FM 2-22.3
(FM 34-52)
HUMAN INTELLIGENCE
COLLECTOR OPERATIONS
HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
September 2006
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION
: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
NOTE
: All previous versions of this manual are obsolete. This document is identical in content
to the version dated 6 September 2006. All previous versions of this manual should be
destroyed in accordance with appropriate Army policies and regulations.
This publication is available at
Army Knowledge Online (
www.us.army.mil
) and
General Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine
Digital Library at (
www.train.army.mil
).
6 September 2006
FM 2-22.3
i
*FM 2-22.3
(FM 34-52)
Field Manual
Headquarters
No. 2-22.3
Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 6 September 2006
Human Intelligence Collector Operations
Contents
Page
PREFACE
............................................................................................................... vi
PART ONE
HUMINT SUPPORT, PLANNING, AND MANAGEMENT
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
...................................................................................................1-1
Intelligence Battlefield Operating System .............................................................1-1
Intelligence Process..............................................................................................1-1
Human Intelligence ...............................................................................................1-4
HUMINT Source....................................................................................................1-4
HUMINT Collection and Related Activities ...........................................................1-7
Traits of a HUMINT Collector..............................................................................1-10
Required Areas of Knowledge ............................................................................1-12
Capabilities and Limitations ................................................................................1-13
Chapter 2
HUMAN INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE
..............................................................2-1
Organization and Structure ...................................................................................2-1
HUMINT Control Organizations ............................................................................2-2
HUMINT Analysis and Production Organizations.................................................2-6
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION
: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
NOTE
: All previous versions of this manual are obsolete. This document is identical in content to the version
dated 6 September 2006. All previous versions of this manual should be destroyed in accordance with
appropriate Army policies and regulations.
*This publication supersedes FM 34-52, 28 September 1992, and ST 2-22.7, Tactical Human Intelligence and
Counterintelligence Operations, April 2002.
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
Chapter 3
HUMINT IN SUPPORT OF ARMY OPERATIONS
.............................................. 3-1
Offensive Operations............................................................................................ 3-1
Defensive Operations ........................................................................................... 3-2
Stability and Reconstruction Operations ............................................................. 3-3
Civil Support Operations....................................................................................... 3-7
Military Operations in Urban Environment............................................................ 3-8
HUMINT Collection Environments........................................................................ 3-8
EAC HUMINT ....................................................................................................... 3-9
Joint, Combined, and DOD HUMINT Organizations .......................................... 3-10
Chapter 4
HUMINT OPERATIONS PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT
............................... 4-1
HUMINT and the Operations Process.................................................................. 4-1
HUMINT Command and Control .......................................................................... 4-3
Technical Control.................................................................................................. 4-4
Command and Support Relationships.................................................................. 4-4
HUMINT Requirements Management .................................................................. 4-5
HUMINT Mission Planning ................................................................................. 4-15
Task Organization .............................................................................................. 4-18
Operational Considerations................................................................................ 4-19
Operations Plans, Operations Orders, and Annexes ......................................... 4-21
Operational Coordination.................................................................................... 4-22
PART TWO
HUMINT COLLECTION IN MILITARY SOURCE OPERATIONS
Chapter 5
HUMINT COLLECTION
....................................................................................... 5-1
HUMINT Collection Operations ............................................................................ 5-1
Human Source Contact Operations ..................................................................... 5-2
Debriefing Operations........................................................................................... 5-7
Liaison Operations.............................................................................................. 5-12
Interrogation Operations..................................................................................... 5-13
Types of Interrogation Operations...................................................................... 5-27
PART THREE THE HUMINT COLLECTION PROCESS
Chapter 6
SCREENING
....................................................................................................... 6-1
Human Source Screening .................................................................................... 6-1
Screening Operations........................................................................................... 6-2
Screening Process ............................................................................................... 6-9
Screening Methodologies ................................................................................... 6-11
Screening Requirements .................................................................................... 6-12
6 September 2006
FM 2-22.3
ii
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
Initial Data and Observations..............................................................................6-13
Source Assessment ............................................................................................6-14
Other Types of Screening Operations ................................................................6-15
Chapter 7
PLANNING AND PREPARATION
.......................................................................7-1
Collection Objectives.............................................................................................7-1
Research ...............................................................................................................7-1
HUMINT Collection Plan .......................................................................................7-8
Final Preparations ...............................................................................................7-13
Chapter 8
APPROACH TECHNIQUES AND TERMINATION STRATEGIES
......................8-1
Approach Phase....................................................................................................8-1
Developing Rapport ..............................................................................................8-3
Approach Techniques ...........................................................................................8-6
Approach Strategies for Interrogation.................................................................8-20
Approach Strategies for Debriefing.....................................................................8-21
Approach Strategies for Elicitation......................................................................8-22
Termination Phase ..............................................................................................8-23
Chapter 9
QUESTIONING
.....................................................................................................9-1
General Questioning Principles ............................................................................9-1
Direct Questions....................................................................................................9-1
Elicitation...............................................................................................................9-5
Leads.....................................................................................................................9-5
Detecting Deceit....................................................................................................9-6
HUMINT Collection Aids .......................................................................................9-9
Recording Techniques ..........................................................................................9-9
Questioning With an Analyst or a Technical Expert............................................9-11
Third-Party Official and Hearsay Information......................................................9-12
Conducting Map Tracking ...................................................................................9-13
Special Source Categories .................................................................................9-16
Chapter 10
REPORTING
.......................................................................................................10-1
Reporting Principles............................................................................................10-1
Report Types.......................................................................................................10-1
Reporting Architecture ........................................................................................10-5
6 September 2006
FM 2-22.3
iii
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
Chapter 11
HUMINT COLLECTION WITH AN INTERPRETER
.......................................... 11-1
Advantages and Disadvantages of Interpreter Use ........................................... 11-1
Methods of Interpreter Use................................................................................. 11-2
Sources of Interpreters ....................................................................................... 11-4
Interpretation Techniques................................................................................... 11-5
Training and Briefing the Interpreter................................................................... 11-5
Placement of the Interpreter ............................................................................... 11-6
Interactions With and Correction of the Interpreter ............................................ 11-7
Interpreter Support in Report Writing ................................................................. 11-8
Evaluating the Interpreter ................................................................................... 11-8
Managing an Interpreter Program ...................................................................... 11-9
PART FOUR
ANALYSIS AND TOOLS
Chapter 12
HUMINT ANALYSIS AND PRODUCTION
........................................................ 12-1
Analytical Support to Operational Planning........................................................ 12-1
Operational Analysis and Assessment............................................................... 12-3
Source Analysis.................................................................................................. 12-4
Single-Discipline HUMINT Analysis and Production .......................................... 12-4
HUMINT Source Selection ............................................................................... 12-19
Chapter 13
AUTOMATION AND COMMUNICATION
.......................................................... 13-1
Automation.......................................................................................................... 13-1
Collection Support Automation Requirements ................................................... 13-2
Analytical Automation Requirements ................................................................. 13-3
Automation Systems........................................................................................... 13-7
Communications................................................................................................. 13-8
APPENDIX A
GENEVA CONVENTIONS
...................................................................................A-1
Section I. Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva Convention) .................................A-1
Section II. Geneva Conventions Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention) ........A-47
APPENDIX B
SOURCE AND INFORMATION RELIABILITY MATRIX
.....................................B-1
APPENDIX C
PRE-DEPLOYMENT PLANNING
....................................................................... C-1
APPENDIX D
S2 GUIDE FOR HANDLING DETAINEES, CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS,
AND CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT
............................................................ D-1
6 September 2006
FM 2-22.3
iv
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
APPENDIX E
EXTRACTS FROM ALLIED JOINT PUBLICATION (AJP)-2.5
.......................... E-1
GLOSSARY
............................................................................................. Glossary-1
BIBLIOGRAPHY
.................................................................................Bibliography-1
APPENDIX F
NATO SYSTEM OF ALLOCATING INTERROGATION SERIAL NUMBERS
... F-1
APPENDIX G
QUESTIONING QUICK REFERENCE
................................................................G-1
APPENDIX H
SALUTE REPORTING
........................................................................................ H-1
APPENDIX I
DOCUMENT EXPLOITATION AND HANDLING
..................................................I-1
APPENDIX J
REFERENCES
......................................................................................................J-1
APPENDIX K
CONTRACT INTERROGATORS
........................................................................ K-1
APPENDIX L
SAMPLE EQUIPMENT FOR HCT OPERATIONS
...............................................L-1
APPENDIX M
RESTRICTED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUE - SEPARATION
.....................M-1
INDEX
............................................................................................................Index-1
6 September 2006
FM 2-22.3
v
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
Preface
This manual provides doctrinal guidance, techniques, and procedures governing the
employment of human intelligence (HUMINT) collection and analytical assets in
support of the commander’s intelligence needs. It outlines
⎯
•
HUMINT operations.
•
The HUMINT collector’s role within the intelligence operating system.
•
The roles and responsibilities of the HUMINT collectors and the roles of those
providing the command, control, and technical support of HUMINT collection
operations.
This manual expands upon the information contained in FM 2-0. It
supersedes FM 34-52 and rescinds ST 2-22.7. It is consistent with doctrine
in FM 3-0, FM 5-0, FM 6-0, and JP 2-0. In accordance with the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005, the only interrogation approaches and techniques
that are authorized for use against any detainee, regardless of status or
characterization, are those authorized and listed in this Field Manual.
Some of the approaches and techniques authorized and listed in this Field
Manual also require additional specified approval before implementation.
This manual will be reviewed annually and may be amended or updated from time to
time to account for changes in doctrine, policy, or law, and to address lessons learned.
This manual provides the doctrinal guidance for HUMINT collectors and
commanders and staffs of the MI organizations responsible for planning and
executing HUMINT operations. This manual also serves as a reference for personnel
developing doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); materiel and force
structure; institutional and unit training; and standing operating procedures (SOPs),
for HUMINT operations at all army echelons. In accordance with TRADOC
Regulation 25-36, the doctrine in this field manual is not policy (in and of itself), but
is “…a body of thought on how Army forces operate….[It] provides an authoritative
guide for leaders and soldiers, while allowing freedom to adapt to circumstances.â€
This manual applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National
Guard of the United States, and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise
stated. This manual also applies to DOD civilian employees and contractors with
responsibility to engage in HUMINT collection activities. It is also intended
for commanders and staffs of joint and combined commands, and Service Component
Commands (SCC). Although this is Army doctrine, adaptations will have to be made
by other Military Departments, based on each of their organizations and specific
doctrine.
Material in this manual applies to the full range of military operations. Principles
outlined also are valid under conditions involving use of electronic warfare (EW) or
nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons.
This manual is intended for use by military, civilian, and civilian contractor
HUMINT collectors, as well as commanders, staff officers, and military intelligence
(MI) personnel charged with the responsibility of the HUMINT collection effort.
HUMINT operations vary depending on the source of the information. It is essential
that all HUMINT collectors understand that, whereas operations and sources may
6 September 2006
vi
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
differ, the handling and treatment of sources must be accomplished in accordance
with applicable law and policy. Applicable law and policy include US law; the law of
war; relevant international law; relevant directives including DOD Directive 3115.09,
“DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioningâ€;
DOD Directive 2310.1E, “The Department of Defense Detainee Programâ€; DOD
instructions; and military execute orders including fragmentary orders (FRAGOs).
Interrogation, the HUMINT subdiscipline responsible for MI exploitation of enemy
personnel and their documents to answer the supported specific information
requirements (SIRs), requires the HUMINT collector to be fully familiar with both
the classification of the source and applicable law. The principles and techniques of
HUMINT collection are to be used within the constraints established by US law
including the following:
•
The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).
•
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (including Common Article III), August 12,
1949; hereinafter referred to as GWS.
•
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (including
Common Article III), August 12, 1949; hereinafter referred to as GPW.
•
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War (including Common Article III), August 12, 1949; hereinafter referred to as
GC.
•
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Public Law No. 109-163, Title XIV.
HUMINT collectors must understand specific terms used to identify categories of
personnel when referring to the principles and techniques of interrogation.
Determination of a detainee’s status may take a significant time and may not be
completed until well after the time of capture. Therefore, there will be no difference
in the treatment of a detainee of any status from the moment of capture until such a
determination is made. The following terms are presented here and in the glossary.
•
Civilian Internee: A person detained or interned in the United States or in
occupied territory for security reasons, or for protection, or because he or she has
committed an offense against the detaining power, and who is entitled to
“protected person†status under the GC.
•
Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW): A detained person, as defined in Articles 4 and
5 of the GPW. In particular, one who, while engaged in combat under orders of
his or her government, is captured by the armed forces of the enemy. As such,
he or she is entitled to the combatant’s privilege of immunity from the municipal
law of the capturing state for warlike acts that do not amount to breaches of the
law of armed conflict. For example, an EPW may be, but is not limited to, any
person belonging to one of the following categories of personnel who have fallen
into the power of the enemy; a member of the armed forces, organized militia or
volunteer corps; a person who accompanies the armed forces, without actually
being a member thereof; a member of a merchant marine or civilian aircraft
crew not qualifying for more favorable treatment; or individuals who, on the
approach of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist invading forces.
•
Other Detainees: Persons in the custody of the US Armed Forces who have not
been classified as an EPW (Article 4, GPW), retained personnel
(Article 33, GPW), and Civilian Internee (Articles 27, 41, 48, and 78, GC) shall
be treated as EPWs until a legal status is ascertained by competent authority;
for example, by Article 5 Tribunal.
•
Retained Personnel: (See Articles 24 and 26, GWS.)
6 September 2006
vii
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
–
Official medical personnel of the armed forces exclusively engaged in the
search for, or the collection, transport or treatment of wounded or sick, or in
the prevention of disease, and staff exclusively engaged in the administration
of medical units and facilities.
–
Chaplains attached to the armed forces.
–
Staff of National Red Cross Societies and that of other Volunteer Aid
Societies, duly recognized and authorized by their governments to assist
Medical Service personnel of their own armed forces, provided they are
exclusively engaged in the search for, or the collection, transport or treatment
of wounded or sick, or in the prevention of disease, and provided that the
staff of such societies are subject to military laws and regulations.
•
Protected Persons: Include civilians entitled to protection under the GC,
including those we retain in the course of a conflict, no matter what the reason.
•
Enemy Combatant: In general, a person engaged in hostilities against the
United States or its coalition partners during an armed conflict. The term
“enemy combatant†includes both “lawful enemy combatants†and “unlawful
enemy combatants.†All captured or detained personnel, regardless of status,
shall be treated humanely, and in accordance with the Detainee Treatment Act
of 2005 and DOD Directive 2310.1E, “Department of Defense Detainee
Programâ€, and no person in the custody or under the control of DOD, regardless
of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to torture or cruel, inhuman,
or degrading treatment or punishment, in accordance with and as defined in US
law.
–
Lawful Enemy Combatant:
Lawful enemy combatants, who are entitled to
protections under the Geneva Conventions, include members of the regular
armed forces of a State Party to the conflict; militia, volunteer corps, and
organized resistance movements belonging to a State Party to the conflict,
which are under responsible command, wear a fixed distinctive sign
recognizable at a distance, carry their arms openly, and abide by the laws of
war; and members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a
government or an authority not recognized by the detaining power.
–
Unlawful Enemy Combatant:
Unlawful enemy combatants are persons not
entitled to combatant immunity, who engage in acts against the United
States or its coalition partners in violation of the laws and customs of war
during an armed conflict. For the purposes of the war on terrorism, the term
“unlawful enemy combatant†is defined to include, but is not limited to, an
individual who is or was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or
associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or
its coalition partners.
Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is the
proponent for this publication. The preparing agency is the US Army Intelligence
Center and Fort Huachuca, Fort Huachuca, AZ. Send written comments and
recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and
Blank Forms) directly to Commander, ATZS-CDI-D (FM 2-22.3), U.S. Army
Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, 550 Cibeque Street, Fort Huachuca, AZ
85613-7017. Send comments and recommendations by e-mail to ATZS-FDT-
D@hua.army.mil. Follow the DA Form 2028 format or submit an electronic DA Form
2028.
Unless otherwise stated, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to
men. Use of the terms “he†and “him†in this manual should be read as referring to
both males and females unless otherwise expressly noted.
6 September 2006
viii
FM 2-22.3
6 September 2006
1-1
PART ONE
HUMINT Support, Planning, and Management
HUMINT collection activities include three general categories: screening,
interrogation, and debriefing. In some cases these may be distinguished by legal
distinctions between source categories such as between interrogation and
debriefing. In others, the distinction is in the purpose of the questioning. Regardless
of the type of activity, or goal of the collection effort, HUMINT collection operations
must be characterized by effective support, planning, and management.
_________________________________________________________________________
Chapter 1
Introduction
INTELLIGENCE BATTLEFIELD OPERATING SYSTEM
1-1.
The Intelligence battlefield operating system (BOS) is one of seven
operating systems
⎯
Intelligence, maneuver, fire support, air defense,
mobility/countermobility/survivability, combat service support (CSS), and
command and control
⎯
that enable commanders to build, employ, direct, and
sustain combat power. The Intelligence BOS is a flexible force of Intelligence
personnel, organizations, and equipment. Individually and collectively, these
assets generate knowledge of and products portraying the enemy and the
environmental features required by a command planning, preparing,
executing, and assessing operations. Inherent within the Intelligence BOS is
the capability to plan, direct, and synchronize intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) operations; collect and process information; produce
relevant intelligence; and disseminate intelligence and critical information in
an understandable and presentable form to those who need it, when they
need it. As one of the seven disciplines of the Intelligence BOS, HUMINT
provides a capability to the supported commander in achieving information
superiority on the battlefield.
INTELLIGENCE PROCESS
1-2.
Intelligence operations consist of the functions that constitute the
intelligence process:
plan, prepare, collect, process, produce
, and the
common tasks of
analyze,
disseminate,
and
assess
that occur throughout
the intelligence process. Just as the activities of the operations process
overlap and recur as circumstances demand, so do the functions of the
intelligence process. Additionally, the analyze, disseminate, and assess tasks
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
1-2
6 September 2006
of the intelligence process occur continuously throughout the intelligence
process. (See Figure 1-1.)
•
Plan
. This step of the intelligence process consists of activities that
include assessing the situation, envisioning a desired outcome (also
known as setting the vision), identifying pertinent information and
intelligence requirements, developing a strategy for ISR operations to
satisfy those requirements, directing intelligence operations, and
synchronizing the ISR effort. The commander’s intent, planning
guidance, and commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs)
(priority information requirements [PIRs] and friendly force
information requirements [FFIRs]) drive the planning of intelligence
operations. Commanders must involve their supporting staff judge
advocate (SJA) when planning intelligence operations (especially
HUMINT operations). Planning, managing, and coordinating these
operations are continuous activities necessary to obtain information
and produce intelligence essential to decisionmaking.
•
Prepare
. This step includes those staff and leader activities that take
place upon receiving the operations plan (OPLAN), operations order
(OPORD), warning order (WARNO), or commander’s intent to improve
the unit’s ability to execute tasks or missions and survive on the
battlefield.
•
Collect.
Recent ISR doctrine necessitates that the entire staff,
especially the G3/S3 and G2/S2, must change their reconnaissance and
surveillance (R&S) mindset to conducting ISR. The staff must carefully
focus ISR on the CCIR but also enable the quick re-tasking of units
and assets as the situation changes. This doctrinal requirement
ensures that the enemy situation, not just our OPLAN, “drives†ISR
operations. Well-developed procedures and carefully planned flexibility
to support emerging targets, changing requirements, and the need to
support combat assessment are critical. The G3/S3 and G2/S2 play a
critical role in this challenging task that is sometimes referred to as
“fighting ISR†because it is so staff intensive during planning and
execution (it is an operation within the operation). Elements of all
units on the battlefield obtain information and data about enemy
forces, activities, facilities, and resources as well as information
concerning the environmental and geographical characteristics of a
particular area.
•
Process.
This step converts relevant information into a form suitable
for analysis, production, or immediate use by the commander.
Processing also includes sorting through large amounts of collected
information and intelligence (multidiscipline reports from the unit’s
ISR assets, lateral and higher echelon units and organizations, and
non-MI elements in the battlespace). Processing identifies and exploits
that information which is pertinent to the commander’s intelligence
requirements and facilitates situational understanding. Examples of
processing include developing film, enhancing imagery, translating a
document from a foreign language, converting electronic data into a
standardized report that can be analyzed by a system operator, and
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
6 September 2006
1-3
correlating dissimilar or jumbled information by assembling like
elements before the information is forwarded for analysis.
•
Produce.
In this step, the G2/S2 integrates evaluated, analyzed, and
interpreted information from single or multiple sources and disciplines
into finished intelligence products. Like collection operations, the
G2/S2 must ensure the unit’s information processing and intelligence
production are prioritized and synchronized to support answering the
collection requirements.
Figure 1-1. Intelligence Process.
1-3.
For more information on the Intelligence process, see FM 2-0.
Commander’s
Intent
ANALYZE,
DISSEMINATE,
and ASSESS
are
continuous
functions
ASSESS
is a
continuous
function
Intelligence Process
Operations Process
The Intelligence Process
provides continuous
intelligence input essential
to the Operations Process
The Operations Process
provides guidance and
focus which drives the
Intelligence Process
PROCESS
COLLECT
PREPARE
PRODUCE
PREPARE
PLAN
EXECUTE
PLAN
COMMANDER
Relevant
Information
(which includes
Intelligence)
Facilitates
Situational
Understanding
Commander’s
Intent
Commander’s
Intent
ANALYZE,
DISSEMINATE,
and ASSESS
are
continuous
functions
ASSESS
is a
continuous
function
Intelligence Process
Operations Process
The Intelligence Process
provides continuous
intelligence input essential
to the Operations Process
The Operations Process
provides guidance and
focus which drives the
Intelligence Process
PROCESS
COLLECT
PREPARE
PRODUCE
PREPARE
PLAN
EXECUTE
PLAN
COMMANDER
COMMANDER
Relevant
Information
(which includes
Intelligence)
Facilitates
Situational
Understanding
Relevant
Information
(which includes
Intelligence)
Relevant
Information
(which includes
Intelligence)
Facilitates
Situational
Understanding
Facilitates
Situational
Understanding
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
1-4
6 September 2006
HUMAN INTELLIGENCE
1-4.
HUMINT is the collection of information by a trained HUMINT collector
(military occupational specialties [MOSs] 97E, 351Y [formerly 351C], 351M
[formerly 351E], 35E, and 35F), from people and their associated documents
and media sources to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength,
dispositions, tactics, equipment, personnel, and capabilities. It uses human
sources as a tool and a variety of collection methods, both passively and
actively, to gather information to satisfy the commander’s intelligence
requirements and cross-cue other intelligence disciplines.
1-5.
HUMINT tasks include but are not limited to—
•
Conducting source operations.
•
Liaising with host nation (HN) officials and allied counterparts.
•
Eliciting information from select sources.
•
Debriefing US and allied forces and civilian personnel including
refugees, displaced persons (DPs), third-country nationals, and local
inhabitants.
•
Interrogating EPWs and other detainees.
•
Initially exploiting documents, media, and materiel.
Note.
In accordance with Army regulatory and policy guidance, a select set of intelligence
personnel may be trained and certified to conduct certain HUMINT tasks outside of those
which are standard for their primary MOS. Such selection and training will qualify these
personnel to conduct only those specific additional tasks, and will not constitute
qualifications as a HUMINT collector.
HUMINT SOURCE
1-6.
A HUMINT source is
a person from whom information can be obtained.
The source may either possess first- or second-hand knowledge normally
obtained through sight or hearing. Potential HUMINT sources include
threat, neutral, and friendly military and civilian personnel. Categories of
HUMINT sources include but are not limited to detainees, refugees, DPs,
local inhabitants, friendly forces, and members of foreign governmental and
non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
HUMINT COLLECTOR
1-7.
For the purpose of this manual, a HUMINT collector is a person who is
specifically trained and certified for, tasked with, and engages in the
collection of information from individuals (HUMINT sources) for the purpose
of answering intelligence information requirements. HUMINT collectors
specifically include enlisted personnel in MOS 97E, Warrant Officers (WOs)
in MOS 351M (351E) and MOS 351Y (351C), commissioned officers in MOS
35E and MOS 35F, select other specially trained MOSs, and their Federal
civilian employee and civilian contractor counterparts. These specially
trained and certified individuals are the
only
personnel authorized to
conduct HUMINT collection operations, although CI agents also use
HUMINT collection techniques in the conduct of CI operations. HUMINT
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
6 September 2006
1-5
collection operations must be conducted in accordance with applicable law
and policy. Applicable law and policy include US law; the law of war; relevant
international law; relevant directives including DOD Directive 3115.09,
“DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical
Questioningâ€; DOD Directive 2310.1E, “The Department of Defense Detainee
Programâ€; DOD instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOs.
Additional policies and regulations apply to management of contractors
engaged in HUMINT collection. (See Bibliography for additional references
on contractor management.) HUMINT collectors are not to be confused with
CI agents, MOS 97B and WO MOS 351L (351B). CI agents are trained and
certified for, tasked with, and carry out the mission of denying the enemy the
ability to collect information on the activities and intentions of friendly
forces. Although personnel in 97E and 97B MOSs may use similar methods
to carry out their missions, commanders should not use them
interchangeably. See Figure 1-2 for HUMINT and CI functions.
PHASES OF HUMINT COLLECTION
1-8.
Every HUMINT questioning session, regardless of the methodology
used or the type of operation, consists of five phases. The five phases of
HUMINT collection are planning and preparation, approach, questioning,
termination, and reporting. They are generally sequential; however,
reporting may occur at any point within the process when critical
information is obtained and the approach techniques used will be reinforced
as required through the questioning and termination phases.
Planning and Preparation
1-9.
During this phase, the HUMINT collector conducts the necessary research
and operational planning in preparation for a specific collection effort with a
specific source. Chapter 7 discusses this phase in detail.
Approach
1-10.
During the approach phase, the HUMINT collector establishes the
conditions of control and rapport to gain the cooperation of the source and to
facilitate information collection. Chapter 8 discusses approach and
termination strategies in detail.
Questioning
1-11.
During the questioning phase, the HUMINT collector uses an
interrogation, debriefing, or elicitation methodology to ask a source questions
systematically on relevant topics, collect information in response to the
intelligence tasking, and ascertain source veracity. Chapter 9 discusses
questioning techniques in detail. (See Appendix B for a source and reliability
matrix.)
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
1-6
6 September 2006
Figure 1-2. HUMINT and CI Functions.
Termination
1-12.
During the termination phase, the HUMINT collector completes a
questioning session and establishes the necessary conditions for future
collection from the same source by himself or another HUMINT collector.
(See Chapter 8.)
Reporting
1-13.
During the reporting phase, the HUMINT collector writes, edits, and
submits written, and possibly oral, reports on information collected in the
course of a HUMINT collection effort. These reports will be reviewed, edited,
and analyzed as they are forwarded through the appropriate channels.
Chapter 10 discusses reporting in detail.
FUNCTIONS
•
HUMINT Collection Activities
- Tactical Questioning
- Screening
- Interrogation
- Debriefing
- Liaison
- Human Source Operations
- DOCEX
- CEE Operations
•
Analysis
- Link Diagrams
- Patterns
HUMINT
INTENT
Shape Blue’s
Visualization
of Red
TARGET
•
Adversary Decisionmaking
Architecture
ROLE
•
Determine
- Capabilities
- Order of Battle
- Vulnerabilities
- Intentions
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
INTENT
Degrade Red’s
Visualization
of Blue
TARGET
•
Adversary Intelligence
Activities
FUNCTIONS
•
Collection
- Contact Operations
- Tactical Source Operations
•
Investigation
- Incidents
- Anomalies
•
Operation
- Agent Operations
•
Analysis
- Link Diagrams
- Patterns
ROLE
•
Detect
•
Identify
•
Exploit
•
Neutralize
FUNCTIONS
•
HUMINT Collection Activities
- Tactical Questioning
- Screening
- Interrogation
- Debriefing
- Liaison
- Human Source Operations
- DOCEX
- CEE Operations
•
Analysis
- Link Diagrams
- Patterns
FUNCTIONS
•
HUMINT Collection Activities
- Tactical Questioning
- Screening
- Interrogation
- Debriefing
- Liaison
- Human Source Operations
- DOCEX
- CEE Operations
•
Analysis
- Link Diagrams
- Patterns
HUMINT
INTENT
Shape Blue’s
Visualization
of Red
TARGET
•
Adversary Decisionmaking
Architecture
ROLE
•
Determine
- Capabilities
- Order of Battle
- Vulnerabilities
- Intentions
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
INTENT
Degrade Red’s
Visualization
of Blue
TARGET
•
Adversary Intelligence
Activities
FUNCTIONS
•
Collection
- Contact Operations
- Tactical Source Operations
•
Investigation
- Incidents
- Anomalies
•
Operation
- Agent Operations
•
Analysis
- Link Diagrams
- Patterns
ROLE
•
Detect
•
Identify
•
Exploit
•
Neutralize
HUMINT
HUMINT
INTENT
Shape Blue’s
Visualization
of Red
INTENT
Shape Blue’s
Visualization
of Red
INTENT
Shape Blue’s
Visualization
of Red
TARGET
•
Adversary Decisionmaking
Architecture
TARGET
•
Adversary Decisionmaking
Architecture
ROLE
•
Determine
- Capabilities
- Order of Battle
- Vulnerabilities
- Intentions
ROLE
•
Determine
- Capabilities
- Order of Battle
- Vulnerabilities
- Intentions
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
INTENT
Degrade Red’s
Visualization
of Blue
INTENT
Degrade Red’s
Visualization
of Blue
INTENT
Degrade Red’s
Visualization
of Blue
TARGET
•
Adversary Intelligence
Activities
TARGET
•
Adversary Intelligence
Activities
FUNCTIONS
•
Collection
- Contact Operations
- Tactical Source Operations
•
Investigation
- Incidents
- Anomalies
•
Operation
- Agent Operations
•
Analysis
- Link Diagrams
- Patterns
FUNCTIONS
•
Collection
- Contact Operations
- Tactical Source Operations
•
Investigation
- Incidents
- Anomalies
•
Operation
- Agent Operations
•
Analysis
- Link Diagrams
- Patterns
ROLE
•
Detect
•
Identify
•
Exploit
•
Neutralize
ROLE
•
Detect
•
Identify
•
Exploit
•
Neutralize
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
6 September 2006
1-7
HUMINT COLLECTION AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
1-14.
HUMINT collection activities include these categories: tactical
questioning, screening, interrogation, debriefing, liaison, human source
contact operations (SCOs), document exploitation (DOCEX), and captured
enemy equipment (CEE) operations. DOCEX and CEE operations are
activities supported by HUMINT collection but usually are only conducted by
HUMINT collectors when the CEE or captured enemy document (CED) is
associated with a source being questioned. In some cases, these
determinations may depend on legal distinctions between collection methods
such as interrogation and debriefing. In others, the distinction is in the
purpose of the questioning. For example, screening is used to identify the
knowledgeability and cooperation of a source, as opposed to the other
activities that are used to collect information for intelligence purposes.
1-15.
The activities may be conducted interactively. For example, a HUMINT
collector may be screening a potential source. During the course of the
screening, the HUMINT collector identifies that the individual has
information that can answer requirements. He might at that point debrief or
interrogate
the source on that specific area. He will then return to screening
the source to identify other potential areas of interest.
1-16.
HUMINT collection activities vary depending on the source of the
information. Once the type of activity has been determined, leaders use the
process of plan, prepare, execute, and assess to conduct the activity. The
following are the different types of HUMINT collection activities.
TACTICAL QUESTIONING
1-17.
Tactical questioning is expedient initial questioning for information of
immediate tactical value. Tactical questioning is generally performed by
members of patrols, but can be done by any DOD personnel. (See ST 2-91.6.)
SCREENING
1-18.
Screening is the process of identifying and assessing the areas of
knowledge, cooperation, and possible approach techniques for an individual
who has information of intelligence value. Indicators and discriminators used
in screening can range from general appearance, possessions, and attitude to
specific questions to assess areas of knowledge and degree of cooperation to
establish if an individual matches a predetermined source profile. Screening
is not in itself an intelligence collection technique but a timesaving measure
that identifies those individuals most likely to have information of value.
1-19.
Screening operations are conducted to identify the level of knowledge,
level of cooperation, and the placement and access of a given source.
Screening operations can also assist in the determination of which discipline
or agency can best conduct the exploitation. Chapter 6 discusses screening in
detail. Screening operations include but are not limited to—
ƒ
Mobile and static checkpoint screening, including screening of
refugees and DPs.
ƒ
Locally employed personnel screening.
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
1-8
6 September 2006
ƒ
Screening as part of a cordon and search operation.
ƒ
EPW and detainee screening.
INTERROGATION
1-20.
Interrogation is the systematic effort to procure information to answer
specific collection requirements by direct and indirect questioning techniques
of a person who is in the custody of the forces conducting the questioning.
Some examples of interrogation sources include EPWs and other detainees.
Interrogation sources range from totally cooperative to highly antagonistic.
Interrogations may be conducted at all echelons in all operational
environments. Detainee interrogation operations conducted at a Military
Police (MP) facility, coalition-operated facility, or other agency-operated
collection facility are more robust and require greater planning, but have
greater logistical support. Interrogations may only be conducted by personnel
trained and certified in the interrogation methodology, including personnel
in MOSs 97E, 351M (351E), or select others as may be approved by DOD
policy. Interrogations are always to be conducted in accordance with the Law
of War, regardless of the echelon or operational environment in which the
HUMINT collector is operating.
DEBRIEFING
1-21.
Debriefing is the process of questioning cooperating human sources to
satisfy intelligence requirements, consistent with applicable law. The source
usually is not in custody and usually is willing to cooperate. Debriefing may
be conducted at all echelons and in all operational environments. The
primary categories of sources for debriefing are refugees, émigrés, DPs, and
local civilians; and friendly forces.
•
Refugees, Émigrés, DPs, and Local Civilians Debriefing
Operations.
Refugee, émigré, and DP debriefing operations are the
process of questioning cooperating refugees and émigrés to satisfy
intelligence requirements. The refugee may or may not be in custody,
and a refugee or émigré’s willingness to cooperate need not be
immediate or constant. Refugee debriefings are usually conducted at
refugee collection points or checkpoints and may be conducted in
coordination with civil affairs (CA) or MP operations. Local civilian
debriefing operations are the process of questioning cooperating local
civilians to satisfy intelligence requirements. As with refugees and
émigrés, the local civilians being debriefed may or may not be in
custody and the civilian’s willingness to cooperate may not be
immediate or constant. Debriefing operations must be conducted
consistent with applicable law and policy. Applicable law and policy
include US law; the law of war; relevant international law; relevant
directives including DOD Directive 3115.09, “DOD Intelligence
Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioningâ€; DOD
Directive 2310.1E, “The Department of Defense Detainee Programâ€;
DOD instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOs.
•
Friendly Force Debriefing Operations.
Friendly force debriefing
operations are the systematic debriefing of US forces to answer
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
6 September 2006
1-9
collection requirements. These operations must be coordinated with US
units. (See Chapter 6.)
LIAISON OPERATIONS
1-22.
Liaison operations are programs to coordinate activities and exchange
information with host country and allied military and civilian agencies and
NGOs.
HUMAN SOURCE CONTACT OPERATIONS
1-23.
Human SCO are operations directed toward the establishment of
human sources who have agreed to meet and cooperate with HUMINT
collectors for the purpose of providing information. Within the Army, SCO
are conducted by trained personnel under the direction of military
commanders. The entire range of HUMINT collection operations can be
employed. SCO sources include one-time contacts, continuous contacts, and
formal contacts from debriefings, liaison, and contact operations.
SCO
consist of collection activities that utilize human sources to identify attitude,
intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, target
development, personnel, and capabilities of those elements that pose a
potential or actual threat to US and coalition forces. SCO are also employed
to develop local source or informant networks that provide early warning of
imminent danger to US and coalition forces and contribute to the Military
Decision-Making Process (MDMP). See Chapter 5 for discussion of approval,
coordination, and review for each type of activity.
DOCEX OPERATIONS
1-24.
DOCEX operations are the systematic extraction of information from
open, closed, published, and electronic source documents. These documents
may include documents or data inside electronic communications equipment,
including computers, telephones, Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs), and
Global Positioning System (GPS) terminals. This operation is not solely a
HUMINT function, but may be conducted by any intelligence personnel with
appropriate language support.
1-25.
Many CEDs are associated with EPWs and other human sources.
Consequently, a HUMINT collector is often the first person to screen them.
HUMINT collectors will screen the documents associated with human
sources and will extract information of use to them in their immediate
collection operation. Any information discovered during this initial screening
that might cross-cue another collection effort will be forwarded to the
appropriate unit.
1-26.
A captured document is usually something that the enemy has written
for his own use. For this reason, captured documents are usually truthful and
accurate. There are cases in which falsified documents have been permitted
to fall into enemy hands as a means of deception but these cases are not the
norm. Normal policy of not relying on single-source information should help
prevent deceptions of this type from being effective. Documents also do not
forget or misinterpret information although it must be remembered that
their authors may have. Usually, each document provides a portion of a
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
1-10
6 September 2006
larger body of information. Each captured document, much like a single piece
of a puzzle, contributes to the whole. In addition to tactical intelligence,
technical data and political indicators that are important to strategic and
national level agencies can sometimes be extracted from captured documents.
Captured documents, while not affected by memory loss, are often time
sensitive; therefore, they are to be quickly screened for possible exploitation.
CEE OPERATIONS
1-27.
CEE includes all types of foreign and non-foreign materiel found on a
detainee or on the battlefield that may have a military application or answer
a collection requirement. The capturing unit must––
•
Recognize certain CEE as having immediate intelligence value, and
immediately forward such CEE to the unit’s S2. Such items include—
ƒ
All electronic communications equipment with a memory card,
including computers, telephones, PDAs, and GPS terminals.
ƒ
All video or photographic equipment.
•
Recognize certain CEE as having technical intelligence (TECHINT)
value. Such items include––
ƒ
New weapons.
ƒ
All communications equipment not immediately exploitable for
HUMINT value.
ƒ
Track vehicles.
ƒ
Equipment manuals.
ƒ
All CEE known or believed to be of TECHINT interest.
•
Evacuate the equipment with the detainee.
•
Confiscate, tag, and evacuate weapons and other equipment found on
the detainee the same as CEDs. (See Appendix D.)
•
Secure and report the capture of TECHINT items to the unit’s S2 for
disposition instructions.
TRAITS OF A HUMINT COLLECTOR
1-28.
HUMINT collection is a science and an art. Although many HUMINT
collection skills may be taught, the development of a skilled HUMINT
collector requires experience in dealing with people in all conditions and
under all circumstances. Although there are many intangibles in the
definition of a “good†HUMINT collector, certain character traits are
invaluable:
•
Alertness.
The HUMINT collector must be alert on several levels
while conducting HUMINT collection. He must concentrate on the
information being provided by the source and be constantly evaluating
the information for both value and veracity based on collection
requirements, current intelligence, and other information obtained
from the source. Simultaneously, he must be alert not only to what the
source says but also to how it is said and the accompanying body
language to assess the source’s truthfulness, degree of cooperation, and
current mood. He needs to know when to give the source a break and
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
6 September 2006
1-11
when to press the source harder. In addition, the HUMINT collector
constantly must be alert to his environment to ensure his personal
security and that of his source.
•
Patience and Tact.
The HUMINT collector must have patience and
tact in creating and maintaining rapport between himself and the
source, thereby enhancing the success of the questioning. Displaying
impatience may—
ƒ
Encourage a difficult source to think that if he remains unresponsive
for a little longer, the HUMINT collector will stop questioning.
ƒ
Cause the source to lose respect for the HUMINT collector, thereby
reducing the HUMINT collector’s effectiveness.
•
Credibility.
The HUMINT collector must provide a clear, accurate,
and professional product and an accurate assessment of his
capabilities. He must be able to clearly articulate complex situations
and concepts. The HUMINT collector must also maintain credibility
with his source. He must present himself in a believable and consistent
manner, and follow through on any promises made as well as never to
promise what cannot be delivered.
•
Object
i
vity and Self-control.
The HUMINT collector must also be
totally objective in evaluating the information obtained. The HUMINT
collector must maintain an objective and dispassionate attitude
regardless of the emotional reactions he may actually experience or
simulate during a questioning session. Without objectivity, he may
unconsciously distort the information acquired. He may also be unable
to vary his questioning and approach techniques effectively. He must
have exceptional self-control to avoid displays of genuine anger,
irritation, sympathy, or weariness that may cause him to lose the
initiative during questioning but be able to fake any of these emotions
as necessary. He must not become emotionally involved with the
source.
•
Adaptability.
A HUMINT collector must adapt to the many and
varied personalities which he will encounter. He must also adapt to all
types of locations, operational tempos, and operational environments.
He should try to imagine himself in the source's position. By being
adaptable, he can smoothly shift his questioning and approach
techniques according to the operational environment and the
personality of the source.
•
Perseverance.
A tenacity of purpose can be the difference between a
HUMINT collector who is merely good and one who is superior. A
HUMINT collector who becomes easily discouraged by opposition, non-
cooperation, or other difficulties will not aggressively pursue the
objective to a successful conclusion or exploit leads to other valuable
information.
•
Appearance and Demeanor.
The HUMINT collector's personal
appearance may greatly influence the conduct of any HUMINT
collection operation and attitude of the source toward the HUMINT
collector. Usually an organized and professional appearance will
favorably influence the source. If the HUMINT collector's manner
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
1-12
6 September 2006
reflects fairness, strength, and efficiency, the source may prove more
cooperative and more receptive to questioning.
•
Initiative.
Achieving and maintaining the initiative are essential to a
successful questioning session just as the offensive is the key to success
in combat operations. The HUMINT collector must grasp the initiative
and maintain it throughout all questioning phases. This does not mean
he has to dominate the source physically; rather, it means that the
HUMINT collector knows his requirements and continues to direct the
collection toward those requirements.
REQUIRED AREAS OF KNOWLEDGE
1-29.
The HUMINT collector must be knowledgeable in a variety of areas in
order to question sources effectively. The collector must prepare himself for
operations in a particular theater or area of intelligence responsibility
(AOIR) by conducting research. The G2 can be a valuable source of
information for this preparatory research. The HUMINT collector should
consult with order of battle (OB) technicians and analysts and collect
information from open sources and from the Secret Internet Protocol Router
Network (SIPRNET) to enhance his knowledge of the AOIR. Some of these
areas of required knowledge are—
•
The area of operations (AO)
including the social, political, and
economic institutions; geography; history; language; and culture of the
target area. Collectors must be aware of all ethnic, social, religious,
political, criminal, tribal, and economic groups and the
interrelationships between these groups.
•
All current and potential threat forces
within the AOIR and their
organization, equipment, motivation, capabilities, limitations, and
normal operational methodology.
•
Applicable law and policy that might affect HUMINT collection
activities. Applicable law and policy include US law; the law of
war; relevant international law; relevant directives including
DOD Directive 3115.09, “DOD Intelligence Interrogations,
Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioningâ€;
DOD
Directive 2310.1E, “The Department of Defense Detainee
Programâ€; DOD instructions; and military execute orders
including FRAGOs.
HUMINT collectors are subject to applicable law,
which includes US law, the law of war (including the Geneva
Conventions as applicable), and relevant international law.
Additionally, local agreements with HNs or allies and the applicable
execute orders and rules of engagement (ROE) may further restrict
HUMINT collection activities. However, these documents cannot
permit interrogation actions that would be illegal under applicable US
or international law.
•
The collection requirements,
including all specific information
requirements (SIRs) and indicators that will lead to the answering of
the intelligence requirements.
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
6 September 2006
1-13
•
Cultural awareness
in the various AOs will have different social and
regional considerations that affect communications and can affect the
conduct of operations. These may include social taboos, desired
behaviors, customs, and courtesies. The staff must include this
information in pre-deployment training at all levels to ensure that
personnel are properly equipped to interact with the local populace.
1-30.
There are other areas of knowledge that help to develop more effective
questioning:
•
Proficiency in the target language
. The HUMINT collector can
normally use an interpreter (see Chapter 11) and machine translation
as they are developed to conduct questioning. Language proficiency is a
benefit to the HUMINT collector in a number of ways: He can save
time in questioning, be more aware of nuances in the language that
might verify or deny truthfulness, and better control and evaluate
interpreters.
•
Understanding ba
s
ic human behavior
. A HUMINT collector can
best adapt himself to the source’s personality and control of the
source’s reactions when he understands basic behavioral factors, traits,
attitudes, drives, motivations, and inhibitions. He must not only
understand basic behavioral principles but also know how these
principles are manifested in the area and culture in which he is
operating.
•
Neurolinguistics
. Neurolinguistics is a behavioral communication
model and a set of procedures that improve communication skills. The
HUMINT collector should read and react to nonverbal
communications. He must be aware of the specific neurolinguistic clues
of the cultural framework in which he is operating.
CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS
CAPABILITIES
1-31.
HUMINT collection capabilities include the ability to
⎯
•
Collect information and cross-cue from an almost endless variety of
potential sources including friendly forces, civilians, detainees, and
source-related documents.
•
Focus on the collection of detailed information not available by other
means. This includes information on threat intentions and local
civilian and threat force attitudes and morale. It also includes building
interiors and facilities that cannot be collected on by other means due
to restrictive terrain.
•
Corroborate or refute information collected from other R&S assets.
•
Operate with minimal equipment and deploy in all operational
environments in support of offensive, defensive, stability and
reconstruction operations, or civil support operations. Based on solid
planning and preparation, HUMINT collection can provide timely
information if deployed forward in support of maneuver elements.
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
1-14
6 September 2006
LIMITATIONS
1-32.
HUMINT collection limitations include
⎯
•
Interpersonal abilities. HUMINT is dependent on the subjective
interpersonal capabilities of the individual rather than on the abilities
to operate collection equipment. HUMINT collection capability is based
on experience within a specific AO that can only be developed over
time.
•
Identification of knowledgeable sources. There is often a multitude of
potential HUMINT sources. Information in response to specific
requirements can only be collected if sources are available and
identified that have that information.
•
Limited numbers. There are never enough HUMINT collectors to meet
all requirements. Limited assets must be prioritized in support of units
and operations based on their criticality.
•
Time limitations. HUMINT collection, particularly source operations,
takes time to develop. Collection requirements must be developed with
sufficient lead-time for collection.
•
Language limitations. Although HUMINT collectors can normally use
an interpreter, a lack of language proficiency by the collector can
significantly slow collection efforts. Such language proficiency takes
time to develop.
•
Misunderstanding of the HUMINT mission. HUMINT collectors are
frequently used incorrectly and assigned missions that belong to CA,
MP, interpreter or translators, CI, or other operational specialties.
•
Commanders’ risk management. Maneuver commanders, in weighing
the risks associated with employing HUMINT collection teams (HCTs),
should seriously consider the potential loss of a wealth of information
such as enemy activities, locations of high-value personnel, and threats
to the force that they will incur if they restrict HCT collection
activities. J/G2Xs, operational management teams (OMTs), and HCT
leaders must educate maneuver commanders on the benefits of
providing security for HCTs and employing them in accordance with
their capabilities.
•
Legal obligations. Applicable law and policy govern HUMINT
collection operations. Applicable law and policy include US law; the
law of war; relevant international law; relevant directives including
DOD Directive 3115.09, “DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee
Debriefings, and Tactical Questioningâ€; DOD Directive 2310.1E, “The
Department of Defense Detainee Programâ€; DOD instructions; and
military execute orders including FRAGOs. HUMINT operations may
be further restricted by Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) and
other agreements, execute orders and ROE, local laws, and an
operational umbrella concept. Such documents, however, cannot
permit interrogation actions that are illegal under applicable law.
•
Connectivity and bandwidth requirements. With the exception of the
size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment (SALUTE) report, most
HUMINT reporting requires considerable bandwidth. Deployed
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
6 September 2006
1-15
HUMINT teams must be able to travel to, and report from, all areas of
the battlefield. Digital communication equipment must be able to
provide reliable connectivity with teams’ reporting channels and
sufficient bandwidth for transmission of reports, including digital
imagery.
•
Timely reporting and immediate access to sources. Except in tactical
situations when HUMINT collectors are in immediate support of
maneuver units, HUMINT collection and reporting takes time. In
stability and reconstruction operations, sources need to be assessed
and developed. Once they are developed, they need to be contacted
which often takes time and coordination. In offensive and defensive
operations, HUMINT collection at detainee holding areas sometimes
may still be timely enough to meet tactical and operational
requirements. See paragraphs 3-2 and 3-7 for more information on
offensive and defensive operations.
This page intentionally left blank.
FM 2-22.3
6 September 2006
2-1
Chapter 2
Human Intelligence Structure
ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE
2-1.
The success of the HUMINT collection effort depends on a complex
interrelationship between command and control (C2) elements,
requirements, technical control and support, and collection assets. Each
echelon of command has its supporting HUMINT elements although no MI
organization in the Army is robust enough to conduct sustained HUMINT
operations under all operational environments using only its organic
HUMINT assets. HUMINT units have specific support requirements to the
commander. HUMINT units must be flexible, versatile, and prepared to
conduct HUMINT collection and analysis operations in support of any
echelon of command. A coherent C2 structure within these HUMINT
organizations is necessary in order to ensure successful, disciplined, and
legal HUMINT operations. This structure must include experienced
commissioned officers, warrant officers, and senior NCOs conscientiously
discharging their responsibilities and providing HUMINT collectors with
guidance from higher headquarters.
2-2.
Regardless of the echelon, there are four basic elements that work
together to provide the deployed commander with well-focused, thoroughly
planned HUMINT support. The four elements are staff support, analysis, C2,
and collection. Each piece of the infrastructure builds on the next and is
based on the size, complexity, and type of operation as shown in Figure 2-1.
Figure 2-1. Tactical HUMINT Organization.
H U M IN T
C o lle c to r
T e a m (s )
S u p p o rte d
S 2
O p e ra tio n a l
M a n a g e m e n t
T e a m (D S )
O p e ra tio n a l
M a n a g e m e n t
T e a m (G S )
A C E
J /G 2
O th e r
G o v e rn m e n t
A g e n c ie s
M ilita ry
A s s e ts
H U M IN T
C o lle c to r
T e a m (s )
J /G 2 X
H U M IN T
C o lle c to r
T e a m (s )
S u p p o rte d
S 2
O p e ra tio n a l
M a n a g e m e n t
T e a m (D S )
O p e ra tio n a l
M a n a g e m e n t
T e a m (G S )
A C E
J /G 2
O th e r
G o v e rn m e n t
A g e n c ie s
M ilita ry
A s s e ts
H U M IN T
C o lle c to r
T e a m (s )
J /G 2 X
H U M IN T
C o lle c to r
T e a m (s )
H U M IN T
C o lle c to r
T e a m (s )
S u p p o rte d
S 2
S u p p o rte d
S 2
O p e ra tio n a l
M a n a g e m e n t
T e a m (D S )
O p e ra tio n a l
M a n a g e m e n t
T e a m (D S )
O p e ra tio n a l
M a n a g e m e n t
T e a m (G S )
O p e ra tio n a l
M a n a g e m e n t
T e a m (G S )
A C E
J /G 2
A C E
A C E
J /G 2
J /G 2
O th e r
G o v e rn m e n t
A g e n c ie s
M ilita ry
A s s e ts
O th e r
G o v e rn m e n t
A g e n c ie s
O th e r
G o v e rn m e n t
A g e n c ie s
M ilita ry
A s s e ts
M ilita ry
A s s e ts
H U M IN T
C o lle c to r
T e a m (s )
H U M IN T
C o lle c to r
T e a m (s )
J /G 2 X
J /G 2 X
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
2-2
6 September 2006
HUMINT CONTROL ORGANIZATIONS
2-3.
HUMINT control organizations are the means by which a commander
exercises command of a unit’s operations. HUMINT control organizations are
vital to the effective use of HUMINT collection assets. HUMINT control
organizations consist of the C/J/G/S2X and the HUMINT operations cell
(HOC) at the brigade and above level and the OMTs at the battalion and
below level.
C/J/G/S2X
2-4.
The C/J/G/S2X is a staff element subordinate to the C/J/G/S2, is the
primary advisor on HUMINT and CI, and is the focal point for all HUMINT
and CI activities within a joint task force (JTF) (J2X), an Army component
task force (G2X) or a brigade combat team (BCT) (S2X). The 2X can be
organic to the unit staff or can be attached or under operational control
(OPCON) to the staff from another organization such as the theater MI
brigade. The C/J/G/S2X is part of a coherent architecture that includes
organic HUMINT assets and HUMINT resources from national, theater, and
non-DOD HUMINT organizations.
2-5.
The C/J2X is responsible for controlling Joint Force HUMINT assets,
coordinating all HUMINT and CI collection activities, and keeping the joint
force C/J/2 informed on all HUMINT and CI activities conducted in the joint
force area of responsibility (AOR). The C/J2X is also part of the review and
recommendation process concerned with the retention or release of detainees.
HUMINT reports maintained at the C/J2X are considered during the review
for release process. The C/J2X consists of the 2X Officer, a HOC, a
Counterintelligence Coordination Authority (CICA), a HUMINT Analysis
Cell (HAC), and a CI Analysis Cell (CIAC). At all echelons, the 2X should
also include an Operational Support Cell (OSC) staffed to operate 24 hours a
day. The authority and operational responsibilities of a C/J2X in combined or
joint contingency operations (CONOP) takes precedence over service-specific
CI and HUMINT technical control agencies. Specifically, the C/J/G/S2X
⎯
•
Accomplishes technical control and support, and deconfliction of all
HUMINT and CI assets through the Army component G2X, the
HUMINT and CI operations sections, or the OMTs.
•
Participates in planning for deployment of HUMINT and CI assets in
support of operations.
•
Coordinates, through the HOC and the CICA, all HUMINT and CI
activities to support intelligence collection and the intelligence aspects
of force protection for the deployed commander.
•
Coordinates and deconflicts all HUMINT and CI operations within the
operational area.
•
Coordinates with the senior US national intelligence representative for
specific operational approval when required by standing agreements.
•
Is the release authority for HUMINT reporting at his echelon and only
releases reports to the all-source system after ensuring all technical
control measures for reporting have been met.
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
6 September 2006
2-3
•
Coordinates with other HUMINT collection agencies not under the
control of the command, such as Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA),
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI).
•
Does not exercise OPCON over HUMINT and CI assets assigned,
attached, or reinforcing the unit; however, he is the staff support
responsible for creating a cohesive HUMINT and CI effort.
•
Coordinates with non-DOD agencies conducting HUMINT collection
operations in the joint area of operations (JAO) to ensure deconfliction
of sources, informants, or contacts and the HUMINT reporting that is
generated by these collection operations.
2-6.
The J2X will maintain technical control (see para 4-10) of all CI
investigative actions within its AOIR; however, all investigative matters will
be in accordance with DOD policies, joint or Military Department doctrine,
applicable US law and policy, SOFAs, or other International Standardization
Agreements (ISAs). The J2X will advise the responsible Theater CICA
(TCICA) of any Army CI element conducting investigative activities that fall
under the purview of AR 381-20.
OPERATIONS SUPPORT CELL (OSC)
2-7.
The OSC in the C/J/G/S2X staff will maintain the consolidated source
registry for all HUMINT and CI activities in the unit’s designated AOIR. The
OSC will provide management of intelligence property book operations,
source incentive programs, and intelligence contingency funds (ICFs) for
subordinate HUMINT and CI elements. The OSC responsibilities also
include requests for information (RFIs) and/or source-directed requirements
(SDRs) management and the release of intelligence information reports
(IIRs).
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE COORDINATION AUTHORITY
2-8.
The CICA is assigned under the J/G2X and coordinates all CI activities
within its designated AOIR. (See FM 34-60 for a detailed explanation of the
CI mission.) The CICA
⎯
•
Provides technical support to all CI assets and coordinates and
deconflicts CI activities in the deployed AOIR.
•
Coordinates and supervises CI investigations and collection activities
conducted by all services and components in the AOIR.
•
Establishes and maintains the theater CI source database.
•
Coordinates with the HOC for CI support to detention, interrogation,
refugee, and other facilities.
•
Manages requirements and taskings for CI collectors in the AO in
coordination with the HOC.
•
Expedites preparation of CI reports and their distribution to
consumers at all levels.
•
Coordinates CI activities with senior CI officers from all CI
organizations on the battlefield.
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
2-4
6 September 2006
•
Performs liaison with HN and US national level CI organizations.
•
Informs the appropriate TCICA when Army CI elements are
conducting CI investigative activities within the purview of AR 381-20.
HUMINT OPERATIONS CELL
2-9.
The HOC is assigned under the J/G2X to track all HUMINT activities in
the AOIR. The J/G2X uses this information to advise the senior intelligence
officer (SIO) on all HUMINT activities conducted within the AOIR. The
HOC—
•
Provides technical support to all HUMINT collection operations and
deconflicts HUMINT collection operations in the designated AOIR.
•
Establishes and maintains a consolidated HUMINT source database in
coordination with the CICA.
•
Coordinates with collection managers and the HAC to identify
collection requirements and to ensure requirements are met.
•
Coordinates the activities of HUMINT collectors assigned or attached
to interrogation, debriefing, refugee, DOCEX, and other facilities.
•
Manages requirements and taskings for HUMINT collectors in the
AOIR, in coordination with the CICA.
•
Expedites preparation of intelligence reports and their distribution to
consumers at all levels.
•
Performs liaison with HN and US national HUMINT organizations.
OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT TEAM
2-10.
A HUMINT OMT consists of senior individuals in MOS 351M (351E)
and MOS 97E. Each OMT can control 2 to 4 HCTs depending upon assigned
mission and operational tempo (OPTEMPO). The OMT performs a necessary
function when two or more HCTs deploy by assisting the HUMINT element
commander in tasking and providing technical support to assigned or
attached HCTs. The OMT is optimally collocated with the command post
(CP) of the supported unit. However, it must be located where it can provide
oversight of team operations and best support the dissemination of tasking,
reports, and technical data between the unit and the deployed collection
assets. When a higher echelon augments subordinate elements with
collection teams, it should include proportional OMT augmentation. When a
single collection team is attached in direct support (DS) of a subordinate
element, the senior team member exerts mission and technical control over
the team. The OMT
⎯
•
Provides operational and technical control and guidance to deployed
HCTs.
•
Normally consists of a WO and noncommissioned officers (NCOs)
whose experience and knowledge provide the necessary guidance for
effective team collection operations.
•
Manages the use of ICFs and incentives for the HCTs.
•
Provides the collection focus for HCTs.
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
6 September 2006
2-5
•
Provides quality control and dissemination of reports for subordinate
HCTs.
•
Directs the activities of subordinate HCTs and controls their
operations.
•
Conducts limited single-discipline HUMINT analysis and mission
analysis for the supported commander.
•
Acts as a conduit between subordinate HCTs, the HOC, and the
C/J/G/S2X.
•
Reports the HCT mission and equipment status to the HOC and the
command element.
HUMINT COLLECTION TEAM
2-11.
HCTs are the elements that collect information from human sources.
The HUMINT collectors deploy in teams of approximately four personnel in
MOS 97E (HUMINT Collector) and MOS 351M (351E) (HUMINT
Technician).
2-12.
The HCT may be augmented based on factors of mission, enemy,
terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil
considerations (METT-TC). Interpreters from the RC or civilian contractors
with appropriate security clearances are added when necessary. TECHINT
personnel or other specific subject-matter experts (SMEs) may augment the
team to meet technical collection requirements. Another example would be
pairing HUMINT collectors with dedicated analysts to provide sharper focus
to the interrogation effort. In fixed detention facilities, these HUMINT
collector or analyst relationships may become more enduring. Commanders
are not encouraged to mix HUMINT collectors and CI agents on a single
team. Doing so seriously undermines the ability to conduct both the
HUMINT collection and CI missions simultaneously. However, commanders
may find times when METT-TC factors make it reasonable to augment a CI
team with HUMINT support for a mission, or vice versa.
COMMAND DEBRIEFING TEAM
2-13.
A command debriefing team is normally not a table of organization and
equipment (TOE) organization but may be task organized to meet mission
requirements. This task-organized team is normally OPCON to the HOC.
Although more prevalent during stability and reconstruction operations,
senior personnel will often acquire information of intelligence interest during
the normal course of their duties. The HUMINT collection assets,
particularly at division echelon or higher, will normally task organize a team
of more senior, experienced individuals to debrief these senior unit personnel.
In offensive and defensive operations, this same team is prepared to
interrogate high-value detainees (including EPWs) or debrief senior civilians.
The command debriefing team should not be confused with the G2/S2
debriefing program, which also is critical and is an important conduit of
information.
DOCUMENT EXPLOITATION TEAM
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
2-6
6 September 2006
2-14.
DOCEX teams are normally found at theater and national level
organizations. Lower echelon HCTs may also be designated to perform the
DOCEX mission based upon mission parameters and linguist availability.
However, if organic assets are used, there will be a mission tradeoff.
Dependent on the priority of exploitation and volume of documents, HCTs
assigned the DOCEX mission may be augmented by military, civilian, or
contractor personnel to accomplish their assigned mission. During
operations, the DOCEX team will normally screen documents, extract
information, and expedite the evacuation of documents to the Joint or
Theater Document Exploitation Facility.
HUMINT ANALYSIS AND PRODUCTION ORGANIZATIONS
2-15.
HUMINT analysis and production organizations analyze information
collected from HUMINT sources, support the requirements management
(RM) system, and produce single-discipline intelligence products. HUMINT
analysis and production are conducted at all echelons, separate brigades, and
higher. (See Chapter 12 for a description of the HUMINT analysis system
and methodologies.)
HUMINT ANALYSIS CELL
2-16.
The HAC is part of the J/G2X; however, it may be collocated with an
analysis and control element (ACE) or Joint Intelligence Support Element
(JISE) single-source enclave depending on facilities and operational
environment considerations. The HAC works closely with the all-source
intelligence elements and the CIAC to ensure that HUMINT reporting is
incorporated into the all-source analysis and common operational picture
(COP). The HAC is the “fusion point†for all HUMINT reporting and
operational analysis in the JISE and ACE. It determines gaps in reporting
and coordinates with the RM to cross-cue other intelligence sensor systems.
The HAC
⎯
•
Produces and disseminates HUMINT products and provides input to
intelligence summaries (INTSUMs).
•
Uses analytical tools found at the ACE or JISE to develop long-term
analyses and provides reporting feedback that supports the HOC,
OMTs, and HCTs.
•
Provides analytical expertise to the C/J/G/S2X, HOC, and OMTs.
•
Produces country and regional studies tailored to HUMINT collection.
•
Compiles target folders to assist C/J/G/S2X assets in focusing collection
efforts.
•
Analyzes and reports on trends and patterns found in HUMINT
reporting.
•
Analyzes source reliability and credibility as reflected in reporting and
communicates that analysis to the collector.
•
Develops and maintains databases specific to HUMINT collection
activities.
•
Produces HUMINT requirements.
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
6 September 2006
2-7
•
Answers HUMINT-related RFIs.
•
Identifies collection gaps and provides context for better collection at
their echelon.
JOINT INTERROGATION AND DEBRIEFING CENTER ANALYSIS SECTION
2-17.
This section ensures that all members of the Joint Interrogation and
Debriefing Center (JIDC) (see para 5-102) are aware of the current situation
through the distribution of INTSUMs and products from external agencies.
The Analysis Section also supports the JIDC by––
•
Providing situation update briefings to all facility personnel every 12
hours.
•
Preparing research and background packets and briefings for
interrogations and debriefings.
•
Developing indicators for each intelligence requirement to support
screening operations.
•
Conducting single-discipline HUMINT analysis based on collected
information to support further collection efforts.
•
Correlating reports produced by the JIDC to facilitate analysis at
higher levels.
•
Answering RFIs from interrogators and formulating RFIs that cannot
be answered by the analytical section on behalf of the interrogators.
•
Reviewing IIRs and extracting information into analysis tools tailored
to support the interrogation process.
•
Pursuing products and resources to support the interrogation effort.
HUMINT ANALYSIS TEAM
2-18.
The HUMINT analysis team (HAT) is subordinate to the G2 ACE. The
HAT supports the G2 in the development of IPB products and in developing
and tailoring SIRs to match HUMINT collection capabilities.
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FM 2-22.3
6 September 2006
3-1
Chapter 3
HUMINT in Support of Army Operations
3-1.
Army doctrine for full spectrum operations recognizes four types of
military operations: offensive, defensive, stability and reconstruction, and
civil support. Missions in any environment require the Army to conduct or be
prepared to conduct any combination of these operations. HUMINT assets
will be called on to provide information in support of all four operations.
Simultaneous operations, for example elements of a force conducting
offensive operations while other elements are engaged in stability and
reconstruction operations, will cause a similar division of the limited
HUMINT assets based on METT-TC.
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
3-2.
Offensive operations aim at destroying or defeating the enemy. Rapid
maneuver, constantly changing situations, and a vital need for intelligence
support at the point of contact influence HUMINT missions during offensive
operations. The guiding principle to the use of HUMINT in support of
offensive operations is to minimize the time between when friendly forces
encounter potential sources (detainees, refugees, and local civilians) and
when a HUMINT collector screens them.
3-3.
During offensive operations, at echelons corps and below, HCTs
normally operate in the engaged maneuver brigades’ AOs and are further
deployed in support of maneuver battalions based on advice from the OMTs.
These collection assets may be in general support (GS) of the parent brigade
or in DS of the maneuver battalions, reconnaissance squadrons, and other
forward-deployed maneuver assets. The HCTs and their supporting control
structure are deployed in accordance with METT-TC based on three
principles:
•
The relative importance of that subordinate element’s operations to the
overall parent unit’s scheme of maneuver and the overall ISR plan.
•
The potential for that subordinate element to capture detainees, media
and materiel, or to encounter civilians on the battlefield.
•
The criticality of information that could be obtained from those sources
to the success of the parent unit’s overall OPLANs.
3-4.
HUMINT missions in support of offensive operations include screening
and interrogating EPWs and other detainees, questioning and debriefing
civilians in the supported unit’s AO, and conducting DOCEX, limited to
extracting information of immediate tactical value. EAC assets normally
support offensive operations through theater interrogation and debriefing
facility operations and mobile interrogation teams. These facilities are better
equipped to conduct in-depth interrogations and DOCEX, so it is imperative
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
3-2
6 September 2006
that EPWs and other detainees who will be evacuated to theater facilities be
transported there as soon as possible.
HUMINT IN SUPPORT OF FORCED ENTRY OPERATIONS
3-5.
Forced entry operations (FEOs) are offensive operations conducted to
establish an initial military presence in a target area in the face of expected
enemy opposition. HUMINT collection assets may be able to provide vital
information to tactical commanders in the critical early stages of the entry
operation. Key considerations for HUMINT support to FEOs include:
•
HUMINT collectors attached or under OPCON of the initial force
package to provide HUMINT collection support for the entry force.
Collection teams will normally operate in support of battalion-sized or
smaller elements. HUMINT collection assets should be integrated
early and should participate in all aspects of planning and training,
including rehearsals, to smoothly integrate and execute operations.
•
HUMINT assets supporting the entry force must include proportional
OMT elements. For example, if 2 to 4 teams are attached to a
maneuver brigade, an OMT also needs to be attached. Even if the
teams are further attached to maneuver battalions, there must be an
OMT at the brigade level to coordinate and control HUMINT collection
activities.
•
HCTs and OMTs must be as mobile and as survivable as the entry
forces. Team leaders should ensure that the supported unit will be able
to provide maintenance support to the team vehicles, as appropriate, in
accordance with the support relationship.
•
Attached or OPCON HUMINT teams must have robust
communications connectivity with the supported unit and must have
reach connectivity through their OMT.
•
HCTs must contain organic or attached language capability in order to
conduct HUMINT collection effectively during FEO. It is unlikely that
the teams can be augmented with attached civilian interpreters during
this type of operation.
HUMINT IN SUPPORT OF EARLY ENTRY OPERATIONS
3-6.
Early entry operations differ from FEOs in that early entry operations
do not anticipate large-scale armed opposition. Early entry operations
establish or enhance US presence, stabilize the situation, and shape the
environment for follow-on forces. HUMINT collection provides critical
support to defining the operational environment and assessing the threat to
US forces. The considerations listed above for FEOs apply equally to early
entry operations.
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
3-7.
Defensive operations defeat an enemy attack, buy time, economize
forces, hold the enemy in one area while attacking in another, or develop
conditions favorable for offensive operations. Forces conducting defensive
________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
6 September 2006
3-3
operations must be able to identify rapidly the enemy’s main effort and
rapidly assess the operational conditions to determine the timing of counter-
offensive or other operations. HUMINT support to defensive operations
centers on the ability to provide the forward-deployed maneuver commander
with information and intelligence of immediate tactical value. HUMINT
assets should be placed in the AO of the forward elements to minimize the
time between when friendly forces encounter potential sources (detainees,
refugees, local civilians) and when a HUMINT collector screens them.
HUMINT collectors are placed where the potential for HUMINT collection
and the criticality of the information are greatest.
3-8.
In defensive operations, it may be necessary to divide the HUMINT
assets equally among the subordinate elements to provide area coverage
until the primary enemy threat is identified. The HUMINT C2 elements
(team leader, OMTs, and unit C2) must be prepared to task organize rapidly
and shift resources as the situation dictates, based on the changing situation
and higher headquarters FRAGO. HUMINT missions in defensive operations
normally include interrogation of detainees, refugee debriefings, and
assisting in friendly force patrol debriefings.
STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS
3-9.
Stability and reconstruction operations sustain and exploit security and
control over areas, populations, and resources. They employ military and
civilian capabilities to help establish order that advances US interests and
values. The immediate goal often is to provide the local populace with
security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-
term goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential
services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and
robust civil society. Stability and reconstruction operations involve both
coercive and cooperative actions. They may occur before, during, and after
offensive and defensive operations; however, they also occur separately,
usually at the lower end of the range of military operations. The primary
focus of the HCTs during stability and reconstruction operations is to answer
the commander's information requirements (IRs) and provide support to force
protection. In stability and reconstruction operations, the HUMINT collectors
must be able to maintain daily contact with the local population. The nature
of the threat in stability operations can range from conventional forces to
terrorists and organized crime and civil disturbances. Consequently,
intelligence requirements can vary greatly. Examples of HUMINT collection
requirements include TECHINT to support arms control; extensive political
information and demographic data; order of battle (OB) regarding several
different former warring factions during peace operations; or extremely
detailed target data. HUMINT collectors also help to ascertain the feelings,
attitudes, and activities of the local populace. Stability and reconstruction
operations may be conducted in coordination with other US departments and
agencies, and in conjunction with other countries and international
organizations.
3-10.
Centralized management and databasing are key to successful
HUMINT operations. The HUMINT assets may operate in GS to the parent
unit or operate in the AO of subordinate elements of the parent unit. For
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
3-4
6 September 2006
example, in a division AO, the HCTs would normally operate in DS to the
division but each team would normally have an AOIR that corresponds to the
AO of the division’s brigades or battalion task forces. There is close
coordination between the HUMINT staff officer (C/J/G/S2X) and the OMTs to
synchronize HUMINT operations properly, to develop the overall threat
awareness, and to deconflict sources. The HCTs screen and debrief contacts
to increase the security posture of US forces, to provide information in
response to command collection requirements, and to provide early warning
of threats to US forces. They may also interrogate detainees if permitted to
do so by the mission-specific orders and in accordance with applicable law
and policy. Applicable law and policy include US law; the law of war; relevant
international law; relevant directives including DOD Directive 3115.09,
“DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical
Questioningâ€; DOD Directive 2310.1E, “The Department of Defense Detainee
Programâ€; DOD instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOs.
3-11.
Many stability and reconstruction operations are initiated with the
establishment of a lodgment or base area. There is a subsequent expansion of
operations to encompass the entire AO. The general concept of an HCT’s
operation is that of a two-phased effort. In the initial phase, the HCT
establishes concentric rings of operations around the US forces starting from
the supported unit’s base of operations and working outward. Each ring is
based on the threat environment and the commander’s need to develop his
knowledge of the tactical situation. The second, or continuation phase, begins
once the initial information collection ring is established. The initial ring is
not abandoned but rather is added to as the HCT shifts its focus to expand
and establish the second and successive rings. The amount of time spent
establishing each ring is situationally dependent.
INITIAL PHASE
3-12.
The initial phase of stability and reconstruction operations is used to
lay the foundation for future team operations. In general, the priority of
effort is focused inward on security. The HCT conducts initial and follow-up
screenings of locally employed personnel, to establish base data for
subsequent source operations. The supported unit S2, with the assistance of
the HUMINT team leader, establishes procedures to debrief reconnaissance
and surveillance assets operating in the supported unit AO, as well as
regular combat patrols or logistics convoys. The HCT lays the groundwork for
future collection efforts by establishing liaison with local authorities, as well
as developing plans and profiles for HUMINT collection. While establishing
the initial and subsequent rings, the HCT actively seeks to collect PIR
information, whether it pertains to the current ring or any other geographic
location.
CONTINUATION PHASE
3-13.
Following the initial phase, the HCT’s focus shifts outward. While the
HCT continues performing HUMINT collection and analysis functions within
the base camp, it also expands its collection effort to outside the base camp to
answer the supported unit’s requirements. During the continuation phase,
the HCT conducts contact operations with local personnel who may be able to
________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
6 September 2006
3-5
provide information of interest to the local commander or to satisfy the
requirements of the tasking or request. The HCT also conducts liaison with
local authorities, coalition forces (if present), NGOs, and others whose
knowledge or activities may affect the success of the US mission. Any time
the HCT is outside the base camp, it must be careful to observe the local
population and report what it sees. The activities and attitudes of the general
population will often have an effect on the commander’s decisions on how to
conduct US missions in the area.
LEVELS OF EMPLOYMENT
3-14.
HCTs may be employed with varying degrees of contact with the local
population. As the degree of contact with the population increases, the
quantity and diversity of HUMINT collection increases. In many instances,
however, there is a risk to the HCT inherent with increased exposure to the
local population. The ability of the HCT members to fit in with the local
populace can become very important to their safety. Consequently, the
commander should consider exceptions to the ROE, as well as relaxed
grooming and uniform standards, to help HCT members blend in and provide
additional security. Commanders must consider the culture in which the
HCT members will be operating. In some cultures, bearded men are more
highly respected than clean-shaven men. Relaxing grooming standards for
HCTs in these situations will support the team’s ability to collect
information. The decision regarding what level to employ an HCT is METT-
TC dependent. The risk to the collection assets must be balanced with the
need to collect information and to protect the force as a whole. The
deployment and use of HUMINT collection assets may be limited by legal
restrictions, mission-specific orders, directions from higher headquarters,
and the overall threat level. The four basic levels of employment for the HCT
are discussed below. Figure 3-1 shows these levels as well as their collection
potential versus team security.
Base Camp
•
Restricting the HCT to operations within the base camp minimizes the
risk to the team. This action, however, minimizes the collection
potential and maximizes the risk to the force as a whole. While
restricted to a base camp, the HCT can maintain an extremely limited
level of information collection by
⎯
ƒ
Interviewing walk-in sources and locally employed personnel.
ƒ
Debriefing combat and ISR patrols.
ƒ
Conducting limited local open-source information collection.
•
This mode of deployment should be used only when dictated by
operational restrictions. These would be at the initial stages of stability
and reconstruction operations when the operational environment is
being assessed, or as a temporary expedient when the force protection
level exceeds the ability to provide reasonable protection for the
collectors. A supported unit commander is often tempted to keep the
HCT “inside the wire†when the force protection level or threat
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
3-6
6 September 2006
condition (THREATCON) level increases. The supported unit and
parent commanders must compare the gains of the HCT collection
effort with the risks posed. This is necessary especially during high
THREATCON levels when the supported unit commander needs as
complete a picture as possible of the threat arrayed against US or
multinational forces.
Figure 3-1. Team Level of Employment.
Integrated with Other Operations
•
Under some circumstances, when it is not expedient to deploy the HCT
independently due to threat levels or other restrictions, it can be
integrated into other ongoing operations. The HCT may be employed
as part of a combat patrol, ISR patrol, or in support of an MP patrol or
stationed at a checkpoint or roadblock. It can also be used to support
CA, psychological operations (PSYOP), engineer, or other operations.
This method reduces the risk to the team while greatly increasing its
collection potential over the confined-to-base-camp method. It has the
advantage of placing the team in contact with the local population and
allowing it to spot, assess, and interact with potential sources of
information.
•
The integration into other operations can also facilitate the elicitation
of information. However, this deployment method restricts collection
by subordinating the team’s efforts to the requirements, locations, and
timetables of the unit or operation into which it is integrated.
Integration can be done at the team or individual collector level.
HUMINT collectors should be used only in situations with an
HI
LO
HI
LO
C
O
L
L
E
C
T
I
O
N
P
O
T
E
N
T
I
A
L
SECURITY TO THE TEAM
Base
Camp
With
ISR
Assets
Defensive
Independent
Soft
Independent
HI
LO
HI
LO
C
O
L
L
E
C
T
I
O
N
P
O
T
E
N
T
I
A
L
SECURITY TO THE TEAM
Base
Camp
With
ISR
Assets
Defensive
Independent
Soft
Independent
________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
6 September 2006
3-7
intelligence collection potential. It is a waste of a valuable asset to use
them in a function that could be performed by a civilian translator.
As an Independent Patrol
•
Defensive. One of the key elements of the HCT success is the
opportunity to spot, assess, and develop relationships with potential
sources of information. Operating as independent patrols, without
being tied to ISR or combat assets, enables the HCTs maximum
interaction with the local population, thereby maximizing the pool of
potential sources of information. The HCT must be integrated into the
supported unit’s ISR plan and be provided with other command
elements as needed to support the collection mission. The team leader
will advise the supported unit on the specific capabilities and
requirements of the team to maximize mission success. This method
also increases the risk to the team. HCT members must carry the
necessary firepower for self-protection. They must also have adequate
communications equipment to call for help if needed. The team’s
posture, equipment, and appearance will be dictated by overall force
restrictions and posture. When operating as an independent patrol, the
HCT should not stand out from overall US forces operations. If US
forces are in battle-dress uniforms and operating out of military
vehicles, so should the HUMINT collectors.
•
Soft. If the threat situation is such that soldiers are authorized to
wear civilian clothes when outside base areas, the HUMINT collectors
should also move among the civilian population in civilian clothes, so
that they do not stand out from others in the area.
CIVIL SUPPORT OPERATIONS
3-15.
Army support supplements the efforts and resources of state and local
governments and organizations. If a presidential declaration initiates civil
support for a major disaster or emergency, involvement of DOD intelligence
components would be by exception. Civil support requires extensive
coordination and liaison among many organizations—interagency, joint, AC,
and RC—as well as with state and local governments, and in any case will
require compliance with the Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C., § 1385, when
US forces are employed to assist Federal, state, or local law enforcement
agencies (LEAs). The National Response Plan provides a national level
architecture to coordinate the actions of all supporting agencies.
MILITARY OPERATIONS IN URBAN ENVIRONMENT
3-16.
Units are often task organized with additional ISR units and assets to
meet the detailed collection requirements in the urban operations. The
complexities of urban terrain cause degradation in the capabilities of many of
the sensor systems. HUMINT collectors may have to be placed in DS of lower
echelon combat maneuver forces (battalion and lower) to support operations.
HUMINT and combat reporting by units in direct contact with threat forces
and local inhabitants becomes the means of collection. For successful ISR
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
3-8
6 September 2006
planning, the S2 must be aware of the capabilities and limitations of the
various organic and attached collection systems as they apply to urban
operations. As in all environments, commanders must assess the risk
involved in the forward deployment of HUMINT assets.
3-17.
In urban operations, people (for example, detainees and civilians) are
the preeminent source of information. HUMINT collection provides
information not otherwise available through signals intelligence (SIGINT)
and imagery intelligence (IMINT) such as threat and local population
intentions. They collect information on, for example, floor plans, defensive
plans, locations of combatants and noncombatants, including civilians in the
buildings and surrounding neighborhoods, and other information. The
collected information is passed directly to the individuals conducting the
combat operation.
3-18.
In small-scale contingencies (SSCs) and in peacetime military
engagements (PMEs), contact with local officials and populace by the
HUMINT collectors can be a prime source of information about the local
environment and is a vital component of intelligence support to force
protection. During routine patrolling of urban areas it is often expedient to
place a HUMINT collector with individual patrols. The key difference
between urban and other operations, from major theater war (MTW) to PME,
is the number of HUMINT collectors required. The need for HUMINT
collectors is a function of population density. Whereas in a rural
environment, a HUMINT team may be able to cover an area in excess of
1,200 square kilometers; the same team in a dense urban environment may
be able to cover only 10 square blocks or less.
HUMINT COLLECTION ENVIRONMENTS
HUMINT COLLECTION IN A PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT
3-19.
In a permissive environment, HCTs normally travel throughout their
specific AOR as separate teams or as part of a larger reconnaissance team.
HUMINT collectors may frequently make direct contact with the individual,
view the activity, or visit the area that is the subject of the ISR effort. They
normally use debriefing and elicitation to obtain first-hand information from
local civilians and officials as their primary collection techniques. Additional
information can be obtained from exploitation of open-source material such
as newspapers, television, and other media. The priority requirements in this
environment are normally linked to force protection. HCTs should establish
liaison and casual source contacts throughout their AOIR. Reporting is
normally via IIRs, although SALUTE reports are used for critical time-
sensitive reporting. Even in a permissive environment, the HUMINT
collector conducts the majority of his collection through the debriefing of
individuals who have first-hand knowledge of the information they are
reporting.
________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
6 September 2006
3-9
HUMINT COLLECTION IN A SEMI-PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT
3-20.
In a semi-permissive environment, security considerations increase,
but the risk to the collector still must be weighed against the potential
intelligence gain. HCTs should still be used throughout their AOIR but will
normally be integrated into other ground reconnaissance operations or other
planned operations. For example, a HUMINT collector may accompany a CA
team or PSYOP team visiting a village. Security for the team and their
sources is a prime consideration. The HCTs are careful not to establish a
fixed pattern of activity and arrange contacts in a manner that could
compromise the source or the collector. Debriefing and elicitation are still the
primary collection techniques. Teams are frequently deployed to conduct
collection at roadblocks, refugee collection points, and detainee collection
points. They may conduct interrogations of EPWs and other detainees within
the limits of the mission-specific orders, and applicable law and policy.
Applicable law and policy include US law; the law of war; relevant
international law; relevant directives including DOD Directive 3115.09,
“DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical
Questioningâ€; DOD Directive 2310.1E, “The Department of Defense Detainee
Programâ€; DOD instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOs.
DOCEX is also used to accomplish exploitation of threat documents.
Reporting is normally via SALUTE report and IIR.
HUMINT COLLECTION IN A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT
3-21.
In a hostile environment, the three concerns for HUMINT collection
are access to the sources of information, timeliness of reporting, and security
for the HUMINT collectors. Prior to the entry of a force into a hostile AO,
HUMINT collectors are used to debrief civilians, particularly refugees, and to
interrogate EPWs and other detainees who have been in the AO. HCTs are
normally located with the friendly units on the peripheries of the AO to
facilitate timely collection and reporting. If a refugee or EPW/detainee
population exists prior to this mission, they are screened to determine
knowledgability of the AO and are debriefed or interrogated as appropriate.
HUMINT collectors accompany the friendly ground reconnaissance elements
as they enter the AO. As part of the ground reconnaissance force, they
interrogate EPWs and other detainees and debrief refugees, displaced
persons, and friendly force patrols. Reporting is normally via oral or written
SALUTE reports with more detailed information reported via IIRs. They may
also support the S2 through the systematic debriefing of friendly ground
reconnaissance assets and the translation of any documents collected by
them.
EAC HUMINT
MI BRIGADES AND MI GROUPS SUPPORTING COMPONENT COMMANDS
3-22.
Each SCC with an outside continental United States (OCONUS)
responsibility has an US Army Intelligence and Security Command
(INSCOM) MI brigade or group to provide operational HUMINT support to
that command. These MI elements provide peacetime support to the unified
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
3-10
6 September 2006
command and add a consistent, forward-deployed presence in a particular
theater of operations. Theater MI brigade and group assets provide HUMINT
support during contingency operations. These HCTs can support a JTF, an
army combatant command, or any deployed element that requires
augmentation.
JOINT, COMBINED, AND DOD HUMINT ORGANIZATIONS
3-23.
The Departments of the Air Force and the Navy have limited HUMINT
collection capability. They will normally provide strategic debriefing trained
and certified personnel to joint interrogation and debriefing facilities
primarily to collect information on areas of particular interest to that
Military Department. Within the Department of the Navy, however, the US
Marine Corps has a robust tactical HUMINT collection capability that
operates primarily in support of engaged Marine Corps forces. Marine
expeditionary elements deploy with human exploitation teams (HETs) that
provide organic HUMINT and CI support to the deployed Marine force.
Marine HETs are rapidly deployable and fully equipped to conduct the full
range of tactical HUMINT and CI functions. They can provide support to
either the deployed Marine force or as part of JTF HUMINT or CI teams.
Each Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) has organic HETs. HETs can also
be attached to a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) for a particular
operation.
SUPPORT AGENCIES
3-24.
HUMINT agencies from DOD, national level intelligence agencies, and
LEAs can support the battlefield commander. In a JTF, a national
intelligence support team (NIST) works with the J2X to coordinate national
level activities with JTF and component HUMINT and analytical assets.
Sometimes liaison officers (LNOs) are assigned directly to the C/J/2X to
facilitate collection activities.
•
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).
The DIA is a DOD combat
support (CS) agency and an important member of the United States
Intelligence Community. With more than 7,000 military and civilian
employees worldwide, DIA is a major producer and manager of foreign
military intelligence. DIA provides military intelligence to warfighters,
defense policymakers and force planners in DOD and the Intelligence
Community in support of US military planning and operations and
weapon systems acquisition.
ƒ
Defense HUMINT (DH) Service.
The DH Service, a branch of the
DIA, is the force provider for strategic HUMINT forces and
capabilities. During operations, elements from DH form a
partnership within the supported JTF headquarters J2X element for
the coordination and deconfliction of HUMINT source-related
collection activities. DH support to a joint force is outlined in the
classified DIAM 58-11 and DIAM 58-12.
•
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
The CIA supports US national
security policy by providing accurate, evidence-based, comprehensive,
and timely foreign intelligence related to national security. The CIA
________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
6 September 2006
3-11
conducts CI activities, HUMINT collection, special activities, and other
functions related to foreign intelligence and national security as
directed by the President. Joint Pub 2-01.2 (S//NF) contains details of
CIA contributions to the deployed force.
•
Department of State.
The State Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic
Security provides CI support to diplomatic missions worldwide and
gathers extensive information on intelligence capabilities of
adversaries within that diplomatic mission’s area of concern. The
Bureau of Intelligence and Research is the State Department's primary
source for interpretive analysis of global developments. It is also the
focal point in the State Department for all policy issues and activities
involving the Intelligence Community.
•
National Security Agency (NSA).
The NSA is a DOD agency that
coordinates, directs, and performs highly specialized activities to
protect US information systems and produce foreign intelligence
information. It is also one of the most important centers of foreign
language analysis and research within the Government.
•
Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS).
The DCIS is the
criminal investigative arm of the Inspector General (IG) of DOD. The
DCIS’s mission is to protect America’s warfighters by initiating,
conducting, and supervising investigations in support of crucial
National Defense priorities.
•
Department of Justice
:
ƒ
Federal Bureau of Investigation. The FBI may provide the deployed
commander with national level expertise on criminal and CI issues if
currently operating in a task force (TF) AO and liaison is established
early.
ƒ
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). The DEA provides counterdrug
operational expertise to a deployed TF and coordinates its operations
with those of a deployed TF.
•
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
The DHS mission is to
prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce the
vulnerability of the United States to terrorism, protect the homeland,
its citizens, and critical infrastructure and key resources against
terrorist attack. DHS provides a lead for Federal incident response,
management, and recovery in the event of terrorist attack and natural
disasters. The Secretary of Homeland Security is the principal Federal
official for domestic incident management. Pursuant to the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, the Secretary is responsible for coordinating
Federal operations within the United States to prepare for, respond to,
and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other
emergencies. DHS operates the Homeland Security Operations Center
(HSOC) and the DHS-led Interagency Incident Management Group
(IIMG). The DHS AOR is the US and its territories. DHS secures and
protects the entry points to the nation, the areas between the entry
points, land and water, for people, and cargo or conveyances. DHS
enforces immigration, customs, and transportation security laws and
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
3-12
6 September 2006
regulations, counter-narcotics, counterfeiting, financial crimes, and
threats to the President. As legislated in the Homeland Security Act of
2002, DHS is chartered as the primary outreach Federal activity for
state, local, and tribal governments, and the private sector. Although
DHS has no direct role in support of a “battlefield commander†outside
the United States, DHS component organizations have representatives
deployed in support of US Government missions in the US Central
Command (USCENTCOM) AOR.
•
Department of Energy (DOE).
The DOE can assist with the—
ƒ
Exploitation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
ƒ
Protection or elimination of weapons and weapons-useable (dual-
use) nuclear material or infrastructure.
ƒ
Redirection of excess foreign weapons expertise to civilian
enterprises.
ƒ
Prevention and reversal of the proliferation of WMD.
ƒ
Reduction of the risk of accidents in nuclear fuel cycle facilities
worldwide.
ƒ
The capability enhancement of WMD detection including nuclear,
biological, and chemical (NBC).
•
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA).
The NGA is a
member of the US Intelligence Community and a DOD Combat
Support Agency. NGA provides timely, relevant, and accurate
geospatial intelligence in support of national security objectives.
Geospatial intelligence is the exploitation and analysis of imagery and
geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical
features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth.
•
Counterintelligence Field Agency (CIFA).
The mission of CIFA is
to develop and manage DOD CI programs and functions that support
the protection of the Department. These programs and functions
include CI support to protect DOD personnel, resources, critical
information, research and development programs, technology, critical
infrastructure, economic security, and US interests against foreign
influence and manipulation, as well as to detect and neutralize
espionage against the Department.
3-25.
Most potential coalition partners have some type of HUMINT
capability. Less developed nations may use HUMINT as their primary
collection system and may be quite skilled in HUMINT operations. These
assets will be present on the battlefield, and US assets are likely to work
with them. HCTs should perform regular liaison with coalition HUMINT
personnel. It is likely that some coalition partners will be more
knowledgeable of the culture in the AO and be able to share insights with US
HCTs.
FM 2-22.3
Chapter 4
HUMINT Operations Planning and Management
4-1. HUMINT operations planning and management are supported by a
robust structure that includes staff elements such as the C2X when working
with non-US forces at the Joint intelligence staff level, G2X at the Division,
Corps intelligence staff, the HUMINT operations section in the MI Battalion,
and HAT in the Division and Corps ACE. It also includes C2 elements at the
MI battalion, company, platoon, and team levels. The OMT provides the first
level of staff and C2 functions when two or more HCTs deploy in support of
an operation. (See Table 4-1.)
Table 4-1. HUMINT Operations.
E
ECHE
CHELON
LON
ISR
ISR
P
PL
LA
ANNI
NNING
NG
T
TE
ECHNIC
CHNICA
AL
L
S
SU
UPPO
PPOR
RT
T A
AN
ND
D
D
DE
ECONFLICT
CONFLICTION
ION
MI
MIS
SS
SIIO
ON
N
EXECU
EXECUT
TIO
ION
N
COMB
COMBIN
INE
ED
D
C2/A
C2/ACE
CE
C2X
C2X//OMT
OMT
M
MI CD
I CDR
R
JOI
JOIN
NT
T
J2
J2//A
AC
CE
E
J2
J2X/
X/OM
OMT
T
MI CD
MI CDR
R
((A
AMIB or
MIB or MI Battal
MI Battaliion)
on)
CORP
CORPS
S//DIV
DIVIIS
SIION
ON
G2
G2//A
ACE
CE
G2
G2X/
X/OM
OMT
T
MI CD
MI CDR/OMT
R/OMT
BR
BRIG
IGAD
ADE
E
S2
S2
MI CD
MI CDR/OMT
R/OMT
MI CD
MI CDR/OMT
R/OMT
HUMINT AND THE OPERATIONS PROCESS
4-2. Following the operations process defined in FM 3-0, Chapter 6, there are
four components within HUMINT operations: Plan, Prepare, Execute, and
Assess.
PLAN
4-3. HUMINT planning defines collection objectives, when to collect it, and
which resources will be tasked to do the collection. Commanders with
HUMINT collection assets in their units receive collection tasking based on
requirements developed during ISR planning. The commander and staff, in
concert with their supporting OMTs, assess the requirements and task the
team or teams best capable of answering the requirement based on contact
placement and access.
4-4. Another aspect to consider carefully during the Plan phase of the
operational cycle is technical control. Technical control is ensuring adherence
to existing policies and regulations, providing information and guidance of a
technical nature, and supervising the MOS-specific TTP required in
6 September 2006
4-1
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
conducting collection missions. Planning must take into account that
technical control does not interfere with or supersede any C2 that a
commander has over an asset or unit nor does it interfere with collection of
the commander's requirements. For HUMINT collectors, the technical control
network includes the C/J/G/S2X, the HOC, and OMTs. Technical control
includes the management of source and other sensitive data and databases,
the management of intelligence contingency and incentive funds, the liaison
with other HUMINT organizations, and the deconfliction of operations.
Technical control provides HCTs with specific requirements and data that
they need to conduct operations and, in certain circumstances, specific
instructions on how to execute missions.
PREPARE
4-5. During this phase, commanders and staff, including HUMINT
management sections, review HUMINT mission plans. This review is to
ensure all areas of the mission are considered and addressed in the plan and
included in rehearsals. Items to cover include but are not limited to
⎯
•
Route (primary and alternate).
•
Communications.
•
Security plan.
•
Convoy procedures including actions on contact and rally points.
•
Initial requirements to be covered.
•
Mission duration.
4-6. The HUMINT collector then researches the topic area addressing the
requirement and prepares a questioning plan. The HCTs and OMTs must
coordinate all mission requirements. It is important that HUMINT elements
are included in all rehearsals conducted by their supported unit. These
rehearsals will enable HCTs to carry out essential coordination with other
units and ensure that they are included in and familiar with procedures such
as resupply, communications, casualty evacuation, fire support, and
fratricide avoidance. Rehearsals and briefbacks will allow the supported
command to see and correct problems with their support to the HUMINT
elements prior to deployment.
EXECUTE
4-7. Mission execution consists of the collection of information in accordance
with the integrated ISR plan. The requirements manager validates the
requirements based on command guidance. The G3 tasks the requirements to
the units and the individual asset managers (that is, OMT) to identify the
assets best capable to answer the requirement. When requirements are
levied against a specific HCT, the HCT leader decides which of his team’s
contacts can best answer the requirements. He then turns the requirement
into specific team tasks.
ASSESS
4-8. Assessment is the continuous monitoring––throughout planning,
preparation, and execution—of the current situation and progress of an
6 September 2006
4-2
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
operation, and the evaluation of it against criteria of success to make
decisions and adjustments. Assessment plays an integral role in all aspects of
the intelligence process (see FM 2-0).
HUMINT COMMAND AND CONTROL
4-9. Commanders of organizations that conduct HUMINT operations are
responsible for task organization, mission tasking, execution, mission
accomplishment, and designation of subordinate AOs (within the guidelines
of the OPORD or OPLAN
).
MI unit commanders who exercise direct control
of HUMINT operations, including interrogation operations, at all levels are
responsible for and stand accountable to ensure HUMINT collection activities
comply with this manual and applicable law and policy. Applicable law and
policy include US law; the law of war; relevant international law; relevant
directives including DOD Directive 3115.09, “DOD Intelligence
Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioningâ€; DOD
Directive 2310.1E, “The Department of Defense Detainee Programâ€; DOD
instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOs. The MI unit
commanders must ensure mission accomplishment by properly allocating
resources and logistics in support of all HUMINT collection assets assigned
to their units. Commanders must ensure that their HUMINT collection
personnel are trained and ready for the mission. There is a need for a
partnership between the J/G2X, who exercises technical direction and
oversight responsibility and the MI commander, who exercises direct
command authority and responsibility. The MI unit commander analyzes the
higher headquarters mission, concept of operations, and the specified and
implied tasks given to his unit. He restates the unit mission, designs the
concept of operations, task organizes his assets, and provides support to
subordinate units. Specifically, the MI unit commander
⎯
•
Issues mission orders with sufficient details and time for subordinate
commanders and leaders to plan and lead their units.
•
Must know the threat, his organization, ISR systems, counter-ISR
systems, operations, and terrain over which his units will operate and
how that terrain enhances or limits HUMINT collection operations.
•
Must be aware of the operational and technical limitations of his unit
and ensures that all assets are task organized, properly positioned, and
fully synchronized to accomplish the mission.
•
Oversees the collective and individual training within his unit.
•
Coordinates continuously with the higher headquarters staff, the
supported maneuver unit staff, and other commanders to ensure
integrated R&S operations and support.
•
Establishes clear, consistent standards and guidance for current and
future operations in order to adhere to policy and the higher
headquarters commander’s intent without his constant personal
supervision.
•
Continually assesses his unit’s ability to sustain its internal operations
and its ability to support assigned missions and keeps the higher
headquarters staff informed of unit, equipment, and personnel status
that affect collection operations.
6 September 2006
4-3
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
•
Advises his higher headquarters commander and staff on the
capabilities, limitations, and most effective employment of his assets.
•
Remains flexible during operations to adjust or execute missions upon
receipt of new orders and when the situation changes.
•
Ensures personnel are working within legal, regulatory, and policy
guidelines.
TECHNICAL CONTROL
4-10. Technical control refers to supervision of the TTP of HUMINT
collection. Technical control ensures adherence to existing policies or
regulations and provides technical guidance for HUMINT operations. The
elements that provide technical control also assist teams in translating
collection requirements into executable tasks. Commanders rely on the
expertise of intelligence personnel organic to their unit and within higher
echelons to plan, execute, and assess the HUMINT collection effort. The
OMTs, HATs, and the HOC of the C/J/G/S2X provide technical control.
They––
•
Define and manage operational coverage and direction.
•
Identify critical collection criteria such as indicators associated with
targeting.
•
Prioritize collection missions in accordance with collection
requirements.
•
Advise teams on collection techniques and procedures in accordance
with policy, regulations, and law.
•
Register and deconflict sources.
•
Conduct operational reviews.
•
Advise commanders.
•
Conduct operational coordination with staff elements and other
intelligence agencies.
•
Manage ICF and incentive usage.
COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS
4-11. The activities of HUMINT assets are governed by their command or
support relationship. There are subtle differences in the Joint versus the
Army description of some of the command and support relationships.
Tables 4-2 through 4-4 show these relationships.
4-12. During interrogation operations, close coordination must occur between
intelligence personnel and personnel responsible for detainee operations
including MP security forces, Master at Arms, and other individuals
providing security for detainees. The facility commander is responsible for
all actions involving the humane treatment, custody, evacuation, and
administration of detainees, and force protection. Whereas, the intelligence
commander is responsible for the conduct of interrogation operations.
6 September 2006
4-4
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS FOR HUMINT OPERATIONS
4-13. Clear command and support relationships are fundamental in
organizing for all operations. These relationships identify responsibilities
and authorities among subordinate and supporting units. The commander
designates command and support relationships within his authority to
weight the decisive operation and support his scheme of maneuver. Some
forces available to a commander are given command or support relationships
that limit his authority to prescribe additional relationships. Command and
support relationships carry with them varying responsibilities to the
subordinate unit by parent and gaining units. By knowing the inherent
responsibilities, a commander may organize his forces to establish clear
relationships.
4-14. Command relationships establish the degree of control and
responsibility commanders have for forces operating under their tactical
control (TACON). When commanders establish command relationships, they
determine if the command relationship includes administrative control
(ADCON). Table 4-2 shows Army command and support relationships and
Table 4-3 shows joint command relationships chart from FM 3-0 (derived
from JP 0-2 and JP 3-0).
4-15. Support relationships define the purpose, scope, and effect desired
when one capability supports another. Support relationships establish
specific responsibilities between supporting and supported units. Table 4-2
shows Army command and support relationships and Table 4-4 shows joint
support relationships from FM 3-0 (derived from JP 0-2 and JP 3-0).
HUMINT REQUIREMENTS MANAGEMENT
4-16. The G2/S2 is responsible for RM. He uses the requirements
management (RM) process to orchestrate the actions of the unit’s organic and
supporting ISR capabilities into a unified effort to gain situational
understanding and answer the commander’s PIRs. Through centralized
planning and decentralized execution, RM optimizes the integration of ISR
operations into the commander’s scheme of maneuver and fire and into the
unit’s long- and short-range planning. Control mechanisms within the RM
structure facilitate the identification of information shortfalls and the
redirection of ISR assets to new intelligence production, reconnaissance, or
surveillance missions.
6 September 2006
4-5
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
Table 4-2. Army Command and Support Relationships.
INHERENT RESPONSIBILITIES ARE:
IF
RELATIONSHIP
IS:
Has
Command
Relation-
ship with:
May Be
Task
Organized
by:
Receives
CSS
from:
Assigned
Position or
AO By:
Provides
Liaison
To:
Establishes/
Maintains
Communica-
tions
with:
Has Priorities
Established
by:
Gaining Unit
Can Impose
Further Com-
mand or Sup-
port
Relationship of:
Attached
Gaining
unit
Gaining
unit
Gaining
unit
Gaining
unit
As re-
quired by
gaining
unit
Unit to which
attached
Gaining unit
Attached;
OPCON;
TACON; GS;
GSR; R; DS
OPCON
Gaining
unit
Parent unit
and gaining
unit; gain-
ing unit
may pass
OPCON to
lower HQ.
Note 1
Parent
unit
Gaining
unit
As re-
quired by
gaining
unit
As required by
gaining unit
and parent
unit
Gaining unit
OPCON;
TACON; GS;
GSR; R; DS
TACON
Gaining
unit
Parent unit
Parent
unit
Gaining
unit
As re-
quired by
gaining
unit
As required by
gaining unit
and parent
unit
Gaining unit
GS; GSR; R; DS
COMMAND
Assigned
Parent unit
Parent unit
Parent
unit
Gaining
unit
As re-
quired by
parent
unit
As required by
parent unit
Parent unit
Not
Applicable
Direct
Support
(DS)
Parent unit
Parent unit
Parent
unit
Supported
unit
Sup-
ported
unit
Parent unit;
Supported unit
Supported unit
Note 2
Reinforc-
ing
(R )
Parent unit
Parent unit
Parent
unit
Reinforced
unit
Rein-
forced
unit
Parent unit;
reinforced unit
Reinforced
unit: then
parent unit
Not
Applicable
General
Support
Reinforc-
ing (GSR)
Parent unit
Parent unit
Parent
unit
Parent unit
Rein-
forced
unit and
as re-
quired by
parent
unit
Reinforced
unit and as
required by
parent unit
Parent unit;
then
reinforced unit
Not
Applicable
SUPPORT
General
Support
(GS)
Parent unit
Parent unit
Parent
unit
Parent unit
As re-
quired by
parent
unit
As required by
parent unit
Parent unit
Not
Applicable
NOTE 1. In NATO, the gaining unit may not task organize a multinational unit (see TACON).
NOTE 2. Commanders of units in DS may further assign support relationships between their subordinate units and elements
of the supported unit after coordination with the supported commander.
6 September 2006
4-6
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
Table 4-3. Joint Command Relationships and Inherent Responsibilities.
(from FM 3-0, derived from JP 0-2 and JP 3-0)
Inherent
If relationship is:
Responsibilities
Are:
COCOM
OPCON
TACON
Has command
Relationship with:
Gaining combatant
commander; gaining
service component
commander
Gaining Command
Gaining Command
May be task organized
by:
Gaining combatant
commander; gaining
service component
commander
Gaining Command
Parent Unit
Receives logistic
support from:
Gaining service
component
commander
Service component
command; parent unit
Parent Unit
Assigned position or
AO by:
Gaining component
commander
Gaining Command
Gaining Command
Provides liaison to:
As required by gaining
component
commander
As required by gaining
command
As required by gaining
command
Establishes and
maintains
communications with:
As required by gaining
component
commander
As required by gaining
command
As required by gaining
command and parent
units
Has priorities
established by:
Gaining component
commander
Gaining Command
Gaining Command
Gaining unit can
impose further
command
relationship/authority
of:
OPCON; TACON;
direct support; mutual
support ; general
support; close support
OPCON; TACON;
direct support; mutual
support; general
support; close support
Direct support; mutual
support; general
support; close support
6 September 2006
4-7
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
Table 4-4. Joint Support Categories.
(from FM 3-0, derived from JP 0-2 and JP 3-0)
C
CA
AT
TE
EGO
GORY
RY
DE
DEFI
FINI
NITI
TIO
ON
N
G
G
Geeene
ne
nerrraaalll S
S
Suppor
uppor
upporttt
T
T
The
he
he ac
ac
actttiiion
on
on gi
gi
givvven t
en t
en tooo ttthe s
he s
he suuupppport
port
porteeeddd forc
forc
forceee as
as
as a whol
a whol
a whole rat
e rat
e rathhher
er
er
ttthan t
han t
han tooo a p
a p
a paaart
rt
rtiiicccul
ul
ular s
ar s
ar subdi
ubdi
ubdivvviiisssiiion t
on t
on thhhereof.
ereof.
ereof.
M
M
Mu
u
utttu
u
uaaalll S
S
Su
u
uppor
ppor
pporttt
T
T
The
he
he ac
ac
actttiiion
on
on ttthat
hat
hat uuunnniiitttsss render
render
render eac
eac
eachhh ot
ot
othhheeer agai
r agai
r agains
ns
nsttt an
an
an ene
ene
enem
m
myyy
bec
bec
becaus
aus
ause o
e o
e offf ttthei
hei
heir as
r as
r assssiiigned t
gned t
gned taaassskkksss,,, ttthei
hei
heir pos
r pos
r posiiitttiiion rel
on rel
on relaaatititivvveee tttooo
eac
eac
each ot
h ot
h othhheeerrr and t
and t
and tooo ttthe ene
he ene
he enem
m
myyy,,, an
an
and t
d t
d thei
hei
heirrr iiinherent
nherent
nherent cccapabi
apabi
apabillliiitttiiies
es
es...
Di
Di
Dirrreeecccttt S
S
Su
u
uppor
ppor
pporttt
A m
A m
A miiissssssiiion
on
on requi
requi
requiri
ri
ring a for
ng a for
ng a forccceee tttooo sssuuupppport
port
port anot
anot
another
her
her ssspec
pec
peciiifffiiiccc fffooorc
rc
rceee
and aut
and aut
and author
hor
horiiizzziiing i
ng i
ng ittt tttooo ans
ans
answer di
wer di
wer direct
rect
rectlllyyy ttthe s
he s
he support
upport
upported
ed
ed forc
forc
forceee’’’sss
reques
reques
requesttt for
for
for aaassssssiiissstttanc
anc
ance.
e.
e.
Cl
Cl
Clos
os
oseee S
S
Su
u
uppor
ppor
pporttt
T
T
The
he
he ac
ac
actttiiion
on
on ooofff ttthe
he
he sssupport
upport
upportiiinnnggg fffooorc
rc
rceee agai
agai
agains
ns
nsttt tttaaarget
rget
rgetsss or o
or o
or obbbjjjeeeccctttiiivvves
es
es
ttthat
hat
hat are s
are s
are suuuffffffiiiccciiient
ent
entlllyyy near t
near t
near the s
he s
he supp
upp
upport
ort
orted
ed
ed fffooorc
rc
rce a
e a
e asss tttooo requ
requ
requiiirrreee
det
det
detai
ai
aillled i
ed i
ed innntttegrat
egrat
egratiiion or c
on or c
on or coordi
oordi
oordinat
nat
natiiiooon of t
n of t
n of the
he
he sssupport
upport
upportiiing a
ng a
ng accctttiiion
on
on
w
w
wiiittthhh fififire,
re,
re, m
m
mooovvveeem
m
ment
ent
ent,,, or ot
or ot
or othe
he
her ac
r ac
r actttiiions
ons
ons ooofff ttthe
he
he sssupport
upport
upported
ed
ed fffooorc
rc
rce.
e.
e.
DEVELOP HUMINT REQUIREMENTS
4-17. The first step in the RM process is to develop intelligence requirements
that accurately identify and prioritize the commander’s concerns about the
threat and the battlefield environment that must be resolved to accomplish
the mission. The G2/S2X, or his representative, normally supports the G2/S2
by identifying HUMINT collection requirements and opportunities and
advises the command and staff on HUMINT capabilities. The HUMINT
representative must be able to discuss any delays or risks involved in using
HUMINT assets. Through participation in the requirements development
process, the HUMINT representative has a thorough understanding of the
commander’s intent and concept of operations and is better able to support
the overall ISR effort.
4-18. The analysis of HUMINT requirements is normally a coordinated effort
between the HUMINT and CI staff officer (C/J/G/S2X) and the HAT of the
supporting analysis element. The C/J/G/S2X team––
•
Records all HUMINT requirements whether generated internally
(Specific Orders) or received from other echelons or units (Requests).
•
Tracks each requirement from receipt to final satisfaction.
•
Reviews each requirement for its––
ƒ
Feasibility.
Feasibility is a determination if a requirement can be
answered given available time and resources.
ƒ
Completeness.
Does the requirement contain all the specifics
needed for collection, such as: What the collection requirement is?
When the latest time information is of value (LTIOV)? Why it needs
to be collected? Who needs the results of the collection?
ƒ
Necessity.
The C/J/G/S2X team, with the assistance of the HAT,
checks available intelligence databases to determine if the required
6 September 2006
4-8
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
information has already been collected or is included in an
intelligence product.
4-19. The RM team, with the assistance of the C/J/G/S2X team and the HAT,
breaks the HUMINT-related PIR into SIRs. Each SIR describes the indicator
of threat activity linked to an area or specific location and time. The HOC
evaluates––
•
Reportable criteria that are linked to the threat activity. The HOC
associates these characteristics with a SIR, and compares the
characteristics to a particular HUMINT asset’s capability to collect.
•
Range, which is the distance from the current location of the HUMINT
asset or resource to the source. In other words, are there sources
available that had or have access to relevant information on the area
or activity in question, and can the HUMINT team contact them in a
timely manner?
•
Timeliness, which is when the information must reach the commander
to be of value; that is, the LTIOV.
4-20. The RM team, supported by the C/J/G/S2X and the HAT, attempts to
answer the SIRs with intelligence products developed from information
available within the existing intelligence databases or pulled from other
organizations within the intelligence architecture. If the requirement can be
answered in this manner, the intelligence is immediately disseminated.
When the required information is neither available nor extractable from
archived information or from lower, lateral, or higher echelons, the
C/J/G/S2X team develops it into an RFI to higher or an ISR tasking for
organic or attached HUMINT assets. The compilation of unanswered
requirements and how to answer them form the basis of the ISR plan. The
tasking may be in the form of an SDR. An SDR is a specific request or
tasking for a collector to question a source on a particular collection
requirement. This request involves analysis that results in the conclusion
that a specific source possibly has the placement and access to answer a SIR.
SDRs are specific; whereas, HUMINT collection requirements (HCRs) are
general.
DEVELOP THE HUMINT PORTION OF THE INTEGRATED ISR PLAN
4-21. The HOC within the C/J/G/S2X section assists the G3/G2 in developing
the HUMINT portion of the ISR plan in coordination with the HAT and the
RM team. The HOC ensures that the HUMINT capabilities and taskings are
included in the plan although the plan often will not contain the specifics of
HUMINT operations due to the sensitivity of the sources and techniques. The
HOC will coordinate with the Office of the SJA to ensure the HUMINT
portion of the integrated ISR plan complies with applicable law and policy
prior to its implementation. Applicable law and policy include US law; the
law of war; relevant international law; relevant directives including DOD
Directive 3115.09, “DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings,
and Tactical Questioningâ€; DOD Directive 2310.1E, “The Department of
Defense Detainee Programâ€; DOD instructions; and military execute orders
including FRAGOs. The HOC coordinates with C/J/G/S2X for mission
deconfliction at that echelon to specify the collection capability and current
6 September 2006
4-9
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
status of the various HUMINT organizations to better enable him to select
the "best" organization to collect on various SIRs. HUMINT collection
generally requires time to develop the environment and access sources.
4-22. The HUMINT collection environment during an SSC is different from
an MTW. During an MTW where the force is moving, a division normally
plans 48 hours out; a corps plans 72 hours out. In contrast, the planning
focus for units supporting an SSC may be 3 to 6 months out. The longer
HCTs are in an area, the better the collector is able to develop leads to
answer collection requirements. Requirements may be continuous or may be
concerned with specific upcoming events such as national elections. HUMINT
is a key asset to determine adversary intentions; however, it is highly
dependent on the ability to cultivate or locate sources with the desired
information. HUMINT in support of stability and reconstruction operations is
not a short-term undertaking. [Example: National level elections are taking
place in the AO in 3 months. As a part of integrated ISR planning, an
assessment must be conducted to determine the capability to answer postÂ
election collection requirements based upon current contacts and HUMINT
leads. If there are no leads or contacts that could answer election-related
collection requirements, it is necessary to spot, assess, and contact sources to
meet requirements.]
4-23. A second part of the HUMINT portion of the integrated ISR plan is the
HUMINT collection focus, which
⎯
•
Designates which collection requirements comprise the emphasis for
collectors’ missions.
•
Prioritizes collection requirements based upon the operational
environment in the AO and future missions in the AO.
•
Includes future operational collection tasks which aid in causing a gap
or pause in collection as the unit transitions to the next operational
phase or the next operation.
4-24. In addition to specific requirements, a statement of intelligence
interest (SII) at the joint level or a collection emphasis message at division or
corps is issued to identify the overall collection goals for a time period. As the
collection request or requirement is passed down, each echelon performs
additional planning for its own specific requirements.
Evaluate HUMINT Resources
4-25. After identifying the SIRs, the HOC and the C/J/G/S2X determine the
availability and capability of HUMINT assets and resources that might
contribute to requirement satisfaction and which are most suited to collect
against each SIR. This does not necessarily imply that the C/J/G/S2X assigns
a tasking to a specific team; rather, it develops the requirements or requests
for an organization that then executes the mission. The HOC and C/J/G/S2X
should also consult the HAT for its analysis of additional potential HUMINT
assets and resources which might be available, both on and off the
battlefield, to contribute to requirement satisfaction. For example, the HAT
may be aware of a group of émigrés now living elsewhere who previously
lived near a target site, and who might be able to provide answers to
collection requirements if debriefed.
6 September 2006
4-10
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
Determine Asset or Resource Capabilities
4-26. The HOC translates the capabilities and limitations of the available
HUMINT assets into a set of factors that they can compare to the SIR
characteristics. Asset capability factors are technical or performance
characteristics, location, and source access. Each HUMINT asset is evaluated
for its—
•
Availability.
The HOC reviews the list of viable HUMINT assets for
current availability and the addition or deletion of capabilities. This
includes considerations such as maintenance time and previous
taskings. Coordination with adjacent and higher headquarters and
national level agencies by the C/J/G/S2X will determine the
availability of higher echelon resources.
•
Survivability
. Survivability must be commensurate with the threats
to which the HUMINT assets will be exposed during the course of
operations. These assets must be as survivable as, or in certain
circumstances more survivable than, the forces they support. The HOC
and the commander must weigh the risk versus the gain in using
HUMINT assets.
•
Reliability.
Reliability is the ability of the asset to overcome threat
deception measures such as misinformation or false information. In
HUMINT there are two areas of reliability: source and collector. Source
reliability is the determination on the part of the collector if the source
is providing accurate information. Collector reliability is a
determination on the part of the HOC that the HUMINT collectors
within a particular organization have the level of training and
experience to collect against a given requirement.
•
Suitability
. Tasking must be based on an asset’s capability and on its
suitability within the context of the overall plan. For example,
HUMINT assets may be capable of collecting against a single target
but have unique capabilities against a second target. Intelligence
requirements may necessitate tasking these HUMINT assets against
the second target if other assets can maintain adequate coverage of the
first target.
•
Connectivity.
Connectivity is a critical aspect of any R&S operation.
Interoperability, reliability, and robustness of sensors,
communications, and supporting automated data processing (ADP) are
crucial to the responsiveness, survivability, and overall combat
effectiveness of a HUMINT asset. If the automation and
communications systems of a HUMINT asset are dissimilar to those of
other units in the AO, or if connectivity among assets, supporting
systems, and supported systems and elements is too fragile to
withstand the stress of operations, commanders will be deprived of
important information essential to conducting tactical operations. The
HUMINT asset must be able to transmit accurate and timely
information to those who must receive it when they need it. Report
formats should adhere to established standards in order to ensure that
information is easily retrieval at the user desktop through automated
queries (push/pull). Planners must look carefully at systems
compatibility and the degree of interoperability among the components
6 September 2006
4-11
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
of the communications architecture. The better the interoperability of
assets and the more robust and redundant the communications links,
the better the cross-cueing and analytical exchange.
Develop the Scheme of Support
4-27. The scheme of support is the orchestration of HUMINT assets,
resources, and requirements to facilitate the collection of information most
effectively. It includes all assets that the G3/S3 can task (organic, attached,
and DS) and the G2 can request (from higher or adjacent units). By
reviewing available HUMINT assets and higher echelon resources, the HOC
and the G/S2X determine whether unit assets or higher echelon resources are
best able to answer the requirements. If another echelon can answer an SIR,
then the J/G/S2, normally through the C/J/G/S2X, requests them to collect
the information and deliver the intelligence product. When planning the
HUMINT portion of the ISR plan, the HOC should consider the following:
•
Cueing
is using one asset to tip off another to a possible target. The
HOC should look for opportunities for HUMINT assets to cue other
collection assets and vice versa.
•
Asset redundancy
uses a combination of the same type of assets
against a high-priority collection target. This is vital in HUMINT
collection since, in dealing with human sources, the information
collected is often part of the overall picture or is influenced by the
perception and prejudice of the source. The collection on the same
target from a number of different assets gives a more accurate
intelligence picture and is a method to validate source reporting.
•
Asset mix
uses a combination of different types of assets against a
high-priority collection target. When the probability of success of one
asset to satisfy the requirement completely is lower than acceptable,
the use of multiple capabilities of different assets increases the
likelihood of success; for example, using SIGINT assets to intercept
voice communications while HUMINT assets observe activities.
Neither can collect all the available information, but the information
collected by both can be fused into a more complete picture. Like asset
redundancy, asset mix places greater demands on the limited assets
available, both collection and analysis, and has to be clearly justified
by the potential intelligence gain.
•
Integration of new requirements
into ongoing missions may make
it possible to reduce timelines, make collection more responsive to the
request, and decrease cost and risk. This is critical in HUMINT due to
the long time that it takes to develop sources. The use of an existing
source to answer new requirements often facilitates collection.
Develop and Prioritize Taskings and Requests for Information
4-28. After the G2/S2X and the G2/S2 approve the HUMINT portion of the
ISR plan, the HOC develops specific orders to task assets, develop additional
assets, and/or requests to seek higher and lateral support and production.
Specific taskings or RFIs are tailored to that specific ISR asset’s capabilities
and limitations. The G2/S2X supports the requirements manager and the
G2/S2 in developing and prioritizing HUMINT taskings. The HOC works
6 September 2006
4-12
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
with the unit requirements manager to incorporate the HUMINT plan into
the overall unit ISR plan and works with the G3/S3 as necessary to help
develop OPORDs or FRAGOs to organic or attached ISR units. HUMINT
taskings will often include technical data that cannot be passed through
normal tasking channels. The HOC will pass that information directly to the
applicable HUMINT OMT or unit operations section.
4-29. The HOC and G2/S2X cannot provide operational taskings to a unit for
collection. Collection is a stated mission that the commander executes.
However, the technical control the HOC can provide as the HUMINT
manager affords the J2/G2X the ability to steer and direct collection assets
and operations. The MI commander and OMT determine specifically which
teams will collect on a given requirement and are responsible for the TTP
used. They report on the status and availability of their collection assets. On
the HCT level, the team chief determines which sources will be contacted and
the details of how the information will be collected from a given source. A
specific plan is developed for each source. This plan should—
•
Identify the requirement.
•
Identify the proposed source.
•
Identify questions to be asked during the source meeting.
•
Contain an outline of how the meeting should proceed.
•
Identify which collector will conduct the source meeting.
4-30. At the HCT level, the senior team member reviews each plan to ensure
the proper planning for the collection mission. The plan is a minimum goal
for the collection. The collector must be fully aware of the overall collection
priorities and be prepared to take advantage of any additional leads.
DIRECT PRODUCTION
4-31. The G2 coordinates intelligence production to provide non-duplicative
all-source intelligence products to the commander, staff, and subordinate
forces. Some type of production occurs in the intelligence staff or separate
analysis element at every echelon from national to battalion level. The HCT
of the ACE at echelon’s division and higher will support the intelligence
production process through the analysis of HUMINT information and the
development of single-discipline HUMINT products.
DISSEMINATE INFORMATION
4-32. The 2X element at each level is normally the release authority for
HUMINT reporting and products, ensuring that reporting, products, and
data are disseminated to the lowest appropriate level. The G/S2X should
preplan criteria for the immediate release of combat information on high-
value targets, impending attacks, or other time-sensitive requirements. This
preplanning will ensure that commanders and other users quickly receive the
information in a format that supports situational understanding, strategic
responsiveness, and ISR and provides support to effects. Special effort is also
made to ensure that information obtained from detainees is passed back
down to the unit that detained them. This measure will support the efforts of
the commander as well as building trust in the intelligence process.
6 September 2006
4-13
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
EVALUATE REPORTING
4-33. The HAT and the HOC provide the requirements manager and the
G2/S2 with expertise to support report evaluation. An important part of the
evaluation process is providing feedback to the collectors. Feedback is
important in HUMINT operations since the same source may be contacted
again for additional information. The collector needs feedback on the
accuracy, reliability, and appropriateness of the information reported. The
G/S2X team tracks reporting to determine how well the HUMINT collection
and production efforts are satisfying the PIRs. The G/S2X team supports the
RM team’s requirements to
⎯
•
Monitor and Maintain Synchronization.
Through coordination
with the G2/S2, the G/S2X, and the HAT, the HOC knows when and
what critical pieces of information are missing from the commander's
estimate of the situation. The HOC uses the HUMINT portion of the
ISR plan to ensure synchronization with the overall operation and
scheme of maneuver. The other critical tool for the HOC is the decision
support template (DST). The HOC must have a complete copy of this
document, ensuring the HUMINT assets do not miss a collection
requirement.
•
Correlate Reports to Requirements.
The HOC tracks which
specific order or group of specific orders originates from which PIR to
ensure that the collected information was provided to the original
requester. This also allows the HOC to rapidly determine which asset
is available for retasking.
•
Screen Reports.
Each report received is screened for accuracy,
timeliness, and applicability to the original tasking or request. If the
HOC determines that it completely fulfills the tasking or request, the
HOC informs the G/S2X and G2/S2 so that the tasking or request can
be closed and the information provided to the original requesting unit.
•
Provide Feedback to Collectors and Analysts.
The HOC provides
feedback to all the HUMINT R&S assets. This is normally provided
through the C2 element of that unit. By doing so, the HOC quickly
reinforces if the reporting is answering the original order or request, or
the HOC can provide guidance if it is not. This feedback is essential.
The RM team may provide additional information on its collection or
analysis if the HOC tells the team exactly what is needed or has been
missed in the original report.
UPDATE ISR PLAN
4-34. This step aids the G2/G3 in updating the ISR plan by eliminating
satisfied collection requirements, redirecting assets to cover non-satisfied
requirements, cross-cueing requirements, and adding new collection
requirements to the ISR. This process is accomplished by adjusting the
HUMINT portion of the overall integrated ISR plan. It maintains intelligence
synchronization and optimizes the exploitation of information in response to
situation changes in the AO. The updated HUMINT plan is distributed to the
G/S2X requirements manager to ensure its incorporation into the overall unit
ISR plan. Continuously updating the HUMINT portion of the ISR plan is
vital due to the time involved in redirecting HUMINT assets.
6 September 2006
4-14
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
HUMINT MISSION PLANNING
4-35. HUMINT mission planning begins when a unit receives a tasking to
conduct HUMINT collection in support of a specific mission, operation, or
collection plan. The mission analysis portion of the MDMP is explained in
FM 5-0. Special factors must be considered when applying the MDMP to
HUMINT operations as discussed below.
RECEIVE AND ANALYZE THE HIGHER HEADQUARTERS ORDER
4-36. Attention must be paid to the support relationship (GS or DS) that
exists between HUMINT assets and the unit. The operational environment,
including applicable law and policy under which the units are operating must
be understood, as this affects the ability of the units to perform certain
missions. Applicable law and policy include US law; the law of war; relevant
international law; relevant directives including DOD Directive 3115.09,
“DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical
Questioningâ€; DOD Directive 2310.1E, “The Department of Defense Detainee
Programâ€; DOD instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOs.
Because of frequently overlapping AOIRs in HUMINT operations, other unit
missions and potential areas of conflict must be identified. Missions of other
non-HUMINT units must be understood for coordination and possible
integration of HUMINT assets. The availability of assets from higher
echelons, requirements to provide support to lower echelons, and the
existence of technical control from higher echelons must be identified.
Tasking, reporting, and communications channels must be clearly
understood.
ISSUE A WARNING ORDER
4-37. After the commander has analyzed his orders and worked out the
mission and related tasks, he must quickly pass on this information to his
team. This is accomplished through the WARNO. As a minimum, the
WARNO must include to whom the order applies, time and nature of the
operation, the earliest time of movement, and the time and place where the
OPORD will be issued. Unit members should prepare for movement while the
leader is performing the remaining preparatory tasks.
MAKE A TENTATIVE PLAN
4-38. When determining how the mission will be carried out, the commander
works with the factors of METT-TC. When planning for HUMINT collection
missions, focus must be placed on the human beings (threat, friendly, and
neutral) as well as the key terrain on the battlefield, including information
on—
•
The demographics of both the AO and AOI.
•
The organization and structure of all opposition in the AO and AOI.
•
The history of the AO and AOI pertinent to the current situation.
•
The economic and social data of all groups in the AO and AOI.
6 September 2006
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FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
•
All key leaders (political, military, social, religious, tribal), opinion
leaders, and other influences on public opinion.
•
The media and its influence on the population of both the AO and AOI.
•
The primary and secondary languages and dialects spoken in all parts
of the AO.
4-39. A target folder, if one is used, provides valuable up-to-date intelligence
information about the AO for mission analysis and planning. Once
intelligence products identify the contentious areas, trends, capabilities, and
latest issues concerning the AO, the commander may request a target folder
prepared on specific items, such as a hostile organization with the inclination
and potential to cause harm to friendly forces. Target folders may include—
•
Imagery of the AO and personalities.
•
Terrain models of the AO.
•
Latest information reports from the AO.
•
Biographical data on key leaders in the AO.
Review Available Assets
4-40. The commander and staff, including the OMTs or HUMINT operations
section, must look at organic assets and consider factors such as language
capability, experience in various aspects of collection, analysis, and
management. If organic assets are inadequate, the commander and staff
should consider additional available assets within the organization and
resources from higher echelons. The commander and staff must consider the
analysis and management structure of a HUMINT operations section in
addition to the OMT and HCTs. During this step the mission analysis and
planning group should determine, among other things—
•
The number of HUMINT collectors available.
•
The number of collectors who are qualified linguists.
•
The number of linguists available to support the collectors.
•
Force protection considerations.
•
The optimal number of HCTs, OMTs, and HUMINT operations
sections that can be configured from the available assets.
•
Whether additional assets such as CI agents, TECHINT personnel,
analysts, additional linguists, or other experts need to be added to
some or all the HCTs to meet mission requirements.
Determine Constraints
4-41. This is a critical step in HUMINT mission analysis. HUMINT collection
operations are affected by applicable law and policy. Applicable law and
policy include US law; the law of war; relevant international law; relevant
directives including DOD Directive 3115.09, “DOD Intelligence
Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioningâ€; DOD
Directive 2310.1E, “The Department of Defense Detainee Programâ€; DOD
instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOs. The degree of
restriction may depend on the type of operation being conducted. Constraints
are normally found in the scheme of maneuver, the concept of operations, and
coordinating instructions. Specific to intelligence interrogation operations, in
6 September 2006
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_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
accordance with DOD Directive 3115.09, “all captured or detained personnel
shall be treated humanely, and all intelligence interrogations or debriefings
to gain intelligence from captured or detained personnel shall be conducted
humanely, in accordance with applicable law and policy. Acts of physical or
mental torture are prohibited.â€
Identify Critical Facts and Assumptions
4-42. The human factor is preeminent in this step. Assumptions and facts
include—
•
How HUMINT collectors can interact with the local population.
•
What types of sources are available.
•
What types of adversary intelligence and unconventional threats are
present.
Conduct Risk Assessment
4-43. There are inherent risks involved in HUMINT collection. HUMINT
collectors need access to the local population to perform their mission. Rules
that restrict all forces to base areas to protect the force may be prudent;
however, these restrictions can severely degrade HUMINT collection
capabilities, particularly in support of force protection requirements. This
measure deprives the collectors of sources needed to anticipate and prevent
violent incidents. HUMINT collectors receive cultural training as well as
security training to allow them to minimize the dangers of interacting with
the local population. Commanders must weigh the risk to collectors against
the risk to the force as a whole, and determine whether to provide additional
security to the HCT in order to allow the team to perform missions outside
the base area to gain needed intelligence. DA Pam 385-1 provides guidance
for risk assessment.
Select Courses of Action (COAs)
4-44. During COA development the staff, under the commander’s guidance,
analyzes various options for deploying and implementing HUMINT assets.
Input from HUMINT senior NCOs and WOs is vital to COA development and
analysis. Items to consider during COA development include—
•
The distribution of the HCTs and OMTs within the AO.
•
The support relationship (GS and DS) that exists for the deployed
teams.
•
The command relationship in effect for the HCTs and OMTs (assigned,
attached, or OPCON).
•
The manner in which the HUMINT assets are phased into the theater.
•
The tactical configuration (personnel and equipment) of the HCT.
•
The actual number of the HCTs and OMTs and the size of the
supporting HUMINT operations section (if any) deployed.
•
The priority of the OMT’s efforts.
•
The priority of linguist support.
6 September 2006
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FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
COLLECTION PRIORITY
4-45. During the MDMP, the MI commander advises his higher headquarters
on the most efficient use of the HUMINT collectors to meet collection
requirements. Depending on the particular higher echelon mission and the
capabilities of the specific personnel under his command, the supported S2
must decide whether to concentrate collection efforts on source, debriefing,
interrogation, tactical questioning, liaison, or DOCEX operations to answer
collection requirements. (See Chapter 5 for a description of these operations.)
The MI commander may be required by his operational tasking to support
any or all of these operations. He must decide how to task organize his assets
to meet these requirements. When faced with limited assets, prioritization of
collection is paramount.
4-46. A commander normally must prioritize HUMINT collections and
DOCEX. Although the decision is primarily dependent on which type of
source (human or document) is most likely to give the priority information,
other factors such as phase of operation, ROE, source availability, and
collection resource capabilities may influence his decision. At the tactical
level, both human sources and documents are screened and the senior
HUMINT soldier establishes the priorities. If documents and human sources
are determined to be equally likely of containing priority information, human
sources are normally exploited first due to—
•
The ability of the HUMINT collector to get a human source to
elaborate and explain his information, which cannot be done with a
document.
•
The rate at which people forget detailed information.
•
The fact that an individual's resistance is easier to bypass immediately
after undergoing a significant traumatic experience (capture). Capture
thrusts them into an unfamiliar environment over which they have no
control and are vulnerable to various approach techniques. This initial
vulnerability passes quickly. An individual's established values begin
to assert themselves again within a day or two, and the individual's
willingness to cooperate might also decrease.
TASK ORGANIZATION
4-47. Because of the need to place HUMINT collectors in contact with the
local population and the need in many cases to integrate the HUMINT
collection process into other operations, the planning and analysis staff for
HUMINT missions is somewhat expanded from the norm. They should
include the C/J/G/S2X, SJA, S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, S6, other staff officers, as
necessary, Provost Marshal, MP, and US Army Criminal Investigation
Command, CA, unit HUMINT commanders, and senior HUMINT technicians
of the deploying unit. If the unit’s mission is to replace a currently deployed
HUMINT unit, a representative of that unit should be included.
4-48. The challenge to the MI commander is the proper training during
operations, task organization, placement, and coordination of movement of
HUMINT elements to meet collection requirements. The unit modified table
of organization and equipment (MTOE) organization, which is designed for
an MTW, may have to be modified to meet the specific requirements of
6 September 2006
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_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
operations in PMEs and SSCs. Augmentation is often needed and must be
requested. Task organization must be flexible to adjust to the dynamic
mission objectives. Commanders must allow for the augmentation of HCT
with other MI specialties and non-MI personnel as mission analysis and
planning indicate the need. Mission analysis and planning identify the
specific requirements for the HUMINT operations section, HAT, OMTs, and
HCTs.
4-49. The composition of the HUMINT elements must be based on METT-TC
factors. The number of HCTs and OMTs in the theater depends on the
intensity of the collection effort and the geographical coverage of the AO.
HCT members should be prepared to support any HUMINT missions they
may receive through command channels. They must have the skills to shift
easily from one set of functions to another based on the dynamic mission
requirements. The number of OMTs in a designated theater will depend on
the type and nature of the mission. A single OMT is capable of managing and
controlling 2 to 4 HCTs. The size and staffing of the OMT will depend on a
number of factors:
•
Whether a HUMINT operations section is deployed and how many
HCTs are subordinate to it.
•
If a single HCT deploys to support a small contingency, there may be
no need for an OMT. In this case the team leader must serve as the
OMT.
•
If three or more OMTs deploy, then a tactical HUMINT operations
section should be deployed.
•
For every 3 to 4 HCTs and their designated OMT, there should be one
headquarters element composed of a platoon leader and a platoon
sergeant to handle all administrative and logistical matters.
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
RESERVE COMPONENT INTEGRATION
4-50. Given the Army’s OPTEMPO and force structure, the integration of
RC forces into the AC is highly likely for future operational deployments.
Commanders must identify their requirements early and establish proactive
coordination (both in garrison and while deployed) with their RC
counterparts to fully integrate them during all phases of training and
operations. During operations that include significant RC participation, an
RC liaison officer normally will be assigned, either temporarily or
permanently (at higher echelons), at the appropriate level of command. The
commander and staff must ensure that the RC LNO is involved in all aspects
of operational planning and execution.
4-51. There are three general categories of RC augmentation:
•
Category 1: Formation of specialized units that include a fully
integrated AC and RC TOE. The activation of the RC of these units is
required for their full operational capability.
•
Category 2: Augmentation of active duty units by RC units to fill out
unit strength levels or to provide additional functionality. For example,
an AC division might require additional HUMINT teams to support it
6 September 2006
4-19
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
during a stability operation. If a division required one additional team,
it should request a team and not request four HUMINT collectors. If
the requirement is for three additional teams, it should request a
HUMINT platoon with its organic C2 and OMTs.
•
Category 3: The requirement for individual augmentees. This usually
occurs when a unit has the C2 structure but needs either additional
personnel or additional capability within the command structure. For
example, a unit may have a HUMINT platoon but the platoon is at 50
percent strength. Individual augmentation is the easiest method of
integration since the individual is integrated in the same manner as
any replacement. The augmented unit normally is required to provide
all equipment other than initial issue-type equipment.
4-52. There are several items to consider in unit augmentation:
•
Accurate Identification of Requirements: During the MDMP, units
need to identify those mission-essential capabilities not already
present in the unit. The G3/S3, working in conjunction with the G1/S1,
considers options that may include RC augmentation of organic units
although the final decision to employ RC units is usually determined at
Headquarters, Department of Army (HQDA). The requirement for
augmentation is forwarded through appropriate personnel channels to
US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) and HQDA, which will
identify the appropriate units or personnel. If approved, they will work
with the appropriate agencies to establish the timeline in which the
units can respond on the Time-Phased Forces Deployment Data List
(TPFDDL). When developing requirements, the requesting unit must
be sure to articulate its needs accurately, specifying required skills,
numbers, and any additional skill identifiers (ASI). [Example: Request
augmentation by a HUMINT platoon consisting of at least a platoon
headquarters, three HCTs, one OMT, two linguists, and one
CI/HUMINT Automated Tool Set (CHATS) proficient operator. The
augmenting element will be operating in support of the commander’s
force protection program in the gaining unit’s AOR.]
•
Activation Timeline: Units need time to mobilize and conduct any
additional collective and individual training that may be specific to the
unit’s mission or operational environment. The requesting unit needs
to be aware of the time required to activate the requested RC and that
there may be differences in levels of training or equipment. Timelines
should be established by FORSCOM to allow resolution of these
problems and should be reflected in the commander’s operational
planning sequence. Timelines will vary from unit to unit and mission
to mission.
•
Training: USAR and ARNG units usually cannot train their units or
individuals to the same proficiency as the AC. Normally, this is due to
the limited amount of training time. Because of this limitation, a
certain degree of train-up prior to deployment may be necessary.
Commanders should identify available training opportunities and
request the participation of personnel identified for augmentation. For
an ongoing mission, you should also plan for an extended “right seat
6 September 2006
4-20
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
ride†mission handover period once the individuals or unit arrives in
the theater of operations.
•
Command and Control: If the RC augmentation requires activation of
an entire unit, it should include their C2 element. If the augmentation
is by individuals, then they will fall under the command and control of
the gaining units.
•
Time on Active Status: USAR and ARNG soldiers are restricted as to
the amount of time they can remain on active status. This timeline
begins on the date of mobilization and ends on the day the soldier
leaves active duty status. Deployed units must take this into account
when conducting continuous operations and must identify the
requirement to replace RC forces early enough to allow for the required
training and handoff procedures.
•
Experience: While RC personnel normally lack current military
experience, they often perform jobs in the civilian sector that either
mitigate this lack of experience or they are able to bring a new and
useful capability with them. Care should be taken that reservists who
have civilian jobs which are similar to their HUMINT MOS (such as
police officers or investigators) recognize the different constraints
under which they operate in the military environment. For example,
police officers who might normally task informants with minimal
oversight cannot do that in their position as a HUMINT collector.
Commanders should try to capitalize on these skills, but ensure proper
training and understanding of the policies and regulations that govern
HUMINT collection operations.
OPERATIONS PLANS, OPERATIONS ORDERS, AND ANNEXES
4-53. An OPLAN is any plan for the conduct of military operations. When a
commander issues a directive for the coordinated execution of a military
operation, it becomes an OPORD. Although plans are based on specific
conditions or assumptions, they are not static. Plans are changed, refined,
and updated as a result of continuous estimates and studies. It is critical to
include HUMINT plans in the Intelligence Annex to the OPLAN.
4-54. The OPORD gives the HUMINT element approval to execute its
mission. OPORDs define the mission, set the parameters of operations,
identify who is responsible for what, and how it is to be supported. Additions
that are necessary to amplify an OPLAN or OPORD are contained in
annexes, appendices, tabs, and enclosures. Tasking for units to conduct
HUMINT collection operations is listed in the main body of the OPORD
under
Tasks to Subordinate Units
. The HUMINT appendix to Annex B
provides the technical guidance for HUMINT collection including the
umbrella concept for HUMINT operations.
4-55. The HUMINT appendices provide details on planning, coordinating,
approving, and managing HUMINT operations as they relate to the unit’s
overall mission. These appendices serve as the basic document authorizing
most HUMINT operations and programs. They must be reviewed and
approved by the appropriate office or commander. The HUMINT appendix to
the ISR Annex is necessary to ensure that augmentation of HUMINT assets
6 September 2006
4-21
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
from other components and agencies are integrated throughout the TF as
required to facilitate their specialized collection requirements. Specific tabs
may include joint debriefing and interrogation facility operations, source
operations, DOCEX, or open-source information.
OPERATIONAL COORDINATION
4-56. HUMINT collection is not conducted in a vacuum. Coordination with
MI organizations and non-MI agencies, units, and staff organizations is often
critical to expedite and complete HUMINT collection operations. (See
Appendix C for predeployment planning.)
MI ORGANIZATIONS
4-57. Elements involved in HUMINT planning, execution, and analysis need
to maintain close coordination with their counterparts in the other
intelligence disciplines. Coordination includes but is not limited to the
disciplines shown below.
Imagery Intelligence:
•
Support imagery analysis by using HUMINT sources to identify or
confirm the identification of items in imagery. This includes, for
example, using human sources to identify the functions of buildings
that have been tentatively identified through external imagery.
•
Coordinate for current military or civilian imagery to use in the
questioning of sources.
•
Cue requirements managers and others involved in imagery tasking on
locations or activities for imagery collection.
•
Coordinate for IMINT information to verify information obtained
through HUMINT collection.
•
Provide imagery for analysis (through still and video photography and
captured imagery).
•
Coordinate for technical support as required when questioning
personnel on subjects related to imagery.
•
Obtain imagery-related collection requirements that can be answered
by human sources.
Signals Intelligence:
•
Support signals analysis by using HUMINT sources to identify or
confirm the information obtained through SIGINT collection.
•
Coordinate for current SIGINT information to use in the questioning of
sources.
•
Cue requirements managers and others involved in SIGINT tasking on
locations or activities (including communications types and
frequencies) for SIGINT collection.
•
Coordinate for information to verify information obtained through
HUMINT collection.
•
Provide SIGINT-related CEDs for SIGINT analysis.
6 September 2006
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_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
•
Coordinate for technical support as required when questioning
personnel on SIGINT-related topics.
•
Obtain SIGINT-related collection requirements that can be answered
by human sources.
Measurement and Signature Intelligence:
•
Support measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) analysis
by using HUMINT sources to identify or confirm the information
obtained through MASINT collection.
•
Cue requirements managers and others involved in MASINT tasking
on locations or activities for the location of MASINT sensors.
•
Coordinate for information to verify information obtained through
HUMINT collection.
•
Provide MASINT-related CEDs for MASINT analysis.
•
Coordinate for technical support as required when questioning
personnel on MASINT-related topics.
•
Obtain MASINT-related collection requirements that can be answered
by human sources.
Technical Intelligence:
•
Support TECHINT analysis by using HUMINT sources and documents
to provide information concerning threat equipment and to support
TECHINT materiel analysis. This includes, for example, the
interrogation or debriefing of equipment operators of the translation of
operators manuals for a piece of equipment being investigated.
•
Coordinate for current information on equipment capabilities to use in
the questioning of sources.
•
Cue requirements managers and others involved in TECHINT tasking
on locations or activities for TECHINT collection. This includes
forwarding the identification and location of equipment of TECHINT
interest obtained during HUMINT collection operations.
•
Coordinate for TECHINT information to verify information obtained
through HUMINT collection.
•
Provide information from CEDs in support of TECHINT.
•
Coordinate for technical support as required when questioning
personnel on subjects related to areas of TECHINT interest.
•
Obtain TECHINT-related collection requirements that can be
answered by human sources.
Counterintelligence:
•
Support CI analysis by using HUMINT sources to provide information
concerning adversary intelligence collection capabilities and
operations.
•
Identify human and document sources that have information of CI
interest.
6 September 2006
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FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
•
Cue requirements managers and others involved in CI tasking
individuals or activities of CI interest.
•
Coordinate for CI information to verify information obtained through
HUMINT collection.
•
Provide information from CEDs in support of CI.
•
Coordinate for CI support as required when questioning personnel on
topics related to areas of CI interest.
•
Obtain CI-related collection requirements that can be answered by
human sources.
•
Integrate CI elements into HUMINT collection operations as
applicable.
Open-Source Intelligence:
•
Support open-source intelligence (OSINT).
•
Provide open source maps, charts, phone directories, business
directories, newspapers, video and audio media (including tapes and
compact discs) to the appropriate J/G/S2X and Intelligence Community
agencies and liaison officers.
OTHER ORGANIZATIONS
4-58. In addition to MI units, HUMINT collection organizations frequently
conduct coordination with other military organizations.
•
Military Police Units:
Close coordination between HUMINT
collectors and MPs is mutually beneficial. The MPs are responsible for
maneuver and mobility support, area security, internment and
resettlement, law and order, and police intelligence operations. Both
activities (HUMINT collection and MP operations) require close
contact with the local civilian, refugee, and detainee populations.
HUMINT collection at checkpoints and at EPW and other detainee
collection points must be coordinated with the MPs, who are normally
responsible for internment and resettlement operations. In return, the
HUMINT collectors, because of their screening and questioning of
these population groups, can help facilitate the MP’s population control
missions by providing information about the population’s activities and
intentions that may be of MP concern. At EPW/detainee collection
points, HUMINT collectors should arrange with the MP leadership to
be allowed to debrief MPs since MPs are in regular contact with the
detainees. This does not constitute tasking. Information collected in
this manner may provide valuable insight, which can aid the collector
in formulating approach strategies. MPs should be debriefed in such a
way so as not to interfere with their mission. Liaison with the MP
chain of command is vital to gain their support and assure them that
HUMINT collection will not interfere with MP operations. Joint patrols
containing MPs and HUMINT collectors can also be mutually
beneficial in many situations.
•
Criminal Investigation Division (CID) and Provost Marshal
Office (PMO):
The goals of HUMINT collection and those of the MPs
(particularly CID) are different. CID and PMO are concerned with
6 September 2006
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_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
identification and apprehension of criminal elements. The goal of
HUMINT collection is the collection of information in response to PIRs
that in many situations are centered on force protection. In the
situation where the threat includes a criminal element, the HCTs
might collect OB type information on the criminal element to ascertain
their activities and threat to friendly forces. HUMINT collectors are
not trained to conduct criminal investigations and must not be used for
this purpose. Criminal investigators and HUMINT collectors must
carefully coordinate their activities as necessary. HUMINT collectors
are required to report to the proper agency information collected on
criminal activities that the HUMINT collectors uncover in the normal
course of their activities.
•
Psychological Operations Units:
As with the MP force, HUMINT
collectors and PSYOP units are often interested in the same target
audience but for different reasons. PSYOP units are interested in
modifying the target audience beliefs and actions to be more supportive
of US goals. Normally, HUMINT collection elements coordinate with
PSYOP elements to obtain information concerning the motivational
factors and cultural value systems of the individuals to be questioned.
PSYOP units, as a part of their normal operations, develop detailed
analysis concerning psychological and cultural factors of friendly and
hostile elements in the AO. Such information will help HUMINT
collection personnel to understand the source's attitude, value system,
and perception; it will also help to obtain information more rapidly. At
the same time, PSYOP units often will develop collection requirements
to determine local attitudes and for information on the effectiveness of
PSYOP campaigns. HUMINT collectors can be tasked to collect on
these requirements if they are included as PIRs.
•
Civil Affairs Units:
The CA mission often places CA units in contact
with the HUMINT collection target audience. If possible, HUMINT
collection missions can be established in coordination with CA
missions. If the HUMINT collection mission is viewed as having the
potential of interfering with the CA mission and coordinated
operations are not possible, CA personnel can still be sensitized to
intelligence collection requirements and debriefed by HUMINT
collectors as part of a friendly force debriefing operation.
•
Drug and Law Enforcement Agency Operations:
Personnel who
are employees of DOD intelligence components may be assigned to
assist Federal law enforcement authorities and, when lives are
endangered, state and local law enforcement authorities; provided such
use is consistent with, and has been approved by an official authorized
pursuant to DOD Directive 5525.5, Enclosure 4 (reference (i)). Such
official shall ensure that the General Counsel of the providing DOD
component concurs in such use. Assistance may be rendered to LEAs
and security services of foreign governments or international
organizations in accordance with established policy and applicable
SOFAs, provided that DOD intelligence components may not request
or participate in activities of such agencies undertaken against US
persons that would not be permitted activities of such components
under the procedures of AR 381-10. HUMINT collectors may assist
6 September 2006
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FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
foreign law enforcement authorities, with prior approval of the J2X.
Under no circumstances will HUMINT collectors assist any US or
foreign law enforcement authorities in any manner without prior
approval by competent authority after a legal review of the proposal.
•
Maneuver Units:
HCTs may be utilized in GS for coverage of an
AOIR or in DS to support a specific maneuver unit. The type of
coordination needed with maneuver units will vary depending on the
type of support relationship the HCT has. HCTs operating in GS
should coordinate with maneuver unit commanders when the HCT will
be operating in that unit’s AO. At a minimum, the HCTs should
announce their presence and request information on any conditions or
ongoing situations that may affect on the conduct of their mission. An
HCT operating in DS of a specific unit will coordinate with the unit for
force augmentation to HUMINT patrols as needed in accordance with
force protection requirements. The HCT leader should also coordinate
with the supported unit’s S2 for involvement in debriefings of
returning patrol members, checkpoint personnel, convoy leaders and
others. HCT leaders may also coordinate to be included in the unit’s
reconnaissance patrols, as appropriate.
•
Combat Service Support Units:
Current and future combat
operations will be conducted in a noncontiguous battlespace. CSS
formations and units may be an excellent source for HUMINT
collectors. In many situations, DPs and refugees will perceive CSS
activities as non-threatening and an activity which can provide them
with aid and comfort. CSS operations will naturally draw DPs and
refugees hoping to receive support. This could provide opportunities for
HUMINT collectors to access this sector of the population. CSS unit
S2s should conduct patrol debriefings of returning convoy personnel to
capture observations made during convoys, with the goal of cross-
cueing the supporting HCT, CI team, or law enforcement element as
appropriate.
STAFF COORDINATION
4-59. Successful HUMINT collection operations require support from the
staff elements of the supported unit. These elements are collectively
responsible for the planning that results in HUMINT tasking. Below is a
partial list of the staff responsibilities that affect HUMINT collection:
•
G1/S1 HUMINT-related responsibilities include but are not limited
to—
ƒ
Supervising the medical support furnished to EPW/detainees.
ƒ
Maintaining a list (by language and proficiency) of qualified
linguists within their command.
ƒ
Coordinating with the G4 or G5 for procurement and payment of
other interpreters and translators needed to perform intelligence
and non-intelligence duties.
ƒ
Ensuring the echelon's OPLAN contains complete provisions for
handling and evacuating detainees, refugees, DPs, and local civilians
6 September 2006
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_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
as required. This plan must satisfy the interests of all other staff
officers and provide for—
−
Ensuring humane treatment of all personnel.
−
Promptly evacuating personnel from the combat zone.
−
Integrating procedures for the evacuation, control, and
administration of personnel with other combat service (CS) and
CSS operations.
−
Ensuring delivery of mail to EPWs and other detainees.
−
Maintaining detainee (including EPW) statistics.
−
Providing administration and control of detainee currency and
pay records, including coordinating with appropriate intelligence
authorities about investigating large sums of money.
•
G2/S2 is responsible for developing intelligence in support of unit
operations. The G2/S2 at division and higher and in the interim BCT is
supported by a G/S2X and normally a HAT in the performance of his
HUMINT-related functions. His HUMINT-related responsibilities
include but are not limited to––
ƒ
Obtaining intelligence through intelligence reach to support
HUMINT collection.
ƒ
Incorporating HUMINT into the ISR plan.
ƒ
Developing the HUMINT annex to the OPORD and OPLAN.
ƒ
Coordinating to provide technical support for all HUMINT collection
operations.
ƒ
Ensuring deconfliction and synchronization for all HUMINT
collection assets within the unit’s AO. A particular effort must be
made to coordinate with all DOD military source operations (MSO),
and DOD and other government agencies (OGAs) that may be
operating in the AO; with the theater J2X, as part of deconfliction.
Failure to deconflict with DOD MSO and OGAs may result in
compromise of assets and interruption of collection operations and
potentially unintended casualties.
−
Obtaining documents and materials of intelligence interest,
including visual and audio media and electronic equipment
(such as computers, phones, PDAs) taken from detainees, or
seized or loaned, in coordination with the Provost Marshal and
other elements.
−
Recording, evaluating, and analyzing collected information and
providing feedback to HUMINT collectors.
−
Ensuring adequate HUMINT collection and reporting nets and
systems are available.
−
Coordinating with the G3 to ensure plans for HUMINT collection
operations are included in unit OPLANs.
−
Coordinating with the G3 to ensure that HUMINT collectors are
included in unit training plans, rehearsals, and briefbacks.
−
Drafting instructions for handling, evacuating, and exploiting
captured enemy personnel and CEDs. (They coordinate with the
G3 to ensure draft instructions are included in the command
standing operating procedures (SOPs), OPLANs, and OPORDs.)
−
Projecting capture rates as well as refugee and DP rates.
6 September 2006
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FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
−
Determining the number of interpreters and translators needed
to perform intelligence duties.
−
Coordinating with other agencies and HUMINT collectors for
intelligence sharing.
−
Controlling the procedures used to process and grant clearances
to the interpreters and translators as required.
−
Coordinating with the civil-military operations (CMO) officer for
intelligence screening of local nationals, refugees, and DPs.
−
Coordinating with SJA for legal review of proposed operations.
•
G3/S3 is responsible for operations, plans, organization, and training.
His HUMINT collection-related responsibilities include but are not
limited to––
ƒ
Ensuring the inclusion of HUMINT collection units in the main body
of OPLANs and OPORDs under
Tasks to Subordinate Units
and
Task Organization
.
ƒ
Ensuring instructions for handling, evacuating, and exploiting
captured enemy personnel and CEDs in all unit command SOPs,
OPLANs, and OPORDs.
ƒ
Incorporating HUMINT collection operations into future plans and
operations.
ƒ
Ensuring subordinate units are trained in proper handling and
evacuation of captured enemy personnel, materiel, and CEDs.
ƒ
Ensuring that the subordinate elements are trained in OPORDs
including ROE and the proper handling of local civilians, foreign
nationals, refugees, and DPs.
ƒ
Obtaining, organizing, and supervising employment of additional
personnel as guards for EPWs and other detainees where MP assets
are not available or insufficient.
ƒ
Tasking the Division/Brigade Engineer Officer in conjunction with
the G2/S2 to conduct a site survey for possible EPW/detainee holding
area facilities within the operational area. Priority should go to
existing facilities needing little or no renovation to meet operational
requirements. If suitable facilities cannot be found, the engineer
officer should provide detailed facilities design specifications to the
G4/S4 for coordination and development of contracted resources.
•
G4/S4 responsibilities related to HUMINT collection include but are
not limited to––
ƒ
Developing command policy for evacuation and internment of
captured enemy personnel, and evacuation and safekeeping of CEE
and CEDs.
ƒ
Coordinating contracts for real estate and construction of source-
holding facilities if local capabilities are not available. Ideally,
existing facilities will be occupied and renovated whenever possible.
ƒ
Collecting and distributing captured enemy supplies. (This is
coordinated with the intelligence and operations staffs.)
ƒ
Procuring and distributing rations to personnel holding areas.
ƒ
Transporting EPWs and other detainees in a timely, safe manner to
the appropriate facility for processing.
6 September 2006
4-28
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
ƒ
Determining requirements for use of source labor for the logistical
support needed in source-handling operations.
ƒ
Providing logistical support to interpreter personnel.
•
G5/S5 responsibilities related to HUMINT collection include but are
not limited to––
ƒ
Coordinating with local US government, personnel staff
representatives, and HN armed forces for procuring native linguists
for interpreter support.
ƒ
Coordinating military support of populous.
ƒ
Providing technical advice and assistance in reorientation of sources
and enemy defectors.
ƒ
Coordinating MI aspects of CMO activities with the G2.
ADDITIONAL SUPPORT
4-60. In addition to the major staff elements, a HUMINT collection element
requires support from several other elements in order to conduct operations.
These elements are discussed below.
•
The US Army Criminal Investigation Command is the organization
with primary responsibility for investigating allegations of criminal
acts or reportable incidents committed by or against detainees.
•
The SJA can provide legal support and advice on the interpretation
and application of applicable law and policy. Applicable law and policy
include US law; the law of war; relevant international law; relevant
directives including DOD Directive 3115.09, “DOD Intelligence
Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioningâ€; DOD
Directive 2310.E, “The Department of Defense Detainee Programâ€;
DOD instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOS. The
SJA is also a channel for reporting known or suspected reportable
incidents of abuse or inhumane treatment.
•
The Inspector General is a channel for reporting known or suspected
reportable incidents of abuse or inhumane treatment.
•
The PMO is the channel for reporting criminal activity other than
reportable incidents, but also can be used for reporting known or
suspected reportable incidents.
•
The Chaplain can also receive reports of reportable incidents.
•
The G7 provides information on Information Operations and conducts
liaison with PSYOP, the Electronic Warfare Officer, the Military
Deception Officer, and Operations Security personnel.
6 September 2006
4-29
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_________________________________________________________________________
FM 2-22.3
PART TWO
HUMINT Collection In Military Source Operations
Part Two discusses HUMINT collection as it pertains to MSO. The Secretary of
Defense (SECDEF) has established a DOD-wide HUMINT Enterprise consisting of
the following executors: The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the
Combatant Commands (COCOMs), the Military Departments, the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA). All Defense HUMINT Enterprise executors support and
satisfy Defense requirements by employing their available resources and
capabilities.
MSO refer to the collection of foreign military and military-related intelligence by
humans from humans. MSO are conducted under SECDEF authorities, to satisfy
DOD needs in compliance with DOD policy. Within the Army, MSO are conducted
by trained personnel under the direction of military commanders. These specially
trained personnel may employ the entire range of HUMINT collection operations.
MSO sources include one-time, continuous, and formal contacts, from contact
operations; and sources from interrogations, debriefings, and liaison activities.
Each type of MSO activity has specific operational requirements, specific legal
restrictions, and operational guidelines. HUMINT collection activities in each of
these categories require specific approval, coordination, and review. MSO include
human source contact operations, debriefing, liaison, and interrogations. This
chapter introduces each of these collection operations.
Chapter 5
HUMINT Collection
HUMINT COLLECTION OPERATIONS
5-1. Full spectrum operations require focused MSO with strong capabilities
dispersed across the battlefield. In offensive and defensive operations, the
HCTs need to be placed in support of the engaged maneuver battalions. In
stability and reconstruction operations and civil support operations, the
HUMINT teams need to be located in battalion AOs throughout the AOIR.
5-2. The rapid pace of operations, the need to provide near-real time (NRT)
support of command decisions and the inherent time delays in moving
detainees, including EPWs and civilian refugees to centralized locations,
necessitate the dispersion of HUMINT collection assets to forward areas in
6 September 2006
5-1
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
support of critical operations rather than their retention at detainee and
refugee holding facilities at echelons corps and below. This forward
deployment gives HUMINT collectors earlier access to sources and is
facilitated by enhanced communication and automation capabilities down to
the collection team level.
5-3. All operations are different, and deployment of HUMINT assets is
METT-TC dependent. Brigades need the capability to provide 24-hour
HUMINT collection capability to each battalion AO. The command
relationship of the HUMINT collection capability is also METT-TC
dependent. The OMT should be located at the echelon that is best able to
manage and support the HCTs and to provide the best capability to answer
the commander’s PIRs.
5-4. The Division and Corps elements should cover their respective areas not
covered by their subordinate commands. They also, as needed, reinforce those
target areas that are most effective in answering their respective command
PIRs already covered by subordinate command capability. EAC HUMINT
units normally are responsible for supporting theater or national
requirements and providing HUMINT support at theater level facilities such
as the JIDC. The EAC units will also augment the echelon below corps units
and conduct source operations in the Corps area as required. Operations,
particularly in challenging terrain and in stability and reconstruction
environments, may require additional HUMINT assets normally obtained
from the RC.
HUMAN SOURCE CONTACT OPERATIONS
5-5. HUMINT collection requires the contact between the HUMINT collector,
who attempts to gather information through a variety of HUMINT collection
techniques, and a human contact, who hopefully has the information that the
HUMINT collector wants and who can be convinced to divulge the
information. Operations with formal contacts are only conducted by
HUMINT collectors and CI agents who are specifically trained and
authorized to do so. There are three levels of contacts:
•
One-time contact.
•
Continuous contact.
•
Formal contact.
5-6. The basic goal of all levels of contact is to collect information in response
to collection tasking; however, only under certain conditions can HUMINT
collectors task contacts to get information for them (see para 5-28).
Understanding the types of contacts is key to understanding each type of
human source contact operation. The following levels are not all-inclusive nor
are the listed categories exclusive. For example, a contact who was initially a
one-time contact (such as a walk-in) may later be developed into a continuous
contact. A continuous contact may be developed into a formal contact, who
can then be tasked, trained, and paid. There is no limit on the number of
times a team can meet contacts without recruiting them and making them
into a formal contact.
6 September 2006
5-2
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
ONE-TIME CONTACT
5-7. The one-time contact is a source of information of value that was, and
will be, encountered only once. In all operational environments the HUMINT
collector will frequently encounter a source only once, particularly at lower
echelons. This may be a local civilian encountered during a patrol, a detainee
who is quickly questioned and then evacuated, or a refugee at a checkpoint.
5-8. In addition to the information obtained from a one-time contact, the
HUMINT collector must make a reasonable effort to obtain as much basic
data as possible about the one-time contact. Complete name, occupation,
address, and other basic data of this source are crucial for a thorough
analysis of the information provided. The one-time contact and the
information he provides cannot be assessed and evaluated independently;
however, the information provided by a one-time contact must be reported
and corroborated through other HUMINT sources and even other intelligence
disciplines.
5-9. Contact reports must be filed with the OMT and source registries
maintained in accordance with FM 34-5 (S//NF), AR 381-100 (S//NF), and
DIAM 58-11 (S//NF) in order to support analysis of information obtained. If a
one-time contact is encountered for a second time and again provides
information of value, then the contact may be thereafter treated as a
continuous contact.
5-10. A walk-in is a one-time contact who volunteers information of value to
US forces on his own initiative. The walk-in source may volunteer
information by approaching an HCT, other ISR elements, or US forces or
civilian personnel anywhere in the AO. Each unit must have in place a
program to identify, safeguard, and direct the walk-in to the appropriate
collection asset, to be screened and debriefed as required. For example, a
walk-in who wanted to report a crime would be directed to the PMO rather
than to a HUMINT collector.
5-11. The collection asset will screen the walk-in to determine the type of
information the source has and to determine and evaluate the reliability of
the individual. After identifying the type of information, the collector
determines if he has the jurisdiction to collect that information. If, for
example, the walk-in wishes to report a crime, the collector refers that
individual to the proper criminal investigative agency.
5-12. Systematic questioning, deception detection techniques, and crossÂ
checking of information are used extensively in the evaluation process.
Concurrently, there are national level directives, DOD directives, and Army
regulations that direct specific actions to be taken with a walk-in. When
dealing with a walk-in source, HUMINT collectors must guard against
adversary intelligence collection. They must also protect legitimate sources of
information. The walk-in is thoroughly debriefed on all areas of information
relevant to collection requirements, and any information of value is reported.
5-13. On occasion, the HUMINT collector may determine that a one-time
contact has the potential to become a continuous contact or a formal contact.
This is referred to as a developmental lead. A developmental lead is an
6 September 2006
5-3
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
individual identified through social and professional status, leads, source
profiling, or other techniques, who has knowledge required by the
commander. A developmental lead is any person the HUMINT collector
expects to see or would like to see again, or a person who indicates that they
intend to return in the future.
5-14. When a HUMINT collector identifies a developmental lead, he reports
his interest in elevating the source to continuous or formal contact status as
soon as possible to the OMT. Although not every developmental lead becomes
a source of information, the HUMINT collector should see each
developmental lead as a potential source of information and apply the
appropriate security measures. The developmental lead is continuously
assessed to verify his placement and access to the type of information the
HCT is seeking. Additionally, the HUMINT collector continuously assesses
the motivation and characteristics of the developmental lead.
5-15. A one-time source cannot be tasked to collect information, but can be
sensitized to information in which the HUMINT collector is interested. For
example, if a walk-in source provides information on activity in a house in his
neighborhood, he might ask if the collector would be interested in more of the
same type information in the future. The HUMINT collector cannot tell him
to go get more information, but can indicate that he would listen if the walk-
in returned with more information on the topic. If the walk-in returns a
second time, he must be handled as a continuous contact.
CONTINUOUS CONTACTS
5-16. Continuous contacts are individuals who have been identified as
having more information than could be obtained through a one-time contact,
and have been met again by HUMINT collection personnel for the purpose of
collecting additional information. HUMINT collectors do
not
task continuous
contacts, but they can be sensitized in the same way as one-time contacts.
Continuous contacts provide their knowledge through informal debriefings
and elicitation.
5-17. All contacts who are seen more than once by HUMINT collectors must
be tracked by registering them in the Source Registry and reporting the
contacts to the OMT. As an example, a one-time contact who reported
information to a HCT contacts them again with follow-up information. That
person will now be registered as a continuous contact and tracked by the
OMT. This registration process helps to prevent the same information from
being collected by multiple collectors from the same contact without realizing
it. See AR 381-172 (S//NF) and FM 34-5 (S//NF) for further information on
source registration and for the required forms. Types of continuous contacts
are discussed below.
Local National and Third-Country National Employees
5-18. Local national and third-country national employees are non-US
personnel from either the country in which the US forces are operating or a
third country who are either employed by US forces directly or through a
contractor to provide logistical support and services. One of the purposes of
locally employed personnel screening is to assess these individuals as
6 September 2006
5-4
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
potential sources of information. Local national and third-country national
employees can be a prolific source of information about local attitudes and
events, particularly in a restrictive environment where US contact with the
local population is curtailed. Their information can also be significant in a
force protection role. The HUMINT collector must register these individuals
with the J/G2X. While the HUMINT collector is assessing the local national
employee as an intelligence source, CI agents are assessing the same source
pool as potential security risks.
5-19. Coordination between HUMINT collectors and CI elements is essential
for deconfliction and to avoid duplication of effort. If the HUMINT collector
identifies an employee that may be of CI interest, he should immediately
notify the appropriate CI unit.
Displaced Personnel and Refugees
5-20. DPs and refugees are excellent sources of information about denied
areas and can be used to help identify threat agents and infiltrators. The
degree of access HUMINT collectors have to DPs is dependent on the
OPORDs, ROE, and SOFAs in effect. HUMINT collectors can work with CA
or other programs dealing with DPs or refugees.
5-21. DPs and refugees are normally considered one-time sources but may be
incorporated into other long-term collection programs if their degree of
knowledge warrants this. In this case, adherence to the restrictions involving
source operations is necessary. Those restrictions can be found in AR 380-10,
AR 381-100 (S//NF), DIAM 58-11 (S//NF), DIAM 58-12 (S//NF), and other
publications as well as existing ROE and SOFAs.
US Forces
5-22. US forces have many opportunities to interact with the local population
in the normal course of their duties in operations. This source perhaps is the
most under-utilized HUMINT collection resource. Some US forces, such as
combat and reconnaissance patrols, are routinely tasked and debriefed by the
appropriate level G2/S2. Others, such as medical teams or engineers who
have extensive contact with the local population, should also be debriefed.
5-23. Commanders and staff members who serve as liaison with the local
population and local government officials can be fruitful sources of
information. CA, PSYOP, MP, and other elements also have legitimate
reasons to conduct liaison with local authorities and should be debriefed as
appropriate. The friendly force debriefing effort can succeed only with
command emphasis.
5-24. HUMINT collection elements need to coordinate with local units to
identify those individuals who would be most profitable to debrief and to
further coordinate with them for time to conduct the debriefing. Although the
S2 and S3 can and should task their soldiers to conduct collection tasks
during the course of their normal duties, HUMINT collectors must ensure
that their friendly force debriefing effort does not interfere with the primary
mission accomplishment of the soldiers being debriefed. HCTs should ensure
that the necessary staff S2s and S3s are aware of the HUMINT collection
6 September 2006
5-5
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
requirements and request that the staffs incorporate these into their
respective collection taskings. The results of debriefings by units should also
be disseminated to the HCTs for source development, collection targeting,
and analysis.
Official Liaison
5-25. Liaison with local military, government, or civilian agency officials
provides an opportunity to collect information required by the commander.
The HUMINT collector meets with these officials to conduct liaison,
coordinate certain operations, collect information, and obtain leads to
potential sources of information. Elicitation is the primary technique used
with liaison contacts, although in many cases there is a more formal
exchange of information. Information obtained by these elements through
liaison normally tends to reflect the official positions of their superiors and
may not be entirely accurate or complete.
Detainees
5-26. A detainee is any person captured or otherwise detained by an armed
force. An EPW is a detainee who meets the criteria of Articles 4 and 5 of the
GPW. (See Appendix A.) Detainees may be interrogated. They are frequently
excellent sources of information but in many instances the access of the
HUMINT collector to the detainees may be curtailed.
5-27. For example, when supporting a counterinsurgency, the supported
government may consider all captured insurgents to be criminals and not
allow US forces access to them. In these instances, US HUMINT collectors
should attempt to sit in during local questioning; they could submit questions
or, at a minimum, coordinate to receive the reports from local authority
questioning. US HUMINT collectors must remember that regardless of the
legal status of the detainees they must be treated in a manner consistent
with the Geneva Conventions. (See Appendix A.)
FORMAL CONTACT
5-28. Formal contacts are individuals who have agreed to meet and cooperate
with HUMINT collectors for the purpose of providing information. HUMINT
collectors who have met with a particular continuous contact three or more
times should consider assessing him for use as a formal contact. Formal
contacts meet repeatedly with HUMINT collectors, and their operation and
tasking must be carried out in accordance with AR 381-172 (S//NF),
DIAM 58-11 (S//NF), and DIAM 58-12 (S//NF).
5-29. Formal contacts are generally local nationals or third-country national
employees. Knowledge of their meeting with HUMINT collectors is restricted.
This can be accomplished by either disguising the fact that the HUMINT
collection personnel are indeed HUMINT personnel, or by concealing the
purpose of overt meetings with HUMINT personnel. HCTs take
extraordinary measures to protect their relationship with these contacts.
Depending on METT-TC factors, meetings with formal contacts may range
from overt meetings, which are conducted discreetly in order to protect the
6 September 2006
5-6
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
6 September 2006
5-7
relationship between the source and HUMINT collectors, to meetings
whereby only the collector and the source know the meeting has occurred.
When contact operations are conducted using this methodology, the operation
must be coordinated in accordance with the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence (USD(I)) policy cited in Appendix J. Specific direction regarding
documentation required for recruitment, and the designation of approval
authority (usually the J/G2X) for recruitment of a formal contact, will be
specified in Appendix 5 (HUMINT) of Annex B (Intelligence) to the governing
OPLAN or OPORD.
DEBRIEFING OPERATIONS
5-30.
Debriefing operations refer to the systematic questioning of individuals
not in the custody of the US, to procure information to answer collection
tasks by direct and indirect questioning techniques. The primary categories
of sources for debriefings are friendly forces and civilians including refugees,
DPs, and local inhabitants.
5-31.
Debriefing operations are those operations directed towards collecting
information from a segment of the target population using primarily
debriefing techniques. These debriefing operations are separate from the
G2/S2 debriefing program to debrief personnel returning from missions.
Debriefing operations often include the debriefing of personnel who may not
usually be debriefed as part of their assigned duties.
5-32.
Normally Army debriefing operations will be directly related to
collection tasks at the operational and tactical levels. Strategic debriefing of
high-level personnel in response to theater and national level requirements
is often under the purview of the DIA/DH. Army HUMINT collectors
frequently participate in this type of collection, which is under the control,
rules, regulations, and operational guidance of DH.
PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES
5-33.
Debriefing operations are conducted under the guidelines of
DIAM 58-11 (S//NF) and DIAM 58-12 (S//NF). They are further subject to
applicable execute orders and the specific ROE and classified “umbrella
concept†that apply to the specific AO.
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS
5-34.
Debriefing requires relatively unconstrained access to the target
audience. Debriefing operations are frequently constrained by the umbrella
concept, overt operational proposal (OVOP), and OPORDs. Debriefing is a
time- and resource-demanding operation that often shows limited immediate
results. Since the potential target audience is so large, debriefing operations
require careful planning and careful screening and selection of specific
targets.
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
5-8
6 September 2006
DEBRIEFING OPERATIONS AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL
5-35.
Debriefing operations at the tactical level include the debriefing of
elements of the local and transient civilian population in support of ongoing
tactical operations. This is different from but often supportive of tactical
SCOs as described in Chapter 1. Although tactical SCOs use specific
identified sources to obtain and report information, tactical debriefing
operations use one-time and continuous contacts to answer requirements.
Tactical debriefing operations are frequently combined with tactical
interrogation operations and may identify potential sources for tactical SCOs.
REFUGEE FACILITY AND CHECKPOINT OPERATIONS
5-36.
Refugee facility and checkpoint operations involve placing HCTs at
points where US forces expect to encounter large numbers of refugees.
Deployment of HUMINT collectors at checkpoints is normally preferred due
to their ability to collect and report more timely information. As in the
questioning of detainees, the debriefing of refugees should not delay their
movement out of the danger area.
5-37.
Checkpoint debriefing is normally done in coordination with MP or
combat forces that are manning the checkpoint. Debriefing at refugee camps
is used to obtain longer term and less immediate information. HUMINT
collection units established at refugee camps coordinate their activities with
the CA, MP, NGO, or other organizations that has responsibility for
operating the refugee camp.
5-38.
In internment facilities operated by the MPs, HUMINT collectors
coordinate with MPs for access to the detainees and for guard support. In
facilities operated by NGOs, HUMINT collectors coordinate with NGOs for
permission to speak to the refugees. NGOs are civilian agencies and may
decide not to permit HUMINT collectors to have access to refugees.
FRIENDLY FORCE DEBRIEFING
5-39.
Every member of the friendly force is a potential source for HUMINT
collection. Friendly force personnel frequently have contact with the threat,
civilian population, or the environment. Although many individuals report
their information in the form of combat information, many do not report the
information, do not realize its significance, or do not know how to report key
information. Frequently a systematic questioning by a trained HUMINT
collector will identify key information that can contribute to the intelligence
picture and help an individual recall details. It also helps to place his
information into a systematic format for the analyst to use.
5-40.
HUMINT collectors debrief selected friendly force personnel including
combat patrols, aircraft pilots and crew, long-range surveillance teams, deep
insert special forces teams, and other high-risk mission personnel. Often the
personnel assigned to a sector of responsibility are the first to notice changes
in the attitude of the local populace or differences in the mission
environment.
5-41.
They are also able to provide indicators concerning the mission
environment. HUMINT collectors also conduct debriefings of returned
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
6 September 2006
5-9
prisoners of war (POWs), freed hostages, returned US defectors, and soldiers
reported as missing in action. These debriefings help to determine enemy
methods of operations, enemy intentions, POW handling and interrogations,
enemy weaknesses, information concerning other POWs not returned, and
battle damage assessment (BDA).
5-42.
HUMINT assets lose access to valuable information if they are not
regularly coordinating with the following elements:
•
Cavalry Troops, Unit Patrols, and Scouts.
Unit patrols and scouts
have a unique view of the battle area that sensors cannot detect.
During operations, units and scouts often patrol villages or populated
areas that are contentious and therefore of interest. The unit will gain
valuable information on the current status of the AO, potentially
answering intelligence requirements, through mission reporting and
debriefing by their unit S2 or HUMINT collector.
•
Military Police.
HUMINT collection assets work with the MPs who
gain area knowledge through their extensive foot patrols and vehicular
convoys. MPs also staff checkpoints and traffic control points (TCPs)
where they interact with large numbers of the civilian populace and
encounter people and situations that often answer intelligence
requirements. MP guards at any internment facility are a valuable
source of information on the attitude and behavior of detainees.
HUMINT collectors should coordinate with the MP detainee facility
commander in order to obtain information on detainees obtained
through custodial observation and conversations.
•
Civil Affairs.
CA units have daily interaction with the civilian
populace including key members of the civilian community such as
politicians, technical personnel, and military leadership.
•
Psychological Operations.
PSYOP teams often interview civilians
on the battlefield to determine the effectiveness of friendly and threat
PSYOP campaigns. PSYOP elements also gather information on
political, social, and other PSYOP requirements. PSYOP elements
produce and disseminate intelligence products based partially on their
interaction with the civilian populace.
•
Special Operations Forces.
The Special Operations Forces (SOF)
team often has greater access to humans and areas on a battlefield
than any other collection asset. Their observation of and interaction
with the local population provides them access to information that
often answers collection requirements. The following are examples of
these types of collection missions:
ƒ
Special reconnaissance missions into denied territory to satisfy
intelligence gaps or to confirm information from another source.
ƒ
Unconventional warfare (UW) missions normally of a long duration.
SOF are inserted into hostile territory to conduct sensitive
operations that support US tactical and national objectives. During
these missions, SOF units often come in contact with the local
population and gather information that meets intelligence
requirements.
•
Long-Range Surveillance.
Direct observation and reporting on
targets such as activities and facilities may provide timely and
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
5-10
6 September 2006
accurate intelligence to support a decision or cross-cue other collection
capabilities. Long-range surveillance (LRS) is often employed when
discreet observation of an activity is necessary over a long period of
time or when a collection system that can respond to redirection is
necessary.
•
Criminal Intelligence Operations.
CID personnel, in cooperation
with MP soldiers, play a key role by linking criminal intelligence to
specific groups and events. The criminal intelligence collection effort
specifically targets weapons, drugs, organized crime, and identities of
smuggling routes. The identification of smuggling routes results in a
significant increase in numbers of weapons being confiscated. The
timely transfer of criminal intelligence products to tactical units
enables a rapid response to serious confrontations, increased
confiscation of arms and ammunition, and improved stability in a TF
and AO. The Fusion Cell within the ACE develops intelligence
products from national, theater, and operational sources. Due to the
significant threat that criminal elements pose, CID military agents
and CID civilian analysts may be attached to the Fusion Cell to
facilitate the police intelligence function.
STRATEGIC DEBRIEFING OPERATIONS
5-43.
Strategic debriefing is debriefing activity conducted to collect
information or to verify previously collected information in response to
national or theater level collection priorities. This avoids surprises of a
strategic nature and is used to support long-range strategic planning.
Strategic debriefing is conducted in peacetime as well as in wartime. It often
fills intelligence gaps on extremely sensitive topics or areas. The sources for
strategic debriefing include but are not limited to émigrés, refugees,
displaced persons, defectors, and selected US personnel.
Strategic debriefing guidance is provided in DIAM 58-11 (S//NF),
DIAM 58-12 (S//NF), and DODD 3115.09, "DOD Intelligence, Interrogations,
Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning."
5-44.
Strategic debriefing is conducted in a non-hostile, business-like
manner. The rapport posture is usually amicable as the source is usually
willingly answering national level intelligence needs. Although voluntary
sources may not be motivated by a desire for money or other material
incentives, it is necessary to ensure that any promised incentives are
delivered. The time used in a strategic debriefing can range from days to
years. Sources typically have high-level backgrounds in scientific, industrial,
political, or military areas.
5-45.
Information gathered as strategic intelligence is categorized into eight
components. Each of these components can be divided into subcomponents.
These components and subcomponents are neither all-encompassing nor
mutually exclusive. This approach enhances familiarization with the types of
information included in strategic intelligence. An easy way to remember
these components is the acronym "
BEST MAPS
":
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
B
iographic Intelligence
E
conomic Intelligence
S
ociological Intelligence
T
ransportation and Telecommunications Intelligence
M
ilitary Geographic Intelligence
A
rmed Forces Intelligence
P
olitical Intelligence
S
cience and Technological Intelligence
•
Biographic intelligence
is the study of individuals of actual or
potential importance through knowledge of their personalities and
backgrounds. For further guidance on collecting and reporting
biographic intelligence, see DIAM 58-12 (S//NF). The subcomponents
are—
ƒ
Educational and occupational history—civilian and military
backgrounds of individuals.
ƒ
Individual accomplishment—notable accomplishments of an
individual's professional or private life.
ƒ
Idiosyncrasies and habits—mannerisms and unusual lifestyles.
ƒ
Position, influence, and potential—present and/or future positions of
power or influence.
ƒ
Attitudes and hobbies—significant interests that may affect an
individual's accessibility.
•
Economic intelligence
studies economic strengths and weaknesses
of a country. The subcomponents are—
ƒ
Economic warfare—information on the diplomatic or financial steps
a country may take to induce neutral countries to cease trading with
its enemies.
ƒ
Economic vulnerabilities—the degree to which a country's military
would be hampered by the loss of materials or facilities.
ƒ
Manufacturing—information on processes, facilities, logistics, and
raw materials.
ƒ
Source of economic capability—any means a country has to sustain
its economy (for example, black market trade, legitimate business or
trades, and imports and exports).
•
Sociological intelligence
deals with people, customs, behaviors, and
institutions. The subcomponents are—
ƒ
Population—rates of increase, decrease, or migrations.
ƒ
Social characteristics—customs, morals, and values.
ƒ
Manpower—divisions and distribution within the workforce.
ƒ
Welfare—health and education.
ƒ
Public information—information services within the country.
•
Transportation and telecommunications intelligence
studies
systems dedicated to and used during military emergencies and
peacetime.
6 September 2006
5-11
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
•
Military geographic intelligence
studies all geographic factors
(physical and cultural) that may affect military operations. Physical
geography is concerned with natural or manmade geophysical features.
Cultural geography provides demographics information.
•
Armed forces intelligence
is the integrated study of the ground, sea,
and air forces of the country. The subcomponents are––
ƒ
Strategy—military alternatives in terms of position, terrain,
economics, and politics.
ƒ
Tactics—military deployments and operations doctrine.
ƒ
OB—location, organization, weapons, strengths.
ƒ
Equipment—analysis of all military materiel.
ƒ
Logistics—procurement, storage, and distribution.
ƒ
Training—as carried out at all echelons to support doctrine.
ƒ
Organization—detailed analysis of command structures.
ƒ
Manpower—available resources and their conditioning.
•
Political intelligence
studies all political aspects which may affect
military operations. The subcomponents are—
ƒ
Government structure—organization of departments and ministries.
ƒ
National policies—government actions and decisions.
ƒ
Political dynamics—government views and reactions to events.
ƒ
Propaganda—information and disinformation programs.
ƒ
Policy and intelligence services—organization and functions.
ƒ
Subversion—subversive acts sponsored by the government.
•
Science and technological intelligence
studies the country's
potential and capability to support objectives through development of
new processes, equipment, and weapons systems. The subcomponents
are—
ƒ
Weapons and weapon systems.
ƒ
Missile and space programs.
ƒ
Nuclear energy and weapons technology.
ƒ
NBC developments.
ƒ
Basic applied science.
ƒ
Research and development systems.
LIAISON OPERATIONS
5-46. Liaison is conducted to obtain information and assistance, to coordinate
or procure material, and to develop views necessary to understand
counterparts. Liaison contacts are normally members of the government,
military, law enforcement, or other member of the local or coalition
infrastructure. The basic tenet of liaison is
quid pro quo
. An exchange of
information, services, material, or other assistance is usually a part of the
transaction. The nature of this exchange varies widely depending upon the
culture, location, and personalities involved.
5-47. Because the nature of liaison tasks varies widely, the general goals of
the liaison operation and the objective of each liaison contact should be
6 September 2006
5-12
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
clearly defined. The objective should include the type of information to be
collected, methods of operations unique to the area, and the command
objectives. Additionally, the collector should know limitations on liaison
activities. These limitations include––
•
Prohibitions against collecting certain types of information or
contacting certain types of individuals or organizations.
•
Memorandums of understanding with other echelons which delineate
each echelon’s AOR and AORs for subordinate units.
•
Coordination requirements per DCID 5/1 dated 19 December 1984,
which are required for selected types of liaison activities.
5-48. Administrative considerations include––
•
Type, method, and channels of reporting information obtained from
liaison activities.
•
Project and contingency fund site numbers to be used.
•
Funding and incentive acquisition procedures.
•
Limitations on the use of ICFs or incentives.
•
Reporting system used.
•
Authority under which the specific liaison program is conducted and
guidelines for joint and combined operations are set.
5-49. Benefits of liaison include––
•
Establishing working relations with various commands, agencies, or
governments.
•
Arranging for and coordinating joint and combined operations.
•
Exchanging operational information and intelligence within legal
limits.
•
Facilitating access to records and personnel of other agencies not
otherwise accessible.
•
Acquiring information to satisfy US requirements.
•
Accessing a larger pool of information.
INTERROGATION OPERATIONS
5-50. HUMINT interrogation is the systematic process of using approved
interrogation approaches to question a captured or detained person to obtain
reliable information to satisfy intelligence requirements, consistent with
applicable law and policy. Applicable law and policy include US law; the law
of war; relevant international law; relevant directives including DOD
Directive 3115.09, “DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings,
and Tactical Questioningâ€; DOD Directive 2310.1E, “The Department of
Defense Detainee Programâ€; DOD instructions; and military execute orders
including FRAGOs. Interrogation is to be conducted by personnel trained
and certified to use legal, approved methods of convincing EPWs/detainees to
give their cooperation. Interrogation sources are detainees, including EPWs.
5-51. Definitions of EPWs and rules for their treatment are contained in the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW).
The definition and rules for the treatment of civilians are contained in the
6 September 2006
5-13
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
Geneva Conventions Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War (GC). (See Appendix A.) For persons covered by those Conventions,
applicable GPW and GC provisions must be adhered to at all times.
(Regarding treatment of detained personnel, see also paragraph 5-74.)
5-52. There is an additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions called
Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions, 1977, which also contains
definitions of who is a civilian and who is an EPW (Articles 50 and 44). The
US has not ratified Protocol I nor does it accept the expanded definition of
EPWs that it contains. Requirements managers, J/G/S2X personnel, and
HUMINT collectors should understand, however, that coalition military
personnel with whom they may work may be bound by Protocol I, and those
coalition personnel may be required to treat additional personnel as EPWs.
Any questions concerning the GPW and Protocol I must be directed to the
SJA office for clarification.
5-53. Interrogation operations are specific operations normally conducted at
detainee collection facilities directed at the wide-scale collection of
information from detainees using interrogation techniques. Although field
interrogations are conducted at all echelons and during all operations in
which there are detainees, detention facilities where interrogation operations
occur are normally located only at theater or JTF level.
5-54. Compliance with laws and regulations, including proper treatment of
detainees, is a matter of command responsibility. Commanders have an
affirmative duty to ensure their subordinates are not mistreating detainees
or their property. HCT leaders must effectively supervise their subordinate
collectors during all interrogation operations. Supervisors must ensure that
each HUMINT collector has properly completed an interrogation plan and
sound collection strategy, and fully understands the intelligence
requirements he is seeking to satisfy prior to beginning an interrogation.
NCOs and WOs should regularly participate in interrogations with their
subordinates to ensure that the highest standards of conduct are maintained.
Interrogation supervisors should also monitor interrogations by video, where
video monitoring is available. The production, use, and dissemination of
interrogation videos must be tightly controlled by HCT leaders. Such videos
must not be released for dissemination outside the Intelligence Community
without the express permission of the SECDEF or his delegate.
NON-DOD AGENCIES
5-55. Non-DOD agencies may on occasion request permission to conduct
interrogations in Army facilities. These requests must be approved by the
JTF commander or, if there is no JTF commander, the theater commander or
appropriate higher level official. The interrogation activity commander will
assign a trained and certified interrogator to escort non-DOD interrogators to
observe their interrogation operations. The non-DOD personnel will sign for
any detainee they want to question from the MPs, following the same
established procedures that DOD personnel must follow. In all instances,
interrogations or debriefings conducted by non-DOD agencies will be
observed by DOD personnel. In all instances, non-DOD agencies must
observe the same standards for the conduct of interrogation operations and
6 September 2006
5-14
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
treatment of detainees as do Army personnel. All personnel who observe or
become aware of violations of Army interrogation operation standards will
report the infractions immediately to the commander. The personnel who
become aware of mistreatment of detainees will report the infractions
immediately and suspend the access of non-DOD personnel to the facility
until the matter has been referred to higher headquarters. Non-DOD
personnel conducting interrogation operations in an Army facility must sign
a statement acknowledging receipt of these rules, and agree to follow them
prior to conducting any interrogation operations. Non-DOD personnel
working in DOD interrogation facilities have no authority over Army
interrogators. Army interrogators (active duty, civilian, or contractor
employees) will only use DOD-approved interrogation approaches and
techniques.
FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INTERROGATORS
5-56. Foreign governments may request to participate, or may be invited to
participate in interrogations in Army facilities. Requests for foreign
government access to detainees will be forwarded through the operational
chain of command for appropriate action pursuant to DOD policy. Foreign
government personnel must comply with US DOD policies and observe the
same standards for the conduct of interrogation operations and treatment of
detainees as do Army personnel. The interrogation activity commander will
assign a trained and certified interrogator to escort foreign government
interrogators to observe their interrogation operations. The foreign
government personnel will sign for any detainee they want to question from
the MPs, following the same established procedures that US DOD personnel
must follow. In all instances, interrogations or debriefings conducted by
foreign government interrogators will be observed by US DOD personnel. In
all instances, foreign government interrogators must observe the same
standards for the conduct of interrogation operations and treatment of
detainees as do US Army personnel.
MP FUNCTIONS IN ASSOCIATION WITH INTERROGATION OPERATIONS
5-57. MP and MI personnel both have responsibilities with regard to
EPW/detainees, but with different goals and responsibilities. (See DOD
Directive 3115.09.) Therefore, close coordination must occur between MP and
MI personnel in order to facilitate the effective accomplishment of the MP
and MI missions. Both MP and MI personnel must ensure that they treat
detainees in accordance with the baseline standards of humane treatment.
5-58. MPs are responsible for the humane treatment, evacuation, custody
and control (reception, processing, administration, internment, and safety) of
detainees; force protection; and the operation of the internment facility,
under the supervision of the provost marshal. The MPs do not conduct
intelligence interrogations. Intelligence interrogation is strictly a HUMINT
function. DOD policy requires that all detainees in its control, whether or not
interrogation has commenced, are assigned an internment serial number as
soon as possible, normally within 14 days of capture. (See AR 190-8.)
6 September 2006
5-15
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
5-59. The standard MP security and internment functions are the only
involvement the MPs have in the interrogation process. MPs will not take
any actions to set conditions for interrogations (for example, “softening up†a
detainee). For purposes of interrogation, military working dogs will not be
used.
5-60. MPs may support interrogators as requested for detainee custody,
control, escort, and/or additional security (for example, for combative
detainees). When interrogators promise an incentive to a detainee, the
interrogators must coordinate with the MPs to ensure that the detainee
receives the incentive and is allowed to retain it. MPs may provide
incentives in support of interrogation operations under the following
conditions:
•
Using incentives is coordinated with and approved by the MP facility
commander.
•
Providing and withdrawing incentives does not affect the baseline
standards of humane treatment. This means that MPs can provide
incentives such as special food items. However, when the incentive is
withdrawn, the MPs still must provide the normal rations.
•
Using incentives does not violate detainee custody and control or
facility security. This means that if a HUMINT collector requests MPs
to provide an incentive (for instance, specialty food) but the detainee
has been spitting on the guards, then MPs would not provide the
incentive because it might reinforce inappropriate behavior.
5-61. MPs exercise the overall responsibility for the safety of detainees, even
in those cases in which detainees are in the temporary custody of HUMINT
collectors or other agency personnel for the purpose of interrogation.
HUMINT collectors should arrange with the MP supervisor to debrief MP
guards. Guards who observe and interact with detainees can report the
detainees’ disposition, activities, mood, and other observable characteristics.
5-62. HUMINT collectors conduct interrogations for intelligence information.
They normally work within the confines of the detainee detention facility, but
have no involvement in the mission of the security of detainees. MPs follow a
strict protocol concerning access to detainees. Accompanied and
unaccompanied access to detainees must be coordinated and approved in
advance by the MP commander responsible for the detainees or that
commander’s designated representative.
5-63. When HUMINT collectors coordinate for a detainee interrogation in an
internment facility, the MPs escort the detainee to the interrogation site,
which is collocated with, or located within the internment facility. MPs verify
that the HUMINT collector is authorized access to the detainee. Depending
on security concerns, the HUMINT collector may request that the MP
remain, or he may request the MP depart until the detainee needs to be
returned to the living area. If the MP remains, his functions are to maintain
the security, accountability, and safety of the detainee and the safety of the
interrogator, interpreter, and others in the interrogation site. The MP will
perform no role in the interrogation. When conducting interrogations in a
holding area such as a detainee collection point (DCP), MPs may not be
available to provide security for interrogation operations. In that case, the
6 September 2006
5-16
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
HUMINT collector will need to arrange for security from the unit that has
established the holding area.
5-64. If the MP departs the immediate area where the detainee is being
questioned (for example, asked to wait outside the interrogation room), the
HUMINT collector will assume custody and responsibility for the detainee by
signing for the detainee, noting the detainee’s physical condition.
5-65. SOPs should be written to comply with a requirement that
interrogation operations will always be under observation, whether
conducted in fixed sites, holding areas, or in the field. Physical setup and
logistical availability will dictate whether observation is conducted directly,
from a concealed location, or by video monitoring. HUMINT collectors should
never be alone with a detainee without being under observation.
5-66. Once a HUMINT collector has assumed custody of a detainee, he will
not turn the detainee over to anyone other than an MP. Specifically, he will
not allow another government agency to assume custody from him. The
HUMINT collector will instead return the detainee to the custody of the MP,
and the agency seeking custody of the detainee will then be required to do so
from the MP. Likewise, HUMINT collectors will not assume custody of a
detainee directly from another government agency, but will require them to
return the detainee directly to the custody of the MP.
LEGAL, REGULATORY, AND POLICY PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES
5-67. The GPW (Appendix A, Section I), the GC (Appendix A, Section III),
and the UCMJ are relevant documents pertaining to interrogations of
detainees.
5-68. The approaches, psychological techniques, and other principles
presented in this manual must be conducted in accordance with applicable
law and policy. Applicable law and policy include US law; the law of war;
relevant international law; relevant directives including DOD Directive
3115.09, “DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and
Tactical Questioningâ€; DOD Directive 2310.1E, “The Department of Defense
Detainee Programâ€; DOD instructions; and military execute orders including
FRAGOs. US policy is to treat all detainees and conduct all interrogations,
wherever they may occur, in a manner consistent with this commitment.
Authority for conducting interrogations of personnel detained by military
forces rests primarily upon the traditional concept that the commander may
use all available resources and lawful means to accomplish the mission and
to protect and secure the unit.
6 September 2006
5-17
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
“Prisoners of war do not belong to the power for which they have fought; they are all under the
safeguard of honor and generosity of the nation that has disarmed them.â€
â–¬
Napoleon, The Military Maxims of Napoleon
1927, ed. Burnod
POINT OF CAPTURE THROUGH EVACUATION
POINT OF CAPTURE THROUGH EVACUATION
MP Functions
HUMINT Functions
MP Functions
HUMINT Functions
• Maneuver and Mobility Support Operations
• Screen and question detainees at TCPs and
• Maneuver and Mobility Support Operations
• Screen and question detainees at TCPs and
• Area Security
checkpoints
• Area Security
checkpoints
• Internment and Resettlement Operations
• Question contacts, local civilians, refugees,
• Internment and Resettlement Operations
• Question contacts, local civilians, refugees,
• Law and Order Operations
and EPWs
• Law and Order Operations
and EPWs
• Police Intelligence Operations
• Conduct liaison with military and civilian
• Police Intelligence Operations
• Conduct liaison with military and civilian
•
Ensure detainee abuse is avoided and
agencies
• Ensure detainee abuse is avoided and
agencies
reported
• Report information obtained
reported
• Report information obtained
•
Ensure detainee abuse is avoided and
• Ensure detainee abuse is avoided and
reported
reported
• Support DOCEX
• Support DOCEX
DETENTION FACILITY
DETENTION FACILITY
MP Functions
HUMINT Functions
MP Functions
HUMINT Functions
•
Detain and guard EPWs, civilian internees,
• Debrief guards
• Detain and guard EPWs, civilian internees,
• Debrief guards
and other detainees
• Screen detainees and EPWs for PIR and IR
and other detainees
• Screen detainees and EPWs for PIR and IR
• Conduct reception and processing
• Provide linguist support when possible
• Conduct reception and processing
• Provide linguist support when possible
• Coordinate Classes I, II, and VIII supplies
• Observe detainees under MP control
• Coordinate Classes I, II, and VIII supplies
• Observe detainees under MP control
•
Coordinate NGOs, PVOs, and interagency
• Ensure detainee abuse is avoided and
• Coordinate NGOs, PVOs, and interagency
• Ensure detainee abuse is avoided and
visits
reported
visits
reported
• Ensure detainee abuse is avoided and reported
• Conduct interrogations
• Ensure detainee abuse is avoided and reported
• Conduct interrogations
•
Transport detainees within the detention
• Report information obtained
• Transport detainees within the detention
• Report information obtained
facility to interrogation area
• Cross-cue other intelligence disciplines
facility to interrogation area
• Cross-cue other intelligence disciplines
•
Maintain security during interrogation
(as needed)
• Maintain security during interrogation
(as needed)
operations
• Support DOCEX
operations
• Support DOCEX
Figure 5-1. MP vs HUMINT Responsibilities.
5-69. The Geneva Conventions establish specific standards for humane care
and treatment of enemy personnel captured, retained, or detained by US
military forces and its allies. All persons who have knowledge of suspected or
alleged violations of the Geneva Conventions are obligated by regulation to
report such matters through command channels or to designated individuals,
such as the SJA or IG. For example, HUMINT collectors who are working
with others must ensure that no incidents of detainee abuse occur, whether
committed by a fellow HUMINT collector, an interpreter, HN or coalition
personnel, MP, representative of another government agency, or anyone else.
5-70. Failure to report a suspected or alleged violation of the law of war may
subject the service member to disciplinary actions. Violations of the Geneva
Conventions committed by US personnel may constitute violations of the
UCMJ. The commander is responsible for ensuring that the forces under his
command comply with the Geneva Conventions. If violations occur in the
conduct of warfare, the commander bears primary responsibility for
investigating and taking appropriate action with respect to the violators.
5-71. Every soldier has the duty to report serious incidents, whether
observed or suspected, in accordance with AR 190-40. Such incidents are
reported to the chain of command. If the chain of command itself is
6 September 2006
5-18
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
implicated, the soldier can report the incident to the SJA, IG, chaplain, or
provost marshal.
5-72. There are reasons for reporting serious incidents beyond those related
to legal requirements. For instance, the publishing of enemy war crimes can
be used to influence public opinion against the enemy. Also, reporting war
crimes of other countries provides important information that may become
relevant, since we would not be able to transfer detainees to any power that
we could not rely on to treat them appropriately under the law of war,
including the Geneva Conventions.
5-73. Several articles of the GPW apply to HUMINT collectors and
interrogation operations. Excerpts from some of the most relevant articles of
the Geneva Conventions are listed below. Although the following excerpts are
specific to EPWs, service members must treat all detainees captured during
armed conflict consistent with the provisions of the GPW unless a
determination to the contrary is made. Moreover, US policy requires that US
forces apply the principles of the Geneva Conventions, during military
operations. (See Appendix A.)
•
Article 5 - Should any doubt arise as to whether persons having
committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the
enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such
persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such
time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.
•
Article 13 - PWs must at all times be treated humanely. Any unlawful
act or omission by the Detaining Power causing death or seriously
endangering the health of a PW in its custody is prohibited. Likewise,
PWs must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of
violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity.
•
Article 14 - PWs are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their
persons and honor. Women shall be treated with all regard due to their
sex, and shall in all cases benefit by treatment as favorable as that
granted to men.
•
Article 15 - The Power detaining PWs shall be bound to provide, free of
charge, for their maintenance and medical attention required by their
state of health.
•
Article 17 - This article covers several requirements with direct impact
on interrogation.
ƒ
Every PW, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his
surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental,
personal or serial number, or failing this, equivalent information. If
he willfully infringes this rule, he may render himself liable to a
restriction of the privileges (emphasis added) accorded to his rank or
status.
ƒ
For example, this does not mean if a prisoner fails to give this
information he loses status as a prisoner, only special privileges. An
example might be an officer who fails to identify himself as such. An
officer cannot be compelled to work (Article 49). An officer who fails
to identify himself as such could lose this privilege.
6 September 2006
5-19
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
ƒ
The questioning of PWs shall be carried out in a language they
understand.
ƒ
No physical or mental torture or any other form of coercion may be
inflicted on EPWs to secure from them information of any kind
whatever. PWs who refuse to answer may not be threatened,
insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of
any kind.
•
Article 18 - All effects and articles of personal use, except arms, horses,
military equipment and documents, shall remain in the possession of
PWs, likewise their metal helmets and protective masks and like
articles issued for personal protection. Effects and articles used for
their clothing or feeding shall also remain in their possession, even if
such effects and articles belong to their regulation military equipment.
ƒ
Badges of rank and nationality, decorations and articles having
above all a personal or sentimental value may not be taken from
PWs.
ƒ
Sums of money carried by PWs may not be taken away from them
except by order of an officer, and after the amount and particulars of
the owner have been recorded in a special register and an itemized
receipt has been given, legibly inscribed with the name, rank, and
unit of the person issuing said receipt. (Note: Unit SOP should
require initial impounding of all sums of money from detainees,
properly documented and accounted for, in order to prevent
detainees from using money to buy influence of any kind, or
participate in black market or other improper activity.)
•
Article 19 - PWs shall be evacuated, as soon as possible after their
capture, to camps situated in an area far enough from the combat zone
for them to be out of danger. Only those PWs, who, owing to wounds
and sickness, would run greater risks by being evacuated than by
remaining where they are, may be temporarily kept back in a danger
zone.
•
Article 33 - Medical personnel and chaplains, while retained by the
Detaining Power with a view to assisting PWs, shall not be considered
as PWs. They shall, however, receive as a minimum, the benefits and
protection of the Geneva Convention. They shall continue to exercise
their medical and spiritual functions for the benefits of PWs.
5-74.
All captured or detained personnel, regardless of status, shall
be treated humanely, and in accordance with the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 and DOD Directive 2310.1E, “Department of
Defense Detainee Program,†and no person in the custody or under
the control of DOD, regardless of nationality or physical location,
shall be subject to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
or punishment, in accordance with and as defined in US law.
All
intelligence interrogations, debriefings, or tactical questioning to gain
intelligence from captured or detained personnel shall be conducted in
accordance with applicable law and policy. Applicable law and policy include
US law; the law of war; relevant international law; relevant directives
including DOD Directive 3115.09, “DOD Intelligence Interrogations,
Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioningâ€; DOD Directive 2310.1E,
6 September 2006
5-20
___________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
“The Department of Defense Detainee Programâ€; DOD instructions; and
military execute orders including FRAGOs. Use of torture is not only illegal
but also it is a poor technique that yields unreliable results, may damage
subsequent collection efforts, and can induce the source to say what he thinks
the HUMINT collector wants to hear. Use of torture can also have many
possible negative consequences at national and international levels.
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment Prohibited
All prisoners and detainees, regardless of status, will be treated humanely. Cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment is prohibited. The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005
defines “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment†as the cruel unusual, and inhumane
treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to
the U.S. Constitution. This definition refers to an extensive body of law developed by the
courts of the United States to determine when, under various circumstances, treatment of
individuals would be inconsistent with American constitutional standards related to
concepts of dignity, civilization, humanity, decency and fundamental fairness. All DOD
procedures for treatment of prisoners and detainees have been reviewed and are consistent
with these standards, as well as our obligations under international law as interpreted by
the United States.
1
Questions about applications not resolved in the field by reference to DOD publications,
must be forwarded to higher headquarters for legal review and specific approval by the
appropriate authority before application.
The following actions will not be approved and cannot be condoned in any circumstances:
forcing an individual to perform or simulate sexual acts or to pose in a sexual manner;
exposing an individual to outrageously lewd and sexually provocative behavior;
intentionally damaging or destroying an individual’s religious articles.
1
Nothing in this enclosure should be understood to affect the U.S. obligations under the
law of war.
5-75.
If used in conjunction with intelligence interrogations,
prohibited actions include, but are not limited to
—
•
Forcing the detainee to be naked, perform sexual acts, or pose in a
sexual manner.
•
Placing hoods or sacks over the head of a detainee; using duct tape
over the eyes.
•
Applying beatings, electric shock, burns, or other forms of physical
pain.
•
“Waterboarding.â€
•
Using military working dogs.
•
Inducing hypothermia or heat injury.
•
Conducting mock executions.
•
Depriving the detainee of necessary food, water, or medical care.
5-76. While using legitimate interrogation techniques, certain applications of
approaches and techniques may approach the line between permissible
actions and prohibited actions. It may often be difficult to determine where
6 September 2006
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FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
permissible actions end and prohibited actions begin. In attempting to
determine if a contemplated approach or technique should be considered
prohibited, and therefore should not be included in an interrogation plan,
consider these two tests before submitting the plan for approval:
•
If the proposed approach technique were used by the enemy against
one of your fellow soldiers, would you believe the soldier had been
abused?
•
Could your conduct in carrying out the proposed technique violate a
law or regulation? Keep in mind that even if you personally would not
consider your actions to constitute abuse, the law may be more
restrictive.
5-77. If you answer yes to either of these tests, the contemplated action
should not be conducted. If the HUMINT collector has any doubt that an
interrogation approach contained in an approved interrogation plan is
consistent with applicable law, or if he believes that he is being told to use an
illegal technique, the HUMINT collector should seek immediate guidance
from the chain of command and consult with the SJA to obtain a legal review
of the proposed approach or technique. (See paras 5-80 and 5-81 for
information on responding to illegal orders.) If the HUMINT collector
believes that an interrogation approach or technique is unlawful during the
interrogation of a detainee, the HUMINT collector must stop the
interrogation immediately and contact the chain of command for additional
guidance.
CAUTION:
Although no single comprehensive source defines impermissible
coercion, certain acts are clearly prohibited. Certain prohibited physical
coercion may be obvious, such as physically abusing the subject of the
screening or interrogation. Other forms of impermissible coercion may be
more subtle, and may include threats to turn the individual over to others to
be abused; subjecting the individual to impermissible humiliating or
degrading treatment; implying harm to the individual or his property. Other
prohibited actions include implying a deprivation of applicable protections
guaranteed by law because of a failure to cooperate; threatening to separate
parents from their children; or forcing a protected person to guide US forces in
a dangerous area. Where there is doubt, you should consult your supervisor or
servicing judge advocate.
5-78. Security internees are detainees who are not combatants but who pose
a security threat, may be under investigation, or who pose a threat to US
forces if released. HUMINT collectors are required to treat all detainees
humanely. EPWs are entitled to additional protections guaranteed by the
GPW that security internees may not be eligible for. For example, allowing a
security internee to communicate with a family member (a right that an
EPW has under the Geneva Conventions) could allow him to pass
information that would compromise a sensitive investigation and endanger
the lives of soldiers and civilians. HUMINT collectors should consult with
their SJA for clarification of detainees’ status and rights.
5-79. HUMINT collectors are employed below brigade level when the combat
situation requires limited tactical interrogation at battalion or lower.
6 September 2006
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_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
HUMINT collectors should also provide training in the area of tactical
questioning to designated S2 personnel. The potential for abuse of the
detainee is greatest at initial capture and tactical questioning phase. With
the excitement and stress of the battlefield, unskilled personnel may exercise
poor judgment or be careless and thus resort to illegal techniques to elicit
critical information. Personnel who are not trained HUMINT collectors will
not attempt to use approach techniques. Instructions must stress the
importance of the proper treatment of detainees. Emphasize that in addition
to legal requirements, the abuse of a detainee at the initial stage of contact
often renders future interrogation futile. All treatment of detainees must be
consistent with the Geneva Conventions. (See ST 2-91.6 for further
information on tactical questioning.)
5-80. Orders given to treat detainees in any way that violate the Law of War,
including the Geneva Conventions, or that result in detainees being treated
in any prohibited manner are unlawful. Every soldier must know how to
respond to orders that he perceives to be unlawful. If a soldier receives an
order that he knows to be unlawful, or that a person of ordinary sense and
understanding would know to be unlawful, or if the order is not clear enough
to determine if it is legal or not, he should follow the steps set out below
(preferably in the order listed):
•
Ask for clarification.
•
State that the order is illegal if he knows that it is.
•
Use moral arguments against the order.
•
State the intent to report the act.
•
Ask the senior interrogator to stop the act.
•
Report the incident or order if the order is not withdrawn or the act in
question is committed.
•
If there appears to be no other recourse, refuse to obey the unlawful
order.
NOTE: If the order is a lawful order, it should be obeyed. Failure to obey a
lawful order is an offense under the UCMJ.
5-81. None of the above actions should be taken in the presence of any
detainee. Witnessing actions taken to determine the legality of an order may
lead to increased resistance of the detainee and could lead to increased
resistance throughout the detainee population if they believe they are being
treated unlawfully.
5-82. Illegal orders or incidents must be reported to the chain of command.
However, if the chain of command itself is implicated, report the incident or
order to the SJA, IG, chaplain, or provost marshal.
6 September 2006
5-23
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS
EPW Evacuation System
5-83. The MPs are responsible for evacuating detainees, civilian internees,
and other detainees, as stipulated in AR 190-8. HUMINT collection assets
must be placed to take advantage of the evacuation system the MPs will put
into place. The evacuation of detainees and civilian internees normally is a
slow and cumbersome process that can severely tax a maneuver unit’s
resources. Appendix D explains the handling of detainees in detail, including
the 5Ss—Search, Silence, Safeguard, Segregate, and Speed to the Rear. The
5Ss are authorized with respect to handling detainees for the purposes of
movement of detainees and security. The 5Ss are not authorized for use as
interrogation approach techniques.
5-84. The initial evacuation of detainees and civilian internees is the
responsibility of the capturing unit. That unit is normally responsible for
moving the detainees and civilian internees from the point of capture to the
nearest DCP. Under MP doctrine, the MPs are responsible for the detention,
security, processing, safety, well-being, accountability, and humane
treatment of detainees and civilian internees.
5-85. Normally the MPs assume responsibility for the further evacuation of
the detainees and civilian internees; however, under certain circumstances,
other units could be charged with this task. The detainees are normally
evacuated from a DCP to a short-term collection facility and then finally to a
theater internment facility. Once the theater internment facility (joint) is
established, dependent on METT-TC factors, the internment facility escort
guard units may go forward as far as the initial collection points and escort
detainees and civilian internees to a short-term collection facility or straight
to a theater internment facility.
5-86. Senior MP commanders coordinate and synchronize transportation
and security requirements with MP divisional and BCT leaders. It may take
8 hours for a detainee to reach the DCP; 8 to 16 hours more to reach a short-
term collection facility; and 24 additional hours to reach the theater
internment facility. Mandatory timelines will be determined in command
policy guidance. Critical during this process is that MPs work closely with
MI, SJA, and interagency personnel to determine the proper status of
individuals detained. Determining whether an individual is an EPW, a
criminal insurgent, or in another status is crucial to facilitate the release or
transportation, holding, and security requirements. This determination will
be used when the individual’s biometric data is taken and entered into the
Biometric Automated Toolset (BAT).
5-87. The HUMINT collection assets need to be positioned to maximize their
collection potential and take advantage of the time available during
evacuation. The rapidity of operations and the need to facilitate the
commander’s situational understanding––coupled with the technological
innovations that link the HUMINT collector to databases, analysts, and
technical support from anywhere on the battlefield––require placing the
HCTs forward into brigade and even maneuver battalion areas to provide
6 September 2006
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_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
immediate access to EPWs/detainees. EPWs/detainees are normally
interrogated for tactical information in the maneuver battalion trains areas
and then questioned in detail at the theater JIDC.
Security
5-88. When dealing with detainees, the HUMINT collector faces two security
considerations: his own physical security and information security.
Particularly when operating in support of tactical operations, the HUMINT
collector is in close contact with enemy soldiers who could attempt to escape
and may attack the HUMINT collector in doing so. Detainees during a
stability and reconstruction operation are often people committed to a cause
who find themselves in desperate circumstances. Although the detainees are
normally under guard, the HUMINT collector must always be alert to any
physical threat posed by these individuals. He must also ensure that his own
actions do not provide the detainee with the means with which to harm the
collector or anyone else.
5-89. The HUMINT collector should also be aware that EPWs and other
detainees may attempt to elicit information. Since HUMINT collectors, by
virtue of their position, may possess a great deal of classified information,
they must be careful not to reveal it unwittingly in the process of questioning
a detainee.
6 September 2006
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FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
PROHIBITION AGAINST USE OF FORCE
Acts of violence or intimidation, including physical or mental torture, or exposure to inhumane
treatment as a means of or aid to interrogation are expressly prohibited. Acts in violation of these
prohibitions may be a violation of US law and regulation and the law of war, including the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, and may be criminal acts punishable under the UCMJ and other US law.
Moreover, information obtained by the use of these prohibited means is of questionable value. If
there is doubt as to the legality of a proposed form of interrogation, the advice of the SJA must be
sought before using the method in question.
Limitations on the use of methods identified herein as expressly prohibited should not be confused
with psychological ploys, verbal trickery, or other nonviolent or non-coercive subterfuge used by the
trained HUMINT collector in the successful interrogation of hesitant or uncooperative sources. Use
of torture by US personnel would bring discredit upon the US and its armed forces while
undermining domestic and international support for the war effort. It also could place US and allied
personnel in enemy hands at a greater risk of abuse by their captors. Conversely, knowing the
enemy has abused US and allied POWs does not justify using methods of interrogation specifically
prohibited by law, treaty, agreement, and policy. In conducting intelligence interrogations, the
J2/G2/S2 has primary staff responsibility to ensure that these activities are performed in accordance
with these laws and regulations.
[*The commander bears the responsibility to ensure that
these activities are performed in accordance with applicable law, regulations, and policy.
The unit must have an internal SOP for execution of the interrogation mission.]
The psychological techniques and principles in this manual should neither be confused with, nor
construed to be synonymous with, unauthorized techniques such as brainwashing, physical or
mental torture, including drugs that may induce lasting or permanent mental alteration or damage.
Physical or mental torture and coercion revolve around eliminating the source's free will, and are
expressly prohibited by GWS, Article 13; GPW, Articles 13 and 17; and GC, Articles 31 and 32.
Torture is an act committed by a person under the
color of law specifically intended to inflict severe
physical or mental pain and suffering (other than
pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon
another person within his custody or physical
control. (Extracted from Title 18 of the United States
Code, Section 2340A).
*Emphasis added for use in this manual.
Capture Rates
5-90. Anticipating not only overall capture rates but also capture rates
linked to specific operations is vital to the correct placement of HUMINT
collectors supporting interrogation operations. Defensive and stability and
reconstructions operations normally provide a small but steady flow of
detainees while successful offensive operations can overwhelm HCTs. To be
successful, HUMINT collection support to tactical operations must be
carefully planned and prioritized. Available HUMINT collection assets must
be balanced against the operations objective, enemy situation estimate, and
projected EPW capture rates. The unit S2 is responsible for projecting
capture rates.
Interrogating Wounded and Injured Detainees
5-91. Commanders are responsible to ensure that detainees receive adequate
health care. Decisions regarding appropriate medical treatment of detainees
and the sequence and timing of that treatment are the province of medical
personnel. Detainees will be checked periodically in accordance with
6 September 2006
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_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
command health care directives, guidance, and SOPs, applicable to all
detainees to ensure they are fit for interrogations. Detainees determined by
medical personnel to be medically unfit to undergo interrogation will not be
interrogated. Health care personnel will be on call should a medical
emergency arise during interrogation. Health care personnel will report
detainees’ conditions, as appropriate, to the commander. Health care
providers shall not be placed in a position to advise on the application or
duration of interrogation approach techniques.
5-92. Wounded and otherwise injured detainees can be a valuable source of
information. For evacuation purposes, medical personnel may classify
detainees as walking wounded or sick or as non-walking wounded or sick.
Walking wounded detainees are evacuated through normal evacuation
channels. Non-walking wounded are delivered to the nearest medical aid
station and evacuated through medical channels.
5-93. HUMINT collectors may interrogate a wounded or injured detainee
provided that they obtain permission from a competent medical authority
and that the questioning will not delay or hinder medical treatment.
Questioning will not delay the administration of medication to reduce pain or
the evacuation of the detainee to where they may receive medical treatment,
nor will interrogation be allowed if it would cause a worsening of the
condition of the detainee. In most cases, this simply requires the HUMINT
collector to ask the doctor, medic, or other medical personnel if it is all right
to talk to the detainee.
5-94. With the doctor’s permission, the HUMINT collector may talk to the
detainee before, after, or during medical treatment. The HUMINT collector
cannot at any time represent himself as being a doctor or any other type of
medical personnel. Nor can he state, imply, or otherwise give the impression
that any type of medical treatment is conditional on the detainee’s
cooperation in answering questions.
TYPES OF INTERROGATION OPERATIONS
5-95. There are two general categories of interrogation operations:
field
interrogation operations
and
interrogation facility operations
.
FIELD INTERROGATION OPERATIONS
5-96. Field interrogation operations constitute the vast majority of
interrogation operations at echelons corps and below. Field interrogations
include all interrogation operations not conducted at a fixed facility. Current
doctrine emphasizes the placement of HCTs forward with maneuver units to
provide immediate interrogation support while the information is fresh and
the detainee may still be susceptible to approaches, due to the shock of
capture. The rationale for this method of employment is twofold:
•
First, the pace of the modern battlefield no longer allows the luxury of
waiting for a detainee to reach a collection point prior to interrogation.
Commanders need more timely information, including HUMINT. Also,
automated tools and improved communications now permit rapid
transmittal of information from forward-deployed HCTs.
6 September 2006
5-27
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
•
Second, current MP doctrine has the theater level EPW escort
companies picking up detainees as far forward as the division forward
collection points and bypassing the intervening collection points.
5-97. An added benefit of placing the HCTs with maneuver units is that it
allows them to conduct other HUMINT collection activities, such as the
debriefing of local civilians and refugees concurrently with interrogation
operations. HCTs are allocated to maneuver units based on—
•
The relative importance of that subordinate element’s operations to the
unit’s overall scheme of maneuver.
•
The potential for that subordinate element to capture detainees,
documents, and materiel or encounter civilians on the battlefield.
•
The criticality of information obtained from those sources to the
success of the parent unit’s overall OPLANs.
5-98. As the mission and situation change, the HCTs are redistributed. As
MI assets, they should never be kept in reserve.
5-99. During offensive and defensive operations, HCTs normally operate
with maneuver brigades and battalions. HUMINT collectors with battalions
or brigades should be equipped with vehicles and communications systems
that are compatible with the systems organic to the supported unit.
HUMINT collectors with brigades and battalions receive their collection
priorities from the S2 of the supported unit. In stability and reconstruction
operations, the HCTs normally operate in the AOs of battalion and brigade
TFs.
INTERROGATION FACILITY OPERATIONS
5-100. Joint interrogation operations are operations conducted at higher
echelons, usually at, and in coordination with, EPW and detainee internment
facilities. The Joint Forces Commander (JFC) normally tasks the Army
component commander to establish, secure, and maintain the EPW
internment facility system. The corps may have the mission of establishing
an interrogation facility when it is acting as the Army Forces (ARFOR) or
Land Component Command (LCC) element.
5-101. An echelon above corps (EAC) MP brigade normally operates the
theater internment facility. The subordinate JFC with a J2 staff lead
establishes a Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center as an activity within
the theater internment facility. The MI Brigade Commander or other named
SIO is normally designated as the JIDC commander. Army interrogation
operations are normally carried out in an area of the MP-operated
internment facility set aside for that use.
5-102. The JIDC is normally administratively and operationally self-
sufficient. A JIDC will function as part of an overall detainee command and
control structure as outlined in FM 3-19.40 and/or by policy. Continuous
coordination between the JIDC commander and internment facility
commander is essential. The JIDC will—
•
Normally consist of facility headquarters, operations, analysis,
editorial, interrogation, screening, and DOCEX elements.
6 September 2006
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_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
•
Collocate with the theater detainee internment facility.
•
Organizationally structure itself to meet METT-TC requirements
within the theater.
•
Include HUMINT collectors, CI personnel, technical experts, personnel
for CEDs and DOCEX, and intelligence analysts, as applicable, from
the Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, Navy, and other government
agencies.
•
Maintain the capability to deploy HCTs forward, as needed, to conduct
interrogations or debriefings of sources of interest who cannot be
readily evacuated to the JIDC.
•
Often establish a combined interrogation facility with allied HUMINT
collector or interrogator augmentation if operating as part of a
multinational operation.
•
Receive collection guidance from the C/J/G2X and send its intelligence
reports to the C/J/G2X and to the supported C/J/G/S2.
5-103. The exact size and organizational structure of these elements will
vary dependent on METT-TC.
Headquarters Element
5-104. The activity headquarters provides all command, administrative,
logistic, and maintenance support to the JIDC. It coordinates with—
•
Higher headquarters for personnel, intelligence, and operational and
logistical support prior to and after deployment.
•
Theater J2 for reporting procedures, operational situation updates,
theater and national level intelligence requirements, and collection
priorities.
•
Provost marshal for location of theater detainee internment facilities
and for procedures to be followed by HUMINT collectors and MPs for
the processing, interrogating, and internment of EPWs.
•
Commanders of theater medical support units and internment facility
for procedures to treat, and clear for questioning, wounded EPWs.
•
Commanders of supporting CI and TECHINT assets to establish
support requirements and procedures.
•
The servicing SJA.
•
Magistrate for Article 78 issues.
•
Commanders of Air Force, Marine, Navy, and national level
organizations to arrange administrative and logistic interoperability.
Operations Element
5-105. The operations element controls the daily activities within the JIDC.
The JIDC operations element—
•
Ensures that work areas are available for all JIDC elements.
•
Establishes and maintains JIDC functional files, logs, and journals.
•
Makes detainee files available to detainee release boards to assist the
board members in their determinations.
•
Establishes interrogation priorities.
6 September 2006
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FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
•
Disseminates incoming and outgoing distribution.
•
Conducts coordination with local officials, adjacent and subordinate
intelligence activities, CI, MP, PSYOP, the Joint Captured Materiel
Exploitation Center (JCMEC), Plans and Policy Directorate (J5), and
provost marshal.
•
Conducts coordination with holding area officer in charge (OIC) for
screening site, medical support, access, movement, and evacuation
procedures for detainees.
•
Conducts operations briefings when required.
•
Supervises all JIDC operations and establishes SOPs.
•
Supervises all intelligence collection activities within the JIDC.
•
Ensures observers are present when OGAs use the JIDC’s
interrogation rooms.
Analytical Element
5-106. The analytical element normally is directly subordinate to the
operations element. The JIDC analytical element ensures that collection
requirements are current and validated. It reviews reports to ensure that the
information reported is in response to validated collection requirements. In
addition, they ensure an up-to-date common operational picture (COP) by
maintaining digital mapping of the current tactical situation and with OB
updates to help HUMINT collectors maintain their situational awareness. At
locations where digital mapping is not possible, paper situation maps
(SITMAPs) are maintained. This element also––
•
Obtains, updates, and maintains the database.
•
Works with interrogators to provide collection focus for interrogations.
•
Establishes and maintains OB workbooks and files including data
generated by intelligence information which has not been verified.
•
Maintains digital or paper SITMAPs, as available, displaying enemy
and friendly situations.
•
Catalogs, cross-references, and disseminates collection requirements to
JIDC collection elements.
•
Reviews interrogation reports for inclusion into the database.
•
Conducts situation briefings when required.
•
Conducts intelligence reach with the J2 analytical cell and other
analytical elements, such as INSCOM Information Dominance Center,
for relevant information and analysis.
Editorial Element
5-107. The editorial element is normally directly subordinate to the
operations element. It reviews all outgoing reports for format, content, and
completeness.
DOCEX Element
5-108. At a minimum, the JIDC will contain a small DOCEX element to
translate, screen, and extract information from and report on information of
6 September 2006
5-30
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
intelligence interest from source-associated documents. The theater joint
document exploitation facility (JDEF) may be collocated with the JIDC. In
this instance, the JDEF will translate, screen, categorize, and exploit all
types of CEDs.
Screening Element
5-109. The JIDC normally has a separate screening element to receive and
screen all incoming detainees and their personal effects. The screening
element will review previous screening reports, which should have been sent
along with the detainees; recommend priorities for interrogation; identify
individuals of interest to other agencies; and may conduct limited
interrogations for PIR information. The exact size of the element will vary
based on detainee capture rates and detainee flow. Interrogation elements
should use their most experienced interrogators as screeners in order to
quickly and effectively select the detainees for interrogation who are most
likely to possess useful information.
Interrogation Element
5-110. The interrogation element assigns HUMINT collectors to specific
detainees, uses interrogation and other HUMINT collection methods to
obtain information in response to intelligence requirements, and produces
intelligence reports (IIRs and SALUTE reports) as well as source-related
operational reports. The interrogation element may also debrief returning US
POWs and other personnel as deemed relevant.
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FM 2-22.3
PART THREE
The HUMINT Collection Process
Part Three discusses the logical progression of phases involved in all HUMINT
collection. There are five phases and the related task of screening that are critical to
HUMINT collection. This remains consistent with previous doctrine as captured in
the interrogation process but adds screening as a phase and combines approach
and termination. The five phases are screening, planning and preparation, approach
and termination strategies, questioning, and reporting.
Chapter 6
Screening
6-1. Available human sources and documents almost always exceed the
qualified HUMINT collection assets and resources that can be applied
against them. Screening facilitates the efficient application of these limited
assets and resources to maximize the collection of relevant information.
HUMAN SOURCE SCREENING
6-2. As it applies to HUMINT operations, screening is the process of
evaluating and selecting human sources and documents for the prioritized
collection of information based on the collection requirements and mission of
the unit conducting the screening or its higher headquarters. Screening
categorizes and prioritizes sources based on the probability of a particular
source having priority information and the level of cooperation of the source.
Screening is also used to determine if a source matches certain criteria that
indicate that the source should be referred to another agency. Screening is
conducted at all echelons of command and in all operational environments.
There are two general categories of screening: human source screening and
document screening. Human source screening will be explained in depth in this
chapter. Document screening is explained in Appendix I.
6-3. The resources (time and personnel) allocated to screening must be
balanced against those required for interrogations, debriefings, and other
collection methodologies. Although screening is not in itself an information
collection technique, it is vital to the rapid collection of information. Through
screening, the effectiveness of limited collection assets can be maximized by
targeting those assets against the sources with the highest potential of
providing key information. Screening requires experienced individuals with
6 September 2006
6-1
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
maturity and judgment who are totally knowledgeable of the collection
requirements and able to make well-reasoned decisions based on limited
information. Collection (interrogation, debriefing, and elicitation) can be
integrated into screening activities; however, it slows the screening process
and decreases the number of potential sources that can be screened.
6-4. Human source screening is the evaluation of an individual or a group of
individuals to determine their potential to answer collection requirements or
to identify individuals who match a predetermined source profile. The
purpose of screening is to––
•
Identify those select individuals among the target audience who have
information of potential value and who are willing or can be persuaded
to cooperate.
•
Identify individuals who match certain criteria that indicate them as
being potential subjects for source operations or matching the profile
for collection by special interest groups such as TECHINT or CI.
6-5. Screening requires the development of criteria that are indicators of
potential information. These might include rank, position, gender, ethnic
group, appearance, and location.
6-6. Screening is an integral part to all HUMINT collection operations.
While questioning an individual source, a HUMINT collector may switch
between screening (finding out general source areas of knowledge) to
interrogation, debriefing, or elicitation (finding out detailed information
about a specific topic). In operations, such as EPW or refugee operations that
involve large numbers of potential sources, screening will normally be
conducted as a separate but collocated operation as part of the overall
interrogation or debriefing effort. The high number of potential sources being
dealt with in most human source screening operations requires a systematic
approach be developed and utilized to make the most effective use of the
personnel and resources being allocated to the source screening operation.
SCREENING OPERATIONS
6-7. Like all intelligence operations, human source screening operations are
focused on certain targets. Although the exact target population group will
depend on the requirements of the theater of operations, the target focus of
source screening operations is best described as the permanent and
transitory population in the AO. This definition includes local indigenous
populations, refugees, and travelers in the area, and detainees (including
EPWs). Specifically excluded from this definition are members of the HN
forces (military and paramilitary), members of allied forces, and members of
HN government agencies who are available to US forces through liaison
operations. Other personnel not indigenous to the AO (such as legitimate
NGOs, humanitarian organizations, UN personnel) are available to US forces
for voluntary debriefing and should be excluded from screening operations.
6-8. Screening operations may be conducted in a variety of situations and are
dependent on the operational situation and the population. Although every
source screening operation has the same basic purpose, each can be directed
against different segments of the population in different locations throughout
6 September 2006
6-2
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
the AO. In order to accommodate the differences in the screening audience
and location, different types of source screening operations are employed.
•
Tactical Screening. Tactical screening is conducted in support of
combat or contingency operations. It can include the screening of
EPWs or detainees at the point of capture, the screening of refugees, or
the screening of local civilians in cordon and search. At the tactical
level, there is no time for elaborate approach techniques so the degree
of cooperation becomes a prime concern. Tactical area screening is
characterized by rapidly changing requirements, the need to evacuate
noncombatants and detainees to a secure area, and the need to collect
priority tactical information while operations are in progress. Although
the most lucrative type of source is often the detainee, all available
sources should be screened for priority tactical information. In tactical
screening, the HUMINT collector normally accompanies the maneuver
force (OPCON or DS). If the HUMINT collector establishes that the
source has information of value during screening, he immediately
questions the source. Information collected is passed to the maneuver
commander, normally via SALUTE reports. The HUMINT collector
may recommend to the commander that individual sources be further
detained for additional questioning. Screening must be done accurately
in order that a commander can make a decision to detain or release
possibly hostile personnel, based on the recommendation of a HUMINT
collector.
•
Checkpoint Screening. Checkpoints are often established to screen the
local populations as they transit through and within the AO or to
screen large numbers of individuals such as refugees or DPs as they
enter the AO. Screening checkpoints can be static or mobile. HUMINT
collectors must pay particular attention to refugees leaving the area
ahead of friendly forces (AO or AOI). It is likely that refugees can
provide information of tactical value more quickly and easily than
detainees. Refugees know the area and may be able to identify for the
collector anything that is out of the ordinary, such as insurgent or
terrorist activities.
•
Local Population Screening. This refers to the screening of the local
population within their own neighborhoods. When HUMINT collectors
move into a new area, they must observe the local population and
determine who may be able and willing to provide the information they
have been tasked to collect. Once this determination is made, the
collectors must engage those individuals in conversation to assess their
level of knowledge.
•
Collection Facility Screening. Screening is conducted as a normal part
of HUMINT collection operations at collection facilities such as theater
interrogation and debriefing facilities and refugee camps. Screening is
coordinated with the unit, normally an MP unit that is responsible for
the operation of the facility.
•
Local Employee Screening. CI personnel periodically screen local
employees to determine possible security risks. Concurrently, local
employee screening may identify sources who can provide information
to answer the CCIRs. Close coordination between HUMINT and CI
collection assets is a must in local employee screening.
6 September 2006
6-3
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
•
Variations and Combinations. All types of screening can be adapted to
meet specific circumstances slightly different from those for which they
were designed. Additionally, it is possible to use more than one type of
screening in an operation if the specific circumstances require it.
6-9. Screening of refugees, EPWs, and other detainees normally occurs at
two locations: initially at the point where friendly forces first encounter them
and again when they arrive at the theater and other holding areas or refugee
camps. The capturing or detaining forces should enforce segregation of EPWs
from refugees and other detained civilians; they should be screened in
separate operations, one screening for EPWs and one for refugees and other
detained civilians. Depending on METT-TC factors, segregation should be
conducted as follows:
•
Refugees: Refugees, even if of the same nationality as the enemy, are
not treated as enemies exclusively based on their nationality and are
not automatically subject to control measures. If refugees are
encountered on the battlefield, they are segregated from EPWs and
screened separately. They are generally not detained further unless
some additional reason requires their detention. At a refugee camp,
screening will be done in coordination with the NGO operating the
refugee camp. If there is a reason to detain refugees for further
questioning for intelligence purposes, or because they pose a security
threat, they will then be treated as a detainee. Under all
circumstances, refugees will be treated humanely. If they are
transported to an internment facility, they will be in-processed by MPs
and their Geneva Conventions status will be determined. Their status
under the Geneva Conventions will afford them certain privileges.
•
EPWs: Officers are segregated from enlisted. The enlisted are divided
into NCOs and lower enlisted. Males are segregated from females. This
segregation facilitates rapid screening for EPWs who may have
information to answer PIRs and IRs as well as prohibits officers from
influencing enlisted personnel to resist questioning.
•
Other Detainees: Civilians should be screened separately from EPWs.
As with refugees, if there is a reason to detain civilians for further
questioning for intelligence purposes, or because they pose a security
threat, they will then be treated as a detainee. Whether or not civilian
detainees are released or detained further, screeners should ensure
that the civilian detainees are treated humanely. If the civilian
detainees are transported to an internment facility, they will be in-
processed by MPs and their Geneva Conventions status will be
determined. Once detainees are in-processed into an internment
facility, they are then considered to be civilian internees and their
status as such will afford them certain privileges under the Geneva
Conventions.
SCREENING AT FORWARD LOCATIONS
6-10. The initial screening and subsequent questioning should be
accomplished as far forward as is operationally expedient. If a HUMINT
collector is not available, the unit S2 must ensure initial screening and
questioning of sources are completed by qualified personnel. At this level, the
individual (military or civilian) is questioned for job, unit (if applicable),
6 September 2006
6-4
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
mission, PIR and IR, and supporting information (JUMPS). If time allows,
the HUMINT collector may collect additional information, such as the
source’s name, to start a formal source file to preclude duplication at higher
echelons. S2s and personnel other than HUMINT collectors should not
attempt an approach at this stage.
6-11. HUMINT collectors will only use approach techniques as time and
circumstance allow. The prime requirement is to identify the individuals
with information of immediate tactical value, to collect that information
expediently, and to evacuate the source. In this case, tactical questioning is
normally integrated seamlessly into the screening process. This initial
screening can also be used to identify individuals for immediate evacuation
to a higher echelon facility for detailed questioning. Any screening reports or
information reports generated at this level must accompany the EPWs or
detainees as they are evacuated. Typically, battlefield screening reports, such
as the screening sheet shown in Figure 6-1, will be done on paper in order to
allow multiple screeners to work simultaneously. If automation support is
available for each screener, an electronic version of the screening report is
used, or the “KB Easy†(Figure 10-2), which allows the screener to easily
put screening information into a DIA report format and transmit it
electronically. (See Chapter 10 for a KB-EZ worksheet.)
6-12. US forces capturing enemy forces or detaining civilians on the
battlefield search each individual for weapons, documents, or other material
of intelligence interest. Each individual receives a Capture Tag which records
basic biographic data such as name, rank, serial number, unit of assignment
(military), location of capture, and any special circumstances concerning the
capture. (See Appendices E and F.) Each document or item removed from the
captive is also “bagged and tagged†to identify from whom it was taken. This
initial step is vital, as properly processing captives and their equipment
greatly simplifies the screening process. All documents associated with the
source and any possessions taken from him must be evacuated with the
source, but not on his person. This is to ensure that the next echelon of
screeners and interrogators will have the ability to exploit these items for
intelligence value, or to support determination of approach strategies.
SCREENING AT REFUGEE CAMPS OR DETENTION FACILITIES
6-13. When a detainee or refugee arrives at an internment facility, refugee
camp, or similar facility, a more extensive screening is conducted. The
screening sheet is used to facilitate this process. This screening is normally
done in conjunction with in-processing into the facility. During in-processing,
the MP will assign an Internment Serial Number (ISN) that is registered
with the Theater Detainee Reporting Center (TDRC). The ISN will be used to
track the detainee throughout the MP detention system. The ISN should not
be used in intelligence channels; however, HUMINT collectors should record
the ISN on the screening sheet to aid in locating the detainee again. For
intelligence reporting purposes, HUMINT collectors will assign the detainee
a source reporting number that will be used to identify the detainee and
information associated with him, regardless of whether or not the detainee is
transported to another facility. The J2 issues source reporting numbers to
HUMINT collectors through the OMT.
6 September 2006
6-5
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
M
M
M
M
MP
P
P
P
P ISN
ISN
ISN
ISN
ISN NUM
NUM
NUM
NUM
NUMB
B
B
B
BE
E
E
E
ER:
R:
R:
R:
R:
EV
EV
EV
EV
EVA
A
A
A
AC
C
C
C
CU
U
U
U
UA
A
A
A
AT
T
T
T
TIIIIION D
ON D
ON D
ON D
ON DA
A
A
A
AT
T
T
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TE
E
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E
E:::::
P
P
P
P
E
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E
E
R
R
R
R
S
S
S
S
O
O
O
O
N
N
N
N
A
A
A
A
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
LN
N
N
NA
A
A
AM
M
M
ME(
E(
E(
E(P)
P)
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______
__
__
____
__
__
____
__
__
____________
__
__
____
__
__
_______________
___
L
L
L
LN
N
N
NA
A
A
AM
M
M
ME(
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E(
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M
M
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______
__
__
____
__
__
____
__
__
____________
__
__
____
__
__
_______________
___
FN
FN
FN
FNA
A
A
AM
M
M
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E
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__
__
__
____
__
__
____
__
__
____
__
__
____
__
__
____
__
__
____
__
__
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___
M
M
M
MN
N
N
NA
A
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AM
M
M
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__
__
__
____
__
__
____
__
__
____
__
__
____
__
__
____
__
__
____
__
__
___________
___
SVC
SVC
SVC
SVC/ID NO
/ID NO
/ID NO
/ID NO::::
______
__
__
____
__
__
____
__
__
____________
__
__
____
__
__
_______________
___
DOB:
DOB:
DOB:
DOB:
__
__
__
____
__
__
____
__
__
____
__
__
____
__
__
____
__
__
____
__
__
___________
___
L
L
L
LA
A
A
ANG
NG
NG
NGU
U
U
UA
A
A
AG
G
G
GE
E
E
ES
S
S
S:::: __
__
__
____
__
__
____
__
__
____
__
__
____
__
__
____
__
__
____
__
__
___________
___
M
M
M
MA
A
A
ARIT
RIT
RIT
RITA
A
A
AL
L
L
L ST
ST
ST
STA
A
A
AT
T
T
TUS:
US:
US:
US:
M
M
M
M
S
S
S
S
W
W
W
W
D
D
D
D
C
C
C
C
A
A
A
A
P
P
P
P
T
T
T
T
U
U
U
U
R
R
R
R
E
E
E
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D
D
D
D
A
A
A
A
T
T
T
T
A
A
A
A
DA
DA
DA
DAT
T
T
TE
E
E
E::::
TI
TI
TI
TIM
M
M
ME
E
E
E::::
PL
PL
PL
PLA
A
A
AC
C
C
CE:
E:
E:
E:
CA
CA
CA
CAP
P
P
P U
U
U
UN
N
N
NIIIIT
T
T
T::::
CIR
CIR
CIR
CIRC
C
C
CUM
UM
UM
UMST
ST
ST
STA
A
A
AN
N
N
NC
C
C
CES:
ES:
ES:
ES:
DO
DO
DO
DOCUM
CUM
CUM
CUMEN
EN
EN
ENT
T
T
TS
S
S
S::::
WP
WP
WP
WPN
N
N
NS
S
S
S QU
QU
QU
QUIIIIP
P
P
P::::
__
__
__
__
____
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__
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____
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__
__
____
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/E
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__
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**
**
**
****** S
S
S
ST
T
T
TA
A
A
AT
T
T
TU
U
U
US:
S:
S:
S:
M =
M =
M =
M = Mi
Mi
Mi
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li
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littttaaaarrrryyyy
C
C
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C =
=
=
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C
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Ciiiivvvviiiilllliiiiaaaan
n
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P = Par
P = Par
P = Par
P = Paraaaamilitar
militar
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militaryyyy ?
?
?
? = O
= O
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= Otttthe
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M
M
M
M
IIII
L
L
L
L
IIII
T
T
T
T
A
A
A
A
R
R
R
R
Y
Y
Y
Y
BR
BR
BR
BRA
A
A
AN
N
N
NC
C
C
CH
H
H
H::::
A
A
A
AF
F
F
F A
A
A
AR
R
R
R CG
CG
CG
CG M
M
M
MC
C
C
C N
N
N
NY
Y
Y
Y
__
__
__
___
___
R
R
R
RA
A
A
AN
N
N
NK
K
K
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______
__
__
____
__
__
____
__
__
____________
__
__
____
__
__
___________
___
FULL UNIT
FULL UNIT
FULL UNIT
FULL UNIT DS
DS
DS
DSG:
G:
G:
G: __
__
__
____________________________
__
__
____
__
__
____
__
__
__
__
__
__
____
__
__
____
__
__
____
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__
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____
__
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___
___
____________________
___
DUT
DUT
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DUTY
Y
Y
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PPSN:
PPSN:
PPSN:
_____________________________________________________
___
JO
JO
JO
JOB:
B:
B:
B: __
__
__
____
__
__
____
__
__
____
__
__
____
__
__
____
__
__
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N:
N:
N: __
__
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____
__
__
____
__
__
____
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__
____
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____
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S
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SK
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: __
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: ____
__
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EXPERIE
EXPERIE
EXPERIE
EXPERIENC
NC
NC
NCE
E
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_______________________ _________
___
_________
___
____
__
____
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__
_____
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ION:
N:
N:
N: SEX:
SEX:
SEX:
SEX:
M
M
M
M F
F
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NDE
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D:
D:
D:
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
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__________________________
__
__
____
__
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____
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CO
CO
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N
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DIII
W
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REM
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RK
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S:
S:
__________
__
T
T
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TA
A
A
AL
L
L
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CON
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DIT
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N:
N:
N:
EDUC
EDUC
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N =
N =
N = __
__
__
____
__
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___Y
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RS
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INT
INT
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L
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LIGENCE:
IGENCE:
IGENCE:
IGENCE:
A
A
A
AV
V
V
VG+
G+
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AVG
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AVG A
A
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M
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N
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L
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__
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M
M
ME
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EN
N
N
C
C
C
C
IIII
V
V
V
V
IIII
L
L
L
L
IIII
A
A
A
A
N
N
N
N
JO
JO
JO
JOB:
B:
B:
B: __
__
__
____
__
__
____
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__
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__
____
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__
____
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O
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_______________________
______
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__
____
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____
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___
DUT
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IES:
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IES: __
__
__
____
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__
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__
__
____
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___
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Figure 6-1. Screening Sheet.
6 September 2006
6-6
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
6-14. When a detainee is in-processed into an internment facility, MPs will
assign the detainee’s status as an EPW, retained person, protected person, or
other status under the Geneva Conventions. Figure 6-2 provides excerpts
from FMI 3-19.40 on MP internment and resettlement operations. In an
international conflict, individuals entitled to POW status (EPWs) include—
•
Members of the regular armed forces.
•
Other militias or volunteer corps, and organized resistance movements
of a State Party to a conflict, provided they meet each of the following
criteria:
â–
Commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates.
â–
Having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance.
â–
Carrying arms openly.
â–
Conducting operations in accordance with the law of war.
•
Civilians who accompany the force.
•
Crew members of the merchant marine and crews of civilian aircraft of
a State Party to the conflict, who do not benefit by more favorable
treatment under any other provisions of international law.
6-15. There are other categories specified in Article 4, GPW. Questions with
respect to an individual’s entitlement to EPW status should be directed to
your SJA.
6-16. Retained personnel (see Articles 24 and 26, GWS):
•
Official medical personnel of the armed forces exclusively engaged in
the search for, or the collection, transport or treatment of wounded or
sick, or in the prevention of disease, and staff exclusively engaged in
the administration of medical units and facilities.
•
Chaplains attached to the armed forces.
•
Staff of National Red Cross Societies and that of other Volunteer Aid
Societies, duly recognized and authorized by their governments to
assist Medical Service personnel of their own armed forces, provided
they are exclusively engaged in the search for, or the collection,
transport or treatment of wounded or sick, or in the prevention of
disease, and provided that the staff of such societies are subject to
military laws and regulations.
6-17. Protected persons include civilians entitled to protection under the GC,
including those we retain in the course of a conflict, no matter what the
reason. A “civilian internee†is a person detained or interned in the United
States or in occupied territory for security reasons, or for protection, or
because they have committed an offense against the detaining power, and
who is entitled to “protected person†status under the GC.
6-18. The term “detainee†may also refer to enemy combatants. In general,
an enemy combatant is a person engaged in hostilities against the United
States or its coalition partners during an armed conflict. The term “enemy
combatant†includes both “lawful enemy combatants†and “unlawful enemy
combatants.â€
•
Lawful enemy combatants:
Lawful enemy combatants, who are
entitled to protections under the Geneva Conventions, include
members of the regular armed forces of a State Party to the conflict;
6 September 2006
6-7
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
militia, volunteer corps, and organized resistance movements
belonging to a State Party to the conflict, which are under
responsible command, wear a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a
distance, carry their arms openly, and abide by the laws of war; and,
members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a
government or an authority not recognized by the detaining power.
•
Unlawful enemy combatants:
Unlawful enemy combatants are
persons not entitled to combatant immunity, who engage in acts
against the United States or its coalition partners in violation of the
laws and customs of war during armed conflict. For purposes of the
war on terrorism, the term “unlawful enemy combatant†is defined to
include, but is not limited to, an individual who is or was part of
supporting Taliban or al Qaida forces, or associated forces that are
engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition
partners.
Excerpts from FMI 3-19.40, Military Police
Internment/Resettlement Operations
ACTIVITIES
The MPs assist MI screeners by identifying captives who may have answers that
support PIR and IR. Because MPs are in constant contact with captives, they see how
certain captives respond to orders and see the types of requests they make. The MPs
ensure that searches requested by MI personnel are conducted out of sight of other
captives and that guards conduct same-gender searches.
The MI screeners examine captured documents, equipment and, in some cases,
personal papers (journals, diaries, and letters from home). They are looking for
information that identifies a captive and his organization, mission, and personal
background (family, knowledge, and experience). Knowledge of a captive’s physical
and emotional status or other information helps screeners determine his willingness
to cooperate.
LOCATION
Consider the following when planning an MI screening site:
•
The site is located where screeners can observe captives as they are segregated
and processed. It is shielded from the direct view of captives and is far enough
away that captives cannot overhear screeners’ conversations.
•
The site has an operation, administrative, and interrogation area. The
interrogation area accommodates an interrogator, a captive, a guard, and an
interpreter as well as furniture. Lights are available for night operations.
•
Procedures are implemented to verify that sick and wounded captives have
been treated and released by authorized medical personnel.
•
Guards are available and procedures are implemented for escorting captives to
the interrogation site.
•
Procedures are published to inform screeners who will be moved and when
they will be moved.
•
Accountability procedures are implemented and required forms are available.
Figure 6-2. MP Support to Screening.
6 September 2006
6-8
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
6-19. It may not be immediately evident in a particular theater of operation
whether an individual is an unlawful enemy combatant or is associated with
or supporting the unlawful enemy combatants of the United States. Consult
your J/G/S2 and servicing SJA for information relevant to your theater of
operations.
6-20. All captured or detained personnel, regardless of status, shall be
treated humanely, and in accordance with the Detainee Treatment Act of
2005 and DOD Directive 2310.1E, “Department of Defense Detainee
Programâ€, and no person in the custody or under the control of DOD,
regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to torture or
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, in accordance with
and as defined in US law. (See Appendix A, GPW Articles 3, 4, 5, 13, and 14.)
6-21. The rights of EPWs are stated in the GPW. They include the right to
quarters, rations, clothing, hygiene and medical attention, property, and
other rights. EPWs may not renounce their rights to renounce EPW status.
(See Appendix A, GPW Article 7, Section I.)
6-22. Retained personnel must receive at least the same benefits as EPWs.
They may only be required to perform religious or medical duties, and they
may only be retained as long as required for the health and spiritual needs of
the EPWs. Retained persons must be returned to their home country when
no longer needed.
6-23. Protected persons’ rights include protection from physical or moral
coercion and from being taken hostage. Protected persons are protected from
murder, torture, corporal punishment, mutilation, medical experimentation,
and any form of brutality. Protected persons rights are limited, though.
They do not have the right to leave captivity and are not immune from
prosecution. Protected persons can be screened and identified for intelligence
purposes.
SCREENING PROCESS
6-24. At the internment facility, the screening process normally is distinct
from the questioning (interrogation or debriefing) process. Dependent on the
criticality of the information identified, the source may be questioned
immediately for relevant information but will more likely be identified for
future questioning. The screening is a more formal process in which the
screener attempts to obtain basic biographic data, areas of general
knowledge, source cooperation, and vulnerability to select approach
techniques in addition to identifying knowledge of critical intelligence tasks.
Once the screener has established the basics (source identification,
cooperation, and knowledge), he normally passes the source on to the
personnel that conduct the questioning. The screener will complete a
screening report that will be forwarded in accordance with unit SOPs (see
Chapter 10). If a detainee’s knowledge is of Joint Forces interest, a
knowledgeability brief (KB) should be written and submitted electronically.
(A short form KB worksheet is shown at Figure 10-2.) Complete guidance on
KBs is contained in DIAM 58-12 (S//NF).
6 September 2006
6-9
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
6-25. If the source freely discusses information of PIR value, the screener
normally exploits the information fully and completes a SALUTE report. (See
Appendices H and I.) If the source’s knowledge of PIR information is
extensive and he is freely giving the information, the senior screener and the
OIC or noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) of the interrogation or
debriefing element are notified immediately. They decide if the screener
should continue questioning the source or if the source should be handed off
to another HUMINT collector. If source-associated documents contain PIR
information, the collector will exploit them as fully as possible and write a
SALUTE report. (See Appendix H.)
6-26. The source normally is assigned a standard screening code. The
screening code is an alphanumeric designation that reflects the level of
cooperation expected from the source and the level of knowledgeability the
source may possess. Table 6-1 shows the codes for assessing sources. Those
sources assigned to the same category are interrogated in any order deemed
appropriate by the interrogation or debriefing element.
Table 6-1. Source Screening Codes.
CO
CODE
DE
C
COOP
OOPER
ERA
AT
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ON
N L
LEVE
EVEL
L
11
R
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sponds to
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tanttllyy to qu
to quest
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ing.
33
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t reesp
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to questioning
uestioning..
K
KN
NO
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A
A
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s PIR in
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ation.
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n.
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e peertinen
rtinent inf
t infoorrm
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ation.
6-27. Figure 6-3 shows the order in which detainees in the assessed
screening categories should be interrogated. Category 1-A sources normally
should be the first priority to be questioned. Category 1-B and 2-A would be
Priority II. Category 1-C, 2-B and 3-A would be next as Priority III sources,
with 2-C, and 3-B being in the fourth group to be interrogated. Category 3-C
sources are normally not questioned. This order ensures the highest
probability of obtaining the greatest amount of relevant information within
the available time. Screening codes may change with the echelon. The higher
the echelon, the more time is available to conduct an approach. Appendix B
discusses the reliability ratings of information obtained.
6 September 2006
6-10
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
Most
Least
Least
1-A
1-B
2-A
2-B
1-C
3-A
2-C
3-B
3-C
AMOUNT OF PERTINENT KNOWLEDGE
EXP
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AMOUNT OF PERTINENT KNOWLEDGE
EXP
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AMOUNT OF PERTINENT KNOWLEDGE
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Priority
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Figure 6-3. Interrogation Priorities by Screening Category.
SCREENING METHODOLOGIES
6-28. Depending on the specific operation or echelon, screening may be a
separate operation or may be integrated into a specific collection mission. For
example, a HUMINT collector accompanying a patrol encounters a civilian
who may have information that is relevant to collection requirements. The
HUMINT collector screens the source (that is, asks some general questions to
determine the source’s level of cooperation and knowledge). Upon receiving a
positive response, the HUMINT collector may debrief the civilian on a
specific topic or question him on areas of PIR interest. He then reverts to the
screening role to determine other relevant knowledge. If the HUMINT
collector determines through screening that the source either has no relevant
information or cannot be persuaded to cooperate within an operationally
expedient timeframe, he is not debriefed as part of the screening process. In
detainee or refugee operations, a separate element will normally conduct all
screenings. They establish a prioritized list of sources who are then
systematically questioned on specific topics by other HUMINT collectors or
other technical specialists.
6 September 2006
6-11
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
SCREENING REQUIREMENTS
6-29. In addition to potential sources, screening requires several components.
•
Collection Requirements. Without a clear list of specific collection
requirements, screening becomes virtually impossible. The concept
behind screening is to rapidly identify source knowledgeability as it
relates to requirements. Screeners should obtain a copy of the
supported element's collection requirements and become familiar with
the intelligence indicators listed therein. Screeners must use their
experience and imagination to devise ways to identify EPWs and
detainees who might possess information pertinent to these indicators.
Vague requirements (such as “What is the threat doing?â€) do not
provide the focus necessary to make a source selection. The HUMINT
collection element must break these SIRs into indicators if the
supported intelligence officer has not already done this. The indicators
must take into account the type of sources anticipated. For example, a
refugee probably will not know if the threat intends to defend a
particular ridgeline. However, he might know whether or not there are
threat forces on the ridge, if an improvised explosive device (IED) is
being employed on a route, if they are digging in, or if engineer type
equipment is in the area.
•
Selection Criteria. After reviewing the collection requirements, the
HUMINT collection element will develop preliminary criteria to
identify the source type that will most likely have the required
information. The source type may include gender, appearance, military
rank, age, or occupation. Some of these criteria are determined by
visual observation, thereby saving time in not having to question
everyone. Other criteria such as occupation or place of residence may
require brief questions.
•
Trained Screeners. Screening is possibly the most difficult HUMINT
skill. A HUMINT collector must use his experience, questioning skill,
cultural knowledge, and knowledge of human nature to decide in a
matter of minutes or possibly seconds whether limited HUMINT
collection assets and valuable time should be spent talking to an
individual based on the way he looks and the answers to a few
questions. A wrong decision will mean wasted assets and valuable
information missed.
•
Language Capability and Cultural Awareness. Screening involves
more than asking a series of questions. The HUMINT collector must be
able to evaluate the answers, the specific language used, and other
clues such as body language to determine the value of an individual to
the collection effort. This requires a mature and experienced screener.
If the HUMINT collector does not possess the target language, he and
his interpreter must be able to work together quickly with mutual
trust and confidence.
•
Area Conducive to Screening Operations. Effective screening
operations must allow the HUMINT collector to speak to the source
where the source is not exposed to outside influences or dangers that
may inhibit his responses. For that reason, sources should never be
screened within the sight or hearing of other potential sources.
6 September 2006
6-12
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
HUMINT collectors can use rooms within a building, tents, or other
field-expedient methods to isolate the individual being screened.
Screening a source within view or hearing of other potential sources
may not only pose a danger to the source but also will tend to inhibit
the source from freely cooperating.
•
Security. The personnel conducting the screening need to be able to
concentrate on the individual being screened. Although the collector is
ultimately responsible for his own personal security, screening is
facilitated by having dedicated personnel present (for example, MPs)
who are responsible for security. Screeners coordinate with MP or
other security personnel concerning their role in the screening process.
INITIAL DATA AND OBSERVATIONS
6-30. Screening is a filtering process whereby, under ideal circumstances, all
potential sources would be questioned to determine if they have information
of intelligence interest. In actuality this is often impossible. Screeners often
use visual and other aids to “prescreen†the sources in order to eliminate a
substantial portion of the target population before conducting detailed
screening. For example, if the HUMINT collector at a checkpoint is only
interested in information concerning a specific denied geographic area,
screeners may ask all refugees if they are from or have been in that denied
area recently. A less experienced screener could do this allowing the
experienced screener to conduct more extensive screening of the select target
audience.
6-31. If time and circumstances permit, screeners should question any
friendly personnel who have had extensive contact with the persons to be
screened. In the case of detainees, this could include holding area personnel
or personnel from the capturing unit. These personnel may be able to help
identify sources that might answer the collection requirements or who might
match a particular source profile.
6-32. Normally the screener will not have time to conduct any extended
observation of the person to be screened; however, the screener should make
a quick visual observation of the source prior to questioning him. He should
note anything in the source’s appearance and behavior that indicates he is
willing to cooperate immediately or is unlikely to cooperate. The screener
should also note any physical indicators that the source may have the type of
information or belong to a certain source profile category.
6-33. Physical indicators include overall appearance such as rank, insignia,
and condition of the uniform and type and condition of equipment for
military sources and general type and condition of dress (for example,
business suit as opposed to work clothes) for civilians. Certain physical
indicators (dress, medals such as religious medals, physical type) may be
indicators that the source belongs to a specific ethnic or religious group. The
source’s physical reactions may also indicate a willingness or lack of
willingness to cooperate. For example, does the source move forward in the
group or attempt to hide within the group; does he intentionally place
himself in the wrong segregation group; or does he show any overt signs of
nervousness, anxiety, or fright?
6 September 2006
6-13
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
6-34. The screeners will also examine all documents and possessions found
on the source (if any) and all documents pertaining to the source (if any).
At
a minimum, a detainee should have a properly filled out capture tag,
which will indicate to the screener where the detainee was captured,
by which unit, and under what circumstance.
(See para 6-12 and
Appendix D.) Documents such as personal letters, orders, rosters, signal
operating instructions (SOIs) and map sections can provide information that
identify the source, his organization, mission, and other personal background
information (family, knowledge, experience, education). They may in
themselves provide information, may identify a source for questioning, and
may provide information helpful in assessing a source’s susceptibility to an
approach.
6-35. Documents pertaining to the source, beginning at the point of capture
throughout the evacuation process, such as previous screening and
intelligence reports and administrative documents (such as source personnel
records prepared by the MPs) help the screener by providing information
concerning the source’s physical status, emotional status, level of knowledge,
level of experience, and other background data. Making timely use of reports
from lower echelons can be difficult for the screener, especially when dealing
with large numbers of potential sources.
SOURCE ASSESSMENT
6-36. Screeners use standard reporting formats to identify the results of
their screening (see Chapter 10). The determination must be made as to
whether the source is of any intelligence value to the HUMINT collector. The
HUMINT collector will basically place the source within one of four
categories.
•
Of Immediate Intelligence Interest. This category includes personnel
who are assessed, based upon the screening process, who possess
information in response to requirements. They are interrogated or
debriefed (dependent on their status) to retrieve relevant information.
This questioning may be conducted by the same person conducting the
screening or by another HUMINT collector.
•
Of Interest to Other Agencies. In most cases, the HUMINT collector
will be provided with collection requirements by other agencies or
disciplines such as TECHINT or CI. In this case the HUMINT collector
will question the source on these requirements and report the
information appropriately. However, in some instances, particularly in
the case of CI, the HUMINT collector may be given a list of topics or a
profile of personnel who are of interest to CI. The HUMINT collector
will notify the local CI representative when a person matching the “CI
profile†is identified. After the HUMINT collector has extracted any
relevant intelligence information, he will “pass†the individual off to
the CI agents. In many cases, particularly with individuals of
TECHINT or other specialized interest, the HUMINT collector will be
asked to conduct the questioning with the technical support of the
individual from the interested agency. This is coordinated through the
HUMINT collector’s OMT and the chain of command.
6 September 2006
6-14
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
•
Of Potential Interest as a Contact Source. On occasion, especially
during stability and reconstruction operations, the HUMINT collector
may identify an individual who has the potential to provide
information in the future, due to his placement or access. Although the
individual may not have information of immediate interest, the
HUMINT collector will pass his recommendation to the appropriate
office, normally the C/J/G/S2X, provided that source operations are
authorized (see Chapter 5).
•
Of No Interest. This category includes sources who prove (based upon
the screening process) to be of no interest to the HUMINT collector or
other agencies. Their biographic data is recorded, but they are not
questioned further. This category will likely include the bulk of
individuals screened. Individuals who have been screened are kept
separated from those who have not yet been screened.
OTHER TYPES OF SCREENING OPERATIONS
LOCAL EMPLOYEE SCREENING
6-37. CI personnel conduct local employee screening, primarily to identify
individuals who may be a security risk. HUMINT collectors also can use local
employee screening as a means to obtain intelligence information or to
identify personnel with placement and access to answer information
requirements. Employee screening must be conducted in a secure
environment and out of the hearing and sight of other employees. Formal
written reports of the screening must be maintained.
LOCAL COMMUNITY OR AREA SCREENING
6-38. Local area screening is normally done in coordination with other
operations such as a cordon and search operation. The HUMINT collectors
accompany the forces conducting the operation and screen the general
population to identify individuals of intelligence or CI interest.
SCREENING FOR CI REQUIREMENTS
6-39. Before initiating the screening process, the HUMINT collector
establishes liaison with supporting CI agents. The CI element provides CI
requirements and provides a profile of personnel of CI interest. CI is
normally interested in personnel who––
•
Have no identification documents.
•
Have excessive or modified identification documents.
•
Possess unexplainable large amounts of cash or valuables.
•
Are illegal border-crossers.
•
Attempt to avoid checkpoints.
•
Are on the CI personalities list, which includes members of an
intelligence service.
•
Request to see CI personnel.
•
Have family in the denied area.
•
Speak a different language or dialect than is spoken in the area.
6 September 2006
6-15
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
6-40. Personnel of CI interest include two general categories of people: The
first type of “person of interest†is any individual or group involved in
adversary intelligence collection operations or who is attempting to enter the
AO to conduct such operations. Examples of these individuals include but are
not limited to––
•
Known or suspected members and/or supporters of foreign intelligence
and security services and known or suspected members and/or
supporters of the intelligence activities of non-state entities such as
organized crime, terrorist groups, and drug traffickers.
•
Known or suspected hostile espionage agents, saboteurs, subversives,
or hostile political figures.
•
Known or suspected enemy collaborators and sympathizers who may
pose a security threat to US forces.
•
Personnel known to have engaged in intelligence, CI, security, police,
or political indoctrination activities.
•
Known or suspected officials of enemy governments whose presence
poses a security threat to US forces.
•
Political leaders known or suspected to be hostile to the military and
political objectives of the US or an allied nation.
6-41. The second type of “person of CI interest†is any individual who
possesses information concerning the identification, location, or activities of
personnel in the first category.
SCREENING FOR OTHER TECHNICAL COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
6-42. Other technical areas such as TECHINT, SIGINT, IMINT, MASINT, or
other services need to supply the HUMINT collectors with a profile of the
individuals with whom they wish to speak. The HUMINT collectors upon
identifying such an individual will contact the requesting agency after
extracting PIR information.
6 September 2006
6-16
FM 2-22.3
Chapter 7
Planning and Preparation
7-1. Planning and preparation is one of the five phases of HUMINT
collection. HUMINT collection, regardless of the methodology employed,
must be a systematic, carefully prepared enterprise. The HUMINT collector
engages in general preparation throughout his career. He focuses that
preparation to a specific area of the world, specific mission, and specific
collection requirements as those become available. Finally, the HUMINT
collector focuses his planning and preparation on a specific collection effort
with a specific source.
COLLECTION OBJECTIVES
7-2. Each HUMINT collection mission is conducted for a definite purpose.
The HUMINT collector must keep this purpose firmly in mind as he proceeds
to obtain usable information to satisfy the requirements, and thus
contributes to the success of the unit's mission. The HUMINT collector must
use the objective as a basis for planning and conducting questioning. The
HUMINT collector should not concentrate on the objective to the extent he
overlooks or fails to recognize and exploit other valuable information
extracted from the source. For example, during HUMINT collection, the
HUMINT collector learns of the presence of a heretofore unknown, highly
destructive weapon. Although this information may not be in line with his
specific objective, the HUMINT collector must develop this important lead to
obtain all possible information concerning this weapon.
RESEARCH
7-3. The key to good HUMINT collection is preparation on the part of the
collector. The HUMINT collector must understand the environment and
particularly its human component, the mission of the supported unit, that
unit’s intelligence requirements, his source, and the cultural environment.
The ultimate success of a questioning session is often decided before the
HUMINT collector even meets the source.
GENERAL RESEARCH
7-4. Due to the quickly changing world circumstances, it is impossible to
conduct all the specific research required immediately prior to questioning a
source. General research should be completed before entering an AO and
continues until operation completion. Areas of research include but are not
limited to––
•
OPLANs and OPORDs. The HUMINT collector must be familiar with
the unit OPLAN and that of its higher headquarters. By thoroughly
understanding the unit OPLAN and OPORD, the HUMINT collector
6 September 2006
7-1
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
and HUMINT commanders and leaders can anticipate collection
requirements, develop source profiles, recommend deployment
strategies, and otherwise integrate HUMINT operations into the
overall unit operation. Although the OPORD needs to be read and
understood in its entirety, certain areas are of critical importance to
the HUMINT collection effort. They include––
ƒ
Task organization. This will show where HUMINT C2, staff support,
and collection assets will fit into the organizational structure.
ƒ
Situation. This gives the friendly and enemy situation.
ƒ
Mission. This gives the HUMINT collectors insight into how their
operations will integrate into the parent unit’s operation.
ƒ
Execution. The four execution subparagraphs explain the
commander’s intent on how the mission is to be carried out:
−
Subparagraph 3a (Concept of Operation) includes how sub-
ordinate units’ operations will be included in the overall plan.
−
Subparagraph 3a(3) (Reconnaissance and Surveillance) details
how HUMINT collection operations will integrate into the
overall ISR plan. Additional information on ISR is found in
Annex L.
−
Subparagraph 3a(4) (Intelligence), along with Annex A (Task
Organization) and Annex B (Intelligence), explains how the
Intelligence BOS will support the scheme of maneuver.
−
Subparagraph 3d (Coordinating Instructions) lists the CCIRs
and initial PIRs.
•
Current events. The HUMINT collector must be knowledgeable about
current events in all potential operational areas, especially those
events that indicate the populace’s feelings or intentions toward the
US. This will facilitate a better understanding of the cultural, political,
and socio-economic conditions that could influence the attitude and
behavior of a source. This knowledge can be obtained and updated
through classified periodic intelligence publications and/or military or
civilian open sources, including both print and broadcast media, CA
and PSYOP databases, and the J/G/S2 analytical elements.
•
SOPs. The HUMINT collector must be familiar not only with his own
unit's SOP but also with that of any supported unit. The HUMINT
collector will be able to obtain specific information about report
numbers and formats, as well as information about distribution
channels for reports from these SOPs. The SOP will also explain unit
policy on source exploitation and evacuation procedures, logistic and
maintenance functions, and other C2 and support issues.
•
Umbrella concept. The TF commander through the J/G2 and J/G2X
issues an umbrella concept for HUMINT operations. When operating
under this concept, collection parameters will be established in writing,
and it is imperative that the HUMINT collector understands his role.
Types of sources will be outlined concerning placement, motivation,
and access. The umbrella concept will also specify the types of
information against which the HUMINT collector can collect. The
umbrella concept is governed by AR 381-100 (S//NF), AR 381-172
(S//NF), DIAM 58-11 (S//NF), and DIAM 58-12 (S//NF).
6 September 2006
7-2
_______________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3 5
•
Legal guides, SOFAs, operations and execute orders, ROE, and other
legal and administrative requirements. The HUMINT collector must
be thoroughly familiar with all documents that may set the legal
parameters for his collection operations. These are available through
the chain of command and from the SJA office. He must know how
these requirements apply and to what type of sources each is applied.
•
Collection requirements. The HUMINT collector needs not only to
know but also to understand the requirements that he will be
attempting to answer. These requirements can include CCIRs (PIRs
and IRs), essential elements of friendly information (EEFIs),
Intelligence Priorities for Strategic Planning (IPSP), specific requests
from national level consumers such as HUMINT collection
requirements (HCRs), SDRs, or even vocal orders given by the local
commander. These all will determine the objective of the questioning
plan.
•
Databases. Intelligence databases can give the HUMINT collector
detailed information about the source's unit, its organization, and its
capabilities. They also have information on personalities. The
HUMINT collector will use information obtained from databases to
control the source and assess his answers for truthfulness. They will
also give the HUMINT collector ideas of other areas to research. For
example, if the threat is primarily a lightly armed insurgent force,
studying similar organizations will provide the HUMINT collector with
valuable insights into the possible methods of operation of the current
target organization.
•
SITMAP and COP. The current situation, both friendly and enemy, is
vital for the movement of the HCT and for its collection operations. It
reflects enemy unit identification, disposition, and boundaries; major
roads or trails for movement of personnel, equipment, weapons; and
locations of artillery, minefields, roadblocks, entrenchments, obstacles,
staging areas, NBC contaminated areas, and ground surveillance
devices. All of this information can be used in source questioning as
control questions or in otherwise determining source veracity. The
HUMINT collector will be able to identify indicators and predict what
should be PIRs and IRs.
•
INTSUM. The INTSUM provides a summary of the intelligence
situation covering a specific period as dictated by the commander. It is
already analyzed intelligence.
•
Intelligence estimate. The intelligence estimate is derived from the
intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). It is based on all
available intelligence and considers everything of operational
significance. It will help point out gaps in the intelligence database. It
is from these gaps that requirements are derived. It will provide
information on the mission, AO, weather, terrain, enemy situation,
enemy capabilities, and conclusions. It will cover all of the standard
OB topics.
•
Weapons and equipment guides. Weapons and equipment guides can
assist the HUMINT collector in becoming familiar with the type of
equipment employed in the AO. Guides are available in hardcopy and
softcopy.
6 September 2006
7-3
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
•
Area handbooks. These handbooks provide detailed information about
a specific area of the world. They provide information on political,
economic, sociological, cultural, military, biographic, transportation,
and geographic topics. The CIA and other agencies publish area
handbooks annually. The US Department of State website also has
continuously updated information on trouble spots around the world.
•
Previous HUMINT reporting. The HUMINT collector should
familiarize himself with all previous relevant reporting from the AO.
This will provide him with insight into current operations, the types of
information collected, and may help identify information gaps.
•
Photographs, maps, and other geospatial products. In conducting
general research, the HUMINT collector should become familiar with
the AOs. This not only will help identify specific areas of HUMINT
collection potential but also will be invaluable in both the questioning
of specific sources and the maneuver of the HCT.
•
Subject matter experts (SMEs) and technical research. Before
deploying to an AO or before supporting on a particular mission, the
HUMINT collector may identify particular areas in which he lacks
critical knowledge. For example, a HUMINT collector who has
previously been operating in an area with a conventional enemy may
be deployed to an area with an unconventional threat from irregular
forces. Also, intelligence requirements may focus on equipment that is
unfamiliar to the HUMINT collector. In order to prepare himself, the
HUMINT collector contacts SMEs or analysts or uses technical
materials to gain background information.
•
Other reports. Intelligence agencies publish numerous reports and
summaries that are readily available to the HUMINT collector.
CLOSED AND OPEN-SOURCE INFORMATION (USE OF REACH)
7-5. Reach is a process by which deployed military forces rapidly access
information from, receive support from, and conduct collaboration and
information sharing with other units and organizations (deployed in theater
and from outside the theater) unconstrained by geographic proximity,
echelon, or command. Intelligence support is established based on
requirements that will help the commanders (regardless of echelon) make
decisions. Reach can be accomplished in various ways. There is no
requirement for all intelligence functional areas or echelons to use the same
approach; hence, there is no common standard for all units to use. Each
organization or section should develop its strategy on using the various
intelligence reach components. Standard enabling tools will provide for
easier access than ever before (for example, access to the INSCOM
Information Dominance Center).
6 September 2006
7-4
_______________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3 5
INTELLIGENCE REACH COMPONENTS
7-6. Intelligence reach requires the G2/S2 to develop a strategy on how best
to support the unit’s mission with intelligence reach capabilities. There are
eight basic elements of the strategy:
•
Push: Push occurs when the producers of intelligence or information
are knowledgeable of the customer’s requirements and are able to send
the desired intelligence to the customer without further requests. Push
is accomplished through the Joint Dissemination System (JDS) and/or
the Automated Message Handling System (AMHS).
•
Pull: Pull occurs when the customer is familiar enough with existing
databases to be able to anticipate the location of the desired
information. Pull is greatly enhanced through the use of portals and
homepages with hyperlinks to the various categories of information
available to the user. This requires the establishment of such a
homepage at each echelon, thus enabling higher echelons to research
and pull from lower databases and homepages.
•
Database Access: Access to local, theater, DOD, non-DOD, and
commercial databases allows analysts to leverage stored knowledge on
topics ranging from basic demographics to OB information. A validated
DIA Customer Number (acquired by the J2/G2/S2) in combination with
SIPRNET and Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System
(JWICS) connectivity establishes access to most of the databases
online.
•
Integrated Broadcast Services (IBS): IBS is an integrated, interactive
dissemination system, focusing on tactical user’s information
requirements using a common message Data Element Dictionary
(DED) and J-series family of message formats. The goal of IBS is to
resolve the uncoordinated proliferation of “stovepiped†intelligence or
information broadcasts by providing the tactical commander with
integrated time-sensitive tactical information.
•
Collaborative Tools: Collaborative tools are computer-based tools
(groupware) that help individuals work together and share
information. They allow for virtual on-line meetings and data sharing.
As much as possible, collaborative tools should be emplaced with all
necessary echelons and centers prior to deployment.
•
Request for Information: Reach includes the ability of an intelligence
officer at any level to request information that is beyond what is
available at his location, using the Community On-Line Intelligence
System for End Users and Managers (COLISEUM) System. Once an
RFI is entered into the system every other user of that system can see
it. Hence, an echelon several echelons above the actual requester can
and often does become aware of the request and may, in fact, answer it.
Reach is also provided through INSCOM’s Information Dominance
Center and other nodes at J2 and G2.
•
Leveraging Collection Management: The collection and ISR
management system is established to provide a mechanism for tasking
and managing collection assets for required information. Analysts who
are trained and familiar with the system and the various tasking
procedures can leverage the system for refined information.
6 September 2006
7-5
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
•
Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A): DCGS-A is the
ISR fusion and processing system for the future, as part of the
overarching DOD-directed DCGS-A surface system family of systems.
It will bring national and joint ISR capabilities down to JTF level,
corps and division levels and BCT level to provide leaders with NRT
information and visualization of threat, weather, and terrain
information and intelligence. DCGS-A consolidates the capabilities of
the following current-force ground processing systems:
ƒ
All-Source Analysis System (ASAS).
ƒ
Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence (CI/HUMINT) Single-
Source Workstation.
ƒ
Tactical Exploitation System (TES).
ƒ
Guardrail Information Node (GRIFN).
ƒ
Guardrail Common Sensor (GRCS) Intelligence Processing Facility
(IPF).
ƒ
Prophet Control.
ƒ
Joint STARS Common Ground Sensor (CGS).
7-7. For more information on Intelligence Reach, see FM 2-33.5/ST.
SOURCE-SPECIFIC RESEARCH
7-8. Source-specific research is done immediately prior to questioning the
source. The HUMINT collector may have to respond spontaneously in the
case of a walk-in source in tactical operations, or if the HUMINT collector
has advanced warning as in the case of a planned meeting with a source, a
long-term debriefing, or an invitational source. Areas of research include but
are not limited to––
•
Screening Reports, KBs, Other Reports: Reports about the source not
only can provide specific information about the type of information the
source can provide to answer specific collection requirements but also
can give the HUMINT collector extensive background information
about the source. This background information can give clues to
information the source might possess and to possible approach
techniques. Information contained in screening reports and KBs may
provide insight into––
ƒ
Geographic Area: This area may show information about the source’s
ethnic background, political affiliation, religion, and customs.
Information can be obtained from databases, locally registered vital
statistics, and residence registries.
ƒ
Languages: Determining the languages and dialects spoken, written,
and understood by a source can provide valuable insights into that
source’s geographic and ethnic or tribal background, education, and
social status. This determination of languages and dialects can be
facilitated by the use of “flash cards†specific to the battlefield.
ƒ
Other Reports: This can include other reports collected from this
source at other echelons or reports from other sources from the same
unit or location as the source. It can also include reports or
documents published by the ACE at your request.
6 September 2006
7-6
_______________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3 5
ƒ
Political Group: This area can provide information on the source’s
beliefs as well as provide information on political leaders and goals.
Additionally, political affiliation can sometimes provide information
about subversive groups and paramilitary ties. Knowing the goals of
the political organization can also assist the HUMINT collector in
choosing an approach or establishing rapport.
ƒ
Religious Affiliation: The source’s religious affiliation may provide
insight into his motivation, moral strengths and weaknesses, and
other motivational factors.
ƒ
Technical Field: Having knowledge about the source’s technical field
can assist the HUMINT collector in deciding upon which questions
to ask. It will also assist the HUMINT collector in verifying the
source’s truthfulness because the HUMINT collector will have an
understanding of the source’s specialty.
ƒ
Employment: By researching the source’s employment history, the
HUMINT collector can discover other areas of information that the
source may be able to provide.
ƒ
Education: The source’s education level and educational history can
not only give the HUMINT collector insight into the possible
information the source can provide but also provide insight into
possible approach strategies.
ƒ
Social Status: Knowledge of the source’s social status may provide a
clue to a good approach strategy because the source may be
accustomed to a certain type of treatment. It may also provide a clue
to biographical information that the source may be able to provide.
ƒ
Criminal Records: Criminal records may also indicate possible
approach strategies. Additionally, they may indicate which groups or
organizations the source may have knowledge about.
•
Documents and Other Media Captured on or in Immediate Association
with a Detainee or Brought in by a Debriefing Source: Documents
captured with or otherwise pertaining to the source may give the
HUMINT collector information about the source, his unit, or his role
within that unit. They may answer requirements or indicate
knowledge of PIRs. Personal letters, for example, could be used during
the approach phase. If a source comes in voluntarily and provides
documents, they should be reviewed prior to debriefing the source.
•
Photographs, Maps, and Other Geospatial Products: Maps and
photographs of the area about which the source is being questioned can
give the HUMINT collector an idea of where the source has been and
in what kind of terrain he operated, which might indicate knowledge or
use of certain tactics. If the HUMINT collector is not familiar with the
area the source was in, the HUMINT collector should take some time
to look over the map so he can more readily relate when the source
mentions locations or dispositions. Aerial photographs show more
detailed up-to-date information than maps. They will not normally be
as readily available as maps. Maps and other geospatial products will
also be needed for use in the map-tracking portion of an interrogation.
The HUMINT collector should work with the ACE of the supported
unit to obtain them for the AO.
6 September 2006
7-7
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
•
SMEs: There will be occasions when the HUMINT collector will talk to
sources about subjects of which the HUMINT collector has no
knowledge. In that case, the HUMINT collector will want to talk to
personnel who are SMEs. Depending on the depth of knowledge that
the source is expected to have and the time available to prepare, the
HUMINT collector may arrange for a technical expert to support the
questioning (see Chapter 9).
•
Technical Manuals: There are various weapon and equipment
identification guides available in hardcopy, softcopy, and off the
Internet that can assist the HUMINT collector in identifying any
equipment mentioned by the source.
•
Source Physical and Mental Condition: HUMINT collectors should
observe the source prior to questioning if possible and also talk to
anyone available who has relevant information concerning the source.
MP guards can be an especially valuable source of information based
on source observation and should be debriefed periodically. This can
prevent surprises at the onset of the questioning session and can help
the HUMINT collector assess the source’s physical and mental
condition as well as provide insights to possible approaches.
•
Databases: Collectors should review source information and reports
contained in the various databases available to them. The CHATS
system, BAT database, and other databases can provide collectors with
source information and previous reporting.
HUMINT COLLECTION PLAN
7-9. After conducting appropriate research, the HUMINT collector working
with an analyst, if available, develops a source-based collection plan. This is
geared to the specific source that is going to be questioned. The amount of
time spent in preparing this plan depends on the operational circumstances.
This may range from a quick mental review by an experienced HUMINT
collector in a tactical environment to a formal written plan submitted by a
subordinate to a team leader. The source collection plan will vary from source
to source. It will also vary with the conditions under which the source is
questioned. It serves as a checklist to ensure that all steps necessary to
prepare for questioning are conducted. Whether written or oral, the
HUMINT collection plan should contain at least the following items:
•
HUMINT collection requirements.
•
Serial number of EPW/detainee to be questioned.
•
Location and time for the questioning.
•
Primary and alternate approaches.
•
Questioning plan including topics to be covered and the planned
sequence of these topics.
•
Prepared questions for unfamiliar or highly technical topics.
•
Method of recording and reporting information obtained.
6 September 2006
7-8
_______________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3 5
OBJECTIVE
7-10. The HUMINT collector will first determine the objective of his
questioning. The objective is the set of collection requirements that the
HUMINT collector will attempt to satisfy during the questioning session. A
number of circumstances including the intelligence requirements, the time
available, and the source will set the objective. Determining the objective
consists of three parts:
•
Identify the intelligence requirements. The primary objective of any
questioning session is to answer or confirm PIR or other collection
requirements.
•
Identify the subject: The HUMINT collector will want to consider the
source; for example, who he is, what he may know. The HUMINT
collector will also want to consider the legal and other restrictions
based on the type of source (contact source, EPW, refugee, strategic).
For a military source (EPW) this includes rank, position specialty, and
unit of assignment. For a civilian source it includes job, placement and
access, associations, area of residence, and employment.
•
Identify the intelligence requirements that the source may be able to
answer. The HUMINT collector cannot normally waste time “fishingâ€
for information. He must determine based on screening, what
collection requirements the source can answer. The HUMINT collector
compares the information that he gathered through his general and
source-specific research and compares it to his list of collection
requirements. He compares that list to the identity of the source and
refines the list including all requirements that the source can be
expected to be able to answer. The HUMINT collector will approach
those areas first while staying aware of leads into other collection
topics.
LOCATION
7-11. In most cases, the location for the questioning will be determined by
operational requirements. However, the HUMINT collector should ensure
some basic requirements are met:
•
Each questioning session should be conducted outside the hearing and
view of third parties. Even in the case of a source meeting in a public
place, the HUMINT collector should choose a location where they
cannot be overheard and where their meeting will not arouse
suspicion.
•
The location should be in a place that has reasonable security for the
HUMINT collector and the source. In contact operations, the risk
cannot always be eliminated but the acceptable risk levels should be
based on the expected intelligence gain. In combat operations, most
questioning (interrogation, debriefing of civilians on the battlefield)
will take place in forward combat areas, but it cannot be done if it
increases the risk to the source. Safe evacuation of the sources has
priority over questioning.
•
The location should provide ready access to the chosen method of
recording and reporting the information.
6 September 2006
7-9
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
7-12. When conducting military source operations, the location of the
questioning will have psychological effects on the source. The questioning
location should be chosen and set up to correspond to the effect that the
HUMINT collector wants to project and his planned approach techniques.
For example, meeting in a social type situation such as a restaurant may
place the source at ease. Meeting in an apartment projects informality while
meeting in an office projects more formality. Meeting at the source’s home
normally places him at a psychological advantage, while meeting in the
HUMINT collector’s work area gives the collector a psychological edge. The
HUMINT collector should consider the status and level of the source,
security, the workspace available, furnishings, the amount of lighting
provided, and the ability to heat or cool the room as needed.
TIME
7-13. Time to conduct questioning should be estimated based on the source,
the type of information that the HUMINT collector expects to get, and the
complexity of that information. Other considerations include expected
evacuation times for sources in tactical situations, the number of other
sources that need to be spoken to; and in contact operations, the estimated
time that the HUMINT collector can meet with the source without increasing
the risk.
7-14. The HUMINT collector must also consider the physical conditions of
the source and himself. After extended operations, there may be a limit on
how long either the HUMINT collector or source can concentrate on a given
subject. Even if the HUMINT collector has an unlimited time period (such as
at a joint interrogation and debriefing facility), he must break his
questioning down into topical sessions to maximize effectiveness. Time is
only an estimate and should be modified based on the circumstances. It may
be extended, for example, if the source has a greater than expected amount of
information, or critical information in unforeseen areas. The time may be
curtailed if the HUMINT collector has met his requirements, the source does
not possess the expected information, or a more valuable source is identified.
PRIMARY AND ALTERNATE APPROACHES
7-15. In most circumstances, if the HUMINT collector is meeting with the
source for the first time, he should select at least two alternate approaches to
use if the direct approach is unsuccessful (see Chapter 8). These approaches
need to be based on the HUMINT collector's source-specific research, his
general area research, knowledge of the current situation, and knowledge of
human nature. There are four primary factors that must be considered when
selecting tentative approaches:
•
The source's mental and physical state. Is the source injured, angry,
crying, arrogant, cocky, or frightened?
•
The source's background. What is the source's age and level of military
or civilian experience? Consider cultural, ethnic, and religious factors.
•
The objective of the HUMINT collection. How valuable is the source’s
potential information? Is it beneficial to spend more effort convincing
this source to talk?
6 September 2006
7-10
_______________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3 5
•
The HUMINT collector himself. What abilities does he have that can
be brought into play? What weaknesses does he have that may
interfere with the HUMINT collection? Are there social or ethnic
barriers to communication? Can his personality adapt to the
personality of the source?
7-16. If the HUMINT collector has a screening sheet or KB, he can use it to
help select his approaches. After reviewing the information, the HUMINT
collector will analyze the information for indicators of psychological and/or
physical weakness that would make a source susceptible to a specific
approach. The HUMINT collector also needs to consider his particular
strengths and weaknesses in conducting specific approaches. He must
consider what immediate incentives he may possibly need and ensure that
they are available. Also, if incentives had been previously offered or
promised, the collector needs to know if they were in fact provided. If the
HUMINT collector has previously questioned the source, he must evaluate
the approaches he used and decide if they need to be modified or if additional
approach techniques will be needed (see Chapter 8.)
ADDITIONAL SUPPORT REQUIRED
7-17. The HUMINT collector must decide if he will need technical support to
include interpreter support.
•
Technical support. The HUMINT collector must decide if he will need
additional support including analytical, technical, or interpreter
support.
•
Analytical or technical support. The HUMINT collector must decide if
he has the analytical or technical capability to question a specific
source. If not, he must decide what degree of support from advice to
participation is required of the analyst or technical expert. Any request
for analytical or technical support must be coordinated with the 2X. On
rare occasions, it may be desirable for the HUMINT collector to seek
polygraph support or support from a Behavioral Science Consultant
(BSC). BSCs are authorized to make psychological assessments of the
character, personality, social interactions, and other behavioral
characteristics of interrogation subjects and advise HUMINT collectors
of their assessments, as needed.
•
Interpreter support. If the HUMINT collector does not speak the
needed language or does not speak the needed language well enough to
conduct questioning, an interpreter will be required. If the HUMINT
collector will need an interpreter, the HUMINT collector will also have
to consider the clearance needed to complete the questioning and the
availability of the interpreter, as well as the extra time necessary to
complete the questioning session. The HUMINT collector will also have
to brief the interpreter on the method of interpretation and the
HUMINT exploitation plan. Also, he should determine whether there
are any cultural aspects associated with the interpreter that may
enhance or detract from the success of the meet. (See Chapter 11 for
detailed information on HUMINT collection using an interpreter.)
6 September 2006
7-11
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
DEVELOP A QUESTIONING PLAN
7-18. The HUMINT collector must develop a plan that will guide his
questioning of the source. This includes general topics to be exploited and the
sequence in which they will be covered.
7-19. There are two general sequences used in questioning: topical and
chronological.
•
Topical questioning is used when time is a prime concern, when the
source is believed to possess key information in a limited area, when
the questioning is concerning a technical topic, or when the source has
been talked to previously and this is a subsequent questioning to
expand on earlier topics.
•
Chronological questioning normally is used when the HUMINT
collector is uncertain of the areas of source knowledge, when time is
not a factor in questioning, during initial questioning when the source
is believed to have knowledge on a large number of topics, and in
friendly force mission debriefing.
7-20. A topical sequence is an outline of topics to be questioned in a selected
sequence and is based on intelligence requirements or HCRs, as well as a
specific source’s potential to provide information pertinent to those
requirements. The plan serves as a checklist for the HUMINT collector to
ensure that all subjects pertinent to the collection objective are questioned in
an efficient and organized manner. The HUMINT collector uses his estimate
of the type and extent of knowledge possessed by the source to modify the
basic topical sequence of questioning. He selects only those topics in which he
believes the source has pertinent knowledge. In this way, the HUMINT
collector refines his element's overall objective into a set of specific HUMINT
collection subjects. In OB factors questioning in either a tactical or strategic
setting, and across the full spectrum of operations, the topics covered include
missions and the nine major OB factors:
•
Composition.
•
Strength.
•
Dispositions.
•
Tactics.
•
Training.
•
Combat effectiveness.
•
Logistics.
•
Electronic technical data.
•
Miscellaneous.
7-21. See Appendix G for questioning quick reference examples of topics
covered under the nine OB factors.
7-22. In strategic and operational debriefing operations the relevant HCR or
SDR will guide the HUMINT collector. Regardless of which tasking
document is referenced, the topical sequence is established by collection
requirements, modified or sequenced, based on source knowledge and time.
7-23. The nine OB factors are not the only guideline that may be used by the
HUMINT collector. If the collection objective is something other than a
6 September 2006
7-12
_______________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3 5
military unit, many of the OB factors will not fit the collection plan. A helpful
memory aid, in this case, is mission, identification, location, and organization
(MILO). MILO gives a short, easily remembered structure for questioning
nonmilitary or strategic topics. The MILO factors can be questioned in any
order, but often the most logical sequence of MILO questioning is
identification, organization, location, and mission. Many of the nine OB
factors can also fit into the MILO format.
IDENTIFY MEANS OF RECORDING AND REPORTING
7-24. The HUMINT collector will want to decide upon a means of recording
the information obtained through source questioning. If the HUMINT
collector is planning to use a sound or video recorder, he will also have to
consider the availability of the equipment and its positioning (see Chapter 9).
Along with the method of recording the information, the HUMINT collector
will have to decide on the means of reporting the information (see Chapter
10). Tapes of interrogations must be safeguarded in accordance with DOD
Regulation 5200.1-R.
FINAL PREPARATIONS
7-25. After the source-specific questioning plan is developed, the HUMINT
collector takes some final preparatory steps.
•
Review plan. The HUMINT collector should always go over his
collection plan with his supervisor. This review can be written or oral.
In addition to the obvious requirements to keep the chain of command
informed, this review helps identify any weaknesses in the plan and is
a means to effect required coordination and support.
•
Collect questioning support materials. The HUMINT collector will
want to collect the various references and other guides that he will use
to support his questioning. These materials may include source
documents, maps, aerial photographs, imagery, OB data, extra lights,
extra tables, drawing templates, graph paper, questioning guides,
technical reference manuals, city plans and handbooks, and recording
devices.
•
Conduct required coordination. The HUMINT collector coordinates any
support requirements including analytical, technical, or interpreter
support, questioning location, ICFs, recording equipment, security, and
transportation.
•
Organize. The HUMINT collector organizes his materials in a logical
manner that will complement his topical sequence. By being organized,
the HUMINT collector will not waste time trying to locate the correct
manual or guide. Additionally, the HUMINT collector will present a
professional appearance to his source.
•
Reconnoiter the questioning location. If the questioning location is to
be somewhere other than the HUMINT collector's normal AO, such as
a public restaurant, the HUMINT collector should conduct an
unobtrusive reconnaissance of the site. If at all possible, this should be
at the same time and day of the week as the planned meeting. This
allows the HUMINT collector to assess the possible security problems
6 September 2006
7-13
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
of the location, judge the traffic flow, and identify any other items that
might affect the questioning. He can also judge where within the
meeting site he can set up for maximum security and psychological
advantage. He must be careful that in doing so he does not set up
patterns of operation that will increase rather than decrease security
problems.
•
Set up questioning site. If the HUMINT collector has control over the
site where the collection is being conducted, the last step in preparing
is the actual setup of the questioning site. The HUMINT collector will
want to decide on the placement of the furniture and lighting and
where everyone will be seated and decide where he will place his
technical support materials.
•
Question guards. If the person to be questioned is a detainee, the
HUMINT collector should arrange to question MP guards who have
been in contact with the detainee to ascertain source behavior,
attitude, and other useful information that guards may be able to
provide.
•
Check with medical personnel. If the detainee was injured or ill,
ensure that he was treated by medical authorities and released for
questioning.
7-26. The supervisor reviews each plan for legal considerations, appropriate
goals in accordance with the collection objectives of the supported unit, and
makes any changes he thinks are necessary. The supervisor ensures that
contract interrogators are utilized in accordance with the scope of their
contract and current policy. (See Appendix K.) After the plan is approved, the
collection operation is executed. Prior to execution, the supervisor ensures
mission brief back, rehearsal, and pre-combat inspections are conducted.
6 September 2006
7-14
FM 2-22.3
Chapter 8
Approach Techniques and Termination Strategies
8-1. Regardless of the type of operation, the initial impression that the
HUMINT collector makes on the source and the approach he takes to gain
the source’s cooperation will have a lasting effect on the continuing
relationship and the degree of success in collecting information. The
approach used will vary based on the type of operation; the operational
environment; the status of the source; the personality, position, and identity
of the source; and the personality and experience level of the HUMINT
collector and the time available.
8-2. The MPs will not take any actions to set conditions for interrogations
(for example, “softening up†a detainee). Additionally, in accordance with
DOD Directive 3115.09, military working dogs, contracted dogs, or any other
dog in use by a government agency shall not be used as a part of an
interrogation approach nor to harass, intimidate, threaten, or coerce a
detainee for interrogation purposes. Leadership throughout the chain of
command is responsible to ensure that HUMINT operations are in
compliance with these governing regulations and guidelines, whether the
HUMINT collection is to take place as part of HCT operations or in an
internment facility.
8-3. The only authorized interrogation approaches and techniques are those
authorized by and listed in this manual, in accordance with the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005. Two approaches, Mutt and Jeff and False Flag,
require approval by the first O-6 in the interrogator’s chain of command. The
restricted interrogation technique “Separation†requires COCOM commander
approval for use, and approval of each interrogation plan using “Separationâ€
by the first General Officer/Flag Officer (GO/FO) in the chain of command.
Coordination may also be required with the C/J/G2X, security, legal, or other
personnel. Regardless of the coordination efforts required, use of all
techniques at all locations must carefully comply with this manual and
additional instructions contained in the latest DOD and COCOM policies.
NOTE: The word “source†will be used in this chapter to mean any person who is
the objective of the HUMINT collector’s approach, and is applicable in any
collection situation unless otherwise noted in the text. This use of the term
“source†is consistent with US Army Intelligence Center HUMINT collector
training.
APPROACH PHASE
8-4. During the approach phase, the HUMINT collector establishes the
conditions of control and rapport to facilitate information collection. The
approach begins with initial contact between the source and the HUMINT
collector. Extreme care is required since the success of the collection effort
6 September 2006
8-1
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
hinges, to a large degree, on the early development of the source’s willingness
to communicate. Interrogators must have a deep understanding of the
cultural norms, anomalies, and emotional triggers of the person being
interrogated in order to select appropriate approach strategies and to
interrogate effectively.
8-5. The HUMINT collector's objective during this phase is to establish a
relationship with the source that results in the source providing accurate and
reliable information in response to the HUMINT collector’s questions. The
HUMINT collector adopts an appropriate persona based on his appraisal of
the source but remains alert for verbal and non-verbal clues that indicate the
need for a change in the approach techniques. The amount of time spent on
this phase will depend mostly on the probable quantity and value of
information the source possesses, the availability of other sources with
knowledge on the same topics, and available time. At the initial contact, a
businesslike relationship should be maintained. As the source assumes a
cooperative attitude, a more relaxed atmosphere may be advantageous. The
HUMINT collector must carefully determine which of the various approach
techniques to employ.
8-6. Sources will cooperate with the HUMINT collector for various reasons
ranging from patriotic duty to personal gain, such as material gifts or money.
They may also respond to emotion or logic. Regardless of the type of source
and his outward personality, every source possesses exploitable
characteristics that, if recognized by the HUMINT collector, can be used to
facilitate the collection process. These characteristics may be readily
apparent or may have to be extrapolated from the source’s speech,
mannerisms, facial expressions, physical movements, involuntary responses
(perspiration, changes in breathing, eye movement), and other overt
indications that vary from source to source. From a psychological standpoint,
the HUMINT collector must be cognizant of the following behaviors. People
tend to—
•
Want to talk when they are under stress and respond to kindness and
understanding during trying circumstances. For example, enemy
soldiers who have just been captured have experienced a significant
stress-producing episode. The natural inclination is for people to want
to talk about this sort of experience. If the EPW has been properly
segregated and silenced, the HUMINT collector will be the first person
the EPW has a chance to talk to. This is a powerful tool for the
collector to use to get the subject talking. The desire to talk may also
be manifested in refugees, DPs, and even local civilians when
confronted by an unsettled situation.
•
Show deference when confronted by superior authority. This is
culturally dependent but in most areas of the world people are used to
responding to questions from a variety of government and quasi-
government officials.
•
Operate within a framework of personal and culturally derived values.
People tend to respond positively to individuals who display the same
value system and negatively when their core values are challenged.
•
Respond to physical and, more importantly, emotional self-interest.
This may be as simple as responding to material rewards such as extra
6 September 2006
8-2
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
food or luxury items for their personal comfort or as complex as
responding to support in rationalizing guilt.
•
Fail to apply or remember lessons they may have been taught
regarding security if confronted with a disorganized or strange
situation.
•
Be more willing to discuss a topic about which the HUMINT collector
demonstrates identical or related experience or knowledge.
•
Appreciate flattery and exoneration from guilt.
•
Attach less importance to a topic if it is treated routinely by the
HUMINT collector.
•
Resent having someone or something they respect belittled, especially
by someone they dislike.
8-7. HUMINT collectors do not "run" an approach by following a set pattern
or routine. Each approach is different, but all approaches have the following
in common. They—
•
Establish and maintain control over the source and collection effort.
This does not necessarily equate to physical control. Rather it means
that the HUMINT collector directs the conversation to cover the topics
that are of interest to him. This may be overt in a debriefing or an
interrogation or subtle in an elicitation. In a very basic sense, the
HUMINT collector is in control if he is asking questions and receiving
answers. If the source is asking questions, refusing to answer
questions, or directing or attempting to direct the exchange, he is
challenging for control. If the source challenges this control, the
HUMINT collector must act quickly and firmly to reestablish control.
•
Establish and maintain a rapport between the HUMINT collector and
the source. Rapport is a condition established by the HUMINT
collector that is characterized by source confidence in the HUMINT
collector and a willingness to cooperate with him. This does not
necessarily equate to a friendly atmosphere. It means that a
relationship is established and maintained that facilitates the
collection of information by the HUMINT collector. The HUMINT
collector may establish a relationship as superior, equal, or even
inferior to the source. The relationship may be based on friendship,
mutual gain, or even fear.
•
Identify the source’s primary emotions, values, traditions, and
characteristics and use them to gain the source’s willing cooperation.
8-8. The successful application of approach techniques, coupled with
measures to ensure source veracity, results in the source providing accurate
information in response to the HUMINT collector’s requirements. The source
may or may not be aware that he is providing the HUMINT collector with
needed information. The approach does not end when the source begins
providing information but is reinforced as necessary throughout the
questioning.
6 September 2006
8-3
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
DEVELOPING RAPPORT
8-9. The basis of rapport is source confidence in the HUMINT collector,
which leads to a willingness to cooperate. Rapport does not necessarily mean
a friendly relationship, although that may be the case. It means an
establishment of a relationship in which the HUMINT collector presents a
realistic persona designed to evoke cooperation from the source. The source
responds with relevant, truthful information. Rapport is established during
the approach and must be maintained throughout the questioning of the
source. If the HUMINT collector has established good rapport initially and
then abandons the effort, the source would rightfully begin to question the
HUMINT collector’s sincerity and may cease answering questions.
BUILDING RAPPORT
8-10. Building rapport is an integral part of the approach phase. The
establishment of rapport begins when the HUMINT collector first encounters
the source. Depending on the situation, the HUMINT collector may introduce
himself to the source. In debriefing and liaison operations, this will normally
be the collector’s true name and affiliation. In elicitation, the requirement
and type of introduction depends on the operation. In interrogation
operations, the HUMINT collector normally will not introduce himself unless
he is laying the groundwork for an approach. If he does introduce himself,
normally he will adopt a duty position and rank supportive of the approach
strategy selected during the planning and preparation phase. The HUMINT
collector must select a rank and duty position that is believable based on the
HUMINT collector’s age, appearance, and experience. A HUMINT collector
may, according to international law, use ruses of war to build rapport with
interrogation sources, and this may include posing or “passing himself off†as
someone other than a military interrogator. However, the collector must not
pose as—
•
A doctor, medic, or any other type of medical personnel.
•
Any member of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
or its affiliates. Such a ruse is a violation of US treaty obligations.
•
A chaplain or clergyman.
•
A journalist.
•
A member of the US Congress.
8-11. The HUMINT collector should seek advice from his SJA concerning
representing himself as holding any other sensitive position.
8-12. A good source assessment is the basis for the approach and vital to the
success of the collection effort. The HUMINT collector continually assesses
the source to see if the approaches—and later the questioning techniques—
chosen in the planning and preparation phase will indeed work. Approaches
chosen in planning and preparation are tentative and based on the limited
information available from documents, guards, and personal observation.
This may lead the HUMINT collector to select approaches that may be totally
incorrect for obtaining this source's willing cooperation. Thus, careful
assessment of the source is critical to avoid wasting valuable time in the
approach phase. Whether the HUMINT collector is using reasoned argument
6 September 2006
8-4
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
or emotion to get the source to cooperate, he must be convincing and
believable and appear sincere.
RAPPORT POSTURE
8-13. Unless there is rationale for acting otherwise, the HUMINT collector
will begin his interaction with the source in a businesslike manner. He will
be neither hostile nor overly friendly. Based on the tentative approaches
developed during planning and preparation and the verbal and physical clues
from the source, the HUMINT collector will modify this posture to facilitate
collection.
8-14. Based on planning and preparation, the HUMINT collector may decide
to adopt a stern posture. He presents himself as a person in a superior
position to the interrogation source and demands proper deference and
obedience by the interrogation source. In the case of an EPW this is
manifested by having the source remain at attention and address the
HUMINT collector as “Sir.†This can be effective in dealing with lower
ranking military personnel or members of oppressed ethnic, tribal, or
religious groups who are conditioned to respond to authority or civilians in
lower economic or social positions who are used to responding to directions
from various bureaucrats and civilian superiors. This posture can have
negative results since many persons in the positions mentioned above have
developed mechanisms for dealing with superiors that mostly involve giving
minimal information and agreeing with whatever the authority figure says.
8-15. In most cases, either initially or after the interrogation source has
begun answering questions, the HUMINT collector will adopt a more relaxed
or even sympathetic posture. The HUMINT collector addresses the
interrogation source in a friendly fashion, striving to put him at ease.
Regardless of the posture selected by the HUMINT collector, he must stay
detached emotionally while maintaining the appearance of total involvement
and stay within his adopted persona. The HUMINT collector must control his
temper at all times. He must not show distaste, disgust, or unease at
anything the source says unless that reaction is a planned part of the
approach strategy. He should not show surprise at anything that the
interrogation source says since it might undermine source confidence in the
HUMINT collector and their relationship.
8-16. The HUMINT collector must support his verbal approaches with
appropriate body language. Just as the HUMINT collector is observing the
source to identify non-verbal clues that support or contradict the verbal
message, the HUMINT collector is being scrutinized by the source to identify
the same clues. The techniques used in an approach are a totality of effort,
not just verbal conversation between the HUMINT collector and the source.
Body language is in many instances culturally dependent. Standing at a
given distance from an individual may be perceived as comforting in some
societies and hostile in others. The HUMINT collector must adapt his body
language to the culture in which he is working rather than expect the source
to adapt to his.
6 September 2006
8-5
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
APPROACH TECHNIQUES
8-17. The approaches listed are not guaranteed solutions for every situation.
Some individual approaches that may be suitable for one operating
environment, such as when conducting HUMINT contact operations, may be
ineffective in another, such as interrogation. Some will be successful with
one source and ineffective with another. In any case, everything the
HUMINT collector says and does must be in compliance with the applicable
law and policy under which the HUMINT collector is operating. Applicable
law and policy include US law; the law of war; relevant international law;
relevant directives including DOD Directive 3115.09, “DOD Intelligence
Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioningâ€; DOD
Directive 2310.1E, “The Department of Defense Detainee Programâ€; DOD
instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOs.
8-18. There are 18 approach techniques that can be employed on any
detainee regardless of status or characterization, including EPWs.
Additionally, there is one restricted interrogation technique called separation
(see Appendix M). Separation cannot be employed on EPWs. With the
exception of the direct approach, which may be effective by itself, approach
techniques are used in combination with other approaches and techniques.
Transitions from one approach to another must be smooth, logical, and
convincing.
DIRECT APPROACH
8-19. (Interrogation and Other MSO) Almost all HUMINT collection begins
with the direct approach. The exception to this is during elicitation
operations that by their very nature are indirect. In using the direct
approach, the HUMINT collector asks direct questions (see Chapter 9). The
initial questions may be administrative or nonpertinent but the HUMINT
collector quickly begins asking pertinent questions. The HUMINT collector
will continue to use direct questions as long as the source is answering the
questions in a truthful manner. When the source refuses to answer, avoids
answering, or falsely answers a pertinent question, the HUMINT collector
will begin an alternate approach strategy. The fact that the source is
answering questions does not preclude the HUMINT collector from providing
an incentive to reward the source and continue his cooperation as long as
that incentive does not slow down the collection. For example, a HUMINT
collector might offer the source coffee or cigarettes to reward his cooperation.
See Chapter 9 for the use of Repeat and Control questions in detecting
deception.
8-20. Statistics from interrogation operations in World War II show that the
direct approach was effective 90 percent of the time. In Vietnam and in
Operations URGENT FURY (Grenada, 1983), JUST CAUSE (Panama, 1989),
and DESERT STORM (Kuwait and Iraq, 1991), the direct approach was 95
percent effective. The effectiveness of the direct approach in Operations
ENDURING FREEDOM (Afghanistan, 2001-2002) and IRAQI FREEDOM
(Iraq, 2003) are still being studied; however, unofficial studies indicate that
in these operations, the direct approach has been dramatically less
successful. The direct approach is frequently employed at lower echelons
when the tactical situation precludes selecting other techniques, and where
6 September 2006
8-6
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
the EPW’s or detainee's mental state is one of confusion or extreme shock.
However, the HUMINT collector must remember that just because a source
is answering a direct question does not mean he is being truthful.
INCENTIVE APPROACH
8-21. (Interrogation and Other MSO) The incentive approach is trading
something that the source wants for information. The thing that you give up
may be a material reward, an emotional reward, or the removal of a real or
perceived negative stimulus. The exchange of the incentive may be blatant or
subtle. On one extreme, the exchange may be a formal cash payment for
information during some contact operations while on the other extreme it
may be as subtle as offering the source a cigarette. Even when the direct
approach is successful, the HUMINT collector may use incentives to enhance
rapport and to reward the source for cooperation and truthfulness. The
HUMINT collector must be extremely careful in selecting the options offered
to a detainee source. He cannot deny the detainee anything that he is
entitled to by law.
8-22. The HUMINT collector also should not offer anything that is not in his
power to give. Although this might be expedient in the short term, in the long
run it will eliminate source cooperation. When asked to provide something
beyond his authority, the HUMINT collector can agree to help, check into, or
otherwise support the request without committing himself to its successful
accomplishment. HUMINT collectors must be cautious in the use of
incentives for the following reasons:
•
There is an inherent suspicion of the truthfulness of “boughtâ€
information. Sources may manufacture information in order to receive
or maintain an incentive. Sources may also “hold back†information in
the hopes of trading it at a later date for greater incentives. They may
also hold back information if the incentive is not immediately available
or guaranteed.
•
The incentive must be believable and attainable. The incentive must be
within the capability of the HUMINT collector’s assumed persona to
achieve. For example, if the detainee was captured after killing a US
soldier, an incentive of release would not be realistic or believable.
Likewise, if the interrogator is presenting himself as being a “harmless
clerk†at the detention center, it would be unrealistic to expect a
detainee to believe that a clerk could arrange to have the detainee’s
girlfriend brought to visit him. Such a visit might be possible, but the
interrogator’s assumed persona would not seemingly provide him with
the authority to make it happen.
•
The HUMINT collector must provide any promised incentive. A simple
promise of an incentive may be sufficient to obtain immediate
cooperation. If, however, the HUMINT collector does not follow
through on providing the incentive, he will lose credibility and rapport
with his source. This may end the cooperation of not only that source
but also possibly any potential source who has contact with that
source.
•
The HUMINT collector may not state or even imply that the basic
human rights guaranteed by applicable national and international
6 September 2006
8-7
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
laws, regulations, and agreements will be contingent on a detained
source’s cooperation. An incentive for cooperation is viable only if the
HUMINT collector has or is perceived to have the authority to
withhold the incentive if the source is not cooperative. A HUMINT
collector cannot promise an EPW that he will be treated in accordance
with the GPW if he cooperates. This statement implies that the EPW
will not be treated properly if he does not cooperate. Since the EPW
must be treated in accordance with the GPW whether he cooperates or
not, the HUMINT collector will rapidly lose credibility.
EMOTIONAL APPROACHES
8-23. (Interrogation and Other MSO) Emotional approaches are centered on
how the source views himself and his interrelationships with others. Through
source observation and initial questioning, the HUMINT collector can often
identify dominant emotions that motivate the EPW/detainee. The motivating
emotion may be greed, love, hate, revenge, or others. The emotion may be
directed inward (feelings of pride or helplessness) or outward (love of family).
The HUMINT collector employs verbal and emotional ruses in applying
pressure to the source’s dominant emotions. He then links the satisfaction of
these emotions to the source’s cooperation. Often, the presentation of like
experiences and presenting the source with an opportunity to express his
emotions is sufficient to result in cooperation. However, sometimes the
source must be presented with a specific action or tangible manifestation of
support.
8-24. Although the emotion is the key factor, an emotional approach is
normally worthless without an attached incentive. The incentive must meet
the criteria listed above for the incentive approach to ensure that the
incentive is believable and attainable. For example, this technique can be
used on the EPW/detainee who has a great love for his unit and fellow
soldiers. Simply having the source express this emotion is not enough. After
the source expresses this emotion, the HUMINT collector can take advantage
of this by telling the EPW/detainee that by providing pertinent information,
he may shorten the war or battle in progress and save many of his comrades'
lives, but his refusal to talk may cause their deaths. This gives the source the
alternatives of facing the status quo or expressing love of comrades through
cooperating with the HUMINT collector.
8-25. Religion is an especially difficult topic to use in any emotional
approach. An approach using religion may encourage the source to be further
motivated by love, remorse, futility, or even pride to cooperate with the
interrogator. On the other hand, an approach using religion may also
encourage the source to end any rapport and cooperation with the
interrogator. Although it is acceptable to use religion in all interrogation
approaches, even to express doubts about a religion, an interrogator is not
permitted to denigrate a religion’s symbols (for example, a Koran, prayer rug,
icon, or religious statue) or violate a religion’s tenets, except where
appropriate for health, safety, and security reasons. Supervisors should
carefully consider the experience level of their subordinates before permitting
the use of religion in any interrogation approach.
6 September 2006
8-8
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
8-26. Similarly, supervisors should question the appropriateness of
demeaning any racial group, including the source’s, to elicit an emotional
response during an interrogation approach.
8-27. One common danger to the use of emotional approaches is the
development of an emotional attachment on the part of the HUMINT
collector. It is natural that a source will develop an emotional attachment to
the HUMINT collector. The HUMINT collector will often foster this
attachment. However, it is vital the HUMINT collector not develop a
corresponding emotional attachment to the source. This problem normally
develops when a HUMINT collector has contact with one source or a group of
similar sources over an extended period of time. There is transference of the
source’s problems to the HUMINT collector. For example, HUMINT
collectors working in a refugee camp frequently begin to view the welfare of
the refugees as a greater concern than HUMINT collection. The HUMINT
collector, while developing emotion within the source, must act believably but
at the same time he must remain detached. He must remember that the
emotion is a means to an end (that is, information collection). Supervisors
must carefully observe HUMINT collectors for signs of this emotional
attachment to the source and take appropriate action ranging from
counseling to reassignment.
8-28. The following are types of emotional approaches.
Emotional Love Approach
8-29. (Interrogation and Other MSO) Love in its many forms (friendship,
comradeship, patriotism, love of family) is a dominant emotion for most
people. The HUMINT collector focuses on the anxiety felt by the source about
the circumstances in which he finds himself, his isolation from those he loves,
and his feelings of helplessness. The HUMINT collector directs the love the
source feels toward the appropriate object: family, homeland, or comrades. If
the HUMINT collector can show the source what the source himself can do to
alter or improve his situation or the situation of the object of his emotion, the
approach has a chance of success.
8-30. The key to the successful use of this approach is to identify an action
that can realistically evoke this emotion (an incentive) that can be tied to a
detained source’s cooperation. For example, if the source cooperates, he can
see his family sooner, end the war, protect his comrades, help his country,
help his ethnic group. A good HUMINT collector will usually orchestrate
some futility with an emotional love approach to hasten the source's reaching
the breaking point. In other words if the source does not cooperate, these
things may never happen or be delayed in happening. Sincerity and
conviction are critical in a successful attempt at an emotional love approach
as the HUMINT collector must show genuine concern for the source, and for
the object at which the HUMINT collector is directing the source's emotion.
The emotional love approach may be used in any MSO where the source’s
state of mind indicates that the approach may be effective.
6 September 2006
8-9
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
Emotional Hate Approach
8-31. (Interrogation and Other MSO) The emotional hate approach focuses
on any genuine hate, or possibly a desire for revenge, the source may feel.
The HUMINT collector must clearly identify the object of the source’s hate
and, if necessary, build on those feelings so the emotion overrides the source's
rational side. The source may have negative feelings about his country's
regime, immediate superiors, officers in general, or fellow soldiers. The
emotional hate approach may be used in any MSO where the source’s state of
mind indicates that the approach may be effective.
8-32. The emotional hate approach may be effective on members of racial or
religious minorities who have or feel that they have faced discrimination in
military and civilian life. The “hate†may be very specific. For example, a
source may have great love for his country, but may hate the regime in
control. The HUMINT collector must be sure to correctly identify the specific
object of the hate. The emotional hate approach is most effective with the
immature or timid source who may have had no opportunity up to this point
for revenge, or never had the courage to voice his feelings.
8-33. As in the emotional love approach, the key to the successful application
is the linking of the emotion with a tangible manifestation of that emotion.
The HUMINT collector must be extremely careful that he does not promise
anything that would be contrary to national or international law or US
interests or goals. For example, if an EPW feels he has been treated unfairly
in his unit, the HUMINT collector can point out that, if the source cooperates
and divulges the location of that unit, the unit can be destroyed, thus
affording the source revenge. But he cannot promise that the unit if attacked
would not be allowed to surrender or that the unit if it surrenders will be
treated badly.
8-34. The HUMINT collector must be careful that he does not assume that
casual negative comments equate to a strong hate. Many soldiers will make
negative comments against their army but will support and defend their
army against any “outsider.†The HUMINT collector should also not assume
generalities; for example, assuming that a member of an ethnic minority
hates the ethnic majority just because most ethnic minorities hate those in
the ethnic majority.
Emotional Fear-Up Approach
8-35. (Interrogation and Other MSO) Fear is another dominant emotion that
can be exploited by the HUMINT collector. In the fear-up approach, the
HUMINT collector identifies a preexisting fear or creates a fear within the
source. He then links the elimination or reduction of the fear to cooperation
on the part of the source. The HUMINT collector must be extremely careful
that he does not threaten or coerce a source. Conveying a threat may be a
violation of the UCMJ. The HUMINT collector should also be extremely
careful that he does not create so much fear that the source becomes
unresponsive. The HUMINT collector should never act as if he is out of
control or set himself up as the object or focal point of the source’s fear. If the
HUMINT collector acts in this manner, it is extremely difficult to then act as
6 September 2006
8-10
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
the outlet for the fear. Supervisors should consider the experience level of
their subordinates before approving their use of this approach.
8-36. If there is a justifiable fear, the HUMINT collector should present it
and present a plan to mitigate it if the source cooperates (combination of
emotional and incentive approaches). For example, an EPW source says that
he will not cooperate because if he does his fellow prisoners will kill him or, if
a contact source says that if people find out he is cooperating, his family will
suffer. In these cases, the HUMINT collector can point out that the source
has already placed himself at risk and he or his family may suffer whether he
cooperates or not (justified fear). But if he cooperates, the HUMINT collector
will do his best to ensure that either no one will find out or that he will be
protected (incentive).
8-37. If there is no justified fear, the HUMINT collector can make use of nonÂ
specific fears. “You know what can happen to you here?†A fear-up approach
is normally presented in a level, unemotional tone of voice. For example, “We
have heard many allegations of atrocities committed in your area and anyone
that was involved will be severely punished†(non-specific fear). “If you
cooperate with me and answer all of my questions truthfully, I can make sure
you are not falsely accused†(incentive). The source should demonstrate some
indication of fear, whether verbal or non-verbal, prior to using this approach.
If a fear is pre-existing, the approach will work and is legal. If there is no
indication of fear, another approach should be considered.
8-38. It is often very effective to use the detainee’s own imagination against
him. The detainee can often visualize exactly what he is afraid of better than
the HUMINT collector can express it.
8-39. The “fear-up†approach is frequently used in conjunction with the
emotional love or hate approaches. For example, the HUMINT collector has
already established that a detainee source has a strong love of family but is
now separated from them. He may state, “I wonder how your family is
getting along without you?†(fear of the unknown). He then promises to allow
the detainee more than the minimum two letters a month required by the
GPW.
Emotional Fear-Down Approach
8-40. (Interrogation and Other MSO) The emotion of fear may dominate the
source to the point where he is unable to respond rationally to questioning,
especially in interrogation sources. However, the fear-down approach may be
used in any MSO where the source’s state of mind indicates that it would be
an appropriate approach to use. In the fear-down approach the HUMINT
collector mitigates existing fear in exchange for cooperation on the part of the
source. This is not normally a formal or even voiced agreement. Instead, the
HUMINT collector through verbal and physical actions calms the source.
Psychologically, the source then views the HUMINT collector as the protector
or the one who is providing the calm and wishes to help the HUMINT
collector in gratitude and in order to maintain the HUMINT collector as the
protector. When used with a soothing, calm tone of voice and appropriate
body language, a fear-down approach often creates rapport and nothing else
may be needed to get the source to cooperate. At times, however, the
6 September 2006
8-11
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
HUMINT collector must describe concrete actions that he will take in order
to remove the source’s fear.
8-41. Frequently the object of the fear is too traumatic for the source to face
directly. While calming the source, the HUMINT collector may initially ask
nonpertinent questions and avoid the subject that has caused the source's
fear. This develops rapport and establishes communication. The HUMINT
collector must remember that his goal is collecting information, not concern
with the psychological well being of the source. He will be concerned with the
latter only insofar as it helps him obtain the former. This approach technique
may backfire if allowed to go too far. After convincing the source he has
nothing to fear, the source may cease to be afraid and may feel secure enough
to resist the HUMINT collector's pertinent question.
Emotional-Pride and Ego-Up Approach
8-42. (Interrogation and Other MSO) The emotional-pride and ego-up
approach may be used in any MSO. It exploits a source's low self-esteem.
Many HUMINT sources including EPWs and other detainees, retained
persons, civilian internees, or refugees may suffer from low self-esteem and
feelings of helplessness due to their immediate circumstances. Others, such
as individuals or members of social or ethnic groups that have been
discriminated against or low-ranking members of organizations (including
the military), may also show low self-worth. In this technique, the source is
flattered into providing certain information in order to gain credit and build
his ego. The HUMINT collector must take care to use a flattering somewhat-
in-awe tone of voice, and speak highly of the source throughout this approach
while remaining believable. This should produce positive feelings on the
source's part as he receives desired recognition. The source will eventually
reveal pertinent information to solicit more favorable comments from the
HUMINT collector.
8-43. This technique can also be employed in another manner––by flattering
the source into admitting certain information in order to gain credit. For
example, while interrogating a suspected saboteur, the HUMINT collector
states: "This was a smooth operation. I have seen many previous attempts
fail. I bet you planned this. Who else but a clever person like you would have
planned it? When did you first decide to do the job?"
8-44. A variation of this approach can also be used on individuals with strong
egos. It is based on the premise that everyone likes to talk about what they
do best. The HUMINT collector shows interest in and asks the source to
explain an aspect of his job. The questioning begins with nonpertinent
aspects of the source’s job. The HUMINT collector displays interest and asks
increasingly technical and pertinent questions. For example, if the source is
an EPW who was a pilot, the HUMINT collector might begin by asking him
what it is like to fly. As the source talks about this, the collector
demonstrates interest and gradually uses questions to lead the conversation
to capabilities of specific aircraft, specific missions that the pilot has flown,
tactics, or whatever topic is a priority for collection.
6 September 2006
8-12
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
Emotional-Pride and Ego-Down Approach
8-45. (Interrogation) The emotional-pride and ego-down approach is based on
attacking the source's ego or self-image. The source, in defending his ego,
reveals information to justify or rationalize his actions. This information may
be valuable in answering collection requirements or may give the HUMINT
collector insight into the viability of other approaches. This approach is
effective with sources who have displayed weakness or feelings of inferiority.
A real or imaginary deficiency voiced about the source, loyalty to his
organization, or any other feature can provide a basis for this technique.
8-46. The HUMINT collector accuses the source of weakness or implies he is
unable to do a certain thing. This type of source is also prone to excuses and
rationalizations, often shifting the blame to others. An example of this
technique is opening the collection effort with the question, "Why did you
surrender so easily when you could have escaped by crossing the nearby ford
in the river?" The source is likely to provide a basis for further questions or
to reveal significant information if he attempts to explain his surrender in
order to vindicate himself. He may give an answer such as, "No one could
cross the ford because it is mined."
8-47. The objective is for the HUMINT collector to use the source's sense of
pride by attacking his loyalty, intelligence, abilities, leadership qualities,
slovenly appearance, or any other perceived weakness. This will usually goad
the source into becoming defensive, and he will try to convince the HUMINT
collector he is wrong. In his attempt to redeem his pride and explain his
actions, the source may provide pertinent information. Possible targets for
the emotional-pride and ego-down approach are the source's—
•
Loyalty.
•
Technical competence.
•
Leadership abilities.
•
Soldierly qualities.
•
Appearance.
8-48. There is a risk associated with this approach. If the emotional-pride
and ego-down approach fails, it is difficult for the HUMINT collector to
recover and move to another approach without losing his credibility. Also,
there is potential for application of the pride and ego approach to cross the
line into humiliating and degrading treatment of the detainee. Supervisors
should consider the experience level of their subordinates and determine
specifically how the interrogator intends to apply the approach technique
before approving the interrogation plan.
Emotional-Futility
8-49. (Interrogation and Other MSO) The emotional-futility approach is
generally used in an interrogation setting, but may also be used for other
MSO, if indicated by the source’s state of mind. In the emotional-futility
approach, the HUMINT collector convinces the source that resistance to
questioning is futile. This engenders a feeling of hopelessness and
helplessness on the part of the source. Again as with the other emotional
approaches, the HUMINT collector gives the source a “way out†of the
6 September 2006
8-13
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
helpless situation. For example “it is hopeless for your forces to continue
fighting because they can no longer get supplies, but you can help end the
war and their suffering.†When employing this technique, the HUMINT
collector must have factual information. The HUMINT collector presents
these facts in a persuasive, logical manner. He should be aware of and able to
exploit the source's psychological and moral weaknesses, as well as
weaknesses inherent in his society.
8-50. The futility approach is effective when the HUMINT collector can play
on doubts that already exist in the source's mind. Factual or seemingly
factual information must be presented in a persuasive, logical manner, and
in a matter-of-fact tone of voice. Making the situation appear hopeless allows
the source to rationalize his actions, especially if that action is cooperating
with the HUMINT collector. When employing this technique, the HUMINT
collector must not only have factual information but also be aware of and
exploit the source's psychological, moral, and sociological weaknesses.
Another way of using the futility approach is to blow things out of proportion.
If the source's unit was low on, or had exhausted, all food supplies, he can be
easily led to believe all of his forces had run out of food. If the source is
verging on cooperating, it may aid the collection effort if he is told all the
other sources have cooperated.
8-51. The futility approach must be orchestrated with other approach
techniques (for example, love of comrades). A source who may want to help
save his comrades' lives may be convinced the battlefield situation is hopeless
and they will die without his assistance. The futility approach is used to
paint a bleak picture for the prisoner, but it is not normally effective in and
of itself in gaining the source's cooperation.
Other Approaches
8-52. There are numerous other approaches but most require considerable
time and resources. Most are more appropriate for use with sources who are
detainees, but some, such as change of scenery, may have application for
elicitation or MSO.
8-53.
We Know All
. (Interrogation) In the “we know all†approach
technique, the HUMINT collector subtly convinces the source that his
questioning of the source is perfunctory because any information that the
source has is already known. This approach may be employed in conjunction
with the "file and dossier" technique or by itself. If used alone, the HUMINT
collector must first become thoroughly familiar with available data
concerning the source and the current situation. To begin the collection
effort, the HUMINT collector asks questions based on this known data.
8-54. When the source hesitates, refuses to answer, or provides an incorrect
or incomplete reply, the HUMINT collector provides the detailed answer
himself. The HUMINT collector may even complete a source's answer, as if
he is bored and just “going through the motions.†When the source begins to
give accurate and complete information, the HUMINT collector interjects
pertinent questions. Questions to which answers are already known are also
asked periodically to test the source's truthfulness and to maintain the
deception that the information is already known. There are some inherent
6 September 2006
8-14
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
problems with the use of the "we know all" approach. The HUMINT collector
is required to prepare everything in detail, which is time consuming. He
must commit much of the information to memory, as working from notes may
show the limits of the information actually known. It is also only usable
when sufficient prior information exists to convince the source that “we know
all.â€
8-55.
File and Dossier
. (Interrogation) The file and dossier approach is a
variation of the “we know all†approach. The HUMINT collector prepares a
dossier containing all available information concerning the source or his
organization. The information is carefully arranged within a file to give the
illusion that it contains more data than actually there. The file may be
padded with extra paper if necessary. Index tabs with titles such as
education, employment, criminal record, military service, and others are
particularly effective. It is also effective if the HUMINT collector is reviewing
the dossier when the source enters the room and the source is able to read his
name on the dossier and sees the numerous topics and supposed extent of the
files.
8-56. The HUMINT collector proceeds as in the “we know all†approach. He
refers to the particular labeled segment of the dossier before, during, or after
asking a question. In the early stages of questioning, the HUMINT collector
asks questions to which he has the answer. He may answer along with the
source, complete the information for the source, or even show the source
where the information is entered in the dossier. He never lets the source
physically handle the dossier. As the source becomes convinced that all the
information that he knows is contained within the dossier, the HUMINT
collector proceeds to topics on which he has no or little information. In doing
so, he still refers to the appropriate section of the dossier and may even nod
his head knowingly or tell the source that the information the source is
providing still matches what is in the dossier.
8-57. This technique has several limitations and drawbacks. The preparation
time in developing the dossier is extensive. The success of this technique is
largely dependent on the naiveté of the source, volume of data on the subject,
and skill of the HUMINT collector in convincing the source that the dossier is
more complete than it actually is. There is also the risk that a less naïve
source will refuse to cooperate, claiming that, if the collector already knows
everything, there is no need for him to talk. Also with this technique, the
HUMINT collector is limited in the method he may use to record new
information. If the HUMINT collector writes down information, it destroys
the illusion that all the information has already been obtained. The
HUMINT collector is normally limited to using electronic recording devices or
his memory. The HUMINT collector can also arrange ahead of time for
another interrogator or analyst to take notes for him, undetected by the
source. This could be especially effective in a situation where a separate
monitoring area (for oversight) is used by the analyst.
8-58.
Establish Your Identity
. (Interrogation) In using this approach, the
HUMINT collector insists the detained source has been correctly identified as
an infamous individual wanted by higher authorities on serious charges, and
he is not the person he purports to be. In an effort to clear himself of this
6 September 2006
8-15
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
allegation, the source makes a genuine and detailed effort to establish or
substantiate his true identity. In so doing, he may provide the HUMINT
collector with information and leads for further development. The HUMINT
collector should initially refuse to believe the source and insist he is the
individual wanted by the ambiguous higher authorities. This will force the
source to give even more detailed information in order to convince the
HUMINT collector he is who he says he is.
8-59.
Repetition
. (Interrogation) The repetition approach is used to induce
cooperation from a hostile source. In one variation of this approach, the
HUMINT collector listens carefully to a source's answer to a question, and
then repeats the question and answer several times. He does this with each
succeeding question until the source becomes so thoroughly bored with the
procedure, he answers questions fully and candidly to satisfy the HUMINT
collector and gain relief from the monotony of this method. The repetition
technique must be judiciously used, as it will generally be ineffective when
employed against introverted sources or those having great self-control. It
may also provide an opportunity for a source to regain his composure and
delay the collection effort. In this approach, the use of more than one
HUMINT collector or a tape recorder has proven effective.
8-60.
Rapid Fire
. (Interrogation) The rapid-fire approach is based upon the
principles that—
•
Everyone likes to be heard when he speaks.
•
It is confusing to be interrupted in mid-sentence with an unrelated
question.
8-61. This approach may be used by one, two, or more HUMINT collectors to
question the source. In employing this technique, the HUMINT collectors ask
a series of questions in such a manner that the source does not have time to
answer a question completely before the next one is asked. This confuses the
source, and he will tend to contradict himself as he has little time to
formulate his answers. The HUMINT collectors then confront the source with
the inconsistencies causing further contradictions. In many instances, the
source will begin to talk freely in an attempt to explain himself and deny the
HUMINT collector’s claims of inconsistencies. In this attempt, the source is
likely to reveal more than he intends, thus creating additional leads for
further exploitation. This approach may be orchestrated with the emotional-
pride and ego-down or fear-up approaches. Besides extensive preparation,
this approach requires experienced and competent HUMINT collectors, with
comprehensive case knowledge and fluency in the source's language.
8-62.
Silent
. (Interrogation) The silent approach may be successful when
used against either a nervous or confident source. When employing this
technique, the HUMINT collector says nothing to the source, but looks him
squarely in the eye, preferably with a slight smile on his face. It is important
not to look away from the source but force him to break eye contact first. The
source may become nervous, begin to shift in his chair, cross and re-cross his
legs, and look away. He may ask questions, but the HUMINT collector should
not answer until he is ready to break the silence. The source may blurt out
questions such as, "Come on now, what do you want with me?" When the
HUMINT collector is ready to break silence, he may do so with questions
6 September 2006
8-16
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
such as, "You planned this operation for a long time, didn't you? Was it your
idea?" The HUMINT collector must be patient when using this technique. It
may appear the technique is not succeeding, but usually will when given a
reasonable chance.
8-63.
Change of Scenery
. (Interrogation and Other MSO) The change-ofÂ
scenery approach may be used in any type of MSO to remove the source from
an intimidating atmosphere such as an “interrogation†room type of setting
and to place him in a setting where he feels more comfortable speaking.
Bringing a source into a formal setting to conduct an interrogation or
debriefing has psychological implications. On the positive side, it places the
HUMINT collector in a superior position since he is operating on his “home
turf†and has set the conditions for the meeting. It allows the HUMINT
collector control over the immediate environment including the positioning of
the participants, to establish the desired atmosphere for the approach.
8-64. However, there are potential negative factors in the conduct of
questioning in an “Interrogation Room†environment. The source may be
intimidated and more guarded; he may consider the formal setting in terms
of an adversarial relationship; and he may limit his answers as a mode of
self-protection. In some circumstances, the HUMINT collector may be able to
invite the source to a different setting for coffee and pleasant conversation.
When removed from the formal environment, the source may experience a
feeling of leaving the interrogation behind. The perceived reduced pressure
may lower his guard and allow him to attach less significance to conversation
that occurs outside the formal setting, even though pertinent information is
still being discussed. During the conversation in this more relaxed
environment, the HUMINT collector steers the conversation to the topic of
interest. Through this somewhat indirect method, he attempts to elicit the
desired information. The source may never realize he is still being
questioned.
8-65.
Mutt and Jeff. (Interrogation)
The goal of this technique is to make
the source identify with one of the interrogators and thereby establish
rapport and cooperation. This technique involves a psychological ploy that
takes advantage of the natural uncertainty and guilt that a source has as a
result of being detained and questioned. Use of this technique requires two
experienced HUMINT collectors who are convincing actors. The two
HUMINT collectors will display opposing personalities and attitudes toward
the source. For example, the first HUMINT collector is very formal and
displays an unsympathetic attitude toward the source. He may, for instance,
be very strict and order the source to follow all military courtesies during
questioning. Although he conveys an unfeeling attitude, the HUMINT
collector is careful not to threaten or coerce the source. Conveying a threat of
violence is a violation of the UCMJ.
8-66. At the point when the interrogator senses the source is vulnerable, the
second HUMINT collector appears (having received his cue by a signal,
hidden from the source, or by listening and observing out of view of the
source), and scolds the first HUMINT collector for his uncaring behavior and
orders him from the room. The second HUMINT collector then apologizes to
soothe the source, perhaps offering him a beverage and a cigarette. He
6 September 2006
8-17
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
explains that the actions of the first HUMINT collector were largely the
result of an inferior intellect and lack of sensitivity. The inference is that the
second HUMINT collector and the source share a high degree of intelligence
and sensitivity.
8-67. The source is normally inclined to have a feeling of gratitude towards
the second HUMINT collector, who continues to show sympathy in an effort
to increase rapport and control for the questioning that will follow. If the
source’s cooperation begins to fade, the second HUMINT collector can hint
that he is a busy person of high rank, and therefore cannot afford to waste
time on an uncooperative source. He can broadly imply that the first
HUMINT collector might return to continue the questioning. The Mutt and
Jeff approach may be effective when orchestrated with Pride and Ego Up and
Down, Fear Up and Down, Futility, or Emotional Love or Hate.
8-68.
Oversight Considerations:
Planned use of the Mutt and Jeff
approach must be approved by the first O-6 in the interrogator’s chain of
command. The HUMINT collector must include as a part of the interrogation
plan—
•
No violence, threats, or impermissible or unlawful physical contact.
•
No threatening the removal of protections afforded by law.
•
Regular monitoring of the interrogation shall be performed by
interrogation personnel.
8-69.
False Flag.
(Interrogation) The goal of this technique is to convince
the detainee that individuals from a country other than the United States
are interrogating him, and trick the detainee into cooperating with US forces.
For example, using an interrogator who speaks with a particular accent,
making the detainee believe that he is actually talking to representatives
from a different country, such as a country that is friendly to the detainee’s
country or organization. The False Flag approach may be effectively
orchestrated with the Fear Down approach and the Pride and Ego Up.
8-70.
Oversight Considerations:
The interrogation chain of command
must coordinate an interrogation plan that uses the False Flag approach
with the legal representative and the 2X, and receive approval from the first
O-6 in the interrogator’s chain of command for each specific use of the False
Flag approach.
•
The use of the False Flag approach must complement the overall
interrogation strategy and other approach techniques listed in the
interrogation plan.
•
When a HUMINT collector intends to pose as a national of a third-
party country, that country must be identified in the interrogation
plan.
•
No implied or explicit threats that non-cooperation will result in harsh
interrogation by non-US entities.
•
HUMINT collectors will not pose or portray themselves as any person
prohibited by this manual, paragraphs 8-10 and 8-11 (for example, an
ICRC representative).
6 September 2006
8-18
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
8-71.
Separation.
See Appendix M, Restricted Interrogation Technique –
Separation.
Selecting an Approach
8-72. There often is insufficient information available to determine an
approach other than the direct approach. In this case where the source
answers questions but will not discuss pertinent issues, the HUMINT
collector may ask direct but nonpertinent questions to obtain sufficient
information to develop an approach strategy. This technique is also useful in
debriefing to establish rapport. Nonpertinent questions may include––
•
Asking about immediate past events. This includes asking an EPW
about the circumstances of his capture or asking a refugee about the
circumstances concerning his arrival at the refugee point or
checkpoint. By doing this, the HUMINT collector can gain insight into
the source’s current state of mind and, more importantly, he can
ascertain his possible approach techniques.
•
Asking background questions. This includes asking about the source's
family, work, friends, likes, and dislikes. These types of questions can
develop rapport and provide clues as to the source’s areas of knowledge
or reveal possibilities for incentives or emotional approaches.
•
Considering what are culturally and socially acceptable topics of
discussion. For example, asking an Arab male about his wife could be
considered extremely rude, whereas not asking an American the same
question might be seen as insensitive.
Making Smooth Transitions
8-73. With the exception of the direct approach, no other approach is
effective by itself. HUMINT collectors use different approach techniques or
combine them into a cohesive, logical technique. Smooth transitions,
sincerity, logic, and conviction are needed to make a strategy work. HUMINT
collectors must carefully assess the source's verbal or nonverbal clues to
determine when a change in approach strategy is required. The HUMINT
collector must guide the conversation smoothly and logically, especially when
moving from one approach technique to another. Using transitional phrases
can make logical and smooth tie-ins to another approach. By using
nonpertinent questions, the HUMINT collector can move the conversation in
the desired direction and, as previously stated, sometimes can obtain leads
and hints about the source's stresses or weaknesses or other approach
strategies that may be more successful.
Recognizing Source Cooperation
8-74. Each source has a point where he will begin to cooperate and answer
questions. Some sources will begin answering questions completely and
truthfully with no preparation; others might require hours or even days of
work. The amount of time that a HUMINT collector spends on an approach
depends on a variety of factors. These include––
6 September 2006
8-19
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
•
The quality and criticality of the information believed to be possessed
by the source.
•
The presence or absence of other sources that probably possess that
information.
•
The number of HUMINT collectors and sources available.
•
The LTIOV that the HUMINT collector is attempting to obtain.
8-75. The HUMINT collector needs to identify the signs that the source is
approaching or has reached the point of cooperation. For example, if during
the approach the source leans forward with his facial expression indicating
an interest in the proposal or is more hesitant in his argument, he is
probably nearing the point where he will cooperate. The HUMINT collector
must also be aware of the fact that a source can begin to cooperate in certain
areas while continuing to resist strongly in other areas. The HUMINT
collector should recognize the reason for refusal, overcome the objection, and
stress the benefit of cooperating (reinforce the approach). Once the HUMINT
collector determines the source is cooperating, he should interject pertinent
questions. If the source does not answer the question, the HUMINT collector
should continue with his approach or switch to an alternate approach
technique and continue to work until he again believes the source will
cooperate. If the source answers the pertinent question, the HUMINT
collector continues asking relevant questions until the questioning session is
completed.
8-76. If a cooperative source balks at answering a specific line of questions,
the HUMINT collector must assess the reason for the refusal. The HUMINT
collector may have arrived at a topic that the source finds particularly
sensitive. Other reasons that might cause a source to stop answering
questions are fatigue or unfamiliarity with the new topic. If this topic is
critical, the HUMINT collector may have to reinforce the previously
successful approach or may have to use a different approach.
APPROACH STRATEGIES FOR INTERROGATION
8-77. Interrogation does not mean a hostile relationship between the
HUMINT collector and the source. In fact, most interrogation sources (90
percent or more) cooperate in response to the direct approach. Unfortunately,
those sources who have the placement and access to make them high priority
sources are also the ones with the highest degree of security awareness. A
source who uses counter-interrogation techniques such as delaying, trying to
control the conversation, or interrogating the HUMINT collector himself
may––
•
Be an intelligence trained soldier.
•
Be survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) trained.
•
Be a terrorist.
•
Have been a detainee or previously incarcerated.
8-78. In stability and reconstruction operations and civil support operations,
detainees are often politically motivated and resistant to most approaches.
6 September 2006
8-20
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
8-79. EPWs are normally vulnerable to basic incentive and emotional
approach techniques. Most EPWs are traumatized to various degrees by the
events preceding or surrounding their capture. They tend to be disoriented
and exhibit high degrees of fear and anxiety. This vulnerable state fades over
time, and it is vital for HUMINT collectors to interrogate EPWs as soon as
and as close to the point of capture as possible. The earlier that an EPW is
questioned the more likely he is to cooperate. And the earlier that he begins
to cooperate, the more likely he is to continue to cooperate. It is also vital
that the HUMINT collector be the first person that the EPW has a chance to
talk to. This means that proper silencing and segregation of the sources by
whoever is transporting them is an important part of a successful approach.
8-80. The vulnerability of civilian detainees to approach techniques available
to the HUMINT collector may be dependent on the exact nature of the
conflict. US HUMINT collectors are obligated to treat all detainees in
accordance with applicable law and policy. Applicable law and policy include
US law; the law of war; relevant international law; relevant directives
including DOD Directive 3115.09, “DOD Intelligence Interrogations,
Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioningâ€; DOD Directive 2310.1E,
“The Department of Defense Detainee Programâ€; DOD instructions; and
military execute orders including FRAGOs. Detainees and, in particular,
EPWs are guaranteed certain rights and privileges. The HUMINT collector
may not take any action to remove, state that he will remove, or imply that
he will remove any guaranteed right if a detainee fails to cooperate. Under
the GPW, EPWs cannot be denied their rights or their privileges accorded
them by rank as guaranteed by the GPW. Privileges afforded to them,
however, which are not guaranteed by the Geneva Conventions or other
applicable law or agreements, may be withheld. (See Appendix A, Section I.)
Consult your SJA for questions concerning rights and privileges.
8-81. The HUMINT collector is frequently under a great deal of pressure to
“produce results.†This situation, coupled with the facts that the HUMINT
collector is dealing with threat personnel who may have been attempting to
kill US personnel just minutes before questioning and the fact that the
source is in a vulnerable state, leads to a tendency to use fear-up techniques.
This may, in some circumstances, be the proper approach; however, the
HUMINT collector must ensure that in doing so he neither loses control of
his own emotions nor uses physical or mental coercion.
APPROACH STRATEGIES FOR DEBRIEFING
8-82. Sources who are debriefed vary even more widely than those who are
interrogated. Since debriefing is the systematic questioning of individuals not
in the custody of the questioning forces, the HUMINT collector needs to
engender an atmosphere of cooperation and mutual benefit. Some sources for
debriefing include members of the friendly forces and local personnel.
HUMINT collectors often believe that approach techniques are not required
for friendly forces and that friendly forces should view debriefing as part of
their duties and in their own best interest. However, this is not necessarily
the case.
6 September 2006
8-21
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
8-83. Many people see debriefing as an interruption in their normal duties
and a waste of their time. HUMINT collectors must be sure to stay focused on
the purpose and goals of the debriefing. They should be businesslike and
must maintain the proper relationship with the source based on his rank and
position. The HUMINT collector should allow senior sources more latitude to
interpose their opinions and evaluations. A change of scene often facilitates
the debriefing of a high-level source since it removes him from his normal
distractions, such as the telephone, and allows him to concentrate on the
topics being discussed.
8-84. Refugees and DPs are subject to many of the same anxieties and
trauma that are experienced by EPWs or other detainees, with the added
benefit to the HUMINT collector that they normally have an obvious vested
interest in cooperating. Basic incentives usually are sufficient to induce their
willing cooperation. The emotional support that can be provided by the
HUMINT collector by simply listening and commiserating with their
hardship is often sufficient to gain cooperation. The emotional approaches
such as love of family and hate toward those who made them refugees are
strong motivators toward cooperation.
8-85. The approach techniques used in the questioning of local civilians are
probably the most difficult. The approach techniques chosen must take into
consideration the attitude of the local population toward the US and its
presence and cultural considerations. The local population must see their
cooperation as self-beneficial.
APPROACH STRATEGIES FOR ELICITATION
8-86. Elicitation is a sophisticated technique used when conventional
collection techniques cannot be used effectively. Of all the collection methods,
this one is the least obvious. However, it is important to note that elicitation
is a planned, systematic process that requires careful preparation. It is
always applied with a specific purpose in mind. This objective is the key
factor in determining the subject (which source to question), the elicitor, and
the setting. The subject will be selected based on access to or knowledge of
the desired information.
8-87. Before approaching the subject, it is necessary to review all available
intelligence files and records, personality dossiers, and knowledge possessed
by others who have previously dealt with the subject. This will help
determine the subject’s background, motivation, emotions, and psychological
nature. It also may require unobtrusive observation of the subject to
establish such things as patterns of activity and likes and dislikes. The
setting can be any number of social or official areas. It is important to note
that the source should be approached in his natural surroundings, as this
will diminish suspicion.
8-88. The key to elicitation is the establishment of a rapport between the
elicitor and the source, normally based on shared interests. In the initial
stages of an elicitation, the collector confines his conversations to innocuous
subjects such as sports and social commentary. Dependent on the value of the
source, the collection environment, and the security consciousness of the
6 September 2006
8-22
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
source the initial stage could last from a few minutes to numerous seemingly
accidental meetings over a period of weeks or months. The HUMINT collector
will gradually shift the conversation to topics of collection interest but will be
prepared to return to more unthreatening topics based on negative reactions
on the part of the subject. Once a topic of interest has been introduced, the
HUMINT collector keeps the conversation going by asking for clarification
(for example, “I agree, however, what did you mean by….?â€) or expressing a
hypothetical situation.
8-89. There are two basic elicitation approaches: mild flattery and
provocation.
•
Mild Flattery: Most people like talking about their interests and like
talking to those who are knowledgeable and interested in the same
topics. People also like to speak to someone who values their opinion on
shared interests. The HUMINT collector takes advantage of this. The
HUMINT collector leads the conversation into areas that he wishes to
collect but does it in such a way that it appears to the source that the
source is leading the conversation. Above all in elicitation, the
HUMINT collector plays the role of the rapt, attentive, and inquisitive
listener.
•
Provocation: This is a more dangerous approach and, if used too early
in an operation, can alienate the source. Once the HUMINT collector
has established shared interests with the source, he can selectively
challenge some of the source’s statements, encouraging the source to
provide more information in support of his view. The HUMINT
collector can also insert bits of actual information into the conversation
to cause the source to confirm and expound on the topic. Care must be
taken so as not to give away more information than is gained.
TERMINATION PHASE
8-90. When it is necessary or prudent, the HUMINT collector will terminate
the questioning of a particular source. Whatever the reason for terminating,
the HUMINT collector must remember there is a possibility that someone
may want to question the source at a later date. There are many reasons why
a HUMINT collector may want or need to terminate questioning:
•
The source remains uncooperative during the approach phase.
•
The collection objective cannot be met in one questioning session.
•
The HUMINT collector fails to maintain rapport and loses control of
the questioning.
•
The collection objectives have been satisfied.
•
The HUMINT collector or the source becomes physically or mentally
unable to continue.
•
Information possessed by the source is of such value that his
immediate evacuation to the next echelon is required.
•
The HUMINT collector's presence is required elsewhere.
8-91. There are many ways to conduct a termination, but the following points
must be conveyed to the source:
6 September 2006
8-23
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
•
The HUMINT collector should sincerely and convincingly reinforce
successful approaches. All promised incentives should be rendered.
•
The source must be told the information he gave will be checked for
truthfulness and accuracy. His reaction to this statement should be
closely monitored. The exact form of this statement will be dependent
on the situation. It should not be done in a manner to alienate a
cooperative source.
•
The source must be told that the same or another individual may
speak to him again. This sets the stage for future contacts.
•
Any identification must be returned to the source. If the HUMINT
collector has other documents or belongings of the detainee (such as
letters or photographs), he will either return them to the detainee, if
appropriate, or will turn them over to the MP guard. Depending on the
circumstances and the legal status of the detainee, the MPs will retain
the detainee’s property and return the property to him at the end of his
internment.
•
In a debriefing, the HUMINT collector will normally ask the source not
to discuss the subject of the questioning for his own protection. In
interrogation operations, the HUMINT collector normally coordinates
with the holding area guards to have the detainees who have been
interrogated kept separate from sources who have not yet been
interrogated if the situation allows.
6 September 2006
8-24
FM 2-22.3
Chapter 9
Questioning
9-1. Questioning is one of the five phases of HUMINT collection. Developing
and using good questioning techniques enable the HUMINT collector to
obtain accurate and pertinent information and to extract the maximum
amount of information in the minimum amount of time. The HUMINT
collector must know when to use different types of questions.
GENERAL QUESTIONING PRINCIPLES
9-2. Questions should be presented in a logical sequence to avoid neglecting
significant topics. The HUMINT collector begins the questioning phase with
the first topic in the sequence he tentatively established as part of his
questioning plan. He obtains all of the source's pertinent knowledge in this
topical area before moving on to the next topic in his sequence. The only
exception is exploiting a hot lead, which is discussed in paragraph 9-21.
9-3. The HUMINT collector must at all times remember that his mission is
the rapid collection and dissemination of accurate information. He must not
allow himself to be sidetracked into nonpertinent discussions or debates nor
should he express distaste or value judgments on the information being
supplied unless that is a planned part of his approach technique. The
HUMINT collector uses vocabulary that is clear, unambiguous, and
understandable by the source. The source may not be on the same
intellectual level or have the same degree of education as the HUMINT
collector, so the HUMINT collector must adapt his questioning to the level of
the source. The source may also have specific technical knowledge, more
education and/or a higher intellectual level than the HUMINT collector. In
this case, the HUMINT collector normally relies on prepared questions or
technical support for his questioning. Without good systematic questioning
techniques, even the most cooperative source may provide only minimal
usable information.
DIRECT QUESTIONS
9-4. Direct questions are basic questions normally beginning with an
interrogative (who, what, where, when, how, or why) and requiring a
narrative answer. They are brief, precise, and simply worded to avoid
confusion. The HUMINT collector must consider the probable response of the
source to a particular question or line of questioning and should not, if at all
possible, ask direct questions likely to evoke a refusal to answer or to
antagonize the source.
6 September 2006
9-1
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
TYPES OF DIRECT QUESTIONS
9-5. The HUMINT collector must be able to use the following types of direct
questions:
•
Initial, topical.
•
Follow-up.
•
Nonpertinent.
•
Repeat.
•
Control.
•
Prepared.
Initial Questions
9-6. The HUMINT collector begins his questioning with the first topic in his
collection plan and asks all the basic questions necessary to cover the topic.
The answers to the basic questions will determine the requirements for
follow-up questioning. The initial questions are directed toward obtaining the
basic information on the topic. In other words, they are the “who, what,
where, when, how, and why†of each topic.
Follow-up Questions
9-7. Follow-up questions are used to expand on and complete the information
obtained from the initial questions. Often even if the initial question is a
well-constructed direct question, it will elicit only a partial answer. For
example, when asked, “Who is going to attack?†The source might say, “My
unit.†Follow-up questions are used to determine precisely what the source
means by “my unit†and what other units may also attack. The answer to
follow-up questions may lead to more follow-ups until the source’s knowledge
on a given topic is exhausted. At a minimum, upon receiving a positive
answer to an initial question, the HUMINT collector needs to ask “Who
(what, where, when, why, how) else?†For example, if the HUMINT collector
asks the source, “Who, in the local government is collaborating with the
insurgents?†and is told a name in response, he will ask follow-up questions
to determine all the required information about this individual and then will
ask, “Who else, in the local government is collaborating with the insurgents?â€
This will continue until the source’s knowledge in this area is exhausted.
Nonpertinent Questions
9-8. Nonpertinent questions are questions that do not pertain to the
collection objectives. They are used to conceal the collection objectives or to
strengthen rapport with the source. They are essential when the collector is
using the elicitation technique. Nonpertinent questions may be used to gain
time for the HUMINT collector to formulate pertinent questions and may
also be used to break the source's concentration, particularly, if the HUMINT
collector suspects the source is lying. It is hard for a source to be a convincing
liar if his concentration is frequently interrupted.
6 September 2006
9-2
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
Repeat Questions
9-9. Repeat questions ask the source for the same information obtained in
response to earlier questions. They are a method to confirm accuracy of
important details such as place names, dates, and component parts of
technical equipment and to test truthfulness. Repeat questions should not be
exact repetitions of an earlier question. The HUMINT collector must
rephrase or otherwise disguise the previous question. The repeat question
also needs to be separated in time from the original question so that the
source cannot easily remember what he said. Repeat questions may also be
used to develop a topic the source had refused to talk about earlier.
Control Questions
9-10. Control questions are developed from recently confirmed information
from other sources that is not likely to have changed. They are used to check
the truthfulness of the source's responses and should be mixed in with other
questions throughout the questioning. If a source fails to answer a control
question as expected, it may be an indicator that he is lying. However, there
are other possible explanations. The source—
•
Could have misunderstood the question.
•
Could be making up information in order to please the questioner
and/or receive a promised incentive.
•
Could have answered the question truthfully to the best of his ability,
but his information could be wrong or outdated.
•
May be correct and the information that the control question was
based on is no longer true.
9-11. It is the responsibility of the HUMINT collector to determine, through
follow-up questions, which of the possibilities is the case. The HUMINT
collector should also consult with the HAT for assistance in verifying the
source reporting through all-source analysis.
Prepared Questions
9-12. Prepared questions are questions developed by the HUMINT collector,
normally in writing, prior to the questioning. Prepared questions are used
primarily when dealing with information of a technical nature or specific
topic, which requires the HUMINT collector to formulate precise and detailed
questions beforehand. The HUMINT collector may have to research
analytical or technical material or contact SMEs to assist him in preparing
questions. HUMINT collectors must not allow the use of prepared questions
or any limitations to their education or training to restrict the scope and
flexibility of their questioning. In many instances, the HUMINT collector
should have an analyst or technical expert “sit in†on the questioning as well.
9-13. The HUMINT collector must be able to use the different types of
questions effectively. Active listening and maximum eye-to-eye contact with
the source will provide excellent indicators for when to use follow-up, repeat,
control, and nonpertinent questions. The HUMINT collector must use direct
and follow-up questions to fully exploit subjects pertinent to his interrogation
objectives. He should periodically include control, repeat, and nonpertinent
6 September 2006
9-3
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
questions in order to check the truthfulness and consistency of the source's
responses and to strengthen rapport.
TYPES OF QUESTIONS TO AVOID
9-14. When using the questioning methodologies of interrogation, HUMINT
collectors should avoid using negative, compound, or vague questions.
Leading questions are usually to be avoided, but some special questioning
techniques, such as use of a polygraph, require the use of leading questions.
Leading Questions
9-15. Leading questions are questions that are constructed so as to require a
yes or no answer rather than a narrative response. They generally begin with
a form of the verb “to be†(such as “is,†“was,†“were,†“will,†“areâ€). For
example, “Is the mayor working with the insurgents?†Leading questions
should generally be avoided for the following reasons:
•
They make it easier for the source to lie since the source only provides
minimal information.
•
It takes longer to acquire information.
•
A source, particularly one that is frightened or trying to get an
incentive, will tend to answer in the way that he thinks the HUMINT
collector wants him to answer.
9-16. Although normally avoided during questioning, an experienced
HUMINT collector may use leading questions when the technical nature of
the subject matter or the specific information needed leaves no alternatives.
Leading questions can be used to—
•
Verify specific facts.
•
Pinpoint map locations.
•
Confirm information obtained during map tracking.
•
Transition from one topic area to another.
Negative Questions
9-17. Negative questions are questions that contain a negative word in the
question itself such as, "Didn’t you go to the pick-up point?†If the source
says “yes,†the HUMINT collector is faced with the question of whether he
means “yes, I went to the pick-up point†or “yes, I didn’t go to the pick-up
point.†When the source answers, the HUMINT collector cannot be sure
what the answer means; therefore, he must ask additional questions. This
can be particularly confusing when working with an interpreter. Other
cultures may interpret a negative question in a way other than what the
HUMINT collector meant. Negative questions should never be used during
questioning unless they are being used deliberately during the approach to
make the source appear to contradict himself. In other instances, the
insertion of negative words within the question makes them impossibly open-
ended. For example, “Who didn’t attend the meeting?â€
6 September 2006
9-4
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
Compound Questions
9-18. Compound questions consist of two questions asked at the same time;
for example, "Before you were captured today, were you traveling north or
south?" Or “Where were you going after work and who were you to meet
there?†They are easily misunderstood and may confuse the source or force
him to give an ambiguous answer. Compound questions allow the source to
evade a part of the question or to give an incomplete answer.
Vague Questions
9-19. Vague questions do not have enough information for the source to
understand exactly what the HUMINT collector is asking. They may be
incomplete, general, or otherwise nonspecific and create doubt in the source's
mind. Vague questions confuse the source, waste time, and are easily evaded.
They result in answers that may confuse or mislead the HUMINT collector
and require further follow-up questions.
ELICITATION
9-20. Elicitation is the gaining of information through direct interaction with
a human source where the source is not aware of the specific purpose for the
conversation. Elicitation is a sophisticated technique used when conventional
questioning techniques cannot be used effectively. Of all the collection
methods, this one is the least obvious. However, it is important to note that
elicitation is a planned, systematic process that requires careful preparation.
Elicitation is always applied with a specific objective in mind and normally
directed toward a specific source.
LEADS
9-20. A lead is a statement made by a source spontaneously or in response to
questioning that leads the questioner to believe that the source has
information on a topic other than the one currently under discussion.
Documents captured with or on the source may also be exploited as sources of
leads. Leads are referred to as either “hot†or “cold.â€
HOT LEADS
9-21. A hot lead is a statement made by a source either spontaneously or in
response to questioning that indicates he has information that could answer
intelligence requirements on a topic other than the one currently under
discussion. The lead could also be on a topic that although not listed as a
requirement is, based on the HUMINT collector’s experience, of critical
importance. Information on WMD and information on US personnel being
held by threat forces are normally considered hot leads even if not listed as
requirements. The HUMINT collector will normally question the source
immediately on a hot lead, unless he is already asking questions on another
topic. In this case, he completes questioning and reports the information on
the priority topic, as appropriate, and then immediately questions on the hot
lead. As soon as the HUMINT collector is sure he has obtained and recorded
all the details known to the source, he reports the hot lead information by the
6 September 2006
9-5
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
most expedient means available, normally in SALUTE report format. The
HUMINT collector then resumes his questioning of the source at the point
where the hot lead was obtained.
COLD LEADS
9-22. A cold lead is a statement made by a source either spontaneously or in
response to questioning that indicates he has information on a topic of
interest other than the one currently under discussion but that would not
answer PIRs. The HUMINT collector makes note of the cold lead and exploits
it after the planned questioning objectives have been satisfied or at the
appropriate time during the questioning sequence.
DETECTING DECEIT
9-23. HUMINT information often has the capability to be more accurate and
reliable than other disciplines. SIGINT information, for example, is not
always able to return to the original source of the information to determine
the reliability of the information, and interpretation of IMINT information
may be uncertain. However, while HUMINT can be reviewed for reliability,
determining the reliability of human sources is a continuous process
accomplished by carefully assessing not only the sources of information but
also assessing the information itself.
9-24. Detection of deception is not a simple process, and it normally takes
years of experience before a HUMINT collector can readily identify deliberate
deceit. Inconsistencies in the source’s actions or words do not necessarily
indicate a lie, just as consistency is not necessarily a guarantee of the truth.
However, a pattern of inconsistencies or unexplainable inconsistencies
normally indicate deceit.
TECHNIQUES FOR IDENTIFYING DECEIT
9-25. Techniques for identifying deceit include but are not limited to the
following:
•
Repeat and control questions (see paras 9-9 and 9-10).
•
Internal inconsistencies. Frequently when a source is lying, the
HUMINT collector will be able to identify inconsistencies in the
timeline, the circumstances surrounding key events, or other areas
within the questioning. For example, the source may spend a long time
explaining something that took a short time to happen, or a short time
telling of an event that took a relatively long time to happen. These
internal inconsistencies often indicate deception.
•
Body language does not match verbal message. An extreme example of
this would be the source relating a harrowing experience while sitting
back in a relaxed position. The HUMINT collector must be careful in
using this clue since body language is culturally dependent. Failing to
make eye contact in the US is considered a sign of deceit while in some
Asian countries it is considered polite.
•
Knowledge does not match duty position or access. Based on the
source’s job, duty position, or access the HUMINT collector should have
6 September 2006
9-6
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
developed a basic idea of the type and degree of information that an
individual source should know. When the source’s answers show that
he does not have the expected level of information (too much or too
little or different information than expected), this may be an indicator
of deceit. The HUMINT collector needs to determine the source of
unexpected information.
•
Information is self-serving. Reporting of information that is self-
serving to an individual or his group should be suspect. For example, a
member of one ethnic group reporting generic atrocities by an opposing
ethnic group or a source reporting exactly the right information needed
to receive a promised incentive should be suspect. That is not to say
that the information is necessarily false, just that the HUMINT
collector needs to be sure to verify the information.
•
Lack of extraneous detail. Often false information will lack the detail
of truthful information, especially when the lie is spontaneous. The
HUMINT collector needs to ask follow-up questions to obtain the
detail. When the source is unable to provide the details that they
should know, it is an indicator of deceit. If the source does provide this
additional information, it needs to be checked for internal
inconsistencies and verified by repeat questions.
•
Repeated answers with exact wording and details. Often if a source
plans on lying about a topic, he will memorize what he is going to say.
If the source always relates an incident using exactly the same
wording or answers repeat questions identically (word for word) to the
original question, it may be an indicator of deceit. In an extreme case,
if the source is interrupted in the middle of a statement on a given
topic, he will have to start at the beginning in order to “get his story
straight.â€
•
Source appearance does not match story. If the source’s physical
appearance does not match his story, it may be an indication of deceit.
Examples of this include the source who says he is a farmer but lacks
calluses on his hands or the supposed private who has a tailored
uniform.
•
Source’s language usage does not match story
.
If the type of language,
including sentence structure and vocabulary, does not match the
source’s story, this may be an indicator of deceit. Examples of this
include a farmer using university level language or a civilian using
military slang.
•
Lack of technical vocabulary. Every occupation has its own jargon and
technical vocabulary. If the source does not use the proper technical
vocabulary to match his story, this may be an indictor of deceit. The
HUMINT collector may require the support of an analyst or technical
expert to identify this type of deceit.
•
Physical cues. The source may display physical signs of nervousness
such as sweating or nervous movement. These signs may be indicators
of deceit. The fact that an individual is being questioned may in itself
be cause for some individuals to display nervousness. The HUMINT
collector must be able to distinguish between this type of activity and
nervous activity related to a particular topic. Physical reaction to a
6 September 2006
9-7
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
particular topic may simply indicate a strong emotional response
rather than lying, but it should key the HUMINT collector to look for
other indicators of deceit.
•
Failure to answer the question asked. When a source wishes to evade a
topic, he will often provide an answer that is evasive and not in
response to the question asked. For example, if the source is asked,
"Are you a member of the insurgent organization?†and he replies, “I
support the opposition party in the legislature,†he has truthfully
answered a question, but not the question that was asked. This is a
subtle form of deceit since the source is seemingly cooperative but is in
fact evading providing complete answers.
ACTIONS UPON IDENTIFYING INDICATORS OF DECEIT
9-26. The exact actions by the HUMINT collector when identifying possible
deceit are dependent on the type of collection, the circumstances of the
collection, the specific sign of deceit observed, the type of approach used, and
cultural factors. The HUMINT collector may—
•
Question the topic in more detail looking for additional indicators.
•
Reinforce the approach.
•
Move to another topic and revisit the original topic later with repeat
questions. Ask control questions (confirmed by known data) and
questions to which the source should know the answer to see if he
answers honestly.
•
Point out the inconsistency to the source and ask for an explanation.
•
Seek assistance from a more experienced HUMINT collector, analyst,
or a technical expert on the culture or the topic being questioned.
•
Conduct continuous assessments of source (see FM 34-5 (S//NF)).
•
Research established databases.
•
Ask yourself if the information makes sense; if not, conduct more
research.
•
Consider how the information was obtained.
•
Compare the information provided to the source’s placement and
access.
•
Compare answers with other sources with similar placement and
access. Be aware that this method is merely a rough tool to check
veracity and should not be used by the collector to confirm intelligence.
•
Use the polygraph.
•
Consider that a source motivated primarily by money will likely be
tempted to fabricate information in order to get paid.
•
Be aware that a source may read the local newspaper to report
information that is already known or may also be providing
information to another agency.
9-27. The one thing that the HUMINT collector cannot do is to ignore signs
of deceit.
6 September 2006
9-8
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
HUMINT COLLECTION AIDS
9-28. There are numerous procedural and recording aids that can assist the
HUMINT collector in conducting rapid, accurate, yet systematic questioning.
They include––
•
HUMINT Collector’s Guide. This guide is a pamphlet or notebook
designed to guide the HUMINT collector through the questioning. The
HUMINT team leader should ensure that team members prepare a
HUMINT collector’s guide, which could be included in the unit's SOP.
The guide is made based on the AO and supported command
intelligence requirements. The HUMINT collector and available
intelligence analysts should jointly prepare the guide. Appendix G
provides the basic topics and example questions that can be adapted to
construct a HUMINT collector’s guide. The guide must be updated for
each interrogation as part of planning and preparation. The guide
should contain information such as—
ƒ
Intelligence requirements and ISR tasks.
ƒ
Topical questioning sequence format.
ƒ
Actual prepared questions to be used during questioning.
ƒ
Guidelines for employing the various approach techniques.
ƒ
Formats or samples of completed reports used by HUMINT
collectors.
•
Time Event Chart. A timeline, or event chart, is a graphic display upon
which the HUMINT collector enters chronological information as it is
collected. This facilitates the HUMINT collector in understanding and
organizing the collected information. It also enables the HUMINT
collector to identify gaps in information, to sequence events properly to
facilitate follow-up questions, and to identify deception. The HUMINT
collector can develop a basic timeline prior to questioning. The source
should not be able to observe the timeline since doing so will help a
deceptive source “keep his story straight.†See Chapter 12 for how to
create and use a time event chart.
•
Organizational Chart. An organizational chart is a graphic
representation of an organization. It is the equivalent of a military
line-and-block chart. This is used to facilitate the questioning of
organizations and in establishing their hierarchical and lateral
linkages. A basic chart can be developed prior to the questioning based
on the expected organizational questioning.
RECORDING TECHNIQUES
9-29. Accuracy and completeness are vital principles to reporting. However,
it is usually not possible to completely record all information in a questioning
session. Recording techniques may involve memory, handwritten or typed
notes, tape recordings, and video recordings. Each has its advantage and
corresponding disadvantage.
•
Memory: Relying on one’s memory has certain advantages. It does not
require any equipment or extra time, and is the least intrusive method
of recording information. It allows maximum interaction with the
source and projects sincerity. An individual can train himself to
6 September 2006
9-9
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
remember highly detailed information. Often in elicitation, memory is
the only viable recording method. However, in general, using the
memory exclusively to record information is the most inaccurate
methodology. Particularly in a long questioning session, details are
forgotten and information tends to be generalized.
•
Handwritten notes: Handwritten notes require minimal equipment (a
pad and pencil), are not intimidating to most sources, and can be as
detailed as the HUMINT collector desires. If an analyst or second
interrogator is present, he should also take notes. This second set of
notes can aid in report writing. The interrogator should not rely solely
on an analyst’s notes unless absolutely necessary. However, writing
notes while questioning an individual often interferes with the rapport
between the collector and the source. The collector loses eye contact
and can easily miss subtle body language that might indicate lying.
Detailed note taking can be extremely time consuming and many
sources will, over time, begin to limit their responses so they do not
have to repeat information or wait for the collector to write it down. It
is somewhat intrusive and inhibiting to the source and is totally
inappropriate in certain situations such as liaison and most casual
source contacts. Handwritten notes can also be inaccurate, have
limited details, and can be hard to read after the fact.
•
Computer notes: With the proliferation of computer equipment,
particularly laptops and handheld devices, note taking on computers is
increasingly commonplace. A computer can provide access to data-
based information that may support questioning such as foreign
language dictionaries or technical support manuals, either through the
Internet (if connected) or on its harddrive. If the computer is linked to
a communications system, it also allows the HUMINT collector to
transmit data, including SALUTE reports, during the course of the
questioning. Notes taken on a computer, however, have many of the
same disadvantages as handwritten notes. In addition, computer
notetaking requires more equipment and technological support and
access to either electricity or a plentiful supply of batteries. Computers
may be intimidating to some sources and the fact that what the source
says is being entered into a computer may cause the source to alter the
information he is providing. Computers tend to isolate the collector
from the source by dividing the collector’s attention between the
computer and the source, and again may cause the collector to miss
critical body language clues. Finally, the computer is even more
inappropriate to casual and controlled source operations than are
handwritten notes.
•
Audiotapes: If recording equipment is discrete and functioning
properly, audiotapes can be extremely accurate. Use of tapes also
allows the HUMINT collector to place his entire attention on the
source. This not only enhances rapport but also allows the HUMINT
collector to observe the source’s body language. Taping a questioning
session, if done overtly though, tends to be extremely inhibiting to the
source and may seriously curtail the information obtained.
Surreptitious taping can be illegal in some situations and dangerous in
some situations as well. Consult your legal advisor to determine if
6 September 2006
9-10
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
taping is legal. Taped information can also be seriously affected by
ambient noise and the relative positioning of the source and collector to
the microphone. Writing a report based on a taped session can be
extremely time consuming, since it takes as long to listen to a tape as it
took to record it. This drawback can be reduced somewhat through the
use of voice activated recording devices. Exclusive dependence on
audiotapes tends to make the collector less attentive and more likely to
miss follow-up questions. Also, if the tape is lost or damaged or does
not function properly, the collector has no backup.
•
Video recording: Video recording is possibly the most accurate method
of recording a questioning session since it records not only the voices
but also can be examined for details of body language and source and
collector interaction. It is also the most resource intensive requiring
proper lighting, cameras, viewing equipment, and possibly trained
operators. If done overtly, video recording can be by far the most
inhibiting to the source. Even if the source is willing to be videotaped,
there is a tendency for both the source and the collector to “play to the
camera,†creating an artificiality to the questioning. Consult your legal
advisor to determine the legality of overt or covert videotaping.
QUESTIONING WITH AN ANALYST OR A TECHNICAL EXPERT
9-30. The HUMINT collector may often find himself in the position where he
needs to use an analyst or a technical expert, or both, in order to conduct
questioning. Many of the techniques involved in using an analyst or technical
expert are the same as those with using an interpreter (see Chapter 11). The
HUMINT collector must pre-brief these supporting personnel. The degree to
which the analyst or technical expert is involved in the actual questioning is
dependent on the established relationship between the analyst or technical
expert and the HUMINT collector. The HUMINT collector will always
remain in charge of the questioning, be present throughout the questioning,
and ensure that the questioning follows his questioning plan. He must
ensure that the supporting analyst or technical expert has the proper
security clearance.
9-31. An analyst or technical expert can participate in the questioning to
various degrees listed below from least intrusive to most intrusive. As the
degree of participation by the analyst or technical expert increases, the
technical fidelity of the information collected usually increases but the
rapport between the HUMINT collector and the source decreases as does the
HUMINT collector’s ability to control the content and judge the truthfulness
of the information. The analyst or technical expert may provide—
•
Advice Only: The HUMINT collector does the questioning. The expert
provides information prior to the meeting and may review the collected
information after the meeting. The technical expert is not present at
the actual questioning.
•
Remote Support: The HUMINT collector does the questioning. In
addition to the above, the expert monitors the questioning and
provides input to the HUMINT collector after the questioning as
required. Based on the technological support, this can involve the
expert sitting in on, but not participating in the questioning (which
6 September 2006
9-11
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
may make the source uncomfortable), or the expert viewing and
listening to the questioning through a remote video and sound hook-
up.
•
Local Support: The HUMINT collector does the questioning. The expert
sits in on the questioning and provides input to the HUMINT collector
during the course of the questioning. This can break both the source’s
and the HUMINT collector’s trains of thought and confuse the lines of
control in the questioning.
•
Expert Participation: The HUMINT collector initiates the questioning,
but the expert participates throughout the questioning, asking for
clarification and additional information as required. Unless properly
trained, the expert can seriously taint the quality of the information
through the use of poor questioning techniques. The HUMINT collector
can lose rapport and control.
•
Trained Expert Questioning: In rare instances, with particularly
difficult technical topics or those areas of questioning that require a
high degree of technical expertise, it may be easier to train the expert
in basic questioning techniques than it is to train the HUMINT
collector on the technical topic. In this instance, the HUMINT collector
sits in on the questioning to ensure proper procedures and techniques
are used and to advise the technical expert. The technical expert does
most of the questioning.
9-32. In any case, if the source is to receive compensation for his time, it
must come from the HUMINT collector, not the analyst or technical expert.
This continues to reinforce that the HUMINT collector is in charge, and does
not transfer the source’s trust to the expert.
THIRD-PARTY OFFICIAL AND HEARSAY INFORMATION
9-33. The source may have information that he did not observe firsthand.
While this information is not as reliable as firsthand knowledge, it is often
significant enough to report. The HUMINT collector must be careful to
identify this information as to its origin, type, and the time and manner that
the information was obtained by the source. This information will be entered
into the report as a source comment or a collector comment. This will
include—
•
The origin of the information. This may be the name, rank, and duty
position or job of an individual or may be an official or unofficial
document such as an OPORD, official memorandum, or party
newspaper.
•
The complete organization to which the person who provided the
information belongs or the identity of the organization that produced
the official or unofficial document from which the source obtained the
information.
•
Date-time group (DTG) when the source obtained the information.
•
The circumstances under which the source obtained the information.
9-34. Comparing the details of the hearsay information, such as DTG, where
the information was obtained and the circumstances under which the source
6 September 2006
9-12
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
claimed to have received it, to the source’s known activities, may provide
indications of truthfulness or deception on the part of the source.
CONDUCTING MAP TRACKING
9-35. Map tracking is a specific questioning skill that the HUMINT collector
uses in all operations. It is a vital skill in supporting targeting and
operational planning
.
Map tracking identifies and verifies key information by
tracking the source's movement and activities within a specific area over a
fixed period using a map or similar graphic aid. The area and the time
involved are dependent on the collection requirements and the source’s
knowledge level. Map tracking can occur at any point in the questioning
process. Normally, the HUMINT collector begins map tracking as soon as his
questioning identifies a priority disposition or activity that the source’s
information can locate on the map.
9-36. Map-tracking techniques, if properly applied, can extract information
from friendly, neutral, or threat sources and can be used with individuals
ranging from those with detailed map skills to illiterates, and those who have
never seen a map. Through map tracking, the HUMINT collector pinpoints
locations of any threat activity, threat dispositions, or any other priority
terrain-related information, such as trafficability, known to the source.
9-37. The HUMINT collector will determine these locations with the degree
of fidelity needed to support operational requirements. The degree of detail
needed may range from an 8-digit grid coordinate for unit locations to
locations of specific buildings, rooms, or even items within a room. The
HUMINT collector uses a variety of map-tracking aids including standard
military maps, aerial photographs, commercial imagery, building blueprints
and diagrams, and commercial road maps. Some advantages to map-tracking
techniques include—
•
The source is led through his memory in a logical manner.
•
Discrepancies in the source's statements are easier to detect.
•
Locations are identified to support targeting and battlefield
visualization.
•
Map tracking is a four-step process:
ƒ
Step 1: Determine the source’s map-reading skills.
ƒ
Step 2: Establish and exploit common points of reference (CPRs).
ƒ
Step 3: Establish routes of travel.
ƒ
Step 4: Identify and exploit key dispositions.
DETERMINE THE SOURCE’S MAP-READING SKILLS
9-38. The first step in the map-tracking process is to determine the specific
map-reading skills of the source. This step only occurs the first time that the
HUMINT collector map tracks a particular source. This information will
determine what methodology will be used for the rest of the process. In this
step the HUMINT collector is determining existing skills; he should not
attempt to teach the source additional map skills at this time. The HUMINT
collector can use prior knowledge, such as the fact that the source is illiterate
or cannot read a map, to skip some of the specific parts of the process. Below
6 September 2006
9-13
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
is a detailed description of the process to establish the map-reading skills of
the source.
•
The HUMINT collector asks the source if he can read the map being
used. If the source answers in the affirmative, the HUMINT collector
asks some key questions to verify this.
•
If the source cannot read the map being used, the HUMINT collector
determines if the source can read another type of available map or
graphic representation. For example, a source may not be able to read
a military map but might be able to use a commercial map or an
imagery product.
•
The HUMINT collector then establishes the method that will be used
to describe movement (direction and distance) on the map. If the source
knows how to use compass directions, that may be the most expedient
method for determining direction. Again, the HUMINT collector must
verify that the source knows how to use compass directions. This can
be done best by having the source tell the compass directions between
known points. Distance is normally determined by using the standard
units of measurement with which the source is familiar, such as
kilometers or miles. This can cause some problems, for example, if the
map is measured in kilometers and the source normally expresses
distance in miles. The HUMINT collector must make the adjustment
rather than trying to teach the source the unfamiliar system.
•
Compass directions and standard units of measure are not the only
method or necessarily even the best method of indicating direction and
distance in all circumstances. When using an urban map, direction and
distance can often be described by indicating blocks traveled and turns
made (right or left) at intersections. Direction of travel can be indicated
in reference to key features such as going toward the downtown area or
moving toward the river. When describing the interior of a building,
references may be to upstairs, downstairs, floor number, or other
descriptive terms. When map tracking in rural areas, especially when
questioning someone who does not know how to use compass
directions, terrain association is normally the best method of
establishing direction of travel and distance. Questions such as “Were
you traveling uphill at that time?†“What prominent terrain features
could you see from that location?†“What was the nearest town?†or
“Was the sun behind you?†help to identify locations on the map. The
HUMINT collector should allow the source to use his own frames of
reference. However, the HUMINT collector must ensure he
understands the source.
ESTABLISH AND EXPLOIT COMMON POINTS OF REFERENCE
9-39. The second step of map tracking is to establish CPRs. It is important in
accurate map tracking to talk the source through his past activities in the
sequence in which they occurred and his movements in the direction in which
they were traveled. Attempting to track a source backward in time and space
is time consuming, inaccurate, and is often confusing to both the source and
the HUMINT collector. Future activities should be tracked in the direction in
6 September 2006
9-14
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
which they are planned to occur. The HUMINT collector will normally
establish various CPRs throughout the questioning of the source.
9-40. For certain sources such as friendly forces, tasked sources, or other
instances where the starting and ending points of the mission being
questioned are easily established, the first point of reference is normally
where that source began the mission. For other sources such as detainees,
line crossers, informers, and refugees, it is often more difficult to establish a
“starting point.†In these instances the HUMINT collector uses a sequential
approach to the map tracking. He establishes a point of reference that is a
logical end point for the subject being discussed. This may be, for example,
the point of capture for a detainee, the point where a line crosser entered the
friendly force area, or where a refugee left the area of intelligence interest.
Second and subsequent points of reference are established during
questioning when the source mentions a disposition, activity, or location of
interest that can be located on the map. The HUMINT collector locates the
reference point on the map through direct questioning and terrain
association. He uses leading questions as necessary to establish an exact
location. He then establishes the route of travel.
ESTABLISH ROUTES OF TRAVEL
9-41. Once the CPR is established, the HUMINT collector questions the
source until he has extracted all pertinent information on the CPR and its
immediate surroundings. For past missions and activities, the HUMINT
collector then establishes the route the source traveled between the newly
established CPR and a previously established CPR and exploits the route.
For future missions or activities, the route is established from the previously
established CPR toward the future mission CPR.
9-42. The HUMINT collector should establish the route traveled by
determining the source’s direction and physical description of the route of
travel. The description should include details such as surface on which the
source traveled and prominent terrain features along the route of travel and
the distance the source traveled or, in the case of future locations, would
travel. The HUMINT collector should also identify any pertinent dispositions
or any activities of military significance, belonging to the opposition forces,
along or in the vicinity of the route of travel. For longer routes, the HUMINT
collector may divide the route into segments for ease of questioning.
IDENTIFY AND EXPLOIT KEY DISPOSITIONS
9-43. The HUMINT collector must obtain the exact location and description
of every pertinent disposition known to the source. This includes the
locations established as CPRs and any other pertinent disposition
established during map tracking. At a minimum, the collector should––
•
Establish a physical description of the disposition. The degree of
fidelity will depend on the collection requirements. This may be as
detailed as the physical layout of a room to the general description of a
training area. This will include security measures and modus operandi
at the location as appropriate.
6 September 2006
9-15
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
•
Identify and describe the significance of the disposition in terms of
ongoing and future threat operations.
•
Identify and describe key activities, equipment, or organizations at the
location, as well as people and leaders.
•
Identify and describe all pertinent collocated activities, locations, or
organizations, as well as people and leaders.
•
Identify the basis (hearsay or personal experience) and DTG of the
source’s knowledge of each disposition.
SPECIAL SOURCE CATEGORIES
9-44. Questioning of every source is unique and requires specific preparation.
Special consideration and preparation must be made for some specific
categories of sources. Some examples of special source categories include but
are not limited to wounded or injured sources or illiterates.
WOUNDED OR INJURED SOURCES
9-45. HUMINT collectors may question (interrogate, debrief, or elicit
information from) a wounded or injured source provided that they obtain
certification from a competent medical authority that the questioning will not
delay or hinder medical treatment or cause a worsening of the condition of
the source. The HUMINT collector can question the source before, after, or
during medical treatment. The HUMINT collector cannot at any time
represent himself as being a doctor or any other type of medical personnel or
member of the ICRC. Nor can he state, imply, or otherwise give the
impression that any type of medical treatment is conditional on the source’s
cooperation in answering questions.
ILLITERATES
9-46. HUMINT collectors should never make the mistake of equating
illiteracy with a lack of intelligence or an inability to provide meaningful
information. In fact, many illiterates have developed extremely good
memories to compensate for their inability to rely on the written word. An
illiterate’s frame of reference does not include street signs, mile markers, and
calendars. It also will probably not include conventional time and distance
measurements. The HUMINT collector must compensate for these
differences. Map tracking, for example, must normally be accomplished by
terrain association. If the source cannot tell time, time of day can be
determined by the position of the sun.
6 September 2006
9-16
FM 2-22.3
Chapter 10
Reporting
10-1. Reporting is the final and in many cases the most vital phase in
HUMINT collection. If the collected information is not reported accurately, in
a timely manner, in the proper format, and to the correct recipient, it cannot
become part of the all-source intelligence product or tip in time to affect
operational decisions. Information that would support targeting must be
reported by the fastest means possible.
REPORTING PRINCIPLES
10-2. The HUMINT collector must be able, in a written report, to convey to
the user the information obtained from a source. Therefore, the following
principles of good report writing are to be followed:
•
Accuracy. Accurately reflect the information obtained from the source.
Reporter comments and conclusions must be clearly identified as such.
•
Brevity. Report all relevant information; however, the report should be
brief, to the point, and avoid unnecessary words.
•
Clarity. Use simple sentences and understandable language. Proper
grammar and punctuation are a must. Another team member, if
possible, should read the reports to ensure clarity.
•
Coherence. Present the information in a logical pattern based on
standard reporting formats.
•
Completeness. Report all information collected. The collector should
not filter information since all information is of interest to an analyst.
Report negative responses to pertinent topics to prevent a
misunderstanding or duplication of effort in subsequent questioning
based on SDRs.
•
Timeliness. Report information as soon as operationally feasible. Most
collection requirements contain a LTIOV as part of the requirement.
While written reports are preferable, critical or time-sensitive
information is passed by the most expedient means available.
•
Releasability. Include only releasable information in reports that are to
be shared with multinational units. When possible, reports to be
shared with multinational units should be kept to the appropriate
classification to ensure the widest dissemination of the reported
information.
REPORT TYPES
10-3. There are two major categories for reporting information: operational
reports and source administrative reports. Figure 10-1 shows the HUMINT
6 September 2006
10-1
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
reporting channels. Refer to DIAM 58-11 (S//NF) and DIAM 58-12 (S//NF) for
specific guidance in using these reports.
OPERATIONAL REPORTS
10-4. Operational reports is a broad category that encompasses all reports
that do not contain information collected in response to intelligence
requirements or the reporting of the technical, and usually sensitive, aspects
of HUMINT collection. It includes but is not limited to all administrative and
logistical reports. Unit SOPs and directives from higher headquarters
establish operational reporting requirements, formats, and procedures.
Operational reporting––
•
Tells the commander where and when assets are conducting missions.
•
Describes unit mission capability.
•
Responds to administrative and logistical requirements.
•
Describes support requirements.
•
Includes but is not limited to unit status reports, mission planning
reports, mission status reports, and equipment status.
•
Reports ICF usage at any echelon where the use of ICFs is authorized.
SOURCE ADMINISTRATIVE REPORTS
10-5. Source administrative reports include intelligence reports that are used
to pass or request information in order to answer intelligence requirements,
and reports that address the HUMINT collector’s contacts with the source.
Intelligence reports include but are not limited to IIRs and SALUTE reports.
Intelligence Information Reports
10-6. The IIR is used to report all HUMINT information in response to
collection requirements. It is used to expand on information previously
reported by a SALUTE report or to report information that is either too
extensive or not critical enough for SALUTE reporting. IIRs are written at
any echelon and “released†by the appropriate authority before they enter the
general Intelligence Community. Normally the G2X will be the release
authority for IIRs.
10-7. At the tactical level, the HUMINT collectors will fill out the complete
IIR; however, the requirements section may link the information collected
against a unit requirement rather than against national requirements. In
any case, the report will be forwarded to the OMT.
10-8. The team leader will review the IIR, place a copy of the IIR in the
detainee’s or source’s local file and forward the IIR to the OMT. (When a
detainee is transferred to another facility or evacuated to a higher echelon, a
copy of each IIR written from interrogations of that detainee is forwarded
with him.) The OMT reviews the report, requests additional information as
necessary from the originator, adds additional administrative detail, and
forwards the report to the HOC of the supporting C/J/G/S2X. The HOC and
the 2X review the report, request additional information as required, add any
6
September
2006
10-2
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
final required information including linking it to national requirements, and
then the 2X releases the report.
10-9. In addition to the above, the text information from the IIR can be
forwarded to the unit’s analytical elements and when it contains critical time-
sensitive information, such as an impending attack, it is sent to units which
may be affected by the information; however, it must be clearly marked
“unevaluated information, not finally evaluated intelligence.†The use of IIRs
and the formats are covered in DIAM 58-12 (S//NF).
SALUTE Reports
10-10. The SALUTE report is a standard Army format used to report
information of immediate interest by individuals at any echelon. (See
Appendix H for a SALUTE report format.) The SALUTE report is the
primary means used to report combat information to units that could be
affected by that information. After review by the team leader, SALUTE
reports are sent simultaneously to the supported unit S2, to the OMT in
control of the HCT, and to the intelligence staff officer of any other tactical
unit that may be affected by the information contained in the SALUTE
report.
10-11. The OMT reviews the report and forwards it to the supporting HAT
and supporting J/G/S2X for inclusion in the analysis picture. The supported
S2 will––
•
Review the information.
•
Incorporate it into his unit intelligence products, as applicable.
•
Forward the information to his higher echelon intelligence staff officer.
•
Ensure that all affected units are notified.
10-12. Units must develop SOPs for the passing of information and
intelligence to multinational units. Report writers and editors must ensure
that reports that are to be shared with multinational units contain only
releasable information. This will enable reports to have the widest
dissemination. Arrangements are made through the C/J2X/LNO for
distribution. When possible, reports to be shared with multinational units
should be kept to the appropriate classification to ensure the widest
dissemination of the reported information.
Basic Source Data Reports
10-13. The basic source data (BSD) reports provide the HUMINT chain with
biographic and operational information related to a source. BSDs are used at
all echelons to collect biographic information on all contacts. The use of BSDs
and BSD formats are covered in DIAM 58-11 (S//NF).
Contact Reports
10-14. Collectors use contact reports to inform their technical chain (from
OMT through J/G/S2X) of all relevant information concerning specific
meetings with HUMINT sources. Information typically includes the
circumstances of the contact (purpose, locations, time), the operational
6 September 2006
10-3
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
matters relative to the contact (topics discussed, taskings given), reports
produced as a result of the contact, and logistics expended.
Other Reports
10-15. HUMINT collectors also use a number of other reports to administer
source contacts and to report information. Copies of the following reports
should be maintained in the detainee’s permanent file for future reference.
HUMINT collectors will review these reports when planning additional
collection activities; release committees or tribunals can use the reports to
help evaluate if a detainee can be released or not. These reports include––
•
Screening Reports. Screening reports are used to report BSDs,
knowledge areas and levels, cooperation, vulnerabilities to approaches,
and other relevant source information between HUMINT collectors. It
is normally filled out either electronically or manually by the initial
HUMINT collector to speak to a source. The screening report is
normally forwarded electronically to higher echelon HUMINT
collection organizations and other MI organizations that might have
interest in the source. Higher echelon organizations may add
information to the screening sheet extracted through subsequent
screenings. Available digital screening reports contained in the
HUMINT collector’s mission support software (for example, BAT or
CI/HUMINT Automated Management System [CHAMS]) should be
used whenever possible to ensure rapid transfer of data. If screening
reports have to be handwritten, the information collected should
conform to theater requirements and local SOPs.
•
Knowledgeability Briefs. The KB is used to inform the Intelligence
Community of a source’s full identity, past history, and areas of
knowledge, as well as to set a suspense date for the submission of
intelligence requirements. It is normally only used at the strategic and
operational echelons. When completed, a KB will be classified at least
Confidential in accordance with the DIA Classification Guide to protect
the identity of the source. The use of KBs and the formats are covered
in DIAM 58-11 (S//NF). See Figure 10-2 for an example of a short
form KB that can be used for screening at all echelons, and can also
be prepared and published like the full KB. This allows the entire
intelligence community to see who is either in custody or to whom US
intelligence has access so that SDRs can be issued to help focus the
intelligence collection effort.
•
Notice of Intelligence Potential (NIP). A NIP is used to inform the US
Intelligence Community of the availability of a source of potential
interest and to notify them of what agency has responsibility for
questioning that source and where to forward questions and requests
for information from that agency. The use of NIPs and the formats
are covered in DIAM 58-11 (S//NF).
•
Lead Development Report (LDR). The LDR is used to inform the
HUMINT chain of ongoing operations directed toward a specific source.
It notifies them as to what element spotted the potential source, the
6
September
2006
10-4
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
current steps in assessing of the source, and the general information on
the potential source.
•
Interrogation Summary. An interrogation summary may be written to
record relevant facts concerning the interrogation. The summary may
include the attitude of the source; approach techniques that were tried
and which ones were effective; incentives promised and whether or not
they were delivered yet; recommended topics for further exploitation;
and any other topics the HUMINT collector considers relevant. Local
SOPs will dictate the use of the interrogation summary.
•
Interrogation Plan. The interrogation plan is a report prepared by the
HUMINT collector to organize his plan to approach and question a
source. It lists collection objectives, approach techniques, preparation
and liaison tasks, and interpreter usage plan. The interrogation plan
also has approval blocks for interrogation supervisor approval of
selected approaches and medical release for questioning. The last part
of the form has termination, approach effectiveness, recommendations
for further exploitation, and a summary of information obtained and
reports expected to be published. Figure 10-3 is an example of an
interrogation plan format.
•
Termination Report. The termination report is used at all echelons to
inform the technical chain of the termination of a contact relationship
between a HUMINT collector and a source.
•
Biographic Report. The biographic report is a formatted IIR used at all
echelons to report information collected from one human source about
another individual of actual or potential intelligence interest. The
biographic report format is found in DIAM 58-11 (S//NF).
REPORTING ARCHITECTURE
10-16. There are three basic reporting channels (see Figure 10-1):
•
The operational reporting chain consists of primarily the C2 elements
for the HUMINT collection element. It includes the OMTs, unit
commanders, and unit S3 and operation sections.
•
The technical chain includes the OMTs, HOC, and the C/J/G/S2X, and
in certain circumstances, the unit G2/S2s.
•
The intelligence reporting chain includes the OMTs, HATS,
C/J/G/S2Xs, and unit G2/S2s.
10-17. Many elements serve multiple and overlapping functions within the
reporting architecture. Each element must be aware of its function within the
architecture to ensure that information is disseminated expeditiously to the
right place in the right format. This architecture should be established and
published prior to implementation in order to avoid confusion.
OPERATIONAL REPORTING
10-18. Operational reporting is sent via the organic communications
architecture (see Chapter 13). Operational reports are normally sent per unit
SOP or based on direction from higher headquarters. HCTs normally send all
6 September 2006
10-5
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
operational reports through their OMT to the command element of the unit to
which they are assigned. If an HCT is attached, it will normally send its
operational reports to the unit to which it is attached with courtesy copies to
their assigned unit as required. If there is an administrative or logistics
relationship established with the supported unit, HCTs that are in DS send
the principal copy of all related administrative and logistic reports to the
supported unit with a courtesy copy to their parent unit. If the HCT is
operating in GS, a courtesy copy of operational reports should be forwarded to
all affected unit commanders in the supported AO.
TECHNICAL REPORTING
10-19. Technical reporting includes the forwarding of source information and
technical parameters of collection operations from lower to higher and the
passing of tasking specifics, source information, technical control measures,
and other information from higher to lower. Technical reporting is conducted
through the technical chain that extends from the HCT through the OMT and
Operations Section (if one exists) to the C/J/G/S2X.
INTELLIGENCE REPORTING
10-20. The key to intelligence reporting is to balance the need for accurate
reporting with the need to inform affected units as quickly as possible. The
J/G/S2 and MI commander are key to ensuring the right balance.
6
September
2006
10-6
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
Operational Reporting
Technical Reporting
Intelligence Reporting
Legend:
NOTE: In addition to the standard HUMINT reporting channels, GS teams will simultaneously
send SALUTE reports to any units in their AOR that may be affected by the reported information.
Operational Reporting
Technical Reporting
Intelligence Reporting
Legend:
NOTE: In addition to the standard HUMINT reporting channels, GS teams will simultaneously
send SALUTE reports to any units in their AOR that may be affected by the reported information.
O
O
Supported
S2
ACE
J/G2
Other
Government
Agencies
Military
Assets
J/G2X
GS CO
DS CO
HUMINT
Collector
Team(s)
Operational
Management
Team (DS)
Operational
Management
Team (GS)
HUMINT
Collector
Team(s)
perational Reporting
Technical Reporting
Intelligence Reporting
perati
Legend:
onal Reporting
Technical Reporting
Intelligence Reporting
Legend:
NOTE: In addition to the standard HUMINT reporting channels, GS teams will simultaneously
send SALUTE reports to any units in their AOR that may be affected by the reported information.
Figure 10-1. HUMINT Reporting Channels.
6 September 2006
10-7
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
KB-EZ WORKSHEET
KB-
KB-EZ WORKSHEET
EZ WORKSHEET
1. PERSONAL DATA:
1. PERSONAL DATA:
1. PER
1. PER
1. PERSONAL DATA:
SONAL DATA:
SONAL DATA:
1A. Name:
1A. Name:
1A.
1A.
1A. Name:
Name:
Name:
1B. Source Number (Capturing Unit):
1B. Source Number (Capturing Unit):
1B.
1B.
1B. Source Number (Capturing Unit):
Source Number (Capturing Unit):
Source Number (Capturing Unit):
1C. Source Number (MPs):
1C. Source Number (MPs):
1C
1C
1C. Source Number (MPs):
. Source Number (MPs):
. Source Number (MPs):
1D. Source Number (Other):
1D. Source Number (Other):
1D
1D
1D. Source Number (Other):
. Source Number (Other):
. Source Number (Other):
1E. Source Number (MI):
1E. Source Number (MI):
1E.
1E.
1E. Source Number (MI):
Source Number (MI):
Source Number (MI):
1F. Country of Citizenship:
1F. Country of Citizenship:
1F
1F
1F. Country of Citizenship:
. Country of Citizenship:
. Country of Citizenship:
1G. Birth City:
1G. Birth City:
1G
1G
1G. Birth City:
. Birth City:
. Birth City:
1H. Birth Country:
1H. Birth Country:
1H
1H
1H. Birth Country:
. Birth Country:
. Birth Country:
1I. Birth Date:
1I. Birth Date:
111I. Birth Date:
I. Birth Date:
I. Birth Date:
1K. Date Departed Country of Origin/Date of
1N. Last County of Residence:
1O. Language Competency:
2. Education:
(Most Recent
ldest)
2A. Military or Civilian:
2B. Dates of Attendan
2D. City Location of Institution:
1K. Date Departed Country of Origin/Date of
1N. Last County of Residence:
1O. Language Competency:
2. Education:
(Most Recent
ldest)
2A. Military or Civilian:
2B. Dates of Attendan
2D. City Location of Institution:
1K.
Capture:
to O
1K.
1K. Date Departed Country of Origin/Date of
1N. Last County of Residence:
1O. Language Competency:
2. Education:
(Most Recent
ldest)
2A. Military or Civilian:
2B. Dates of Attendance:
2D. City Location of Institution:
Date Departed Country of Origin/Date of Capture:
1N. Last County of Residence:
1O. Language Competency:
Date Departed Country of Origin/Date of Capture:
1N. Last County of Residence:
1O. Language Competency:
2. Education:
(Most Recent to Oldest)
2A. Military or Civilian:
2B. Dates of Attendance:
2D. City Location of Institution:
2. Education:
(Most Recent to Oldest)
2A. Military or Civilian:
2B. Dates of Attendance:
2D. City Location of Institution:
2C. Name of Institution:
2C. Name of Institution:
2C
2C
2C. Name of Institution:
. Name of Institution:
. Name of Institution:
2E. Country Location of Institution:
2E. Country Location of Institution:
2E.
2E.
2E. Country Location of Institution:
Country Location of Institution:
Country Location of Institution:
2F: Completion Status/Degree Type:
2F: Completion Status/Degree Type:
2F
2F
2F: Completion Status/Degree Type:
: Completion Status/Degree Type:
: Completion Status/Degree Type:
3. EMPLOYMENT:
(Most Recent to Oldest)
3. EMPLOYMENT:
(Most Recent to Oldest)
3. EM
3. EM
3. EMPLOYMENT:
(Most Recent to Oldest)
PLOYMENT:
(Most Recent to Oldest)
PLOYMENT:
(Most Recent to Oldest)
3A. Dates of Employment:
3A. Dates of Employment:
3A.
3A.
3A. Dates of Employment:
Dates of Employment:
Dates of Employment:
3B. Name of Place of Employment:
3B. Name of Place of Employment:
3B.
3B.
3B. Name of Place of Employment:
Name of Place of Employment:
Name of Place of Employment:
3C. City Location of Place of Employment:
3C. City Location of Place of Employment:
3C
3C
3C. City Location of Place of Employment:
. City Location of Place of Employment:
. City Location of Place of Employment:
3D. Country of Place of Employment:
3D. Country of Place of Employment:
3D
3D
3D. Country of Place of Employment:
. Country of Place of Employment:
. Country of Place of Employment:
3E. Employment Duty Position:
3E. Employment Duty Position:
3E.
3E.
3E. Employment Duty Position:
Employment Duty Position:
Employment Duty Position:
3F. Security Clearance:
3F. Security Clearance:
3F
3F
3F. Security Clearance:
. Security Clearance:
. Security Clearance:
Figure 10-2. KB-EZ Worksheet.
6
September
2006
10-8
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
4. MILITARY SERVICE:
(Most Recent to Oldest)
4.
4. MILITARY SERVICE:
(Most Recent to Oldest)
MILITARY SERVICE:
(Most Recent to Oldest)
4A. Dates of Service:
4A.
4A. Dates of Service:
Dates of Service:
4B. Name of Post/Base:
4B.
4B. Name of Post/Base:
Name of Post/Base:
4C. Armed Service Component:
4C
4C. Armed Service Component:
. Armed Service Component:
4D. Rank of Equivalent:
4D
4D. Rank of Equivalent:
. Rank of Equivalent:
4E. Name of Unit/Group:
4E.
4E. Name of Unit/Group:
Name of Unit/Group:
4F. City Location of Unit/Group:
4F
4F. City Location of Unit/Group:
. City Location of Unit/Group:
4G. Country Location of Unit/Group:
4G
4G. Country Location of Unit/Group:
. Country Location of Unit/Group:
4H. Military/Group Duty Position/Title:
4H
4H. Military/Group Duty Position/Title:
. Military/Group Duty Position/Title:
4I. Security Clearance:
4I
4I. Security Clearance:
. Security Clearance:
5. Comments:
(Character, intelligence, motivat
veness)
5.
5. Comments:
(Character, intelligence, motivat
veness)
Comments:
(Character, intelligence, motivat
veness)
5A. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE: Capt
, circumstances, documents,
5A.
5A. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE: Capt
, circumstances, documents,
CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE: Capt
, circumstances, documents,
weapons, and equipment.
weapo
weapons, and equipment.
ns, and equipment.
elligence, cooperation (1, 2, 3),
eelligence, cooperation (1, 2, 3),
lligence, cooperation (1, 2, 3),
knowledgeability (A, B, C), personal
knowl
knowledgeability (A, B, C), personal
edgeability (A, B, C), personal
5C. ADDITIONAL PERSONAL INFOR
experience, marital status, other).
5C
5C. ADDITIONAL PERSONAL INFOR
experience, marital status, other).
. ADDITIONAL PERSONAL INFOR
experience, marital status, other).
6. NAME OF SCREENER:
66. NAME OF SCREENER:
. NAME OF SCREENER:
ity, cooper
uri
5B. ASSESSMENT: Physical condition, ment
(Skill
ity,
uri
5B. ASSESSMENT: Physi
(Skill
ion, personal
cooper
cal condition, ment
ity, cooperati
ure date, capturing unit
5B. ASSESSMENT: Physical condition, mental condition, int
ity.
MATION: (Skills,
Theater-specific collection requirements may require modification of the KB-EZ format.
Theater-specific collection requirements may require modification of the KB-EZ format.
T
T
Theater-specific collection requirements may require modification of the KB-EZ format.
heater-specific collection requirements may require modification of the KB-EZ format.
heater-specific collection requirements may require modification of the KB-EZ format.
Consider adding entries for:
Consider adding entries for:
C
C
Consider adding entries for:
onsider adding entries for:
onsider adding entries for:
• Race
• Race
• R
• R
• Race
ace
ace
• Ethnicity
• Ethnicity
••• Ethnicity
Ethnicity
Ethnicity
• Tribal Affiliation
• Tribal Affiliation
••• Tribal Affiliation
Tribal Affiliation
Tribal Affiliation
• Religion and Sect
• Religion and Sect
••• Religion and Sect
Religion and Sect
Religion and Sect
• Language and Dialect Spoken
• Language and Dialect Spoken
••• Language and Dialect Spoken
Language and Dialect Spoken
Language and Dialect Spoken
Entries for “Location†may need to include a village or even neighborhood.
Entries for “Location†may need to include a village or even neighborhood.
Ent
Ent
Entries for “Location†may need to include a village or even neighborhood.
ries for “Location†may need to include a village or even neighborhood.
ries for “Location†may need to include a village or even neighborhood.
Figure 10-2. KB-EZ Worksheet (continued).
6 September 2006
10-9
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
10-10
6
September
2006
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
PREPARATION:
PR
PREPARATION:
EPARATION:
Coordinate with MP for access to the detainee.
Coordi
Coordinate with MP for access to the detainee.
nate with MP for access to the detainee.
Prepare for exploitation topics:
Prepa
Prepare for exploitation topics:
re for exploitation topics:
Obtain appropriate map sheet(s)
O
Obtain appropriate map sheet(s)
btain appropriate map sheet(s)
Obtain references
Ob
Obtain references
tain references
Review previous reports, detainee correspondence
R
Review previous reports, detainee correspondence
eview previous reports, detainee correspondence
Research collection topics
R
Research collection topics
esearch collection topics
Prepare questions
Prepare qu
Prepare questions
estions
Effectiveness of Approaches:
Ef
Effectiveness of Approaches:
fectiveness of Approaches:
Attitude and Behavior of Detaine
At
Attitude and Behavior of Detaine
titude and Behavior of Detaine
Summary of Topics Expl
Sum
Summary of Topics Expl
mary of Topics Expl
Expected Reports Producti
to Requirements:
Expec
Expected Reports Producti
to Requirements:
ted Reports Producti
to Requirements:
Termination:
T
Termination:
ermination:
Prepare interrogation site (furnishings, lighting, climate, security, monitoring).
Prepa
Prepare interrogation site (furnishings, lighting, climate, security, monitoring).
re interrogation site (furnishings, lighting, climate, security, monitoring).
Post-Inte
port
Post-Interrogation Re port
e
Pos
:
oi
:
ted:
on i
ted:
n R
n esponse
e
t-Interrogation Report
e
oi
on i R sponse
Ask Guard Questions.
As
Ask Guard Questions.
k Guard Questions.
Review Detainee Documentation:
Rev
Review Detainee Documentation:
iew Detainee Documentation:
ID Card
ID Card
ID Card
Capture Tag
C
Capture Tag
apture Tag
Documents captured with the detainee
D
Documents captured with the detainee
ocuments captured with the detainee
Reason:
R
Reason:
eason:
Approach Reinforced:
Approa
Approach Reinforced:
ch Reinforced:
Incentive Promised:
IIncentive Promised:
ncentive Promised:
Delivered:
D
Delivered:
elivered:
Recommendation for Further Interrogation and Rationale:
R
Recommendation for Further Interrogation and Rationale:
ecommendation for Further Interrogation and Rationale:
Recommended Approach(es):
R
Recommended Approach(es):
ecommended Approach(es):
Topics for Further Exploitation (Leads):
T
Topics for Further Exploitation (Leads):
opics for Further Exploitation (Leads):
Disposition of Source:_______________________________________________________________
D
Disposition of Source:_______________________________________________________________
isposition of Source:_______________________________________________________________
Additional Comments:_______________________________________________________________
Addi
Additional Comments:_______________________________________________________________
tional Comments:_______________________________________________________________
Figure 10-3. Interrogation Plan Format (continued).
6 September 2006
10-11
This page intentionally left blank.
FM 2-22.3
Chapter 11
HUMINT Collection With An Interpreter
11-1. The use of interpreters is an integral part of the HUMINT collection
effort. It is vital that the HUMINT collection skills be paired up with a
qualified interpreter. Use of an interpreter is time consuming and potentially
confusing. Proper use and control of an interpreter is a skill that must be
learned and practiced to maximize the potential of HUMINT collection. It is
also vital for the HUMINT collector to confirm that the interpreter he
intends to use holds the required clearance for the level of information that
will be discussed or potentially collected, and is authorized access to the
detainee. This chapter deals strictly with the use of interpreters to support
HUMINT collection; it is not intended to be applied to more routine uses of
interpreters in support of administrative, logistical, or other operational
requirements.
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF INTERPRETER USE
ADVANTAGES
11-2. Interpreters are frequently a necessary aid to HUMINT collection.
There are certain advantages to using an interpreter. The most obvious is
that without an interpreter, a HUMINT collector without the proper
language or necessary proficiency in that language is severely limited.
Furthermore, if properly trained, briefed, and assessed, the interpreter can
be a valuable assistant to the HUMINT collector. The interpreter––
•
Probably has a greater knowledge of the local culture and language
usage than could be developed by the HUMINT collector.
•
Can identify language and culturally based clues that can help the
HUMINT collector confirm or refute the veracity of the source’s
statements.
•
Can interpret not only the literal meaning of a statement but also the
intent and emotion of a sentence.
DISADVANTAGES
11-3. There are, however, several significant disadvantages to using
interpreters. Disadvantages may include—
•
A significant increase in time to conduct the collection. Since the
interpreter must repeat each phrase, the time for a given questioning
session or meeting is normally at least doubled.
•
Since there is now a third person in the communications loop, the
potential for confusion or misunderstanding increases significantly.
This is especially true when the interpreter is deficient in his command
of either language.
6 September 2006
11-1
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
•
The establishment of rapport and the use of some approach techniques
(see Chapter 8) are made difficult or even impossible when working
through an interpreter.
•
The ability of the HUMINT collector to interpret the source’s veracity
through the analysis of word usage, nuances of speech, and body
language is curtailed.
•
The interpreter will have his own set of biases that could influence the
manner in which the dialogue is interpreted.
•
The source may be culturally biased against the interpreter. This is
especially possible if the interpreter was locally hired and is of a
different ethnic, social, or religious group than the source.
•
The interpreter may be culturally biased against the source and
intentionally misinterpret the meaning to obtain a desired effect.
•
There may be mission or subject matter classification problems
involved.
CAUTIONS
11-4. Be careful of comments made in the presence of your interpreter.
Although you plan comprehensively with your interpreter, you should only
share information with your interpreter on a need-to-know basis. Obviously
the exchange of information concerning the “what, where, when, with whom,
and how†of each meeting must be discussed with your interpreter, but
sometimes the “real why†is none of his business! You may be meeting with a
source or contact because the commander believes this individual has lied.
The real purpose (the why) of the meeting is to pose control questions and to
determine whether the source or contact lied in the past or whether there
was simply a miscommunication.
11-5. Be careful of sensitive or personal conversations when the interpreter
is present. This applies to conversations en route to or from meetings,
conversations over lunch or dinner in the operational area, and conversations
in the team area. It is easy to get used to the presence of the interpreter and
to overlook his presence. An interpreter is a necessary tool but we must
remember that most are only very lightly screened for the sensitive access
they have. If your interpreter turned out to be working for the other side,
what information beyond “the necessary†could he provide?
METHODS OF INTERPRETER USE
11-6. There is a basic method and advanced method of interaction between
the HUMINT collector and the interpreter. As the collector and the
interpreter become experienced at working together and gain confidence in
each other’s abilities, they may use more advanced interactive techniques. It
is the HUMINT collector’s decision whether or not to use more advanced
techniques.
6 September 2006
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_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
BASIC METHOD
11-7. The basic method of interaction is used when––
•
The interpreter and HUMINT collectors have not worked together
extensively.
•
The interpreter has language skills but no interpreter training or
experience.
•
The interpreter’s skill in English or the target language is suspect.
•
The HUMINT collector has limited experience using an interpreter.
•
The interpreter’s capabilities, loyalty, or cultural knowledge are not
known or suspect.
11-8. Using the basic method, the interpreter is used solely as an
interpretation device. When initial contact is made, the interpreter instructs
the source to maintain eye contact with the HUMINT collector. The
interpreter is briefed on the general course of the collection but usually is not
advised of the specific purpose or collection goals. While the interpreter will
be instructed to reflect the attitude, behavior, and tone of voice of both the
collector and the source, he is told to
not
interpose comments or personal
opinions at all in the conversation.
11-9. The questioning phase is conducted in the same way it would be if no
interpreter were used with the obvious increase in time due to the
interpretation. The interpreter uses the same person and tense as the
HUMINT collector or source and neither adds nor subtracts anything from
the dialogue. He does his best to fade into the background. When reports are
written, the interpreter will only be asked questions based on the actual
translation of the dialogue.
ADVANCED METHOD
11-10. The advanced method of interaction requires additional training on
the part of the HUMINT collector and the interpreter, extensive experience
working together, and a rapport between the HUMINT collector and the
interpreter. The HUMINT collector must trust both the capabilities and the
judgment of the interpreter. At this level of interaction, the interpreter
becomes a more active participant in the HUMINT activities. The HUMINT
collector remains in charge and makes it clear to the interpreter that he (the
HUMINT collector) is responsible for the substance and direction of the
questioning. The interpreter is normally briefed as to the specific goals of the
collection.
11-11. The interpreter becomes a more active participant in the approach
and termination phases to the point of even making planned comments to the
source supportive of the HUMINT collector’s approach. For example, if the
HUMINT collector is using an incentive approach, the interpreter in an aside
to the source can tell him that the HUMINT collector always keeps his
promises. This type of technique should only be used if both planned and
rehearsed.
11-12. During the questioning phase, the interpreter supports the collector
by not only translating the word of the source but also cueing the collector
when there are language or culturally based nuances to what the source is
6 September 2006
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FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
saying that might add credence or doubt as to the veracity of the statements.
For example, the interpreter could point out that although the source claims
to be a factory worker, his language use indicates that the source has a
university education. In another example, the interpreter could indicate that
the dialect or pronunciation that the source is using does not match the area
that he claims to be from. During report writing, the interpreter supports the
HUMINT collector by not only answering questions on the literal
interpretation but also adds, when appropriate, comments on the significance
of both what was said and how it was said.
SOURCES OF INTERPRETERS
11-13. There are almost never sufficient interpreters to meet all unit mission
requirements. Interpreters in support of HUMINT collection require a
security clearance and knowledge of the operational situation. While any
qualified interpreter can be used to support HUMINT collection, the
HUMINT collectors maximize the collection potential if the interpreter has
received specific training. The number of interpreters needed to support a
HUMINT collection mission is METT-TC driven based primarily on the
number of HUMINT collectors, the dispersion of the HUMINT collectors in
the AO, and the number of sources. Normally one interpreter for every two
non-language qualified HUMINT collectors is sufficient; however, in
situations where a large number of high-value sources must be questioned in
a limited time, a ratio of 1 to 1 may be required. Interpreters are obtained
from within the military and from the US and local civilian populations or
other English-speaking countries.
MILITARY
11-14. There are many soldiers, including non-US citizens, who have native
language abilities due to their upbringing. Their parent unit may identify
these language abilities, or these soldiers may volunteer their abilities when
a contingency arises. The ARNG, USAR, other US military services, and even
coalition militaries, have language-trained and certified personnel in
Military Intelligence MOSs, such as 98G or 09L, who may be called upon to
serve as interpreters for the HUMINT collection effort.
CIVILIAN
11-15. Civilian corporations may be contracted by the military to provide
interpreters for an operation. These interpreters are divided into three
categories:
•
CAT I Linguists - Locally hired personnel with an understanding of the
English language. These personnel undergo a limited screening and
are hired in-theater. They do not possess a security clearance and are
used for unclassified work. During most operations, CAT I linguists are
required to be re-screened on a scheduled basis. CAT I linguists should
not be used for HUMINT collection operations.
•
CAT II Linguists - US citizens who have native command of the target
language and near-native command of the English language. These
personnel undergo a screening process, which includes a national
6 September 2006
11-4
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
agency check (NAC). Upon favorable findings, these personnel are
granted an equivalent of a Secret collateral clearance. This is the
category of linguist most used by HUMINT collectors.
•
CAT III Linguists - US citizens who have native command of the target
language and native command of the English language. These
personnel undergo a screening process, which includes a special
background investigation (SBI). Upon favorable findings, these
personnel are granted an equivalent of a Top Secret (TS) clearance.
CAT III linguists are used mostly for high-ranking official meetings
and by strategic collectors.
INTERPRETATION TECHNIQUES
11-16. During the planning and preparation phase, the HUMINT collector, in
collaboration with the interpreter, selects a method of interpretation. There
are two methods:
•
Alternate Interpretation. The interpreter listens to the entire phrase,
sentence, or paragraph. The interpreter then translates it during
natural pauses in speech.
•
Simultaneous Interpretation. The interpreter listens to the source and
translates what he says, just a phrase or a few words behind. The
HUMINT collector should select the simultaneous method only if all
the following criteria are met:
ƒ
The sentence structure of the target language is parallel to English.
ƒ
The interpreter can understand and speak English as well as the
target language with ease.
ƒ
The interpreter has special vocabulary skills for the topics to be
covered.
ƒ
The interpreter can easily imitate the HUMINT collector’s tone of
voice and attitude for the approaches and questioning technique
selected.
ƒ
Neither the collector nor the interpreter tends to get confused when
using the simultaneous method of interpretation.
11-17. If any of the above-mentioned criteria in the simultaneous method
cannot be met, the HUMINT collector should use the alternate method. The
alternate method should also be used when a high degree of precision is
required.
TRAINING AND BRIEFING THE INTERPRETER
11-18. The HUMINT collector will need to train an individual who has no
interpreter experience as well as remind a trained and certified interpreter of
the basic interpreter requirements. The requirements include—
•
Statements made by the interpreter and the source should be
interpreted in the first person, using the same content, tone of voice,
inflection, and intent. The interpreter must not interject his or her own
personality, ideas, or questions into the interview.
6 September 2006
11-5
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
•
The interpreter should inform the HUMINT collector if there are any
inconsistencies in the language used by the source. The HUMINT
collector will use this information in his assessment of the source.
•
The interpreter needs to assist with the preparation of reports and
administrative documents relevant to the source and meeting.
11-19. Once the HUMINT collector has chosen a method of interpretation, he
must brief the interpreter. This briefing must cover—
•
The current situation.
•
Background information on the source (if available).
•
The administrative particulars of the meeting such as where it will be
held, the room setup, how long it will last.
•
The specific positioning of the interpreter, collector, and source.
•
The general or (if advanced method of interaction is being used) the
specific collection objectives.
•
The selected approach and possible alternate approaches that the
HUMINT collector plans on using. If time allows, the collector and
interpreter should rehearse the approaches.
•
Any special topic or technical language that is anticipated. If time
allows, the interpreter should research any anticipated technical
vocabulary with which he is unfamiliar.
11-20. Throughout the briefing, the HUMINT collector fully and clearly
answers questions the interpreter may have. This helps ensure the
interpreter completely understands his role in the HUMINT collection
process. With a more advanced interaction plan, the HUMINT collector and
the interpreter should “wargame†their plan and rehearse their actions as
necessary.
PLACEMENT OF THE INTERPRETER
11-21. The interpreter should be placed in a position that enhances the mood
or general impression that the HUMINT collector wants to establish. When
dealing with detainees or EPWs, the HUMINT collector generally wants to
establish a dominant position, maintain a direct relationship with the source,
and increase or at least maintain the anxiety level of the source. Having the
HUMINT collector and the source facing each other with the interpreter
located behind the source normally facilitates this. It allows the HUMINT
collector to maximize control of both the source and interpreter. If desired,
having the interpreter enter the room after the source, so the source never
sees the interpreter, can further heighten the anxiety of the source.
11-22. Having the interpreter sit to the side of the HUMINT collector creates
a more relaxed atmosphere. This is the norm for debriefings and official
meetings. Having the interpreter at his side also facilities “off lineâ€
exchanges between the HUMINT collector and the interpreter. The collector
should avoid having the interpreter sit beside the source since this has a
tendency of establishing a stronger bond between the source and the
interpreter and makes “off line†comments between the collector and the
interpreter more difficult.
6 September 2006
11-6
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
11-23. When conducting source meetings in a public setting, a more natural
appearance is desirable. The seating needs to conform to the norm at the
location where the meeting is taking place. For example, if meeting at a
restaurant, the HUMINT collector, interpreter, and source will sit naturally
around the table.
INTERACTIONS WITH AND CORRECTION OF THE INTERPRETER
11-24. The HUMINT collector must control the interpreter. He must be
professional but firm and establish that he is in charge. During a questioning
session, the HUMINT collector corrects the interpreter if he violates any
standards that the pre-mission briefing covered. For example, if the
interpreter interjects his own ideas into the meeting, he must be corrected.
Corrections should be made in a low-key manner as to not alienate the
interpreter, interrupt the flow of the questioning, or give the source the
impression that there is an exploitable difference of opinion between the
HUMINT collector and the interpreter. At no time should the HUMINT
collector rebuke the interpreter sternly or loudly while they are with the
source. The HUMINT collector should never argue with the interpreter in the
presence of the source. If a major correction must be made, the HUMINT
collector should temporarily terminate the meeting and leave the site
temporarily to make the correction. The HUMINT collector needs to
document any difficulties as part of his interpreter evaluation. The HUMINT
collector must always ensure that the conduct and actions of the interpreter
are within the bounds of applicable law and policy. Applicable law and policy
include US law; the law of war; relevant international law; relevant
directives including DOD Directive 3115.09, “DOD Intelligence
Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioningâ€; DOD
Directive 2310.1E, “The Department of Defense Detainee Programâ€; DOD
instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOs.
11-25. The HUMINT collector must be alert for any signs that the
interpreter is not performing as required. The following are some indicators
of possible problems.
•
Long-to-short. If you take 20 seconds to express yourself and the
interpreter reduces it to a 3-second translation, it may indicate that
something has been omitted, and you should not proceed until you
have resolved the issue. There is nothing wrong with stating that you
would “prefer†the interpreter translate everything that was just said.
If you have trained your interpreter properly, this should not be an
issue. If it arises even with the training you have given the interpreter,
then it has significance and you must not let it pass.
•
Short-to-long. If you take 5 seconds to express yourself and the
interpreter expands it to a 30-second translation, it may indicate that
something has been added, and you should not proceed until you have
resolved the issue.
•
Body-language shift. If the interpreter’s body language suddenly has a
significant shift from his normal behavior, you should look for the
reason. (It is advisable for you to determine a base line of behavior for
your interpreter to facilitate recognition of the changes.) Perhaps he is
reluctant to translate what you just said. Be aware that the body shift
6 September 2006
11-7
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
means that something is happening––your task is to find out what it
means.
•
Unusual pauses. Look for a longer delay than usual before the
translation begins. Unless it is a vocabulary or concept issue, the long
delay means that the interpreter is “thinking†before he translates.
Any thinking beyond what is needed to translate, as closely as possible,
what was just said represents a potential problem. Again, you should
establish a base line of behavior for your interpreter so you can
recognize these unusual pauses.
•
“Wrong†reactions. If you say something humorous that should provoke
a positive response from the source, and you do not get that response,
then you should wonder if the message got through. If the source
becomes upset in response to something (positive) you said, then you
should begin to wonder what message was passed by the interpreter.
Did you fail to express yourself clearly, or was it an accidental or
deliberate mistranslation?
11-26. A trusted linguist should periodically review the accuracy of the
interpreter’s translations by monitoring an interrogation or debriefing and
critiquing the monitored interpreter’s performance.
INTERPRETER SUPPORT IN REPORT WRITING
11-27. The interpreter assists the HUMINT collector in preparing all
required reports. He may be able to fill gaps and unclear details in the
HUMINT collector’s notes. He may also assist in transliterating, translating,
and explaining foreign terms.
EVALUATING THE INTERPRETER
11-28. After submitting all reports, the HUMINT collector evaluates the
performance of his interpreter. This should be done in writing, and copies
should be given to the interpreter and placed on file with the individual
managing the HUMINT collection portion of the interpreter program. The
interpreter program manager needs to develop a standard evaluation format
for inclusion in the unit SOP. The evaluation forms should note at a
minimum:
•
Administrative data (for example, date, time, interpreter’s name).
•
Strengths and weaknesses of the interpreter with any problems and
corrective actions taken.
•
Type of interpretation used (simultaneous or alternate).
•
Type of HUMINT operation the interpretation was supporting (that is,
an interrogation, a debriefing, a liaison meeting).
•
Ability or lack of ability of the interpreter to use specific technical
language that may have been required.
•
Name or collector number of the HUMINT collector.
11-29. The interpreter program manager uses these forms to decide on future
use of the interpreters, to develop training programs for the interpreters, and
to assign interpreters to make maximum use of their specific capabilities.
6 September 2006
11-8
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
The HUMINT collector should also review these files before using an
unfamiliar interpreter.
MANAGING AN INTERPRETER PROGRAM
11-30. Units requiring interpretation support need to identify an individual
or individuals to manage the interpreter program. In most units, this will be
someone in the G3/S3 section. Division and Corps-level units will have a
language manager. In MI units whose specific function is HUMINT
collection, it will normally be a senior Warrant Officer within that unit. The
functions of the interpreter program manager include but are not limited
to—
•
Consolidating and prioritizing interpreter requirements.
•
Coordinating with G2 or INSCOM to contract for qualified
interpreters.
•
Coordinating with the G1/S1 to identify personnel in the unit with
language skills who can be used as interpreters.
•
Coordinating with the G1/S1 and G5 to obtain qualified local-hire
interpreters.
•
Coordinating with G2/S2 for clearances.
•
Coordinating with the G3/S3 to establish training for both the
interpreters and those that will be using interpreters.
•
Coordinating with the G3/S3 for language testing of the interpreters in
both English and the target language as required.
•
Coordinating with the G1/S1 and G4/S4 to ensure that all
administrative and logistical requirements for the interpreters are
met.
•
Establishing and maintaining the administrative, operational, and
evaluation files on the interpreters.
•
Assigning or recommending the assignment of interpreters to
operational missions based on their specific capabilities.
6 September 2006
11-9
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_________________________________________________________________________
FM 2-22.3
PART FOUR
Analysis and Tools
Part Four discusses HUMINT analysis and the automation and communication tools
needed to support the HUMINT collection effort.
HUMINT analysis supports operational planning and provides direction to HUMINT
collection operations. Analysts determine if information from a single human source
is internally consistent based on factors such as placement and access of source,
prior information from the source, and existing holdings. Source analysis is used to
determine if the information from a source is complete, truthful, and responsive to
collection requirements. Operational analysis consists of those actions taken to
determine how to best meet requirements.
Modern automation and communications systems are vital to HUMINT collection.
Real-time collaboration, detailed operational planning and ISR integration, as well as
enhanced collection and source exploitation tools, must support team efforts.
Emerging technology continues to allow the entire HUMINT collection system to
operate more effectively. Commanders must be prepared to supply their HUMINT
collection assets with the best possible technology.
Chapter 12
HUMINT Analysis and Production
12-1. Analytical processes provide information to support the commander,
his staff, and his unit. Analysis is an integral part of HUMINT collection.
Analysis occurs throughout the HUMINT collection process but can be
divided into four primary categories: analytical support to operational
planning and targeting, operational analysis and assessment, source
analysis, and single-discipline HUMINT analysis and production.
ANALYTICAL SUPPORT TO OPERATIONAL PLANNING
12-2. Several elements provide analytical support at various echelons,
including the following:
•
The HAT is subordinate to the G2 ACE. The HAT supports the G2 in
developing IPB products and in developing and tailoring SIRs to
match HUMINT collection capabilities.
6 September 2006
12-1
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
•
The HAC is subordinate to the C/J/G/S2X and functions in the same
capacity for the C/J/G/S2X as the HAT does for the ACE.
•
The HOC of the C/J/G/S2X supports the C/J/G/S2 and C/J/G/S2X in
the identification of HUMINT collection opportunities, the
development of taskings and RFIs for HUMINT collection assets, as
well as the development of a HUMINT database.
INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD
12-3. The HAT assists the G2 in the identification and characterization of
the human component of operations and its effects on friendly and enemy
operations. As part of its assistance to the G2, the HAT compiles and
analyzes data about the local civilian population including its political,
ethnic, religious, cultural, tribal, economic, and other social components. It
carefully examines the various component groups and their predicted
reaction to friendly force operations.
12-4. The HAT also provides input to all-source analysis by identifying
specific actions and motivational factors that should strengthen the local
population’s support of the US or at least weaken its support of the enemy
and by providing information on transient (refugees, DPs, third-country
nationals) population and its effects on friendly and enemy operations. In
addition to the above, the HAT––
•
Closely examines the current and potential threat to identify all
factors, such as morale, motivation, training, and beliefs that would
affect both positively and negatively on enemy and opposing force
capabilities.
•
Identifies formal and informal leaders of hostile, neutral, and
friendly groups and how their influence is likely to affect operations.
•
Develops overlays, databases, and matrices, as required, to support
IPB. These overlays may represent a wide variety of intelligence
issues, including battlefield infrastructure (for example, electrical
power grid), population density, ethnic, religious, or tribal affiliation,
and no-strike or collateral damage.
•
Provides its products to the C/J/G/S2, the all-source analysts and CI
analysts of the ACE, the HOC, the C/J/G/S2X, and HUMINT
collection units as required.
ISR TASK DEVELOPMENT
12-5. The HAT and the C/J/G/S2X support the C/J/G/S2 by expanding the
PIRs that can be answered through HUMINT collection into ISR tasks that
can be answered by a human source and that can be tasked to a specific
collection entity. The HAT and the C/J/G/S2X provide this information to
support the development of the HUMINT collection plan and its integration
into the overarching ISR plan. The HAT normally establishes a list of
prioritized standing indicators, and supplements this with ISR tasks
developed to answer specific PIRs. The standing indicators are incorporated
into the ACE’s all-source analysis team’s list of indicators that point to a
pattern or COA. Each standing indicator is integrated with other indicators
6 September 2006
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________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
and factors so that analysts can detect patterns and establish threat
intentions.
SUPPORT TO HUMINT TASKING
12-6. The C/J/G/S2X supports the C/J/G/S2 and the C/J/G/S2 requirements
manager by developing tasking for specific organic or attached HUMINT
collection assets and by developing requests and coordinating for support
from higher and lateral echelon HUMINT collection elements. The C/J/G/S2X
matches specific collection requirements to collection units and sources. If
current sources cannot answer the requirement, he develops profiles for new
sources that guide the collection teams in the development of new sources.
The C/J/G/S2X also determines the best method to achieve collection
requirements. The C/J/G/S2X supplies any required technical support to the
HUMINT operations section, OMTs, and HCTs.
HUMINT DATABASE DEVELOPMENT
12-7. The C/J/G/S2X maintains the source database, which receives input
from HUMINT collection and CI operations. The C/J/G2X is responsible for
maintaining the source database.
OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT
12-8. Operational analysis consists of those actions taken to determine how
to best meet requirements. Assessment evaluates the effectiveness of the
requirement effort. Operational analysis begins with the C/J/G/S2X when he
determines the best collection assets and sources needed to answer collection
requirements. For
analysis
, the C/J/G/S2X section and specifically the
HOC—
•
Provides higher echelon coordination and deconfliction for collection
operations.
•
Provides required technical support to the HUMINT operations
sections, OMTs, and HCTs.
•
Facilitates feedback and evaluations.
12-9. For
assessment
, the C/J/G/S2X section and specifically the HOC—
•
Monitors all HUMINT reporting to ensure that requirements are
being met.
•
Refocuses efforts of assigned assets as needed.
12-10. The HUMINT operations section (if one exists) and the OMTs of
tasked collection units determine which HCTs are best suited to meet specific
collection requirements. They also conduct operational coordination for the
HCT, provide technical support, and monitor all reporting to ensure that
reports are properly formatted and support collection requirements. The
team leader of the tasked HCT selects the specific collectors and sources to
meet collection requirements, reviews the collection plan, provides technical
support to the collectors, coordinates with the supported unit, and monitors
all team reporting for format and content. He identifies additional lines of
questioning and approaches required to fulfill collection requirements.
6 September 2006
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FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
SOURCE ANALYSIS
12-11. Source analysis involves the actions taken to determine if information
from a single human source is internally consistent based on factors such as
placement and access of source, prior information from the source, and
existing holdings. Source analysis is used to determine if the information
from a source is complete, truthful, and responsive to collection
requirements. Preliminarily source analysis is the responsibility of the
individual HUMINT collector.
12-12. The HUMINT collector evaluates all source statements within the
context of the information known about the source and the current situation
to determine both the veracity and the validity of source statements. That is
not to say that the HUMINT collector ignores any information that does not
fit into expected pattern; rather that he treats that information with
skepticism and uses appropriate questioning methodology to validate the
statements (see Chapter 9). Source analysis is supported by the HCT leader,
the OMTs, and the HOC. Each echelon reviews the intelligence and
operational reports, identifies inconsistencies, evaluates veracity, and recom-
mends additional lines of questioning as appropriate.
12-13. Analysts can assign an alphanumeric designator to collected
information based on an analyst’s determination of the reliability of the
source and the probable accuracy of the information reported. A letter from A
to F is assigned reflecting the level of reliability, with A representing the
highest degree of reliability. The letter designation is then coupled with a
number from 1 to 6. The number 1 represents confirmed intelligence and the
numbers 2 through 6 represent increasing degrees of uncertainty as to the
veracity of the information. A complete explanation if this rating system is
contained in Appendix B. [NOTE: This system of labeling the reliability of
sources and their reported information should not be confused with the
alphanumeric rating scheme for source-screening operations as described in
Chapter 6.]
SINGLE-DISCIPLINE HUMINT ANALYSIS AND PRODUCTION
12-14. Single-discipline HUMINT analysis involves the actions taken to
evaluate the information provided by all HUMINT sources at a given echelon
to determine interrelationships, trends, and contextual meaning. While
called “single discipline," the analyst reviews and incorporates, as necessary,
information from other disciplines and all-source analysis to provide a
contextual basis for the HUMINT analysis. Single-discipline HUMINT
analysis is conducted primarily by the HAT of the ACE. HUMINT operations
sections and OMTs also conduct analysis to a lesser degree, based on the
information from HUMINT sources at their echelon.
12-15. Analysis does more than simply restate facts. The analyst formulates
a hypothesis based on available data, assesses the situation, and explains
what the data means in logical terms that the user can understand. There
are two basic thought processes used by analysts to study problems and
reach conclusions: induction and deduction.
6 September 2006
12-4
________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
•
Induction is the process of formulating hypotheses on the basis of
observation or other evidence. It can best be characterized as a
process of discovery when the analyst is able to establish a
relationship between events under observation or study. Induction,
or plausible reasoning, normally precedes deduction and is the type
of reasoning analysts are required to perform most frequently.
•
Deduction is the process of reasoning from general rules to particular
cases. The analyst must draw out, or analyze, the premises to form a
conclusion. Deductive reasoning is sometimes referred to as
demonstrative reasoning because it is used to demonstrate the truth
or validity of a conclusion based on certain premises.
ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES AND TOOLS
12-16. There are three basic analytical techniques and automated tools that
are particularly useful to single-discipline HUMINT analysis. Each of these
tools takes fragmented bits of information and organizes them to create a
chart or graph that can easily be read. They are the time event chart,
matrices, and the link analysis diagram. HUMINT collectors and analysts
can use automated computer programs such as Analyst Notebook or Crime
Link to produce these tools or they can create them on paper. Computer
programs are faster to use than previous methods and have the added
advantage of producing a product that can be shared easily and rapidly over
networks and portals. The diagrams in this chapter represent the tools that
can be produced using automated programs.
Time Event Chart
12-17. A time event chart is a method for placing and representing individual
or group actions in chronological form. It uses symbols to represent events,
dates, and the flow of time. Normally, triangles are used to depict the
beginning and end of the chart and may be used within the chart to indicate
particularly critical events such as an ideological shift or change. Rectangles,
used as event nodes, store administrative data and indicate significant
events or activities. Drawing an “X†through the event node may highlight
noteworthy or important events. Each of these symbols contains a sequence
number, date (day, month, and year of the event), and may, if desired,
contain a file reference number. The incident description written below the
event node is a brief explanation of the incident and may include team size
and type of incident. Arrows indicate time flow. By using these symbols and
brief descriptions, it is possible to analyze the group's activities, transitions,
trends, and particularly operational patterns in both time and activity. If
desired, the event nodes may be color coded to indicate a particular event or
type of event to aid in pattern recognition. The time event chart is the best
analytical tool for pattern analysis. The example at Figure 12-1 depicts the
history of the group, including most major players, which carried out the
World Trade Center bombing in February 1993.
6 September 2006
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FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
Matrices
12-18. Construction of a matrix is the easiest and simplest way to show the
relationships between a number of similar or dissimilar associated items.
The items can be anything that is important to a collection effort such as
people, places, organizations, automobile license plates, weapons, telephone
numbers, or locations. In analysis, matrices are often used to identify “who
knows whom,†or “who has been where or done what†in a clear concise
manner. There are two types of matrices used in human analysis: the
association matrix, used to determine existence of relationships between
individual human beings, and the activities matrix, used to determine
connectivity between individuals and any organization, event, address,
activity, or any other non-personal entity. The graphics involved in
constructing the two types of matrices differ slightly, but the principles are
identical.
12-19. The association matrix (Figure 12-2) shows connections between key
individuals involved in any event or activity. It shows associations within a
group or associated activity. Normally, this type of matrix is constructed in
the form of an equilateral triangle having the same number of rows and
columns. Personalities must be listed in exactly the same order along both
the rows and columns to ensure that all possible associations are correctly
depicted. An alternate method is to list the names along the diagonal side of
the matrix. This type of matrix does not show the nature, degree, or duration
of a relationship, only that a relationship exists. The purpose of the matrix is
to show the analyst who knows whom and who are suspected to know whom.
In the event that a person of interest dies, a diamond is drawn next to his or
her name on the matrix.
12-20. The analyst uses a dot or closed (filled-in) circle to depict a strong or
known association. A known association is determined by direct contact
between one or more persons. Direct contact is determined by several factors.
Direct associations
include––
•
Face-to-face meetings.
•
Telephonic conversations in which the analyst is sure who was
conversing with whom.
•
Members of a cell or other group who are involved in the same
operations.
6 September 2006
12-6
________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
FBI arrest Siddig,
Sallah, Alvarez,
Kallafalla, and 5
Sundanese
24 JUN 93
19
Timing device
tested
27 MAY 93
15
Recon of Holland
and Lincoln tunnels
29 MAY 93
16
First batch of
ANFO mixed
19 JUN 93
17
Salem and Alvarez
attempt to buy guns
22 JUN 93
18
START
Rahman issued
FATWA against
President Sadat
1980
1
Rahman advisor
to Farag, Karam,
and two others
1980
2
President Sadat
assassinated by
Muslim B’Hood
OCT 81
3
Rahman leaves
Egypt for Sudan
1990
4
Rahman in US
control of NJ
Mosque
JUL 90
5
Rabbi Kahane
shot in NYC by
El Sayyid Nosair
1990
6
Rahman linked to
4 bombings in
Egypt
1990
7
Rahman issues
FATWA against
Mustafa Shalabi
JAN 91
8
Shalabi
assassinated
in Brooklyn
MAR 91
9
Rahman preaches
against Zionism
and Capitalism
1991 - 1992
10
WTC Bombing
26 FEB 93
11
Sallameh and
Elgabrowny
arrested
4-5 MAR 93
12
Initial planning for
UN bombing
7 MAY 93
13
Salem, Siddig, and
Hampton El include
Fed Bldg and
tunnels in plan
23 MAY 93
14
FBI arrest Siddig,
Sallah, Alvarez,
Kallafalla, and 5
Sundanese
24 JUN 93
19
FBI arrest Siddig,
Sallah, Alvarez,
Kallafalla, and 5
Sund
n
Holland
and Lincoln tunnels
Y 93
16
First batch of
ANFO mixed
Salem and Alvarez
attempt to buy guns
yid Nosair
Rahman linked to
4 bombings in
Egypt
Rahman issues
FATWA against
Mustafa Shalabi
91
8
Shalabi
assassinated
in Brooklyn
91
9
nn
anese
24 JUN 93
19
Timing device
tested
27 MAY 93
15
Reco of
29 MA
19 JUN 93
17
22 JUN 93
18
START
Rahman issued
FATWA against
President Sadat
1980
1
Rahman advisor
to Farag, Karam,
and two others
1980
2
President Sadat
assassinated by
Muslim B’Hood
OCT 81
3
Rahman leaves
Egypt for Sudan
1990
4
Rahman in US
control of NJ
Mosque
JUL 90
5
Rabbi Kahane
shot in NYC by
El Say
1990
6
1990
7
JAN
MAR
Rahman preaches
against Zionism
and Capitalism
1991 - 1992
10
WTC Bombing
26 FEB 93
11
Sallameh and
Elgabrowny
arrested
4-5 MAR 93
12
Initial planning for
UN bombing
7 MAY 93
13
Salem, Siddig, and
Hampton El include
Fed Bldg and
tunnels in plan
23 MAY 93
14
Timing device
tested
27 MAY 93
15
Timing device
tested
27 MAY 93
15
Reco of Holland
and Lincoln tunnels
29 MAY 93
16
Reco of Holland
and Lincoln tunnels
29 MAY 93
16
First batch of
ANFO mixed
19 JUN 93
17
First batch of
ANFO mixed
19 JUN 93
17
Salem and Alvarez
attempt to buy guns
22 JUN 93
18
Salem and Alvarez
attempt to buy guns
22 JUN 93
18
START
Rahman issued
FATWA against
President Sadat
1980
1
Rahman advisor
to Farag, Karam,
and two others
1980
2
President Sadat
assassinated by
Muslim B’Hood
OCT 81
3
Rahman leaves
Egypt for Sudan
1990
4
Rahman in US
control of NJ
Mosque
JUL 90
5
Rahman in US
control of NJ
Mosque
JUL 90
5
Rabbi Kahane
shot in NYC by
El Sayyid Nosair
1990
6
Rabbi Kahane
shot in NYC by
El Sayyid Nosair
1990
6
Rahman linked to
4 bombings in
Egypt
1990
7
Rahman linked to
4 bombings in
Egypt
1990
7
Rahman issues
FATWA against
Mustafa Shalabi
JAN 91
8
Rahman issues
FATWA against
Mustafa Shalabi
JAN 91
8
Shalabi
assassinated
in Brooklyn
MAR 91
9
Shalabi
assassinated
in Brooklyn
MAR 91
9
Rahman preaches
against Zionism
and Capitalism
1991 - 1992
10
WTC Bombing
26 FEB 93
11
Sallameh and
Elgabrowny
arrested
4-5 MAR 93
12
Initial planning for
UN bombing
7 MAY 93
13
Salem, Siddig, and
Hampton El include
Fed Bldg and
tunnels in plan
23 MAY 93
14
Figure 12-1. Example of a Time Event Chart.
12-21. Suspected or weak associations are those associations in which there
are indicators that individuals may have had associations but there is no way
to confirm that association; this is depicted with an open circle. Examples of
suspected associations
are––
•
A known party calling a known telephone number (the analyst knows
to whom the telephone number is listed) but it cannot be determined
with certainty who answered the call.
•
A face-to-face meeting where one party can be identified, but the
other party can only be tentatively identified.
12-22. The rationale for depicting suspected associations is to get as close as
possible to an objective analytic solution while staying as close as possible to
known or confirmed facts. If a suspected association is later confirmed, the
appropriate adjustment may be made on the association matrix. A secondary
reason for depicting suspected associations is that it may give the analyst a
focus for tasking limited intelligence collections assets in order to confirm the
suspected association. An important point to remember about using the
association matrix is that it will, without modification, show only the
6 September 2006
12-7
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
existence of relationships; not the nature, degree, or duration of those
relationships.
Al
b
e
rt
G
e
or
ge
He
rb
e
rt
Lu
dw
ig
W
ill
ia
m
Vi
ct
o
r
Mi
c
h
a
e
l
Ber
n
a
rd
Cl
a
re
n
c
e
Ju
lia
Fr
an
ci
s
Al
b
e
rt
G
e
or
ge
He
rb
e
rt
Lu
dw
ig
W
ill
ia
m
Vi
ct
o
r
Mi
c
h
a
e
l
Ber
n
a
rd
Cl
a
re
n
c
e
Ju
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Fr
an
ci
s
Al
b
e
rt
G
e
or
ge
He
rb
e
rt
Lu
dw
ig
W
ill
ia
m
Vi
ct
o
r
Mi
c
h
a
e
l
Ber
n
a
rd
Cl
a
re
n
c
e
Ju
lia
Fr
an
ci
s
Figure 12-2. Example of an Association Matrix.
12-23. The activities matrix (Figure 12-3) is a rectangular array of
personalities compared against activities, locations, events, or other
appropriate information. The kind and quality of data that is available to the
collector determines the number of rows and columns and their content. The
analyst may tailor the matrix to fit the needs of the problem at hand or he
may add to it as the problem expands in scope. This matrix normally is
constructed with personalities arranged in a vertical listing on the left side of
the matrix, and events, activities, organizations, addresses, or any other
common denominator arranged along the bottom of the matrix. This matrix
is critical for the study of a group’s internal and external activities, external
ties and linkages, and even modus operandi. As with the association matrix,
confirmed or “strong†associations between individuals and non-personal
entities are shown with a solid circle or dot, while suspected or “weakâ€
associations are illustrated by an open circle.
12-24. Using matrices, the analyst can pinpoint the optimal targets for
further intelligence collection, identify key personalities within an
organization, and considerably increase the analyst's understanding of an
organization and its structure. Matrices can be used to present briefings or to
store information in a concise and understandable manner within a database.
Matrices augment but cannot replace SOPs or standard database files. It is
possible, and sometimes productive, to use one matrix for all associations.
This is done routinely using the automated systems mentioned in paragraph
13-6.
6 September 2006
12-8
________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
Frankf
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Paris
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a
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Rome
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T
errace Clu
b
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b
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B e rn a rd
M ic h a e l
V ic to r
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G e o rg e
C la re n c e
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F ra n c is
Frankf
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mb
Paris
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kf
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Li
by
a
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ed Fi
g
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te
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Blue Flat
Frankf
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mb
Paris
F
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kf
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Li
by
a
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Blue Flat
Mo
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errace Clu
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M ic h a e l
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F ra n c is
Figure 12-3. Example of an Activities Matrix.
12-25. The link analysis diagram (Figure 12-4) shows the connections
between people, groups, or activities. The difference between matrices and
link analysis is roughly the same as the difference between a mileage chart
and a road map. The mileage chart (matrix) shows the connections between
cities using numbers to represent travel distances. The map (link analysis
diagram) uses symbols that represent cities, locations, and roads to show how
two or more locations are linked to each other.
6 September 2006
12-9
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
Hampton
El
Khalla-
Falla
Saleh
Zaid
Salem
Siddig
El
Hassan
Alvarez
Planned UN/FBI/Tunnel
Bombing – In Custody
Shalabi
Assn MAR 91
-
$
$
$
?
$
Hampton
El
Khalla-
Falla
Saleh
Zaid
Salem
Siddig
El
Hassan
Alvarez
Planned UN/FBI/Tunnel
Bombing – In Custody
Shalabi
Assn MAR 91
-
$
$
$
?
$
Hampton
El
Khalla-
Falla
Saleh
Zaid
Salem
Siddig
El
Hassan
Alvarez
Planned UN/FBI/Tunnel
Bombing – In Custody
Hampton
El
Khalla-
Falla
Saleh
Zaid
Salem
Siddig
El
Hassan
Alvarez
Hampton
El
Khalla-
Falla
Saleh
Zaid
Hampton
El
Khalla-
Falla
Saleh
Zaid
Salem
Siddig
Salem
Siddi
El
Hassan
Alvarez
g
El
Hassan
Alvarez
Planned UN/FBI/Tunnel
Bombing – In Custody
Shalabi
Assn MAR 91
Shalabi
Shalabi
Assn MAR 91
-
Abou-
Halima
Shaik
Rahman
FBI
4 Bomb Attacks in
Egypt 1990
Unk
Unk
Farag
Karam
Mrs.
Rahman
Egypt
Elgabr
Owny
?
Ayyad
Salameh
WTC
Bomb
German
Bank
Nossair
Kahane
Assassination
Yusef
Tvl to Iraq
Fall 1992
Iran
Hezbollah
$$
$
$
?
$
?
$
Figure 12-4. Example of a Link Analysis Diagram.
12-26. As with construction of association matrices, there are certain rules of
graphics, symbology, and construction that must be followed.
Standardization is critical to ensuring that everyone constructing, using, or
reading a link analysis diagram understands exactly what the diagram
depicts. Circles and lines are arranged so that no lines cross whenever
possible. Often, especially when dealing with large groups, it is very difficult
to construct a line diagram in which no lines cross. In these cases, every
effort should be made to keep the number of crossings at an absolute
minimum. The standard rules are as follows:
•
Persons are shown as open circles with the name written inside the
circle. Deceased persons are depicted in either open circles, with a
diamond next to the circle representing that person (as in
Figure 12-4) or as open diamonds with the name written inside the
diamond.
JONES
JONES
JONES
JONES
E
E
E
JON S
JON S
JON S
12-10
6 September 2006
RRRRTTTT
EEEER
RRR
RRRRTTTT
EEEER
RRR
________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
•
Persons known by more than one name (alias or AKA) are shown as
overlapping circles with names in each circle (as shown below) or
both names are simply listed in the same circle. If the alias is
suspected, a dotted line is used to depict the intersection. If the alias
is confirmed, the intersection is shown with a solid line.
BROWN GREEN
BROWN GREEN
BROWN GREEN
BROWN
BROWN GREEN
GREEN
OW
GREEN
OW
OW
OW
BR
N
BR
N GREEN
BR
N
BR
N GREEN
GREEN
•
Non-personal entities (organizations, governments, events, locations)
are shown as appropriately labeled rectangles.
MOSQUE
MOSQUE
•
Solid lines denote confirmed linkages or associations and dotted lines
show suspected linkages and associations.
CARTER
JONES
CARTER
=
=
=
JONES
CA
JO
NE
S
CA
JO
NE
S
CCA
JO
NE
S
A
JO
NE
S
CA
JO
NE
S
C
JO
NE
S
CCAA
JO
NE
S
A
JO
NE
S
=
=
=
•
Footnotes on the matrices can be shown as a brief legend on the
connectivity line.
=
=
=
3333
CARTER
CARTER
CA
R
CA
CA
CARTE
RTER
RTER
RTER
JONES
JONES
JO
JO
JO
JONES
NES
NES
NES
CCNY ’88 – ‘91
CCNY ’88 – ‘
C
C
91
CNY ’88 – ‘91
CNY ’88 – ‘91
3. Attended CCNY ’88-’91
3. Attended CCNY ’88-’91
•
Each person or non-personal entity is depicted only once in a link
analysis diagram.
6 September 2006
12-11
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
12-27. The following diagram shows only connectivity between persons:
12-28. The analyst can easily determine from the diagram that Alpha knows
A
B
C
D
E
Bravo, Bravo knows Charlie and Delta. Bravo is suspected of knowing Echo
and Charlie knows Delta, Bravo, and Echo. Although the same information
could be shown on a matrix, it is easier to understand when depicted on a
link analysis diagram. As situations or investigations become more complex,
the ease in understanding a link analysis diagram becomes more apparent.
In almost all cases, the available information is first depicted and analyzed
on both types of matrices, which are then used to construct a link analysis
diagram for further analysis.
12-29. Link analysis diagrams can show organizations, membership within
the organization, action teams or cells, or participants in an event. Since each
individual depicted on a link analysis diagram can be shown only once, and
some individuals may belong to more than one organization or take part in
more than one event, squares or rectangles representing non-personal
entities may have to overlap. The following illustration demonstrates that
Ralph and Fred are both members of the "Red Fighters," and that Fred also
is a member of the "Students for Peace." Further, since Ralph and Fred are
shown in the same “box,†it is a given that they are mutually associated.
S.F.P.
Red Fighters
Fred
Fred
Ralph
Ra
S.F.P.
lph
Bombing
Terrorist Group
Bombing
Terrorist Group
Ahmed
Terrorist
Training
Camp
Supporting
Government
12-30. There is more to overlapping organizations than is immediately
obvious. At first glance, the overlap indicates only that an individual may
belong to more than one organization or has taken part in multiple activities.
Further study and analysis would reveal connections between organizations,
connections between events, or connections between organizations and
events, either directly or through persons. The above diagram reveals a more
12-12
6 September 2006
________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
complex connection between organizations, personal connections, and
linkages.
12-31. The analysis diagram in paragraph 12-29 shows a connection between
organizations and events to which an individual belongs or is associated. In
this case, a national government runs a training camp for terrorists. Ahmed,
a member of the terrorist group, is associated with the training camp, and
participated in the bombing attack. From this diagram, one can link the
supporting government to the bombing through the camp and the
participant.
12-32. When, as is often the case, an organization or incident depicted in a
link analysis diagram contains the names of more than one individual, it is
not necessary to draw a solid line between those individuals to indicate
connectivity. It is assumed that individual members of the same cell or
participants in the same activity know each other, and the connection
between them is therefore implied. If the persons are
not
mutually
associated, they cannot be placed in the same “box.†Another solution must
be found to depict the situation; that is, show the persons as associated with
a subordinate or different organization or activity.
12-33. A final set of rules for link analysis diagrams concerns connectivity
between individuals who are not members of an organization or participants
in an activity, but who are somehow connected to that entity. Two
possibilities exist: First, the individual knows a member or members of the
organization but is not associated with the organization itself; or second, the
person is somehow connected with the organization or activity but cannot be
directly linked with any particular member of that entity.
12-34. In the first case, the connectivity line is drawn only between the
persons concerned as depicted here:
BROWN
CELL
JONES
SMITH
BROWN
BROWN
CELL
JONES
JONES
SMITH
SMITH
6 September 2006
12-13
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
12-35. In the second case, where Smith is associated with the entity, but not
the persons who are members of entity, the situation is shown as depicted
here:
BROWN
JONES
SMITH
CELL
12-36. The steps in constructing a link analysis diagram are as follows:
•
Step 1
. Raw data or fragments of information are organized into
logical order. Names of individuals, organizations, events, and
locations are compiled on appropriate lists. At this point, a time
event chart may be completed to assist in understanding the
information and to arrange events into chronological order.
•
Step 2
. Information is entered onto the appropriate matrices,
graphically displaying “who is associated with whom†and “who is
associated with what.â€
•
Step 3.
Drawing information from the database and intelligence
reports, and relationships from the matrices, the link analysis
diagram can be constructed. The best method to start the link
analysis diagram is to––
ƒ
Start with the association matrix and determine which person has
the greatest number of personal associations. Depict that person in
the center of the page.
SMITH
ƒ
Determine which person has the next highest number of personal
associations. Depict that person near the first person.
SMITH
JONES
12-14
6 September 2006
________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
12-37. Use the association matrix and show all confirmed and suspected
personal associations.
D
F
G
H
A
B
C
E
I
J
•
After all personal associations have been shown on the link analysis
diagram, the analyst uses the activities matrix to determine which
activities, organizations, or other non-personal entities need to be
depicted by appropriate rectangles. Having done so, the lines of
connectivity between persons within the rectangles may be removed
to prevent clutter. (It is assumed that participants in the same
activity or members of the same cell are acquainted.)
CELL 1
CELL 2
D
F
G
H
A
B
C
E
I
J
CELL 1
CELL 2
12-38. As shown in Figure 12-4, the link analysis diagram depicts the
membership, organization, activities, and connections of the group that,
under the leadership of Sheik Omar Abdul Rahman, carried out the bombing
of the World Trade Center in New York City and planned other bombing
attacks. Together with the time event chart (Figure 12-1), one can gain a
basic understanding of the group and its activities, and develop working
hypotheses for additional collection and analysis efforts.
12-39. After completion of the matrices and the link analysis diagram, the
analyst makes recommendations about the group’s structure, and areas can
be identified for further collection. Collection assets are employed to verify
suspected connections, ID key personalities, and substantiate or refute the
conclusions and assessments drawn from the link analysis that has been
done. The link analysis diagram and thorough analysis of the information it
contains can reveal a great deal about an organization. It can identify the
group’s leadership, its strong and weak points, and operational patterns. The
analyst can use these to predict future activities.
6 September 2006
12-15
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
OTHER ANALYSIS TOOLS
12-40. Pattern analysis is the process of deducing the doctrine and TTP that
threat forces prefer to employ by careful observation and evaluation of
patterns in its activities. This technique is based on the premise that threat
COAs reflect certain characteristic patterns that can be identified and
interpreted. Pattern analysis can be critically important when facing a threat
whose doctrine is unknown and it is necessary to create new threat model
and doctrinal templates. Three additional tools that can help the analyst to
determine operational patterns and create and update their threat model are
the coordinates register, pattern analysis plot sheet, and OB factors.
Coordinates Register
12-41. The coordinates register, or incident map, is one type of pattern
analysis tool (Figure 12-5). It illustrates cumulative events that have
occurred within the AO and focuses on the “where†of an event. The analyst
may use multiple coordinates registers that focus on a different subject or
blend subjects. Normally, the coordinates register includes additional
information such as notes or graphics. The analyst should use the
coordinates register in conjunction with the pattern analysis plot sheet.
Town of Macomb
Town of Macomb
Figure 12-5. Coordinates Register.
12-16
6 September 2006
ous
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27 28
29
30
31
________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
Pattern Analysis Plot Sheet
12-42. The analyst uses a pattern analysis plot sheet to focus on the time and
date of each serious incident that takes place within the AO (Figure 12-6)
The rings depict days of the month; the segments depict the hours of the day
As shown in the sheet’s legend, the event itself is identified by using an
alphanumeric designation and directly corresponds to the legend used on the
coordinates register. Another type of the pattern analysis plot sheet helps
distinguish patterns in activities that are tied to particular days, dates, or
times. When used in conjunction with the coordinates register and any
doctrinal templates, a pattern analysis plot sheet supplies the bulk of the
data needed to complete an event template.
ACTIVITY AND AREA: McDonough – Schuyler Province (Division AO)
ACTIVITY AND AREA: McDonough – Schuyler Province (Division AO)
KNOWN COVERAGE GAPS: Colchester, Quincy
KNOWN COVERAGE GAPS: Colchester, Quincy
MONTH and YEAR: 1 April 01
MONTH and YEAR: 1 April 01
LEGEND:
LEGEND:
R – Ambush
R – Ambush
B – Miscellane
B – Miscellaneous
L – Raid
L – Raid
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
1111
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
22
33
44
55
66
77
88
99
10
10
11
11
12
12
13
13
14
14
15
15
16
16
17
17
18
18
19
19
20
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27 28
29
30
31
21
23
24
25
26
27 28
29
30
21
21
21
22
31
22
23
24
25
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27 28
29
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31
22
22
23
23
24
24
25
25
26
26
27
27 28
28
29
29
30
30
31
31
NOTE: Daily journal number i
NOTE: Daily journal number i
NO
NO
s
TE: Daily journal number is
TE: Daily journal number is
listed on calendar (journa
listed on calendar (journa
lili
l
sted on calendar (journal
sted on calendar (journal
cross-references each incident to
cross-references each incident t
cr
cr
o
oss-references each incident to
oss-references each incident to
a coordinates register).
a coordinates register)
a co
a co
.
ordinates register).
ordinates register).
Figure 12-6. Pattern Analysis Plot Sheet.
6 September 2006
12-17
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
OB Factors
12-43. A final analytical tool is OB. The OB does not predict enemy
intentions or probable COAs but is a means of cataloging intelligence data
that qualifies and quantifies certain aspects of threat units. The analyst uses
nine factors shown in Table 12-1 to focus the analysis. These help the analyst
determine threat capabilities, vulnerabilities, and COAs. Although the
situation may dictate that one or more of the factors are given a higher
priority, generally speaking, they are all of equal importance. The OB
framework, while initially developed to support force-on-force offensive and
defensive operations, is easily adapted to support stability and reconstruction
operations and to depict “unconventional†forces or even civilian
organizations.
Table 12-1. Order of Battle Factors.
Factor Component
Composition
•
Unit
identification
•
Organization
Disposition
•
Geographical
Location
•
Tactical
Deployment
•
Movements
Strength
•
Personnel
•
Weapons and Equipment
•
Types of Units
Tactics
•
Tactical
Doctrine
•
Special
Operations
Training
•
Individual
•
Unit
•
Specialized
Logistics
•
Systems
•
Status
•
Funding
Combat Effectiveness
•
Combat
Experience
•
Morale
•
Tactics
•
Logistics
Electronic Technical Data/Emitter Nomenclature
•
Emitter
Type
•
Mode of Emission
•
Frequency
Range
•
Location Accuracy for Direction Finding
•
Associated Use (Units or Weapons)
Miscellaneous
•
Personalities/Leadership
•
Unit
History
•
Uniforms and Insignia
•
Code Names and Numbers
12-44. The OB is based on the premise that there are certain constants to
any group activity. All groups whether they are conventional military forces,
insurgent groups, or civilian organizations must have an organizational
structure (composition). This structure may not be easily discernable but it
will exist. Likewise, any organization has a location or locations in which it
operates, personnel and equipment numbers, a system for training, getting
supplies, judging efficiency and effectiveness of its operations, communi-
12-18
6 September 2006
________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
cating, and taking care of other intangibles such as morale. The OB gives the
analyst a framework to organize information. The analyst adapts the topic
headings to match the particular environment.
HUMINT SOURCE SELECTION
12-45. HUMINT source selection involves identifying, researching, and
actively locating a specific group, organization, or individual for the purpose
of collecting information in response to intelligence requirements. The
HUMINT source selection process includes the C/J/G/S2X, the HOC, the
HAT, the OMT, and the HCT. The source selection process allows the
HUMINT team leader to identify the most likely source of information,
eliminating the uncertainty of the access and placement of sources. Source
selection also helps optimize the HUMINT collection effort. Any individual,
group, organization, or agency that can be approached for information
regarding intelligence requirements is a potential source. Sources are chosen
according to their reliability, level of cooperation, and placement and access.
Selection is particularly important in stability and reconstruction operations
where the HUMINT collectors have access to a large potential source pool.
Source selection establishes which current sources can best answer
requirements and establishes source profiles to support the screening and
selection of new sources.
ESTABLISH DATABASES AND TARGET FOLDERS
12-46. The establishment of local databases, target folders, and personality
files is normally the responsibility of the OMT. This is done in coordination
with the supporting ACE or analysis control team (ACT). Databases are
required to manage the information. By using databases one can identify
gaps in the information. The HCT and OMT access higher databases through
intelligence reach to share and deconflict locally maintained data with higher
level databases. Local databases can be created and used to help track source
production, knowledge, reliability, and accuracy, and they simplify cross-
reference data that is of primarily local interest. It is ideal to review and
update databases at least weekly.
12-47. A target folder provides the collector with up-to-date intelligence
information about details of the target. It includes anything of HUMINT
value including biographies, descriptions, photographs, and previous
information reports. The information can be gained from the ACE or ACT,
past reports, INTSUMs, and databases; it can then be organized into easily
accessible automated folders. Information on people is categorized and
recorded in a personality file. The file serves as reference material for
collectors. Information on key military and civilian figures can be of
significant value when establishing unit or group identification, tactics, and
combat effectiveness. The file should not only provide information on
cultural, religious, tribal, political, military, criminal, and governmental
background but also contain specific personalities for collectors to focus their
collection effort on. This allows the collectors to concentrate on mission
planning and to conduct their mission rather than to research information.
6 September 2006
12-19
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
COMPARE SOURCE LIST WITH REQUIREMENTS
12-48. As target folders are compiled, a list of high-value sources will
emerge. It is a simple matter to compare the source list with the PIRs and/or
SIRs. This will lead to efficient and time-saving missions for the collectors.
Rather than spend time meeting with sources who may have information
concerning certain subjects, the HCT is able to tackle the collection process
with foresight. Upon receipt of the mission, the OMT conducts mission
analysis to determine the optimal way to meet mission requirements. Proper
mission analysis enables the collector to properly focus his assets (sources) to
gain the maximum amount of intelligence from those sources most likely to
possess the highest quality information.
12-49. The following products, which will focus the HCT’s collection efforts,
can be prepared in conjunction with the ACE and joint intelligence centers:
•
Time event charts.
•
Source coverage overlays or matrices (see Figure 12-7).
•
Link analysis diagrams.
•
HUMINT portions of OPORDs and situation reports.
12-50. The source coverage overlay or matrix helps tie in the source coverage
to the requirements. It also helps identify gaps in collection. A collection
matrix serves the same purpose. It supplies a quick reference when
answering intelligence requirements. The matrices must cover both the
geographical area and the placement and access of the source. A demographic
overlay helps to identify ethnic groups in an area and to track events and
patterns based on religious or ethnic differences. The overlay and matrix are
examples of how source coverage can be tied to intelligence requirements.
12-51. Source profiles are vital to screening sources for HUMINT collection
operations and to identifying personnel that might be of interest to other
agencies such as CI and TECHINT. As the situation changes, the HCT might
be tasked with new collection requirements that cannot be answered by the
current sources. The HCT is constantly looking for new and better sources.
When presented with new requirements, the OMT develops a source profile
of the type of individual that would most likely be able to provide the
information required. This profiling can include placement, access, age,
ethnic type, gender, location, occupation, and military specialty. The OMT
first searches through existing local databases to try to get a source match. If
not, it passes the profile to the HCTs along with the requirements to
facilitate their screening of potential sources.
12-20
6 September 2006
________________________________________________________________________________ FM 2-22.3
SOURCE
PLACEMENT/
ACCESS
GEOGRAPHICAL
AREA
PIR
1
PIR
2
PIR
3
PIR
4
PIR
6
PIR
5
0001
0002
0003
0004
Police
Municipal
Government
Political
Party 1
Political
Party 2
Village 1
Village 1 and
National
City 1 and 2
City 3 and 4
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Source
2
Source
1
Source
3
Source
4
SOURCE
PLACEMENT/
ACCESS
GEOGRAPHICAL
AREA
PIR
1
PIR
2
PIR
3
PIR
4
PIR
6
PIR
5
0001
0002
0003
0004
Police
Municipal
Government
Political
Party 1
Political
Party 2
Village 1
Village 1 and
National
City 1 and 2
City 3 and 4
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Source
2
Source
1
Source
3
Source
4
SOURCE
PLACEMENT/
ACCESS
GEOGRAPHICAL
AREA
PIR
1
PIR
2
PIR
3
PIR
4
PIR
6
PIR
5
00
SOURCE
PLACEMENT/
ACCESS
GEOGRAPHICA
01
0002
0003
0004
Police
Municipal
Government
Political
Party 1
Political
Party 2
Village 1
Village 1 and
National
City 1 and 2
City 3 and 4
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
L
AREA
PIR
1
PIR
2
PIR
3
PIR
4
PIR
6
PIR
5
0001
0002
0003
0004
Police
Municipal
Government
Political
Party 1
Political
Party 2
Village 1
Village 1 and
National
City 1 and 2
City 3 and 4
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Source
2
Source
1
Source
3
Source
4
Source
2
Source
1
Source
3
Source
4
Figure 12-7. Example of a Source Coverage Overlay or Matrix.
6 September 2006
12-21
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AUTOMATION
FM 2-22.3
Chapter 13
Automation and Communication
13-1.
Modern automation and communications systems are vital to
HUMINT collection. Real-time collaboration, detailed operational planning
and ISR integration, as well as enhanced collection and source exploitation
tools, must support team efforts. Emerging technology continues to allow
the entire HUMINT collection system to operate more effectively.
Commanders must be prepared to supply their HUMINT collection assets
with the best possible technology not only to enhance collection but also to
optimize the survivability of the collectors. (See Appendix L.) Commanders
may not be able to rely solely on standard military equipment but must be
prepared to bridge the inevitable technological development gap through
the identification and adaptation of commercially available products and
technologies. For specific system components and capabilities, see ST 2-50.
13-2.
HUMINT automation uses common hardware and software solutions
with a flexible interactive user interface to provide standardization of
equipment and processes across all operational environments and
conditions. HUMINT automation must be deployable and scalable to fit the
mission or force package. System components must be capable of
intelligence reach to support forward-deployed elements. HUMINT
automation allows integration and interaction with existing intelligence
operations, HUMINT operational systems, and databases. This integration
allows operations personnel and analysts to develop plans and levy
collection and operational requirements, as well as to manage, control,
analyze, and report the information collected. HUMINT automation—
•
Provides connectivity and reach capability between all echelons of
HUMINT activity.
•
Receives higher echelon requirements and transmits requests for
information.
•
Converts HUMINT reporting into formats for JTF or coalition task
force (CTF), theater, or national consumption.
•
Pushes requirements, requests, and plans for HUMINT operations in
theater as required.
•
Maintains the central HUMINT database for the theater or AO.
•
Leverages JTF or CTF, theater, and national level requirements and
products for strategic, operational, and tactical HUMINT assets in
theater.
6 September 2006
13-1
FM 2-22.3 ________________________________________________________________________________
•
Enables HUMINT to provide accurate and timely correlated
information to supported commanders through established reporting
channels.
•
Provides automated analysis tools.
13-3.
Systems such as Trusted Workstation (TWS) can convert HUMINT
reporting into formats for JTF or CTF, theater, or national consumption.
TWS can also connect between the SIPRNET and any lower level networks,
such as coalition, multinational, or NATO, or unclassified networks such as
NIPRNET or the Internet.
COLLECTION SUPPORT AUTOMATION REQUIREMENTS
BIOMETRICS
13-4.
Biometrics is the study of measurable biological characteristics. In
HUMINT collection, biometric devices, usually computer based, enable the
HUMINT collector to use biological data to support the collection and
analysis effort. Biometrics can also be used in non-HUMINT efforts to
collect and maintain evidence for criminal prosecution. The two major types
of biometric data that are useful to the HUMINT collector are identification
data and data that indicate source truthfulness. Identification devices use
biological information such as fingerprints, voiceprints, facial scans, and
retinal scans to match an individual to a source database. They can verify
the identity of a specific individual from the target population during
screening.
13-5.
HCTs may be equipped with portable equipment for collecting,
storing, analyzing, forwarding, and retrieving biometric information. The
BAT is able to identify personnel by using identifying characteristics of
their irises, fingerprints, or facial photograph. The structured query
language (SQL) server-based database links identifying characteristics
with all previous reports related to the person. Once a person’s identifying
characteristics are entered into the database, if that person is again
detained and scanned, the system has a probability of identifying them that
approaches 100 percent. This ability is especially useful for determining if
a source is providing the same information to multiple collectors; thereby
avoiding false confirmation of information. HUMINT collectors primarily
use BAT during screening operations at all echelons; from checkpoint
screening, to screening at a DCP, to screening at a JIDC. MPs use the
Detainee Reporting System (DRS) during in-processing at internment
facilities. The DRS records data for detainee processing and tracking and is
intended to interact with the BAT system to avoid duplication of effort.
13-6.
The hardware that makes up the system, which is given to MI teams,
consists of a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) semi-hardened laptop
computer running an operating system with a graphical user interface. It
has a camera and an iris scanner, each of which is portable and can be used
independent of the computer to collect and temporarily store information.
The system also includes a fingerprint scanner that conforms to FBI
requirements for admissible evidence. The fingerprint scanner must be
attached to the computer during use.
6 September 2006
13-2
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
13-7.
Biometric devices such as voice stress analyzer and polygraph support
the determination of the truthfulness of a source. The polygraph is of
limited usefulness in general HUMINT collection due to the level of
expertise needed to operate it and the lack of general availability of the
device to the field. As devices are developed that can remotely collect and
report information to the HUMINT collector on subtle changes in the
source’s respiration, heartbeat, perspiration, and eye movement that can be
indicators of deceit, they can be used to support HUMINT collection.
MACHINE TRANSLATION AND INTERPRETATION
13-8.
Understanding oral and written communication in a foreign language
is often the center of effective HUMINT collection operations. The optimal
solution is to have an individual who is a trained collector of native
proficiency, totally versed in the local situation and US requirements, with
the requisite security clearance, who is capable of reporting accurately in
English. Commanders’ access to such individuals is usually problematic.
This requirement is met through a combination of MI linguists, contractors,
native speakers within the DOD system, and locally hired civilian
translators. Difficulties arise if the proficiency levels of MI linguists are not
up to mission requirements, or if the linguists do not possess the proper
language for the theater of operation. Using locally hired translators raises
security problems. In light of these conditions, an increasingly viable
solution for the commander is the use of machine translation devices to
meet some of these requirements.
13-9.
Voice and text translation machines or software are critical in
augmenting available linguists. This includes natural language processing,
artificial intelligence, and optical character recognition (OCR) capabilities.
The basic application of machine translation, such as speech recognition
and OCRs, dramatically increases the speed of processing information.
Software programs are becoming widely available that allow a non-linguist
to determine the intelligence significance of a foreign document, aid
linguists with laborious tasks, and add consistency to human translation.
13-10.
Machine interpretation is the use of a machine to interpret the
spoken word between the HUMINT collectors and another individual
speaking a foreign language. Linguists are in high demand during
operations and usually limited in number. As machine interpretation
devices that address this problem become available to the field, they will
improve the communication ability of non-linguists.
ANALYTICAL AUTOMATION REQUIREMENTS
13-11.
The requirement for a robust HUMINT single-discipline analytical
capability extends through all echelons from national level to the OMTs.
Communication between HUMINT analysts at the operational level and
analysts at the staff level may best be accomplished through a web-based
communication capability. Web-based visual analytical tools allow maxi-
mum analyst participation in the development of products geared to
mission planning, targeting, and information analysis at all echelons.
6 September 2006
13-3
FM 2-22.3 ________________________________________________________________________________
Analytical products must be responsive to the special needs of a specific
collection operation, project, or element.
13-12.
HUMINT collectors run operations in terrain made up of persons,
organizations, and installations of interest. Intelligence analysis support
determines the specific terrain in each team area and how it differs from
one team’s named area of interest (NAI) to another. Specific products
include studies on nominated targets (persons, organizations, and
installations) and trends based on HUMINT reporting, as appropriate, and
visual analysis products (time event charts, matrices, link analysis
diagrams, and organizational diagrams).
AUTOMATED ANALYSIS TOOLS
13-13.
Automation of HUMINT analytical tools such as time event charts,
association matrices, activity matrices, and link analysis diagrams
dramatically increase predictive analysis capability. Automation saves
time and permits access to more complete information thus producing a
more accurate, timely product. Automated analysis techniques, aided by
computerized virtual-viewing programs, allow the analyst better battlefield
visualization. Automated analysis, linked to data and databases, includes
artificial intelligence programs. These programs assist the analyst in
developing predictions and identifying information gaps to support
targeting and collection. Automation and web-based tools allow the analyst
to
⎯
•
Track and cross-cue HUMINT reports.
•
Incorporate data extraction technology, retrieval, automated data
organization, content analysis, and visualization.
•
Share analytical conclusions with HUMINT teams and other
analysts in real time.
•
Apply multidimensional technologies, content analysis techniques,
and web-based collaborations.
•
Display analytical results and view HUMINT operations in real time.
•
Share resources such as models, queries, visualizations, map
overlays, geospatial images, and tool outputs through a common
interface.
•
Apply clustering (a nonlinear search that compiles the results based
on search parameters) and rapid spatial graphical and geographic
visualization tools to determine the meaning of large informational
streams.
•
Rapidly discover links, patterns, relationships, and trends in text to
use in predictive analysis.
•
Capture analytical conclusions and automatically transfer to
intelligence databases and systems.
6 September 2006
13-4
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
SEARCH ENGINES
13-14.
Search engines provide access to previously collected or known
information facilitating the development of comprehensive analytical and
intelligence products and avoiding unnecessary collection tasking
redundancy. A tool set for data visualization, search, and discovery is
required, which is embedded with several software programs for
manipulating data from multiple databases. The types of modules in
visualization packages should include search engines and knowledge
discovery (semantic clustering) for unformatted data, applications for
extracting and organizing formatted data, and data labeling. The package
should also include a model building tool to enable users to make their
archives more efficient with respect to search, retrieval, and compatibility
to other applications as well as archiving and maintenance tools to support
what will eventually become a large data warehouse. Search engines
should be
⎯
•
Multilingual and able to query multiple classified and unclassified
databases.
•
Capable of developing, querying, and manipulating stored
information.
WEB-BASED REPORTING AND PORTALS
13-15.
Web-based reporting employs current Internet portal technology. The
web-based portal is an efficient and effective means of developing a
repository of HUMINT information. It employs an interactive graphic
interface using client browser technology, search engines, hyperlinks, and
intelligent software agents for searching, finding, viewing, and maintaining
databases and supporting HUMINT work, data, and information flows. It
supports collaborative analysis at multiple echelons through connectivity
on the SIPRNET. The following pertains to web-based reporting:
•
Web-based databases work with any computer hardware, operating
system, or software and can be made accessible through web portals.
•
Firewalls and information access are controlled at each level with an
approving systems administrator at each level conducting quality
control through release authority procedures.
•
Graphic user interface uses standard Army and DOD report formats.
•
Graphic user interface walks the user through a critical task and is
able to identify Army and DOD reports as required. Reports must be
Army and DOD platform compatible and transferable through and to
their respective systems.
•
Multimedia supports applications for attaching, associating, and
hyperlinking video, still photographs, voice, scanned objects,
graphics, and maps to records and files.
13-16.
Web-based reporting and web pages developed for specific products
allow the user to
⎯
•
Leverage their effort and expertise against all requirements, not just
the ones that must be met immediately.
6 September 2006
13-5
FM 2-22.3 ________________________________________________________________________________
•
Identify timely intelligence gaps and the leads to fill those gaps.
•
Ensure immediate analytical feedback on collector reports to—
ƒ
Post questions directly to a web page to enable all HCTs to answer
or be cued to the specific request.
ƒ
Identify or request clarification on questionable data for quality
control.
•
Fuse HUMINT information and all-source information as required.
•
Focus collection teams supporting maneuver commanders’
requirements more effectively.
•
Immediately extract information for crisis reaction.
13-17.
If HCTs use web portals to submit reports directly to theater level,
they must also send the reports through their OMT for submission to the
2X. Failure to do so may deny the 2X the ability to deconflict and cross-
reference reports. HUMINT collectors must ensure that they follow the
theater-specific methodology for access to the theater web portal.
DATABASES
13-18.
Without databases, information is difficult or impossible to retrieve
quickly, especially under adverse conditions. Databases allow access to
data in a distributed environment and support many complex HUMINT
functions and requirements, including—
•
Mission deconfliction.
•
RM.
•
RFIs.
•
HUMINT analysis.
•
Summary, report, and assessment preparation.
•
Threat and friendly situation tracking.
•
Targeting.
13-19.
Databases interact with other tools to support predictive analysis,
prepare graphic analytical products, and provide situational understanding
down to the HCT. These databases
⎯
•
Support time event charts, association matrices, link analysis, and
other analysis tools.
•
Require a designated systems administrator at each. To ensure a
high degree of integrity, discrepancies must be verified for accuracy.
•
Allow operators, managers, and analysts to—
ƒ
Compartment (protect) source-sensitive operational database
segments, files, records, and fields.
ƒ
Create, update, and maintain databases from locally generated
information.
ƒ
Import complete or partial databases from larger or peer databases.
ƒ
Export complete or partial databases to peer or larger databases.
6 September 2006
13-6
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
ƒ
Share data and databases between peers, subordinates, or higher
with appropriate access authorization.
•
Provide systematic processing and automated parsing using
standardized forms in intelligence operations, which are
automatically parsed into appropriate databases for information
storing, sharing, retrieval, and analysis.
•
Allow query functions for decisionmaking as well as operational and
analytical support.
•
Provide analytical programs able to correlate data that facilitate
information retrieval from any data repository.
•
Incorporate information retrieval functions such as browsing (that is,
point and click), key word searching, concepts, and similar functions.
•
Support a suite of specialized decision support software (DSS)—a set
of tools which supports HUMINT source administration, analysis,
and risk management decisions. DSS tools should produce a set of
HUMINT reports specifically tailored to the HUMINT
decisionmaking, analysis, and assessment process.
13-20.
HARMONY is the national intelligence database for foreign DOCEX
and translations management. HARMONY is the single, comprehensive
bibliographic reference for all available primary source foreign technical
and military documents and their translations. This single database
concept eliminates duplicate collection, translation, and reporting of
primary source foreign technical and military documents and greatly
streamlines the process of providing exploited documents to consumers.
The HARMONY database application uses the DOD Information
Infrastructure (DII) Common Operating Environment (COE) guidance. The
HARMONY database is web-enabled and can be readily accessed, easily
used, and responsive to the needs of analysts and other consumers within
the US Government community.
AUTOMATION SYSTEMS
13-21.
The HUMINT collection automation systems are normally shared
systems used by both the HUMINT and CI communities. They must have
connectivity with lateral units as well as higher and subordinate elements.
C/J/G/S2X, HOC, AND HAT AUTOMATION REQUIREMENTS
13-22.
The HUMINT staff elements need to receive input from the OMTs
and HCTs as well as input from higher and lateral echelons. They must be
able to conduct HUMINT planning, RM, and report dissemination. They
must transmit technical support information, interface with ACE and
automated analysis systems, manipulate HUMINT databases, conduct
reach, and have access to HUMINT analytical tools.
6 September 2006
13-7
FM 2-22.3 ________________________________________________________________________________
OMT AND COLLECTION TEAM LEADER REQUIREMENTS
13-23.
The OMT must be able to track teams and team members; receive
and transmit data including graphic data to and from higher, lateral, and
lower HUMINT elements; create, receive, edit, and transmit reports;
conduct single-discipline HUMINT analysis; receive and transmit technical
support information and tasking information; conduct reach; and conduct
mission planning.
INDIVIDUAL COLLECTOR AUTOMATION REQUIREMENTS
13-24.
The key to effective HUMINT collection is unimpeded communication
between the collector and the source of information. Any technological
support to HUMINT collection must be as unobtrusive as possible to
minimize the intimidation factor when dealing with human sources. The
individual collector must be able to––
•
Record (both video and voice) conversations with sources.
•
Scan, translate, and transmit documents and photographs.
•
Instantaneously locate themselves in both rural and urban
environments.
•
Immediately access local, theater, and even national level databases.
•
Communicate instantaneously with other team elements.
HUMINT AND CI WORKSTATION REQUIREMENTS
13-25.
The CI and HUMINT teams have organic computer and data
processing equipment. These workstations provide HUMINT and CI teams
with both productivity and management and analysis tools. They also
provide SIPRNET connectivity and processing capability to identify
requirements and facilitate reporting into other DOD systems as required.
The HUMINT and CI workstation is able to use standard Army, DOD, and
HUMINT and CI reporting programs, standard symbols, programs to
produce map overlays, and map plotting software; all of which are included.
13-26.
Teams use workstations to—
•
Provide quality control and dissemination of reports from the
subordinate HCTs.
•
Direct activities of subordinate HCTs and provide management to
them.
•
Perform single-discipline HUMINT analysis for the supported
commander.
•
Transmit intelligence and administrative reports in NRT to higher
headquarters.
•
Receive tasking and administrative reports from higher headquarters
and distribute to HCTs as required.
•
Consolidate local databases and provide database input to higher
headquarters.
•
Receive database and digital information from higher headquarters
and pass to lower and vice versa.
6 September 2006
13-8
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
COMMUNICATIONS
13-27.
Successful HUMINT operations must be supported by multi-echelon
technical control and a communications system that provides internal team
communications, links HCTs to OMTs, and links OMTs to higher
headquarters, analytical elements, and theater and national agencies.
COMMUNICATION ARCHITECTURE
13-28.
The HUMINT collection architecture requires operation on several
communications and processing nets. These nets provide the framework
needed to coordinate the tasking, reporting, C2, and service support of
HUMINT collection units spread across the width and depth of the
battlefield. Under most operational scenarios, HCTs are not stationary.
They are constantly moving throughout their supported command’s AO and
are able to communicate on the move. They cannot rely on fixed
communications nodes for support. Communications redundancy ensures
the loss of any one system does not severely disrupt HUMINT operations.
HCTs and OMTs normally operate at the collateral security level to ensure
the timely dissemination of combat information and targeting data to
organizations operating outside MI channels. The C/J/G/S2X normally
requires access to Top Secret (SCI) communications capabilities to maintain
coordination with national level agencies.
13-29.
The HUMINT collection assets use three basic communications nets:
the operations and intelligence (O/I) net, a command net, and a HUMINT-
specific technical net. Dependent on their mission and battlefield location,
the HCTs may also need to monitor the fire support element (FSE),
aviation, or air defense artillery (ADA) communications nets.
•
The O/I net links the collectors and producers of intelligence to the
consumers of the intelligence information. It is used to pass
information of immediate value to the affected unit and to analytical
elements at the supported unit.
•
The command nets exist at every echelon of command. They link the
superior headquarters with its subordinate elements. Normally a
unit will operate on two command nets; the one that links that unit
to its higher headquarters and the one that links that unit to its
subordinate elements. HUMINT elements will also use their unit’s
command net to coordinate logistic and administrative support.
•
The technical nets link the control team to all of their subordinate
collection teams and to the centers or organizations that provide the
databases and technical guidance necessary for single-discipline
collection and analysis. For example, the technical net would connect
HCTs through their control teams to the S2X and higher echelon
HUMINT analysis organizations.
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FM 2-22.3 ________________________________________________________________________________
MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS REQUIREMENTS
13-30.
HUMINT mobile communications requirements augment the
network connectivity that elements should have when at a base camp or
facility; they vary with each element’s mission and location as follows:
•
Individual HUMINT collectors must maintain communications
capability with the other team members and the team leader while
dismounted. HUMINT collectors, especially when supporting offensive
and defensive operations, may be deployed as individuals. They need
to maintain contact with their team leader for technical and
operational support.
•
The HCT may operate anywhere within the supported unit’s AO.
They may operate mounted or dismounted. If supporting airmobile,
airborne, amphibious, or other mobile operations, they may not have
access to their vehicle-mounted communications systems for the
critical early stages of these operations. They receive and report
operational and technical information, as well as report intelligence
information to the OMT using their unit’s command net. They
monitor their superior unit’s O/I net. If in DS to a maneuver
element, they also monitor the command net of the unit they are
supporting.
•
OMTs normally operate on the superior unit O/I net, their unit C2
net, and the HUMINT technical net. If the OMT is in DS, it must
also operate on the C2 net of the supported unit.
•
The C/J/G/S2X operates on the C2 net, monitors the O/I net, and
controls its echelon HUMINT technical net. The 2X needs secure
(SCI) communications capability to coordinate operations and pass
data between themselves and higher HUMINT organizations.
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Appendix A
Geneva Conventions
SECTION I. GENEVA CONVENTIONS RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF
PRISONERS OF WAR (THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION)
The articles in this section are extracted from the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949.
PART I GENERAL PROVISIONS
ARTICLE 1
The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present
Convention in all circumstances.
ARTICLE 2
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace time, the present Convention
shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between
two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of
them.
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a
High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention, the Powers
who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall
furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts and
applies the provisions thereof.
ARTICLE 3
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of
the High Contracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum,
the following provisions:
1. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who
have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or
any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse
distinction founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar
criteria. To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in
any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
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(a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel
treatment and torture;
(b) Taking of hostages;
(c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment;
(d) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment
pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
2. The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may
offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavor to bring into force, by means of special
agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the
conflict.
ARTICLE 4
A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging to one of the
following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy:
1. Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members of militias or
volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.
2. Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of
organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or
outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or
volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfill the following
conditions:
(a) That of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) That of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) That of carrying arms openly;
(d) That of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.
3. Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority
not recognized by the Detaining Power.
4. Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof, such as
civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members
of labor units or of services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that they
have received authorization from the armed forces which they accompany, who shall provide
them for that purpose with an identity card similar to the annexed model.
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5. Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices, of the merchant marine and
the crews of civil aircraft of the Parties to the conflict, who do not benefit by more favorable
treatment under any other provisions of international law.
6. Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously
take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into
regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of
war.
B. The following shall likewise be treated as prisoners of war under the present Convention:
1. Persons belonging, or having belonged, to the armed forces of the occupied country, if the
occupying Power considers it necessary by reason of such allegiance to intern them, even
though it has originally liberated them while hostilities were going on outside the territory it
occupies, in particular where such persons have made an unsuccessful attempt to rejoin the
armed forces to which they belong and which are engaged in combat, or where they fail to
comply with a summons made to them with a view to internment.
2. The persons belonging to one of the categories enumerated in the present Article, who have
been received by neutral or non-belligerent Powers on their territory and whom these Powers
are required to intern under international law, without prejudice to any more favorable
treatment which these Powers may choose to give and with the exception of Articles 8, 10, 15,
30, fifth paragraph, 58-67, 92, 126 and, where diplomatic relations exist between the Parties
to the conflict and the neutral or non-belligerent Power concerned, those Articles concerning
the Protecting Power. Where such diplomatic relations exist, the Parties to a conflict on whom
these persons depend shall be allowed to perform towards them the functions of a Protecting
Power as provided in the present Convention, without prejudice to the functions which these
Parties normally exercise in conformity with diplomatic and consular usage and treaties.
C. This Article shall in no way affect the status of medical personnel and chaplains as provided
for in Article 33 of the present Convention.
ARTICLE 5
The present Convention shall apply to the persons referred to in Article 4 from the time they fall
into the power of the enemy and until their final release and repatriation.
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and having
fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such
persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has
been determined by a competent tribunal.
ARTICLE 6
In addition to the agreements expressly provided for in Articles 10, 23, 28, 33, 60, 65, 66, 67, 72,
73, 75, 109, 110, 118, 119, 122 and 132, the High Contracting Parties may conclude other special
agreements for all matters concerning which they may deem it suitable to make separate
provision. No special agreement shall adversely affect the situation of prisoners of war, as
defined by the present Convention, nor restrict the rights which it confers upon them.
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Prisoners of war shall continue to have the benefit of such agreements as long as the Convention
is applicable to them, except where express provisions to the contrary are contained in the
aforesaid or in subsequent agreements, or where more favorable measures have been taken with
regard to them by one or other of the Parties to the conflict.
ARTICLE 7
Prisoners of war may in no circumstances renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured to
them by the present Convention, and by the special agreements referred to in the foregoing
Article, if such there be.
ARTICLE 8
The present Convention shall be applied with the cooperation and under the scrutiny of the
Protecting Powers whose duty it is to safeguard the interests of the Parties to the conflict. For
this purpose, the Protecting Powers may appoint, apart from their diplomatic or consular staff,
delegates from amongst their own nationals or the nationals of other neutral Powers. The said
delegates shall be subject to the approval of the Power with which they are to carry out their
duties.
The Parties to the conflict shall facilitate to the greatest extent possible the task of the
representatives or delegates of the Protecting Powers.
The representatives or delegates of the Protecting Powers shall not in any case exceed their
mission under the present Convention. They shall, in particular, take account of the imperative
necessities of security of the State wherein they carry out their duties.
ARTICLE 9
The provisions of the present Convention constitute no obstacle to the humanitarian activities
which the International Committee of the Red Cross or any other impartial humanitarian
organization may, subject to the consent of the Parties to the conflict concerned, undertake for
the protection of prisoners of war and for their relief.
ARTICLE 10
The High Contracting Parties may at any time agree to entrust to an organization which offers
all guarantees of impartiality and efficacy the duties incumbent on the Protecting Powers by
virtue of the present Convention.
When prisoners of war do not benefit or cease to benefit, no matter for what reason, by the
activities of a Protecting Power or of an organization provided for in the first paragraph above,
the Detaining Power shall request a neutral State, or such an organization, to undertake the
functions performed under the present Convention by a Protecting Power designated by the
Parties to a conflict.
If protection cannot be arranged accordingly, the Detaining Power shall request or shall accept,
subject to the provisions of this Article, the offer of the services of a humanitarian organization,
such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, to assume the humanitarian functions
performed by Protecting Powers under the present Convention.
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Any neutral Power or any organization invited by the Power concerned or offering itself for these
purposes, shall be required to act with a sense of responsibility towards the Party to the conflict
on which persons protected by the present Convention depend, and shall be required to furnish
sufficient assurances that it is in a position to undertake the appropriate functions and to
discharge them impartially.
No derogation from the preceding provisions shall be made by special agreements between
Powers one of which is restricted, even temporarily, in its freedom to negotiate with the other
Power or its allies by reason of military events, more particularly where the whole, or a
substantial part, of the territory of the said Power is occupied.
Whenever in the present Convention mention is made of a Protecting Power, such mention
applies to substitute organizations in the sense of the present Article.
ARTICLE 11
In cases where they deem it advisable in the interest of protected persons, particularly in cases of
disagreement between the Parties to the conflict as to the application or interpretation of the
provisions of the present Convention, the Protecting Powers shall lend their good offices with a
view to settling the disagreement.
For this purpose, each propose to the Parties of the Protecting Powers may, either at the
invitation of one Party or on its own initiative, to the conflict a meeting of their representatives,
and in particular of the authorities responsible for prisoners of war, possibly on neutral territory
suitably chosen. The Parties to the conflict shall be bound to give effect to the proposals made to
them for this purpose. The Protecting Powers may, if necessary, propose for approval by the
Parties to the conflict a person belonging to a neutral Power, or delegated by the International
Committee of the Red Cross, who shall be invited to take part in such a meeting.
PART II GENERAL PROTECTION OF PRISONERS OF WAR
ARTICLE 12
Prisoners of war are in the hands of the enemy Power, but not of the individuals or military units
who have captured them. Irrespective of the individual responsibilities that may exist, the
Detaining Power is responsible for the treatment given them.
Prisoners of war may only be transferred by the Detaining Power to a Power which is a party to
the Convention and after the Detaining Power has satisfied itself of the willingness and ability of
such transferee Power to apply the Convention. When prisoners of war are transferred under
such circumstances, responsibility for the application of the Convention rests on the Power
accepting them while they are in its custody.
Nevertheless if that Power fails to carry out the provisions of the Convention in any important
respect, the Power by whom the prisoners of war were transferred shall, upon being notified by
the PROTECTING Power, take effective measures to correct the situation or shall request the
return of the prisoners of war. Such requests must be complied with.
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ARTICLE 13
Prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated. Any unlawful act or omission by the
Detaining Power causing death or seriously endangering the health of a prisoner of war in its
custody is prohibited, and will be regarded as a serious breach of the present Convention. In
particular, no prisoner of war may be subjected to physical mutilation or to medical or scientific
experiments of any kind which are not justified by the medical, dental or hospital treatment of
the prisoner concerned and carried out in his interest.
Likewise, prisoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of violence or
intimidation and against insults and public curiosity.
Measures of reprisal against prisoners of war are prohibited.
ARTICLE 14
Prisoners of war are entitled in all circumstances to respect for their persons and their honor.
Women shall be treated with all the regard due to their sex and shall in all cases benefit by
treatment as favorable as that granted to men. Prisoners of war shall retain the full civil
capacity which they enjoyed at the time of their capture. The Detaining Power may not restrict
the exercise, either within or without its own territory, of the rights such capacity confers except
in so far as the captivity requires.
ARTICLE 15
The Power detaining prisoners of war shall be bound to provide free of charge for their
maintenance and for the medical attention required by their state of health.
ARTICLE 16
Taking into consideration the provisions of the present Convention relating to rank and sex, and
subject to any privileged treatment which may be accorded to them by reason of their state of
health, age or professional qualifications, all prisoners of war shall be treated alike by the
Detaining Power, without any adverse distinction based on race, nationality, religious belief or
political opinions, or any other distinction founded on similar criteria.
PART III CAPTIVITY
SECTION I BEGINNING OF CAPTIVITY
ARTICLE 17
Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his surname, first
names and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal or serial number, or failing this,
equivalent information. If he willfully infringes this rule, he may render himself liable to a
restriction of the privileges accorded to his rank or status.
Each Party to a conflict is required to furnish the persons under its jurisdiction who are liable to
become prisoners of war, with an identity card showing the owner's surname, first names, rank,
army, regimental, personal or serial number or equivalent information, and date of birth. The
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identity card may, furthermore, bear the signature or the fingerprints, or both, of the owner, and
may bear, as well, any other information the Party to the conflict may wish to add concerning
persons belonging to its armed forces. As far as possible the card shall measure 6.5 x 10 cm. and
shall be issued in duplicate. The identity card shall be shown by the prisoner of war upon
demand, but may in no case be taken away from him.
No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of
war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to
answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous
treatment of any kind.
Prisoners of war who, owing to their physical or mental condition, are unable to state their
identity, shall be handed over to the medical service. The identity of such prisoners shall be
established by all possible means, subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraph.
The questioning of prisoners of war shall be carried out in a language which they understand.
ARTICLE 18
All effects and articles of personal use, except arms, horses, military equipment and military
documents shall remain in the possession of prisoners of war, likewise their metal helmets and
gas masks and like articles issued for personal protection. Effects and articles used for their
clothing or feeding shall likewise remain in their possession, even if such effects and articles
belong to their regulation military equipment.
At no time should prisoners of war be without identity documents. The Detaining Power shall
supply such documents to prisoners of war who possess none.
Badges of rank and nationality, decorations and articles having above all a personal or
sentimental value may not be taken from prisoners of war.
Sums of money carried by prisoners of war may not be taken away from them except by order of
an officer, and after the amount and particulars of the owner have been recorded in a special
register and an itemized receipt has been given, legibly inscribed with the name, rank and unit
of the person issuing the said receipt. Sums in the currency of the Detaining Power, or which are
changed into such currency at the prisoner's request, shall be placed to the credit of the
prisoner's account as provided in Article 64.
The Detaining Power may withdraw articles of value from prisoners of war only for reasons of
security; when such articles are withdrawn, the procedure laid down for sums of money
impounded shall apply.
Such objects, likewise the sums taken away in any currency other than that of the Detaining
Power and the conversion of which has not been asked for by the owners, shall be kept in the
custody of the Detaining Power and shall be returned in their initial shape to prisoners of war at
the end of their captivity.
ARTICLE 19
Prisoners of war shall be evacuated, as soon as possible after their capture, to camps situated in
an area far enough from the combat zone for them to be out of danger.
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Only those prisoners of war who, owing to wounds or sickness, would run greater risks by being
evacuated than by remaining where they are, may be temporarily kept back in a danger zone.
Prisoners of war shall not be unnecessarily exposed to danger while awaiting evacuation from a
fighting zone.
ARTICLE 20
The evacuation of prisoners of war shall always be effected humanely and in conditions similar
to those for the forces of the Detaining Power in their changes of station.
The Detaining Power shall supply prisoners of war who are being evacuated with sufficient food
and potable water, and with the necessary clothing and medical attention. The Detaining Power
shall take all suitable precautions to ensure their safety during evacuation, and shall establish
as soon as possible a list of the prisoners of war who are evacuated.
If prisoners of war must, during evacuation, pass through transit camps, their stay in such
camps shall be as brief as possible.
SECTION II INTERNMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR
CHAPTER I GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
ARTICLE 21
The Detaining Power may subject prisoners of war to internment. It may impose on them the
obligation of not leaving, beyond certain limits, the camp where they are interned, or if the said
camp is fenced in, of not going outside its perimeter. Subject to the provisions of the present
Convention relative to penal and disciplinary sanctions, prisoners of war may not be held in close
confinement except where necessary to safeguard their health and then only during the
continuation of the circumstances which make such confinement necessary.
Prisoners of war may be partially or wholly released on parole or promise, in so far as is allowed
by the laws of the Power on which they depend. Such measures shall be taken particularly in
cases where this may contribute to the improvement of their state of health. No prisoner of war
shall be compelled to accept liberty on parole or promise.
Upon the outbreak of hostilities, each Party to the conflict shall notify the adverse Party of the
laws and regulations allowing or forbidding its own nationals to accept liberty on parole or
promise. Prisoners of war who are paroled or who have given their promise in conformity with
the laws and regulations so notified, are bound on their personal honor scrupulously to fulfil,
both towards the Power on which they depend and towards the Power which has captured them,
the engagements of their paroles or promises. In such cases, the Power on which they depend is
bound neither to require nor to accept from them any service incompatible with the parole or
promise given.
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ARTICLE 22
Prisoners of war may be interned only in premises located on land and affording every guarantee
of hygiene and healthfulness. Except in particular cases which are justified by the interest of the
prisoners themselves, they shall not be interned in penitentiaries.
Prisoners of war interned in unhealthy areas, or where the climate is injurious for them, shall be
removed as soon as possible to a more favorable climate.
The Detaining Power shall assemble prisoners of war in camps or camp compounds according to
their nationality, language and customs, provided that such prisoners shall not be separated
from prisoners of war belonging to the armed forces with which they were serving at the time of
their capture, except with their consent.
ARTICLE 23
No prisoner of war may at any time be sent to or detained in areas where he may be exposed to
the fire of the combat zone, nor may his presence be used to render certain points or areas
immune from military operations.
Prisoners of war shall have shelters against air bombardment and other hazards of war, to the
same extent as the local civilian population. With the exception of those engaged in the
protection of their quarters against the aforesaid hazards, they may enter such shelters as soon
as possible after the giving of the alarm. Any other protective measure taken in favor of the
population shall also apply to them.
Detaining Powers shall give the Powers concerned, through the intermediary of the Protecting
Powers, all useful information regarding the geographical location of prisoner of war camps.
Whenever military considerations permit, prisoner of war camps shall be indicated in the
daytime by the letters PW or PG, placed so as to be clearly visible from the air. The Powers
concerned may, however, agree upon any other system of marking. Only prisoner of war camps
shall be marked as such.
ARTICLE 24
Transit or screening camps of a permanent kind shall be fitted out under conditions similar to
those described in the present Section, and the prisoners therein shall have the same treatment
as in other camps.
CHAPTER II QUARTERS, FOOD AND CLOTHING OF PRISONERS OF
WAR
ARTICLE 25
Prisoners of war shall be quartered under conditions as favorable as those for the forces of the
Detaining Power who are billeted in the same area. The said conditions shall make allowance for
the habits and customs of the prisoners and shall in no case be prejudicial to their health.
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The foregoing provisions shall apply in particular to the dormitories of prisoners of war as
regards both total surface and minimum cubic space, and the general installations, bedding and
blankets.
The premises provided for the use of prisoners of war individually or collectively, shall be
entirely protected from dampness and adequately heated and lighted, in particular between dusk
and lights out. All precautions must be taken against the danger of fire.
In any camps in which women prisoners of war, as well as men, are accommodated, separate
dormitories shall be provided for them.
ARTICLE 26
The basic daily food rations shall be sufficient in quantity, quality and variety to keep prisoners
of war in good health and to prevent loss of weight or the development of nutritional deficiencies.
Account shall also be taken of the habitual diet of the prisoners.
The Detaining Power shall supply prisoners of war who work with such additional rations as are
necessary for the labor on which they are employed.
Sufficient drinking water shall be supplied to prisoners of war. The use of tobacco shall be
permitted.
Prisoners of war shall, as far as possible, be associated with the preparation of their meals; they
may be employed for that purpose in the kitchens. Furthermore, they shall be given the means of
preparing, themselves, the additional food in their possession.
Adequate premises shall be provided for messing.
Collective disciplinary measures affecting food are prohibited.
ARTICLE 27
Clothing, underwear and footwear shall be supplied to prisoners of war in sufficient quantities
by the Detaining Power, which shall make allowance for the climate of the region where the
prisoners are detained. Uniforms of enemy armed forces captured by the Detaining Power
should, if suitable for the climate, be made available to clothe prisoners of war.
The regular replacement and repair of the above articles shall be assured by the Detaining
Power. In addition, prisoners of war who work shall receive appropriate clothing, wherever the
nature of the work demands.
ARTICLE 28
Canteens shall be installed in all camps, where prisoners of war may procure foodstuffs, soap
and tobacco and ordinary articles in daily use. The tariff shall never be in excess of local market
prices. The profits made by camp canteens shall be used for the benefit of the prisoners; a special
fund shall be created for this purpose. The prisoners' representative shall have the right to
collaborate in the management of the canteen and of this fund.
When a camp is closed down, the credit balance of the special fund shall be handed to an
international welfare organization, to be employed for the benefit of prisoners of war of the same
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nationality as those who have contributed to the fund. In case of a general repatriation, such
profits shall be kept by the Detaining Power, subject to any agreement to the contrary between
the Powers concerned
CHAPTER III HYGIENE AND MEDICAL ATTENTION
ARTICLE 29
The Detaining Power shall be bound to take all sanitary measures necessary to ensure the
cleanliness and healthfulness of camps and to prevent epidemics.
Prisoners of war shall have for their use, day and night, conveniences which conform to the rules
of hygiene and are maintained in a constant state of cleanliness. In any camps in which women
prisoners of war are accommodated, separate conveniences shall be provided for them.
Also, apart from the baths and showers with which the camps shall be furnished, prisoners of
war shall be provided with sufficient water and soap for their personal toilet and for washing
their personal laundry; the necessary installations, facilities and time shall be granted them for
that purpose.
ARTICLE 30
Every camp shall have an adequate infirmary where prisoners of war may have the attention
they require, as well as appropriate diet. Isolation wards shall, if necessary, be set aside for cases
of contagious or mental disease.
Prisoners of war suffering from serious disease, or whose condition necessitates special
treatment, a surgical operation or hospital care, must be admitted to any military or civilian
medical unit where such treatment can be given, even if their repatriation is contemplated in the
near future. Special facilities shall be afforded for the care to be given to the disabled, in
particular to the blind, and for their rehabilitation, pending repatriation.
Prisoners of war shall have the attention, preferably, of medical personnel of the Power on which
they depend and, if possible, of their nationality.
Prisoners of war may not be prevented from presenting themselves to the medical authorities for
examination. The detaining authorities shall, upon request, issue to every prisoner who has
undergone treatment, an official certificate indicating the nature of his illness or injury, and the
duration and kind of treatment received. A duplicate of this certificate shall be forwarded to the
Central Prisoners of War Agency.
The costs of treatment, including those of any apparatus necessary for the maintenance of
prisoners of war in good health, particularly dentures and other artificial appliances, and
spectacles, shall be borne by the Detaining Power.
ARTICLE 31
Medical inspections of prisoners of war shall be held at least once a month. They shall include
the checking and the recording of the weight of each prisoner of war. Their purpose shall be, in
particular, to supervise the general state of health, nutrition and cleanliness of prisoners and to
detect contagious diseases, especially tuberculosis, malaria and venereal disease. For this
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purpose the most efficient methods available shall be employed, e.g. periodic mass miniature
radiography for the early detection of tuberculosis.
ARTICLE 32
Prisoners of war who, though not attached to the medical service of their armed forces, are
physicians, surgeons, dentists, nurses or medical orderlies, may be required by the Detaining
Power to exercise their medical functions in the interests of prisoners of war dependent on the
same Power. In that case they shall continue to be prisoners of war, but shall receive the same
treatment as corresponding medical personnel retained by the Detaining Power. They shall be
exempted from any other work under Article 49.
Chapter IV Medical Personnel and Chaplains Retained To Assist Prisoners Of War
ARTICLE 33
Members of the medical personnel and chaplains while retained by the Detaining Power with a
view to assisting prisoners of war, shall not be considered as prisoners of war. They shall,
however, receive as a minimum the benefits and protection of the present Convention, and shall
also be granted all facilities necessary to provide for the medical care of, and religious
ministration to, prisoners of war.
They shall continue to exercise their medical and spiritual functions for the benefit of prisoners
of war, preferably those belonging to the armed forces upon which they depend, within the scope
of the military laws and regulations of the Detaining Power and under the control of its
competent services, in accordance with their professional etiquette. They shall also benefit by the
following facilities in the exercise of their medical or spiritual functions:
(a) They shall be authorized to visit periodically prisoners of war situated in working
detachments or in hospitals outside the camp. For this purpose, the Detaining Power shall
place at their disposal the necessary means of transport.
(b) The senior medical officer in each camp shall be responsible to the camp military
authorities for everything connected with the activities of retained medical personnel. For
this purpose, Parties to the conflict shall agree at the outbreak of hostilities on the subject of
the corresponding ranks of the medical personnel, including that of societies mentioned in
Article 26 of the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949. This senior medical officer, as well
as chaplains, shall have the right to deal with the competent authorities of the camp on all
questions relating to their duties. Such authorities shall afford them all necessary facilities
for correspondence relating to these questions.
(c) Although they shall be subject to the internal discipline of the camp in which they are
retained, such personnel may not be compelled to carry out any work other than that
concerned with their medical or religious duties.
During hostilities, the Parties to the conflict shall agree concerning the possible relief of retained
personnel and shall settle the procedure to be followed.
None of the preceding provisions shall relieve the Detaining Power of its obligations with regard
to prisoners of war from the medical or spiritual point of view.
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CHAPTER V RELIGIOUS, INTELLECTUAL AND PHYSICAL
ACTIVITIES
ARTICLE 34
Prisoners of war shall enjoy complete latitude in the exercise of their religious duties, including
attendance at the service of their faith, on condition that they comply with the disciplinary
routine prescribed by the military authorities.
Adequate premises shall be provided where religious services may be held.
ARTICLE 35
Chaplains who fall into the hands of the enemy Power and who remain or are retained with a
view to assisting prisoners of war, shall be allowed to minister to them and to exercise freely
their ministry amongst prisoners of war of the same religion, in accordance with their religious
conscience. They shall be allocated among the various camps and labor detachments containing
prisoners of war belonging to the same forces, speaking the same language or practicing the
same religion. They shall enjoy the necessary facilities, including the means of transport
provided for in Article 33, for visiting the prisoners of war outside their camp. They shall be free
to correspond, subject to censorship, on matters concerning their religious duties with the
ecclesiastical authorities in the country of detention and with international religious
organizations. Letters and cards which they may send for this purpose shall be in addition to the
quota provided for in Article 71.
ARTICLE 36
Prisoners of war who are ministers of religion, without having officiated as chaplains to their
own forces, shall be at liberty, whatever their denomination, to minister freely to the members of
their community. For this purpose, they shall receive the same treatment as the chaplains
retained by the Detaining Power. They shall not be obliged to do any other work.
ARTICLE 37
When prisoners of war have not the assistance of a retained chaplain or of a prisoner of war
minister of their faith, a minister belonging to the prisoners' or a similar denomination, or in his
absence a qualified layman, if such a course is feasible from a confessional point of view, shall be
appointed, at the request of the prisoners concerned, to fill this office. This appointment, subject
to the approval of the Detaining Power, shall take place with the agreement of the community of
prisoners concerned and, wherever necessary, with the approval of the local religious authorities
of the same faith. The person thus appointed shall comply with all regulations established by the
Detaining Power in the interests of discipline and military security.
ARTICLE 38
While respecting the individual preferences of every prisoner, the Detaining Power shall
encourage the practice of intellectual, educational, and recreational pursuits, sports and games
amongst prisoners, and shall take the measures necessary to ensure the exercise thereof by
providing them with adequate premises and necessary equipment.
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Prisoners shall have opportunities for taking physical exercise, including sports and games, and
for being out of doors. Sufficient open spaces shall be provided for this purpose in all camps.
CHAPTER VI DISCIPLINE
ARTICLE 39
Every prisoner of war camp shall be put under the immediate authority of a responsible
commissioned officer belonging to the regular armed forces of the Detaining Power. Such officer
shall have in his possession a copy of the present Convention; he shall ensure that its provisions
are known to the camp staff and the guard and shall be responsible, under the direction of his
government, for its application.
Prisoners of war, with the exception of officers, must salute and show to all officers of the
Detaining Power the external marks of respect provided for by the regulations applying in their
own forces.
Officer prisoners of war are bound to salute only officers of a higher rank of the Detaining Power;
they must, however, salute the camp commander regardless of his rank.
ARTICLE 40
The wearing of badges of rank and nationality, as well as of decorations, shall be permitted.
ARTICLE 41
In every camp the text of the present Convention and its Annexes and the contents of any special
agreement provided for in Article 6, shall be posted, in the prisoners' own language, at places
where all may read them. Copies shall be supplied, on request, to the prisoners who cannot have
access to the copy which has been posted.
Regulations, orders, notices and publications of every kind relating to the conduct of prisoners of
war shall be issued to them in a language which they understand. Such regulations, orders and
publications shall be posted in the manner described above and copies shall be handed to the
prisoners' representative. Every order and command addressed to prisoners of war individually
must likewise be given in a language which they understand.
ARTICLE 42
The use of weapons against prisoners of war, especially against those who are escaping or
attempting to escape, shall constitute an extreme measure, which shall always be preceded by
warnings appropriate to the circumstances.
CHAPTER VII RANK OF PRISONERS OF WAR
ARTICLE 43
Upon the outbreak of hostilities, the Parties to the conflict shall communicate to one another the
titles and ranks of all the persons mentioned in Article 4 of the present Convention, in order to
ensure equality of treatment between prisoners of equivalent rank. Titles and ranks which are
subsequently created shall form the subject of similar communications.
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The Detaining Power shall recognize promotions in rank which have been accorded to prisoners
of war and which have been duly notified by the Power on which these prisoners depend.
ARTICLE 44
Officers and prisoners of equivalent status shall be treated with the regard due to their rank and
age.
In order to ensure service in officers' camps, other ranks of the same armed forces who, as far as
possible, speak the same language, shall be assigned in sufficient numbers, account being taken
of the rank of officers and prisoners of equivalent status. Such orderlies shall not be required to
perform any other work.
Supervision of the mess by the officers themselves shall be facilitated in every way.
ARTICLE 45
Prisoners of war other than officers and prisoners of equivalent status shall be treated with the
regard due to their rank and age.
Supervision of the mess by the prisoners themselves shall be facilitated in every way.
CHAPTER VIII TRANSFER OF PRISONERS OF WAR AFTER THEIR
ARRIVAL IN CAMP
ARTICLE 46
The Detaining Power, when deciding upon the transfer of prisoners of war, shall take into
account the interests of the prisoners themselves, more especially so as not to increase the
difficulty of their repatriation.
The transfer of prisoners of war shall always be effected humanely and in conditions not less
favorable than those under which the forces of the Detaining Power are transferred. Account
shall always be taken of the climatic conditions to which the prisoners of war are accustomed
and the conditions of transfer shall in no case be prejudicial to their health.
The Detaining Power shall supply prisoners of war during transfer with sufficient food and
drinking water to keep them in good health, likewise with the necessary clothing, shelter and
medical attention. The Detaining Power shall take adequate precautions especially in case of
transport by sea or by air, to ensure their safety during transfer, and shall draw up a complete
list of all transferred prisoners before their departure.
ARTICLE 47
Sick or wounded prisoners of war shall not be transferred as long as their recovery may be
endangered by the journey, unless their safety imperatively demands it.
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If the combat zone draws closer to a camp, the prisoners of war in the said camp shall not be
transferred unless their transfer can be carried out in adequate conditions of safety, or if they
are exposed to greater risks by remaining on the spot than by being transferred.
ARTICLE 48
In the event of transfer, prisoners of war shall be officially advised of their departure and of their
new postal address. Such notifications shall be given in time for them to pack their luggage and
inform their next of kin.
They shall be allowed to take with them their personal effects, and the correspondence and
parcels which have arrived for them. The weight of such baggage may be limited, if the
conditions of transfer so require, to what each prisoner can reasonably carry, which shall in no
case be more than twenty-five kilograms per head.
Mail and parcels addressed to their former camp shall be forwarded to them without delay. The
camp commander shall take, in agreement with the prisoners' representative, any measures
needed to ensure the transport of the prisoners' community property and of the luggage they are
unable to take with them in consequence of restrictions imposed by virtue of the second
paragraph of this Article.
The costs of transfers shall be borne by the Detaining Power.
SECTION III LABOR OF PRISONERS OF WAR
ARTICLE 49
The Detaining Power may utilize the labor of prisoners of war who are physically fit, taking into
account their age, sex, rank and physical aptitude, and with a view particularly to maintaining
them in a good state of physical and mental health.
Non-commissioned officers who are prisoners of war shall only be required to do supervisory
work. Those not so required may ask for other suitable work which shall, so far as possible, be
found for them.
If officers or persons of equivalent status ask for suitable work, it shall be found for them, so far
as possible, but they may in no circumstances be compelled to work.
ARTICLE 50
Besides work connected with camp administration, installation or maintenance, prisoners of war
may be compelled to do only such work as is included in the following classes:
(a) Agriculture;
(b) Industries connected with the production or the extraction of raw materials, and
manufacturing industries, with the exception of metallurgical, machinery and chemical
industries; public works and building operations which have no military character or purpose;
(c) Transport and handling of stores which are not military in character or purpose;
(d) Commercial business, and arts and crafts;
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(e) Domestic service;
(f) Public utility services having no military character or purpose.
Should the above provisions be infringed, prisoners of war shall be allowed to exercise their right
of complaint, in conformity with Article 78.
ARTICLE 51
Prisoners of war must be granted suitable working conditions, especially as regards
accommodation, food, clothing and equipment; such conditions shall not be inferior to those
enjoyed by nationals of the Detaining Power employed in similar work; account shall also be
taken of climatic conditions.
The Detaining Power, in utilizing the labor of prisoners of war, shall ensure that in areas in
which prisoners are employed, the national legislation concerning the protection of labor, and,
more particularly, the regulations for the safety of workers, are duly applied.
Prisoners of war shall receive training and be provided with the means of protection suitable to
the work they will have to do and similar to those accorded to the nationals of the Detaining
Power. Subject to the provisions of Article 52, prisoners may be submitted to the normal risks
run by these civilian workers.
Conditions of labor shall in no case be rendered more arduous by disciplinary measures.
ARTICLE 52
Unless he be a volunteer, no prisoner of war may be employed on labor which is of an unhealthy
or dangerous nature.
No prisoner of war shall be assigned to labor which would be looked upon as humiliating for a
member of the Detaining Power's own forces.
The removal of mines or similar devices shall be considered as dangerous labor.
ARTICLE 53
The duration of the daily labor of prisoners of war, including the time of the journey to and fro,
shall not be excessive, and must in no case exceed that permitted for civilian workers in the
district, who are nationals of the Detaining Power and employed on the same work.
Prisoners of war must be allowed, in the middle of the day's work, a rest of not less than one
hour. This rest will be the same as that to which workers of the Detaining Power are entitled, if
the latter is of longer duration. They shall be allowed in addition a rest of twenty-four
consecutive hours every week, preferably on Sunday or the day of rest in their country of origin.
Furthermore, every prisoner who has worked for one year shall be granted a rest of eight
consecutive days, during which his working pay shall be paid him.
If methods of labor such as piecework are employed, the length of the working period shall not be
rendered excessive thereby.
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ARTICLE 54
The working pay due to prisoners of war shall be fixed in accordance with the provisions of
Article 62 of the present Convention.
Prisoners of war who sustain accidents in connection with work, or who contract a disease in the
course, or in consequence of their work, shall receive all the care their condition may require.
The Detaining Power shall furthermore deliver to such prisoners of war a medical certificate
enabling them to submit their claims to the Power on which they depend, and shall send a
duplicate to the Central Prisoners of War Agency provided for in Article 123.
ARTICLE 55
The fitness of prisoners of war for work shall be periodically verified by medical examinations at
least once a month. The examinations shall have particular regard to the nature of the work
which prisoners of war are required to do.
If any prisoner of war considers himself incapable of working, he shall be permitted to appear
before the medical authorities of his camp. Physicians or surgeons may recommend that the
prisoners who are, in their opinion, unfit for work, be exempted therefrom.
ARTICLE 56
The organization and administration of labor detachments shall be similar to those of prisoner of
war camps.
Every labor detachment shall remain under the control of and administratively part of a prisoner
of war camp. The military authorities and the commander of the said camp shall be responsible,
under the direction of their government, for the observance of the provisions of the present
Convention in labor detachments.
The camp commander shall keep an up-to-date record of the labor detachments dependent on his
camp, and shall communicate it to the delegates of the Protecting Power, of the International
Committee of the Red Cross, or of other agencies giving relief to prisoners of war, who may visit
the camp.
ARTICLE 57
The treatment of prisoners of war who work for private persons, even if the latter are responsible
for guarding and protecting them, shall not be inferior to that which is provided for by the
present Convention. The Detaining Power, the military authorities and the commander of the
camp to which such prisoners belong shall be entirely responsible for the maintenance, care,
treatment, and payment of the working pay of such prisoners of war.
Such prisoners of war shall have the right to remain in communication with the prisoners'
representatives in the camps on which they depend.
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SECTION IV FINANCIAL RESOURCES OF PRISONERS OF WAR
ARTICLE 58
Upon the outbreak of hostilities, and pending an arrangement on this matter with the Protecting
Power, the Detaining Power may determine the maximum amount of money in cash or in any
similar form that prisoners may have in their possession. Any amount in excess, which was
properly in their possession and which has been taken or withheld from them, shall be placed to
their account, together with any monies deposited by them, and shall not be converted into any
other currency without their consent.
If prisoners of war are permitted to purchase services or commodities outside the camp against
payment in cash, such payments shall be made by the prisoner himself or by the camp
administration who will charge them to the accounts of the prisoners concerned. The Detaining
Power will establish the necessary rules in this respect.
ARTICLE 59
Cash which was taken from prisoners of war, in accordance with Article 18, at the time of their
capture, and which is in the currency of the Detaining Power, shall be placed to their separate
accounts, in accordance with the provisions of Article 64 of the present Section.
The amounts, in the currency of the Detaining Power, due to the conversion of sums in other
currencies that are taken from the prisoners of war at the same time, shall also be credited to
their separate accounts.
ARTICLE 60
The Detaining Power shall grant all prisoners of war a monthly advance of pay, the amount of
which shall be fixed by conversion, into the currency of the said Power, of the following amounts:
Category I: Prisoners ranking below sergeant: eight Swiss francs.
Category II: Sergeants and other non-commissioned officers, or prisoners of equivalent rank:
twelve Swiss francs.
Category III: Warrant officers and commissioned officers below the rank of major or prisoners
of equivalent rank: fifty Swiss francs.
Category IV: Majors, lieutenant colonels, colonels or prisoners of equivalent rank: sixty Swiss
francs.
Category V: General officers or prisoners of equivalent rank: seventy-five Swiss francs.
However, the Parties to the conflict concerned may by special agreement modify the amount of
advances of pay due to prisoners of the preceding categories.
Furthermore, if the amounts indicated in the first paragraph above would be unduly high
compared with the pay of the Detaining Power's armed forces or would, for any reason, seriously
embarrass the Detaining Power, then, pending the conclusion of a special agreement with the
Power on which the prisoners depend to vary the amounts indicated above, the Detaining Power:
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(a) Shall continue to credit the accounts of the prisoners with the amounts indicated in the
first paragraph above;
(b) May temporarily limit the amount made available from these advances of pay to prisoners
of war for their own use, to sums which are reasonable, but which, for Category I, shall never
be inferior to the amount that the Detaining Power gives to the members of its own armed
forces.
The reasons for any limitations will be given without delay to the Protecting Power.
ARTICLE 61
The Detaining Power shall accept for distribution as supplementary pay to prisoners of war sums
which the Power on which the prisoners depend may forward to them, on condition that the
sums to be paid shall be the same for each prisoner of the same category, shall be payable to all
prisoners of that category depending on that Power, and shall be placed in their separate
accounts, at the earliest opportunity, in accordance with the provisions of Article 64. Such
supplementary pay shall not relieve the Detaining Power of any obligation under this
Convention.
ARTICLE 62
Prisoners of war shall be paid a fair working rate of pay by the detaining authorities direct. The
rate shall be fixed by the said authorities, but shall at no time be less than one-fourth of one
Swiss franc for a full working day. The Detaining Power shall inform prisoners of war, as well as
the Power on which they depend, through the intermediary of the Protecting Power, of the rate of
daily working pay that it has fixed.
Working pay shall likewise be paid by the detaining authorities to prisoners of war permanently
detailed to duties or to a skilled or semi-skilled occupation in connection with the administration,
installation or maintenance of camps, and to the prisoners who are required to carry out
spiritual or medical duties on behalf of their comrades.
The working pay of the prisoners' representative, of his advisers, if any, and of his assistants,
shall be paid out of the fund maintained by canteen profits. The scale of this working pay shall
be fixed by the prisoners' representative and approved by the camp commander. If there is no
such fund, the detaining authorities shall pay these prisoners a fair working rate of pay.
ARTICLE 63
Prisoners of war shall be permitted to receive remittances of money addressed to them
individually or collectively.
Every prisoner of war shall have at his disposal the credit balance of his account as provided for
in the following Article, within the limits fixed by the Detaining Power, which shall make such
payments as are requested. Subject to financial or monetary restrictions which the Detaining
Power regards as essential, prisoners of war may also have payments made abroad. In this case
payments addressed by prisoners of war to dependants shall be given priority.
In any event, and subject to the consent of the Power on which they depend, prisoners may have
payments made in their own country, as follows: the Detaining Power shall send to the aforesaid
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Power through the Protecting Power a notification giving all the necessary particulars
concerning the prisoners of war, the beneficiaries of the payments, and the amount of the sums
to be paid, expressed in the Detaining Power's currency. The said notification shall be signed by
the prisoners and countersigned by the camp commander. The Detaining Power shall debit the
prisoners' account by a corresponding amount; the sums thus debited shall be placed by it to the
credit of the Power on which the prisoners depend.
To apply the foregoing provisions, the Detaining Power may usefully consult the Model
Regulations in Annex V of the present Convention.
ARTICLE 64
The Detaining Power shall hold an account for each prisoner of war, showing at least the
following:
1. The amounts due to the prisoner or received by him as advances of pay, as working pay or
derived from any other source; the sums in the currency of the Detaining Power which were
taken from him; the sums taken from him and converted at his request into the currency of
the said Power.
2. The payments made to the prisoner in cash, or in any other similar form; the payments
made on his behalf and at his request; the sums transferred under Article 63, third
paragraph.
ARTICLE 65
Every item entered in the account of a prisoner of war shall be countersigned or initialed by him,
or by the prisoners' representative acting on his behalf.
Prisoners of war shall at all times be afforded reasonable facilities for consulting and obtaining
copies of their accounts, which may likewise be inspected by the representatives of the Protecting
Powers at the time of visits to the camp.
When prisoners of war are transferred from one camp to another, their personal accounts will
follow them. In case of transfer from one Detaining Power to another, the monies which are their
property and are not in the currency of the Detaining Power will follow them. They shall be given
certificates for any other monies standing to the credit of their accounts.
The Parties to the conflict concerned may agree to notify to each other at specific intervals
through the Protecting Power, the amount of the accounts of the prisoners of war.
ARTICLE 66
On the termination of captivity, through the release of a prisoner of war or his repatriation, the
Detaining Power shall give him a statement, signed by an authorized officer of that Power,
showing the credit balance then due to him. The Detaining Power shall also send through the
Protecting Power to the government upon which the prisoner of war depends, lists giving all
appropriate particulars of all prisoners of war whose captivity has been terminated by
repatriation, release, escape, death or any other means, and showing the amount of their credit
balances. Such lists shall be certified on each sheet by an authorized representative of the
Detaining Power.
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Any of the above provisions of this Article may be varied by mutual agreement between any two
Parties to the conflict.
The Power on which the prisoner of war depends shall be responsible for settling with him any
credit balance due to him from the Detaining Power on the termination of his captivity.
ARTICLE 67
Advances of pay, issued to prisoners of war in conformity with Article 60, shall be considered as
made on behalf of the Power on which they depend. Such advances of pay, as well as all
payments made by the said Power under Article 63, third paragraph, and Article 68, shall form
the subject of arrangements between the Powers concerned, at the close of hostilities.
ARTICLE 68
Any claim by a prisoner of war for compensation in respect of any injury or other disability
arising out of work shall be referred to the Power on which he depends, through the Protecting
Power. In accordance with Article 54, the Detaining Power will, in all cases, provide the prisoner
of war concerned with a statement showing the nature of the injury or disability, the
circumstances in which it arose and particulars of medical or hospital treatment given for it.
This statement will be signed by a responsible officer of the Detaining Power and the medical
particulars certified by a medical officer.
Any claim by a prisoner of war for compensation in respect of personal effects, monies or
valuables impounded by the Detaining Power under Article 18 and not forthcoming on his
repatriation, or in respect of loss alleged to be due to the fault of the Detaining Power or any of
its servants, shall likewise be referred to the Power on which he depends. Nevertheless, any such
personal effects required for use by the prisoners of war whilst in captivity shall be replaced at
the expense of the Detaining Power. The Detaining Power will, in all cases, provide the prisoner
of war with a statement, signed by a responsible officer, showing all available information
regarding the reasons why such effects, monies or valuables have not been restored to him. A
copy of this statement will be forwarded to the Power on which he depends through the Central
Prisoners of War Agency provided for in Article 123.
SECTION V RELATIONS OF PRISONERS OF WAR WITH THE
EXTERIOR
ARTICLE 69
Immediately upon prisoners of war falling into its power, the Detaining Power shall inform them
and the Powers on which they depend, through the Protecting Power, of the measures taken to
carry out the provisions of the present Section. They shall likewise inform the parties concerned
of any subsequent modifications of such measures.
ARTICLE 70
Immediately upon capture, or not more than one week after arrival at a camp, even if it is a
transit camp, likewise in case of sickness or transfer to hospital or another camp, every prisoner
of war shall be enabled to write direct to his family, on the one hand, and to the Central
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Prisoners of War Agency provided for in Article 123, on the other hand, a card similar, if
possible, to the model annexed to the present Convention, informing his relatives of his capture,
address and state of health. The said cards shall be forwarded as rapidly as possible and may not
be delayed in any manner.
ARTICLE 71
Prisoners of war shall be allowed to send and receive letters and cards. If the Detaining Power
deems it necessary to limit the number of letters and cards sent by each prisoner of war, the said
number shall not be less than two letters and four cards monthly, exclusive of the capture cards
provided for in Article 70, and conforming as closely as possible to the models annexed to the
present Convention. Further limitations may be imposed only if the Protecting Power is satisfied
that it would be in the interests of the prisoners of war concerned to do so owing to difficulties of
translation caused by the Detaining Power's inability to find sufficient qualified linguists to
carry out the necessary censorship. If limitations must be placed on the correspondence
addressed to prisoners of war, they may be ordered only by the Power on which the prisoners
depend, possibly at the request of the Detaining Power. Such letters and cards must be conveyed
by the most rapid method at the disposal of the Detaining Power; they may not be delayed or
retained for disciplinary reasons.
Prisoners of war who have been without news for a long period, or who are unable to receive
news from their next of kin or to give them news by the ordinary postal route, as well as those
who are at a great distance from their homes, shall be permitted to send telegrams, the fees
being charged against the prisoners of war's accounts with the Detaining Power or paid in the
currency at their disposal. They shall likewise benefit by this measure in cases of urgency.
As a general rule, the correspondence of prisoners of war shall be written in their native
language. The Parties to the conflict may allow correspondence in other languages.
Sacks containing prisoner of war mail must be securely sealed and labeled so as clearly to
indicate their contents, and must be addressed to offices of destination.
ARTICLE 72
Prisoners of war shall be allowed to receive by post or by any other means individual parcels or
collective shipments containing, in particular, foodstuffs, clothing, medical supplies and articles
of a religious, educational or recreational character which may meet their needs, including books,
devotional articles, scientific equipment, examination papers, musical instruments, sports outfits
and materials allowing prisoners of war to pursue their studies or their cultural activities.
Such shipments shall in no way free the Detaining Power from the obligations imposed upon it
by virtue of the present Convention.
The only limits which may be placed on these shipments shall be those proposed by the
Protecting Power in the interest of the prisoners themselves, or by the International Committee
of the Red Cross or any other organization giving assistance to the prisoners, in respect of their
own shipments only, on account of exceptional strain on transport or communications.
The conditions for the sending of individual parcels and collective relief shall, if necessary, be the
subject of special agreements between the Powers concerned, which may in no case delay the
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receipt by the prisoners of relief supplies. Books may not be included in parcels of clothing and
foodstuffs. Medical supplies shall, as a rule, be sent in collective parcels.
ARTICLE 73
In the absence of special agreements between the Powers concerned on the conditions for the
receipt and distribution of collective relief shipments, the rules and regulations concerning
collective shipments, which are annexed to the present Convention, shall be applied.
The special agreements referred to above shall in no case restrict the right of prisoners'
representatives to take possession of collective relief shipments intended for prisoners of war, to
proceed to their distribution or to dispose of them in the interest of the prisoners.
Nor shall such agreements restrict the right of representatives of the Protecting Power, the
International Committee of the Red Cross or any other organization giving assistance to
prisoners of war and responsible for the forwarding of collective shipments, to supervise their
distribution to the recipients.
ARTICLE 74
All relief shipments for prisoners of war shall be exempt from import, customs and other dues.
Correspondence, relief shipments and authorized remittances of money addressed to prisoners of
war or dispatched by them through the post office, either direct or through the Information
Bureau provided for in Article 122 and the Central Prisoners of War Agency provided for in
Article 123, shall be exempt from any postal dues, both in the countries of origin and destination,
and in intermediate countries.
If relief shipments intended for prisoners of war cannot be sent through the post office by reason
of weight or for any other cause, the cost of transportation shall be borne by the Detaining Power
in all the territories under its control. The other Powers party to the Convention shall bear the
cost of transport in their respective territories.
In the absence of special agreements between the Parties concerned, the costs connected with
transport of such shipments, other than costs covered by the above exemption, shall be charged
to the senders.
The High Contracting Parties shall endeavor to reduce, so far as possible, the rates charged for
telegrams sent by prisoners of war, or addressed to them.
ARTICLE 75
Should military operations prevent the Powers concerned from fulfilling their obligation to
assure the transport of the shipments referred to in Articles 70, 71, 72 and 77, the Protecting
Powers concerned, the International Committee of the Red Cross or any other organization duly
approved by the Parties to the conflict may undertake to ensure the conveyance of such
shipments by suitable means (railway wagons, motor vehicles, vessels or aircraft, etc.). For this
purpose, the High Contracting Parties shall endeavor to supply them with such transport and to
allow its circulation, especially by granting the necessary safe-conducts.
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Such transport may also be used to convey:
(a) Correspondence, lists and reports exchanged between the Central Information Agency
referred to in Article 123 and the National Bureau referred to in Article 122;
(b) Correspondence and reports relating to prisoners of war which the Protecting Powers, the
International Committee of the Red Cross or any other body assisting the prisoners, exchange
either with their own delegates or with the Parties to the conflict.
These provisions in no way detract from the right of any Party to the conflict to arrange other
means of transport, if it should so prefer, nor preclude the granting of safe-conducts, under
mutually agreed conditions, to such means of transport.
In the absence of special agreements, the costs occasioned by the use of such means of transport
shall be borne proportionally by the Parties to the conflict whose nationals are benefited thereby.
ARTICLE 76
The censoring of correspondence addressed to prisoners of war or dispatched by them shall be
done as quickly as possible. Mail shall be censored only by the dispatching State and the
receiving State, and once only by each.
The examination of consignments intended for prisoners of war shall not be carried out under
conditions that will expose the goods contained in them to deterioration; except in the case of
written or printed matter, it shall be done in the presence of the addressee, or of a fellow-
prisoner duly delegated by him. The delivery to prisoners of individual or collective consignments
shall not be delayed under the pretext of difficulties of censorship.
Any prohibition of correspondence ordered by Parties to the conflict, either for military or
political reasons, shall be only temporary and its duration shall be as short as possible.
ARTICLE 77
The Detaining Powers shall provide all facilities for the transmission, through the Protecting
Power or the Central Prisoners of War Agency provided for in Article 123, of instruments, papers
or documents intended for prisoners of war or dispatched by them, especially powers of attorney
and wills.
In all cases they shall facilitate the preparation and execution of such documents on behalf of
prisoners of war; in particular, they shall allow them to consult a lawyer and shall take what
measures are necessary for the authentication of their signatures.
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SECTION VI RELATIONS BETWEEN PRISONERS OF WAR AND THE
AUTHORITIES
CHAPTER I COMPLAINTS OF PRISONERS OF WAR RESPECTING
THE CONDITIONS OF CAPTIVITY
ARTICLE 78
Prisoners of war shall have the right to make known to the military authorities in whose power
they are, their requests regarding the conditions of captivity to which they are subjected.
They shall also have the unrestricted right to apply to the representatives of the Protecting
Powers either through their prisoners' representative or, if they consider it necessary, direct, in
order to draw their attention to any points on which they may have complaints to make
regarding their conditions of captivity.
These requests and complaints shall not be limited nor considered to be a part of the
correspondence quota referred to in Article 71. They must be transmitted immediately. Even if
they are recognized to be unfounded, they may not give rise to any punishment.
Prisoners' representatives may send periodic reports on the situation in the camps and the needs
of the prisoners of war to the representatives of the Protecting Powers.
CHAPTER II PRISONER OF WAR REPRESENTATIVES
ARTICLE 79
In all places where there are prisoners of war, except in those where there are officers, the
prisoners shall freely elect by secret ballot, every six months, and also in case of vacancies,
prisoners' representatives entrusted with representing them before the military authorities, the
Protecting Powers, the International Committee of the Red Cross and any other organization
which may assist them. These prisoners' representatives shall be eligible for re-election.
In camps for officers and persons of equivalent status or in mixed camps, the senior officer
among the prisoners of war shall be recognized as the camp prisoners' representative. In camps
for officers, he shall be assisted by one or more advisers chosen by the officers; in mixed camps,
his assistants shall be chosen from among the prisoners of war who are not officers and shall be
elected by them.
Officer prisoners of war of the same nationality shall be stationed in labor camps for prisoners of
war, for the purpose of carrying out the camp administration duties for which the prisoners of
war are responsible. These officers may be elected as prisoners' representatives under the first
paragraph of this Article. In such a case the assistants to the prisoners' representatives shall be
chosen from among those prisoners of war who are not officers.
Every representative elected must be approved by the Detaining Power before he has the right to
commence his duties. Where the Detaining Power refuses to approve a prisoner of war elected by
his fellow prisoners of war, it must inform the Protecting Power of the reason for such refusal.
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In all cases the prisoners' representative must have the same nationality, language and customs
as the prisoners of war whom he represents. Thus, prisoners of war distributed in different
sections of a camp, according to their nationality, language or customs, shall have for each
section their own prisoners' representative, in accordance with the foregoing paragraphs.
ARTICLE 80
Prisoners' representatives shall further the physical, spiritual and intellectual well being of
prisoners of war.
In particular, where the prisoners decide to organize amongst themselves a system of mutual
assistance, this organization will be within the province of the prisoners' representative, in
addition to the special duties entrusted to him by other provisions of the present Convention.
Prisoners' representatives shall not be held responsible, simply by reason of their duties, for any
offences committed by prisoners of war.
ARTICLE 81
Prisoners' representatives shall not be required to perform any other work, if the
accomplishment of their duties is thereby made more difficult.
Prisoners' representatives may appoint from amongst the prisoners such assistants as they may
require. All material facilities shall be granted them, particularly a certain freedom of movement
necessary for the accomplishment of their duties (inspection of labor detachments, receipt of
supplies, etc.).
Prisoners' representatives shall be permitted to visit premises where prisoners of war are
detained, and every prisoner of war shall have the right to consult freely his prisoners'
representative.
All facilities shall likewise be accorded to the prisoners' representatives for communication by
post and telegraph with the detaining authorities, the Protecting Powers, the International
Committee of the Red Cross and their delegates, the Mixed Medical Commissions and with the
bodies which give assistance to prisoners of war. Prisoners' representatives of labor detachments
shall enjoy the same facilities for communication with the prisoners' representatives of the
principal camp. Such communications shall not be restricted, nor considered as forming a part of
the quota mentioned in Article 71.
Prisoners' representatives who are transferred shall be allowed a reasonable time to acquaint
their successors with current affairs.
In case of dismissal, the reasons therefor shall be communicated to the Protecting Power.
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CHAPTER III PENAL AND DISCIPLINARY SANCTIONS
I. GENERAL PROVISIONS
ARTICLE 82
A prisoner of war shall be subject to the laws, regulations and orders in force in the armed forces
of the Detaining Power; the Detaining Power shall be justified in taking judicial or disciplinary
measures in respect of any offence committed by a prisoner of war against such laws, regulations
or orders. However, no proceedings or punishments contrary to the provisions of this Chapter
shall be allowed.
If any law, regulation or order of the Detaining Power shall declare acts committed by a prisoner
of war to be punishable, whereas the same acts would not be punishable if committed by a
member of the forces of the Detaining Power, such acts shall entail disciplinary punishments
only.
ARTICLE 83
In deciding whether proceedings in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by a
prisoner of war shall be judicial or disciplinary, the Detaining Power shall ensure that the
competent authorities exercise the greatest leniency and adopt, wherever possible, disciplinary
rather than judicial measures.
ARTICLE 84
A prisoner of war shall be tried only by a military court, unless the existing laws of the Detaining
Power expressly permit the civil courts to try a member of the armed forces of the Detaining
Power in respect of the particular offence alleged to have been committed by the prisoner of war.
In no circumstances whatever shall a prisoner of war be tried by a court of any kind which does
not offer the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality as generally recognized, and,
in particular, the procedure of which does not afford the accused the rights and means of defense
provided for in Article 105.
ARTICLE 85
Prisoners of war prosecuted under the laws of the Detaining Power for acts committed prior to
capture shall retain, even if convicted, the benefits of the present Convention.
ARTICLE 86
No prisoner of war may be punished more than once for the same act, or on the same charge.
ARTICLE 87
Prisoners of war may not be sentenced by the military authorities and courts of the Detaining
Power to any penalties except those provided for in respect of members of the armed forces of the
said Power who have committed the same acts.
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When fixing the penalty, the courts or authorities of the Detaining Power shall take into
consideration, to the widest extent possible, the fact that the accused, not being a national of the
Detaining Power, is not bound to it by any duty of allegiance, and that he is in its power as the
result of circumstances independent of his own will. The said courts or authorities shall be at
liberty to reduce the penalty provided for the violation of which the prisoner of war is accused,
and shall therefore not be bound to apply the minimum penalty prescribed.
Collective punishment for individual acts, corporal punishments, imprisonment in premises
without daylight and, in general, any form of torture or cruelty, are forbidden.
No prisoner of war may be deprived of his rank by the Detaining Power, or prevented from
wearing his badges.
ARTICLE 88
Officers, non-commissioned officers and men who are prisoners of war undergoing a disciplinary
or judicial punishment, shall not be subjected to more severe treatment than that applied in
respect of the same punishment to members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power of
equivalent rank.
A woman prisoner of war shall not be awarded or sentenced to a punishment more severe, or
treated whilst undergoing punishment more severely, than a woman member of the armed forces
of the Detaining Power dealt with for a similar offence.
In no case may a woman prisoner of war be awarded or sentenced to a punishment more severe,
or treated whilst undergoing punishment more severely, than a male member of the armed
forces of the Detaining Power dealt with for a similar offence.
Prisoners of war who have served disciplinary or judicial sentences may not be treated
differently from other prisoners of war.
II. DISCIPLINARY SANCTIONS
ARTICLE 89
The disciplinary punishments applicable to prisoners of war are the following:
1. A fine which shall not exceed 50 per cent of the advances of pay and working pay which the
prisoner of war would otherwise receive under the provisions of Articles 60 and 62 during a
period of not more than thirty days.
2. Discontinuance of privileges granted over and above the treatment provided for by the
present Convention.
3. Fatigue duties not exceeding two hours daily.
4. Confinement.
The punishment referred to under (3) shall not be applied to officers.
In no case shall disciplinary punishments be inhuman, brutal or dangerous to the health of
prisoners of war.
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ARTICLE 90
The duration of any single punishment shall in no case exceed thirty days. Any period of
confinement awaiting the hearing of a disciplinary offence or the award of disciplinary
punishment shall be deducted from an award pronounced against a prisoner of war.
The maximum of thirty days provided above may not be exceeded, even if the prisoner of war is
answerable for several acts at the same time when he is awarded punishment, whether such acts
are related or not.
The period between the pronouncing of an award of disciplinary punishment and its execution
shall not exceed one month.
When a prisoner of war is awarded a further disciplinary punishment, a period of at least three
days shall elapse between the execution of any two of the punishments, if the duration of one of
these is ten days or more.
ARTICLE 91
The escape of a prisoner of war shall be deemed to have succeeded when:
1. He has joined the armed forces of the Power on which he depends, or those of an allied
Power;
2. He has left the territory under the control of the Detaining Power, or of an ally of the said
Power;
3. He has joined a ship flying the flag of the Power on which he depends, or of an allied Power,
in the territorial waters of the Detaining Power, the said ship not being under the control of
the last-named Power.
Prisoners of war who have made good their escape in the sense of this Article and who are
recaptured, shall not be liable to any punishment in respect of their previous escape.
ARTICLE 92
A prisoner of war who attempts to escape and is recaptured before having made good his escape
in the sense of Article 91 shall be liable only to a disciplinary punishment in respect of this act,
even if it is a repeated offence.
A prisoner of war who is recaptured shall be handed over without delay to the competent
military authority.
Article 88, fourth paragraph, notwithstanding, prisoners of war punished as a result of an
unsuccessful escape may be subjected to special surveillance. Such surveillance must not affect
the state of their health, must be undergone in a prisoner of war camp, and must not entail the
suppression of any of the safeguards granted them by the present Convention.
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ARTICLE 93
Escape or attempt to escape, even if it is a repeated offence, shall not be deemed an aggravating
circumstance if the prisoner of war is subjected to trial by judicial proceedings in respect of an
offence committed during his escape or attempt to escape.
In conformity with the principle stated in Article 83, offences committed by prisoners of war with
the sole intention of facilitating their escape and which do not entail any violence against life or
limb, such as offences against public property, theft without intention of self-enrichment, the
drawing up or use of false papers, the wearing of civilian clothing, shall occasion disciplinary
punishment only.
Prisoners of war who aid or abet an escape or an attempt to escape shall be liable on this count to
disciplinary punishment only.
ARTICLE 94
If an escaped prisoner of war is recaptured, the Power on which he depends shall be notified
thereof in the manner defined in Article 122, provided notification of his escape has been made.
ARTICLE 95
A prisoner of war accused of an offence against discipline shall not be kept in confinement
pending the hearing unless a member of the armed forces of the Detaining Power would be so
kept if he were accused of a similar offence, or if it is essential in the interests of camp order and
discipline.
Any period spent by a prisoner of war in confinement awaiting the disposal of an offence against
discipline shall be reduced to an absolute minimum and shall not exceed fourteen days.
The provisions of Articles 97 and 98 of this Chapter shall apply to prisoners of war who are in
confinement awaiting the disposal of offences against discipline.
ARTICLE 96
Acts which constitute offences against discipline shall be investigated immediately.
Without prejudice to the competence of courts and superior military authorities, disciplinary
punishment may be ordered only by an officer having disciplinary powers in his capacity as camp
commander, or by a responsible officer who replaces him or to whom he has delegated his
disciplinary powers.
In no case may such powers be delegated to a prisoner of war or be exercised by a prisoner of
war.
Before any disciplinary award is pronounced, the accused shall be given precise information
regarding the offences of which he is accused, and given an opportunity of explaining his conduct
and of defending himself. He shall be permitted, in particular, to call witnesses and to have
recourse, if necessary, to the services of a qualified interpreter. The decision shall be announced
to the accused prisoner of war and to the prisoners' representative.
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A record of disciplinary punishments shall be maintained by the camp commander and shall be
open to inspection by representatives of the Protecting Power.
ARTICLE 97
Prisoners of war shall not in any case be transferred to penitentiary establishments (prisons,
penitentiaries, convict prisons, etc.) to undergo disciplinary punishment therein.
All premises in which disciplinary punishments are undergone shall conform to the sanitary
requirements set forth in Article 25. A prisoner of war undergoing punishment shall be enabled
to keep himself in a state of cleanliness, in conformity with Article 29.
Officers and persons of equivalent status shall not be lodged in the same quarters as non-
commissioned officers or men.
Women prisoners of war undergoing disciplinary punishment shall be confined in separate
quarters from male prisoners of war and shall be under the immediate supervision of women.
ARTICLE 98
A prisoner of war undergoing confinement as a disciplinary punishment, shall continue to enjoy
the benefits of the provisions of this Convention except in so far as these are necessarily
rendered inapplicable by the mere fact that he is confined. In no case may he be deprived of the
benefits of the provisions of Articles 78 and 126.
A prisoner of war awarded disciplinary punishment may not be deprived of the prerogatives
attached to his rank.
Prisoners of war awarded disciplinary punishment shall be allowed to exercise and to stay in the
open air at least two hours daily.
They shall be allowed, on their request, to be present at the daily medical inspections. They shall
receive the attention which their state of health requires and, if necessary, shall be removed to
the camp infirmary or to a hospital.
They shall have permission to read and write, likewise to send and receive letters. Parcels and
remittances of money, however, may be withheld from them until the completion of the
punishment; they shall meanwhile be entrusted to the prisoners' representative, who will hand
over to the infirmary the perishable goods contained in such parcels.
III. JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
ARTICLE 99
No prisoner of war may be tried or sentenced for an act which is not forbidden by the law of the
Detaining Power or by international law, in force at the time the said act was committed.
No moral or physical coercion may be exerted on a prisoner of war in order to induce him to
admit himself guilty of the act of which he is accused.
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No prisoner of war may be convicted without having had an opportunity to present his defense
and the assistance of a qualified advocate or counsel.
ARTICLE 100
Prisoners of war and the Protecting Powers shall be informed as soon as possible of the offences
which are punishable by the death sentence under the laws of the Detaining Power.
Other offences shall not thereafter be made punishable by the death penalty without the
concurrence of the Power upon which the prisoners of war depend.
The death sentence cannot be pronounced on a prisoner of war unless the attention of the court
has, in accordance with Article 87, second paragraph, been particularly called to the fact that
since the accused is not a national of the Detaining Power, he is not bound to it by any duty of
allegiance, and that he is in its power as the result of circumstances independent of his own will.
ARTICLE 101
If the death penalty is pronounced on a prisoner of war, the sentence shall not be executed before
the expiration of a period of at least six months from the date when the Protecting Power
receives, at an indicated address, the detailed communication provided for in Article 107.
ARTICLE 102
A prisoner of war can be validly sentenced only if the sentence has been pronounced by the same
courts according to the same procedure as in the case of members of the armed forces of the
Detaining Power, and if, furthermore, the provisions of the present Chapter have been observed.
ARTICLE 103
Judicial investigations relating to a prisoner of war shall be conducted as rapidly as
circumstances permit and so that his trial shall take place as soon as possible. A prisoner of war
shall not be confined while awaiting trial unless a member of the armed forces of the Detaining
Power would be so confined if he were accused of a similar offence, or if it is essential to do so in
the interests of national security. In no circumstances shall this confinement exceed three
months.
Any period spent by a prisoner of war in confinement awaiting trial shall be deducted from any
sentence of imprisonment passed upon him and taken into account in fixing any penalty.
The provisions of Articles 97 and 98 of this Chapter shall apply to a prisoner of war whilst in
confinement awaiting trial.
ARTICLE 104
In any case in which the Detaining Power has decided to institute judicial proceedings against a
prisoner of war, it shall notify the Protecting Power as soon as possible and at least three weeks
before the opening of the trial. This period of three weeks shall run as from the day on which
such notification reaches the Protecting Power at the address previously indicated by the latter
to the Detaining Power.
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The said notification shall contain the following information:
1. Surname and first names of the prisoner of war, his rank, his army, regimental, personal or
serial number, his date of birth, and his profession or trade, if any;
2. Place of internment or confinement;
3. Specification of the charge or charges on which the prisoner of war is to be arraigned,
giving the legal provisions applicable;
4 . Designation of the court which will try the case, likewise the date and place fixed for the
opening of the trial.
The same communication shall be made by the Detaining Power to the prisoners' representative.
If no evidence is submitted, at the opening of a trial, that the notification referred to above was
received by the Protecting Power, by the prisoner of war and by the prisoners' representative
concerned, at least three weeks before the opening of the trial, then the latter cannot take place
and must be adjourned.
ARTICLE 105
The prisoner of war shall be entitled to assistance by one of his prisoner comrades, to defense by
a qualified advocate or counsel of his own choice, to the calling of witnesses and, if he deems
necessary, to the services of a competent interpreter. He shall be advised of these rights by the
Detaining Power in due time before the trial.
Failing a choice by the prisoner of war, the Protecting Power shall find him an advocate or
counsel, and shall have at least one week at its disposal for the purpose. The Detaining Power
shall deliver to the said Power, on request, a list of persons qualified to present the defense.
Failing a choice of an advocate or counsel by the prisoner of war or the Protecting Power, the
Detaining Power shall appoint a competent advocate or counsel to conduct the defense.
The advocate or counsel conducting the defense on behalf of the prisoner of war shall have at his
disposal a period of two weeks at least before the opening of the trial, as well as the necessary
facilities to prepare the defense of the accused. He may, in particular, freely visit the accused and
interview him in private. He may also confer with any witnesses for the defense, including
prisoners of war. He shall have the benefit of these facilities until the term of appeal or petition
has expired.
Particulars of the charge or charges on which the prisoner of war is to be arraigned, as well as
the documents which are generally communicated to the accused by virtue of the laws in force in
the armed forces of the Detaining Power, shall be communicated to the accused prisoner of war
in a language which he understands, and in good time before the opening of the trial. The same
communication in the same circumstances shall be made to the advocate or counsel conducting
the defense on behalf of the prisoner of war.
The representatives of the Protecting Power shall be entitled to attend the trial of the case,
unless, exceptionally, this is held in camera in the interest of State security. In such a case the
Detaining Power shall advise the Protecting Power accordingly.
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ARTICLE 106
Every prisoner of war shall have, in the same manner as the members of the armed forces of the
Detaining Power, the right of appeal or petition from any sentence pronounced upon him, with a
view to the quashing or revising of the sentence or the reopening of the trial. He shall be fully
informed of his right to appeal or petition and of the time limit within which he may do so.
ARTICLE 107
Any judgment and sentence pronounced upon a prisoner of war shall be immediately reported to
the Protecting Power in the form of a summary communication, which shall also indicate
whether he has the right of appeal with a view to the quashing of the sentence or the reopening
of the trial. This communication shall likewise be sent to the prisoners' representative concerned.
It shall also be sent to the accused prisoner of war in a language he understands, if the sentence
was not pronounced in his presence. The Detaining Power shall also immediately communicate
to the Protecting Power the decision of the prisoner of war to use or to waive his right of appeal.
Furthermore, if a prisoner of war is finally convicted or if a sentence pronounced on a prisoner of
war in the first instance is a death sentence, the Detaining Power shall as soon as possible
address to the Protecting Power a detailed communication containing:
1. The precise wording of the finding and sentence;
2. A summarized report of any preliminary investigation and of the trial, emphasizing in
particular the elements of the prosecution and the defense;
3. Notification, where applicable, of the establishment where the sentence will be served.
The communications provided for in the foregoing subparagraphs shall be sent to the Protecting
Power at the address previously made known to the Detaining Power.
ARTICLE 108
Sentences pronounced on prisoners of war after a conviction has become duly enforceable, shall
be served in the same establishments and under the same conditions as in the case of members
of the armed forces of the Detaining Power. These conditions shall in all cases conform to the
requirements of health and humanity.
A woman prisoner of war on whom such a sentence has been pronounced shall be confined in
separate quarters and shall be under the supervision of women.
In any case, prisoners of war sentenced to a penalty depriving them of their liberty shall retain
the benefit of the provisions of Articles 78 and 126 of the present Convention. Furthermore, they
shall be entitled to receive and dispatch correspondence, to receive at least one relief parcel
monthly, to take regular exercise in the open air, to have the medical care required by their state
of health, and the spiritual assistance they may desire. Penalties to which they may be subjected
shall be in accordance with the provisions of Article 87, third paragraph.
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PART IV TERMINATION OF CAPTIVITY
SECTION I DIRECT REPATRIATION AND ACCOMMODATION IN
NEUTRAL COUNTRIES
ARTICLE 109
Subject to the provisions of the third paragraph of this Article, Parties to the conflict are bound
to send back to their own country, regardless of number or rank, seriously wounded and
seriously sick prisoners of war, after having cared for them until they are fit to travel, in
accordance with the first paragraph of the following Article.
Throughout the duration of hostilities, Parties to the conflict shall endeavor, with the
cooperation of the neutral Powers concerned, to make arrangements for the accommodation in
neutral countries of the sick and wounded prisoners of war referred to in the second paragraph of
the following Article. They may, in addition, conclude agreements with a view to the direct
repatriation or internment in a neutral country of able-bodied prisoners of war who have
undergone a long period of captivity.
No sick or injured prisoner of war who is eligible for repatriation under the first paragraph of
this Article, may be repatriated against his will during hostilities.
ARTICLE 110
The following shall be repatriated direct:
1. Incurably wounded and sick whose mental or physical fitness seems to have been gravely
diminished.
2. Wounded and sick who, according to medical opinion, are not likely to recover within one
year, whose condition requires treatment and whose mental or physical fitness seems to have
been gravely diminished.
3. Wounded and sick who have recovered, but whose mental or physical fitness seems to have
been gravely and permanently diminished.
The following may be accommodated in a neutral country:
1. Wounded and sick whose recovery may be expected within one year of the date of the
wound or the beginning of the illness, if treatment in a neutral country might increase the
prospects of a more certain and speedy recovery.
2. Prisoners of war whose mental or physical health, according to medical opinion, is seriously
threatened by continued captivity, but whose accommodation in a neutral country might
remove such a threat.
The conditions which prisoners of war accommodated in a neutral country must fulfil in order to
permit their repatriation shall be fixed, as shall likewise their status, by agreement between the
Powers concerned. In general, prisoners of war who have been accommodated in a neutral
country, and who belong to the following categories, should be repatriated:
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1. Those whose state of health has deteriorated so as to fulfil the conditions laid down for
direct repatriation;
2. Those whose mental or physical powers remain, even after treatment, considerably
impaired.
If no special agreements are concluded between the Parties to the conflict concerned, to
determine the cases of disablement or sickness entailing direct repatriation or accommodation in
a neutral country, such cases shall be settled in accordance with the principles laid down in the
Model Agreement concerning direct repatriation and accommodation in neutral countries of
wounded and sick prisoners of war and in the Regulations concerning Mixed Medical
Commissions annexed to the present Convention.
ARTICLE 111
The Detaining Power, the Power on which the prisoners of war depend, and a neutral Power
agreed upon by these two Powers, shall endeavor to conclude agreements which will enable
prisoners of war to be interned in the territory of the said neutral Power until the close of
hostilities.
ARTICLE 112
Upon the outbreak of hostilities, Mixed Medical Commissions shall be appointed to examine sick
and wounded prisoners of war, and to make all appropriate decisions regarding them. The
appointment, duties and functioning of these Commissions shall be in conformity with the
provisions of the Regulations annexed to the present Convention.
However, prisoners of war who, in the opinion of the medical authorities of the Detaining Power,
are manifestly seriously injured or seriously sick, may be repatriated without having to be
examined by a Mixed Medical Commission.
ARTICLE 113
Besides those who are designated by the medical authorities of the Detaining Power, wounded or
sick prisoners of war belonging to the categories listed below shall be entitled to present
themselves for examination by the Mixed Medical Commissions provided for in the foregoing
Article:
1. Wounded and sick proposed by a physician or surgeon who is of the same nationality, or a
national of a Party to the conflict allied with the Power on which the said prisoners depend,
and who exercises his functions in the camp.
2. Wounded and sick proposed by their prisoners' representative.
3. Wounded and sick proposed by the Power on which they depend, or by an organization duly
recognized by the said Power and giving assistance to the prisoners.
Prisoners of war who do not belong to one of the three foregoing categories may nevertheless
present themselves for examination by Mixed Medical Commissions, but shall be examined only
after those belonging to the said categories.
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The physician or surgeon of the same nationality as the prisoners who present themselves for
examination by the Mixed Medical Commission, likewise the prisoners' representative of the said
prisoners, shall have permission to be present at the examination.
ARTICLE 114
Prisoners of war who meet with accidents shall, unless the injury is self-inflicted, have the
benefit of the provisions of this Convention as regards repatriation or accommodation in a
neutral country.
ARTICLE 115
No prisoner of war on whom a disciplinary punishment has been imposed and who is eligible for
repatriation or for accommodation in a neutral country, may be kept back on the plea that he has
not undergone his punishment.
Prisoners of war detained in connection with a judicial prosecution or conviction and who are
designated for repatriation or accommodation in a neutral country, may benefit by such
measures before the end of the proceedings or the completion of the punishment, if the Detaining
Power consents.
Parties to the conflict shall communicate to each other the names of those who will be detained
until the end of the proceedings or the completion of the punishment.
ARTICLE 116
The costs of repatriating prisoners of war or of transporting them to a neutral country shall be
borne, from the frontiers of the Detaining Power, by the Power on which the said prisoners
depend.
ARTICLE 117
No repatriated person may be employed on active military service.
SECTION II RELEASE AND REPATRIATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR
AT THE CLOSE OF HOSTILITIES
ARTICLE 118
Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active
hostilities.
In the absence of stipulations to the above effect in any agreement concluded between the Parties
to the conflict with a view to the cessation of hostilities, or failing any such agreement, each of
the Detaining Powers shall itself establish and execute without delay a plan of repatriation in
conformity with the principle laid down in the foregoing paragraph.
In either case, the measures adopted shall be brought to the knowledge of the prisoners of war.
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The costs of repatriation of prisoners of war shall in all cases be equitably apportioned between
the Detaining Power and the Power on which the prisoners depend. This apportionment shall be
carried out on the following basis:
(a) If the two Powers are contiguous, the Power on which the prisoners of war depend shall
bear the costs of repatriation from the frontiers of the Detaining Power.
(b) If the two Powers are not contiguous, the Detaining Power shall bear the costs of transport
of prisoners of war over its own territory as far as its frontier or its port of embarkation
nearest to the territory of the Power on which the prisoners of war depend. The Parties
concerned shall agree between themselves as to the equitable apportionment of the remaining
costs of the repatriation. The conclusion of this agreement shall in no circumstances justify
any delay in the repatriation of the prisoners of war.
ARTICLE 119
Repatriation shall be effected in conditions similar to those laid down in Articles 46 to 48
inclusive of the present Convention for the transfer of prisoners of war, having regard to the
provisions of Article 118 and to those of the following paragraphs.
On repatriation, any articles of value impounded from prisoners of war under Article 18, and any
foreign currency which has not been converted into the currency of the Detaining Power, shall be
restored to them. Articles of value and foreign currency which, for any reason whatever, are not
restored to prisoners of war on repatriation, shall be dispatched to the Information Bureau set
up under Article 122.
Prisoners of war shall be allowed to take with them their personal effects, and any
correspondence and parcels which have arrived for them. The weight of such baggage may be
limited, if the conditions of repatriation so require, to what each prisoner can reasonably carry.
Each prisoner shall in all cases be authorized to carry at least twenty-five kilograms.
The other personal effects of the repatriated prisoner shall be left in the charge of the Detaining
Power which shall have them forwarded to him as soon as it has concluded an agreement to this
effect, regulating the conditions of transport and the payment of the costs involved, with the
Power on which the prisoner depends.
Prisoners of war against whom criminal proceedings for an indictable offence are pending may be
detained until the end of such proceedings, and, if necessary, until the completion of the
punishment. The same shall apply to prisoners of war already convicted for an indictable offence.
Parties to the conflict shall communicate to each other the names of any prisoners of war who
are detained until the end of the proceedings or until punishment has been completed.
By agreement between the Parties to the conflict, commissions shall be established for the
purpose of searching for dispersed prisoners of war and of assuring their repatriation with the
least possible delay.
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SECTION III DEATH OF PRISONERS OF WAR
ARTICLE 120
Wills of prisoners of war shall be drawn up so as to satisfy the conditions of validity required by
the legislation of their country of origin, which will take steps to inform the Detaining Power of
its requirements in this respect. At the request of the prisoner of war and, in all cases, after
death, the will shall be transmitted without delay to the Protecting Power; a certified copy shall
be sent to the Central Agency.
Death certificates in the form annexed to the present Convention, or lists certified by a
responsible officer, of all persons who die as prisoners of war shall be forwarded as rapidly as
possible to the Prisoner of War Information Bureau established in accordance with Article 122.
The death certificates or certified lists shall show particulars of identity as set out in the third
paragraph of Article 17, and also the date and place of death, the cause of death, the date and
place of burial and all particulars necessary to identify the graves.
The burial or cremation of a prisoner of war shall be preceded by a medical examination of the
body with a view to confirming death and enabling a report to be made and, where necessary,
establishing identity.
The detaining authorities shall ensure that prisoners of war who have died in captivity are
honorably buried, if possible according to the rites of the religion to which they belonged, and
that their graves are respected, suitably maintained and marked so as to be found at any time.
Wherever possible, deceased prisoners of war who depended on the same Power shall be interred
in the same place.
Deceased prisoners of war shall be buried in individual graves unless unavoidable circumstances
require the use of collective graves. Bodies may be cremated only for imperative reasons of
hygiene, on account of the religion of the deceased or in accordance with his express wish to this
effect. In case of cremation, the fact shall be stated and the reasons given in the death certificate
of the deceased.
In order that graves may always be found, all particulars of burials and graves shall be recorded
with a Graves Registration Service established by the Detaining Power. Lists of graves and
particulars of the prisoners of war interred in cemeteries and elsewhere shall be transmitted to
the Power on which such prisoners of war depended. Responsibility for the care of these graves
and for records of any subsequent moves of the bodies shall rest on the Power controlling the
territory, if a Party to the present Convention. These provisions shall also apply to the ashes,
which shall be kept by the Graves Registration Service until proper disposal thereof in
accordance with the wishes of the home country.
ARTICLE 121
Every death or serious injury of a prisoner of war caused or suspected to have been caused by a
sentry, another prisoner of war, or any other person, as well as any death the cause of which is
unknown, shall be immediately followed by an official enquiry by the Detaining Power.
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A communication on this subject shall be sent immediately to the Protecting Power. Statements
shall be taken from witnesses, especially from those who are prisoners of war, and a report
including such statements shall be forwarded to the Protecting Power.
If the enquiry indicates the guilt of one or more persons, the Detaining Power shall take all
measures for the prosecution of the person or persons responsible.
PART V INFORMATION BUREAU AND RELIEF SOCIETIES FOR
PRISONERS OF WAR
ARTICLE 122
Upon the outbreak of a conflict and in all cases of occupation, each of the Parties to the conflict
shall institute an official Information Bureau for prisoners of war who are in its power. Neutral
or non-belligerent Powers who may have received within their territory persons belonging to one
of the categories referred to in Article 4, shall take the same action with respect to such persons.
The Power concerned shall ensure that the Prisoners of War Information Bureau is provided
with the necessary accommodation, equipment and staff to ensure its efficient working. It shall
be at liberty to employ prisoners of war in such a Bureau under the conditions laid down in the
Section of the present Convention dealing with work by prisoners of war.
Within the shortest possible period, each of the Parties to the conflict shall give its Bureau the
information referred to in the fourth, fifth and sixth paragraphs of this Article regarding any
enemy person belonging to one of the categories referred to in Article 4, who has fallen into its
power. Neutral or non-belligerent Powers shall take the same action with regard to persons
belonging to such categories whom they have received within their territory.
The Bureau shall immediately forward such information by the most rapid means to the Powers
concerned, through the intermediary of the Protecting Powers and likewise of the Central
Agency provided for in Article 123.
This information shall make it possible quickly to advise the next of kin concerned. Subject to the
provisions of Article 17, the information shall include, in so far as available to the Information
Bureau, in respect of each prisoner of war, his surname, first names, rank, army, regimental,
personal or serial number, place and full date of birth, indication of the Power on which he
depends, first name of the father and maiden name of the mother, name and address of the
person to be informed and the address to which correspondence for the prisoner may be sent.
The Information Bureau shall receive from the various departments concerned information
regarding transfers, releases, repatriations, escapes, admissions to hospital, and deaths, and
shall transmit such information in the manner described in the third paragraph above.
Likewise, information regarding the state of health of prisoners of war who are seriously ill or
seriously wounded shall be supplied regularly, every week if possible.
The Information Bureau shall also be responsible for replying to all inquiries sent to it
concerning prisoners of war, including those who have died in captivity; it will make any
inquiries necessary to obtain the information which is asked for if this is not in its possession.
All written communications made by the Bureau shall be authenticated by a signature or a seal.
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The Information Bureau shall furthermore be charged with collecting all personal valuables,
including sums in currencies other than that of the Detaining Power and documents of
importance to the next of kin, left by prisoners of war who have been repatriated or released, or
who have escaped or died, and shall forward the said valuables to the Powers concerned. Such
articles shall be sent by the Bureau in sealed packets which shall be accompanied by statements
giving clear and full particulars of the identity of the person to whom the articles belonged, and
by a complete list of the contents of the parcel. Other personal effects of such prisoners of war
shall be transmitted under arrangements agreed upon between the Parties to the conflict
concerned.
ARTICLE 123
A Central Prisoners of War Information Agency shall be created in a neutral country. The
International Committee of the Red Cross shall, if it deems necessary, propose to the Powers
concerned the organization of such an Agency.
The function of the Agency shall be to collect all the information it may obtain through official or
private channels respecting prisoners of war, and to transmit it as rapidly as possible to the
country of origin of the prisoners of war or to the Power on which they depend. It shall receive
from the Parties to the conflict all facilities for effecting such transmissions.
The High Contracting Parties, and in particular those whose nationals benefit by the services of
the Central Agency, are requested to give the said Agency the financial aid it may require.
The foregoing provisions shall in no way be interpreted as restricting the humanitarian activities
of the International Committee of the Red Cross, or of the relief Societies provided for in Article
125.
ARTICLE 124
The national Information Bureau and the Central Information Agency shall enjoy free postage
for mail, likewise all the exemptions provided for in Article 74, and further, so far as possible,
exemption from telegraphic charges or, at least, greatly reduced rates.
ARTICLE 125
Subject to the measures which the Detaining Powers may consider essential to ensure their
security or to meet any other reasonable need, the representatives of religious organizations,
relief societies, or any other organization assisting prisoners of war, shall receive from the said
Powers, for themselves and their duly accredited agents, all necessary facilities for visiting the
prisoners, distributing relief supplies and material, from any source, intended for religious,
educational or recreative purposes, and for assisting them in organizing their leisure time within
the camps. Such societies or organizations may be constituted in the territory of the Detaining
Power or in any other country, or they may have an international character.
The Detaining Power may limit the number of societies and organizations whose delegates are
allowed to carry out their activities in its territory and under its supervision, on condition,
however, that such limitation shall not hinder the effective operation of adequate relief to all
prisoners of war.
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The special position of the International Committee of the Red Cross in this field shall be
recognized and respected at all times.
As soon as relief supplies or material intended for the above-mentioned purposes are handed
over to prisoners of war, or very shortly afterwards, receipts for each consignment, signed by the
prisoners' representative, shall be forwarded to the relief society or organization making the
shipment. At the same time, receipts for these consignments shall be supplied by the
administrative authorities responsible for guarding the prisoners.
PART VI EXECUTION OF THE CONVENTION
SECTION I GENERAL PROVISIONS
ARTICLE 126
Representatives or delegates of the Protecting Powers shall have permission to go to all places
where prisoners of war may be, particularly to places of internment, imprisonment and labor,
and shall have access to all premises occupied by prisoners of war; they shall also be allowed to
go to the places of departure, passage and arrival of prisoners who are being transferred. They
shall be able to interview the prisoners, and in particular the prisoners' representatives, without
witnesses, either personally or through an interpreter.
Representatives and delegates of the Protecting Powers shall have full liberty to select the places
they wish to visit. The duration and frequency of these visits shall not be restricted. Visits may
not be prohibited except for reasons of imperative military necessity, and then only as an
exceptional and temporary measure.
The Detaining Power and the Power on which the said prisoners of war depend may agree, if
necessary, that compatriots of these prisoners of war be permitted to participate in the visits.
The delegates of the International Committee of the Red Cross shall enjoy the same
prerogatives. The appointment of such delegates shall be submitted to the approval of the Power
detaining the prisoners of war to be visited.
ARTICLE 127
The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time of peace as in time of war, to disseminate the
text of the present Convention as widely as possible in their respective countries, and, in
particular, to include the study thereof in their programs of military and, if possible, civil
instruction, so that the principles thereof may become known to all their armed forces and to the
entire population.
Any military or other authorities, who in time of war assume responsibilities in respect of
prisoners of war, must possess the text of the Convention and be specially instructed as to its
provisions.
ARTICLE 128
The High Contracting Parties shall communicate to one another through the Swiss Federal
Council and, during hostilities, through the Protecting Powers, the official translations of the
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6 September 2006
present Convention, as well as the laws and regulations which they may adopt to ensure the
application thereof.
ARTICLE 129
The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective
penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches of
the present Convention defined in the following Article.
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have
committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such
persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in
accordance with the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another
High Contracting Party concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima
facie case.
Each High Contracting Party shall take measures necessary for the suppression of all acts
contrary to the provisions of the present Convention other than the grave breaches defined in the
following Article.
In all circumstances, the accused persons shall benefit by safeguards of proper trial and defense,
which shall not be less favorable than those provided by Article 105 and those following of the
present Convention.
ARTICLE 130
Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of the
following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the Convention: willful
killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, willfully causing great
suffering or serious injury to body or health, compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of
the hostile Power, or willfully depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular trial
prescribed in this Convention.
ARTICLE 131
No High Contracting Party shall be allowed to absolve itself or any other High Contracting Party
of any liability incurred by itself or by another High Contracting Party in respect of breaches
referred to in the preceding Article.
ARTICLE 132
At the request of a Party to the conflict, an enquiry shall be instituted, in a manner to be decided
between the interested Parties, concerning any alleged violation of the Convention.
If agreement has not been reached concerning the procedure for the enquiry, the Parties should
agree on the choice of an umpire who will decide upon the procedure to be followed.
Once the violation has been established, the Parties to the conflict shall put an end to it and
shall repress it with the least possible delay.
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SECTION II FINAL PROVISIONS
ARTICLE 133
The present Convention is established in English and in French. Both texts are equally
authentic. The Swiss Federal Council shall arrange for official translations of the Convention to
be made in the Russian and Spanish languages.
ARTICLE 134
The present Convention replaces the Convention of 27 July 1929, in relations between the High
Contracting Parties.
ARTICLE 135
In the relations between the Powers which are bound by The Hague Convention respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land, whether that of July 29, 1899, or that of October 18, 1907,
and which are parties to the present Convention, this last Convention shall be complementary to
Chapter II of the Regulations annexed to the above-mentioned Conventions of The Hague.
ARTICLE 136
The present Convention, which bears the date of this day, is open to signature until February 12,
1950, in the name of the Powers represented at the Conference which opened at Geneva on April
21, 1949; furthermore, by Powers not represented at that Conference, but which are parties to
the Convention of July 27, 1929.
ARTICLE 137
The present Convention shall be ratified as soon as possible and the ratifications shall be
deposited at Berne.
A record shall be drawn up of the deposit of each instrument of ratification and certified copies of
this record shall be transmitted by the Swiss Federal Council to all the Powers in whose name
the Convention has been signed, or whose accession has been notified.
ARTICLE 138
The present Convention shall come into force six months after not less than two instruments of
ratification have been deposited.
Thereafter, it shall come into force for each High Contracting Party six months after the deposit
of the instrument of ratification.
ARTICLE 139
From the date of its coming into force, it shall be open to any Power in whose name the present
Convention has not been signed, to accede to this Convention.
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ARTICLE 140
Accessions shall be notified in writing to the Swiss Federal Council, and shall take effect six
months after the date on which they are received.
The Swiss Federal Council shall communicate the accessions to all the Powers in whose name
the Convention has been signed, or whose accession has been notified.
ARTICLE 141
The situations provided for in Articles 2 and 3 shall give immediate effect to ratifications
deposited and accessions notified by the Parties to the conflict before or after the beginning of
hostilities or occupation. The Swiss Federal Council shall communicate by the quickest method
any ratifications or accessions received from Parties to the conflict.
ARTICLE 142
Each of the High Contracting Parties shall be at liberty to denounce the present Convention.
The denunciation shall be notified in writing to the Swiss Federal Council, which shall transmit
it to the Governments of all the High Contracting Parties.
The denunciation shall take effect one year after the notification thereof has been made to the
Swiss Federal Council. However, a denunciation of which notification has been made at a time
when the denouncing Power is involved in a conflict shall not take effect until peace has been
concluded, and until after operations connected with the release and repatriation of the persons
protected by the present Convention have been terminated.
The denunciation shall have effect only in respect of the denouncing Power. It shall in no way
impair the obligations which the Parties to the conflict shall remain bound to fulfill by virtue of
the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized
peoples, from the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience.
ARTICLE 143
The Swiss Federal Council shall register the present Convention with the Secretariat of the
United Nations. The Swiss Federal Council shall also inform the Secretariat of the United
Nations of all ratifications, accessions and denunciations received by it with respect to the
present Convention.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, having deposited their respective full powers, have
signed the present Convention.
DONE at Geneva this twelfth day of August 1949, in the English and French languages. The
original shall be deposited in the Archives of the Swiss Confederation. The Swiss Federal Council
shall transmit certified copies thereof to each of the signatory and acceding States.
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SECTION II. GENEVA CONVENTIONS RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF
CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR (FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION)
The following excerpted articles from the Geneva Conventions contain requirements concerning
the treatment of civilians during time of war. Violations of these articles can constitute war
crimes and should be treated as such.
PART I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 1
The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present
Convention in all circumstances.
Article 2
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the present Convention
shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between
two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of
them.
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a
High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention, the Powers
who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall
furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts and
applies the provisions thereof.
Article 3
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of
the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum,
the following provisions:
1. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have
laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any
other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction
founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place
whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and
torture;
(b) Taking of hostages;
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(c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;
(d) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment
pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
2. The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may
offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special
agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the
conflict.
Article 4
Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given moment and in any manner
whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the
conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.
Nationals of a State which is not bound by the Convention are not protected by it.
Nationals of a neutral State who find themselves in the territory of a belligerent State, and
nationals of a co-belligerent State, shall not be regarded as protected persons while the State of
which they are nationals has normal diplomatic representation in the State in whose hands they
are.
The provisions of Part II are, however, wider in application, as defined in Article 13.
Persons protected by the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949, or by the Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea of August 12, 1949, or by the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949, shall not be considered as protected persons within the
meaning of the present Convention.
Article 5
Where, in the territory of a Party to the conflict, the latter is satisfied that an individual
protected person is definitely suspected of or engaged in activities hostile to the security of the
State, such individual person shall not be entitled to claim such rights and privileges under the
present Convention as would, if exercised in the favour of such individual person, be prejudicial
to the security of such State.
Where in occupied territory an individual protected person is detained as a spy or saboteur, or as
a person under definite suspicion of activity hostile to the security of the Occupying Power, such
person shall, in those cases where absolute military security so requires, be regarded as having
forfeited rights of communication under the present Convention.
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In each case, such persons shall nevertheless be treated with humanity, and in case of trial, shall
not be deprived of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed by the present Convention. They
shall also be granted the full rights and privileges of a protected person under the present
Convention at the earliest date consistent with the security of the State or Occupying Power, as
the case may be.
Article 25
All persons in the territory of a Party to the conflict, or in a territory occupied by it, shall be
enabled to give news of a strictly personal nature to members of their families, wherever they
may be, and to receive news from them. This correspondence shall be forwarded speedily and
without undue delay.
If, as a result of circumstances, it becomes difficult or impossible to exchange family
correspondence by the ordinary post, the Parties to the conflict concerned shall apply to a neutral
intermediary, such as the Central Agency provided for in Article 140, and shall decide in
consultation with it how to ensure the fulfillment of their obligations under the best possible
conditions, in particular with the cooperation of the National Red Cross (Red Crescent, Red Lion
and Sun) Societies.
If the Parties to the conflict deem it necessary to restrict family correspondence, such restrictions
shall be confined to the compulsory use of standard forms containing twenty-five freely chosen
words, and to the limitation of the number of these forms dispatched to one each month.
PART III
STATUS AND TREATMENT OF PROTECTED PERSONS
SECTION I
PROVISIONS COMMON TO THE TERRITORIES OF THE PARTIES
TO THE CONFLICT AND TO OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
Article 27
Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour,
their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs.
They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of
violence or threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity.
Women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against
rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault.
Without prejudice to the provisions relating to their state of health, age and sex, all protected
persons shall be treated with the same consideration by the Party to the conflict in whose power
they are, without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, religion or political
opinion.
However, the Parties to the conflict may take such measures of control and security in regard to
protected persons as may be necessary as a result of the war.
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Article 28
The presence of a protected person may not be used to render certain points or areas immune
from military operations.
Article 29
The Party to the conflict in whose hands protected persons may be is responsible for the
treatment accorded to them by its agents, irrespective of any individual responsibility which may
be incurred.
Article 30
Protected persons shall have every facility for making application to the Protecting Powers, the
International Committee of the Red Cross, the National Red Cross (Red Crescent, Red Lion and
Sun) Society of the country where they may be, as well as to any organization that might assist
them.
These several organizations shall be granted all facilities for that purpose by the authorities,
within the bounds set by military or security considerations.
Apart from the visits of the delegates of the Protecting Powers and of the International
Committee of the Red Cross, provided for by Article 143, the Detaining or Occupying Powers
shall facilitate as much as possible visits to protected persons by the representatives of other
organizations whose object is to give spiritual aid or material relief to such persons.
Article 31
No physical or moral coercion shall be exercised against protected persons, in particular
to obtain information from them or from third parties.
Article 32
The High Contracting Parties specifically agree that each of them is prohibited from taking any
measure of such a character as to cause the physical suffering or extermination of protected
persons in their hands. This prohibition applies not only to murder, torture, corporal
punishment, mutilation and medical or scientific experiments not necessitated by the medical
treatment of a protected person but also to any other measures of brutality whether applied by
civilian or military agents.
Article 33
No protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally committed.
Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited.
Pillage is prohibited.
Reprisals against protected persons and their property are prohibited.
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Article 34
The taking of hostages is prohibited.
SECTION II
ALIENS IN THE TERRORITY OF A PARTY TO THE CONFLICT
Article 41
Should the Power in whose hands protected persons may be consider the measures of control
mentioned in the present Convention to be inadequate, it may not have recourse to any other
measure of control more severe than that of assigned residence or internment, in accordance
with the provisions of Articles 42 and 43.
In applying the provisions of Article 39, second paragraph, to the cases of persons required to
leave their usual places of residences by virtue of a decision placing them in assigned residence
elsewhere, the Detaining Power shall be guided as closely as possible by the standards of welfare
set forth in Part III, Section IV of this Convention.
Article 42
The internment or placing in assigned residence of protected persons may be ordered only if the
security of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary.
If any person, acting through the representatives of the Protecting Power, voluntarily demands
internment, and if his situation renders this step necessary, he shall be interned by the Power in
whose hands he may be.
Article 43
Any protected person who has been interned or placed in assigned residence shall be entitled to
have such action reconsidered as soon as possible by an appropriate court or administrative
board designated by the Detaining Power for that purpose. If the internment or placing in
assigned residence is maintained, the court or administrative board shall periodically, and at
least twice yearly, give consideration to his or her case, with a view to the favourable amendment
of the initial decision, if circumstances permit.
Unless the protected persons concerned object, the Detaining Power shall, as rapidly as possible,
give the Protecting Power the names of any protected persons who have been interned or
subjected to assigned residence, or who have been released from internment or assigned
residence. The decisions of the courts or boards mentioned in the first paragraph of the present
Article shall also, subject to the same conditions, be notified as rapidly as possible to the
Protecting Power.
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Article 44
In applying the measures of control mentioned in the present Convention, the Detaining Power
shall not treat as enemy aliens exclusively on the basis of their nationality de jure of an enemy
State, refugees who do not, in fact, enjoy the protection of any government.
FM 2-22.3
Appendix B
Source and Information Reliability Matrix
SOURCE RELIABILITY
B-1. Reliability ratings range from “Reliable†(A) to “Unreliable†(E) as shown
in Table B-1. In every instance the rating is based on previous reporting
from that source. If there has been no previous reporting, the source must be
rated as “Fâ€. [NOTE: An “F†rating does not necessarily mean that the
source cannot be trusted, but that there is no reporting history and therefore
no basis for making a determination.]
Table B-1. Evaluation of Source Reliability.
A Reliable
No
doubt
of authenticity, trustworthiness, or
competency; has a history of complete reliability
B
Usually Reliable
Minor doubt
about authenticity, trustworthiness,
or competency; has a history of valid information
most of the time
C Fairly
Reliable Doubt
of authenticity, trustworthiness, or
competency but has provided valid information in
the past
D Not
Usually
Reliable
Significant doubt
about authenticity,
trustworthiness, or competency but has provided
valid information in the past
E Unreliable
Lacking
in authenticity, trustworthiness, and
competency; history of invalid information
F Cannot
Be
Judged
No basis
exists for evaluating the reliability of the
source
INFORMATION CONTENT
B-2. The highest degree of confidence in reported information is given to that
which has been confirmed by outside sources, “1â€. Table B-2 shows evalua-
tion of information content. The degree of confidence decreases if the
information is not confirmed, and/or does not seem to make sense. The
lowest evaluated rating of “5†means that the information is considered to be
false. [NOTE: A rating of “6†does not necessarily mean false information,
but is generally used to indicate that no determination can be made since the
information is completely new.]
6 September 2006
B-1
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
Table B-2. Evaluation of Information Content.
1 Confirmed Confirmed
by other independent sources;
logical
in itself;
Consistent
with other
information on the subject
2 Probably
True
Not confirmed;
logical
in itself;
consistent
with
other information on the subject
3 Possibly
True
Not confirmed;
reasonably logical
in itself;
agrees with some
other information on the
subject
4 Doubtfully
True
Not confirmed; possible but
not logical
;
no
other information
on the subject
5 Improbable
Not confirmed;
not logical
in itself;
contradicted
by other information on the
subject
6 Cannot
Be
Judged
No basis
exists for evaluating the validity of the
information
6 September 2006
B-2
FM 2-22.3
Appendix C
Pre-Deployment Planning
HUMINT leaders must anticipate, identify, consider, and evaluate all
potential threats. They must take advantage of enhanced information flow
through hierarchical and nonhierarchical networks (computer,
communications, and personnel). HCTs should––
•
Review available databases on assigned contingency AOIs; review
existing IPB products, conduct IPB on these AOIs; and develop
appropriate IPB products. Information on databases created for
specific contingencies can be gotten from the J2X.
•
Continually monitor and update their OPLANs to reflect the evolving
situation.
•
Be aware of higher headquarters SOPs and DIA manuals for specific
ISR management guidance.
•
Prepare and practice an intelligence “surge†on likely contingency
crises.
•
Prepare and practice coordination from pre-deployment through
redeployment with personnel from HUMINT, IMINT, MASINT,
SIGINT, CA, PSYOP, SOF units, MP, and Engineers.
•
Plan for requirements to support 24-hour operations: automation,
communications capacity, and personnel necessary to provide
continuous intelligence information collection and RM, processing, and
reporting.
•
Plan and coordinate for linguistic support.
•
Forward all RFIs to higher headquarters in accordance with SOPs.
•
Prepare and practice coordination with units they will support during
pre-deployment exercises. Liaison must be conducted with
commanders, S2s, administrative support personnel, logistical support
personnel, communications personnel, and others. Obtain supported
unit’s briefing slide formats.
•
Obtain copies of the supported unit’s SOPs and ensure all team
members are aware of the procedures governing HUMINT interface.
•
Ensure that team data processing equipment is compatible with the
supported unit’s network structure and that appropriate interfaces are
available.
•
Exercise unit deployment SOPs, load plans, and packing lists.
Helpful Unclassified Links:
•
https://portal.rccb.osis.gov/index.jsp
Service home page.
•
International news compiled by the US
Department of Commerce.
6 September 2006
C-1
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
•
Department of State’s Bureau of
Intelligence and Research home page. Contains country and region-
specific information, policies, and warnings.
•
Early Bird News Service of the Armed Forces
Information Service.
•
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)
(formerly National Imagery and Mapping Agency).
•
http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/cshome.html#toc
Country Studies from
the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress.
6 September 2006
C-2
FM 2-22.3
6 September 2006
D-1
Appendix D
S2 Guide for Handling Detainees, Captured Enemy
Documents, and Captured Enemy Equipment
D-1.
Detainees, retained personnel, CEDs, and CEE are critical sources of
combat intelligence. Often the Maneuver Battalion S2 is the first MI officer
to encounter these sources. His actions are critical to the exploitation system.
Information from these items is time sensitive, and these information sources
need to be exploited at as low an echelon as possible. The S2 should
anticipate requirements for support based on planned missions and request
HUMINT collector support as necessary. If unable to receive HUMINT
collector support, the S2 must be prepared to exploit these sources of
information to the best of his ability and more importantly expedite their
evacuation to locations and units where they can be exploited.
PURPOSE
D-2.
This guide is for battalion and brigade S2s. It explains standard
procedures on what the S2 should do when his unit—
•
Captures an enemy soldier or other detainee.
•
Encounters a civilian on the battlefield.
•
Finds or captures an enemy document.
•
Discovers an unusual enemy weapon or other unusual piece of
equipment during tactical operations.
PERSONNEL HANDLING
D-3.
The GPW defines persons entitled to treatment as prisoners of war upon
capture, in Article 4 (see Appendix A, Section I).
D-4.
The GC defines the civilian population (exclusive of those civilian
persons listed in GPW, Article 4) who benefit to varying degrees from the
provisions of the Geneva Conventions. (See Appendix A, Sections II and III.)
D-5.
Persons in each of these categories have distinct rights, duties, and
restrictions. Persons who are not members of the Armed Forces, as defined in
Article 4, GPW, who bear arms or engage in other conduct hostile to the
enemy thereby deprive themselves of many of the privileges attaching to the
members of the civilian population. The capturing unit treats all combatants
and noncombatants who are suspected of being part of the threat force as
EPWs or retained personnel until their status can be determined. This
determination normally occurs at the detainee collection point or at a higher
echelon. Noncombatants are handled, questioned, detained, evacuated, and
released in accordance with theater policy. In all cases, detainees are treated
humanely.
FM 2-22.3
_________________________________________________________________________________________
D-2
6 September 2006
D-6.
Detainees are treated humanely but with firmness at all times. High
standards of discipline are required not only of detainees but also of
capturing and escort forces. Fraternization with detainees or mistreatment
or abuse of them is not only a violation but also is not conducive to good
discipline. In addition to not being conducive to good discipline, the
mistreatment or abuse of detainees is a violation of the UCMJ for which
violators may be punished. The control of detainees is exercised through the
issuance and firm enforcement of necessary instructions in their own
language. Instructions relating to their control during evacuation from the
combat zone should be as brief as possible. Care must be taken to ensure that
detainees have a clear understanding of all instructions to them.
D-7.
At the capture point, the capturing element performs the following steps
on detainees. The senior soldier will ensure that the steps are performed. The
steps are referred to as the "Five S's and a T".
STEP 1. SEARCH
D-8.
The capturing unit’s first job is to disarm, search, and maintain positive
control over all detainees. The detainees are disarmed and searched for
concealed weapons and for equipment and documents of particular
intelligence value immediately upon capture, unless the number of detainees
captured, enemy action, or other circumstances make such a search
impracticable. Until each detainee is searched, the responsible forces must be
alert to prevent the use of concealed weapons or destruction of documents or
equipment.
D-9.
The capturing unit gathers all loose CEDs and CEE in the area.
Identification documents and protective military equipment such as helmets
or NBC gear stay with the detainee unless otherwise directed by the
battalion S2.
•
Equipment
.
Items of personal or individual equipment that are new or
appear to be of a type not previously observed may be of intelligence
value and should be processed and reported in accordance with the
unit’s SOP, specific evacuation instructions in Annex B (Intelligence) of
the OPORD, and theater policy. Equipment for personal protection
such as protective masks or protective clothing may not be taken
unless replaced with equivalent equipment.
•
Documents. A CED is any piece of recorded information that has been
in the hands of the enemy. CEDs include but are not limited to maps,
sketches, photographs, orders, tactical and technical manuals and
instructions, code books, log books, maintenance records, shipping and
packing slips and lists, war and field diaries, personal diaries, pay
books, newspapers, service records, postal savings books, payrolls,
postcards and letters, and any written, printed, engraved, or
photographic matter that may contain information relative to the
enemy and to weather and terrain data. A capturing unit is normally
not able to accurately determine the potential intelligence value of any
documents found on the detainee. It is therefore normally expedient to
remove all documents, with the exception of the detainee’s primary
identification document. These documents are sealed in a waterproof
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
6 September 2006
D-3
container and tagged with part C of the capture tag. If capture tags are
not available, the document bag must be marked at a minimum to
identify the detainee to whom the documents belong (see Appendix I).
•
Personal effects. Except as provided in Step 1, detainees should be
permitted to retain all of their personal effects including money;
valuables; protective equipment, such as helmets, protective masks,
and like items; effects and articles used for clothing or eating, except
knives and forks; identification cards or tags; badges of grade and
nationality; and articles having a personal or sentimental value. When
items of equipment issued for the personal protection of detainees are
taken from them, they must be replaced with equivalent items serving
the same purpose. Although money and other valuables may be taken
from detainees as a security measure, they must then be receipted for
and a record thereof maintained in a special register. These
administrative steps normally are not practical to accomplish prior to
arrival of the detainee at an EPW camp.
STEP 2. SILENCE
D-10.
Detainees are kept silent so that they cannot plan deception or
encourage each other to resist. Keeping the detainees silent also prevents
them from relieving the stress and shock of capture by talking with others. If
the shock of capture is preserved, HUMINT collectors can take advantage of
it in an approach. The capturing unit instructs or signals the detainees to be
silent. If that does not work, the detainee is gagged. Guards give orders to
detainees, but do not converse with them or give them any comfort items.
STEP 3. SAFEGUARD
D-11.
All detainees are promptly evacuated out of the “danger†zone. Their
presence may not be used to render points or areas immune to attack, nor
should they be retained for participation in psychological warfare or other
activities. The capturing forces must protect detainees from reprisals.
Detainees will not be denied food, potable water, or appropriate clothing and
shelter. Necessary medical attention will not be delayed. Those detainees
held in an area should be provided protective facilities and equipment and
should be oriented as to procedures to be followed in case of chemical,
biological, and radiological agent attack.
STEP 4. SEGREGATE
D-12.
The capturing unit separates officers from enlisted, senior from junior,
male from female, and civilian from military within their capabilities to both
guard and safeguard the detainees. (Physical segregation at this point is not
always possible.) Deserters and people of different nationalities and
ideologies should be further segregated. The capturing unit prepares a
capture tag and puts one on each detainee (see Figure D-1). Tagging
procedures are discussed in paragraph D-16.
FM 2-22.3
_________________________________________________________________________________________
D-4
6 September 2006
STEP 5. SPEED TO THE REAR
D-13.
The capturing unit moves detainees and CEDs to the unit supply point
or other area where transportation to the rear is available for evacuation.
Evacuation of detainees from the combat zone should be effected within the
minimum time after capture. While in the combat zone, not only may
detainees become casualties as the result of enemy fire but also the fluidity of
operations, the wide dispersion of units, and the austerity of facilities may
necessitate their rapid evacuation.
D-14.
The normal evacuation channel is from the detainee collection point
through intermediate detainee holding areas to an internment facility at a
higher echelon. Available returning transportation, however, may bypass any
intermediate detainee holding area and proceed directly to a corps or theater
internment facility. Detainees will then be processed directly into the corps
or theater internment facility. Evacuation may be by foot, vehicle, rail,
aircraft, or ship. Evacuate detainees who are litter patients through medical
channels.
D-15.
The command (brigade and above) from which the detainees are being
evacuated is responsible to provide transportation and rations and for
coordinating all other matters related to the evacuation. Escort guards are
furnished by the command (division and above) to which the detainees are
being evacuated.
STEP 6. TAG
D-16.
When the detainees have been searched and segregated, the capturing
unit prepares a capture tag and puts one on each detainee. It is very
important that the capturing unit fill out the Capture Tag as accurately and
completely as possible. HUMINT collectors will use the information from
the tag when preparing to interrogate detainees. The “capturing unit†and
“location of capture†information will be used to provide direct feedback to
the capturing unit when information of immediate tactical value is obtained.
Each EPW tag has a different serial number used for the purpose of
accountability and cannot be reproduced. The EPW tag is perforated into
three parts: Part A is attached to the detainee, Part B is retained by the
capturing unit, and Part C is attached to the detainee’s property (see Figure
D-1).
DOCUMENT HANDLING
DOCUMENTS FOUND ON ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR
D-17.
The battalion S2 and subordinate unit commander ensure that CEDs
found on detainees are handled as follows. The capturing unit will—
•
Search each detainee.
•
Return identification documents to detainees. It may be preferable to
return only one identity document, to preclude the detainee from
spreading extras around to cause confusion. The preferred ID
document to return to the detainee is a picture ID (such as a military
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
6 September 2006
D-5
or government ID card). If the detainee has several identification
documents, the S2 returns the ID that most accurately reflects the
detainee’s official status. This might be a military ID for a soldier and
a passport or government-issue ID for a civilian. If the detainee has
several identification documents with different names, this may be an
indicator of CI interest. The S2 notifies the nearest CI unit.
•
Write the following on the top and bottom half of the EPW capture tag:
Number of documents taken, date and time, location and
circumstances of capture, capturing unit’s designation.
•
Put CEDs in a waterproof bag, one per detainee.
•
Affix Part C of the capture tag to the bag.
•
Give CEDs to the senior escort.
•
Direct the senior escort to evacuate CEDs with the detainee.
DOCUMENTS FOUND IN THE AO
D-18.
An example of CEDs found in the AO is paperwork discovered in an
overrun CP, but not on a detainee. The capturing unit will—
•
Put CEDs in a waterproof bag.
•
Follow the same procedures described above, and tag the bag.
•
Evacuate the CEDs to the battalion S2.
•
Evacuate all CEDs as dictated by Annex B of the OPORD. This is
normally through the MI chain (for example, from Battalion S2 to
Brigade S2, to the first HUMINT collection or DOCEX unit in the MI
chain). The S2 normally coordinates with the S4 for the use of supply
vehicles returning empty to the rear for the transportation of large
numbers of documents.
INITIAL DOCUMENT EXPLOITATION
D-19.
A combat unit without language-qualified personnel can perform
limited battlefield DOCEX, mainly on maps and overlays. The unit S2 is
normally responsible for any initial exploitation by the capturing unit. The
S2 safeguards the items pending disposition. At the same time he—
•
Looks over the document.
•
Does not mark or harm it in anyway.
•
Uses whatever resources are available to decipher it; for example,
dictionaries and enemy map symbol guides.
•
Looks for information that has a direct bearing on his current mission.
D-20.
The S2 extracts the combat information and uses the SALUTE format
as a template to organize the information.
FM 2-22.3
_________________________________________________________________________________________
D-6
6 September 2006
EQUIPMENT HANDLING PROCEDURES
D-21.
CEE includes all types of foreign materiel found on a detainee or in the
AO that may have military application. The capturing unit—
•
Always permits the detainee to keep protective equipment and
equipment for his personal well being unless this gear is replaced by
equivalent items by the capturing unit. This equipment includes
helmet, NBC gear, mess gear (excluding knife and fork).
•
Disposes of equipment in accordance with unit SOPs and instructions
in Annex B of the OPORD. Most routine equipment is normally
destroyed in place. Unusual or new equipment or equipment identified
as being of TECHINT interest is tagged with a CEE tag (Part C of
DD Form 2745) and evacuated to the nearest TECHINT unit.
Communications equipment is also tagged and evacuated to the
nearest SIGINT unit.
•
Identifies equipment that cannot be easily evacuated; its location is
passed through intelligence channels to the nearest unit that will be
involved in its exploitation.
FIELD-EXPEDIENT TAGGING PROCEDURES
D-22.
When no standard tag forms are available, the following field-
expedient methods may be used:
•
Use meals, ready-to-eat (MRE) cardboard or other type of paper.
•
Write the capturing unit’s designation.
•
Write data and time of capture.
•
Write POC coordinates.
•
Write circumstances of capture.
•
Identify EPW, captured document, or equipment captured.
•
Put tag, without damaging the CED, in a waterproof bag.
•
Attach EPW and CEE tags so they will not come off.
MEDICAL CARE
D-23.
Medical equipment and supplies to permit the administering of
emergency first aid should be available at each EPW collecting point and
EPW holding area. A qualified medical retained person, if available, may
administer first aid to other detainees. All detainees suspected of having
communicable diseases are isolated for examination by a medical officer.
Wounded detainees may be questioned by intelligence personnel once the
detainees are cleared by competent medical authority for questioning.
D-24.
For evacuation purposes, detainees may be classified as walking
wounded or sick, or as non-walking wounded or sick. Walking wounded
detainees are evacuated through MP EPW evacuation channels. Non-walking
wounded are delivered to the nearest medical aid station and evacuated
through medical channels.
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
6 September 2006
D-7
Figure D-1. DD Form 2745 (Enemy Prisoner of War Capture Tag).
This page intentionally left blank.
FM 2-22.3
Appendix E
Extracts from Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-2.5
Following are excerpts from Allied Joint Publication-2.5, Handling of Captured
Personnel, Equipment and Documents. AJP-2.5 is primarily an amalgamation of
procedures outlined in STANAG 2033, STANAG 2044, and STANAG 2084, and will be
used as the authoritative source for matters governed by those STANAGs. S2s and
HUMINT collectors should maintain a copy on hand.
THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS
E-1. Treatment of prisoners of war (PWs) and other detainees as well as the
handling of personal possessions including personal documents belonging to
them will at all times be in accordance with the 1949 Geneva Conventions
and, if ratified by the nations concerned, with the 1977 Protocols.
THE DETAINING POWER
E-2. The responsibilities of the â€Detaining Power†as set out in GC3 shall rest
with the nation or the deployed NATO command which initiated the capture
or detention of the person or persons in question.
E-3. Transfers of PWs between NATO nations must be in accordance with
GC3, Article 12, as interpreted but not superseded by national agreements.
KNOWLEDGE OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND THE 1977
PROTOCOLS
E-4. The Geneva Conventions require the signatories in time of both peace
and war to circulate the text of the Conventions as widely as possible within
their countries. They are especially required to ensure that the provisions
and implications of the Conventions are clearly understood by the members
of their armed forces and by the civilians attached to them. In order to assist
this process, it is suggested in the Conventions that instruction in them is
included in the syllabus of appropriate military and civilian courses of
instruction.
E-5. The conventions also state that any military or other authority
assuming responsibility for dealing with PWs in time of war or armed conflict
must be in possession of the text of the Conventions and that its personnel
must be instructed in how the Conventions affect them in the execution of
their duties with PWs.
E-6. If ratified by the nations concerned, these requirements are, by
inference, also applicable to the 1977 Protocols.
6 September 2006
E-1
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
PRISONER-OF-WAR STATUS
E-7. Captured personnel (CPERS) can be divided into two categories:
Captured personnel who are PWs and other detainees.
E-8. Prisoner-of-war status is conferred on captured personnel who fall
within the categories listed in Article 4 of GC3, which is reproduced in
Annex A, or, if ratified by the nations concerned, those who meet the
expanded definition of a PW as stated in Protocol I of the 1977 Protocols.
E-9. Other detainees are personnel being held by NATO forces until their
status can be determined and their further disposition can be decided.
E-10. Furthermore, when NATO forces are engaged in Peacetime Support
Operations (PSOs), the operational plan should contain specific instructions
as to which individuals will have PW status. Directions for handling other
detainees, including those suspected of crimes against humanity and war
crimes, are also to be included in the operational plan or in the Standing
Operating Procedures used in the operation.
PERSONNEL
E-11. Conditions allowing, the following procedures should be followed by the
capturing unit:
a. CPERS should be disarmed immediately, and all documents and
effects of military or investigative interest except for necessary clothing,
identity documents and protective equipment (Geneva Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GC3), Article 18) should be removed.
CPERS should then be tagged in accordance with the procedures outlined at
Annex B. A Common Capture Report should also be completed and forwarded
in accordance with the procedure set out in Annex C. It is important that the
documents, equipment, maps, etc., taken from a CPERS accompany him to
the next receiving unit. Valuable information may be lost by not having these
items available during processing and interrogation.
b. Within the confines of the tactical situation, CPERS are to be
segregated according to rank, grade, service, sex and nationality or ethnic
group/warring faction to minimize the opportunity to prepare counter-
interrogation measures. Furthermore, deserters, civilians and political
indoctrination personnel will be individually segregated from other CPERS.
Such segregation shall be undertaken in a manner which does not violate
GC3, Article 16.
c. Talking or fraternization between CPERS is to be prevented in order
not to prejudice future intelligence collection operations. CPERS will be
allowed no opportunity to exchange information between themselves, to
exchange identities or to dispose of articles of intelligence interest.
d. Interrogation operations must not be compromised by contact between
CPERS and personnel not concerned with interrogation duties.
e. CPERS will also be prevented from observing sensitive and critical
activities, equipment and procedures involving NATO, national or allied
forces.
6 September 2006
E-2
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
f. CPERS are to be guarded in a manner which shall deny them the
opportunity for escape or sabotage.
g. Defectors and political refugees should also be segregated from other
CPERS wherever possible. These personnel shall be screened by the nearest
Interrogation Unit (IU), which will decide on their value to the intelligence
organization and consequent future movements. In all cases, defectors are to
be treated in accordance with the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilians in Time of War (GC4). National policy may provide
defectors treatment in accordance with GC3 where such treatment provides
greater protection than GC4.
h. Personnel claiming to be agents of an allied power shall also be
segregated from other CPERS. The intelligence organization (G2 or CJ2) is to
be informed of all such individuals as soon as possible and will arrange for
their screening to determine their future disposition.
i. CPERS suspected of crimes against humanity and war crimes will also
be segregated from other prisoners. Legal authorities and the intelligence
organization are to be informed of such suspects as soon as possible. They
will be taken into custody by law enforcement personnel. Intelligence
exploitation should be undertaken in cooperation with the legal authorities.
j. All CPERS are to be treated humanely.
k. Naval and Air Force personnel are to be identified and the intelligence
organization is to be notified in order that interrogation by naval/air force
personnel may take place at the earliest opportunity.
l. CPERS are to
be escorted to the nearest Collecting Point or Holding Area as
quickly as possible.
m. Should any doubt arise as to whether any persons, including those
appearing to be PWs, having committed a belligerent act and having fallen
into Allied hands, belong to any of the categories of persons entitled to PW
status pursuant to Article 4 of GC3, such persons shall enjoy the protection of
GC3 until such time as their status has been determined by a competent
tribunal. If such a tribunal determines that an individual does not qualify for
PW status, then the detaining commander must determine whether the
detainee qualifies as a â€protected person†pursuant to GC4, and obtain legal
advice relative to the proper course of action for dealing with such detainees.
DOCUMENTS
E-12. Captured documents (CDOC) considered of intelligence interest will be
handled by the capturing unit in the following manner:
a. The capturing unit will conduct a preliminary screening to obtain
information of immediate technical or tactical value.
b. An intelligence report (INTREP) identifying the CDOC and its
disposition as well as giving information considered to be of immediate
tactical value will be prepared and submitted by the capturing unit. (See
STANAG 2022.)
6 September 2006
E-3
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
c. The capturing unit will tag or otherwise mark the CDOC as follows:
- National identifying letters of capturing unit
as prescribed in
STANAG 1059.
-
Designation of capturing unit including service.
-
Serial number of the CDOC. This will consist of a number allocated
sequentially by the capturing unit.
-
DTG of capture.
- Location of capture (geographic coordinates or UTM grid reference
including grid zone designation and 100,000-meter square
identification).
- Captured from Unit (enemy or warring faction) (including national
identifying letters in accordance with STANAG 1059).
- Summary of circumstances under which the CDOC was obtained.
Interrogation serial number of any associated CPERS, if appropriate
or known.
- CED associated with a captured person should be marked with part
C of the Standardized EPW Capture and Personal Equipment Tag.
d. CED to be used as evidence in legal proceedings against CPERS
suspected of crimes against humanity and war crimes will be kept under
guard or in a secure area separate from other CED.
EQUIPMENT
E-13. Captured Equipment (CE) and Associated Technical Documents
(ATDs) considered of intelligence interest will be handled by the capturing
unit in the following manner:
a. A Capture Report as set out in Annex C of the OPORD will be
prepared by the capturing unit upon the discovery or capture of CE or ATD
believed to be of intelligence interest. The reporting channels are from the
capturing unit through the chain of command to the first TECHINT element.
b. The capturing unit will conduct a preliminary screening to obtain
information of immediate technical or tactical value. A Preliminary Technical
Report (PRETECHREP) as set out in Annex D of the OPORD will be
prepared and submitted through established intelligence channels.
c. Intelligence Reports (INTREP) may, as circumstances dictate, be
submitted in advance but not in lieu of the Capture Report and
PRETECHREP. (See STANAG 2022.)
d. CE and ATD will be tagged or marked by the capturing unit as follows:
-
National identifying letters of capturing unit as prescribed in
STANAG 1059.
-
Designation of capturing unit including service.
-
DTG of capture.
- Location of capture (geographic coordinates or UTM grid reference
including grid zone designation and 100,000-meter square
identification).
6 September 2006
E-4
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
- Captured from Unit (enemy or warring faction) (including national
identifying letters in accordance with STANAG 1059).
- Summary of circumstances of capture.
- Associated CPERS.
e. CE and ATD to be used as evidence in legal proceedings against
CPERS suspected of crimes against humanity and war crimes will be kept
under guard separate from other CE and ATD.
6 September 2006
E-5
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FM 2-22.3
Appendix F
NATO System of Allocating Interrogation Serial Numbers
1. Every captured person selected for interrogation will be given an Interrogation Serial
Number. This number shall be allocated by the Interrogation Unit conducting the
first
interrogation of the captured person.
2. The number should not be confused with the Prisoner of War Internment Serial Number
(ISN), which is to be used for administrative purposes only.
3. The purpose of the Interrogation Serial Number is to identify the source of information to
ensure its proper evaluation, processing, and follow-up action. It will also identify the nationality
and location of the interrogation unit.
4. The number shall be constituted as follows:
a.
2 letters to indicate the Nationality of the captured person (see para 6).
b.
2 letters to indicate the Service of the captured person (see para 7).
c.
1 letter to indicate the Arm of Service of the captured person (see para 8).
d.
4 numbers to indicate the Interrogation Sequence Number of the captured person (see
para 9).
e.
4 numbers to indicate the Day and Month of Capture.
f.
A dash (-) to show a sequence break.
g.
4 letters to indicate the Nationality and Service of the Interrogation Unit (see para 10).
h.
4 letters to indicate the Interrogation Unit.
5. Each group shall be separated by a dash. The final number shall therefore appear as in the
following examples:
LS – NV – B – 0012 – 2105 – USNV – 0159
Liechtenstein – Naval prisoner – Seaman – 12
th
captured person interrogated -
captured 21 May – interrogated by US Navy – team 159
AN – AF – H – 0357 – 0211 – GEAF – 0007
Andorra – Air force prisoner – Intelligence – 357
th
captured person interrogated –
captured 2 Nov – interrogated by GE Air Force – team 7
6 September 2006
F-1
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
SM – AR – X – 0431 – 0707 – UKAR – 0019
San Marino – Army prisoner – One star or above – 431
st
captured person interrogated –
captured 7 Jul – interrogated by UK Army – team 19
6. The two letters used for indicating the Nationality of the captured person will be in
accordance with established NATO Country codes in STANAG 1059.
7. The following list of letters is to be used to indicate the Service of the captured person:
AR
- Army
NI
- Naval Infantry
NV
- Navy
AB
- Airborne Forces
NA
- Naval Air Arm
SF
- Special Purpose Forces
AF
- Air Force
PL
- Police
IR
- Irregular
CV
- Civilian (other than Police)
8. The following list of letters is to be used to indicate the Arm of Service of the captured person:
Navy
(A)
Army
(B)
Air Force
(C)
Other/Partisan
Forces
(D)
A. Aircrew
Aircrew
Aircrew
Aircrew
B. Seamen
Infantry
Ground Crew
Merchant Marine
C. Communications
Signals
Communications
Radio
Officers/Operators
D. Weapons/
Electronic Engineer
Electrical/Electronic
Engineer
Electrical/Electronic
Engineer
E. Mechanical/
Marine/Engineers
Engineers Mechanical/Air
Frame/Engineers
F. Gunnery
Artillery
Ordnance
Weapons/Ordnance
Explosives
G. *HQ Staff
*HQ Staff
*HQ Staff
*HQ Staff
H. Intelligence
Intelligence
Intelligence
Intelligence
I. Marines
Airborne Forces
Airfield Defense
J. Cooks/Stewards
Catering
Catering
Catering
K. Legal/Political
Legal/Political Legal/Political Legal/Political
L. Medical/Dental/
Nursing
Medical/Dental/
Nursing
Medical/Dental/
Nursing
Medical/Dental/
Nursing
M. Electronic
Warfare
Electronic Warfare
Electronic Warfare Electronic
Warfare
N. Operations
Operations Operations Operations
O. Police
Police
Police
Police
P. Supply
Quartermaster
Supply
Supply
Q. Strategic
Weapons
Strategic Weapons
Strategic Weapons Strategic
Weapons
R. Special Purpose
Forces
Special Purpose
Forces
Special Purpose
Forces
Special Purpose
Forces
S. Air Traffic Control Armored
Air Traffic Control
Air Traffic Control
T. *Unknown
*Unknown
*Unknown
*Unknown
6 September 2006
F-2
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
Navy
(A)
Army
(B)
Air Force
(C)
Other/Partisan
Forces
(D)
U. Instructors
V. Ministers of
Religion
Education
Ministers of Religion
Education
Ministers of Religion
Instructors
Ministers of Religion
W. *Submarines
Artillery Spotters
Forward Air
Controllers
Couriers, etc.
X. *One Star +
*One Star +
*One Star +
*Officers in Command
of Irregular Forces
Y. *Other
*Other
*Other
*Other
*Notes: G – Headquarters staffs below one star rank
T – Captured Person’s arm of service not known to report writer
W – To be used in respect of all submarines regardless of arm or specialization
X – To be used in respect of all ONE STAR or above officers regardless of army
Y – PW arm of service not included in the appropriate list
9. The sequence number of the interrogated captured personnel shall be of four digits allocated
in numerical order of interrogation by the team first interrogating the captured person.
10. Country, services and team codes.
a. Country codes, as laid down in STANAG 1059, are to be used for indication of the
Nationality of the Interrogation Team.
b. The following lists of letters are to be used for indicating the Service of the Interrogation
Team:
ARMY
- AR
AIR FORCE
- AF
NAVY
- NV
MARINE
- MR
COAST GUARD - CG
PARA-MILITARY
- PM
c. NATO teams will use the following abbreviations: (These will be determined as
command changes are implemented and STANAG 1059 is revised).
SC
EUROPE
RC
SOUTH
RC
NORTH
JHQ
SOUTHWEST
JHQ
NORTH
JHQ
SOUTH
JHQ NORTHEAST
JHQ SOUTH CENTER
JHQ
CENTER
JHQ
SOUTHEAST
CC AIR NORTH
CC AIR SOUTH
CC NAV NORTH
CC NAV SOUTH
SC
ATLANTIC
RC
EAST
RC
WEST
STRIK
FLTLANT
RC
SOUTHEAST
SUB
ACLANT
11. Nations will allocate 4-digit serial numbers to their interrogation teams. NATO Commands
will issue similar numbers to subordinate national interrogation teams under their command.
6 September 2006
F-3
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FM 2-22.3
Appendix G
Questioning Quick Reference
This appendix offers a quick reference for the trained HUMINT collector. It is not meant to be
all-inclusive, nor instructive in proper questioning technique, but lays out frequently used
requirements grouped logically by OB factor. Proper formation of questions is covered in detail
in Chapter 9.
Missions
: Mission questioning consists of three areas: Time of Capture Mission, Future
Mission, and Past Mission. Missions are questioned in that order, to ensure that the information
is collected in the order of importance to a supported commander. Logical follow-up questioning
may lead the collector into any of the OB factors at any time during questioning in order to
provide complete information.
Offensive Missions:
When will the enemy attack?
Where will they attack?
What is the main objective of the attack?
What units will participate in the attack?
What tactics will be employed?
What artillery, air, and other units will support the attack?
Defensive Missions:
Where will the enemy establish lines of defense?
What units have been assigned to the defensive lines?
What obstacles have been emplaced (mines, trenches, wire, etc.)?
What artillery support is there for the defensive operation?
Retrograde Operations:
What units will take part in the retreat?
What are the current positions of the retreating units?
When will they start to retreat?
What routes will be used?
What is the planned destination of the retreating units?
What units will cover the retreat?
Composition:
What is the command and control element of (the target unit)?
What types of units are directly subordinate to (the target unit)?
What is the designation of (each of the subordinate units)?
How many units of that type are directly subordinate to (target unit)?
What units are attached? When? Why? What unit(s) are they detached from?
What units are detached? When? Why? What unit(s) are they attached to now?
6 September 2006
G-1
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
Weapons and Equipment Strength:
Individual Weapons
:
What individual weapons are there in (target unit)?
How many?
What is the distribution of the weapons?
Crew-Served Weapons:
What crew-served weapons are in (target unit)?
How many?
What is the distribution of the weapons?
Other Weapons:
What other weapons are there in (target unit)?
What types?
How many?
How are they distributed?
Vehicles
: What armored vehicles are in (unit)?
How many?
What nomenclature?
What other vehicles are in (unit)?
Dispositions:
Disposition questioning is ideally done with the aid of a map.
Where is (the target disposition)?
Show (on the map) the location of (the target disposition).
What enemy units, activities, or equipment are at that location?
What security measures are being employed at that location?
Additionally, specific types of dispositions require additional follow-up:
Area-Type Dispositions:
(Staging Areas, Assembly Areas, Trains, etc.)
Show on the map (or describe) the perimeter of the disposition.
Where are units or activities located within it?
Where are the approaches/entrance?
What unit is in charge?
What vehicles or equipment are located within the disposition?
What is the date of information?
Line-Type Dispositions:
(Line of Departure, Artillery emplacement, etc.)
Show on the map (or describe) the location of the disposition.
Define and locate both ends of the disposition.
What equipment is located there?
In the case of artillery, describe the placement and orientation of the guns,
ammunition, radar, and support vehicles.
Tactics:
Offensive:
What offensive tactics are being employed by (unit)?
What other units are involved?
When did (unit) begin employing these tactics?
What are the major objectives?
Defensive:
What defensive tactics are being employed by (unit)?
What other units are involved?
When did (unit) begin employing these tactics?
Special Operations:
What special operations tactics are being employed by (unit)?
What are the designations of the units employing special operations tactics? When did
(unit) begin employing special operations tactics?
Where/Why are these tactics being employed?
6 September 2006
G-2
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
Training:
Individual Training:
What individual training is being conducted by (unit)?
Who is being trained?
How effective is the training?
Where is the training conducted?
What are the training standards?
Unit Training:
What unit training is being conducted by (unit)?
Who is being trained?
How effective is the training?
Where is the training conducted?
What are the training standards?
Specialized Training:
What specialized training is being conducted by (unit)?
Who is being trained?
How effective is the training?
Where is the training conducted?
What are the training standards?
What specialized equipment is used in the conduct of the training?
Combat Effectiveness:
Losses:
Personnel:
What personnel losses have been incurred by (unit)?
When? Where? How?
What were the duty positions/ranks of the lost personnel?
Equipment:
What equipment losses have been sustained by (unit)?
What type of equipment was lost?
When? Where? How many?
How were they lost?
Replacements (Personnel):
Received:
What replacements have been received by (unit)?
What replacements are available to (unit)?
How many?
From where were the replacements received?
Available:
What personnel replacements are available to (unit)?
From where are replacements available?
How many? What ranks?
How long would it take for replacements to arrive once requested?
Replacements (Equipment):
Received:
What equipment replacements have been received by (unit)?
How many?
From where were the replacements received?
How does the quality of the replacement equipment compare to that of the original
equipment?
What is the level of confidence in the replacement equipment, compared to the original?
Available:
What equipment replacements are available to (unit)?
From where are replacements available?
How long would it take to receive replacement equipment once requested?
How many of each type of equipment are available?
6 September 2006
G-3
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
G-4
6 September 2006
Reinforcements:
Received:
What reinforcements have been received by (unit)?
What type was the reinforcing unit?
What is the designation of the reinforcing unit?
What equipment did the reinforcing unit bring?
To which unit was the reinforcing unit further assigned?
Why did (receiving unit) receive reinforcements?
How long will the reinforcing unit be assigned as reinforcement to (unit)?
Available:
What reinforcements are available to (unit)?
From where (parent unit/location) are reinforcements available?
What types of units are available to reinforce (unit)?
How long would it take for reinforcements to arrive, once requested?
Morale:
Describe the morale of the members of (unit).
How long has the morale been…?
What is the unit leadership doing to (maintain/improve) the morale?
What effect has (high/low) morale had on the behavior or performance of the unit
members?
Logistics:
Weapons:
What is the condition of the (specific weapons) in (the unit)?
Why are (the weapons) in that condition?
What is being done to improve the condition of (the weapons)?
How often is maintenance performed? By whom?
Who inspects weapons? How often?
Is there an increased emphasis on maintenance? If so, why?
What is done to prevent/alleviate a shortage while weapons are being maintained?
What spare parts are there for weapons in (unit)?
What shortages of spare parts are there?
What problems are there with spare parts (quality, fit, delays, etc)?
Ammunition:
What types of ammunition are available for the (weapon/weapon system)
in the (unit)?
What problems are being experienced with ammunition for (weapon or weapon system)
in (unit)? Why? Since when?
What is being done to correct the problem(s)?
What shortages of ammunition for (weapon or weapon system) are there in (unit)?
What is being done to correct the shortage?
When was the last issue of ammunition for the (weapon or weapon system) in the (unit)?
How much was issued?
When is the next issue of ammunition planned?
(For insurgents/irregulars - Where is funding obtained for ammunition/explosive
purchases?
Where are ammunition/explosives obtained?
How are ammunition/explosives transported/delivered?
Vehicles:
What is the condition of the (specific vehicle) in (the unit)?
Why are (the vehicles) in that condition?
What is being done to improve the condition of (the vehicles)?
How often is maintenance performed? By whom?
Who inspects vehicles? How often?
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
6 September 2006
G-5
Is there an increased emphasis on maintenance? If so, why?
What is done to prevent/alleviate a shortage while vehicles are being maintained?
What spare parts are there for vehicles in (unit)?
What shortages of spare parts are there?
What problems are there with spare parts (quality, fit, delays, etc)?
POL:
What problems have been experienced with the petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) for
the (vehicle type) in the (unit)?
Why are there problems?
Since when have there been problems?
What is being done to correct the problems?
What shortages of POL are there? Why?
What is being done to alleviate the shortages?
When was the last resupply of POL in (unit)? Where? How much?
When is the next resupply of POL planned?
Communications Equipment:
What is the condition of the (specific radio set) in (the unit)?
Why are (the radios) in that condition?
What is being done to improve the condition of (the radios)?
How often is maintenance performed? By whom?
Who inspects communication equipment? How often?
Is there an increased emphasis on maintenance? If so, why?
What is done to prevent/alleviate a shortage while radios are being maintained? What
spare parts are there for communication equipment in (unit)?
What shortages of spare parts are there?
What problems are there with spare parts (quality, fit, delays, etc)?
Medical:
Equipment:
What individual medical equipment is in (unit)? How many?
What is the distribution?
What are the contents of individual medical kits in the (unit)?
What is the quality?
What shortages are there?
What problems are there with the individual medical equipment/supplies in (unit)?
What vehicular medical equipment is in (unit)? How many?
What is the distribution?
What are the contents of vehicular medical kits in (unit)?
What is the quality?
What shortages are there?
What problems are there with the vehicular medical equipment/supplies in (unit)?
Personnel:
What medical personnel are assigned to (unit)?
What medical personnel are available to treat members of (unit)? How many? What are
the duty positions of the medical personnel?
What level of medical care are the medical personnel able to provide to members of
(unit)?
Facilities:
What medical facilities are available to members of (unit)?
Where are the medical facilities?
What level of care is available there?
What higher echelons of medical care are available?
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
G-6
6 September 2006
Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) Procedures:
What MEDEVAC procedures are
available to members of (unit)?
Where are MEDEVAC collection points?
What different MEDEVAC procedures are used for more seriously wounded personnel,
compared to lightly wounded?
Food:
What rations are members of (unit) eating?
What shortages are there of food?
What is the quality?
What problems have been encountered with the rations provided to (unit)?
When was the last issue of rations to members of (unit)?
When is the next issue?
What reserve stocks of field rations are there in (unit)?
Water:
What is the source of drinking water for members of (unit)?
What problems have been encountered with quality, shortages, or contamination of
drinking water?
What water purification methods are available to members of (unit)?
Under what circumstances will they be used?
If water purification tablets are used, what color are they?
Electronic Technical Data:
Radio Frequencies:
What are the primary and alternate frequencies for radios in
(each unit)?
Under what circumstances will alternate frequencies be used?
What networks operate on the various frequencies?
Call Signs:
What is the call sign of (unit)?
What is the call sign of (each) person of authority in the unit?
When do call signs change?
What informal call signs are in use?
Miscellaneous:
Personalities:
Question for name, rank, unit, duty position, and unit of key leaders.
Collect identifying characteristics such as age, height, weight, build, hair and eye color,
writing hand, facial hair and teeth.
Report contact information such as work and home addresses, telephone numbers, fax
number, and email address.
Complete biographical IIR format is in DIAM 58-12 (S//NF).
Code Names:
What is the code name of (each unit)?
What code names are being used for specific operations?
Passwords:
What is the current challenge/password for (unit)?
When did it go into effect?
When will it change?
What will the next challenge/password be?
What other (informal, “run inâ€) passwords are in use?
Obstacles:
Enemy:
What obstacles have the enemy forces emplaced?
Where, when, what type of obstacles?
What safe lanes are there through or around the obstacles?
(If mine fields, collect type, pattern, quantity, and method of emplacement of mines.)
How are the obstacles being covered (artillery, ambush, etc.)?
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
6 September 2006
G-7
Why have the obstacles been emplaced where they are (denial of terrain, canalization
into a fire sack, etc.)?
Friendly:
What friendly obstacles have enemy forces encountered?
Where? When?
Have those obstacles been breached or otherwise neutralized?
What effect have the friendly obstacles had on enemy maneuver?
PSYOP:
Enemy:
What PSYOP are being conducted by (unit)?
What is the text of the messages?
Who is the target audience?
Where are the PSYOP materials prepared?
Where and how are they delivered? What is the hoped-for effect?
Friendly:
What PSYOP have members of (unit) encountered? Where? When?
What form of PSYOP was encountered?
What effect have the PSYOP had on the officers/NCOs/enlisted of (unit)?
What is the leadership of (unit) doing to counter the effects of friendly PSYOP?
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FM 2-22.3
Appendix H
SALUTE Reporting
H-1. The SALUTE report format requires brief entries which require the
collector to break information down into basic elements: who, what, where,
when, why, and how. This allows for efficient reporting via electronic or
hardcopy medium. It also allows the analyst to quickly scan multiple reports
to find specific information.
H-2. Figure H-1 provides guidance and is not to be construed as strict
requirements. SALUTE reports of combat activity may only contain a word
or two in each entry, whereas Intelligence reports tend to include more
detail.
6 September 2006
H-1
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
TO
: Usually the address of the supported S2/G2 (according to unit SOP)
FROM:
Your unit or team designation, or your duty position, as appropriate
DTG:
The date-time group of when the report is being submitted
Report Number:
From local SOP
1. (S)
ize/Who: Expressed as a quantity, and echelon, or size (e.g., 1 x BDE). If
multiple echelons are involved in the activity being reported, there can be multiple
entries (e.g.,1 x BDE; 2 x BN). Non-standard units are reported as such (e.g., bomb-
making class; support staff).
2. (A)
ctivity/What: This line is the focal point of the report and relates to the PIR or
important non-PIR information being reported. It should be a concise bullet
statement.
3. (L)
ocation/Where: Generally a grid coordinate, including the 100,000 meter grid
zone designator. The entry can also be an address, if appropriate, but still should
include an 8-digit grid coordinate. City names will always be followed by the two-
character country code. If the activity being reported involves movement (advance,
withdrawal, etc.) the location entry will include “From†and “To†entries. The route
used will be reported under “Equipment/How.â€
4. (U)
nit/Who: This entry identifies who is performing the activity described in the
“Activity/What†entry. Include the complete designation of a military unit,
identification of a civilian or insurgent group, or the full name of an individual, as
appropriate.
5. (T)
ime/When: For a future event, this is when the activity will initiate. Past
events are usually not the subject of SALUTE reports, but if a past event is to be
reported, the Time/When entry will generally reflect when the event ended. Ongoing
events are reported as such. Reports of composition of forces, morale, and Electronic
Technical Data and other non-event topics are reported as ongoing. When reporting
on a disposition, the “Time/When†entry is generally the last time the source was at
the disposition.
6. (E)
quipment/How: The information reported in this entry clarifies, completes,
and/or expands upon information reported in any of the previous entries. It includes
information concerning equipment involved, tactics used, and any essential elements
of information not reported in the previous paragraphs.
7. Remarks: Use this entry to report the source of the information, whether a person,
a CED, open-source media, or other source. Include the date of information and the
PIR that the reported information addresses. Map data for coordinates given in the
“Location/Where†entry are included, stating map series name, sheet number, scale
and edition. If there are enclosures to the SALUTE report, such as sketches, they are
annotated here.
Figure H-1. Example of a Written SALUTE Report.
6 September 2006
H-2
FM 2-22.3
Appendix I
Document Exploitation and Handling
I-1. DOCEX is a vital information source in the development of the all-
source intelligence picture. Unless planned for and carefully monitored, the
volume of CEDs in all operations can rapidly overwhelm a unit’s capability to
extract meaningful information.
DEFINITIONS
I-2. A document, as defined by AJP 2.5, is any piece of recorded information,
regardless of form
.
Documents include printed material such as books,
newspapers, pamphlets, OPORDs, and identity cards as well as handwritten
materials such as letters, diaries, and notes. Documents also include
electronically recorded media such as computer files, tape recordings, and
video recordings and the electronic equipment which contains documents or
other vitally important intelligence. Examples include hard drives, operating
systems, and personal electronic devices, including phones, PDAs, and GPS
devices. A CED may be needed by several collection or exploitation activities
at the same time, requiring copies to be made. Collectors must have ready
access to copying equipment. Documents often must be evacuated through
two different channels for proper exploitation, which also makes copying
necessary. Such documents and equipment require special handling to
assure that they are returned to their owners.
I-3. DOCEX is the systematic extraction of information from threat
documents for the purpose of producing intelligence or answering IRs. A
threat document has been in the possession of the threat, written by the
threat, or is directly related to a future threat situation. DOCEX can occur in
conjunction with HUMINT collection activities or as a separate activity.
I-4. A CED is any document that was in the possession of an enemy force
that subsequently comes into the hands of a friendly force, regardless of the
origin of that document. There are three types of CEDs.
•
Official - documents of government or military origin.
•
Identity - personal items such as identification (ID) cards or books,
passports, driver licenses.
•
Personal - documents of a private nature such as diaries, letters, and
photographs.
I-5. Open-source documents are documents that are available to the general
public including but not limited to newspapers, books, videotapes, public
records, and documents available on the Internet or other publicly available
electronic media.
6 September 2006
I-1
FM 2.22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
I-6. Source-associated documents are documents that are encountered on or
in immediate association with a human source. These may include both
official and personal documents. Documents associated with human sources
are normally exploited, at least initially, during the interrogation or
debriefing of the source. Interrogators typically use these documents during
planning and preparation for interrogation of the associated EPW. These
personal documents and source identification documents are therefore
evacuated in conjunction with the associated source and sent through
prisoner, detainee, or refugee evacuation channels rather than through
intelligence channels. If the duplication capability exists, collectors should
copy personal documents that contain intelligence information and evacuate
the copy through intelligence channels. The original personal document
should be evacuated with the detainee but not on his person until the
HUMINT collector has exploited it. Collectors evacuate official documents
through intelligence channels after initial exploitation. If possible, the
collector will copy official documents and evacuate the copy with, but not on,
the source.
OPEN-SOURCE INFORMATION
I-7. Open-source information is publicly available information appearing in
print or electronic form. Open-source information may be transmitted via
radio, television, newspapers, commercial databases, electronic mail
networks, or other electronic media like CD-ROMs. Whatever form they take,
open sources are not—
•
Classified at their origin.
•
Subject to proprietary constraints.
•
The product of sensitive contacts with US or foreign persons.
I-8. In all operations, open-source collection can be a valuable addition to the
overall intelligence collection and each intelligence discipline’s efforts. Open-
source information supplements the HUMINT collection effort, and all types
of open sources must be considered for exploitation.
I-9. Open sources are evaluated and categorized as friendly, neutral, or
hostile. Certain high-value, open-source information sources may be
identified for continuous monitoring. Other open-source information sources
may be identified to screen for the presence or lack of specific indicators. In
addition, the information obtained from open sources is extremely helpful for
the HCT members to be current with the latest developments in the AO,
which enables them to establish rapport and effectively converse with their
sources. Open-source documents are exploited in the same manner as CEDs.
OPEN-SOURCE DOCUMENT OPERATIONS
I-10.Open-source document operations are the systematic extraction of
information from publicly available documents in response to command IRs.
Open-source document operations can be separate operations or can be
included as part of other ongoing operations. Open-source documents are
significant in the planning of all operations, especially during the execution
6 September 2006
I-2
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
of stability and reconstruction operations and civil support operations. As
well as hard data, open-source information can provide valuable background
information on the opinions, values, cultural nuances, and other sociopolitical
aspects in AOIs. In evaluating open-source documents, collectors and
analysts must be careful to determine the origin of the document and the
possibilities of inherent biases contained within the document.
CAPTURED DOCUMENT OPERATIONS
I-11.One of the significant characteristics of operations is the proliferation of
recordkeeping and communications by digital methods (faxes, e-mails, typed,
or computer-generated documents). The rapid and accurate extraction of
information from these documents contributes significantly to the
commander’s accurate visualization of his battlefield. Documents may be
captured on or in immediate association with EPWs and detainees, may be
found on or turned in by refugees, line crossers, DPs or local civilians, or may
be found in abandoned enemy positions or anywhere on the battlefield.
DOCUMENT EVACUATION AND HANDLING
I-12.The rapid evacuation and exploitation of documents is a shared
responsibility. It originates with the capturing unit and continues to the
complete extraction of pertinent information and the arrival of the document
at a permanent repository, normally at the joint level, either within the
theater of operations or outside of it. Documents captured in association with
detainees and EPWs, with the exception of identity documents, are removed
from the individual to ensure that documents of intelligence interest are not
destroyed. These documents are evacuated through EPW evacuation
channels with, but not on the person of, the detainee. With the exception of
official documents, all documents are eventually returned to the detainee.
I-13.CEDs not associated with a detainee are evacuated through MI
channels, generally starting with the capturing unit’s S2. Depending on the
type of documents, they may eventually be evacuated to the National Center
for Document Exploitation. HUMINT collectors and translators can extract
information of intelligence interest from CEDs at every echelon; they will
make an attempt to exploit CEDs within their expertise and technical
support constraints. Collectors evacuate CEDs to different elements based
upon the information contained and the type of document concerned. For
example, documents related to criminal activity may be evacuated to the
nearest criminal investigative unit. Direct evacuation to an element outside
the chain of command takes place at the lowest practical echelon but is
normally done by the first MI unit in the chain of command. Document
evacuation procedures are outlined in Annex B (Intelligence) of the unit’s
OPORD and SOPs.
Actions by the Capturing Unit
I-14.Document accountability begins at the time the document comes into US
possession. Original documents must not be marked, altered, or defaced in
any way. The capturing unit attaches a DD Form 2745 (Enemy Prisoner of
War Capture Tag), Part C, to each document. Only in the case where a
6 September 2006
I-3
FM 2.22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
capturing unit does not have the time nor the manpower to mark each
document due to ongoing combat operations should the capturing unit fill out
one capture tag for a group of documents. In this case, the capturing unit
should place the documents in a weatherproof container (box or plastic bag).
The capturing unit should fill out two copies of the DD Form 2745, placing
one copy inside the container and attaching one to the outside of the
container. If these forms are not available, the capturing unit records the
required data on any piece of paper. Figure I-1 shows an example of a field
expedient tag. At a minimum, the capturing unit should record the
information as follows:
•
Time the document was captured as a DTG.
•
Place document was captured, including an 8-digit coordinate, and
description of the location. This should be as detailed as time allows.
For example, if a terrorist safe house was searched, documents might
be “bagged and tagged†based on what room of the house they were in,
what file cabinet, what desk, and so forth.
•
Identity of the capturing unit.
•
Identity of the source from whom the document was taken, if
applicable.
•
Summary of the circumstances under which the document was found.
I-15.Document evacuation procedures are listed in Annex B (Intelligence) to
the OPORD. If the capturing unit does not contain a supporting HCT, it
forwards any CEDs found on the battlefield directly to its S2. The S2 extracts
PIR information as practicable, ensures that the documents are properly
tagged, and ensures speedy evacuation to the next higher echelon through
intelligence channels. Normally, a capturing unit will use any available
vehicle, and in particular empty returning supply vehicles, to evacuate
documents. Documents captured on or in association with detainees,
including EPWs, should be tagged and removed from the detainee. They are
evacuated with (but not on) the detainees to an MP escort unit or an EPW
holding facility.
I-16.When large numbers of documents are captured in a single location, it is
often more expedient for the capturing unit to request a DOCEX team or
HCT from the supporting MI unit be sent to the documents rather than
attempting to evacuate all the documents. This reduces the burden on the
capturing unit, facilitates the rapid extraction of information, and enables
the priority evacuation of documents of importance to higher echelons. This
method should only be used if the capturing unit can adequately secure the
documents until the arrival of the DOCEX team and if the battlefield
situation and MI resources permit the dispatch of a team. The capturing unit
should include in its request the following:
•
The identification of the capturing unit.
•
Its location and the location of the documents.
6 September 2006
I-4
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
6 September 2006
I-5
Figure I-1. Example of a Field Expedient Capture Document Tag.
•
The general description of the document site (such as an enemy
brigade headquarters).
•
The approximate number and type of documents.
•
The presence of captured computers or similar equipment.
I-17.
The MI unit dispatching the team should notify the requesting team as
soon as possible to provide them an estimated time of arrival and to
coordinate the arrival of the team. There is no set time for how long any
particular echelon may keep a document for study. The primary aim of
speedy evacuation to the rear for examination by qualified DOCEX elements
remains. Each echelon is responsible to prevent recapture, loss, or
destruction of the CEDs.
ACTIONS BY THE FIRST HUMINT COLLECTION OR DOCEX UNIT
I-18.
The first HUMINT collection or DOCEX unit to receive CEDs should
log, categorize, and exploit the documents to the best of its abilities based on
METT-TC factors. They should rapidly identify documents requiring special
handling or special expertise to exploit and evacuate those documents to the
appropriate agencies. The MI unit SOP or OPORD should list special
document evacuation requirements and priorities.
CAPTURED DOCUMENT TAG
NATIONALITY OF CAPTURING FORCE:_____________________________
_______________________________________________________________
DATE/TIME CAPTURED:__________________________________________
PLACE CAPTURED______________________________________________
CAPTURING UNIT:_____________________________________________
IDENTITY OF SOURCE (If Applicable):_____________________________
______________________________________________________________
CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE:_________________________________
______________________________________________________________
DESCRIPTION OF WEAPON/DOCUMENT:___________________________
______________________________________________________________
151310ZAUG2004
US
BH56321785, Smalltown, IZ
1stPlt/B Trp/1-1 Cav
MAJ, Republican Guard
Surrendered his company to
1 x PSYOP document
a passing US cavalry patrol
produced by US 16
th
PSYOP Bn
CAPTURED DOCUMENT TAG
NATIONALITY OF CAPTURING FORCE:_____________________________
_______________________________________________________________
DATE/TIME CAPTURED:__________________________________________
PLACE CAPTURED______________________________________________
CAPTURING UNIT:_____________________________________________
IDENTITY OF SOURCE (If Applicable):_____________________________
______________________________________________________________
CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE:_________________________________
______________________________________________________________
DESCRIPTION OF WEAPON/DOCUMENT:___________________________
______________________________________________________________
151310ZAUG2004
US
BH56321785, Smalltown, IZ
1stPlt/B Trp/1-1 Cav
MAJ, Republican Guard
Surrendered his company to
1 x PSYOP document
a passing US cavalry patrol
produced by US 16
th
PSYOP Bn
CAPTURED DOCUMENT TAG
NATIONALITY OF CAPTURING FORCE:_____________________________
_______________________________________________________________
DATE/TIME CAPTURED:__________________________________________
PLACE CAPTURED______________________________________________
CAPTURING UNIT:_____________________________________________
IDENTITY OF SOURCE (If Applicable):_____________________________
______________________________________________________________
CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE:_________________________________
______________________________________________________________
DESCRIPTION OF WEAPON/DOCUMENT:___________________________
______________________________________________________________
151310ZAUG2004
US
BH56321785, Smalltown, IZ
1stPlt/B Trp/1-1 Cav
MAJ, Republican Guard
Surrendered his company to
1 x PSYOP document
a passing US cavalry patrol
produced by US 16
th
PSYOP Bn
FM 2.22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
Accountability
I-19.The capturing unit and each higher echelon take steps to ensure that
they maintain CED accountability during document evacuation. To establish
accountability, the responsible element inventories all incoming CEDs.
Anyone who captures, evacuates, processes, or handles CEDs must maintain
accountability. All CEDs should have completed captured document tags. An
incoming batch of documents should include a captured document
transmittal. Figure I-2 shows this format. The exact format for a document
transmittal is a matter of local SOP, but it should contain the information
listed below:
•
The identity of the element to which the CEDs are to be evacuated.
•
The identity of the unit forwarding the CEDs.
•
The identification number of the document transmittal.
•
Whether or not CEDs in the package have been screened and the
screening category. (If not screened, NA is circled.)
Document
handlers should package documents that have been screened
separately, by category.
•
A list of the document serial numbers of the CEDs in the package.
TO:__________________________
FROM:_______________________
SCREENED: YES / NO
CED SERIAL NUMBERS:
DTG:_____________________________
TRANSMITTAL NO:_________________
CATEGORY: A B C D NA
TO:__________________________
FROM:_______________________
SCREENED: YES / NO
CED SERIAL NUMBERS:
DTG:_____________________________
TRANSMITTAL NO:_________________
CATEGORY: A B C D NA
TO:__________________________
FROM:_______________________
SCREENED: YES / NO
CE
TO:__________________________
FROM:____
D SERIAL NUMBERS:
DTG:_____________________________
TRANSMITTAL NO:_________________
CATEGORY: A B C D NA
___________________
SCREENED: YES / NO
CED SERIAL NUMBERS:
DTG:_____________________________
TRANSMITTAL NO:_________________
CATEGORY: A B C D NA
Figure I-2. Example of a Captured Document Transmittal Sheet.
I-20.When a batch is received without a transmittal, the HUMINT collection
element contacts the forwarding units and obtains a list of document serial
numbers (if possible). The HUMINT collection element records all trace
actions in its journal. Accountability includes—
•
Inventorying the CEDs as they arrive.
•
Initiating necessary trace actions.
6 September 2006
I-6
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
•
Maintaining the captured document log. (See Figure I-3.)
I-21.When a collector includes intelligence derived from a CED in an
intelligence report, he references the identification letters and number of the
document concerned to avoid false confirmation.
Inventory
I-22.The receiving element conducts an initial inventory of incoming CEDs
by comparing the CED to the captured document tag and accompanying
transmittal documents. This comparison identifies—
•
Transmittals that list missing CEDs.
•
Document tags not attached to CEDs.
•
CEDs not attached to document tags.
•
CEDs not listed on the accompanying transmittal documents.
UNIT:________________________________________________________
UNIT:_______________________________________________________
U
U
_
NIT:________________________________________________________
NIT:________________________________________________________
FILE
NUMBER
RECEIVED DOCUMENT
DTG
SERIAL #
INCOMING
TRANSMITTAL#
FORWARDING
UNIT
RECEIVED
BY
DTG AND PLACE
OF CAPTURE
1501
1502
1503
1504
150830AUG99 0102368
150930AUG99 0110443
150930AUG99 1039964
150930AUG99 1192583
1T08
2T11
2T11
2T11
1/82
d
Abn Div
2/82
d
Abn Div
2/82
d
Abn Div
2/82
d
Abn Div
SSG KIM
SSG KIM
SSG KIM
SSG KIM
150500AUG99/EK030949
150620AUG99/EK045860
150725AUG99/EK058383
150725AUG99/EK058383
CAPTURING
UNIT
SCREENING
CATEGORY
DESCRIPTION
OF DOCUMENT
DESTINATION/
TRANSMITTAL #
REMARKS
Co A, 1/504
th
, 1 Bde, 82
d
Co B, 2/504
th
, 2 Bde, 82
d
Co B, 2/504
th
, 2 Bde, 82
d
Co B, 2/504
th
, 2 Bde, 82
d
A
A
B
C
Letter of promotion, KP, 1Pg
Letter describing attack, RU, 3 Pg
List of call signs, RU, 1Pg
Personal letter, KP, 2 Pg
JDEC, 15T01
JDEC, 15T01
JDEC, 15T03
JDEC 15T02
SALUTE written
SALUTE written
None
Translation end
FILE
NUMBER
RECEIVED DOCUMENT
DTG
SERIAL #
INCOMING
TRANSMITTAL#
FORWARDING
UNIT
RECEIVED
BY
DTG AND PLACE
OF CAPTURE
1501
1502
1503
1504
150830AUG99 0102368
150930AUG99 0110443
150930AUG99 1039964
150930AUG99 1192583
1T08
2T11
2T11
2T11
1/82
d
Abn Div
2/82
d
Abn Div
2/82
d
Abn Div
2/82
d
Abn Div
SSG KIM
SSG KIM
SSG KIM
SSG KIM
150500AUG99/EK030949
150620AUG99/EK045860
150725AUG99/EK058383
150725AUG99/EK058383
ING
UNIT
SCREENING
CATEGORY
DESCRIPTION
OF DOCUMENT
DESTINATION/
TRANSMITTAL #
REMARKS
Co A, 1/504
th
, 1 Bde, 82
d
Co B, 2/504
th
, 2 Bde, 82
d
Co B, 2/504
th
, 2 Bde, 82
d
Co B, 2/504
th
, 2 Bde, 82
d
A
A
B
C
Letter of promotion, KP, 1Pg
Letter describing attack, RU, 3 Pg
List of call signs, RU, 1Pg
Personal letter, KP, 2 Pg
JDEC, 15T01
JDEC, 15T01
JDEC, 15T03
JDEC 15T02
SALUTE written
SALUTE written
None
Translation end
FIL
FI
CAPTUR
E
NUMBER
RECEIVED DOCUMENT
DTG
SERIAL #
INCOMING
TRANSMITTAL#
FORWARDING
UNIT
RECEIVED
BY
DTG AND PLACE
OF CAPTURE
1501
1502
1503
1504
150830AUG99 0102368
150930AUG99 0110443
150930AUG99 1039964
150930AUG99 1192583
1T08
2T11
2T11
2T11
1/82
d
Abn Div
2/82
d
Abn Div
2/82
d
Abn Div
2/82
d
Abn Div
SSG KIM
SSG KIM
SSG KIM
SSG KIM
150500AUG99/EK030949
150620AUG99/EK045860
150725AUG99/EK058383
150725AUG99/EK058383
CAPTURING
UNIT
SCREENING
CATEGORY
DESCRIPTION
OF DOCUMENT
DESTINATION/
TRANSMITTAL #
REMARKS
Co A, 1/504
th
, 1 Bde, 82
d
Co B, 2/504
th
, 2 Bde, 82
d
Co B, 2/504
th
, 2 Bde, 82
d
Co B, 2/504
th
, 2 Bde, 82
d
A
A
B
C
Letter of promotion, KP, 1Pg
Letter describing attack, RU, 3 Pg
List of call signs, RU, 1Pg
Personal letter, KP, 2 Pg
JDEC, 15T01
JDEC, 15T01
JDEC, 15T03
JDEC 15T02
SALUTE written
SALUTE written
None
Translation end
LE
NUMBER
RECEIVED DOCUMENT
DTG
SERIAL #
INCOMING
TRANSMITTAL#
FORWARDING
UNIT
RECEIVED
BY
DTG AND PLACE
OF CAPTURE
1501
1502
1503
1504
150830AUG99 0102368
150930AUG99 0110443
150930AUG99 1039964
150930AUG99 1192583
1T08
2T11
2T11
2T11
1/82
d
Abn Div
2/82
d
Abn Div
2/82
d
Abn Div
2/82
d
Abn Div
SSG KIM
SSG KIM
SSG KIM
SSG KIM
150500AUG99/EK030949
150620AUG99/EK045860
150725AUG99/EK058383
150725AUG99/EK058383
CAPTURING
UNIT
SCREENING
CATEGORY
DESCRIPTION
OF DOCUMENT
DESTINATION/
TRANSMITTAL #
REMARKS
Co A, 1/504
th
, 1 Bde, 82
d
Co B, 2/504
th
, 2 Bde, 82
d
Co B, 2/504
th
, 2 Bde, 82
d
Co B, 2/504
th
, 2 Bde, 82
d
A
A
B
C
Letter of promotion, KP, 1Pg
Letter describing attack, RU, 3 Pg
List of call signs, RU, 1Pg
Personal letter, KP, 2 Pg
JDEC, 15T01
JDEC, 15T01
JDEC, 15T03
JDEC 15T02
SALUTE written
SALUTE written
None
Translation end
Figure I-3. Example of a Captured Document Log.
Trace Actions
I-23.The receiving unit initiates trace actions on all missing CEDs, missing
captured document tags, and all information missing from the captured
document tags. They initiate trace actions by contacting elements from which
the documents were received. The receiving unit can complete this corrective
action swiftly if that unit's captured document log was filled out completely.
If necessary, the trace action continues to other elements that have handled
the document. If a captured document tag is unavailable from elements that
have previously handled the CED, the document examiner fills out a
6 September 2006
I-7
FM 2.22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
captured document tag for the document using whatever information is
available. Attempts to obtain missing CEDs are critical because of the
information those CEDs might contain.
Document Logs
I-24.The captured document log is a record of what an element knows about
a CED. After trace actions are initiated for any missing documents, the CEDs
are entered in the REMARKS section of the captured document log. This log
must contain the following:
•
Name of capturing unit.
•
File number (a sequential number to identify the order of entry).
•
DTG the CED was received at this element.
•
Document serial number of the captured document tag.
•
Identification number of the transmittal document accompanying the
CED.
•
Complete designation of the unit that forwarded the CED.
•
Name and rank of individual that received the CED.
•
DTG and place of capture (as listed on the captured document tag).
•
Identity of the capturing units (as listed on the captured document
tag).
•
Document category (after screening).
•
Description of the CED. (At a minimum, the description includes the
original language; number of pages; type of document such as a map,
letter, or photograph; and the enemy's identification number for the
CED, if available.)
•
Destination and identification number of the outgoing transmittal.
•
Remarks to include any other information that can assist the unit in
identifying the CED including processing codes. These are set up by
local SOPs to denote all actions taken with the document while at the
element, including intelligence reports, translations, reproductions, or
return of the CED to the source from whom it was taken.
DOCUMENT SCREENING
I-25.Document screening is the rapid but systematic evaluation of documents
to determine which documents contain priority information. Selected priority
documents will be exploited immediately for PIR information and evacuated
expeditiously (often electronically) to a DOCEX facility. Document screening
can be done manually (requiring a linguist who is well versed in the current
collection requirements) or through the use of scanning devices with key
word identification capability. Document processing does not require the
complete translation of a document but requires sufficient translation to
6 September 2006
I-8
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
determine the significance of the document. A non-linguist may be able to do
a degree of preliminary screening based on document format and the location
where the document was found.
I-26.As screeners screen each document, they assign one of four category
designations. The assigned category determines the document's priority for
exploitation and evacuation. Document screening requires that the screening
units receive the most current PIR and intelligence requirements; current
friendly and enemy situation update; and relevant OB information.
Screeners at higher echelons can re-categorize CEDs, to more accurately
reflect the requirements at that level or information that has past its LTIOV.
DOCUMENT CATEGORIES
I-27.Documents are divided into categories to prioritize their evacuation and
the extraction of information from them for intelligence purposes. Document
categories are discussed below.
Category A
I-28.Category A documents are those that require priority evacuation and/or
special handling because of their special intelligence value. They contain
SALUTE reportable information. Category A documents also include those
that are of interest to another command, collecting agency, or other agency
(for example, TECHINT, Air Force, Navy, PSYOP, Cryptography).
I-29. What determines if a document is a Category A document changes
according to the operational environment and will be set forth in each
DOCEX element's SOP and in Annex B (Intelligence) of the unit’s OPORD.
Documents that are evidence in legal proceedings against captured personnel
suspected of crimes against humanity and war crimes will be handled as
Category A documents. All Category A documents are handled as SECRET.
Standard Category A documents include but are not limited to
—
•
Unmarked maps.
•
Maps and charts containing any operational graphics, which are sent
to the G2/S2. From G2/S2, they would be evacuated to the all-source
analysis center.
•
Air Force related documents, which should go to the nearest Air Force
headquarters.
•
Navy related documents, which should be sent to the nearest Navy
headquarters.
•
TECHINT-related documents, which are evacuated to the nearest
TECHINT unit.
•
Cryptographic and communications-related documents, which are
evacuated to the nearest SIGINT analysis unit.
•
Documents constituting evidence to be used in legal proceedings
against persons suspected of crimes against humanity and war crimes,
6 September 2006
I-9
FM 2.22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
which will be marked “CRIMINAL EVIDENCE.†Such documents will
be kept separate from other documents and will be stored under guard
or in a secure area until turned over to a war crimes investigative unit.
SJA should be consulted concerning chain of custody requirements.
Category B
I-30.Category B documents contain information of intelligence interest to the
supported command. The lowest echelon possible exploits the documents and
evacuates them through intelligence channels. Category B documents are
handled as SECRET.
Category C
I-31.Category C documents and items contain no information of intelligence
interest but still require special administrative accountability (for example,
currency, works of art, narcotics). Currency is accounted for on DA Form
4137 (Evidence/Property Custody Document).
Category D
I-32.Category D documents contain no information of intelligence value.
Only the theater or higher document repository can categorize documents as
Category D.
GROUP DOCUMENTS
I-33.CEDs are first grouped according to their assigned screening category.
Personnel must be careful when sorting CEDs to ensure no CED is separated
from its associated documents. These large groupings can be broken down
into smaller groups. Each of these smaller groupings consists of CEDs that
were—
•
Captured by the same unit.
•
Captured in the same place.
•
Captured on the same day at the same time.
•
Received at the DOCEX element at the same time.
TRANSMITTAL OF CEDS FROM FIRST AND SUBSEQUENT MI UNITS
I-34.Unless they have an HCT in DS, most units that capture or find
documents normally have no way of evaluating, categorizing, or otherwise
differentiating documents. They are all tagged and evacuated together by the
most expedient means through MI channels. Once these documents arrive at
a HUMINT collection or DOCEX unit, the unit can screen, categorize, and
extract information from the documents. The degree that documents are
exploited at each echelon is dependent on mission priorities and available
resources. Document handlers must note any attempts to exploit CEDs on
the transmittal documents to prevent unnecessary duplication of effort by
higher echelons.
6 September 2006
I-10
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
I-35.When transportation assets are limited, CEDs are evacuated according
to priority based on document categorization. All Category A CEDs will be
evacuated first, followed in order by Categories B, C, and D. Documents that
have not yet been screened will be evacuated as Category C documents, but
the transmittal slip will clearly indicate that the documents have not been
screened.
I-36.Documents will be evacuated in accordance with unit SOP and Annex B
(Intelligence) in the unit OPORD. Lower priority CEDs, no matter how old,
are never evacuated ahead of those with higher priority. CEDs are packaged
so that a package of documents contains CEDs of only one category. If the
CED cannot be screened because of time or language constraints, it should be
treated as a Category C, but kept separate from screened Category C CEDs.
I-37.When CEDs are evacuated from any echelon, a document transmittal
sheet is used (Figure I-2). A separate transmittal document is prepared for
each group of CEDs to be evacuated. The sending unit prepares a separate
transmittal document for each separate addressee. The transmittal
identification number is recorded in the captured document log (Figure I-3)
as part of the entry for each captured document. Copies of all translations
should accompany the documents to avoid duplication of effort. If the sending
unit submitted intelligence reports electronically, it should note the report
number or include a copy of the report with the document to avoid duplicate
reporting.
I-38.All CEDs being evacuated must be accompanied with the appropriate—
•
Technical document (TECHDOC) cover sheet.
•
SECRET cover sheet on Categories A and B documents.
•
Translation reports and hardcopy reports accompanying translated
documents.
•
Captured document tags.
JOINT DOCUMENT EXPLOITATION FACILITY
I-39.The Theater MI brigade or group is normally tasked with the
establishment of the theater JDEF. The JDEF is staffed by Army linguists,
supported by technical experts from the Army and from the other services,
and supplemented as required by military and civilian contract translators.
The JDEF will normally contain MI experts from SIGINT, CI, TECHINT,
and other areas as required to identify and exploit documents of interest to
these specialties.
I-40.Military and civilian translators must have security clearances
appropriate to their mission requirements. This normally equates to at least
a Secret clearance since the translators must be made aware of US collection
requirements to facilitate their work. The JDEF performs a final
examination of all documents of possible theater intelligence value before
storing or evacuating them. The DIA sets procedures for exploitation of
documents above theater Army level.
6 September 2006
I-11
FM 2.22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
DOCUMENT PROCESSING (RECOVERY AND TRANSLATION)
I-41.Units must normally process documents prior to exploiting them.
Document processing includes the translation of foreign language documents
into English, the recovery of damaged documents, the decryption of
encrypted documents, and the extraction of documents from electronic media
such as the extraction or downloading of files from a computer disc or hard
drive. This need for processing frequently limits the amount of DOCEX that
can be done outside a DOCEX facility.
DOCUMENT RECOVERY
I-42.At a minimum, the JDEF manning includes teams trained in extracting
and downloading information from electronic media such as computer hard
drives. These individuals work in conjunction with TECHINT personnel
responsible for the evaluation of captured computer hardware and software.
These teams are prepared to deploy forward as necessary to accomplish their
mission.
DOCUMENT TRANSLATION
I-43.Translations are not intelligence information reports. They are,
however, often a precondition for DOCEX. Once translated, intelligence
information can be extracted and reported on an IIR, SALUTE, or similar
report. A translation should accompany the original foreign language
document; a copy of the translation should accompany any copies of the
original foreign language document and, as required, the intelligence reports.
A translation report should contain the following information:
•
Where the report will be sent.
•
Which element prepared the report.
•
DTG of the document translation.
•
Report number as designated by local SOPs.
•
Document number taken from the captured document tag.
•
Document description including type of document, number of pages,
physical construction of document, and enemy identification number, if
applicable.
•
Original captured document language.
•
DTG document was received at element preparing the report.
•
DTG document was captured.
•
Place document was captured.
•
Identity of capturing unit.
•
Circumstances under which document was captured.
•
Name of translator.
6 September 2006
I-12
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
•
Type of translation: full, extract, or summary.
•
Remarks for clarification or explanation, including the identification of
the portions of the document translated in an extract translation.
•
Classification and downgrading instructions in accordance with
AR 380-5.
TYPES OF TRANSLATION
I-44.There are three types of translations:
•
Full—one in which the entire document is translated. This is both time
and manpower intensive, especially for lengthy or highly technical
documents. Normally only a DOCEX facility at theater or national
level will do full translations, and then only when the value of the
information, technical complexity, or political sensitivity of the
document requires a full translation. Even when dealing with Category
A documents, it may not be necessary to translate the entire document
to gain the relevant information it contains.
•
Extract—one in which only a portion of the document is translated. For
instance, a TECHINT analyst may decide that only a few paragraphs
in the middle of a 600-page helicopter maintenance manual merit
translation, and that a full translation is not necessary. The analyst
would request only what he needed.
•
Summary—one in which a translator begins by reading the entire
document. He then summarizes the main points of information instead
of rendering a full or extract translation. A summary translation is
normally written, but may be presented orally, particularly at the
tactical level. Summary translations may be done as part of the
document screening process. A summary translation requires a
translator have more analytical abilities. The translator must balance
the need for complete exploitation of the document against time
available in combat operations. Translators working in languages of
which they have a limited working knowledge may also use a summary
translation. For instance, a Russian linguist may not be able to
accurately deliver a full translation of a Bulgarian language document.
However, he can probably render a usable summary of its content.
TRANSLATOR SUPPORT TO DOCEX
I-45.When HUMINT collectors are not available due to shortages or other
mission requirements, DOCEX can be performed by military or civilian
linguists under the management of a cadre of HUMINT collectors.
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
I-46.Document translators will usually need to have a clearance in order to
conduct document translation. An exception is that open-source document
translation does not require a security clearance unless the information
collected from the open-source documents is linked to specific US collection
6 September 2006
I-13
FM 2.22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
requirements, plans, or operations. In this case the translator will need a
clearance appropriate to the level of the particular contingency plan or
operation to which the information is linked. Individuals without a security
clearance should not be used in the exploitation of a closed source or CEDs.
By their very nature, the translation of these documents gives keys into the
level of US knowledge and the direction of US planning and intentions that
precludes their translation by individuals without a security clearance.
SOURCES OF TRANSLATORS
I-47.There are various sources that a commander can use to obtain the
linguists necessary to support DOCEX operations.
•
RC and AC MI linguists. Dependent on their mission requirements,
any MI soldiers with the required language qualification may be used
as document translators. The advantage of using MI soldiers is that
they have the appropriate security clearance and have a firm grasp of
collection requirements. The DOCEX operation will usually require MI
officers to manage the administrative portions.
•
Other linguists. Non-MI Army linguists include numerous soldiers who
have proficiency in a foreign language, regardless of MOS. US civilians
can be contracted to provide translator support as can local nationals.
Local national hires will provide the bulk of the translator support.
REQUIREMENTS FOR A DOCEX OPERATION
I-48.The number of personnel required to conduct DOCEX varies with the
echelon and with the volume of documents. Regardless of the size of the
operation, certain basic functions must occur:
•
Supervision and Administration. These are the C2 and logistical
aspects of the DOCEX operation that ensure that operations are
smooth and uninterrupted.
•
Accountability. Accountability includes logging documents in and out,
copying documents as required, storing documents, receiving and
transmitting documents, maintaining files, and other routine
activities. This ranges from a parttime task for one individual at a low
echelon, to warehouse-sized operations involving tons of documents at
an EAC document repository.
•
Screening. Screening involves the review and categorization of all
documents, the prioritization for translation and exploitation, and the
identification of documents for special handling and immediate
transmittal to specialized units for exploitation. Screening requires
senior, experienced individuals well versed in the target language and
the collection requirements, capable of making rapid decisions based
on minimal information. The number of screeners required depends on
the document flow that may range from only a few per day at a low
echelon, to literally thousands of documents a day at a theater-level
activity.
6 September 2006
I-14
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
•
Security Requirements. Security requirements include ensuring that
the personnel dealing with the documents have the appropriate
security level and that they do not pose a security risk to the US. This
is particularly important when dealing with non-US translators.
Security also evolves ensuring that the documents are marked in
accordance with regulation and that proper security measures are in
place to prevent compromise of information. At higher echelons,
dealing with large numbers of non-US translators normally requires a
designated CI team conducting recurring personnel security
evaluations.
•
Translation. This function involves the directed translation of
documents from the target language to English. It requires personnel
with the appropriate clearance level who have a working idiomatic
knowledge of the target language and English. Higher echelon
activities, such as the EAC document repository, group their
translation efforts by subject area. For example, one person or group
could translate all medical-related documents. At lower echelons, the
translators require a more general knowledge. At lower echelons, the
same person may translate a document, extract the pertinent
information, and report that information. At higher echelons, these are
often separate functions.
•
Exploitation and Reporting. This task is the identification and
extraction of information in response to collection requirements and
requires a high level of expertise. The individual must be totally
knowledgeable of collection requirements and must be able to readily
identify indicators of activity or identify the significance of minute
pieces of information that could contribute to answering requirements.
Reporting involves placing that extracted information into a coherent,
properly formatted report so that the all-source analyst can add it to
the intelligence picture.
•
Quality Control. This aspect includes ensuring that all aspects of the
DOCEX operation
⎯
including accounting for, screening, translating,
exploiting, and reporting––are functioning correctly.
REPORTING
I-49.Information collected from documents is normally reported in a
SALUTE report or an IIR. Reporting through other reporting formats is
discouraged. Intelligence reports are normally forwarded electronically or as
otherwise directed by SOPs and operational instructions. Normally an
electronic or hardcopy file of each report is maintained at the unit of origin;
one electronic or hardcopy is submitted through intelligence reporting
channels; and one is forwarded with evacuated documents to the next unit to
receive the document to prevent redundant reporting. In the event that the
document itself cannot be evacuated in a timely manner, a verified copy of a
translation report can be forwarded separately from the original document to
an exploitation agency.
6 September 2006
I-15
FM 2.22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
DOCUMENT EXPLOITATION IN SUPPORT OF HUMINT COLLECTION
I-50.Documents found on detainees, including EPWs––that can be exploited
more efficiently when combined with HUMINT collection––are forwarded
with the detainee to the next echelon in the EPW/detainee evacuation
channel. In exceptional cases, documents may be evacuated ahead of the
EPW or other detainee for advance study by intelligence units. A notation
should be made on the EPW’s capture tag or accompanying administrative
papers about the existence of such documents and their location if they
become separated from the detainee.
SOURCE-ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTS
I-51.Documents captured on or in association with a human source play an
important role in the HUMINT collection process. These documents may
contain reportable information the same as with any other CED. The
information is immediately extracted from the documents and forwarded in
the appropriate intelligence report. In addition to reportable information,
documents (in particular personal documents) may provide valuable insight
into the attitude and motivation of the source and can be effectively used by
the HUMINT collector in the approach process (see Chapter 8). Guidelines
for the disposition of the detainee's documents and valuables are set by
international agreements and discussed in more detail in AR 190-8 and
FM 19-4.
I-52.The capturing unit removes all documents, with the exception of the
source's primary identification document, from an EPW or other detainee to
prevent their destruction. These are placed in a waterproof container
(usually a plastic bag) and Part C of the capture tag is placed in the bag.
Documents from each source should be placed in a separate bag. These
documents are turned over to the first MP EPW handling unit in the chain of
command. The MPs will inventory all documents and prepare a handreceipt
and provide a copy to the EPW or detainee.
I-53.To ensure proper handling and expeditious disposition of these
documents, the first HUMINT collection element to see the detainee should
review the documents as part of the source screening process. If an official
document is confiscated and evacuated through MI channels, the HUMINT
collector must obtain a receipt for that document from the MPs. If possible,
the HUMINT collection unit copies any documents that contain information
of intelligence interest and forwards the copies through MI channels. With
the exception of an identification document, documents are normally kept
separate from the detainee until the detainee arrives at a permanent
confinement facility, at which time documents are returned to them per AR
190-8.
I-54.Three possible actions may be taken with documents captured with a
source. The documents may be confiscated, impounded, or returned to the
source.
6 September 2006
I-16
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
Confiscated
I-55.Documents confiscated from a source are taken away with no intention
of returning them. Official documents, except identification documents, are
confiscated and appropriately evacuated. The intelligence value of the
document should be weighed against the document's support in the HUMINT
collection of the source. The HUMINT collector must comply with the
accounting procedures established for CEDs by the MPs in accordance with
AR 190-8.
Impounded
I-56.Some CEDs will contain information that must be exploited at higher
echelons. These documents may be impounded by the HUMINT collector and
evacuated through intelligence channels. The HUMINT collector must issue
a receipt to the source for any personal documents that he impounds. He
must comply with the accounting procedures established for CEDs
impounded by the MPs in accordance with AR 190-8. When a CED is
impounded, it is taken with the intent of eventual return. Personal
documents with military information will be impounded if the military value
is greater than the sentimental value. An example of a personal document
whose military value might outweigh the sentimental value could be a
personal photograph that includes military installations or equipment.
I-57.When a CED is impounded, it must be receipted. The receipt will
include an itemized list of all the items taken from the prisoner, and the
name, rank, and unit of the person issuing the receipt. Items of high value
may be impounded for security reasons. For instance, an EPW or detainee
apprehended with an unusually large amount of money would have the
money impounded and receipted. The MPs will establish and maintain a DA
Form 4237-R (Detainee Personnel Record) for impounded items. The register
will identity the owner of the impounded items and provide a detailed
description of the items impounded. A receipt will be given to anyone who
has items impounded. Also, the OIC or authorized representative will
complete and sign DA Form 1132-R (Prisoner's Personal Property List –
Personal Deposit Fund). A copy will be provided the source. See AR 190-8 for
procedures on handling personal effects.
Returned
I-58.Returned CEDs are usually personal in nature. They are taken only to
be inspected for information of interest and are given back to the source.
Personal documents belonging to a source will be returned to the source after
examination in accordance with the GPW. These documents are CEDs whose
sentimental value outweighs their military value and may be returned to the
source. Copies of these documents may be made and forwarded if deemed
necessary. Except for an identification document (which is always returned
to the source), documents are evacuated with the source, rather than on the
source, until the source reaches a permanent confinement facility at EAC.
6 September 2006
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FM 2-22.3
Appendix J
References
The following references are provided to assist HUMINT collectors, commanders, and
trainers in obtaining regulatory guidance for HUMINT collection operations. These and
other references are in the bibliography
.
1.
AR 350-1.
Army Training and Education.
9 April 2003.
2.
AR 380-5.
Department of the Army Information Security Program.
September 2000.
3.
AR 380-10.
Technology Transfer, Disclosure of Information, and Contacts with Foreign
Representatives.
15 February 2001.
4.
AR 380-15.
(C) Safeguarding NATO Classified Information.
1 March 1984.
5.
AR 380-28.
Department of the Army Special Security System
. 12 December 1991.
6.
AR 380-40.
Policy for Controlling and Safeguarding Communications Security (COMSEC)
Material.
22 October 1990.
7.
AR 380-49.
Industrial Security.
15 April 1982.
8.
AR 380-53.
Telecommunications Security Monitoring
. 29 April 1998.
9.
AR 380-67.
Personnel Security Program.
9 September 1988.
10. AR 381-1.
Security Controls on Dissemination of Intelligence Information.
12 February 1990.
11. AR 381-10.
U.S. Army Intelligence Activities
. 1 July 1984.
12. AR 381-12.
Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the US Army (SAEDA).
15 January 1993.
13. AR 381-14.
Technical Counterintelligence (TCI).
30 September 2002.
14. AR 381-20.
(U) US Army Counterintelligence Activities (S).
26 September 1986.
15. AR 381-45.
Investigative Records Repository
. 25 August 1989.
16. AR 381-47.
(U) US Army Offensive Counterespionage Activities (S).
30 July 1990.
17. AR 381-100
. (U) Army Human Intelligence Collection Program (S).
15 May 1988.
18. AR 381-102.
(U) US Army Cover Support Program (S).
10 January 1991.
19. AR 381-143.
Military Intelligence Nonstandard Material Policies and Procedures.
1 December 1986.
6 September 2006
J-1
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
20. AR 381-172.
Counterintelligence Force Protection Source Operations and Low-Level Source
Operations.
30 December 1994.
21. AR 614-115.
Military Intelligence Excepted Career Program.
12 April 2004.
22. AR 614-200.
Military Intelligence Civilian Excepted Career Program.
30 September 2004.
23. DA Pam 381-15.
Foreign Military Intelligence Collection Activities Program.
1 June 1988.
24. Executive Order 12333.
United States Intelligence Activities.
4 December 1981.
25. DOD Directive 2310.1.
DOD Program for Enemy Prisoners of War (EPOW) and Detainees
(Short Title: DOD Enemy POW Detainee Program).
18 August 1994.
DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and
Tactical Questioning.
3 November 2005.
DOD Law of War Program.
9 December 1998.
28. DOD Directive 5240.1.
DOD Intelligence Activities.
3 December 1982.
Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the U.S. Armed
Forces
. 3 October 2005.
30. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I) Memorandum,
Guidance for the
Conduct and Oversight of Defense Human Intelligence (HUMINT) (U)
. 14 December 2004.
31.
USD(I) Memorandum
,
Implementation Instructions for USD(I) Memorandum,
Guidance
for the Conduct and Oversight of Defense Human Intelligence HUMINT
(U). 7 September
2005.
32. DOD Regulation 5240.0-R.
Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence
Components That Affect United States Persons.
December 1982.
33. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Public Law No. 109-163, Title XIV.
Further information and links to many of the above publications can be found at:
http://www.dami.army.pentagon.mil/offices/dami-cd/
ARTEPS, MTPs, and other intelligence training products are available at the Reimer
Digital Library http://www.adtdl.army.mil.
6 September 2006
J-2
FM 2-22.3
Appendix K
Contract Interrogators
INTRODUCTION
K-1. Contractors are used increasingly to augment existing capabilities and
bridge gaps in the deployed force structure. With the increased use of
contractors comes the need to identify the doctrine and procedures affecting
their employment. Leaders and those working with contractors must
understand that contractors are civilians authorized to accompany the force
in the field and should be provided with an ID card as proof of their
authorization. In accordance with GPW Article 4, contractors are to be
accorded POW status if captured.
KEY TERMS
K-2.
Contract Interrogator.
A contract interrogator is a contractor who is
specifically trained and DOD certified for, tasked with, and engages in the
collection of information from individuals (HUMINT sources) for the
purpose of answering intelligence information requirements. Their
operations must be conducted in accordance with all applicable law and
policy. Applicable law and policy include US law; the law of war; relevant
international law; relevant directives including DOD Directive 3115.09,
“DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical
Questioningâ€; DOD Directive 2310.1E, “The Department of Defense
Detainee Programâ€; DOD instructions; and military execute orders
including FRAGOs. Contract interrogators will operate only in fixed
facilities and not in tactical operations. See DOD Instruction 3020.41 for
additional information.
K-3.
External Support Contractor.
Contract interrogators fall into the
category of External Support Contractor
.
They work under contracts
awarded by contracting officers serving under the command and
procurement authority of supporting headquarters outside the theater.
Their support augments the commander's organic capability.
K-4.
Contracting Officer Representative (COR).
A COR is the
contracting officer’s designated representative who assists in the technical
monitoring and administration of a contract. Typically, a COR is
responsible for assisting the contracting officer in contractor-employee day-
to-day management of issues that may affect contractor or unit
requirements.
K-5. Statement of Work (SOW) or Performance Work Statement:
•
Contractor roles and functional requirements, as well as security
issues and the relationship to the military chain of command, must be
accurately and adequately defined in the SOW. The SOW should
include a description of the essential service and require the contractor
6 September 2006
K-1
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
to prepare contingency plans to reasonably ensure continuation.
Contractors are required to perform all tasks identified within the
SOW and all other provisions defined within the contract. The SOW
may also stipulate the appointment of a senior contractor at each
echelon or facility to be the point of contact for the commander and the
COR for resolving contract performance and scheduling challenges.
•
The contract must stipulate whether the duty of a senior contractor is
an additional duty or the full-time job of the selected contractor.
Considering that contractors are “managed†rather than “commanded,â€
having a senior contractor will assist the commander in managing the
contract. Without an onsite contractor supervisor, the default chain of
command for contract interrogators might otherwise reside in CONUS,
at the contractor’s headquarters.
CIVILIAN STATUS
K-6. A contract employee cannot be made to engage in any activity
inconsistent with his civilian status such as serving as a crew member on a
weapon system. Interrogations are presumptively consistent with civilian
contractor status, but other tasks should be vetted with the command’s
legal advisor to ensure they are legally permissible.
COMMAND CONSIDERATIONS
K-7. Theaters in which large-scale operations are conducted are very likely
to employ contract interrogators, due to limited numbers of Army HUMINT
collectors available. The presence of contractors in the AO adds an
additional dimension to the commander’s planning process. Force protection
is a critical issue. Even in "permissive" environments such as in the case of
humanitarian operations, contractors may be placed in danger. The
commander must protect his contractors since they have limited capacity to
protect themselves.
K-8. The commander has no command authority over contractor personnel.
Their relationship with the Government is governed by the terms and
conditions of their contract. In short, the commander must "manage"
contractor personnel through the contracting process. He has no authority
to command or discipline them unless it is a declared war, at which time
contractors may fall under the provisions of the UCMJ. This distinction
between command and management does not prohibit the commander from
directing contractors to carry out essential activities, such as activities
related to security and safety, consistent with the terms of their contracts.
K-9. The terms and conditions of any contract must be constructed so as to
include provisions requiring contractor personnel to abide by all guidance
and obey all instructions and general orders applicable to US Armed Forces
and DOD civilians including those issued by the Theater Commander. The
contractor can be required to "take reasonable steps" to ensure his
personnel comply with the above and to ensure "the good conduct" of his
employees. Furthermore, the contractor can be required to promptly
resolve, to the satisfaction of the COR, all contractor employee performance
and conduct problems identified by the COR. The COR can direct the
6 September 2006
K-2
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
contractor, at the contractor's expense (for example, a non-allowable charge
to the contract) to remove and replace any contractor employee failing to
comply with the above. This provides a significant tool to aid in achieving
good order and discipline within an AO. The commander also has the
authority to initiate proceedings that could lead to charges under Military
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) or the War Crimes Act.
K-10. Contractors will be subject to the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the
United States and will comply with all applicable law and policy. Applicable
law and policy include US law; the law of war; relevant international law;
relevant directives including DOD Directive 3115.09, “DOD Intelligence
Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioningâ€; DOD
Directive 2310.1E, “The Department of Defense Detainee Programâ€; DOD
instructions; and military execute orders including FRAGOs. Contractor
misconduct may be subject to prosecution under federal jurisdiction
pursuant to the MEJA or the War Crimes Act, or both. Procedures for
initiating investigation into such misconduct will normally be established
by the operational command.
K-11. The operational command will also establish procedures for referral
to federal civilian authorities and necessary pre-trial confinement.
Contractors normally will also be subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the
HN unless granted immunity from jurisdiction through the provisions of a
SOFA or equivalent agreement, or unless the HN waives jurisdiction. As a
general rule, contractors are not subject to the UCMJ (with the possible
exception for periods of formally declared war).
K-12. The commander should expect contractors to use all means at their
disposal to continue to provide essential services, in accordance with the
terms and conditions of contracts, until the military releases them. The
combatant commander determines when to execute contingency plans for
essential services and when to release a contractor.
INTERROGATOR CONTRACT CONSIDERATIONS
K-13. Contracts should be written with the following principles and
considerations:
•
Contractors will be deployable under all operational scenarios. They
will be subject to the same time-phased force deployment data
requirements as deploying military units.
•
The contractor information system will interface with the Standard
Army Management Information System at both retail and wholesale
levels. Army units should not have to contend with two separate
information systems.
•
The contractors will provide interrogation support at fixed facilities as
needed. During deployments, the commander (subject to contract terms
and conditions) will determine where contractors operate in their AO.
•
The contractors will not replace force structure. They will augment
Army capabilities and provide an additional option for meeting support
requirements.
6 September 2006
K-3
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
•
Force protection, including the protection of contractors, is the
responsibility of commanders.
•
The unit must integrate contractor support into the overall support
plan. Transportation of contractors on the battlefield must be planned.
•
Command and control of contract personnel is dependent upon terms
and conditions of the contract. The contracting officer or his designated
representative is the appointed liaison for monitoring contractor
performance requirements and will ensure that contractors move
material and personnel according to the combatant commander’s plan.
A good technique is for the command to designate and train a unit
COR or Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative (COTR) at each
facility where contract interrogators will be working. Because
international and domestic law, including SOFAs, affect the
relationship between commanders and contract personnel,
commanders and CORs should seek legal advice concerning issues
arising during operations.
•
The unit must establish a contractor personnel reporting and
accountability system. Again, a good technique is for the command to
designate and train a unit COR or TCOR at each facility where
contract interrogators will be working.
•
During deployments, contractors will live and work in field conditions
comparable to those for the supported ARFOR. Living arrangements,
transportation requirements, food, medical, and other support services
will be provided according to the contract. These services may include
but are not limited to––
ƒ
Non-routine medical and dental care.
ƒ
Mess.
ƒ
Quarters.
ƒ
Special clothing, equipment, weapons, or training mandated by the
applicable commander.
ƒ
Mail.
ƒ
Emergency notification.
•
Planning must be accomplished to ensure agreed upon support to
contractors is available to the responsible commander.
CONTRACT INTERROGATOR REQUIREMENTS
SELECTION AND EMPLOYMENT CRITERIA
K-14. Contract personnel must meet certain minimum requirements to be
qualified to work as contract interrogators. It is the responsibility of the
hiring contracting company to ensure that these criteria, set by the
Government, are met by the personnel they hire.
K-15. Policy will dictate employment criteria such as minimum education,
military service, security clearance, and previous training. Certain civilian
experience and training may also meet the policy requirements for contract
6 September 2006
K-4
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
interrogator qualifications. Commanders and CORs should refer to the
current DA policy on contract interrogators for appropriate guidance.
TRAINING REQUIREMENTS
K-16. All contractor interrogators must successfully complete a training
program approved by the United States Army Intelligence Center and Fort
Huachuca, or the Defense HUMINT Management Office, which will serve
as validation to perform MI interrogations (see DODD 3115.09). The
organization Commander or Director initiating the contract must certify
that the training has been completed. The training program will ensure
that contract interrogators are trained and certified on—
•
The most current TTP of interrogation as promulgated by DOD.
•
The applicable law and policy related to the treatment of detainees.
Applicable law and policy include US law; the law of war; relevant
international law; relevant directives including DOD Directive
3115.09, “DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and
Tactical Questioningâ€; DOD Directive 2310.1E, “The Department of
Defense Detainee Programâ€; DOD instructions; and military execute
orders including FRAGOs.
K-17. Contract interrogators must also receive training on the supported
unit’s mission and Interrogation Counter-Resistance Policy pertinent to the
AOR they are supporting. This training will be conducted in-theater by the
gaining unit.
EQUIPMENT
K-18. Contractors must be issued personal protection gear appropriate for
the threat environment. This may include ballistic helmet, personal body
armor, NBC protective gear, and in certain circumstances a personal
weapon. Contract interrogators must have access to automation equipment
to support their mission of intelligence collection and reporting.
UTILIZATION
K-19. Only trained and certified contractors working under the supervision
of MI personnel are authorized to conduct interrogations. Contract
interrogators may conduct interrogations with an interpreter in the room;
however, an OIC or NCO will monitor the interrogation by personal
presence or by means of live video camera feed.
K-20. Contract interrogators—
•
Will not supervise any military personnel or federal government
employees, nor will they be in charge of interrogation facilities.
•
Will operate only in fixed facilities. This requirement provides a
measure of force protection to the contract interrogator and frees up
Army HUMINT collectors for tactical missions.
•
Must submit a written interrogation plan to the OIC or NCOIC, and
receive approval for the plan, in advance of each interrogation. The
plan will specify the information desired and identify what techniques
6 September 2006
K-5
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
and approaches for obtaining information will be used to conduct the
interrogations.
WORK LOCATIONS
K-21. The commander may position contract interrogators in fixed
detention facilities anywhere in the theater, in accordance with the terms
and conditions of their contract.
ATTIRE
K-22. Contractors accompanying the force should be visibly distinct from
soldiers so as not to jeopardize their status. The JTF or combatant
commander may direct contract personnel to wear civilian clothing or a
uniform that says “civilian.†Specific items of military attire required for
safety or security may also be worn, such as chemical defense equipment,
cold weather equipment, or mission specific safety equipment.
FIRE ARMS
K-23. A contractor authorized to accompany the force in the field is
not
entitled
to be issued a firearm. However, a contract employee may be armed
only if
all
of following conditions are met:
•
The theater commander grants his approval.
•
The employee's corporate policy allows it.
•
The employee agrees.
K-24. If all three conditions are met, then the employee must pass proper
military side-arm training and will be issued a military specification
weapon and ammunition (generally, a 9-millimeter pistol) for
personal
protection
. The contractor must also comply with all applicable DOD,
service, and local command policies on weapons.
RECOMMENDED READING
Contractor Personnel Authorized to
Accompany the U.S. Armed Forces.
3 October 2005.
AR 715-9.
Contractors Accompanying the Force
. 29 October 1999.
DA Pamphlet 715-16.
Contractor Deployment Guide
. 27 February
1998.
Contractors on the Battlefield
. 3 January 2003.
FM 63-11
. Logistics Support Element Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
.
8 October 1996.
AMC Pamphlet 715-18.
AMC Contracts and Contractors Supporting
Military Operations
. June 2000.
6 September 2006
K-6
FM 2-22.3
Appendix L
Sample Equipment for HCT Operations
L-1. This materiel and equipment list is provided as a sample of what an
HCT may require to support the commander’s intelligence requirements.
Some of the equipment that is intended to be given to a source should be
considered expendable.
L-2. HCT Kit Bag - Assumes four-person configuration for each echelon.
Regardless of support relationship (Organic/DS/GS/GSR), HCTs inherently
require the following.
L-3. Movement/Survivability/Security:
•
Two M998 1-¼ ton vehicle (or non-tactical vehicle as appropriate for
mission) per team.
•
One crew/squad served weapon per team.
•
One M16A2 per team.
•
Three M4s per team.
•
Four 9mms per team.
•
M68 Aim-point System.
•
One x body armor with protective plate per team member.
L-4. Collection and Reporting System - Hardware 1 x System per HCT:
•
Scaleable collection and reporting tool that changes configuration
depending on where it is on the battlefield.
•
Should include an individual collection and reporting tool.
•
Should include a tool for stand-alone SIPRNET connectivity via satellite
or other.
L-5. Collection and Reporting System - Software 1 x per System:
•
Simple, intuitive Graphic User Interface (GUI).
•
Standardized Reports - SALUTE, IIR, Tactical Interrogation Report,
Contact Report, BSD Report. (Policy states that once filled out, the BSD
becomes classified; therefore, change policy or make the collection or
reporting tool classified as well.)
•
Source Management Tool.
•
CI Investigations Reports.
•
Link Analysis (capable of interface with coalition systems––in this case,
Analyst Notebook).
•
Mapping - Single, standardized tool (down to 1:12,500 scale maps,
operational graphics, GPS interface).
6 September 2006
L-1
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
•
Biometrics Integration/Biometrics Enrollment Tools (Integrated
Automated Fingerprint Identification System [IAFIS]-compliant 10-print
fingerprint scanners, iris scanners, photographing station).
•
Basic DOCEX application.
•
Foreign Language Translation.
•
Mission Planning Software.
•
Query Tools: basic, advanced, multi-entity, multi-media, save user-
defined queries.
L-6. Collection and Reporting System - Peripherals 1 x HCT:
•
Digital video/still.
•
Printer with print and scanner head (photo quality with ports for flash
cards/memory sticks).
•
Separate collection kit for biometrics (ink/card packets and/or IAFIS-
compliant live scanner, iris scanner). Must be FBI compliant and
portable).
•
GPS.
•
Digital voice recorder (Universal Serial Bus [USB] interface).
L-7. Communications - Requires organic communications systems to higher
and laterally (non-line of sight and line of sight):
•
Intra-team communications - 1 x individual:
ƒ
Secure or nonsecure (prefer secure).
ƒ
Hands-free and/or handheld.
•
Team to all - 1 x HCT:
ƒ
Secure.
ƒ
FM/UHF/Microwave.
ƒ
Line of sight.
ƒ
Non-line of sight.
ƒ
Voice.
ƒ
Digital.
ƒ
Cellular telephone:
- Voice.
- Backup for transmitting data.
- GPS enabled.
ƒ
Friendly force identification and tracking system.
•
HCT to Source - 2 sets x HCT:
ƒ
Phone cards.
ƒ
Cell phones.
ƒ
Radios.
ƒ
Email or “Blackberry-like†communications.
ƒ
One-way pager.
ƒ
Clandestine signaling.
6 September 2006
L-2
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
L-8. Source Support - 2 sets x HCT:
•
Source tracking (blue-force tracker-like capability).
•
Digital Voice Recorder (micro, USB interface).
•
Digital video or still camera, with telephoto lenses.
•
GPS.
•
1 x 1Gb Thumb Drive.
L-9. Data Storage - 1 x HCT:
•
2 x hard drives (one for UNCLASS, one for SECRET).
•
2 x Micro/Thumb, 1Gb drive (one for UNCLASS, one for SECRET).
L-10. Power Generation - 1 x liquid fuel generator or high-capacity (12Â
hour) (battery - silent, vehicle recharge), power source - 1 x HCT.
L-11. 1 x Universal Power Conversion Kit per HCT and OMT.
L-12. Vision Enhancement:
•
2 x night vision goggles (NVG) per HCT.
•
1 x thermal sensor per HCT.
•
1 x binoculars per individual (4 each).
•
1 x laser range finder per HCT.
6 September 2006
L-3
This page intentionally left blank.
FM 2-22.3
6 September 2006
M-1
Appendix M
Restricted Interrogation Technique – Separation
INTRODUCTION
M-1.
As part of the Army's efforts to gain actionable intelligence in the war
on terrorism, HUMINT collectors may be authorized, in accordance with this
appendix, to employ the separation interrogation technique, by exception, to
meet unique and critical operational requirements. The purpose of separation
is to deny the detainee the opportunity to communicate with other detainees
in order to keep him from learning counter-resistance techniques or
gathering new information to support a cover story; decreasing the detainee's
resistance to interrogation. Separation, further described in paragraphs M-2
and M-28, is the only restricted interrogation technique that may be
authorized for use. Separation will only be used during the interrogation of
specific unlawful enemy combatants for whom proper approvals have been
granted in accordance with this appendix. However, separation may
not
be
employed on detainees covered by Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW), primarily enemy prisoners of war
(EPWs). The separation technique will be used only at COCOM-approved
locations. Separation may be employed in combination with authorized
interrogation approaches—
•
On specific unlawful enemy combatants.
•
To help overcome resistance and gain actionable intelligence.
•
To safeguard US and coalition forces.
•
To protect US interests.
GENERAL
M-2.
This appendix provides doctrinal guidance for the use of separation as
an interrogation technique. Separation involves removing the detainee from
other detainees and their environment, while still complying with the basic
standards of humane treatment and prohibitions against torture or cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, as defined in the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 and addressed in GPW Article 3 (Common Article III).
Separation is to be distinguished from segregation, which refers to removing
a detainee from other detainees and their environment for legitimate
purposes unrelated to interrogation, such as when necessary for the
movement, health, safety and/or security of the detainee, or the detention
facility or its personnel. This appendix—
•
Will be reviewed annually and may be amended or updated from time
to time to account for changes in doctrine, policy, or law, and to address
lessons learned.
•
Is not a stand-alone doctrinal product and must be used in conjunction
with the main portion of this manua
l.
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
M-2
6 September 2006
M-3.
Careful consideration should be given prior to employing separation as
an interrogation technique in order to mitigate the risks associated with its
use. The use of separation should not be confused with the detainee-handling
techniques approved in Appendix D. Specifically, the use of segregation
during prisoner handling (Search, Silence, Segregate, Speed, Safeguard, and
Tag [5 S's and a T]) should not be confused with the use of separation as a
restricted interrogation technique.
M-4.
Members of all DOD Components are required to comply with the law of
war during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and
in all other military operations. Proper application of separation as a
restricted interrogation technique in selective cases involving specific
unlawful enemy combatants and in accordance with the safeguards outlined
in this manual is consistent with the minimum humane standards of
treatment required by US law, the law of war; and does not constitute cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment as defined in the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 and addressed in GPW Common Article III.
M-5.
Use of separation for interrogation is authorized by exception.
Separation will be applied on a case-by-case basis when there is a good basis
to believe that the detainee is likely to possess important intelligence and the
interrogation approach techniques provided in Chapter 8 are insufficient.
Separation should be used as part of a well-orchestrated strategy involving
the innovative application of unrestricted approach techniques. Separation
requires special approval, judicious execution, special control measures, and
rigorous oversight.
M-6.
Additionally, the use of separation as a restricted interrogation
technique shall be conducted humanely in accordance with applicable law
and policy. Applicable law and policy for purposes of this appendix include
US law; the law of war; relevant international law; relevant directives
including DOD Directive 3115.09, “DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee
Debriefings, and Tactical Questioningâ€; DOD Directive 2310.1E, “The
Department of Defense Detainee Programâ€; DOD instructions; and military
execute orders including FRAGOs.
M-7.
More stringent than normal safeguards must be applied when using the
separation technique. Use of separation is subject to USD(I) oversight.
Compared to approach techniques, there are two additional steps in the
approval process (see Figure M-l) for the use of the separation technique:
•
First, the COCOM Commander approves (after SJA review) use of the
separation technique in theater.
•
Second, following the COCOM Commander's approval, the first
General Officer/Flag Officer (GO/FO) in an interrogator's chain of
command approves each specific use of separation and the
interrogation plan that implements separation (this is non-delegable).
Interrogation supervisors shall have their servicing SJA review the
interrogation plan before submitting it to the GO/FO for approval.
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
6 September 2006
M-3
Figure M-1. Separation Approval Process.
M-8.
The employment of separation requires notification, acknowledgment,
and periodic review, in accordance with USD(I) Memorandum, "(S//NF)
Guidance for the Conduct and Oversight of Defense Human Intelligence
(HUMINT) (U)," dated 14 December 2004. This means that after the
separation is approved for use by COCOMs, the I&WS must be notified as
soon as practical. The Office of the Secretary of Defense will review these
activities periodically in accordance with DOD Directive 3115.09.
M-9.
The planning process for the employment of standard interrogation
operations also applies to the employment of the separation technique
(see Chapter 4).
Separation Technique Approval
Available
Advice:
SJA,
BSC,
Analysts
Interrogation Unit
Reviews interrogation plans that include use of
COCOM-approved use of separation. Plans,
prepares, executes, and assesses their use.
GO/FO
Approves each interrogation plan that includes
COCOM-authorized use of separation.
Approves all extensions or additional iterations.
COCOM Commander
Approves overall use of
interrogation approach techniques
in theater.
Interrogation Supervisor
Reviews interrogation plan for necessity and
appropriateness of requested use of separation.
Ensures that proper safeguards and support
are stipulated.
Interrogator
Develops interrogation plan based on screening
and assessment of source’s intelligence value
and level of cooperation.
USD(I)
Provides oversight of OSD Policy
Separation Technique Approval
Available
Advice:
SJA,
BSC,
Analysts
Interrogation Unit
Reviews interrogation plans that include use of
COCOM-approved use of separation. Plans,
prepares, executes, and assesses their use.
GO/FO
Approves each interrogation plan that includes
COCOM-authorized use of separation.
Approves all extensions or additional iterations.
COCOM Commander
Approves overall use of
interrogation approach techniques
in theater.
Interrogation Supervisor
Reviews interrogation plan for necessity and
appropriateness of requested use of separation.
Ensures that proper safeguards and support
are stipulated.
Interrogator
Develops interrogation plan based on screening
and assessment of source’s intelligence value
and level of cooperation.
USD(I)
Provides oversight of OSD Policy
Separation Technique Approval
Available
Advice:
SJA,
BSC,
Analysts
Interrogation Unit
Reviews interrogation plans that include use of
COCOM-approved use of separation. Plans,
prepares, executes, and assesses their use.
GO/FO
Approves each interrogation plan that includes
COCOM-authorized use of separation.
Approves all extensions or additional iterations.
COCOM Commander
Approves overall use of
interrogation approach techniques
in theater.
Interrogation Supervisor
Reviews interrogation plan for necessity and
appropriateness of requested use of separation.
Ensures that proper safeguards and support
are stipulated.
Interrogator
Develops interrogation plan based on screening
and assessment of source’s intelligence value
and level of cooperation.
USD(I)
Provides oversight of OSD Policy
Available
Advice:
SJA,
BSC,
Analysts
Available
Advice:
SJA,
BSC,
Analysts
Interrogation Unit
Reviews interrogation plans that include use of
COCOM-approved use of separation. Plans,
prepares, executes, and assesses their use.
Interrogation Unit
Reviews interrogation plans that include use of
COCOM-approved use of separation. Plans,
prepares, executes, and assesses their use.
GO/FO
Approves each interrogation plan that includes
COCOM-authorized use of separation.
Approves all extensions or additional iterations.
GO/FO
Approves each interrogation plan that includes
COCOM-authorized use of separation.
Approves all extensions or additional iterations.
COCOM Commander
Approves overall use of
interrogation approach techniques
in theater.
COCOM Commander
Approves overall use of
interrogation approach techniques
in theater.
Interrogation Supervisor
Reviews interrogation plan for necessity and
appropriateness of requested use of separation.
Ensures that proper safeguards and support
are stipulated.
Interrogation Supervisor
Reviews interrogation plan for necessity and
appropriateness of requested use of separation.
Ensures that proper safeguards and support
are stipulated.
Interrogator
Develops interrogation plan based on screening
and assessment of source’s intelligence value
and level of cooperation.
Interrogator
Develops interrogation plan based on screening
and assessment of source’s intelligence value
and level of cooperation.
USD(I)
Provides oversight of OSD Policy
USD(I)
Provides oversight of OSD Policy
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
M-4
6 September 2006
RESPONSIBILITIES
M-10.
Commanders of interrogation or detention facilities and forces
employing the approved separation technique are responsible for compliance
with applicable law and policy. Commanders must understand that
separation poses a higher risk to the detainee than do standard techniques,
and so require strenuous oversight to avoid misapplication and potential
abuse.
M-11.
The interrogation chain of command must coordinate the interrogation
plan with the detention operations commander. Close coordination must
occur between intelligence personnel and personnel responsible for detainee
operations, including MP, security forces, Master at Arms, and other
individuals providing security for detainees (hereafter referred to as guards).
Guards do not conduct intelligence interrogations and, in accordance with
DOD Directive 3115.09, will not set the conditions for interrogations. Guards
may support interrogators as requested for detainee custody, control, escort,
and/or additional security (for example, for combative detainees), in
accordance with paragraphs 5-57 through 5-66 and FM 3-19.40, JP 3-63, and
the approved interrogation plan.
M-12.
The detention operations commander (in conjunction with the MI
commander) may convene a multidiscipline custody and control oversight
team including, but not limited to, MP, MI, BSC (if available), and legal
representatives. The team can advise and provide measures to ensure
effective custody and control in compliance with applicable law and policy.
M-13.
Commanders must consider the following when employing separation:
•
Is separation directed against the appropriate individual and is it
necessary for collecting important intelligence?
•
Does separation complement the overall interrogation strategy and
interrogation approach technique or techniques?
•
Is the application of separation with the specific detainee at issue
consistent with humane treatment and in accordance with applicable
law and policy?
M-14.
Planning for the use of separation requires coordination with staff
elements that provide support to interrogation operations. Staff elements
that support interrogation facilities and forces employing separation will
comply with paragraphs 4-59 and 4-60 and all controls and safeguards
identified in paragraphs M-17 through M-26.
GENERAL CONTROLS AND SAFEGUARDS
HUMANE TREATMENT
M-15.
All captured or detained personnel shall be treated humanely at all
times and in accordance with DOD Directive 3115.09, "DOD Intelligence
Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning"; DOD
Directive 2310.1E, “Department of Defense Detainee Program,†and no
person in the custody or under the control of the DOD, regardless of
nationality or physical location, shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment as defined in US law, including the
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
6 September 2006
M-5
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. All intelligence interrogations, debriefings,
or tactical questioning to gain intelligence from captured or detained
personnel shall be conducted in accordance with applicable law and policy.
M-16.
Any inhumane treatment—including abusive practices, torture, or
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment as defined in US law,
including the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005—is prohibited and all
instances of such treatment will be reported immediately in accordance with
paragraph 5-69 thru 5-72. Beyond being impermissible, these unlawful and
unauthorized forms of treatment are unproductive because they may yield
unreliable results, damage subsequent collection efforts, and result in
extremely negative consequences at national and international levels. Review
by the servicing SJA is required prior to using separation. Each interrogation
plan must include specific safeguards to be followed: limits on duration,
interval between applications, and termination criteria. Medical personnel
will be available to respond in the event a medical emergency occurs.
FM 2-22.3 REQUIREMENTS
M-17.
Separation must be employed in accordance with the standards in this
manual. These standards include the following:
•
Prohibitions against abusive and unlawful actions (see para 5-75) and
against the employment of military working dogs in the conduct of
interrogation (see paras 5-59 and 8-2).
•
Requirement for non-DOD agencies to observe the same standards for
the conduct of interrogation operations and treatment of detainees
when in DOD facilities (see para 5-55).
•
Prohibition on guards conducting intelligence interrogations or taking
any actions to set the conditions for interrogations. Humane treatment,
evacuation, custody and control (reception, processing, administration,
internment, and safety) of detainees; force protection; and the
operation of the internment facility are discussed in paragraphs 5-57
through 5-66. (FM 3-19 .40 and JP 3-63 also thoroughly discuss
detainee operations.)
•
Assignment of ISNs to all detainees in DOD control, whether or not
interrogation has commenced, as soon as possible; normally within 14
days of capture. (See AR 190-8 and Secretary of Defense Memorandum
dated 20 September 2005, "(S//NF) Policy on Assigning Detainee
Internment Serial Numbers (ISN)(U)."
•
Access to detainees by the ICRC.
REPORTING OF ABUSES AND SUSPECTED ABUSES
M-18.
As an interrogation technique, separation is particularly sensitive due
to the possibility that it could be perceived as an impermissible act.
Interrogators applying the separation technique and the chain of command
supervising must be acutely sensitive to the application of the technique to
ensure that the line between permissible or lawful actions and impermissible
or unlawful actions is distinct and maintained. Therefore, HUMINT
collectors should have heightened awareness and understanding of the risks,
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
M-6
6 September 2006
control measures, and safeguards associated with the use of separation. Any
interrogation technique that appears to be cruel, inhuman, or degrading as
defined in US law; or impermissibly coercive, or is not listed in this manual,
is prohibited and should be reported immediately to the chain of command or
other appropriate channels for resolution. Orders given to treat detainees
inhumanely are unlawful. Every interrogator must know how to respond to
orders that the individual interrogator perceives to be unlawful
(see paras 5-80 through 5-82).
M-19.
If the order is a lawful order, it should be obeyed. Failure to obey a
lawful order is an offense under the UCMJ.
COMMAND POLICY AND OPERATION ORDERS
M-20.
The provisions of this appendix must be written into COCOM policy
and/or OPORDs when using the restricted interrogation technique of
separation.
MEDICAL
M-21.
Commanders are responsible to ensure that detainees undergoing
separation during interrogation receive adequate health care as described in
greater detail in paragraph 5-91.
TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION
M-22.
Only those DOD interrogators who have been trained and certified by
the United States Army Intelligence Center (USAIC), or other Defense
HUMINT Management Office (DHMO) designated agency, in accordance
with guidance established by USD(I) to use separation, are authorized to
employ this technique. The training must meet certification standards
established by the Defense HUMINT Manager in coordination with
applicable DOD components. Properly trained and certified contract
interrogators are authorized to initiate interrogation plans that request the
use separation, and, once the plan is approved, to employ the technique in
accordance with the provisions of this appendix and Appendix K. Contract
interrogators will always be utilized under the supervision and control of US
government or military personnel (see para K-19 and K- 20). Non-DOD
personnel conducting interrogations in DOD facilities must be certified by
their agency and separately gain approval (through their agency's chain of
command) for the additional technique described in this appendix. They must
present this written certification and agency approval to the COCOM before
use is permitted (see para 5-55).
PLANNING
M-23.
Planning for the use of separation must include—
•
An interrogation plan that addresses safeguards, limits of duration,
interval between applications, termination criteria, and presence of
qualified medical personnel for emergencies (see Figure M-2).
•
A provision for detainees to be checked periodically in accordance with
command health care directives, guidance, and SOPs applicable to all
detainees.
•
A legal review.
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
6 September 2006
M-7
Figure M-2. Installation Plan for Restricted Separation Techniques.
Figure M-2. Installation Plan for Restricted Separation Techniques.
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
M-8
6 September 2006
•
Documentation of the use of separation, including photographs and/or
videotaping, if appropriate and available (see para 5-54).
M-24.
Separation is only authorized for use in interrogation operations, not
for other Military Source Operations. Separation may be approved for use in
combination with authorized approach techniques. General controls and
safeguards contained in this manual must be applied during the use
separation, in conjunction with the safeguards specific to the separation
technique.
Planning must consider the possible cumulative effect of
using multiple techniques and take into account the age, sex, and
health of detainees, as appropriate.
TECHNICAL CONTROL
M-25.
Requests for approval of separation will be forwarded (for information
purposes only) via secure means through intelligence technical channels at
the same time as they are sent through command channels. Intelligence
technical channels are those used for forwarding of source information and
technical parameters of collection operations from lower to higher and
passing tasking specifics, source information, technical control measures, and
other sensitive information from higher to lower. The technical chain extends
from the HCT through the OMT and Operations Section (if one exists) to the
C/J/G/S2X.
APPLICATION OF SEPARATION TECHNIQUE
M-26.
The purpose of separation is to deny the detainee the opportunity to
communicate with other detainees in order to keep him from learning
counter-resistance techniques or gathering new information to support a
cover story, decreasing the detainee's resistance to interrogation. Separation
does not constitute sensory deprivation, which is prohibited. For the purposes
of this manual, sensory deprivation is defined as an arranged situation
causing significant psychological distress due to a prolonged absence, or
significant reduction, of the usual external stimuli and perceptual
opportunities. Sensory deprivation may result in extreme anxiety,
hallucinations, bizarre thoughts, depression, and anti-social behavior.
Detainees will not be subjected to sensory deprivation.
M-27.
Physical separation is the best and preferred method of separation. As
a last resort, when physical separation of detainees is not feasible, goggles or
blindfolds and earmuffs may be utilized as a field expedient method to
generate a perception of separation.
M-28.
Objectives:
•
Physical Separation: Prevent the detainee from communicating with
other detainees (which might increase the detainee's resistance to
interrogation) and foster a feeling of futility.
•
Field Expedient Separation: Prolong the shock of capture. Prevent the
detainee from communicating with other detainees (which might
increase the detainee's resistance to interrogation) and foster a feeling
of futility.
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
6 September 2006
M-9
M-29.
Safeguards:
•
Duration:
Self-explanatory.
•
Physical Separation:
Limited to 30 days of initial duration.
•
Field Expedient Separation:
Limited to 12 hours of initial
duration at the initial interrogation site. This limit on duration does
not include the time that goggles or blindfolds and earmuffs are used
on detainees for security purposes during transit and evacuation.
•
Oversight Considerations for Field Expedient Separation:
ƒ
The intended use of field expedient means of separation must be
specified on the interrogation plan that is submitted to the GO/FO
for approval.
ƒ
Detainees must be protected from self-injury when field expedient
means of separation are used. The effect of the application of field
expedient separation means on the detainee must be monitored to
detect any possible health concerns.
M-30.
The following safeguards apply to both Physical Separation and Field
Expedient Separation.
•
Break:
Additional periods of separation will not be applied without the
approving GO/FO's determination of the length of a break between
iterations.
•
Extension:
ƒ
Physical Separation Method
: Extensions of this technique past 30
days must be reviewed by the servicing SJA and approved by the
original approving GO/FO or his replacement in that position.
ƒ
Field Expedient Method:
Extensions past 12 hours of initial
duration at the initial interrogation site must be reviewed by the
servicing SJA and approved by the original approving/replacement
GO/FO.
ƒ
Medical:
Detainees will be checked periodically in accordance with
command health care directives, guidance, and SOPs applicable to
all detainees.
ƒ
Custody and Control:
The interrogation chain of command must
coordinate the interrogation plan with the Detention Operations
Commander. The Detention Operations Commander (in conjunction
with the MI commander) may convene a multidiscipline custody and
control oversight team including, but not limited to, MP, MI, BSC (if
available), and legal representatives. The team can advise and
provide measures to ensure effective custody and control in
compliance with the requirements of applicable law and policy.
•
Oversight Considerations:
ƒ
Use of hoods (sacks) over the head, or of duct tape or adhesive tape
over the eyes, as a separation method is prohibited.
ƒ
If separation has been approved, and the interrogator subsequently
determines that there may be a problem, the interrogator should
seek further guidance through the chain of command before applying
the technique.
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
M-10
6 September 2006
ƒ
Care should be taken to protect the detainee from exposure (in
accordance with all appropriate standards addressing excessive or
inadequate environmental conditions) to—
−
Excessive noise.
−
Excessive dampness.
−
Excessive or inadequate heat, light, or ventilation.
−
Inadequate bedding and blankets.
−
Interrogation activity leadership will periodically monitor the
application of this technique.
ƒ
Use of separation must not preclude the detainee getting four hours
of continuous sleep every 24 hours.
ƒ
Oversight should account for moving a detainee from one
environment to another (thus a different location) or arrangements
to modify the environment within the same location in accordance
with the approved interrogation plan.
M-31.
Suggested Approach Combinations:
•
Futility.
•
Incentive.
•
Fear Up.
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
Glossary
The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions, and other selected terms.
Where Army and joint definitions are different, (
Army
) follows the term. Terms for which
FM 2-22.3 is the proponent manual (the authority) are marked with an asterisk (*) and followed
by the number of the paragraph (¶) or page where they are defined. For other terms, refer to the
manual listed. JP 1-02, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms and FM 1-02 Operational
Terms and Graphics are posted on the Joint Electronic Library, which is available online and on
CD ROM.
•
Use this URL to access JP 1-02 online:
http://atiam.train.army.mil/soldierPortal/atia/adlsc/view/public/11444-1/FM/1Â
02/TOC.HTM
•
Use this URL to access FM 1-02 online:
http://atiam.train.army.mil/soldierPortal/atia/adlsc/view/public/11444-1/FM/1Â
02/TOC.HTM
•
/jel/service_pubs/101_5_1.pdf
•
Follow this path to access JP 1-02 on the Joint Electronic Library CD-ROM:
Mainmenu>Joint Electronic Library>DOD Dictionary.
•
Follow this path to access FM 1-02 on the Joint Electronic Library CD-ROM:
Mainmenu>Joint Electronic Library>Service Publications>Multiservice Pubs>
FM 101-5-1.
*2X
The *2X Staff conducts mission and RM for all HUMINT and CI
entities located within the designated AOIR. It coordinates,
deconflicts, and synchronizes all HUMINT and CI activities in the
designated AOIR. (“*2X†indicates 2X functions at all levels.)
AC
Active
Component
ACCO
Army Central Control Office
ACE
analysis and control element
ACT
Analysis Control Team
ADA
Air
Defense
Artillery
ADP
automated data processing
ADCON
administrative
control
aka
also known as
AMHS
Automated
Message Handling System
AMID
allied military intelligence battalion
AO
area of operations
AOI
area
of
interest
AOIR
area of intelligence responsibility
AOR
area
of
responsibility
6 September 2006
Glossary-1
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
approx
approximately
ARNG
Army Reserve National Guard
ASAS
All-Source Analysis System
ASCC
Army Service Component Command
ASD(C3I)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence)
ASI
additional skill identifier
assn
assassination
ATD
associated technical document
BAT
Biometric Automated Toolset
BCT
brigade combat team
BDA
battle damage assessment
BOS
Battlefield Operating System
BSC
Behavioral Science Consultant
BSD
basic source data
C2
command and control
CA
civil
affairs
CAT
category
CCIR
commander’s critical information requirement
CCNY
City College of New York
CDOC
captured
document
CDR
commander
CGS
common ground station
CE
captured equipment (STANAG term)
CED
captured enemy document
CEE
captured enemy equipment
CENTCOM
US
Central
Command
CFSO
Counterintelligence Force Protection Source Operations
CHAMS
CI/HUMINT Automated Management System
CHATS
CI/HUMINT Automated Tool Set
CI
counterintelligence
CIA
Central Intelligence Agency
CICA
Counterintelligence Coordination Authority
CIAC
Counterintelligence Analysis Cell
Glossary-
2
6 September 2006
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
CID
Criminal
Investigation
Division
CIFA
Counterintelligence Field Agency
C2X
Coalition Intelligence Staff Officer
C/J2X LNO
Coalition/Joint Intelligence Staff Liaison Officer
C/J/G2X
Coalition/Joint/Corps/Division Intelligence Staff Officer
C/J/G/S2 Coalition/Joint/Corps/Division/Brigade and Below Intelligence
Staff Officer
C/J/G/S2X Coalition/Joint/Corps/Division/Brigade and Below Intelligence
Staff Officer
CMO
civil-military
operations
COA
course
of
action
COCOM
Combatant
Command
COE
common
operating
environment
COLISEUM
Community
On-Line
Intelligence System for End Users and
Managers
COMMZ
communications
zone
CONUS
continental United States
CONOP
contingency
operations
COP
common
operational
picture
COR
contracting officer representative
COT
commercial
off-the-shelf
COTR
Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative
counterintelligence
Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against
espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or
assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments
or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or
international terrorist activities. (FM 2-0)
Counterintelligence
Subordinate to the J/G2X and coordinates all CI activities for a
Coordinating Authority
deployed force. It provides technical support to all CI assets and
coordinates and deconflicts CI activities in the deployed AO.
(FM 2-0)
CP
command
post
CPERS
captured personnel (JP-2.5)
CPR
Common Point of Reference
CS
combat
support
CSS
combat service support
CTF
coalition task force
6 September 2006
Glossary-3
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
DA
Department of the Army
DCGS-A
Distributed Common Ground System-Army
DCIS
Defense Criminal Investigative Service
DCISS
Defense Intelligence Agency CI Information System
DCP
detainee collection point
DEA
Drug Enforcement Agency
debriefing
The systematic questioning of individuals to procure information
to answer specific collection requirements by direct and indirect
questioning techniques. (FM 2-0)
DED
Data Element Dictionary
DH
Defense
HUMINT
DHMO
Defense HUMINT Management Office
DHS
Department of Homeland Security
DIA
Defense Intelligence Agency
DII
DOD Information Infrastructure
DISCOM
Division Support Command
DOCEX
document
exploitation
document exploitation
The systematic extraction of information from all media formats
in response to collection requirements. (FM 2-0)
DOD
Department of Defense
DOE
Department
of
Energy
DP
displaced
person
DRP
Detainee
Reporting
DRS
Detainee Report System
DS
direct
support
DSCA
defense support of civilian authorities
DSS
decision support software
DST
decision support template
DTG
date-time
group
EAC
echelons above corps
EEFI
essential elements of friendly information
EPW
enemy prisoner of war
evaluating
In intelligence usage, appraisal of an item of information in
terms of credibility, reliability, pertinence, and accuracy.
(FM 2-0)
Glossary-
4
6 September 2006
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
EW
electronic
warfare
FBI
Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEO
forced entry operations
FFIR
friendly force information requirement
FHA
foreign humanitarian assistance
FISS
Foreign Intelligence Security Service
Five S’s
search, seize, segregate, safeguard, and silence
FORSCOM
US Army Forces Command
FRAGO
fragmentary
order
FRN
field reporting number
FSE
fire
support
element
Gb
gigabyte
GC
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War
GPS
Global Positioning System
GPW
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
GRCS
Guardrail Common Sensor
GRIFN
Guardrail Information Node
GS
general
support
GSR
general
support-reinforcing
GUI
graphic
user
interface
GWS
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field
HAC
HUMINT analysis cell
HAT
HUMINT analysis team
HCR
HUMINT collection requirement
HCT
HUMINT collection team
HET
human exploitation team
HN
host
nation
HOC
HUMINT
operations
cell
HSOC
Homeland Security Operations Center
HQ
headquarters
HQDA
Headquarters, Department of the Army
6 September 2006
Glossary-5
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
Glossary-
6
6 September 2006
human
intelligence The collection by a trained HUMINT collector of foreign
information from people and multimedia to identify elements,
intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equip-
ment, and capabilities. (FM 2-0)
HUMINT
Human
Intelligence
HUMINT Analysis Cell The “fusion point†for all HUMINT reporting and operational
analysis in the ACE and JISE. It determines gaps in reporting
and coordinates with the requirements manager to cross-cue
other intelligence sensor systems.
HUMINT Analysis Team
Sub-element of the G2 ACE that supports the G2 development of
IPB products and developing and tailoring requirements to match
HUMINT collection capabilities.
HUMINT Operations Cell
Assigned under the J/G2X to track all HUMINT activities in the
area of intelligence responsibility (AOIR). It provides technical
support to all HUMINT collection operations and deconflicts
HUMINT collection operations in the AO. (FM 2-0)
I&WS
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and
Warfighting Support
IAFIS
Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System
IBS
Integrated Broadcast Services
ICF
intelligence contingency fund
ICRC
International Committee of the Red Cross
ID
identification
IED
improvised
explosive
device
IG
Inspector
General
IIMG
Interagency Incident Management Group
IIR
intelligence information report
IMINT
imagery
intelligence
INTREP
intelligence
report
INTSUM
intelligence
summary
IPB
intelligence preparation of the battlefield
IPF
Intelligence Processing Facility
IPSP
Intelligence Priorities for Strategic Planning
IR
information
requirements
ISA
International Standardization Agreement
ISN
Internment
Serial
Number
ISR
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
IU
Interrogation Unit (AJP-2.5)
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
6 September 2006
Glossary-7
J2
Joint Intelligence Directorate/Staff
J2X
Joint Intelligence Staff Officer
J2X Responsible for controlling, coordinating and deconflicting all
HUMINT and CI collection activities and keeping the joint force
J2 informed on all HUMINT and CI activities conducted in the
joint force AOR. (*2X Staff Handbook) Umbrella organization
consisting of human intelligence operation cell and the task force
counterintelligence coordinating authority. The J2X is
responsible for coordination and deconfliction of all human
source-related activity. See also counterintelligence; human
intelligence. (JP 2-01)
J5
Joint Staff Directorate, Civil Affairs
J/G2
Joint/Corps/Division
Intelligence Staff Officer
J/G/S2
Joint/Corps/Division/Brigade and Below Intelligence Staff Officer
J/G/S2X
Joint/Corps/Division/Brigade and Below Intelligence Staff Officer
JAC
Joint Analysis Center
JAO
joint area of operations
JCMEC
Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Center
JDEF
joint document exploitation facility
JDS
Joint Dissemination System
JFC
Joint Forces Commander
JIC
Joint
Interrogation
Center
JIDC
Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center
JISE
Joint Intelligence Support Element
JTF
joint
task
force
JUMPS
job, unit, mission, PIR and IR, and supporting information
JWICS
Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System
KB
knowledgeability
brief
LCC
Land
Component
Command
LDR
Lead Development Report
LEA
law
enforcement
agency
LNO
Liaison
Officer
LRS
long-range
surveillance
LTIOV
latest time information is of value
MAGTF
Marine Air-Ground Task Force
MASINT
measurement and signature intelligence
MDMP
Military Decisionmaking Process
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
Glossary-
8
6 September 2006
MEDEVAC
medical
evacuation
MEF
Marine
expeditionary
force
MEJA
Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act
METT-TC
mission, equipment, terrain and weather, troops and support
available, time available, and civil considerations
MI
Military
Intelligence
MILO
mission, identification, location, and organization
MSO
military source operations
MOS
military
occupation
specialty
MP
Military
Police
MTOE
modified table of organization and equipment
MTW
major theater war
NA
not
applicable
NAC
national agency check
NAI
named area of interest
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC
nuclear, biological, and chemical
NCO
noncommissioned
officer
NCOIC
noncommissioned officer in charge
NGA
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NGO
non-governmental
organization
NIP
Notice of Intelligence Potential
NIST
national intelligence support team
NOFORN
no foreign dissemination
NRT
near-real
time
NSA
National
Security
Agency
NVG
night
vision
goggles
OB
order of battle
OCONUS
outside continental United States
OCR
optical character recognition
OGA
other government agencies
O/I
operations and intelligence
OIC
officer in charge
OMT
operational
management
team
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
6 September 2006
Glossary-9
OPCON
operational
control
OPLAN
operations
plan
OPORD
operations
order
OSC
operations support cell
OSD
Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSINT
open-source
intelligence
OPTEMPO
operational
tempo
OVOP
overt operational proposal
PDA
Personal
Digital Assistant
PIR
priority intelligence requirement
PME
peacetime military engagement
PMO
Provost Marshal Office
POL
petroleum, oils, and lubricants
POW
prisoner
of
war
PRETECHREP
preliminary
technical
report
priority intelligence
Those intelligence requirements for which a commander has
requirements
an anticipated and stated priority in the task of planning and
decisionmaking. (JP 1-02)
PSO
peacetime stability operation (STANAG term)
PSYOP
Psychological
Operations
PVO
private volunteer organization
PW
Prisoner of War (as used in the GPW)
R
reinforcing
R&S
reconnaissance and surveillance
RC
Reserve
Components
RFI
request for information
RM
requirements
management
ROE
rules
of
engagement
RSR
Resource Status Report
SALUTE
Size, Activity, Location, Unit, Time, Equipment
SBI
special
background
investigation
SCC
Service Component Commands
SCI
sensitive compartmented information
SCO
Sub-Control
Office
SDR
Source-Directed
Requirement
FM 2-22.3 _________________________________________________________________________________
Glossary-
10
6 September 2006
security detainee
Those detainees who are not combatants, but who may be under
investigation or pose a threat to US forces if released.
SE
southeast
SECDEF
Secretary of Defense
SERE
survival, evasion, resistance, and escape
S.F.P.
Students
for
Peace
SIGINT
signals
intelligence
SII
statement of intelligence interest
SIO
senior intelligence officer
SIPRNET
Secret Internet Protocol Router Network
SIR
specific
information
requirement
SITMAP
situation
map
SJA
Staff
Judge
Advocate
SME
subject matter expert
SOF
Special Operations Forces
SOFA
Status of Forces Agreement
SOI
signal operating instruction
SOP
standing operating procedure
SOW
statement
of
work
Source (DOD)
1. A person, thing, or activity from which information is obtained.
2. In clandestine activities, a person (agent), normally a foreign
national, in the employ of an intelligence activity for intelligence
purposes. 3. In interrogation activities, any person who furnishes
information, either with or without the knowledge that the
information is being used for intelligence purposes. In this
context, a controlled source is in the employment or under the
control of the intelligence activity and knows that the information
is to be used for intelligence purposes. An uncontrolled source is a
voluntary contributor of information and may or may not know
that the information is to be used for intelligence purposes. See
also agent; collection agency. (JP 1-02)
SQL
structured
query
language
SSC
small-scale
contingency
Stability and Reconstruction
Operations
Those operations that sustain and exploit security and control
over areas, populations, and resources. They employ military
capabilities to reconstruct or establish services and support
civilian agencies. Stability and reconstruction operations involve
both coercive and cooperative actions.
STANAG
Standardization
Agreement
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
6 September 2006
Glossary-11
TACON
tactical
control
tactical questioning The expedient initial questioning for information of immediate
tactical value. Soldiers conduct tactical questioning based on the
unit’s SOP, ROE, and the order for that mission. Unit leaders
must include specific guidance for tactical questioning in the
order for appropriate missions. The unit S3 and S2 must also
provide specific guidance down to the unit level to help guide
tactical questioning. (FM 2-0)
TCICA
Theater Counterintelligence Coordination Authority
TCP
traffic control point
TDA
table of distribution and allowances
TDRC
Theater Detainee Reporting Center
TECHDOC
technical
document
TECHNINT
technical
intelligence
TES
Tactical Exploitation System
TF
task
force
THREATCON
threat
condition
TOE
table of organization and equipment
TPFDDL
Time-Phased Forces Deployment Data List
TTP
tactics, techniques, and procedures
TS
Top
Secret
tvl
travel
TWS
Trusted
Workstation
UCMJ
Uniform Code of Military Justice
UNCLASS
unclassified
unk
unknown
USAR
US Army Reserve
USB
Universal
Serial
Bus
USCENTCOM
US
Central
Command
USD(I)
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
UTM
universal
transverse mercator (grid)
UW
unconventional
warfare
WARNO
warning
order
WMD
weapons of mass destruction
WO
warrant
officer
WTC
World
Trade
Center
This page intentionally left blank.
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
6 September 2006
Bibliography
–
1
Bibliography
The bibliography lists field manuals by new number followed by old number,
as indicated.
DOCUMENTS NEEDED
These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication.
JP 0-2.
Unified Action Armed Forces.
10 July 2001.
JP 2-0.
Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint
Operations. 9 March 2000.
JP 2-01.2.
(U) Joint Doctrine and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for
Counterintelligence Support to Operations (S//NF).
13 June 2006.
JP 3-0.
Doctrine for Joint Operations
. 10 September 2001.
JP 3-63.
Joint Doctrine for Detainee Operations.
September 2005.
JP 4-0.
Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations
. 6 April 2000.
AR 40-25.
Nutrition Standards and Education.
15 June 2001.
AR 715-9.
Contractors Accompanying the Force
. 29 October 1999.
DA Pam 715-16.
Contractor Deployment Guide.
27 February 1998.
FM 1.
The Army.
14 June 2005.
FM 1-02.
Operational
Terms and Graphics.
21 September 2004.
FM 2-0.
Intelligence.
17 May 2004.
FM 3-0.
Operations
. 14 June 2001.
Contractors on the Battlefield
. 3 January 2003.
FM 5-0.
Army Planning and Orders Production.
20 January 2005.
FM 6-0.
Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces.
11 August 2003.
FM 27-10.
Law of Land Warfare.
July 1956.
FM 34-5. (U)
Human Intelligence and Related Counterintelligence Operations
(S//NF).
29 July 1994.
FM 34-130.
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
. 8 July 1994.
FM 63-11.
Logistics Support Element Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
. 8 October
1996.
FM 71-100.
Division Operations.
28 August 1996.
FM 100-15.
Corps Operations.
13 September 1989.
FM 101-5.
Staff Organization and Operations
. 31 May 1997.
AMC Pam 715-18.
AMC Contracts and Contractors Supporting Military Operations
.
June 2000.
FM 2-22.3 _____________________________________________________________________________________
6 September 2006
Bibliography
-
2
READINGS RECOMMENDED
These sources contain relevant supplemental information.
ARMY PUBLICATIONS
Most Army doctrinal publications are available online:
http://155.217.58.58/atdls.htm
AR 190-8.
Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other
Detainees
. 1 October 1997.
AR 190-40.
Serious Incident Report.
15 July 2005.
AR 195-5.
Criminal Investigation Evidence Procedures
. 28 August 1982.
AR 380-5.
Department of the Army Information Security Program
. September 2000.
AR 380-10.
Technology Transfer, Disclosure of Information, and Contacts with
Foreign Representatives.
15 February 2001.
AR 380-15.
(C) Safeguarding Classified NATO Information.
1 March 1984.
AR 380-28.
Department of the Army Special Security System
. 12 December 1991.
AR 380-40.
Policy for Controlling and Safeguarding Communications Security
(COMSEC) Material.
22 October 1990.
AR 380-49.
Industrial Security.
15 April 1982.
AR 380-53.
Telecommunications Security Monitoring.
29 April 1998.
AR 380-67.
Personnel Security Program.
9 September 1988.
AR 381-1.
Security Controls on Dissemination of Intelligence Information
.
12 February 1990.
AR 381-10.
US Army Intelligence Activities
. 1 July 1984.
AR 381-12.
Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the US Army (SAEDA).
15 January 1993.
AR 381-14.
Technical Counterintelligence (TCI).
30 September 2002.
AR 381-20.
(U) US Army Counterintelligence Activities (S).
26 September 1986.
AR 381-45.
Investigative Records Repository.
25 August 1989.
AR 381-47
. (U) US Army Offensive Counterespionage Activities (S).
30 July 1990.
AR 381-100.
(U) Army Human Intelligence Collection Program (S//NF)
. 15 May
1988.
AR 381-102.
(U) US Army Cover Support Program (S).
10 January 1991.
AR 381-143.
Military Intelligence Nonstandard Material Polices and Procedures
.
1 December 1986.
AR 381-172. (U)
Counterintelligence Force Protection Operations (CFSO) and Low
Level Source Operations (LLSO) (S//NF).
30 December 1994.
AR 385-10.
The Army Safety Program
. 23 May 1988.
AR 614-115.
Military Intelligence Excepted Career Program
. 12 April 2004.
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
6 September 2006
Bibliography
–
3
AR 614-200.
Military Intelligence Civilian Excepted Career Program
.
30 September 2004.
AR 715-9.
Contractors Accompanying the Force.
29 October 1999.
DA Pam 381-15.
Foreign Military Intelligence Collection Activities Program.
1 June 1988.
DA Pam 385-1.
Small Unit Safety Officer/NCO Guide
. 29 November 2001.
TRADOC Reg 25-36.
The TRADOC Doctrinal Literature Program (DLP).
1 October
2004.
FM 2-0.
Intelligence
. 17 May 2004.
FM 3-19.4.
Military Police Leader’s Handbook
. March 2002.
FM 3-19-40.
Military Police Internment/Resettlement Operations
. August 2001.
. Division and Brigade Surgeon’s Handbook of Tactics, Techniques and
Procedures
. November 2000.
FM 5-0.
Staff Organizations and Operations
. 31 May 1997.
FM 19-4.
Military Police Battlefield Circulation Control, Area Security, and Enemy
Prisoner of War Operations
. 7 May 1993.
FM 27-10.
Law of Land Warfare
. July 1956.
FM 34-3
. Intelligence Analysis
. March 1990.
FM 34-7-1.
Tactical Human Intelligence and Counterintelligence Operations
.
April 2002.
FM 34-8.
Combat Commander’s Handbook for Intelligence
. September 1992.
FM 34-54.
Technical Intelligence
. January 1998.
FM 34-60.
Counterintelligence
. 3 October 1995.
FM 41-10.
Civil Affairs Operations
. 11 January 1993.
Military Police Internment/Resettlement Operations.
30 September
2005.
TC 25-20.
A Leader’s Guide to After-Action Reviews
. 30 September 1993.
ST 2-22.7.
Tactical Human Intelligence and Counterintelligence Operations
.
April 2002.
ST 2-33.5.
US Army Intelligence Reach Operations
. 1 June 2001.
ST 2-50.
Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Assets.
June 2002.
ST 2-91.6.
Small Unit Support to Intelligence.
March 2004.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
JP 2-01.
Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations
. November 1996.
AR 350-1.
Army Training and Education
. 9 April 2003.
DIAM 58-11. (U
) DOD HUMINT Policies and Procedures (S//NF)
. August 1993.
DIAM 58-12.
(U) DOD HUMINT Management Systems (S//NF)
. June 1997.
FM 2-22.3 _____________________________________________________________________________________
6 September 2006
Bibliography
-
4
AJP-2.5.
Handling of Captured Personnel, Materiel, and Documents
. September
2001.
DOD Directive 2310.1.
DOD Program for Enemy Prisoners of War (POW) and Other
Detainees (Short Title: DOD Enemy POW Detainee Program).
18 August 1994.
DOD Directive 2310.1E.
The Department of Defense Detainee Program
.
DOD Directive 3115.09.
DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and
Tactical Questioning.
3 November 2005.
DOD Directive 5100.77.
DOD Law of War Program.
9 December 1998.
DOD Directive 5240.1.
DOD Intelligence Activities.
3 December 1982.
DOD Directive 5525.5.
DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials.
15
January 1986.
DOD Instruction 3020.41.
Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the U.S.
Armed Forces.
3 October 2005
DOD Regulation 5200.1-R.
Information Security Program,
1977.
DOD Regulation 5240.0-R.
Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence
Components That Affect United States Persons.
December 1982.
DOD SOP for Collecting and Processing Detainee Biometric Data.
11 February 05
Protocol 1 Additional to the Geneva Conventions
. Part IV: Civilian Population,
Section 1: General Protection Against Effects of Hostilities
. 1977.
Executive Order 12333,
United States Intelligence Activities
. 4 December 1981.
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I) Memorandum, “
Guidance for the
Conduct and Oversight of Defense Human Intelligence (HUMINT) (U)
.†14
December 2004.
Implementing Instructions to the USD(I) Memorandum. “
Guidance for the Conduct
and Oversight of Defense Human Intelligence (HUMINT) (U).â€
7 September
2004.
SECDEF Memorandum,
Policy on Assigning Detainee Serial Numbers (ISN) (
U). 20
September 2005.
18 U.S.C.
Posse Comitatus Act of 1878,
§ 1385.
Homeland Security Act of 2002.
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Public Law No. 109-163, Title XIV.
DA Form 1132-R.
Prisoner’s Personal Property List – Personal Deposit Fund (LRA)
.
April 1986.
DA Form 4137.
Evidence/Property Custody Document. July
1976.
DA Form 4237-R.
Detainee Personal Record
. August 1995.
DD Form 2745.
Enemy Prisoner of War Capture Tag
. May 1996.
Standardization Agreements (STANAG):
STANAG
1059.
Distinguishing Letters for Geographic Entities for Use by
NATO Armed Forces.
Edition 8. April 2003.
STANAG
2022.
Intelligence Reports.
29 September 1988.
_________________________________________________________________________________FM 2-22.3
6 September 2006
Bibliography
–
5
STANAG
2033.
Interrogation of Prisoners of War (PW).
Edition 6. December
1994.
STANAG
2044.
Procedures for Dealing with Prisoners of War (PW).
Edition 5.
June 1994.
STANAG
2084.
Handling and Reporting of Captured Enemy Equipment and
Documents.
June 1986.
This page intentionally left blank.
FM 2-22.3
Index
Entries are by paragraph number
A
ACE. See analysis and control
element.
AJP 2.5, Appendix E
AO. See area of operations.
Activities matrix, 12-23,
Figure 12-3. See also
Automation analysis tools.
Analysis and control element,
2-16
Analyst support, 9-30.
Analytical
Support, 12-2
Tools, 12-16
Approach, 1-10, 7-15, 8-1
Phase, 8-4
Rapport, 8-9
Strategies, 8-77
Debriefing, 8-82
Elicitation, 8-86
Interrogation, 8-77
Techniques, 8-17
Transitions, 8-73
Approaches
Change of Scenery, 8-63
Direct, 8-19
Emotional, 8-23
Establish Your Identity, 8-58
False Flag, 8-69
File and Dossier, 8-55
Incentive, 8-21
Mutt and Jeff, 8-65
Rapid Fire, 8-60
Repetition, 8-59
Silent, 8-62
We Know All, 8-53
Area Handbook, 7-4
Area of operations, 1-29
Assets, HUMINT Collection,
4-40
Association Matrix, 12-19, Figure
12-2
Audio recording, 9-29
Automation, 13-2
Analysis tools, 13-13
Requirements for collectors,
13-24
Systems, 13-21, L-3
Workstation requirements,
13-25
B
Basic Source Data Reports
(BSD), 10-13
Battlefield Operating System
(BOS), 1-1
BEST MAPS, 5-45
Biographic Intelligence, 5-45
Biometrics, 13-4
C
C2X, 2-4
CA.
See
Civil Affairs.
Capabilities, 1-31
Capture Rates, 5-90
Capture tag, Figure D-1
Captured document
Handling, I-12
Log, I-24, Figure I-3
Transmittal sheet, I-19,
Figure I-2
Captured equipment handling,
D-21
Central Intelligence Agency,
3-24
Change of Scenery Approach,
8-63
Checkpoint Operations, 5-7,
5-36, 5-42
CIA.
See
Central Intelligence
Agency.
CICA.
See
Counterintelligence
Coordination Authority.
CID.
See
Criminal Investigation
Division.
Civil Affairs (CA) Units, 4-47,
4-58
Cold leads, 9-22
Collect, 1-2
Collection
Objectives, 7-2
Priority, 4-45
Requirements, 7-4
Combat Service Support Units,
4-58
Combatants, viii
Lawful, 6-18
Unlawful, 6-18
Command Debriefing Team,
2-13
Command Relationships,
(HUMINT) 4-11
Army, Table 4-2
Joint, Table 4-3
Common points of reference,
9-39.
See also
Map tracking.
Communication requirements,
13-27, 13-30, L-7
Contact reports, 10-14
Continuous Contacts, 5-16
Contractor, 1-7, K-1
Control Questions, 9-10
Coordinates register, 12-41
6 September 2006
Index-1
_________________________________________________________________________________ Index
Coordination with other units and
operations, 5-42, 5-56, 5-102
Counterintelligence
Coordination Authority, 2-8
Functions, 1-7, Figure 1-2
Screening, 6-39, table 6-1
Courses of Action, 4-44
Criminal Investigation Division,
4-58, 4-60, 5-42
Cultural Awareness, 1-29, 8-4
D
DEA.
See
Drug Enforcement
Agency.
Databases, 12-46, 13-18
Debriefing, 1-21
Debriefing Operations, 1-21,
5-30
Legal Guidelines, 5-33
Operational Considerations,
5-34
Deceit, 9-23, 9-25, 9-26
Defensive Operations, 3-7
Detainee, 5-26
Geneva Convention
categories, 6-14
Security, 5-58, 5-78
Interrogation Operations,
1-20
Direct Approach, 8-19
Direct Questioning, 9-4
Document
Accountability, I-19
Associated with a source,
I-51
Categories, I-27
Exploitation (DOCEX)
Operations, 1-24, 4-51,
E-12, I-1, I-11, I-48
Exploitation Team, 2-14
Evacuation,
I-12
Handling,
I-14
Screening,
I-25
Tag,
I-14
Translation,
I-43
Transmittal,
I-34
Drug Enforcement Agency, 4-58
E
EAC HUMINT, 3-22
Emotional Approach, 8-23
EPW
Serial number, 6-12, 6-13
Status, 6-14
Early Entry Operations.
See also
HUMINT operations.
HUMINT Support of, 3-6
Economic Intelligence, 5-45
Elicitation, 8-80
Establish Your Identity
Approach, 8-58
Exploit dispositions, 9-43
F
False Flag, 8-69
Field Interrogations Operations,
5-95
File and Dossier Approach, 8-55
Fingerprint scanner, 13-4
Five S’s, D-7
Forced Entry Operations.
See
also
HUMINT operations.
HUMINT Support of , 3-5
Formal Contacts, 5-28
Friendly Force Debriefing
Operations, 1-21, 5-39
G
G2X, 2-4
Geneva Conventions, 5-68, 5-72
Categories of detainees,
6-15
Excerpts, Appendix A
H
HCT, 2-11.
See also
HUMINT
Collection Team.
As an Independent Patrol,
3-14
Integrated with other
operations, 3-14
Restricted to Base Camp,
3-14
Hot leads, 9-21
Human Intelligence, 1-4,
Structure, 2-1
HUMINT, 1-4
Agencies, 3-24
Analysis, 12-1
Analysis Cell, 2-16
Asset Capabilities, 4-17,
4-26, 4-45
HUMINT Collection, 1-8, 5-1
Aids, 9-28
Constraints, 4-41
In a Hostile Environment,
3-21
In Permissive Environment,
3-19
In Semi-permissive
Environment, 3-20
Phases, 1-8
Plan, 7-9
HUMINT Collection Team, 2-11
Allocation to maneuver
units, 5-96
HUMINT Collector, 1-7
Traits, 1-28
HUMINT Command and Control,
4-9
HUMINT Contacts, 5-5
One Time Contact, 5-7
Continuous Contacts, 5-16
Formal Contact, 5-28
HUMINT Control Organizations,
2-3 through 2-14
HUMINT Collection and Related
Activities, 1-14
HUMINT Methodology, 1-14,
1-18
HUMINT Mission Planning, 4-35,
4-44
HUMINT Operations, 1-23
Assessing, 4-8
Executing, 4-7
Planning, 4-3
Preparing, 4-5
Index-2
6
September
2006
FM 2-22.3_______________________________________________________________________________
HUMINT Organization,
Figure
2-1
HUMINT Requirements
Analysis, 4-18
HUMINT Requirements
Management, 4-16
HUMINT Source, 1-6
Database, 2-9, 12-7
Collection Activities, 1-16
Selection, 12-45
HUMINT Structure, 2-1
HUMINT Tasks, 1-5
HUMINT Technical Control, 4-10
I
Imagery Intelligence, 4-57
Incentive Approach, 8-21
Information Dissemination, 4-32
INSCOM, 3-22
Intelligence Battlefield Operating
System, 1-1
Intelligence Estimate, 7-4
Intelligence information reports,
10-6
Intelligence preparation of the
battlefield, 12-3
Intelligence Process, 1-2,
Figure
1-1
Intelligence Production, 4-31
Intelligence Reach, 7-5, 7-6
Interrogation, 1-20, 5-50
Of wounded detainees,
5-91
Priorities, Figure, 6-3
Prohibited techniques, 5-68,
5-74
Prohibition against use of
force, 5-73
Serial number allocation,
Appendix F
Interrogation Operations, 5-50
Field, 5-96
Joint, 5-100
Interpreter program, 11-28,
11-29, 11-30
Interpreter use, 11-2
Advantages, 11-2
Briefing, 11-18
Cautions, 11-4
Controlling and correcting,
11-24
Disadvantages, 11-3
Evaluating, 11-28
Methods, 11-6, 11-7
Placement, 11-21
Techniques, 11-16
Interpreters, 11-1, 11-26
Civilian, 11-15
Evaluating, 11-28
Military, 11-14
INTSUM, 7-4
Iris scanner, 13-6
ISR Plan (Integrated), 4-3, 4-27,
4-28
Updating, 4-34
J
J2X, 2-4
JIDC Analysis Section, 2-17
Joint HUMINT, 3-23, 5-91
Joint Interrogation and
Debriefing Center (JIDC),
5-102
Joint interrogation operations,
5-99
K
Knowledgeability Brief, 10-15
L
Lawful enemy combatants, 6-18
Lead development report, 10-15
Leads, 9-20
Levels of Employment, 3-14
Liaison Operations, 1-22, 5-46
Link analysis diagram, 12-16,
12-25, Figure 12-4
Limitations, 1-32
Local civilian debriefing
operations, 1-21
Long-Range Surveillance, 5-42
M
Machine translation, 13-8
Maneuver unit support, 4-9
Map tracking, 9-35
Matrices, 12-18
Measurement and Signals
Intelligence (MASINT), 4-57
Military geographic intelligence,
5-46
Military Intelligence
Organizations, 4-57
Military Police in Association
with Interrogation Operations,
5-56, Figure 6-2
Internment/resettlement
operations, 6-14,
Figure 6-2
Units, 4-58, 5-42
Mutt and Jeff, 8-65
N
National level intelligence
agencies, 3-24
Notice of intelligence potential,
10-15
O
OB Factors, 12-43
Offensive Operations, 3-2
One-Time Contact, 5-7
Open source documents, I-10
Operational analysis and
assessment, 12-8
Operational Coordination, 4-9
Operational Management Team
(OMT), 2-10
Team leader requirements,
13-23
Operational reports, 10-4
Operations Orders, 4-53
Operations Plans, 4-54
Operations Support Cell, 2-7
Orders
Illegal, 5-80, 5-82
Organizational Chart, 9-28,
Figure 2-1
6 September 2006
Index-3
7-1
_________________________________________________________________________________ Index
P
Pattern analysis, 12-40, 12-42
Plan, 1-2
Planning and Preparation, 1-9,
Political intelligence, 5-45
Polygraph, 13-7
Detainee status, 6-14 through
6-23, E-8
Pre-deployment planning,
Appendix C
Prepare, 1-2
Primary approach strategy, 7-15
Process, 1-2
Produce, 1-2
Protected persons, 6-17
Protocol I Additional to the
Geneva Conventions,
Appendix B
Psychological Operations
(PSYOP) Units, 4-58, 5-42
Q
Questioning, 1-11
Illiterates, 9-46
Plan, 7-18
Principles, 9-2
Quick reference guide,
Appendix G
Sequence, 7-19, 7-20
Questions, 9-2
Direct, 9-4
Follow Up, 9-7
Non-pertinent, 9-8
Prepared, 9-12
Repeat, 9-9
To avoid, 9-14
R
Rapid Fire Approach, 8-60
Reach.
See
Intelligence Reach.
Recording principles and
techniques, 9-29
References, Appendix J
Refugee debriefing operations,
1-21, 5-31
Repetition Approach, 8-59
Reporting, 1-13, 7-24, 10-1
Channels, 10-3, 10-16,
Figure 10-1
Evaluation, 4-33
Principles, 10-2
Report types, 10-3
Required areas of knowledge,
1-29
Research, 7-3
Source-specific, 7-8, 7-25
Reserve component integration,
4-50
Restricted Interrogation
Techniques, 8-71
Retained personnel, 6-22
Risk assessment, 4-43
S
S2 Guide for Handling
Detainees, Appendix D
S2X, 2-4
SALUTE reports, 10-10
Format, Appendix H
Science and technical
intelligence, 5-45
Screening, 1-18, 6-1
Codes, Table 6-1
Community, 6-38
Documents, I-25
Local employees, 6-37
Methodologies, 6-9
MP support, 6-14, Figure
6-2
Observations, 6-30
Operations, 1-19, 6-7, 6-8
Prisoner of war and refugee,
6-9 , 6-13
Reports, 10-15
Requirements, 6-7
Sheet, Figure 6-1
Search engine, 13-14
Separation, M-1
Signals Intelligence, 4-57
Silent Approach, 8-62
Single-discipline HUMINT
analysis and production,
12-14
Situation Map (SITMAP), 7-4
Sociological Intelligence, 5-45
SOF.
See
Special operation
forces.
SOR development, 12-5
Source, 1-6
Administrative reports, 10-5
Analysis, 12-11
Assessment, 6-36
Coverage overlay, 12-50
Map reading skills, 9-38
Profiles, 12-51
Reliability matrix, B-1
Special Operation Forces, 5-42
Stability and reconstruction
operations, 3-9
Staff coordination, 4-59
Strategic Debriefing Operations,
5-43
Subject matter expert (SME),
7-4
Support Operations, 3-15
Support Relationships
(HUMINT), 4-13
Direct Support, Table 4-2
General Support, Table 4-2
Support Scheme Development,
4-27, 4-60
T
Tactical Debriefing Operations,
5-35
Tactical questioning, 1-17
Target Folder, 4-39, 12-47
Task Organization, 4-47
Taskings and Requests, 4-28
Technical expert support, 9-30
Technical intelligence
(TECHINT), 4-57
Screening requirements for,
6-42
Support, 7-17
Termination, 1-12
Index-4
6
September
2006
1-28
FM 2-22.3_______________________________________________________________________________
Phase, 8-84
Report, 10-15
Third-party information, 9-33
Time Event Chart, 9-28, 12-17,
Figure 12-1
Traits of a HUMINT Collector,
Translation machines, 13-8
Translators, I-47
Transportation and
telecommunication
intelligence, 5-45
Trusted Workstation (TWS),
13-3
U
Umbrella concept, 7-4
Unit Augmentation, 4-58
Unlawful enemy combatant, viii,
6-18
Urban Operations, 3-16
V
Video Recording, 9-29
Warning Order, 4-37
W
We Know All Approach, 8-53
Web-based reporting, 13-15
Wounded detainees
Interrogation of, 5-91,
9-45
6 September 2006
Index-5
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FM 2-22.3
(FM 34-52)
6 September 2006
I have approved FM 2-22.3 in accordance with DOD Directive 3115.09, DOD Intelligence
Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning.
STEPHEN A. CAMBONE
Under
Secretary
of
Defense
for Intelligence
0516001
DISTRIBUTION:
Regular Army, Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve
: To be distributed in accordance with
the initial distribution number (IDN) 111130, requirements for FM 2-22.3.
This page intentionally left blank.
PIN: 082535-000