Combat of Goehrde 1813; Hannoverians (right) routed the French (left).
At Gohrde, 66 French infantrymen delivered a deadly volley at close range (60-80 paces)
hiting 27 Hannoverians and Bremen-Verden (40 % accuracy for the first volley).

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French method of delivering volley.
"The system of fire used by the French ...
had been established by the Regulation of 1764.
It was based on the 3-rank peloton (company)."

According to George Nafziger, american military historian, "The system of fire used by the French ... had been established by the Regulation of 1764. It was based on the 3-rank peloton (company). The Regulation of 1791 had established a 2-rank voluntary firing system to supplement it, because fire from the third rank had proven impractical when the troops were wearing backpacks. In this situation the 3rd rank loaded muskets and passed them forward.

The French infantry was taught to fire:
- by peloton (by one company).
Until 1808 the French infantry battalion comprised of
1 grenadier/carabinier and 8 infantry pelotons (companies).
Two infantry pelotons (companies) formed so-called division.
"The pelotons fired successively in the order of their numbers:
1st, 3rd, 5th, 7th, or 2nd, 4th, 6th, and 8th. The peloton pairs
executed their fire by the half division, alternating their fire.
Only the grenadiers (in amalgamated separate battalions)
fired by entire divisions. - - - It means not by single pelotons
(companies) but by pairs of pelotons (companies).
- by division (by two companies).
It was executed in the following sequence:
I, II, III, and IV division, and then the grenadiers.
Demi-rang (half-rank) fire was started from the right.
- by half-battalion (by four companies).
- by battalion (by eight companies)
"Fire by battalion started with the first battalion,
and the second battalion fired only as the first
reloaded their weapons."
- They were taught an advancing fire where the battalion
would advance alternate pelotons, which would fire when
they halted. The non-firing pelotons would then advance.
- One of the principal forms of musketry was fire by ranks.
During this evolution, the third rank stood 6.5 inches to the
right and fired through the gaps in the two front ranks. In
this system the 3rd rank fired first, then the 2nd rank fired
and the 1st rank fired last." (George Nafziger - "Napoleon's
Invasion of Russia" p 19)

French flag 1804,
from warflag.com

Prussian method of delivering volley.
The Prussian infantry of 1792
used several different firing techniques.

The Prussian infantry of 1792 used several different firing techniques.

- "When a battalion was formed by half-companies in line,
fire was executed by the alternate firing of half-companies.
The three ranks fired simultaneously. The 1st rank knelt, while
the 2nd and 3rd stood upright. The fire began from the right.
- A second form of fire used by the Prussians was by half-
companies with the third rank taking a half turn to the right.
This fire was executed when the battalion made half-turn to
the right, but with the line not moving from its original
position. The rest of the action was the same as firing by half-
companes.
- The third form of fire was the so-called advancing fire.
Here the half-companies marched towards the enemy. The
right half-company stopped and fired first. Upon the signal
of their officer, and without reloading, the right hand half-
company shouldered arms and advanced. The next half-
company would stop and fire when the first half-company
caught up with the slowly retreating line, and so on down
the line of the battalion."
- The fourth method of fire was the so-called retreating fire.
When advancing directly away from the enemy the first half-
company (formerly on the left, now the right) would stop, turn
about, and fire. When the fire was executed, the soldiers would
shoulder their arms, about face and resume the retreat, catching
up with the battalion. Each successive half-company would act
in the same manner as the preceding half-company caught up
with the retiring battalion. - - - Again, there is no indication of
stopping to reload.
- There were also three types of 'hedge' (or sniper) fire.
The first of these was a withdrawing fire where pairs of files
would turn about and fire on pursuing hussars or skirmishers.
This was intended as just enough fire to keep the harassing
forces away.
The second type of hedge fire was used when facing small
groups of enemy infantry which were not sufficient to justify
a battalion volley, but were sufficiently annoying to merit some
response. In this latter instance pairs of files would advance 8
paces in front of the battalion, form in two ranks, fire, reform
in three ranks, and return to the battalion." (George Nafziger -
"Imperial Bayonets" Greenhill Books 1996)

Prussian flag,
from warflag.com

Russian method of delivering volley.
"Each company had to have a list
of the best marksmen." - Zhmodikov

Zhmodikov described methods of fire used by the Russian infantry, "One had to try to train soldiers to load and fire their muskets at least 3 times per minute." The recruits were trained to fire directly forward and obliquely to the left and right by files. The first and second rank fired their first shots, file-by-file and then loaded and fired as quickly as possible. Each man in the second rank, having fired his musket, passed it to the man in the 3rd rank standing behind it, took his musket, fired, loaded it, fired again and then returned it to the man in the 3rd rank and took his own musket from him, and so on. Men in the 3rd rank did not fire at all. They only loaded muskets and passed them on to the second rank. This method was borrowed from the French and often caused confusion. The infantry was trained to fire volleys by:
- by company (battalion had 4 companies or 8 platoons),
- by ranks,
- by platoons,
- by files.
The firing by files started from the right flank of the platoon or half-platoon.
Soldiers were taught to cease fire with a drum signal. Soldiers were also trained to fire to the rear. ..." (Zhmodikov - "Tactics of the Russian Army of the Napoleonic Wars." Vol II, p 9)

Russian flag,
from warflag.com

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Concentrated firepower.
Concentrated firepower was essential because of
the poor accuracy of the smoothbore muskets.

The intricacies of the tactics demanded a high level of skill on the part of the soldiers. Drill developed by Maurice [of Nassau] and further extended by Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden enabled maneuver and rate of fire unknown before.
"This promise of tactical effectivenes lured French officers to the Netherlands and northern Germany, where they learned the great streess that the Dutch and Swedes placed on drill. ... Under the direction of Maurice of Nassau, Dutch infantry learned to maneuver precisely under fire. Although the square Spanish formations of 16th century could present a strong face to all four directions, they had done so at the cost of wasting manpower, for relatively few weapons could be brought to bear to the front.
Formations were thus solid but innefficient.
Linear tactics, such as those employed by the Dutch, made the most of manpower by facing all weapons to the front in relatively thin formatios. ... Linear formations claimed greater efficiency, then, but were more vulnerable if taken off guard." (Lynn - "Giant of the Grand Siecle" pp 515-516)

To modern man, long accustomed to repeating and automatic firearms, one, two, or even three rounds per minute is nothing to write home about. However, once one comes to grips with the idea of 600 men, packed into front of about 200 paces, able to fire anywhere from 1000 to 3000 rounds per minute, then the image alters drastically, even in the eyes of a modern soldier. The noise was incredible. When at Eylau in 1807 a musket detonated within inches of Colonel Pouget's ear it left him temporarily deaf ! (Pouget was colonel of the 26th Light Infantry Regiment).

Von Angeli described the fight for Baumersdorf in 1809 between the Austrians and the French 57th Line Regiment: "One exchanged musketry at very close range. The enormous din, as wave upon wave of musketry constantly erupted ...is completely beyond the imagination. Evrything, even the thunder of the numerous cannon, seemed insignificant amid the raging storm of the so-called smallarms."

Concentrated firepower was essential because of the poor accuracy of the smoothbore muskets used during Napoleonic Wars. During firing in three ranks, "elbow-to-elbow", the infantrymen were struggling for space to load, aim and fire their muskets. Firing sometimes set tall dry grass or cornfield alight with burning paper from cartridges. In the flames many wounded perished.

Such firefight sucked in other battalions.
It all happened with or without the conset of their officers. For this reason it was important to have troops in reserve, far enough (but not too far) from the combat zone. The stress level during the firefight was incredibly high.
(The stress during real combat is tremendous, for example during WW2 approx. 500.000 men were discharged from USA Army for psychiatric reasons. This is said that 101 psychiatric casualties per 1.000 men per year were recorded in the First Army (USA) in Europe. Source: Kellet - "Combat motivation" p 272)

Fire-fight at Albuera in 1811: "British Die Hards vs French Die Hards."

Prussian landwehr firing, by Dmitrii Zgonnik.

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1st, 2nd and 3rd rank in firefight.
The first two ranks loaded and fired, while - theoretically - the 3rd rank
had to load their muskets and then give them to those in 2nd rank.
In reality it was very difficult to keep them doing this under fire.
They would become excited once the battle commenced and
would blaze away through the first two ranks.

Napoleonic infantry was formed on 3 ranks. A 600-men strong battalion had 200 men in the first, 200 in second and 200 men in the third rank. The first two ranks loaded and fired, while - theoretically - the 3rd rank had to load their muskets and then give them to those in 2nd rank.

In reality it was very difficult to keep them doing this under fire. They would become excited once the battle commenced and would blaze away through the first two ranks. Passing the barrels of their muskets over the shoulders of 2nd rank, the muzzles were very near the ears and heads of the first rank. The loud discharge, heat and powder so close to ears, head and eyes were quite disturbing for the first rank. Sometimes fingers and elbows were shot away, and if the bursting percussion caps were too close to the ears of 2nd and 1st rankers their eardrums could be damaged.

Gouvion St. Cyr claimed that 1 in 4 casualties were inflicted by own 3rd rank. For these reasons they not suppose to fire.

The Russian recruits were trained to fire by two ranks. The first and second rank fired their first shots, file-by-file and then loaded and fired as quickly as possible. Each man in the 2nd rank, having fired his musket, passed it to the man in the 3rd rank standing behind it, took his musket, fired, loaded it, fired again and then returned it to the man in the 3rd rank and took his own musket from him, and so on. Men in the 3rd rank did not fire at all. They only loaded muskets and passed them on to the second rank. This method was borrowed from the French and often caused confusion.

Theoretically the men of 1st rank would be kneeling and firing - it gave more space for those standing in the 2nd rank. Some veterans (for example Tanski) declared that they never saw among the French troops kneeling and firing soldiers as was prescribed by instructions.
If they were kneeling and firing it was difficult to get them stand up and advance. Kneeling soldier presented a much smaller target for the enemy and he wanted to keep this advantage as long as he could.

The Austrian regulations introduced in 1805 (Abrichtungs Reglement für die K. und K.K. Infanterie 1806 ) abolished the practice of kneeling the 1st rank of infantry while firing. By 1809 kneeling in the Russian infantry was considered as idiocy. Most experts considered kneeling 1st rank good only for the infantry formed in square against cavalry.
Regardless however of their opinions many troops used this method of delivering volley.

Polish line infantry open fire at Austrian cavalry and infantry.
Awesome picture by Giuseppe Rava, Italy. >

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Gun smoke.
The smoke was sometimes so dense that the infantry
could hardly distinguish friend from enemy.

A high rate of fire produced massive clouds of smoke unless there was a strong breeze. The smoke was sometimes so dense that the infantrymen could hardly distinguish friend from foe. In such situation there was little chance of sensing the other side casualties. "Burning black powder gave off dense grey-white smoke with a distinct bad-egg stink, and on a damp or still day the smoke hung about ..." (- Professor Richard Holmes)

The smoke obscured all vision and aiming, that is picking out an individual target was virtually impossible. Until wind cleared the battlefield the soldiers knew little about their position in line or the situation.

In 1805 at Austerlitz, two battalions of Austrian Grenzers opened fire on the French in Tellnitz: "Now a very murderous musketry fire began and the smoke was so close because of the fog that one could not see a single step. The battalions were completely wrapped in smoke, which made the operation more difficult." (Vanicek - "Specialgeschichte der Militargrenze ..." IV, p 112)

Musket volley delivered by company of napoleonic reenactors.
Imagine the volume of gunsmoke if there were 10 times more men
and firing numerous times. (photo from from http://fp.redshift.com)

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Length of the firefight.
The resolute Austrian Grenzers delivered a single volley,
immediately attacked with cold steel and drove the
Italian Guard away.

The firefight always made great impression on its participants. For example the firefight at Albuera between British Hoghton's brigade and French Maransin's brigade lasted 10-20 minutes. Some participants however thought it lasted one hour. "By Hobhouse's calculation, his regiment [57th Foot] was 'actually engaged' with the enemy for 'at least 4 hours.' This is almost certainly an exaggeration, but demonstrates as well as any other oiece of evidence the deep impression left by the fire-fight on the survivors." ( Dempsey - "Albuera 1811" p 151)

The length of the firefight varied, see examples below (from the shortest to the longest ones).

• On 12th October 1813 at Smarje one battalion of Italian Guard appeared
  on Austrian flank and Oberst Milutinovich detached 1 1/2 company of
  Grenzers to face them. The Austrian Grenzers delivered a single volley
  and immediately attacked with cold steel. Although Milutinovich was
  wounded his Grenzers drove the guardsmen away.
  
• In 1813 at Kulm, 4000 French infantry stood near Schandau to receive
  Russian grenadiers. The French fired volley after volley exhausting their
  ammunition, then some fled while others surrendered.
  
• "Though hotly engaged at the time, I determined to watch their movements.
  The 88th Foot [Irish] next deployed into line, advancing all the time towards
  their opponents, who seemed to wait very coolly for them. When they had
  approached to within 300 or 400 yards, the French poured in a volley or I
  should say a running fire from right to left.
  As soon as the British regiment had recovered the first shock, and closed
  their files on the gap it had made, they commenced advancing at double
  time until within 50 yards nearer to the enemy, when they halted and in
  turn gave a running fire from their whole line, and without a moment's
  pause cheered and charged up the hill against them. The French [infantry]
  meanwhile were attempting to reload. But being hard pressed by the British,
  who allowed them no time to give a second volley, came immediately to the
  right about, making the best of their way to the village." (Costello - "The
  Peninsular and Waterloo Campaigns" p 125)
  
• According to Friederich, Herbstfeldzuges Vol. I, in 1813 at Hagelberg, two
  Prussian battalions (of 3rd Landwehr and 1st Reserve Regiment) advanced
  against the French. Behind them marched several other battalions. The
  Prussians passed through the skirmish chain and deployed into line. The
  French line opened rapid fire. After 3 minutes of musketry the Landwehr
  battalion had enough and hastily withdrew, "carrying the other battalions
  back with them." The French advanced forward.
  
• At Marengo one battalion of French 43rd and one of 96th Line engaged the
  mustachioed Austrian grenadiers at point blank. The hot firefight lasted
  15 minutes, and according to General Rivaud half of the French was either
  killed or wounded. The Austrian grenadiers also suffered badly.
  
• In 1806 during the famous battle of Auerstadt took place a lengthy firefight.
  The French and Prussians fired for 3 hours (!) before the Prussians noticed
  a reduction in the enemy's fire and advanced forward. The Prussians were
  down to 50 % of their strength but were able to break the wavering French.
  
• In 1812 at Shevardino, the Russian XII Position Company (Battery) began
  to withdraw from the fieldwork, and the 27th Infantry Division began to
  waver. Half of Compans' French infantry division closed in and charged
  the redoubt from one side, and the other half from the other side.
  An officer of the 111th Line Infantry Regiment wrote: "... we almost caught
  up with the retreating Russian infantry, when it halted, turned back and
  opened fire at us." Gourgaud writes, "Only separated by a couple of dozen
  paces, the troops on either side of the wattle fences were protected from
  each other up to chest level. Thus, this sanguinary fusillade lasted approx.
  three-quarters of an hour ..." The noise was such that no voices could be
  overheard.
  [General] Compans brought in two last battalions. He took the II/57th and
  "having opened up the fences on his right, made it advance in close column
  of divisions, covering 4 guns charged with canister that moved behind it.
  He [Compans] led this battalion against the extreme right of the Russian
  infantry flanking the redoubt. When at 100 m from them, he unmasked his
  guns, which caused a dreadful havoc. Compans profiting by the disorder
  which he observed in their ranks, charged with his battalion at the point
  of the bayonet." ( - Gourgaud)

Friendly fire.
In 1809 at Wagram the white-clad Saxon infantry
was fired upon by their French allies.

During battle the soldier's senses were overloaded by what was going on around him. He was anxious as all men are, no matter how poor or excellent troops they were. (I am talking about real combat and real soldiers and not about armchair generals' wargames.) Stress does funny things to humans, stomachs knot and arses twitch.
At Pultusk in December 1806 the Russians hacked the first battalion of the 88th Ligne to pieces, mortally wounding the unit's commander, and apparently captured its eagle. "Lastly, the regiment suffered losses to friendly fire. D'Heralde ... related: I was on foot. The mud made it impossible to flee. A volley from the 64th Ligne directed against the Russian dragoons, killed or wounded many of the French around me." (Arnold - "Crisis in the Snows" p 159)

• - During the battle of Shevardino in 1812 the French 111th Line Infantry Regiment
  tried to form squares against the charging Russian cavalry. One battalion was
  destroyed while other battalions became disordered. The disordered regiment was
  then shattered by a friendly fire from a French battalion standing near the village.
  
• - In 1809 at Aspern-Essling the Baden infantry outshot and outfought
  the Austrians and in the heat of the the street fighting they also fired
  on the withdrawing friendly Hessian infantry.
  
• - On 5 July 1809, one day before the battle of Wagram, the Saxons fought
  for that village. The Saxon Schutzen particularly distinguished themselves.
  Unfortunately the French infantry of MacDonald's corps mistook the white-
  -coated Saxon line infantry for Austrians and opened fire. It shocked the
  Germans and they fled across the Russbach Stream to safety.
  In the evening three battalions of Saxon grenadiers, hove into sight out of
  the dusk. Bernadotte's adjutant brought order to storm the village, but
  neglected to tell the grenadiers that their countrymen were already fighting
  in the burning Wagram. The darkness, the smoke, and the stress created
  confusion. The grenadiers fired at groups of white-coated infantry in front
  of them. The officers soon discovered to their horror that they were shooting
  at their own men, but it took several minutes to cease the firing and by then
  the damage had been done. The Austrians then charged and took the village.
  The Saxon grenadiers and the line infantry withdrew in great disorder.
  Before midnight Wagram was firmly in Austrian hands. ( from John Gill's
  "With Eagles to Glory")
  
• - In 1809 at Talavera, the British II/87th and I/88th Regiment of Foot
  became so disordered and frightened after French attack that they fired
  at each other. Both regiments then took cover behind the 45th and 60th
  Regiment of Foot, reformed and the British division retreated, covered
  by cavalry. The British lost 440 men (incl. 100 who surrendered) while
  the French lost less than 100.
  
• - In 1809 at Wagram, the white-clad Saxon infantry was fired upon by
  their French allies because the French confused the white uniforms of
  the Saxons with the white outfits of their Austrian adversaries.
  
• - In 1811 at Fuentes de Onoro, the French infantry took their allies, the
  Hannoverian Legion, for an English battalion and opened fire on them.
  The Hannoverians with over 100 dead hastily retreated past the village.
  
• - In 1815 at Waterloo, the Nassauers were fired upon by their Prussian
  allies because they were still wearing the French style uniforms. The shooting
  went on for at least 10 minutes (!) before the officers on both sides realized
  their mistake.
  
• - Friendly fire happened not only to troops in close formation, also the
  skirmishers suffered. In August 1812 at Polotzk, two companies of the
  Russian 26th Jager Regiment were sent in skirmish order to drive the
  French out of the wood.
  The skirmishers were met with musket fire, charged with bayonets and
  went through the wood. They halted on the edge of the wood and only
  then began firing on the French skirmishers standing in the open. The
  commander of 26th Jager Regiment sent two more companies to push the
  enemy even further. Unfortunately the newcomers were so confused in the
  wood covered with smoke that they opened fire on their own troops. The
  brave skirmishers suffered from enemy fire and from friendly fire for a
  half an hour.
  
• - In 1815 at Quatre Bras, the Hihlanders mistook the Netherlands cavalry
  for French and fired. Williams writes, "There then occuredd one of those tragic
  incidents of war in which men die in error at the hands of friends. Seeing the
  Netherlands in blue (hussars) and green (light dragoons) galloping wildly
  toward the crossroads and hearing them shouting in French, the Scots of the
  92nd and 42nd Highland along the Namur road mistook them for the French
  and were ordered to open fire on them. Many horses in particular were brought
  down, as they presented the largest targets ... van Merlen was left to reflect with
  sadness on the losses his unit had suffered and with bitterness that more had
  been caused by their 'Scotch' allies than by the French."
  
• - At Waterloo, the counter-attacking British infantry (Picton's division) fired on
  their allies, the Belgians of General Bylandt, whose uniforms resembled the
  enemy's outfits. Shortly thereafter, having realized their error, they mistook
  French troops for Belgians and let them get away.
  
• - in the very last stage of the battle of Waterloo, the British 52nd Light Infantry
  mistook 23rd Light Dragoons for enemy and fired. It resulted in great disorder
  and hesitation among the troops.
  
• - in 1809 at Aspern-Essling the French infantry took the Hessains for Austrians.
  Major Scharnhorst wrote, "The repeated attacks of the enemy (Austrians), fighting
  desperately for the village drove the ever-present Marshal Massena to order up a
  French battalion as reinforcement.
  It was past noon when this battalion approached at the charge ... I joined the head
  of this column with my flank company (of Hessains) and we must have advanced
  some 100 paces at the charge when the French battalion opened a heavy fire to its
  left flank.
  To our sorrow, we instantly discovered that its target was elements of Koeniger's
  retreating company which the French had mistaken for Austrians. Efforts by my
  adjutant and me to rectify the error were fruitless."
  
• - At Austerlitz the French 26th Light Infantry took the 108th Line for the enemy.
  Robert Goetz writes, "The men of the 26th Light immediately deployed and fired into
  the head of the approaching column, halting it and forcing it to fall back. After several
  rounds of fire, the outline of the Imperial eagle was seen through the mist, being waved
  on the end of its pole by Captain Livadot of the 108th Line. Immediately the order was given
  to cease fire and the two columns joined and made their escape to the northwest toward Turas."
  (Goetz - "1805: Austerlitz" p 145)

Austerlitz's Climax - Firefight on Pratzen Heights.
"... for at least an hour, intense fighting raged
across the entire length of the Pratzen Heights"
- Robert Goetz

The Battle of Austerlitz took place on the Dec 2nd 1805, exactly one year after Napoleon's crowning as Emperor of the French. Napoleon had been seeking a battle for a few days, which the Russians and Austrians were trying to avoid, since Kutuzov was awaiting the arrival of strong reinforcements. Pressed by the Tsar of Russia and the Austrian chief of staff the allied army decided to attack Napoleon. Their attack failed and Napoleon took the initiative in his own hands. Napoleon had strong centre, under Generals Vandamme and St. Hilaire climb the Pratzen Heights, the key position on the battlefield and smash the Allies.

Kutuzov (left), Tzar Alexander and Kaiser Francis
in the Battle of Austerlitz, 1805. Movie War and Peace.

Kutuzov and part of Russian staff rode forward with Jurczik's Austrian brigade. As they drew closer against the French center and began to deploy, the French placed 6 heavy guns behind the 36th Line Regiment (3 pieces on either end of the regiment) and waited. Both sides deployed in almost a mirror image of each other. On north flank Vandamme sent one battalion of 10th Light but the attackers wavered and the Austrian grenadiers counterattacked. The French were driven off to the northwest. Grenadiers' victory was short-lived as Boye's dragoons (part of 3rd Dragoon Division) charged and surrounded them. The grenadiers were captured "almost to a man". The Austrian VI/23rd Infantry instead of coming to the grenadiers' rescue they threw their muskets and fled in panic. (Goetz - "1805: Auserlitz" p 184)

On the southern flank appeared Kamenski's brigade, the Russians were unaware of the situation further north. The French II/10th Light (750 muskets) exchanged volleys with two Russian battalions (total of 1,000 muskets). Both sides held ground however the Russians suffered heavier casualties than the French. More battalions drew into line adjacent to the ones already in firefight. Now came the dreadful battle picture. Generals were galloping hither and thither - the infantrymen were all in their places, and you might have heard the rattle of several thousand ramrods as they drove home and "thugged" upon the little globes and cones of lead. Now began to appear the countless flashes, and the long fiery sheets of the muskets, and the rattle of the volleys, mingled with the thunder of the guns. Approx. 3,000 Frenchmen stood in line and fired at 3.000 Russians. After 20 minutes of this firefight and after the Austrian brigade under Jurczik fell back the Russians began wavering.

Russian General Langeron writes, "Soon, the French lines initiated a very sharp and very murderous fire of musket and canister upon the brigade of Kamensky which in a moment had many men rendered hors de combat. (Kamensky's brigade) answered with a less sharp and badly directed fire, the majority of our soldiers fired in the air ... in justice I ought to say that despite the superior number of the enemy, despite their little experience of war and the effect on them of an unforseen attack on their rear, despite the noise of gunfire, which many of them were hearing for the first time, they maintained themselves admirably for nearly 2 hours and in these two hours more than half of the two regiments were left dead." (Langeron - "Journal inedit de la Campagne de 105; Austerlitz" p 75)

General Langeron (see picture) arrived, placed himself at the head of Russian grenadiers and led them in bayonet charge. This attack was successful and one grenadier battalion captured 2 guns and almost reached Pratzen. St.Hilaire led counter-attack, he drove the grenadiers back, recaptured the guns and took the Russian positions. Langeron sent officer to Kutuzov asking for reinforcements.
In the center Austrian Jurczik's brigade advanced against Pratzen. Thiebault ordered his infantry to hold their fire until the Austrians had closed to 30-40 meters.
When the whitecoats drew closer the French infantry unmasked several cannons and opened a murderous fire. The Austrians were surprised and halted, unable to move forward one step. The French opened musket fire and charged with bayonets. Jurczik's first line (3 btns.) fell back, while his second line (2 btns.) counterattacked but without success. Jurczik was mortally wounded.

GdD Vandamme (see picture) attacked Kollowrath and Miloradovich on the Pratzen Heights. According to Robert Goetz "for at least an hour, intense fighting raged across the entire length of the Pratzen Heights" Vandamme's divisional battery took active part in it firing canister at the whitecoats.

The Austrians wavered and when few squadrons of French dragoons charged from the flank, they broke and fled. The dargoons captured hundreds of prisoners and sabered Austrian and Russian gunners. Once Kollowrath's northern flank was falling back, his center began crumbling. Around 11 AM Kollowrath ordered all his forces to withdraw.
Vandamme's infantry rushed forward with a cheer. Once Vandamme's men crossed over the crest Napoleon lost sight of them. They were now advancing against the second line under the command of Miloradovich. They opened a heavy musket fire killing and wounding many Russians and some Austrians. Both sides held their ground and paused - for a while - to put order in their weary battalions. Vandamme renewed his attack after 11:15 AM and broke the Russians. They fled toward Zbishow.

Only Kamenski's brigade still kept fighting. The French brought up fresh 43rd Line and attacked Kamenski's one flank while Boye's dragoons charged against the other flank. Kamenski received support from couple of squadrons of Russian dragoons but it was too little too late. Almost surrounded and with 1,230 killed and wounded (!) Kamenski's brigade began withdrawal. The brave Fanagoria Grenadiers broke through encicrlement and moved toward Littawa.

According to Robert Goetz the fighting on the Pratzen Heights had marked the climax of the Battle of Austerlitz. Sergei Mihailovich Kamenski-I demonstrated "excellent initiative, which was rare among allied commanders during the day of battle." (In June 1806 Kamenski-I was promoted to the rank of general-lieutenant). The good performance of the French made the Austrians' brave attempts futile.

Bayonet fight: French (left) vs British (right)
at Waterloo 1815, by unknown Russian author.

Bayonet Fight
(French and Russians fighting for the Great Redoubt at Borodino.)
At Borodino in 1812, the Colonel of French 30th Line Infantry Regiment was captured
in the Great Redoubt by NCO Zolotov of the 18th Jager Regiment. The Russian
pushed and prodded the Frenchman with a bayonet and then marched him as a
kind of living trophy straight to headquarters, paying no heed to the trail of blood
the general was leaving behind from his wounds.

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Grenadiers, the masters of bayonet.
"... it was advantage to have big soldiers
who could make good use of the bayonet,
but nowadays the cannon does everything
and the infantry often cannot get to grips
with cold steel..." - Frederick the Great

The British sources give numerous examples of their superiority in bayonet fight, and the French authors make exactly the same claims about their own troops. The Russians and Poles were also convinced that they were the masters of bayonet.
Britten-Austin gives an example of Russians predilection for bayonet: "The Russians' resistance astounds everyone. Defying their officers' orders merely to stand firm, the Russian light infantry in the cemetery can only be restrained from counter-attacking by blows with the flats of their officers' swords. 'Major-General Tsibulski, on horseback in full uniform, told me he couldn't keep his men under control. Over and over again they after exchanging a few shots with the Frenchmen in the cemetery tried to throw them out of it at bayonet point." (Britten-Austin - "1812 The March on Moscow" p 194)

But the real masters of bayonet were the grenadiers.
They were tall, physically strong, and thus well suited for this kind of fighting. Grenadiers were originally soldiers who specialized in throwing grenades. "The earliest references to these grenade-throwing soldiers are from Austria and Spain. ... However, the great King Louis XIV, of France finalized the concept of the Grenadier as an official type of soldier and company throughout his army ... By 1670, 29 of Louis's regiments had grenadier companies. Shortly after France's lead almost all of Europe went grenadier crazy. ... " (- Robert Sulentic)

Prussian grenadier in 1713, by Knotel
"Lads ! Shoot and get at them ! [Austrians & Croats]
Haven't you got bayonets ? Go out and skewer the swine !"
- Duke of Bevern to Prussian grenadiers, in 1756

The height of the European vogue for grenade-throwing heavyweight infantry was in the 1700s. "The fashion passed soon enough, for the grenades were cumbersome, triccky to ignite, and ... only marginally less perilous to the thrower than to the target. However the grenadiers themselves survived in virtue of being elite troops in their own right, and they were marked out by their stature, their swarthy complexions, their bristling moustaches, their arrogant demeanour, their grenadier marches (characterised by alternate passages on the rim and the skin of the drum), and their grenadier caps ..." (Duffy - "Instrument of War" Vol I p 234)

Spanish grenadiers defeating British
infantry at Pensacola, 1781.

British grenadiers defeating American
infantry. Picture by Percy Moran.

During the Napoleonic Wars every army had grenadiers, these were troops more suited for assault with cold steel than others. They were the tallest and strongest men. Tall man has longer arms and can outstretch his opponent armed with the same weapon. At Morungen in 1807, the Russian Yekaterinoslav Grenadiers (all robut tall men) used only musket butts against French voltigeurs (the shortest French troops). The grenadiers said: "These shorties are not worthy of our bayonets" and drove them away, just with musket butts , guffawing with laughter. Sir Robert Wilson - "Campaigns in Poland 1806 and 1807"
but ... at Valutina Gora in 1812, "a considerable column of Russian grenadiers made a bayonet charge against a battalion of the 7th Light and another of the 12th Line. In this bloody melee lieutenant of voltigeurs of the 12th (M.Etienne) flung himself on the Russian general and having hit him twice on the head with his sabre, took him prisoner in the midst of his men." (Britten-Austin - "1812 The March on Moscow" p 212)
And not to be undone by the French shorties, the Russian shorties (jagers) had their own great exploits. At Borodino in 1812, the Colonel of French 30th Line Infantry Regiment was captured in the Great Redoubt by NCO Zolotov of the 18th Jager Regiment. The Russian pushed and prodded the Frenchman with a bayonet and then marched him as a kind of living trophy straight to headquarters, paying no heed to the trail of blood the general was leaving behind from his wounds.

Thus not only the physical stamina and height mattered in bayonet fight. Bravery, discipline, battle experience, leadership, tactics and morale were even more important. For these reasons Napoleon, Frederick the Great and others required from their grenadiers being battle-hardened men, selected only from the bravest soldiers.
Nobody messed with them. Let me give just an example.
Jean-Jacques Pelet was with Friant's 2nd Division when Russian 2nd Grenadier Division attacked at Borodino. He wrote: "As Bagration's supporting troops arrived ... boldly advancing over the bodies of the fallen to retake the lost fleches. The Russian columns ... were living bastions. As soon as they emerged into the open field, our canister knocked them down, but these brave warriors let nothing bother them and continued to come at us as before."
In the same battle, the Westphalian infantry met the grenadiers marching with fixed bayonets. As one of the Russian officers recalled: "When they saw us, they melted down as quickly as snow in the spring !" Unter-Offitzer Tikhonov wrote, "The Frenchmen were courageous, as they remained firm under artillery fire ... and even made a stand against the cavalry, and no one could best them as skirmishers. But they could not resist our [grenadier's] bayonet."

Austrian grenadiers of the Napoleonic Wars
During Suvorov’s campaign in Italy an Austrian grenadier battalion (600 men) deployed into
line and marched on the advancing French. They then stopped and fired volleys into the flank of
the French columns (approx. 2,000 men of the 5th Light Infantry). Since the French did not break,
they took the cold steel to them.
The French then broke immediately and retreated, with the grenadiers following them still in line.
Souvarov was so impressed that he decorated the captain in command with the Maria Theresa
Order on the spot.

The Hungarian grenadiers of the Austrian army were considered as being very good fighters and is not surprising that they gripped the enemy imagination. Often a defeated party of Austrian infantry was likely to be reported as battalions of those mustachioed Hungarians. For example in the official report after the battle of Engen (May 1800) the French claimed to have pushed 8 battalions of the Hungarians out of a wood, although there was none.
French General Kellerman claimed to have captured 6.000 Hungarian grenadiers at Marengo, yet there were at most 3.000 in the last phase and none were Hungarian.

Russian grenadier.
Picture by Courcelle, France.
" The Russians had to be beaten down man by man . . .
our [ French ] soldiers fired upon them at 2 5 paces ,
t h e y continued their march without replying , every
troop filed past,without saying a word,or slackening
its pace for a moment . The streets were filled with
dying and wounded, but not a groan was heard . . . .
You might have said that they were firing at shadows.
At last we charged the Russians with the bayonet and
only when we pierced them could be convinced that
they were dealing with men. "
- Baron de Marbot, Battle of Golymin

In 1805 in the Battle of Austerlitz, several battalions of Russian and Austrian infantry attacked the village of Sokolnitz. French Colonel Pouget estimated the enemy strength at "12.000 Russian Grenadiers."
Not only the French had vivid imagination. Some British authors promoted the French line grenadiers into the grenadiers of Imperial Guard. According to Sir Oman's "A History of the Peninsula War" Vol IV at Fuentes de Onoro the British defeated the Imperial Guard, which is a pure fiction. The same author places the French Guard in the Battle of El Bodon.

The grenadiers were the tallest and strongest infantrymen. They were at least 5'3" tall and such men consisted only small part of the male population. "According to calculations made in France in 1778 only 1 Frenchman in 30 stood 5'3" or more tall, while a stipulated height of 5'3" would have required a population base of 79,000 souls to produce 400 men." (Duffy - "Instrument of War" Vol I p 197)
Height requirements for grenadiers:
- Russian grenadier: 177.84 cm (2 arshin and 8 vershok), physically strong and healthy, good marcher and shooter, with no disciplinary problems.
- Austrian grenadier: 175 cm, veteran of at least 1 campaign, brave, good shooter.
- French grenadier in 1791: 173,5 cm, approved merit, with 2 years' service
- French grenadier in 1808: 173,5 cm tall, 4 years' service, and at least 2 campaigns
- French fus.-grenad. of Middle Guard: 173.5 cm, 4 years' service in the Young Guard.
- French grenadiers of Old Guard: 176 cm, 10 years' service, at least 3 campaigns
- Polish grenadiers: ?
- British grenadiers: ?
- Prussian grenadiers: ?
- Swedish grenadiers: ?
(Many veterans of the first battalion of 1st Grenadier Regiment of the Old Guard had 184-cm height and participated in up to 20 campaigns. Approx. 30 % of them were awarded with Legion d'Honneur for bravery. The were called the Oldest of the Old.) In 1814 Chateaubriand saw them: "I do not believe that human faces have ever worn such threatening expressions. These Grenadiers covered with scars, these conquerors of Europe, were forced to salute an old king, a veteran of years and not of war ... [some] drew the corners of their mouths into grimaces of scorn and rage ..." Mr Hayden writes, "More dreadful-looking fellows I had never seen. They had the look of thoroughbread, veteran, disciplined banditti."

Grenadiers of Napoleon's Old Guard

With the number of cannons and infantry firepower steadily increasing the role of grenadiers decreased. In 1812 in the Battle of Borodino, the French artillery heavily bombarded Vorontzov's 2nd Converged Grenadier Division. When asked where are his grenadiers, Vorontzov sadly replied: "All are over there, lying dead."

.

Grenadiers of 20th century. (Left) German Panzer-Grenadiere of World War Two, Eastern Front. (Right) British Guard Grenadier in beautiful uniform, parade in London. Comments from our visitors: M. Townsend (UK): "One point which may or may not be of interest, the last British battle where bayonets were used, was during the 1982 Falkland's war. The Scot's Guards were given the order to fix bayonets before charging Argentine positions on Mount Tumbledown." D.Murray: "The Highland infantry fixed bayonets and fought hand to hand with a Shi’ite militia in Iraq in 2004. At least 20 militiamen were believed killed in more than 3 hours of fighting." M.Lee (China): "Sorry for my poor English. The Japanese infantrymen did kill with bayonets my people. You can find on the net pictures of smiling soldiers conducting bayonet practice on chinese male prisoners."