploded in the middle of the squadron."
  
• In 1815 at Waterloo, when a French shell fell into the column of British 15th
  Hussar Regiment, the swords and scabbards were flying in the air and wounded
  men and horses fell on the ground. The trumpeters sounded to lie down. The
  cavalrymen dismounted and lay facedown on the wet earth while French
  cannonballs whizzed over their heads, hiting rather horses than men. The 7th
  Hussars dismounted in order to offer a less conspicious target, and had been
  moved back and forth several times. Then they took cover in the sunken lane, but
  not even this was safe.
  In contrast, the Cumberland hussars were motionless in their saddles.
  The British and KGL officers wondered in amazement what was wrong with the
  hussars, allowing themselves to be slaughtered like that. The Cumberland
  Hussars finally began showing very visible signs of wavering and Lord Uxbridge
  sent an officer to see what was going on. The regiment began withdrawing but a
  number of officers, NCOs and privates outraged by the cowardice of their
  comrades, left their ranks and attached themselves to other regiments. The rest of
  the regiment left the battlefield and galloped all the way to Brussels without
  participating in one single action. Their colonel was courtmartialed and expelled
  from the army. (Barbero - "The Battle")
  (The Cumberland Hussars were all-volunteer, all young men in their first battle. Their horses were their
  own property and not supplied and paid by the goverment as it was the case with the French and British
  cavalry. It had not occured to their officers that they could reduce casualties by having their men
  dismount.)

British hussars
under French fire.

French chasseurs under Russian fire.

General Lepic noted some of his troopers ducking incoming shells.
" Heads up, by God ! " - he cried - " Those are bullets - not turds. "
Picture: Horse Grenadiers of the Imperial Guard under artillery fire
in the battle of Eylau 1807.

.

Artillery captured by cavalry/infantry.
Most guns were captured by flank attack.

Very often the gunners when under threat from the cavalry left their pieces. Wellington wrote after Waterloo: "To tell the truth, I was not very pleased with the Artillery. They received the order not to shoot against the enemy's guns, only against his troops. It was difficult to get them to follow this order. ... We could not expect them to stand and die there, instead the officers and men were ordered to retreat to the squares (like I and my staff), until their cavalry was driven away. ...
But they did no such thing. They ran from the battlefield, took with them the slow match, ammunition, and everything else. After we beat back the enemy's attacks and could have made good use of the artillery, we had no gunners. Actually, I would have had no artillery for the second part of the battle if I had not formed a reserve at the beginning." The gunners that ran into squares before the cavalry and "then returned to serve the guns again once the charges had passed, were rather the exception than the rule."
A few months later, when there was talk of giving the artillery officers who had been present
at Waterloo a cash award, Wellington expressed his unequivocal opposition to this idea.

During the Napoleonic Wars most guns were captured in the very last stage of battle when enemy's army, or part of it, was already in disorder and troops were either abandoning their positions or fleeing. For example the British-Portuguese-Spanish troops took 151 French artillery pieces at Vitoria (21 June 1813).

There were however quite many guns captured by direct assault, with troops on both sides being in good order and defending their artillery the best way they could (several examples below.) Most often a general left part of his infantry to protect the artillery. For example at Borodino in 1812, General Compans kept back 2 battalions to protect his artillery while the remaining 15 battalions attacked the Russian positions. The same did General Dessaix, by protecting his artillery with 2 btns. while 10 btns. attacked the Russians.

• Dahlmann had set off on patrol with two squadrons of Guard Horse Chasseurs and the
  Guard Mamelukes in December 1806. Near Lopacin they ran into the Russian rear guard
  under Pahlen. Pahlen's force consisted of the Soumy Hussars, 21st Jagers (2 battalions)
  and a horse battery (12 pieces).
  "... instead of charging blindly ahead, Dahlmann sent scouts to find a way across the
  marsh that bordered the Sonna River. ... Dahlmann saw that he confronted six Russian
  horse guns divided into 3 sections. The Russian guns ineffectually pelted his troopers
  while they filed across the marshy ground. Upon reaching solid ground, Dahlmann
  ordered his trumpeters to sound the charge. ... In mass, artillery could defend its front.
  Individual sections could not.
  Some horse gunners defended themselves with saber, handspike, or rammer while others
  crouched beneath the equipment to evade the blows. Dahlmann personally sabered several
  gunners as his troopers overrun a section of guns.
  Next into the lists came two squadrons of the Sumsk Hussars who assignment was to support these guns. ...
  A brief hack-and-slash melee took place and the Sumsk Hussars withdrew. Dahlmann's troopers pursued along
  the river until they approached a village where a concealed party of jagers stopped them with a punishing volley.
  ... The four remaining Russian guns retired to a new position near the village while his Sumsk Hussars fixed
  Dahlmann by bluffing a charge." (Arnold - "Crisis in the Snows" pp 123-124)
  
• At Hoff in 1807 the French 26th Light Infantry captured Russian battery of 4 pieces.
  One battalion of the regiment was formed in square while the lead battalion formed
  line and advanced against the artillery. The canister made no impression on the French
  and they reached the guns. A bloody melee took place. The French bayoneted the gunners
  and horses, and cut the traces. Seeing Russian infantry counter-attacking the French
  fell back behind the second battalion. The fresh battalion deployed from square into
  line, charged, overthrown the infantry and recaptured the guns. Then Russian cavalry
  intervened forcing the victorious battalion to form square. Russian skirmishers moved
  up to join their cavalry.
  
• At Pultusk in 1806, two battalions of the French 17th Light Infantry advanced
  against Russian jager battalion sheltered in a ravine. From behind the ravine
  12 Russian guns opened fire. The 17th Light drove the jagers out of the ravine
  and back on the artillery. The guns were taken. Baggovout counter-attacked
  across the ravine and the Tula Musketiers recaptured the pieces.
  Napoleon wrote: "The 17th Light ... covered themselves with glory."
  
• In 1809 at Aspern-Essling, the French 24th Light Infantry, in a bayonet charge
  overran Austrian battery, took 700 prisoners and recaptured the church.
  
• In 1800 at Marengo, the French 22nd Line Infantry captured several Austrian
  pieces near Fontanone and used them against their former owners.
  
• In 1806 at Jena, the French 16th Light Infantry advanced left in front towards the
  woods: its third battalion advanced en tirailleurs (in skirmish order) towards the
  wood, the first and second battalion, marching still in column, went past the right
  of the woods and deployed into line in the plain at musket range from the
  Prussian battery. This line formed, they commenced an active and well-aimed fire;
  marching then toward the enemy line, they approached within pistol range; they
  threw themselves into skirmishing order and seized energetically 11 pieces of
  artillery."
  
• In 1809 at Aspern-Essling, the French Guard infantry deployed from 3-rank deep
  line into a thick skirmish line and took advantage of numerous canals and
  ditches. They closed to the 50 guns and delivered a volley. It surprised the
  Austrian gunners, they limbered up and hastily withdrew all 50 guns to a
  position where stood Austrian cavalry.
  
• In 1812 in Borodino the Russian cuirassiers attacked several times the French
  artillery. Girod de l’Ain writes, “… we saw a charge of Russian cuirassiers
  coming at us like a tempest. They weren’t aiming exactly at us [infantry] but at a
  battery of 30 of our guns…. Although this charge suffered from our fire as it
  passed us, it didn’t slow them down, any more than discharges of grapeshot from
  our battery, which they overthrew... But soon they were thrown back by cavalry
  squadrons….”
  
• In 1808 Napoleon's Guard Lighthorse (Chevaulegere) captured 16 cannons
  by frontal assault. British author, William Napier, wrote that the charge of
  "these gallant warriors ... can hardly be paralleled in the annals of war...
  The charge itself, viewed as a simple military operation, was extravagantly
  rash ..."
  The Spanish artillery and musket fire decimated the leading troop. De Segur
  wrote: "Nearly the whole of the squadron was laid low ... I only saw one
  trumpeter left standing, motionless in the midst of the firing which was
  still going on. The poor child was weeping for his squadron..."
  The cannons however were silent.
  Awed Emperor Napoleon saluted the cavalry: "I proclaim you my bravest
  cavalry !" The Grenadiers of Imperial Guard drained a bumper in the honor
  of the brave men.

  
  Charge at Somosierra 1808 from the movie "Ashes" by Wajda.
  "You are worthy of my Old Guard." - Napoleon

If the battery was deployed near bushes, trees, ditches, hollow ground etc. the enemy's infantry skirmishers would take cover and fire on the gunners. This method usually brought very good results and the gunners either fled or were killed.

• In 1813 at Halle, General Maison detached a battalion of French 153rd Line
  Infantry to the Giermeritz farm, on an island formed by two branches of the
  Saal River. The battalion's voltigeurs took up a position where their fire
  began picking off the Prussian gunners serving the guns in the earthwork
  on the far side of the river. The 2 6pdr cannons and 1 howitzer were soon
  withdrawn because of the voltigeurs' well aimed fire. The French threw
  another company of voltigeurs (of 151st Line) up to the bridge. They took
  up positions where they could shower musket fire on the Prussian artillery.

Such formation forced the artillery to divide its fire into three different targets. If the skirmishers were of infantry they would advance up to 250-300 paces from the guns and then they would either took cover in ditches, canals, behind trees and bushes or simply lay down. The guns would fire canister but with little results.

If the attackers were brave they would take advantage of the gunsmoke, and time the gunners needed to load their guns, and attack. However if the infantrymen were shaken by artillery fire, the attack would fail.

• In 1815 at Ligny, two lines of French skirmishers attacked a Prussian battery.
  The guns fired canister and the skirmishers delivered a volley and then they
  threw themselves on the ground. The fire kept the French "glued" to the ground.

• When at Waterloo French skirmishers, closely followed by columns, approached
  the British batteries behind the sunken lane, a wave of panic began to spread
  among the artillerymen. Sir William Gomm, a member of Wellington's staff,
  saw 2 cannons being moved back in great haste, and he couldn't help noting
  that this withdrawal was carried out with 'considerable bustle'. But the majority
  of the guns were simply [temporarily] abandoned.
  
• In 1813 at Bautzen the Wirtembergian infantry brigade closed to within 200
  paces of the Prussian artillery, braving its intense fire, and with a great yell
  lunged forward to put the gunners to the bayonet.
  (Nafziger - "Lutzen and Bautzen" p 239)

Prussian cavalry and French horse chasseurs fight for Prussian battery.
Battle of Jena, 1806.

French cuirassiers sabering British gunners.
Battle of Waterloo, 1815.

.

Spiking or draging off the captured guns.
The time to do it was almost always too short
due to enemy's (cavalry or infantry) counterattacks.

When enemy captured the battery, they tried to spike the guns.
Most of the time it was not possible, due to lack of tools in that moment and that place (in contrast to long lasting sieges, the cavalry had little opportunity and time to distribute the hammers and nails before battle). The time to do it was almost always too short due to enemy's counterattack.

• When at Borodino, the French captured several Russian guns they tried
  to block the touchholes of the guns with earth and sticks. The Russians
  counterattacked, recaptured their guns, cleared the touchholes and managed
  to open fire on the retreting enemy.

• On 8th Feb 1814 at Pozzolo, the Austrian Savoy and Hohenlohe dragoons
  and the Erzherzog Karl Uhlans routed the French and Italian cavalrymen
  (Perreimond's cavalry, French 1st Hussars, Italian Queen's dragoons) and
  captured 6 guns. As the Austrians tried to drag off the captured pieces, they
  found that the French had taken all the limbers. As a result they were able
  to seize just one gun as proof of their bravery.
  (Nafziger and Gioannini - "The Defense of the Napoleonic Kingdom of
  Northern Italy, 1813-1814" p 166)
  
• In 1811 at Albuera, the Horse Battery of KGL under Cleeves was attacked by
  French 2nd Hussars and Polish Vistula Uhlans. Cleeves described how the
  cavalry "... turned us, and cut and piked the gunners of the right division down.
  The left division limbered up, and both guns would have been saved; but the
  shaft horses of the right gun were wounded, and came down, and the leading driver
  of the left gun got shot from his horse. Corporal Heinrich Fincke had presence of
  mind enough to quit his horse, to replace the driver, and then galloped boldly
  through the enemy's cavalry; his own horse, which ran alongside of him ...
  At this moment I was made prisoner, but had the luck to escape unhurt.
  Two guns were nearly immediately retaken; but the howitzer was carried off."
  The men of the 10th Hussars however were unable to carry off the other 2 guns
  because camp followers swarmed onto the field cut the harness of the horses and
  led them to the rear :-)
• English officer Patterson, wrote after Waterloo: "The French cavalry, having
  posessed themselves of the brigade of Dutch guns posted on the heights to
  the left and rear of the wood of Hougoumont, were galloping, sword in hand,
  and cutting right and left at the gunners, who took shelter beneath the guns;
  but in this maneuver the gallant horsemen were exposed to the fire of the
  Black Brunswickers, whose heads were on level with the slope of the hill,
  which proved so destructive to them, at the very moment when they thought
  themselves in full posession of their prey, that, being without means of spiking
  the guns, or carrying them off ... they were compelled to retire ..."