O

BSERVATION

 

OF

 

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 1998 V

ENEZUELAN

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LECTIONS

BY

 H

AROLD

 T

RINKUNAS

 

AND

 J

ENNIFER

 M

C

C

OY

S

PECIAL

 R

EPORT

 S

ERIES

★

★

★

★

 

◆

 

◆

 

O

BSERVATION

 

OF

 

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1998 V

ENEZUELAN

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A R

EPORT

 

OF

 

THE

C

OUNCIL

 

OF

 F

REELY

 E

LECTED

 H

EADS

OF

 G

OVERNMENT

WRITTEN

 

BY

HAROLD

 

TRINKUNAS

JENNIFER

 

M

c

COY

F

EBRUARY

, 1999

L

ATIN

 A

MERICAN

 

AND

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ARIBBEAN

 P

ROGRAM

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NE

 C

OPENHILL

453 F

REEDOM

 P

ARKWAY

A

TLANTA

, G

EORGIA

  30307

(404) 420-5175

F

AX

 (404) 420-5196

WWW

.

CARTERCENTER

.

ORG

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Members of The Carter Center’s 42-person delegation.

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 1) Nicholas Brady
 2) Jimmy Carter
 3) Jennifer McCoy
 4) Ken Abdalla
 5) Becky Castle
 6) Ari Swiller
 7) Bronwen Morrison
 8) Pablo Galarce
 9) Jonathan Hartlyn
10) Ron Burkle
11) Ed Casey
12) Neil Gaudry
13) Mary Ann Chalker
14) John Burkle
15) Esther Low
16) Terrance Adamson
17) Rosalynn Carter
18) Kent Spicer
19) Beatriz Fuentes
20) Virginia López-Glass
21) Annamari Laaksonen
22) Tanya Mújica
23) Vanessa Marti

24) Debbie Palmer
25) Jason Calder
26) Shelley McConnell
27) Harold Trinkunas
28) Rodrigo Chávez Palacios
29) Jaime Areizaga
30) George Jones
31) Harry Vanden
32) Horace Sibley
33) Rafael Toribio
34) John Hardman
35) Chuck Costello
36) John Newcomb
37) Ken Roberts
38) Deanna Congileo

Not Pictured
Patricio Aylwin
Fidel Chávez Mena
Curtis Kohlhaas
Nancy Konigsmark
Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada
Jesus Ortega
Andrew Shue

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OVERNMENT

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BSERVATION

 D

ELEGATION

VENEZUELA

Dec. 3-7, 1998

DELEGATION LEADERS

The Honorable Jimmy Carter, 

39

th

 President of the United States and Council Chair, UNITED

STATES

The Honorable Patricio Aylwin Azocar, 

former President of Chile, CHILE

The Honorable Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, 

former President of Bolivia, BOLIVIA

Mr. Nicholas Brady, 

Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Darby Overseas Investments, Ltd., and

former Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, UNITED STATES

Mrs. Rosalynn Carter, 

Vice Chair of The Carter Center and former First Lady of the United States,

UNITED STATES

Dr. Jennifer McCoy, 

Director, Latin American and Caribbean Program, The Carter Center, UNITED

STATES

DELEGATION

Mr. Ken Abdalla,

 President, Jerry’s Famous Delis, and Managing Director, Waterton Management, LLC

Mr. Terrance Adamson,

 Senior Vice President for Law, Business, and Government Affairs, National

Geographic Society, and Member, The Carter Center Board of Trustees

Mr. Jaime Areizaga, 

Associate, Hogan & Hartson

Mr. Ron Burkle, 

Chairman and Partner, The Yucaipa Companies

Mr. John Burkle, 

Student, Los Angeles, California

Mr. Jason Calder,

 Program Coordinator, Global Development Initiative, The Carter Center

Mr. Ed Casey, 

Managing Director, Hills & Company, and former State Department Deputy Assistant

Secretary for Inter-American Affairs

Ms. Becky Castle, 

Program Coordinator, Latin American and Caribbean Program, The Carter Center

Ms. Mary Anne Chalker, 

President, LFC Insurance

Dr. Fidel Chávez Mena, 

Advisor to the President, Grupo Taca, and former Deputy to Salvadoran

Legislative Assembly

Mr. Rodrigo Chávez Palacios, 

Student, Bachelor of Arts in Business Administration, El Salvador

Ms. Deanna Congileo, 

Senior Associate Director, Public Information, The Carter Center

Mr. Chuck Costello, 

Director, Democracy Program, The Carter Center

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Mr. Pablo Galarce, 

Program Assistant, Americas Division, International Foundation for Election

Systems

Mr. Neil Gaudry,

 Representative, Legislative Assembly, Manitoba, Canada

Dr. John Hardman, 

Executive Director, The Carter Center

Dr. Jonathan Hartlyn, 

Professor, Political Science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Amb. George Jones, 

Director, Americas Division, International Foundation for Election Systems

Mr. Curtis Kohlhaas, 

Events Coordinator, The Carter Center

Ms. Nancy Konigsmark, 

Scheduling Director for President Carter, The Carter Center

Ms. Annamari Laaksonen, 

Finnish Fulbright Fellow, Latin American and Caribbean Program, The

Carter Center

Ms. Esther Low, 

Assistant to the Associate Executive Director, The Carter Center

Ms. Vanessa Marti, 

Intern, Latin American and Caribbean Program, The Carter Center

Dr. Shelley McConnell, 

Associate Director, Latin American and Caribbean Program, The Carter Center

Ms. Tanya Mújica, 

Program Assistant, Latin American and Caribbean Program, The Carter Center

Mr. John Newcomb,

 Instructor, Geography, University of Victoria, British Columbia

Dr. Jesús Ortega, 

Secretary-General, Partido Revolucionario Democrático (PRD), Mexico

Ms. Debbie Palmer, 

Bobby Jones Scholar, Emory University, and Intern, Latin American and Caribbean

Program, The Carter Center

Dr. Ken Roberts, 

Professor, Political Science, University of New Mexico

Mr. Horace Sibley, 

Partner, King & Spalding

Mr. Ari Swiller, 

Vice President, External Affairs, Ralph’s Grocery Company

Mr. Andrew Shue

, Actor

Mr. Kent Spicer, 

Financial Analyst, The Carter Center

Dr. Rafael Toribio

, Rector, INTEC (Technical Institute of Santo Domingo), Member of Participación

Ciudadana, and Executive Committee Member of Action Group for Democracy

Dr. Harold Trinkunas, 

Carter Center Field Representative, Caracas, Venezuela

Dr. Harry Vanden, 

Professor, Political Science and International Relations, University of South Florida,

Tampa

LOCAL STAFF

Ms. Beatríz Fuentes, 

Carter Center Logistics Assistant, Caracas, Venezuela

Ms. Virginia López-Glass,

 Carter Center Logistics Coordinator, Caracas, Venezuela

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ABLE

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 C

ONTENTS

Foreword by Jimmy Carter

 8

Preface and Acknowledgments by Jennifer McCoy

 9

Key Election Terms and Abbreviations

11

Executive Summary

14

Historical Background

16

Pre-Election Period

18

Pre-Election Assessment Visit, Oct. 6-10

18

Automating the Voting Process in Venezuela

20

Pre-Election Assessment Visit, Nov. 2-3

22

The Legislative and Regional Elections

26

Analysis of Nov. 8 Regional Elections

27

           Technical Assessment

31

The Presidential Elections

36

The Campaign

36

Technical Preparations

38

Campaign Problems and Complaints

39

The Observation of the Presidential Elections

41

Preparations for Electoral Observation

41

The Leadership Team Agenda

42

Election Day: Dec. 6, 1998

44

Election Night

48

Post-Election Observation

51

Challenges to the 1998 Electoral Results

51

Politics in the Wake of the 1998 Elections

53

Recommendations and Suggestions

55

           Procedural Recommendations

55

           Legal Recommendations

56

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List of Tables

Table 1: Planned Automation of the Voting Process

21

Table 2: Outcomes in the 1998 Elections for Governors

28

Table 3: Composition of Venezuelan Congress

30

Table 4: Abstentionism in 1998 Regional Elections

34

Table 5: Final Vote Totals — 1998 Venezuelan Presidential Elections

49

Table 6: Official Electoral Statistics — 1998 Venezuelan Presidential Elections

50

Table 7: Sample of States in Which the Results of the Governor’s Election were

51

       Challanged as of January 1999

Endnotes

58

Appendices

59

About The Carter Center

84

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F

OREWORD

V

enezuela has long been a model of
democracy in Latin America, and has sent
observers and technical assistance to other

countries struggling to establish new electoral
procedures.  Two members of The Center’s Council
of Freely Elected Heads of Government were twice
elected president of Venezuela – Rafael Caldera
and Carlos Andrés Pérez.

Yet, when Venezuelans asked us to serve as

international monitors for their electoral process in
1998, we quickly responded.  Dr. Jennifer McCoy,
director of the Center’s Latin American and Carib-
bean Program (LACP), traveled to Caracas with
staff member Becky Castle to meet with the Na-
tional Electoral Council and the presidential
candidates.  They found widespread concern about
the 1998 elections, and a strong desire for interna-
tional monitors.  After a tumultuous decade, which
included two failed coup attempts, the indictment
and ouster of a president, a financial crisis, and a
severe drop in oil revenues, Venezuelans were
anxious about these elections.  The demise of the
traditional party system and the rise of independent
candidates, including a former coup leader, added
to the uncertainty.

After consulting with other regional leaders, we

accepted the National Electoral Council’s invita-
tion.  We organized a 42-member delegation and
asked Patricio Aylwin, former president of Chile,
and Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, former president
of Bolivia, both members of the Council of Freely
Elected Heads of Government, to join me as co-
leaders.  President Sánchez de Lozada also joined
me in a pre-election visit in November.   We were
fortunate to have Nicholas Brady, former secretary
of the U.S. Department of the Treasury and author

of the Brady debt-reduction plan, as co-leader
during the presidential elections.  The experience
and wisdom of all three of these leaders added
immeasurably to our effectiveness.

My thanks to all delegation members for their

dedication and hard work that made our mission a
success. I also want to acknowledge Dr. McCoy,
whose knowledge of Venezuelan politics and
experience in election monitoring enabled us to
organize a mission that contributed to a peaceful
and orderly election in Venezuela.

Most importantly, I want to recognize the

Venezuelan people, especially the election workers,
whose dedication to sustaining their democratic
system, even in the wake of profound change, made
these elections a true demonstration of democracy
at work. 

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P

REFACE

 

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CKNOWLEDGMENTS

LACP interns Annamari Laaksonen, Vanessa Martí and
Debbie Palmer, LACP program assistant Tanya Mújica and
delegate Rodrigo Chávez Palacios prepare for deployment.

R

ENATO

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APPELLETTI

T

he Carter Center’s Council of

      Freely Elected Heads of Government

            has observed 18 elections in 12 countries
in the Western hemisphere since 1989.  Most of
those have been transitional elections in coun-
tries with little or no experience in freely com-
petitive elections.  Recently, however, we turned
our attention to established democracies facing
extraordinary tensions threatening to erode their
democratic practices, and countries that invited
international monitors to help restore the equi-
librium.  In December 1997, the Council ob-
served elections in Jamaica in a context of
spiraling violence, with hopes to help restore a
peaceful process in that longstanding democracy.

During an October 1998 assessment mission

to Venezuela, we saw some developments
that led us to accept the invitation of the
National Electoral Council (Consejo Nacional
Electoral, CNE) to monitor the elections. First, the
Venezuelan political system was shifting from a
strong two-party system to a politically fragmented
one.  Second, the national organization and
populist message of front runner Hugo Chávez, a
former coup leader who had been jailed and
pardoned, appeared to be polarizing the electorate.
Third, the experiment with a new automated vote
count system raised concerns among the parties and
voters.  Overall, these changes produced
uncertainty and anxiety about the electoral process,
and the parties and candidates looked to
international observers to help calm the waters and
affirm a clean election.

We decided that we could organize a delegation

only for the presidential elections, due to time and
resource constraints.  The mission was funded by a
generous grant from the U.S. Agency for Interna-

tional Development and with support from the
Canadian International Development Agency

1

.

The National Democratic Institute for International
Affairs (NDI) aided The Carter Center with grant
administration.  I also want to thank Manuel
Arango and Ron Burkle for their generous support,
as well as the in-kind support of The Coca-Cola
Company, BellSouth, Telcel, and Delta Air Lines.
NDI, the International Foundation for Election
Systems (IFES), and the Canadian Foreign Ministry
designated qualified observers to serve on our
mission.

The mission was made possible through the

superb organizational skills of the LACP staff –
Shelley McConnell, Becky Castle, and Tanya

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Mújica.  Harold Trinkunas flew to Caracas from
Stanford University on short notice to serve as our
field representative, bringing his knowledge of
Venezuelan politics and keen analytical abilities.
Harold also wrote the bulk of this report.
Additional Carter Center staff helped to make this
one of the best-organized election observer
delegations we have fielded. These included: Jason
Calder, Deanna Congileo, Nancy Konigsmark,
Curtis Kohlhaas, and Esther Low.  Carter Center
interns in the LACP program put together
excellent briefing books, kept us updated on
Venezuelan politics, and in some cases joined us in
the field.  They include Beth Bercaw, Christie
Crane, Alex Gillies, Annamari Laaksonen, Vanessa
Marti, and Debbie Palmer.

In Venezuela, our office was augmented with

the skills of two Venezuelans:  Virginia López-Glass
and Beatríz Fuentes, who managed the logistics of
delegate teams traveling to 14 different states in
Venezuela.  Back in Atlanta, Pam Auchmutey and
Rochelle Williams managed the production of this
report.

Finally, I want to thank the Venezuelan Na-

tional Electoral Council for its responsive answers
to all of our requests for information, and
Jacquelyn Mosquera for her patient and capable
role as coordinator of international election

observers.  We were grateful for the warm reception
we received throughout Venezuela.  We were
extremely impressed with: the orderly voting thanks
to the voters, election workers, and soldiers of the
Plan República; the speed of the automated
transmission of vote results in the presidential
election; and the gracious and conciliatory speeches
of the winner and losers.  We hope the next stage of
Venezuelan democracy reflects the desire
demonstrated by the people both for change in
their political and economic life and for continuity
of democratic principles. 

■

Jennifer McCoy, Ph.D.
Director, Latin American and
Caribbean Program
Atlanta, Georgia

LACP staff, Dr. Shelley McConnell,

Becky Castle, Dr. Harold Trinkunas,

and Tanya Mújica relax following the

elections.

C

URTIS

 K

OLHAAS

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K

EY

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 T

ERMS

 

AND

 A

BBREVIATIONS

Acción Democrática

Democratic Action party. The traditional social democratic party in
Venezuela.

Acta en Cero

The initial tally sheet printed by every voting machine at the start of
the voting process. It was supposed to indicate that the voting
machine registered no votes.

Actas  (de  Escrutinio)

Tally sheets printed out or hand written at the end of the voting
process at each voting table.

Apertura

New  party created by former President Carlos Andrés Pérez, who
won a Senate seat in the November 1998 elections.

Automatización

Generic name given to the automation of the voting process
during the 1998 elections.

Boleta Electoral

Electoral ballot.

Centro de Votación

A voting center, typically established in a school to serve the
surrounding neighborhood. It usually had multiple voting tables
clustered into groups of three which shared a vote tabulating
machine.

Centro Regional de Totalización An automated vote tallying center. There was one established in

each state plus one for the federal district and a national tallying
center that aggregated results from regional centers. The Spanish
company INDRA managed these centers.

Circumscripción

A  voting district. Important for the regional elections, but less so in
the presidential elections.

Comandante de Guarnición

The local garrison commander who controlled troops deployed for

the Plan República in a given area. There were 26 garrison
commanders.

CNE

The National Electoral Council (Consejo Nacional Electoral)
organized the voting process across Venezuela. All seven Council
members were independents.

COPEI

Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independente. A
traditional Christian democratic party in Venezuela.

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Cotillón  Electoral

Materials used at the voting tables, excluding the ballots. Includes
pens, folders, ink, stamps, labels, and privacy booths.

Cuaderno  de  Electores

The register of voters assigned to a specific voting table.

CUFAN

Comando Unificado de las Fuerzas Armadas Nacionales (Armed
Forces Unified Command). The CUFAN controlled the 70,000
troops deployed as part of the Plan República.

Impugnación

A  challenge filed against the results of the elections that the CNE
is legally empowered to review.

IRENE

Integración, Representación, Nueva Esperanza.  A party
formed to support the candidacy of Irene Sáez.

 JER

Regional Electoral Council (Junta Electoral Regional). Charged with
supervising elections at the state level, as well as tallying and
confirming local electoral results.

La Causa R

Political party based on the independent union movement. A strong
national party after the 1993 elections, it had only a limited regional
presence during the 1998 elections.

Ley Orgánica del Sufragio

The Venezuelan electoral law.

y Participación Política

Máquina de votación

A vote tabulating machine.

MAS

Movimiento Al Socialismo. Traditional socialist party in Venezuela.
Part of the electoral coalition supporting candidate Hugo Chávez.

Mesa  Electoral

A voting table, officially consisting of five poll workers who sat at a
table to administer the vote. A voting center could have from one
to nine voting tables, typically clustered in groups of three sharing a
vote tabulatng machine.

Miembro de Mesa

A poll worker.

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National Electoral Council

See CNE

ORA

Organización Renovadora Auténtica.  Political party based in
Maracay, Aragua state.

Patria Para Todos (PPT)

Fatherland for All party. Leftist party that split from the La Causa R
party.  It supported Hugo Chávez in the presidential race.

Plan  República

Refers to both the plan and the personnel of the armed forces elec-
toral security operation. Plan República were deployed at all polling
sites, and although many were young soldiers, each polling center had
an officer in charge. This plan has been implemented in every elec-
tion since 1963 and is a source of pride for the Venezuelan military.

Polo  Patriótico

Patriotic Pole. An electoral alliance bringing together several new
and old, left and left-center parties to support candidate Hugo
Chávez.

Proyecto Venezuela

Venezuela Project. New party backing candidate Henrique Salas

Römer.

Queremos Elegir

Venezuelan nongovernmental organization formed in 1991 to

develop and deepen democracy in Venezuela.

Recurso Jerárquico

An appeal filed challenging a technical or administrative aspect of
the electoral process.

Sala de Sustanciación

Consejo Nacional Electoral committee assigned to determine the
validity of tally sheets and compare them to the electronically
transmitted results.

Tarjeta PCMCIA

Electronic memory card that stored the electoral software for each
vote tabulating machine and tracked votes cast.  The card was
inserted into the machine at the opening of the polls, and an 

acta en

cero

 was printed to show the card had not yet registered any votes.

Tarjetón

Alternative name for an electoral ballot.

Testigos  Políticos

Poll watchers. Party witnesses to the voting process. Witnesses should

have had free access to their assigned polling sites during the electoral
process.

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I

n brief, the 1998 Venezuelan elections

proceeded as follows:

1. Although Venezuela has had competitive

elections for four decades, changing political
dynamics produced a high degree of uncertainty in
the country, leading Venezuelans to invite interna-
tional observers to monitor their elections for the
first time. In particular, the decline of the two-party
dominant system and the rise of independent
candidates, the emergence of a former coup leader
promising radical changes as the leading candidate,
and the introduction of a new automated vote
count and transmission system all caused uncer-
tainty and some uneasiness among Venezuelans.

2. At the invitation of the Venezuelan Na-

tional Electoral Council (CNE) and with the
welcome of all the national political parties and
major candidates, The Carter Center’s Council of
Freely Elected Heads of Government observed the
Dec. 6, 1998, Venezuelan presidential election.
Through two pre-election visits, a field office, and a
42-member international delegation on election
day, the Center assessed election preparations,
voting procedures, and the new automated system.
The Center also fielded a small staff team to
observe the Nov. 8 legislative and regional elec-
tions, and cooperated with the delegations formed
by the Organization of American States (OAS),
European Union (EU), and the International
Republican Institute (IRI).

3. Prior to the elections, parties and candi-

dates had been concerned about the preparations
by the newly appointed CNE, the level of training
of the newly drafted poll workers, the performance
of the vote tabulating machines, and the willing-
ness of all candidates and their supporters to accept
the results peacefully.

E

XECUTIVE

 S

UMMARY

4. Both the Nov. 8 and the Dec. 6 elections

were peaceful. Voters demonstrated particular
patience during the Nov. 8 elections as late starts,
problems with the vote tabulating machines, and
an extremely complicated ballot delayed the vote
for hours. The CNE corrected many of these
problems before the Dec. 6 election, which, with a
simpler presidential ballot, proceeded much more
smoothly. Security officials under the Plan
República maintained an orderly process on both
election days.

5. The Center’s delegation visited 252 voting

sites (many with three voting tables) in 13 states
and the federal district on presidential election day.
The delegation found 96 percent were open by 8
a.m. and 94 percent had party poll watchers (or
witnesses) supporting at least two different candi-
dates. Finding no significant problems, the delega-
tion concluded that the elections clearly expressed
the will of the Venezuelan people in one of the
most transparent elections in the country’s history.

6. Venezuelans introduced the world’s first

nationally integrated electronic network to count
and transmit the votes to central headquarters.
After the polls closed at 4 p.m. on Dec. 6, the CNE
announced preliminary results at 6:37 p.m., with 76
percent of the results counted. The rapidity of the
announcement and the decisive victory of Hugo
Chávez, with 57 percent of the vote, contributed to
the immediate acceptance of the results by Venezu-
elans and a calm election night. Gracious and
conciliatory messages from both the winner and
second-place finisher set the stage for Venezuela to
move forward in tackling its serious socioeconomic
problems.

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7. This report offers some suggestions for

improving the electoral process in the future,
including better accounting for party and campaign
financing, an earlier audit of the voter registration
list, more extensive voter education and poll
worker training, and a revamping of the physical
arrangement of voting tables to improve the flow of
voters.

Poll workers greet
President Carter at a
voting center in
Caracas.

R

ENATO

 C

APPELLETTI

8. Venezuelans voted peacefully, but defini-

tively for change. With more than 96 percent
voting for the two candidates who promised to
overhaul the system, Venezuelans carried out a
peaceful revolution through the ballot box. Never-
theless, significant differences of opinion remain to
test the skills of Venezuela’s politicians.  Key issues
include: how to tackle the poverty afflicting the
majority of the population while facing a fiscal deficit
of 10 percent of Gross Domestic Product, how to best
use Venezuela’s rich petroleum resources, and how to
restructure the political system through constitutional
reform. We are confident that Venezuelans will rise to
the challenge and address these issues with the same
spirit of cooperation and commitment to democratic
principles that The Carter Center witnessed Dec. 6. 

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H

ISTORICAL

 B

ACKGROUND

V

enezuela has been a democracy for four

decades, beginning with the transition
from the authoritarian regime of

General Marcos Pérez Jiménez in 1958.

2

 During

this time, it held nine presidential elections and
experienced five peaceful transfers of power be-
tween opposing parties. Between 1958 and 1993,
the election results for these offices were generally
accepted and viewed as legitimate, although it was
widely acknowledged that small-scale fraud oc-
curred episodically.

Until 1993, democratic transfers of power

occurred exclusively between the two traditional
parties, social democratic Acción Democrática
(AD) and Christian democratic Comité de
Organización Política Electoral Independente
(COPEI). Together these parties had garnered
more than 90 percent of the votes in every election
since 1973.

During the 1993 elections, this pattern of a

strong two-party system began to collapse, resulting
in the election of former President Rafael Caldera
with the backing of a heterogeneous group of
political parties. Remarkably, his supporters did not
include the party he founded, COPEI.  Although
everyone accepted Caldera’s election as legitimate,
suspicions of electoral fraud existed concerning the
allegedly low vote totals for a new left-labor party,
La Causa R. President Caldera took office during a
tumultuous period, which followed the indictment
and ouster of a president and two failed coup
attempts.  The collapse of the financial system, the
periodic suspension of constitutional guarantees,
and a deep and persistent economic crisis marked
his term in office.

This pattern of political uncertainty seemed

likely to be sustained in the 1998 elections, as
evidenced by the dramatic shifts in public opinion
during the first nine months of the election year. In
December 1997, Irene Sáez, the mayor of the
Chacao district of Caracas, led in the polls with 40
percent of voter preference. Claudio Fermín, a
former leader of AD followed with 35 percent.
After accepting the backing of the traditional party,
COPEI, Sáez’s popularity began to decline in
March. By April 1998, she had dropped to 18
percent in voter preferences.

Meanwhile, Hugo Chávez, a former lieutenant

colonel in the Venezuelan army and a leader of one
of the failed 1992 coup attempts, began his dra-
matic ascent, registering 30 percent in polls taken
in May and achieving 39 percent by August 1998.
Henrique Salas Römer, a former governor of
Carabobo state, also began to receive popular
support, achieving 21 percent by August.

3

 These

shifts in popular opinion and having both front-
runners as independents created a great concern
about the outcome of the 1998 elections.

Adding to the uncertainty, a new electoral law

mandated the automation of the voting system and
the selection of a new, nonpartisan National Elec-
toral Council (CNE). These steps were to reduce
possible electoral fraud and increase the transpar-
ency of the 1998 elections. However, CNE mem-
bers were selected only 10 months before the
elections. In this short time, the new CNE had to
learn about the Venezuelan electoral process and
simultaneously take charge of a traditional bureau-
cracy that AD and COPEI parties had dominated.
They also had to design and implement an auto-
mated voting system to handle both the regional
and federal 1998 elections.

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To help reduce some of the uncertainty sur-

rounding the process, the CNE took the unprec-
edented step of inviting international observers to
witness the 1998 elections. In September, Dr.
Rafael Parra Pérez, CNE president, invited former
U.S. President Jimmy Carter and the Council of
Freely Elected Heads of Government to participate
as electoral observers during the upcoming elec-
tions (See Appendix 3). 

■

John Newcomb, Neil Gaudry, Esther Low, and Jaime Ariezaga listen as other
teams provide reports on their election day observations.

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o evaluate the need for observation,
the Council of Freely Elected Heads of
Government authorized an assessment trip

from Oct. 6-9 by Dr. Jennifer McCoy, director of
The Carter Center’s Latin America and Caribbean
Program (LACP), and Becky Castle, program
coordinator. During their trip, McCoy and Castle
met with then-president Rafael Caldera, five
presidential candidates or their representatives, the
minister of interior, the CNE, and Indra, the
Spanish company that managed the automation of
the voting process. All welcomed the participation
of electoral observers in general, and many strongly
favored the participation of The Carter Center and
the Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government
in particular.

Venezuelans cited several factors that made the

1998 elections unique in the country’s democratic
history and contributed to their desire to invite
international observers. First, these elections repre-
sented a historic watershed in Venezuelan democ-
racy, and voter preference polls reflected a desire
for a profound political transformation. Traditional
political institutions, such as the strong, hierarchical
political parties, government-recognized labor and
business federations, and a presidentialist system
were all crumbling in the face of citizen demands for
change and the decentralization of authority to
governors and mayors.  The fact that all four lead-
ing presidential candidates represented new political
organizations, formed specifically to back their
candidacies, confirmed the collapse of the two-party
system. Ninety percent of the voters, as reflected in
October opinion polls, desired a peaceful change in
the political system, with approximately 45 percent

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PERIOD

backing the populist candidacy of Chávez, and 40
percent backing the moderate candidacy of
Römer.

4

 Only 10 percent supported the status quo,

as represented by the traditional parties AD and
COPEI. The very high popularity of candidate
Chávez, a former coup leader who promised to
reform the constitution via a constituent assembly
and revamp a system “corrrupted” by traditional
political elites, served as a prominent indicator of
how deeply voters desired change in 1998.

The second set of concerns expressed by Ven-

ezuelans during the assessment visit focused on the
unprecedented degree of automation being intro-
duced into the voting process. Venezuela was the
first country in the world to attempt to integrate an
automated ballot counting system with a single
national integrated network to transmit the voting
results within minutes to a central headquarters.
Having had previous electoral experience, the
Indra company acted as the system integrator,
coordinating hardware, software, logistics, and
technical support for this process.

The CNE claimed that it would automate

voting centers representing 92 percent of the
registered voters with 7,000 voting machines. Only
900 voting machines had arrived to date, and the
first full test of the automated system was slated to
occur on Oct. 31, one week before the Nov. 8
legislative elections.

The newly reformed electoral system also called

for more citizen participation in implementing the
voting process to help improve transparency and
deter fraud. There were 360,000 poll workers
conscripted via a lottery system from among regis-
tered voters. They replaced the party poll workers
who had previously managed voting centers.

The new system permitted party witnesses to

observe the voting process, but only allowed them

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to participate if not enough lottery-selected poll
workers arrived to do the job. The introduction of
citizen participation was intended to prevent a
traditional source of electoral fraud in Venezuela,
popularly known as 

“acta mata voto”

 (“the tally

sheet trumps the ballot”). This type of fraud
occurred when party poll workers at a given polling
site conspired to redistribute the votes of those
parties that did not have poll workers present when
preparing the final tally sheet.

While Venezuelans praised the efforts to im-

prove citizen participation, some doubted whether
this new cadre of poll workers would be notified in
a timely fashion and receive sufficient training. The
CNE and Indra contracted with a Venezuelan
university, the Universidad Simón Rodríguez, to
train the poll workers, but this program began late
and was criticized for using poor training materials.
Venezuelans also questioned how many poll work-
ers would actually show up on election day, even
though the CNE had announced plans to pay them
(approximately U.S. $42 for the November elec-
tions) and had threatened substantial fines for those
failing to appear for work.

Venezuelans also expressed concern about the

effect that separation of the legislative and presi-
dential elections would have on the electoral
process. The two elections would be held within a
month of each other, instead of simultaneously as
had occurred on all previous occasions. The legisla-
tive and regional elections slated to take place
Nov. 8 were the most complicated since they
included five races on two ballots. Many of the
ballots were extremely complex due to the large
number of regional parties that could participate in
any given voting district (more than 450 nationally
and more than 80 in a single state). At the very
least, multiple, complicated ballots could be

expected to introduce delays into the voting
process, possibly raising tensions. Also, no one
could predict how the split timing of the two
elections would affect political support. The leading
presidential candidates voiced widely held
suspicions that the traditional parties devised the
split to damage their candidacies, since the new
political movements associated with the
independent candidates were expected to perform
poorly in the regional elections.

Following this visit, the Council of Freely

Elected Heads of Government and The Carter
Center decided to accept the invitation to send a
delegation of electoral observers to monitor the
1998 presidential elections. The pre-conditions for
observation were met: The mission had been
invited by the proper authorities and enjoyed the
welcome of all major parties. The Carter Center
decided to participate because: a) the Venezuelan
political system was shifting from a strong two-party
system to one based on political fragmentation; b)
the front-runner, Chávez Frias, was a former coup
leader who had been jailed and pardoned, and
whose strong organization and populist message
appeared to be polarizing the electorate; and c) the
experiment with an unprecedented degree of
automation of the voting process raised concerns
among voters.

The Carter Center opened a field office in

Venezuela on Oct. 16 and organized a Nov. 2-3
pre-election visit by former President Jimmy Carter,
Rosalynn Carter, and former Bolivian President
Sánchez de Lozada to assess preparations for the
Nov. 8 regional elections. The Carter Center also
decided to send a three-person staff team to witness
the regional elections and observe trouble spots in
preparation for the Dec. 6 presidential elections.

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A

UTOMATING

 

THE

 V

OTING

P

ROCESS

 

IN

 V

ENEZUELA

Venezuela is the first country in the world to

attempt to fully integrate its polling centers into a
single electronic network for transmitting and
tabulating the votes of 92 percent of the registered
voters.

Indra, as system integrator, contracted the

manufacture of 7,000 voting machines to a U.S.-
based company, Election Systems & Software. It
also contracted for electoral software from Spain
and transportation services from Venezuela. In
addition, Indra reached an agreement with a
Venezuelan university, the Universidad Simón
Rodríguez, to select and train 8,400 technicians to
support the automated voting system.

The CNE and Indra coordinated with the

national telephone company and municipal electri-
cal utilities to ensure that the appropriate technical
infrastructure was available at each voting site.

To test the system as a whole, Indra conducted

partial and full tests of the system before both the
regional and presidential elections. Although

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Dr. Jennifer McCoy consults with President Carter during a pre-election
press conference.

scheduled for Oct. 24, the first full test took place
on Nov. 1, only one week before the regional
election, due to delays in contracting for and
delivering the vote tabulating machines.

The vote tabulating machines were designed to

scan ballots as they were introduced into the ballot
boxes, keeping a running tally of the votes cast on a
removable PCMCIA memory card. This card also
carried the tabulating software that only read the
ballots assigned to specific voting stations.

5

One voting machine was assigned to every three

mesas electorales (“

voting stations”). Each voting

center, generally located in a school, could have up
to nine 

mesas electorales

. On election day, the

presidents of the voting stations would ask an Indra
technician to print out a tally sheet at the beginning
of voting to show that no ballots had yet been cast
(known as the 

“acta en cero”

 or the “zero tally

sheet”). During the voting itself, each individual
voter would feed his or her ballot into the voting
machine, although an Indra technician would stand
by to assist in case of difficulty. At the end of
voting, the presidents of the 

mesas electorales

 would

ask the Indra technician to transmit the voting

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results via modem to the regional vote counting
centers. These results were to be transmitted using
data compression techniques that Indra assured the
public would be tamperproof.

As the last step in the voting process, the

machines would print out multiple copies of the
final voting tally for the poll workers, electoral
authorities, and party witnesses, who were required
by law to sign them. However, they could make
dissenting observations on the tally sheet. The
signed originals of the tally sheet, along with the
PCMCIA card, then were transported to the
regional tabulating centers that would verify the
accuracy of the electronically transmitted results.

The system incorporated multiple safeguards

into the process. Voting machines included a
battery backup that allowed them to operate for up
to 12 hours. The machines were designed to shut
down automatically if they were tampered with
before or during the election. If any voting machine
broke accidentially during the electoral process,
Indra planned to attempt to repair it in the field. If
this was not possible, then the 

mesas electorales

 using

that particular machine would have to use a tradi-
tional manual voting method. Due to the expense
of each voting machine, the CNE did not have a
pool of replacement machines available during the
regional elections, although additional machines

were later purchased for the presidential elections.

The CNE established one 

Centro Regional de

Totalización

 in each of the 22 states and in the

federal district. Indra operated these centers, but
most were co-located with the 

Juntas Electorales

Regionales (JERs

). Each of these regional centers was

equipped with modems, servers, and personal
computers to receive transmissions from voting
machines, tabulate the regional results, and retrans-
mit them to the national tabulating center located
in CNE headquarters in Caracas. Vote tallies from
manual centers would also be transported to the
regional tabulating centers and entered into the
automated system.

During the regional elections, each JER

 

was

charged with tabulating votes in its state and
officially proclaiming the victors. Federal authori-
ties at the CNE only received a record of the results
via electronic transmission. Conversely, during the
presidential elections, the regional tabulating
centers would simply serve as way stations for the
electronic transmission of the results to the CNE.
The CNE would officially proclaim the president.
Speed and accuracy were touted as the main
advantages of the electronic voting system.

Table 1

Planned Automation of the Voting Process

D

ESCRIPTION

       A

UTOMATED

   M

ANUAL

        T

OTAL

      % A

UTOMATED

D

ESCRIPTION

A

UTOMATED

M

ANUAL

T

OTAL

% A

UTMATED

V

OTING

 C

ENTERS

       4,852

    3,419

          8,271

58.7%

V

OTING

 S

TATIONS

     16,739

    3,473

        20,212

82.8%

R

EGISTERED

 V

OTERS

9,960,338

963,795

 10,924,133

            91.2%

(Source: Consejo Nacional Electoral, October 1998)

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Ambassador George Jones, Dr.

Jennifer McCoy, and President

Carter observe a poll opening on

Dec. 6, 1998.

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The Polo Patriótico was a coalition of left-of-

center parties that included the 

Movimiento Quinta

República

 (Fifth Republic Movement, Chávez’ s

party), MAS, the third largest party, and Patria
Para Todos (a splinter from the Causa R party).
Chávez’s campaign centered on a message of
radical change, punishing those elites who had
“ruined the country” and calling for a constituent
assembly to thoroughly reform the political institu-
tions of Venezuela’s democracy, positions that
raised fears among the middle and upper classes. In
his meeting with the delegation, Chávez pledged to
respect the election results. He also said he ex-
pected to win the second largest block of seats in
the new Congress. He argued that the new con-
stituent assembly, the central theme of his cam-
paign, could be convened legally through a na-
tional referendum, a position many legal scholars
disputed as being of doubtful constitutionality.

Römer, the successful former governor of

Carabobo state who held second place in public
opinion polls, also campaigned on a message of
change. He advocated the continuing devolution
of power and resources from the central govern-
ment to the states and municipalities. Salas Römer
expressed concern, shared by several other

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. 2-3

On Nov. 2, 1998, President and Mrs. Carter,

accompanied by another member of the Council
of Freely Elected Heads of Government, former
Bolivian President Sánchez de Lozada, and Dr.
McCoy arrived in Caracas to meet with Presi-
dent Caldera, the presidential candidates, the CNE,
the minister of defense and military high command,
and the OAS and European Union (EU) mission
chiefs. They found the country calm and in the
midst of preparations for the Nov. 8. regional
elections.

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ANDIDATES

The delegation met with six presidential candi-

dates during the pre-electoral assessment trip: Hugo
Chávez Frias of Polo Patriótico, Henrique Salas
Römer of Proyecto Venezuela, Irene Sáez of IRENE
and COPEI, Luis Alfaro Ucero of Acción
Democrática, Alfredo Ramos of La Causa R, and
Miguel Rodríguez of Apertura. All assured the
Council delegation that they would respect the
results of the November and December elections.
However, they also expressed concern about the
electoral process and each other’s intentions.

Chávez met with the Carter Center delegation

and discussed his political platform and plans for a
constituent assembly. As a former lieutenant
colonel, who led a coup against the democratic
government in 1992, he was jailed for two years.
Later, he was pardoned by President Caldera,
enabling him to run for office.

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candidates, that even though more independent
persons led the new CNE, the electoral bureaucracy
remained in the hands of the traditional parties which
previously had been associated with fraud. He also
stated that he did not expect to achieve great success
in the Nov. 8

 

elections partly because the CNE-

prepared ballots  distorted his party symbol and made
it difficult for voters to recognize.

Candidate Sáez, former mayor of a Caracas

suburb, had seen her popularity drop precipitously
after she accepted the endorsement of COPEI, the
traditional Christian democratic party. In her meet-
ings with Presidents Carter and Sánchez de Lozada,
Sáez explained her decision by arguing that the
survival of democracy and the governability of Ven-
ezuela depended on the survival of political institu-
tions, such as the party system. Nevertheless, she
expected to be strengthened by the positive results of
COPEI in up to eight governorships that would
vindicate her decision. Her principal concerns, which
matched those of other candidates, included the new
polling officials. Some of whom, she claimed, were
illiterate and would not be properly trained to carry
out their functions. She also raised the issue of
campaign finance, pointing out that some candidates
were running considerably more television advertising
than was allowed under electoral law.

6

AD candidate Ucero, expected his party to win

more than half the gubernatorial races in the Nov. 8
elections, despite his own poor showing of 6 percent
in the public opinion polls. He also thought that these
victories would boost his own candidacy for the
presidency. In his meeting with the delegation, Ucero
expressed concern that the newly selected poll
workers, who had replaced the traditional party
representatives, would lack the training to carry out
their functions. Like Sáez, he expressed concern that
despite the electoral law’s provision that students and
teachers be included

at every voting table, many of these poll workers
would be illiterate and unable to perform their duties.
He also feared overall confusion and violence in states
with close gubernatorial elections and cited the states
of Zulia, Sucre, and Bolivar as particularly vulnerable
in this respect.

Ramos expressed concern about the possibility of

electoral fraud under the new automated voting
system, claiming his own party had been deprived of
victory due to fraud in previous elections. Miguel
Rodríguez, representing a new party that includes
former President Carlos Andrés Pérez, Apertura,
discussed

 

his unsuccessful attempt to form a coalition

among opponents of Chávez.

E

LECTORAL

 P

REPARATIONS

The Carter Center pre-election delegation also

visited the CNE for a briefing on the new electoral
system and a demonstration of a vote tabulating
machine.

In this meeting, the seven principal members of

the CNE assured the delegation that the new system
would be ready in time for the Nov. 8 elections. They
also informed the delegation that the Oct. 31 national
test of the automated voting system had been success-
ful, with a 90 percent success rate in the transmission
of results. The CNE reiterated its full confidence in
the new automated voting system, arguing that it
would increase transparency, accuracy, and speed in
delivering results.

As the CNE explained, 80 percent of voters

would use a fully automated voting system that
included both automatic tabulation of ballots and
electronic transmission of the results. Twelve percent
would have their votes tallied automatically, but due
to the absence of telephone lines, the results would be
hand carried to the respective JER. The remaining 8
percent would cast their ballots by the traditional
method, and these results would be tallied by poll
workers at their voting center.

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Given the high percentage of the population
covered by the automated voting process, the CNE
believed it would be able to transmit the results
within a few hours of the end of voting at 4 p.m.

Each voter would cast two ballots: one for

federal senators and deputies and a second ballot
for state governors and assembly members. The
Venezuelan electoral system allocated some posi-
tions such as the federal senate by proportional
representation and a closed party list. For other
posts, such as for state governor, the candidates
competed nominally (first past the post). Federal
deputies could be selected either by proportional
representation from a closed party list, or nomi-
nally, from multimember districts.

Each ballot was 8 by 20 inches, and could

contain identification boxes on both sides of the
ballot for more than 80 parties (as was the case in
the state of Miranda), with ovals next to each box
for voters’ selections. (See Appendix #5 for a
sample legislative ballot.)

All of these different mechanisms for selecting

candidates had to be accommodated in the regional
elections, which resulted in a ballot that was diffi-

cult to read and interpret. The CNE assured the
delegation that Venezuelans were accustomed to
voting under the rules of the current electoral
system, and they would have little difficulty inter-
preting the ballot. However, First Vice President
Miriam Kornblith acknowledged the voting system
had changed since 1993 to replace single-member
districts with multimember districts in elections to
the federal Chamber of Deputies and this might
generate confusion. To minimize this concern, the
CNE took steps to display poster-sized ballots at
voting centers for voters to examine. The CNE also
reported it was taking an active role in educating
the public through a television and radio campaign
that began Oct. 21.

During the pre-electoral visit, the Carter

Center delegation met with the minister of defense,
Vice Admiral Tito Rincón Bravo, and the military
high command to discuss their role in the upcom-
ing electoral process. The military high command
assured Presidents Carter and Sánchez de Lozada of
their impartiality during the electoral process and
their firm commitment to respecting the election
results.

Augustín Berrios,
President Aylwin Azocar,
Mrs. Carter, President
Sánchez de Lozada,
presidential candidate
Irene Sáez, President
Carter, and Nicholas
Brady meet at the
Caracas Hilton before the
Dec. 6 presidential
elections.

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Since 1963, the armed forces had provided

security for all aspects of elections, an operation
known as Plan República. This operation involved
the armed forces guarding electoral materials,
voting centers, and regional and national vote
tabulating centers, as well as maintaining public
order on election day.

For the 1998 elections, 70,000 troops would be

deployed under the direction of General Martínez
Ochoa, commander of the National Armed Forces
Unified Command (CUFAN). The armed forces
also would be responsible for transporting tally
sheets and the PCMCIA software cards containing a
backup of the vote tally to the regional counting
centers after the end of voting. Although the
electoral results would be known long before these
materials arrived, they were necessary for verifying
the accuracy of the electronically transmitted
results. The armed forces also were responsible for
storing the ballots after the end of elections for at
least 45 days, since these would provide a physical
record of the vote, should there be a legal challenge
to an official result. Because the armed forces
enjoyed a very high degree of confidence among
the population and were perceived as nonpartisan,
Venezuelans viewed this substantial degree of
military participation as an additional guarantee of
the honesty and integrity of the electoral process.

C

OOPERATION

 

WITH

 I

NTERNATIONAL

 O

BSERVERS

The delegation met with ambassadors and

representatives of the OAS and EU, each of whom
planned to field small delegations for the Nov. 8
regional elections and larger delegations for the
Dec. 6 presidential elections. All three missions
agreed to jointly coordinate deployment and share
information. They also agreed to consult with each
other before making any post-election public
statements. The OAS delegation chief, Edgardo
Reis, announced its plans to conduct a parallel vote
tabulation during the presidential elections. While

the “quick count” would not provide information
on the outcome any more rapidly than the new
automated voting system, the OAS thought it
would add confidence to the official results. The
Carter Center agreed to help the OAS collect data
if needed on Dec. 6, which would prove to be a
useful collaboration. 

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F

ollowing the Nov. 4 departure of the
leadership team, three Carter Center staff
members remained in the country to

witness regional elections and perform a technical
analysis of the voting process. Two staff members
deployed to Zulia state, where a highly polarized
and contentious race for governor was taking place.
The third partnered with an EU observer from the
United Kingdom to witness elections in Caracas
and neighboring Vargas state. Carter Center staff
also witnessed voting returns at regional vote
tallying centers the evening of Nov. 8.

 Zulia state was chosen because it was

expected to have the most problematic
regional elections. Supporters of both leading
candidates had warned of possible electoral
fraud and violence there, and the AD candi-
date for governor, Manuel Rosales, had
publicly requested the presence of interna-
tional observers.

Just prior to the elections, the CNE

dismissed the members of the JER in Zulia
state on grounds of mismanagement and
partisanship. The CNE assigned its second
vice president, Rafael Garcia Borges, as
intervenor. He arrived the morning before
the election to attempt to restore order and
supervise the elections. The Carter Center
team arrived in Maracaibo the evening of
Nov. 7 and met with Borges and local politi-
cal representatives. By the time the staff team
visited the Zulia JER, Garcia Borges had
successfully re-established control over the
regional electoral machinery, and he assured The
Carter Center staff  the elections would proceed

Mesa workers check voters’ identity and verify their eligibility to
vote at a polling station in Vargas state.

G

EORGE

 J

ONES

smoothly.

On election day, the team visited eight voting

centers and witnessed three poll openings and two
poll closings. At these sites, the voting process
proceeded freely and fairly, although the team
noted some problems. The most common included
delays at the start of voting and inexperienced poll
workers. That evening, the staff team met with the
regional Indra manager and witnessed the reception
of the electronically transmitted results at the
regional vote counting center. With more than 75

T

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AND

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EGIONAL

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 1998 V

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percent of the results tabulated, the first official
bulletin with electoral results for Zulia was issued
shortly after 11 p.m. It gave an overwhelming
victory to the Polo Patriótico candidate and
incumbent governor, Francisco Arias Cardenas. At
no time during election day did the Carter Center
team witness disturbances or acts of violence, even
though voters grew impatient with the long delays
experienced at some voting centers.

The Carter Center/EU team deployed in

Caracas also found that elections proceeded well,
although with problems similar to those witnessed
by the Zulia team. They visited nine voting centers
in the neighborhoods of La Guaira and Catia-la-
Mar in Vargas state, and Catia and 23 de Enero in
Caracas. The principal problems observed were
long delays before and during the voting process.
Also, unlike Zulia, a significant number of 

mesas

electorales

 had to use party witnesses because many

poll workers selected by lottery never arrived.
However, the team observed a high level of coop-
eration between poll workers and party witnesses at
all locations they visited. The Caracas staff member
observed closings at 5:30 p.m. and 8:30 p.m., and
then observed the electoral returns at the regional
tabulating center for the federal district. As in Zulia,
the Caracas team did not witness any public distur-

bances or acts of violence, a common fear voiced
by Venezuelans prior to the elections.

Following the regional elections, the Carter

Center staff met with other EU observers to ex-
change information and opinions concerning the
electoral process. EU teams, which had deployed to
six states in Venezuela, observed problems very
similar to those that the Center’s teams witnessed
in Caracas and Maracaibo. This factor helped
improve confidence in the findings. Both the EU
and the OAS made public statements concerning
the regional legislative elections, but The Carter
Center declined to do so due to the small number
of observers it fielded. Instead, its teams focused on
learning about the Venezuelan electoral process to
prepare for observing the presidential elections.

A

NALYSIS

 

OF

 

THE

 N

OV

. 8

R

EGIONAL

 E

LECTIONS

Politically, almost all major parties achieved

their stated goals and thus could claim success in
the legislative and regional elections. This relative
success discouraged the parties from resorting to
violence to alter the electoral results. The new
automated voting system reported results with
speed and accuracy despite some problems.

E

STHER

 L

OW

John Newcomb
(second from left) and
Horace Sibley (fourth
from left) meet with
other international
observers and CNE
officials in the state of
Sucre.

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Table 2

Outcomes in the 1998 Elections for Governors

 

Political Parties

Official  Number

Number of

Total Stake in

(Polo Patriotico

of Governorships

Governorships

Governorships

indicated with

held in Alliance

asterisk

)

A

CCIÓN

 D

EMOCRÁTICA

 (AD)

8

          1

          9

COPEI

5

          5

        10

MAS*

4

          5

          9

M

OVIMIENTO

 Q

UINTA

 R

EPÚBLICA

*

1

          6

          7

P

ATRIA

 P

ARA

 T

ODOS

*

2

                      7

          9

P

ROYECTO

 V

ENEZUELA

1

          2

          3

L

A

 C

AUSA

 R

1

          6

          7

C

ONVERGENCIA

1

          5

          6

(Source: Alfredo Keller, Venezuelan electoral analyst)

Overall, these elections emphasized the continuing
democratic convictions of the citizenry. Fifty-four
percent of Venezuelans turned out to vote, a higher
number than in previous regional elections.

 Two parties had dominated the electoral scene

between 1973 and 1993 – the social democratic
party AD and the Christian democratic party
COPEI. In 1993, new parties emerged on the scene
to challenge their leadership, and in 1998, the
number of parties proliferated. Three parties lost
ground in the 1998 regional elections: COPEI, La
Causa R (a left-labor party), and Convergencia (the
electoral grouping that supported President
Caldera). AD had mixed results, losing several
governorships, but increasing its representation in

the legislature. The new party, the Movimiento
Quinta República, led by Hugo Chávez, won about
25 percent of the congressional seats, and the
coalition led by Chávez, the Polo Patriótico, won
control of 35 percent of the seats in the Chamber of
Deputies.

T

HE

 G

OVERNORSHIPS

Compared to predictions made before Nov. 8,

AD lost ground in the gubernatorial elections, while
the Polo Patriótico did considerably better. How-
ever, taking into account the electoral alliances
among parties at the state level, the outcome was
quite balanced. The results of the governors’ races
were as follows:

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R

ENATO

 C

APPELLETTI

A voter feeds his ballot into a voting machine with a
technician’s help.

Several analysts spoke of the gubernatorial

elections as a political earthquake that dramatically
reshaped the distribution of party strength in the
regions. Certainly, the reduction of AD’s governor-
ships from 12 to 8 indicated a shift away from the
traditional parties, but at the same time, COPEI
increased its governors from three to five. Victories
of Polo Patriótico candidates in Vargas (the coastal
state near Caracas) and in the plains state of Barinas
(where Chávez’s father won the governorship)
surprised analysts. However, considering that 16 of
18 incumbent governors won re-election, the actual
shift in state leadership was relatively small. Rather,
the pattern of support for established regional
leaders changed. This reflects the opportunistic
alliances made by political parties on a state-by-state
basis. For example, while the COPEI party was
completely opposed to a Chávez victory in the
presidential race, it was allied with his party, the
Movimiento Quinta República, in the western state
of Zulia, where they jointly won the governorship in
the Nov. 8 elections. In another state, Delta
Amacuro, AD and COPEI made an alliance to win
the governor’s race, even though they competed at
the national level. Thus, electoral alliances gave
multiple parties a stake in the success of each
governor and in the results of the regional elections.

All parties generally accepted the outcome in

the governors’ races with the exception of the Polo
Patriótico. It immediately challenged the results of
these races in at least 7 of 23 states. AD then
challenged the victories of Polo Patriótico candi-
dates in the states of Barinas and Guárico. These
legal challenges to the results of the Nov. 8 election
are expected to take years to resolve through the
process established by Venezuelan electoral law.

7

O

UTCOME

 

OF

 

THE

 C

ONGRESSIONAL

 R

ACES

The Nov. 8 elections produced an entirely

heterogeneous Congress, in which no group has a
governing majority. AD managed to remain the
leading minority in both chambers of Congress, and
it was the strongest party in the assembly of most
states. Chávez’s Movimiento Quinta República
represents the second largest single party, followed
by COPEI, and Proyecto Venezuela, the new party
that supported presidential candidate Henrique
Salas Römer. If Chávez’s electoral alliance with the
socialist party MAS and the radical party Patria Para
Todos (PPT) holds together, the Polo Patriótico will
control 34 percent of the deputies in the new
Congress, compared to AD’s 30 percent. In other
words, any president would need to devise a work-
able majority in the Congress to govern.

The number of senators and deputies in the

Venezuelan Congress varies from election to elec-
tion because, to ensure proportional representation,
some parties are assigned extra legislators according
to their electoral quotient.

8

 The electoral quotient

is akin to the minimum number of votes required to
elect a legislator, and it is used to calculate the
number of legislators any given party should have in
Congress. The base number of legislators (48 in the
Senate and 189 in the Chamber of Deputies) is
divided into the number of valid votes in the
legislative elections (4,963,760) to determine the
electoral quotient (103,412 in the Senate and
26,263 in the Chamber). The electoral quotient for
a given Chamber is then divided into the total

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Table 3

Composition of Venezuelan Congress

Electoral alliance Polo Patriótico indicated with asterisk

 

Political Parties                 New Congress

                        Previous

`

Congress

Senators

Deputies

  Senators

   Deputies

AD

20 (33.9%)

62 (30.75%

  16 (30.2%)       55 (27.1%)

MVR*

12 (20.3%)

45 (22.27%)

    0

     0

MAS*

  5 (8.47%)

18 (8.91%)

    5 (9.43%)    24 (11.8%)

PCV*

  0

  1 (.495%)

    0

     0

PPT*

  1 (1.7%)

  7 (3.47%)

    0

     0

COPEI

  8 (13.56%)     27 (13.37%)

  14 (26.42%)    53 (26.11%)

Projecto Venezuela

  4 (6.78%)       20 (9.9%)

    0

     0

La Causa R

  1 (1.7%)

  7 (3.47%)

    9 (16.98%)    40 (19.7%)

Apertura

  3 (5.08%)

  3 (1.485%)

    0

     0

Convergencia

  3 (5.08%)

  4 (1.98%)

    5 (9.43%)    26 (12.81%)

IRENE

  1 (1.7%)

  2 (.99%)

    0

     0

Renovación

  1 (1.7%)

  2  (.99%)

    0

     0

Other

  0

  4 (1.98%)

    4 (7.55%)      5 (2.46%)

Total

59

         

202

  

53

 

203

(Sources: El Nacional, 12-21-1998 and 1993 Consejo Supremo Electoral figures.

 Includes senators for life and legislators assigned by electoral quotient.)

number of votes any given party received
nationally to determine the number of legislators
they should have under the Venezuelan electoral
law. If the actual number elected directly is less
than this, extra legislators are assigned to this party.
Thus a party such as IRENE, from which no
deputies were directly elected but which received
61,112 votes, would receive two deputies by
electoral quotient. In the Senate, this leads some
particularly populous states, such as Miranda and
Zulia, to be represented by three senators, instead
of two. This system of calculating additional
legislators generally only applies to parties that
nationally received a substantial number of votes
but were unable to elect any legislators in the
nominal (first-past-the-post) races.

Venezuelans quickly realized that the 1998

congressional results could influence whether a new
president would call for a constituent assembly. The
issue of convening a constituent assembly to carry
out a reform of the constitution was a dominant
theme in 1998 election campaigns, reflecting a
strong desire for change among the voters. It also
was a controversial issue, because the 1961 Venezu-
elan constitution did not appear to provide a legal
basis for such a constituent assembly. Many believe
that the constitution must be amended by the
Congress to permit such a measure or that the
constituent assembly must be convened outside the
framework established in the existing constitution.

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LECTIONS

The Polo Patriótico, the only group that sup-

ported calling for a constituent assembly without
amending the constitution, was in the minority in
both chambers of the legislature. Its presidential
candidate, Hugo Chávez, argued that a referendum
would provide the legal basis for convening a
constituent assembly. In a meeting with Polo
Patriótico’s governors-elect on Nov. 14, Chávez
restated his commitment to convening a constitu-
ent assembly with the power to dissolve Congress
and the Supreme Court. He said the current elec-
toral system produced a legislature that did not
reflect the will of the people, and, if elected, he
would sign the decree calling for a referendum on a
constituent assembly on Feb. 15.

However, after the Nov. 8 elections, significant

national figures, such as Pedro Nikken, a human
rights lawyer, and Alan Brewer-Carias, a former
minister of state, shifted their position on calling a
constituent assembly. They argued that the new
Congress would have sufficient legitimacy to
successfully reform the constitution. Even the
leadership of the MAS party (the socialist party
allied with Polo Patriótico) called for a consensual
approach to reforming the constitution, rather than
a majoritarian one. One public opinion poll taken
after the regional elections showed that while
support for a constituent assembly was still high,
voters preferred a consensual approach by a sub-
stantial margin.

9

 These shifts in elite and mass

opinion indicated that the constituent assembly
issue would continue to be controversial both
during and after the Dec. 6 presidential elections.

T

ECHNICAL

 A

SSESSMENT

The new voting system generally worked

successfully, reporting more than 70 percent of the
results within hours of the poll closings. By Nov. 15,
95 percent or more of all votes, whether automated
or manual, had been tallied. Also, the lottery
system for selecting poll workers seemed to have

worked partially, and many praised the poll work-
ers’ dedication and hard work during the electoral
process.

However, the Nov. 8 elections revealed several

flaws in the new system, most of which may have
been associated with human error, inexperience,
and inadequate planning. The four principal prob-
lems reported during this process were: the com-
plexity of the ballots, the inexperience of the
technicians operating the voting machines, the
inadequate physical infrastructure of the voting
sites, and delays caused by difficulty issuing creden-
tials to poll workers and assembling a quorum of
these workers so voting could begin. This resulted
in long lines at polling places, with some voters
reporting waits of up to four hours.

The security provided by the Plan República

was generally praised, although crowd control
presented a problem at some visited voting centers.

B

ALLOT

 C

OMPLEXITY

The ballots’ complexity for the regional elec-

tions led to two problems: delays due to the length
of time voters needed to complete their ballots and
a high number of null votes. The large number of
parties on each ballot and the small print made it
difficult for voters to find their preferred candidate.
Poll workers at several of the sites visited by Carter
Center observers reported that the ballots’ com-
plexity mostly affected the elderly or those with
poor eyesight. This slowed the process while they
received assistance. Moreover, since there often was
only one voting booth per polling station, many
voters experienced long lines.

Null votes were higher than expected in these

elections, although they were distributed unevenly
across the races for governors, national legislators,
and local legislators. The governors’ races typically
had only 5 to 8 percent null votes, while votes for
senators and deputies were tabulated as null 10-15
percent of the time, rising to 16-22 percent for state

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assembly races. In part, this distribution can be
attributed to difficulty reading the ballots, but it
also may reflect a lack of voter interest or
knowledge about the regional legislative races.

I

NEXPERIENCE

 

OF

 I

NDRA

 T

ECHNICIANS

 

IN

 O

PERATING

V

OTING

 M

ACHINES

Indra, a Spanish company, carried out the

automation of the 1998 elections. It coordinated
hardware, software, and training from both interna-
tional and Venezuelan sources. The degree of
automation achieved in the Venezuelan elections is
unprecedented, and the Nov. 8 elections repre-
sented the first full operational test of the system.

According to the CNE, Indra, and the armed

forces, about 10 percent of the voting machines
failed during the regional elections, forcing poll
workers to use the traditional manual voting
method in these cases. Many of these failures were
attributed to failures in the PCMCIA cards and
technicians’ errors. After the Nov. 8 elections, the
Universidad Simón Rodríguez, the Venezuelan
institution contracted to select and train the
operators, announced it would retrain some of the
operators before the Dec. 6 elections but claimed
only 147 of the voting machines failed due to
human error.

P

OOR

 P

HYSICAL

 I

NFRASTRUCTURE

Although almost all sites seemed to have the

requisite electrical and communications connec-
tions, many were too cramped to adequately hold
the polling stations assigned to them. Most voting
centers were established in schools and other public
centers. However, the limited number of voting
machines (one for every three polling stations) led
the CNE to put several polling stations in each
classroom, rather than one per room as had oc-
curred in previous elections.

Overcrowding resulted, compounded by the

fact that each classroom had only one entrance.

This contributed to long lines for voters and may
have compromised ballot secrecy. Also,
overcrowding led the local representatives of the
Plan República to restrict access by party witnesses
to the polling stations, often discriminating against
the representatives of new or minority parties.

A

SSEMBLING

 

AND

 C

ERTIFYING

 P

OLL

 W

ORKERS

Many voting centers opened considerably later

than expected Nov. 8 due to some absent poll
workers. The CNE had selected a list of primary
and alternate poll workers by lottery from the
voters in the electoral registry months before the
election. The Universidad Simón Rodríguez was to
notify these voters of their selection and then
provide training through its long-distance learning
network. This differed from previous elections, in
which political parties supplied the poll workers.

In the weeks leading up to the regional elec-

tions, there were widespread reports that the CNE
had neither notified many citizens of their selection
nor provided proper training to them. However,
the CNE partially addressed this problem by
conscripting more than three times as many poll
workers (360,000) as were required to staff the
voting tables.

A substantial number of poll workers selected

by lottery either arrived late or did not appear on
election day. Electoral regulations required voting
station personnel be drawn from primary and
alternate poll workers before party witnesses could
be included. In Zulia, where sufficient poll workers
showed up on election day, this was not as great a
problem as in Caracas, where many tables had to
be partially constituted with party witnesses.

Even when enough poll workers showed up,

some of them were not admitted to the polling sites
because they lacked credentials due to CNE delays
in issuing them. This meant a substantial number of
polling sites did not open until 9 or 10 a.m., instead
of 6:30 a.m. as planned. This also contributed to

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delays in closing polling sites, some of which were
still open for voting at 10 p.m. The CNE later
reported that 18,000 party witnesses and 103,000
persons selected by lottery had served as poll
workers during the regional elections.

S

ECURITY

 

AND

 

THE

 P

LAN

 R

EPÚBLICA

Almost all reports praised the operation of the

armed forces electoral security operation, known as
the Plan República, during the regional elections.
Very few voting sites reported instances of abuse of
authority by military officials. However, at some
sites, military officials conducted security searches
of male voters, although this was the exception
rather than the rule. Also, there were almost no
reports of electoral violence.

Electoral observers noted a clear pattern in the

success of the Plan República, particularly in the
area of crowd control. Due to problems cited
earlier, in this report, many voting centers had long
lines of people waiting to vote. In places where
professional officers or noncommissioned officers
were present, crowds generally waited in an orderly
fashion. However, in places where security had
been assigned to lower ranking soldiers (mainly
conscripts), crowd control was poorer. Also,
conscripts were generally less familiar with the role
of electoral observers, which meant Carter Center
observers were temporarily denied access to one set
of voting tables in Maracaibo. EU observers re-
ported a similar incident during their efforts.

A

LLEGATIONS

 

OF

 F

RAUD

A poll taken soon after the election showed a

considerable degree of citizen confidence in the
automated voting system. However, the results in
several gubernatorial and legislative races were
challenged by political parties. Allegations of fraud
included tampering with tally-sheets, errors in
tabulation, and electronic fraud during transmission
of the results. Eventually, 155 challenges to the

E

ST

H

ER

 L

O

W

Carter Center delegate Jaime Areizaga speaks with an

officer from the Plan República in Maragas.

outcomes of the elections of governors and federal
state legislators were filed. Members of the Polo
Pátriotico filed many of these challenges, and other
parties responded tit-for-tat. For example, the Polo
Patriótico challenged the election results in
Miranda state, although its candidate has lost by a
wide margin. In Barinas, AD challenged the
election of Hugo Chávez’s father as governor.

In a separate motion, La Causa R filed a na-

tional challenge to the election, based on the claim
that it was impossible to adequately audit electroni-
cally tabulated and transmitted voting results.
(Under Venezuelan electoral law, any voting
process must be auditable for it to be valid.) The
Supreme Court quickly dismissed this challenge as
groundless. All of these claims were made through
the previously established legal process that assigns
responsibility for conducting an initial investigation
to the CNE.

In states where electoral results were chal-

lenged, some political activists marched on the
location of the Regional Electoral Council (JER) to
demand that it not proclaim an official victor until
the results had been audited. In the 1993 and 1995
elections, similar protests resulted in the seizure of
electoral council buildings by defeated political
parties. To prevent a repetition of these events, the

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Table 4

Abstentionism in 1998

Regional Elections

Number of Voters

Percentage

 Votes Cast

     5,792,391

   53.86%

Abstentionism

     4,962,748

   46.14%

(Source: CNE 1998 Regional Elections website)

Plan República garrisoned the JERs in all of the
states where protests occured, and no such seizures
were reported following these regional elections.

Despite allegations of fraud, the CNE and the

JER worked rapidly to proclaim victors in the Nov.
8 elections. The CNE believed it was obligated to
designate official victors in all regional elections,
despite legal challenges. In the weeks following the
elections, the CNE ensured that all regional elec-
toral councils carried out their legally mandated
duties, despite the reluctance of some JERs in
highly contested states to proclaim victors.

Only in Carabobo state, where an undercurrent

of political conflict and intimidation existed, was
the CNE forced to relocate the JER to Caracas to
finish the process of tabulating, confirming, and
proclaiming the official electoral results. According
to CNE President Dr. Parra Pérez, the process of
challenging the elections was entirely separate from
that of adjudicating the Nov. 8 results. If previous
experience holds true, these challenges will be tied
up in the judicial system for years to come.

T

HE

 R

EGIONAL

 E

LECTIONS

: A C

ONTINUING

C

OMMITMENT

 

TO

 

THE

 D

EMOCRATIC

 P

ROCESS

Venezuelan citizens expressed a continuing

commitment to the democratic process in the Nov.

8 elections, one that went beyond what most
analysts expected given extremely high abstention
rates in past elections. Abstentionism decreased
from previous regional elections by at least 15
percent to total 46 percent. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that turnout would have been even higher
if citizens had faced fewer obstacles. Certainly, the
number of participants was lower than the
expressed intention to vote (which exceeded 75
percent in most public opinion polls before Nov.
8). The two- to four-hour wait reported at many
polling sites presented the primary obstacle and
may have dissuaded as many as 5 percent to 10
percent of registered voters from participating.
Several observers reported meeting voters who had
returned two or three times to their polling site in
hopes of finding a shorter wait.  Participation was
expected to be even higher in the December
presidential elections.

Contrary to many expectations, the voting

process took place peacefully throughout Venezu-
ela. In the weeks after the elections, there were no
significant reports of violence, and the few political
protests that occurred were small and ended peace-
fully. Voters, poll workers, political witnesses, and
soldiers all seemed to cooperate to make the

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 elections a success, despite some flaws in the new
electoral process.

The shortcomings of the new system did not

significantly affect the outcomes of the regional
elections. Only in two states (Guárico and Vargas)
were the results in the governor’s race close enough
that a legal challenge might reasonably change the
outcome. Problems with delays, overcrowding, and
mishandling of the electoral machines were ex-
pected to be less significant in the presidential
elections due to a simpler ballot.

Following the regional elections, the CNE’s first

vice president, Miriam Kornblith, announced that
all technicians would be retrained prior to the
presidential elections. Also, all members of the
voting stations were required to return for the
December elections, guaranteeing a supply of
experienced poll workers. The CNE announced it
planned to re-engineer the flow of voters through
the polling stations after the Dec. 6 elections. The
commanders of the Plan República reviewed their
performance based on their electoral experience
and announced plans to end any security searches
of voters prior to their entrance into voting sites
and improve the access of party witnesses to the
voting tables in crowded situations. 

■

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THE

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ENEZUELAN

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T

HE

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AMPAIGN

T

he regional elections’ outcome had a
decisive and polarizing impact on the
presidential race, although this was not

immediately apparent. Hugo Chávez and his
coalition emerged
successfully from
their first test of
popular support.

Meanwhile,

the strength of the
traditional parties,
AD and COPEI,
in the regional
elections temporarily masked the weakness of their
presidential candidates. Römer’s party, Proyecto
Venezuela, had not done as well as anticipated in
regional elections. This was expected to have some
impact on his standing among voters.

Following the Nov. 8 elections, AD and its

candidate, Luis Alfaro Ucero, sought to position
themselves as the principal challengers to the
acknowledged front-runner, Chávez. Given that
AD controlled 30 percent of the legislators in the
new Congress and one-third of the governors,
Ucero and the party leadership publicly argued this
would translate into a strong boost for their candi-

T

HE

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RESIDENTIAL

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date, replacing Römer of Proyecto Venezuela in
second place. They also argued that any anti-
Chávez coalition should be led by its presidential
candidate, and they called on Salas Römer to
resign to allow the formation of a “democratic
pole.” Candidate Chávez and the Polo Patriótico

also stated publicly
that they saw AD as
their principal
contender. General
Müller Rojas,
Chavez’s campaign
manager argued that
the strength shown

by AD in the regional elections would translate
into strong support for the party in the presidential
elections, and that Römer no longer presented the
main challenger to the Polo Patriótico. Römer
initially did not respond to these attacks, but he
continued his policy of refusing any official support
from other political organizations. Instead, Römer

President Carter

and presidential candidate

Henrique Salas Römer

meet in Caracas prior

to the elections.

R

ENATO

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APPELLETTI

The strength of the traditional parties, AD and

COPEI, in the regional elections temporarily masked

the weakness of their presidential candidates.

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called on the traditional parties to allow their
activists, whom he believed favored his candidacy,
to vote their conscience.

The post-Nov. 8 polls suggested that the

presidential race remained polarized between
Chávez and Römer, with the presidential candidates
of the traditional parties trailing far behind.

10

 Public

opinion polls placed Chávez in the lead with 6 to
12 points over the fairly steady 38 percent for
Römer, although one outlier (Consultores 21)
placed Chávez ahead 57 percent to 26 percent.
Ucero generally remained at 6 to 7 percent and
Sáez at 3 percent. This was a shift from the polls
before the Nov. 8 election, some of which had
shown Römer practically tied with Chávez. Some
analysts theorized that the twin attacks by AD and
the Polo Patriótico on Römer damaged his standing
with the public. However, others voiced suspicion
that the polling data was being deliberately altered
to manipulate public opinion.

This evidence of weak public support for

candidates of the traditional parties led the newly
elected regional leaders of AD and COPEI to rebel
against them and force their ouster. By Nov. 13,
COPEI began reconsidering the candidacy of Irene
Sáez. It initially had sought to extricate itself from
its trailing position through an alliance with AD.

The AD-COPEI coalition talks collapsed Nov.

24, when COPEI’s leadership refused to support
Ucero as the alliance candidate. Shortly thereafter,
AD’s governors rebelled and forced the party
leadership to withdraw its support from Ucero. A
full conclave of the party leadership (Comité
Directivo Nacional) officially revoked Alfaro’s
candidacy on Nov. 27. COPEI adopted a “wait-
and-see” position, quietly negotiating the resigna-
tion of its candidate, Sáez.

By revoking its support for its official candidate,

AD’s action provoked an electoral crisis. Venezu-
elan electoral law allows parties to name substitute
candidates if their official nominee dies, is

J

ENNIFER

 M

C

C

OY

President Aylwin Azocar, President Carter, presidential
candidate Hugo Chávez, President Sánchez de Lozada,
and Secretary Nicholas Brady meet in Caracas prior to
the Dec. 6 presidential elections.

incapacitated, or resigns. COPEI avoided a crisis
when Irene Sáez agreed to resign as the party’s
candidate, though she stayed in the race with the
support of two smaller parties.

 However, candidate Ucero refused to resign

from his position as AD’s candidate. The CNE,
which is the body competent to issue new electoral
regulations under current legislation, was therefore
forced to rule on whether the AD slot on the ballot
belonged to the party or the nominee. AD filed
motions before the CNE and a court to compel
Ucero to give up his position on the ballot. While
Venezuelan electoral law 

(Ley Orgánica del Sufragio

y Participación Política)

 does not speak to this issue,

the law on political parties does establish that the
symbols of a political party belong to the organiza-
tion, not an individual.

Even though the CNE had not yet ruled on the

issue, AD and COPEI quickly named Römer as
their party nominee on Nov. 28 and 29 respec-
tively. The party leaderships proceeded to order
their activists to vote for the new nominee. In the
meantime,  although the CNE initially raised some
doubts about whether a ballot spot could be taken
away from a candidate, it eventually returned the

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party slot on the presidential ballot to Acción
Democrática on Dec. 1. This allowed the party to
officially substitute Römer for Ucero.

This electoral crisis had significant repercus-

sions on the campaigns of the two leading presiden-
tial contenders, Chávez and Römer, and created
additional uncertainty concerning the outcome.
Chávez attacked the traditional parties for their
treatment of their presidential candidates, accused
the CNE of favoring the traditional parties with its
ruling on the Ucero case, and denounced the
nomination of Römer by AD and COPEI as a last
gasp effort by the status quo to defeat him. In his
final campaign rally, Chávez asserted that the only
way he could lose the election would be through
fraud, and that his alliance would be prepared to
defend his victory.

In the meantime, Römer initially refused to

accept the endorsement of AD and COPEI, citing
his opposition to any negotiations with the status
quo. In the very last week of the campaign, he
accepted the support of the traditional parties, but
only from their governors and mayors, rather than
from their central leadership. Salas Römer was
endorsed by 15 governors-elect and more than 200
mayors.

By receiving the endorsement of the regional

leaders, Römer hoped to avoid the taint of being
associated with the status quo leadership of the
traditional parties. However, since opinion polls
could not be published during the final week of the
campaign, there was a great deal of uncertainty
about the impact of AD and COPEI support for
Römer.

T

ECHNICAL

 P

REPARATIONS

The CNE and the Plan República began prepar-

ing for the presidential elections shortly after Nov.
8. Given the failure of more than 550 voting
machines in the previous elections, Indra made a
considerable effort to restore damaged machines.
The CNE and Indra announced that 2 percent of
voting machine operators would be replaced, others
would be re-trained, and a backup set of PCMCIA
cards for the machines would be prepared for the
presidential elections. The CNE also ordered an
additional 720 voting machines (in addition to the
original 7,000) for the presidential elections and
began negotiations with local cellular telephone
companies to extend the reach of the automated
voting system. Even so, Eladio Hernández, a CNE
automation manager, stated there were still 966
machines unable to transmit results electronically
on election day, and their tally sheets would have
to be transported to the national tabulating center
by the soldiers of the Plan República.

The CNE conducted two tests of the voting

machines and the electronic transmission network
prior to the elections. The first occurred Nov. 25
and achieved 90 percent success in transmission of
results. The second test was conducted Nov. 28,
and it also reportedly was successful.

To reassure voters and the political parties of

the effectiveness of the automated process, the
CNE initiated a random audit of one ballot box
from each of the 196 voting districts in Venezuela.
The CNE did not complete the audit before the
presidential election, but in those districts where it
had occurred, no unusual discrepancies were
revealed between the number of votes tallied
manually and those transmitted electronically.

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The armed forces completed transferring

materials used in the regional elections to the CNE
by the second week of November. The voting
machines were stored at regional garrisons or Indra
warehouses in preparation for the presidential
elections. Responding to rumors and public fears of
unrest following the elections, General Martínez
Ochoa, head of the Plan República, repeatedly
reassured the nation that the armed forces were
prepared to guarantee public order and stability. He
also announced the armed forces had developed a
contingency plan (Plan Soberanía) to restore order
if disturbances occurred during or after the electoral
process.  On Nov. 30, the armed forces again
deployed to guard voting centers and transport
electoral materials.

C

AMPAIGN

 P

ROBLEMS

 

AND

C

OMPLAINTS

During November, the CNE concentrated on

preparing for the presidential elections although it
did follow up on a few complaints related to the
political campaigns. The principal official action
taken by the CNE in this area concerned political
advertisements used by the Römer campaign.
Under Venezuelan electoral law, political cam-
paigns are not permitted to use advertising that
depicts the image of an opposing candidate or their
party symbols without their permission. Twice, the
CNE banned political advertisements by the Römer
campaign that included the image of Chávez.
Candidate Römer later complained publicly that
the CNE had singled him out on this issue.

Following regional elections, the political

parties slowly began submitting their claims of fraud
to the judicial process. The CNE’s 

Sala de

Sustanciación

, which investigates fraud involving the

overall electoral process, had received 14 official

claims by Nov. 14. The Consultoría Jurídica, which
receives claims concerning individual tally sheets,
had received none by Nov. 12. Eventually, these
official claims would rise to 155, most of which
were still pending in January 1999. In general, the
CNE largely confined itself to receiving party
complaints during November and delayed making
formal decisions until after the presidential
elections.

D

IFFICULTIES

 

WITH

 

THE

 P

RESIDENTIAL

 B

ALLOT

The decision by the AD and COPEI parties to

withdraw support for their own nominees and
support Römer created a difficult problem for the
CNE. By the time this substitution had been formal-
ized, it was too late to change the ballots for
the presidential elections. The first lot of ballots had
already arrived in Venezuela on Nov. 15. As
Appendix #5 shows, the presidential ballot had a
picture of a party’s presidential nominee in each
identification box. After the substitution, voters
who selected the AD or COPEI party would be
voting for Römer, even though the ballot continued
to depict the image of Ucero or Sáez.

A further complication was that Venezuelans

could vote for more than one party in the presiden-
tial elections, as long as the parties they selected
had nominated the same candidate. The vote
tabulating software contained in the voting ma-
chines contained programmed information on these
alliances, and the machines would therefore read
ballots with multiple selections for the same candi-
date as valid. For example, a voter who favored
Ucero as presidential candidate could fill in ovals
for the Acción Democrática and ORA parties, both
of which had nominated Ucero.  This would be
regarded as a valid vote by the tabulating software.
However, the voting machine would read ballots as
null if voters selected multiple parties that were not

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in an electoral alliance.

Once AD and COPEI substituted Römer for

their original candidates, the pattern of electoral
alliances programmed into the tabulating software
was no longer valid. Juan Navarro, the president of
Indra, announced to the public on Dec. 2 that it
would be impossible to reprogram the software for
the voting machines since too little time remained
before the presidential election. Thus, returning to
the previous example, a voter who cast a ballot for
both AD and ORA in the presidential elections
would no longer be casting a valid vote, since AD
now supported Römer instead of Ucero.

Moreover, a Römer supporter who selected

both AD and Proyecto Venezuela in his ballot
(parties that now had an official electoral alliance)
would have his vote mistakenly read as null by the
voting machine, since it was not programmed to
recognize the new alliance. One member of the
COPEI party leadership informed The Carter
Center that a study by his party indicated that no
more than 4 percent of voters had selected multiple
parties in previous elections. Even so, this margin
could be significant in any close election, and many
warned the Dec. 6 elections could be decided by a
narrow margin.

One day before the elections, the CNE officially

ruled each voter should select only one party on the
presidential ballot. They issued instructions to all
poll workers that they should inform the voters of
this new ruling as they received their ballots. The
press published this information and announced it
on radio and television. However, it was not clear
whether all registered voters and poll workers would
be informed of this decision in a timely fashion.
Furthermore, since AD and COPEI had nominated
Römer only days before the presidential campaigns
had ended, no one could be certain all voters had
received information on the substitution. This
created the possibility some voters could select AD
or COPEI with the expectation of voting for Ucero

or Sáez respectively, but have their votes tabulated
as supporting Römer. 

■

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T

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OF

 

THE

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RESIDENTIAL

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LECTIONS

O

n Dec. 6, 1998, 6,988,291 Venezu-

elans (63.76 percent of registered
voters) cast their ballots in a peaceful

election for their ninth president of the democratic
era. The Carter Center’s Council of Freely Elected
Heads of Government deployed a delegation of 42
observers from seven different countries.

Delegation leaders included President and Mrs.

Carter, former Bolivian President Gonzalo Sánchez
de Lozada, former Chilean President Patricio
Aylwin, and former Secretary of the U.S. Depart-
ment of the Treasury Nicholas Brady. The delega-
tion also included representatives from the Na-
tional Democratic Institute and the International
Foundation for Election Systems.

The Council delegation was one of several

international observer delegations, including those
from the OAS, the EU, CAPEL, and the Interna-
tional Republican Institute. In all, more than 200
international observers were present during the
1998 presidential elections, according to the CNE.

P

REPARATIONS

 

FOR

 E

LECTORAL

O

BSERVATION

Council observers began arriving in Caracas

Dec. 3. The observers met Dec. 4 for a full day of
training, including meetings with representatives of
leading presidential candidates, the CNE, and local
nongovernmental organizations.

All political party representatives were confident of
their candidate’s victory, but also expressed a
willingness to respect the elections’ outcome.

Dr. Chang Motta, CNE technical director,

briefed delegates on the automated voting system
and preparations for the elections. He expressed
confidence that the automated system would
overcome problems registered during the Novem-
ber regional elections. Delegates also heard from a
local nongovernmental organization, Queremos
Elegir, concerning problems surrounding the 1998
elections. While Queremos Elegir praised the new
participation of independents as poll workers and
felt the elections would be fair, it was critical of the
CNE for concentrating too heavily on the automa-
tion of the elections. Instead, it felt the CNE should
have focused more on supervising the political
campaigns, including monitoring campaign financ-
ing and political advertising, as Venezuela’s elec-
toral law requires.

On Dec. 5, the delegates deployed by ground

and air to 14 different states to observe the presi-
dential elections. (See Appendix 6 for deployment
sites.) Teams were deployed to Venezuela’s cities,
which contain more than 80 percent of the popula-
tion. Council observers also were present in rural
areas and frontier states. The leadership divided
into four teams, to observe in Caracas and the
states of Miranda and Vargas.

Upon arrival, teams met with representatives

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previous visit and what their expectations were
concerning the outcome of the presidential
elections. The leadership also met with other
international observers, including the head of the
OAS delegation, Secretary General Cesar Gaviria,
and the head of the EU delegation, Ana Miranda.
All agreed to share information among observers
and to consult with other delegations before making
public statements.

The leadership team met with President Caldera

and several of his ministers at a lunch held in honor
of the international observers at the Presidential
Palace on Dec. 5. The president and his ministers
expressed confidence in the transparency of the
upcoming elections and downplayed any possibility
of electoral violence. In a separate meeting with the
minister of defense, Vice Admiral Rincón Bravo,
and the commander of Plan República, General
Martínez Ochoa, the leadership team received
similar assurances that all necessary preparations for
the election had been carried out. They also assured
the Council that the armed forces would accept the
outcome of the presidential elections, whatever the
results. The minister of defense discounted rumors
of military resistance to Chavez’s election or to the
convening of a constituent assembly.

M

EETING

 

THE

 C

ANDIDATES

The leadership team met with presidential

candidates Chávez, Römer, and Sáez. Römer
expressed confidence in his own victory. He felt
that the last- minute support by AD and COPEI
would be positive for his candidacy, particularly in
rural areas, although it might hurt him in Caracas.
However, because he had run a close second
throughout the campaign, Römer expressed con-
cern that, should he win, his adversaries’ reaction
might be negative and possibly violent. He also was

of local political parties and the regional electoral
council. The teams deployed to Monagas and
Carabobo states also met with the military officers
in charge of the local Plan República. In general,
delegates were well-received and local officials were
enthusiastic about the presence of international
observers. Although some members of regional
electoral councils expressed concern about possible
problems during the elections, there was a
consensus that the presidential elections would run
more smoothly than the regional ones. Most local
party officials expressed confidence the elections
would be transparent. However, in states where
results of the regional elections were challenged,
especially Guárico, tension existed among the local
parties as revealed in their meetings with the
observers.

Several Carter Center teams assisted the OAS

in gathering primary and secondary samples for the
OAS “quick count.”  Both of these samples trans-
mitted to Caracas on Dec. 6 and would enable the
OAS to develop a relatively accurate picture of
final electoral results. Teams also met with other
international observers in the field, including
delegates from the EU, the International Republi-
can Institute, and the National Democratic Insti-
tute.

T

HE

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EADERSHIP

 T

EAM

 A

GENDA

On Dec. 4 and 5, the leadership team, which

consisted of President and Mrs. Carter, President
Aylwin, President Sánchez de Lozada, Secretary
Nicholas Brady, and Dr. Jennifer McCoy, met with
presidential candidates, party leaders, and govern-
ment officials. The purpose of these meetings was
to hear from Venezuelans how the electoral process
had evolved in the month since the Council’s

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concerned that mass media would not respect rules
prohibiting them from announcing exit polls until
after voting centers closed. Römer thought an early
announcement would hurt him, since it might be
based on exit polls conducted mainly in urban
areas.

In his meeting with Council leadership, Hugo

Chávez also ex-
pressed confidence
of victory and said
he already was
preparing to govern
in a spirit of recon-
ciliation and toler-
ance. He felt the
last-minute substitu-
tion by AD and COPEI of their presidential candi-
dates violated the law and it reflected the despera-
tion of the status quo parties. Chávez restated his
commitment to convene a constituent assembly
through a national referendum and said this would
be legal without prior reform to the constitution.
The Council leadership team, while understanding
his desire for radical change, reminded him that
adhering to the strict constitutional process would

The Council team emphasized it would be im-

portant for the victor to reach out to opponents.

R

ENATO

 C

APPELLETTI

President Sánchez de Lozada, General Martínez Ochoa,
Minister of the Interior Vice Admiral Rincón Bravo,
President Carter, Nicholas Brady, and President Aylwin
Azocar at the Ministry of Defense residence in Caracas.

shore international and domestic confidence in his
new government, should he win the election. The
Council team emphasized it would be important for
the victor to reach out to opponents and reassure
both Venezuelans and the international
community with a conciliatory message after the
elections.  Chávez reiterated he was a democrat and

would seek to govern
democratically, but
he understood it
would take time for
his opponents to feel
confident of this.

Sáez acknowl-

edged she was un-
likely to win the

election, but said that, in a polarized electoral
scenario, someone had to remain in the political
center, acting as a conciliator. She cited her recent
meetings with all the principal political parties and
presidential candidates as evidence of her willing-
ness to act as a bridge between the contending
candidates. The leadership expressed its support for
her role as a political conciliator.

M

EETING

 

THE

 P

ARTIES

The Council also decided to meet with the

principal political parties, AD and COPEI, that
had nominated new presidential candidates in the
final week of the elections, AD and COPEI. Both
parties’ leaders believed the present polarized
election offered a choice between dictatorship and
democracy, and declared they had chosen to throw
all their support behind the democratic option with
the best possibility of winning the election, repre-
sented by Römer.

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R

ENATO

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APPELLETTI

Nicholas Brady, Mrs. Carter, President Carter, President Caldera, OAS
secretary general Cesár Gaviria, President Aylwin Azocar, President
Sánchez de Lozada, Ana Miranda, Foreign Minister Burelli Rivas and
other dignitaries meet at Miraflores, the Venezuelan presidential palace.

Several party leaders also worried that, should
Chávez win the election, he would choose to call a
constituent assembly without reforming the
constitution to permit it. They generally believed
this path would lead to a political and military
crisis.

Presidents Carter, Aylwin, and Sánchez de

Lozado, and Secretary Brady met with several of
the principal leaders of MAS in the afternoon of
Dec. 5. The message of the MAS leadership was
conciliatory. They said they believed that Chávez
would win the election, but the possibility of
electoral violence was overstated. They also said
the traditional parties would have to renew them-
selves, but they looked forward to working with
AD and COPEI to carry out the reforms needed to
renew Venezuelan democracy. MAS leaders also
felt that a consensual path to constitutional reform
and a constituent assembly was viable.

E

LECTION

 D

AY

: D

EC

. 6, 1998

On election day, observers from the Council of

Freely Elected Heads of Government visited 252
voting sites in 13 states and the federal district of
Venezuela. Most began their days at 5:30 a.m., the
official time set for poll workers to arrive and set up
voting stations. Some observers reported finding
long lines of voters even at this early hour, pa-
tiently waiting for the polling sites to open.

Observers visited voting centers throughout the

day to evaluate the voting process and the political
climate. At closing time, they also observed vote
counts, mostly at automated voting sites. In almost
all cases, observers were able to report these results
to the Carter Center headquarters in Caracas.
Delegates who participated in collecting primary
and secondary samples for the OAS “quick count”
reported results from designated voting centers to

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Polling booths set up at a

voting center in readiness for

the Dec. 6 elections.

R

ENATTO

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APPELLETTI

observers were favorably impressed by the relaxed
atmosphere at most of the voting centers they
visited.  The observers found party witnesses
supporting at least two different candidates in 94
percent of all voting centers. In 87 percent of the
voting stations observed by the delegation, poll
workers selected by lottery constituted the 

mesas

,

with the rest of the sites containing a mix of lottery
and party workers. In more than 95 percent of
cases, Carter Center observers found the poll
workers to be nonpartisan and well-trained.

In about 10 percent of the centers, Carter

Center observers reported poll workers had not
received appropriate training from the Universidad
Simón Rodríguez, but even in those instances,
previous experience during the November elections
ensured a smooth voting process.

Also, the CNE apparently communicated

effectively with poll workers on short notice, since
almost all observer teams reported voters were
being informed of the latest CNE decision requiring
them to select only one party on the presidential
ballot.

OAS headquarters as well. While they noted
occasional problems, Council observers felt the
voting process went very smoothly and the
functioning of the automated voting system was
technologically impressive.

Council observers reported no significant

problems in the overwhelming number of voting
centers they visited. Almost 96 percent of centers
were open by 8 a.m., and 68 percent were open
shortly after the official time of 6:30 a.m. Although
there were long lines at many voting centers early
in the day, most voters had to wait for less than 30
minutes to vote, a considerable improvement over
the experience of the regional elections. There
were only two instances reported by Carter Center
delegates in which voters had been waiting for
more than two hours; in both cases, it was the result
of a defective voting machine. Both voters and poll
workers attributed the generally shorter waits to the
experience gained in the November elections and
the simpler presidential ballot.

Poll workers, party witnesses, and voters re-

ported a good working relationship, and the

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President Carter observes a voter preparing to feed her ballot into the vote
tabulating machine.

R

ENATTO

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APPELLETTI

The vote tabulating machines operated

smoothly throughout the day, showing considerable
improvement over the reported rate of failure in
the November elections. In almost all cases, poll
workers and party witnesses had watched the Indra
technician print out a tally sheet at the beginning
of the vote that verified the machine had been set
to a zero count. In 4 percent of the voting sites,
party witnesses reported being unable to print out
the “zero” tally due to a paper jam in the printer. In
these instances, poll workers and party witnesses
visually verified the zero count on the voting
machine’s screen and noted this observation on the
relevant electoral form. Only 15 voting sites visited
by Council observers had malfunctioning vote
tabulating machines.

Observers also noted some machines appeared

to be more sensitive to how ballots were inserted
than others. For example, in one voting center in a
poor neighborhood of Caracas, delegates observed
a machine that rejected most voters’ initial attempt
to insert the ballot. This required the Indra

machine operator to assist almost all voters in
casting their ballots at this voting site.

In fact, Carter Center observers reported that

ballot secrecy was not completely assured in 13
percent of the sites because participation of the
Indra machine operator in the voting process meant
that the ballot might be observed as it was cast.
However, they also reported that voters did not
seem concerned by this reduced level of ballot
secrecy. In almost all sites visited, both party
witnesses and poll workers thought the voting
process was proceeding very well.

In general, observers thought Plan República

soldiers did an excellent job of providing security
for the electoral process. They reported problems
with crowd control in only four (of 252) voting sites
visited, mainly in Caracas. Generally, voters re-
sponded positively to the military’s role in the
elections, and relations between military personnel
and poll workers were smooth.

However, observers in Carabobo and Bolívar

states reported military presence was particularly

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President Aylwin

Azocar listens to a

poll worker who

explains his role in the

voting procedure at a

voting center in Brisas

del Paraíso, Caracas.

G

EORGE

 J

ONES

Overall, observers found the participation of
the armed forces helpful in ensuring a peaceful
and transparent electoral process.

heavy. Some voters in Bolívar mentioned to the
delegates that they thought the military had
assumed too high a profile during the elections. The
observer team in Carabobo noted the military paid
close attention to their activity. They found it
difficult to observe or to have a conversation with
voters or poll workers without being overheard by a
military officer. Overall, observers found the
participation of the armed forces helpful in ensuring
a peaceful and transparent electoral process.

The close of voting and tallying of ballots went

particularly smoothly due to automation of the
process. In centers that had been automated, the
process of transmitting the results occurred within
minutes of the close of voting. After transmission,
observers reported it took poll workers and party
witnesses little more than one hour to complete the
necessary forms and provide the Plan República

with the documentation and tally sheets to be
transported to the National Election Council. The
clearest indication of the smoothness of the
automated voting process was the rapidity with
which the CNE was able to announce results on the
evening of Dec. 6.

Overall, the Council of Freely Elected Heads of

Government observers expressed enthusiasm about
the election process and were impressed by the
technology involved in the automation of the vote.
Problems were reported in only 16 of 252 voting
sites visited, and most of these would not affect the
results of the elections. The delegates found voters,
poll workers, party witnesses, and soldiers worked
together harmoniously to make this a transparent
and peaceful election that clearly reflected the will
of the Venezuelan people.

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A hand-drawn poster in
a local CNE office
shows towns within the
state of Táchira and lists
voting center locations.

A

NNAMARI

 L

AAKSONEN

E

LECTION

 N

IGHT

At 6:37 p.m. on Dec. 6, 1998, the CNE an-

nounced on live television that Hugo Chávez Frias
had been elected president. The voting tally
announced was 57 percent for president-elect
Chávez

 

and 39 percent for the second-place

winner, Henrique Salas Römer, with a 65 percent
turnout among registered voters. These results were
announced based on returns from voting centers
covering 76 percent of registered voters, which had
been successfully transmitted electronically from
across the country. President and Mrs. Carter and
Dr. Jennifer McCoy observed the transmission of
the results at the CNE’s Caracas headquarters from
5 p.m. on, and they were on hand to congratulate
the CNE council members for a successful electoral
process when the first results were announced.

The rapidity with which the CNE announced

the vote surprised most people and was seen as
evidence of the success of the automated voting
system. The OAS contacted the Carter Center
shortly after the announcement by the CNE and
informed the Council’s leadership team that their

“quick count” showed a victory for Chávez of 59
percent to 38 percent. This information, drawn
from a random sample of voting centers, gave the
Carter Center confidence in the partial results its
observers had been phoning in from across
Venezuela.

Initially the second-place winner, Römer, said

he would not concede the election until all votes
had been tallied. This reflected his view that voting
results expected to arrive later in the evening and
on the following days, largely from rural areas,
would tend to favor his candidacy. Shortly after the
CNE made its announcement, the Römer campaign
contacted the Carter Center headquarters. The
leadership delegation reported that the OAS “quick
count” and the delegation’s own information
matched the results provided by the CNE and
confirmed the magnitude of Chávez’s  victory. The
leadership also noted the delegation observed very
few problems during the electoral process, none of
which would affect the voting results.

By 8 p.m., Römer made a gracious and concilia-

tory concession speech on live television. Only four

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Table 5

Final Vote Totals —1998 Venezuelan Presidential Elections

     Candidate

          Total Votes

Percentage of Votes

Hugo Chávez Frias

3,673,685

         56.20%

Henrique Salas Römer

2,613,161

         

39.97%

Irene Sáez

   

184,568

           

2.82%

Luis Alfaro Ucero

     

27,586

0.42%

Miguel Rodríguez

     

19,629

0.30%

hours after the official poll closing time, Chávez was
the acknowledged president-elect of Venezuela.
President-elect Chávez’s initial statements also were
conciliatory, and he proceeded to hold a lengthy
press conference late on the evening of Dec. 6 to
familiarize Venezuelans with his proposals for the
upcoming government.

Prior to his departure from Venezuela, President

Carter held a meeting with President-elect Chávez
on the morning of Dec. 7 at the Circulo Militar in
Caracas. President Carter offered his congratula-
tions to the president-elect, and they discussed
Chávez’s plans for
his government.
President Carter
also spoke by
telephone with the
second-place
finisher, Römer,
who had returned
to Carabobo state
the morning of
Dec. 7. President
Carter congratu-
lated Römer on his campaign and concession
speech, and they discussed his potential future role
in Venezuelan politics.

As Presidents Carter and Sánchez de Lozada

stated in their final press conference on Dec. 7, the
Venezuelan people had voted peacefully, but
definitively, for change. The leadership team also
congratulated the voters, the CNE, poll workers,
and soldiers on the success of the elections. Presi-
dent Carter called the electoral outcome a “peace-
ful revolution,” a statement that Venezuelans
quoted often in the days that followed. Chávez won
by more than a million votes over his nearest rival,
winning victories in 20 of 23 states. The margin of
votes by which Chávez won left little room for

(Source:  CNE, “Resultados  Electorales Venezuela 1998”)

doubt as to the credibility of the results.
Furthermore, as the preliminary statement from the
Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government
pointed out, the automated vote count system —
the first national electronic system in the
hemisphere — brought a new level of transparency
and confidence to the process. This combination
made the 1998 Venezuelan elections among the
most peaceful and transparent in the country’s 40-
year history of democracy. 

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Table 6

Official Electoral Statistics – 1998 Venezuelan Presidential Elections

Total Votes

Percentage of Votes

Number of Registered Voters

 11,001,913

Number of Ballots Cast

   6,988,291

         63.76%

Number of Abstentions

   3,971,239

         36.24%

Valid Votes

   6,537,304

         93.55%

Null Votes

      450,987

           6.45%

(Source: CNE, “Resultados Electorales Venezuela 1998.”)

T

Y

T

T

Y

T

Y

Y

T

T

T

T

Virginia López-Glass, Beatriz

Fuentes, and Becky Castle staff the

Caracas office.

A

NN

A

M

A

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A

KSO

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EN

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P

OST

-E

LECTION

 O

BSERVATION

C

HALLENGES

 

TO

 

THE

 1998

E

LECTORAL

 R

ESULTS

H

ugo Chávez’s margin of victory over

his nearest contender, by more than
one million votes, was of such magni-

tude that no challenges to the presidential electoral
results were filed after Dec. 6. Initially, it seemed
the results from the November regional elections
would be respected, since all parties achieved at
least partial success. However, 155 challenges,
called 

impugnaciones

 in Venezuela, were filed

against the results of the regional elections, many of
them after the presidential elections had concluded.
The CNE rejected 30 of these, and 112 were still
pending as of Jan. 17, 1999. Nine challenges were

admitted for further investigation. Challenges in the
governors’ elections were filed in all states except
for Zulia.

11

The CNE is the body legally empowered to

conduct the initial review of any challenge to an
electoral process. An electoral process can be
impugned by parties, voters, interested organiza-
tions by presenting a 

Recurso Jerárquico

 to the

CNE.

12

 A 

Recurso Jerárquico

 can challenge an

outcome on one or more of the following grounds:
1) an error in the tally sheets or other official
documents related to the functioning of a polling
site; 2) an error in the act of totaling the electoral
results; 3) an error in adjudicating the votes to a
given candidate or party; 4) an error in proclaiming
an electoral result. There is a period of 20 days

Table 7

Sample of States in Which the Results of the Governor’s Election

Were Challenged as of January 1999

 

State

Party

Challenging

Total

Absolute                 Percentage

     Party

Votes

Margin of

Margin of

Votes

Victory

Apure

José Montilla (AD)

Polo Patriótico

  94,911

  15,591

 16.42%

Barinas

Hugo Chávez (MVR)

AD

157,171

    3,084

  1.96%

Bolívar

Jorge Carvajal (AD)

Polo Patriótico

258,259

  12,717

  4.92%

Carabobo

Enrique Salas Feo

Polo Patriótico

499,601

  72,325

14.48%

     (Proyecto Venezuela)

Cojedes

José Galíndez (AD)

Polo Patriótico

  81,640

  21,121

25.87%

Falcón

José Curiel (COPEI)

Polo Patriótico

227,323

  27,217

11.97%

Guárico

Eduardo Manuit (MVR)

AD

176,967

    1,726

  0.98%

Miranda

Eduardo Mendoza (COPEI) Polo Patriótico

602,916

108,201

17.94%

Portuguesa

Iván Colmenares (MAS)

AD

197,080

    7,955

  4.04%

Sucre

Eloy Gil (AD)

Polo Patriótico

206,168

  22,197

10.77%

(Source: CNE 1998 Regional Electoral Results)

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following any election in which to file a 

Recurso

Jerárquico

, except for a presidential election, when

the filing period is 30 days.

13

 However, Article 232

of the Electoral Law states the act of filing a
challenge is not grounds for delaying the
proclamation of an official victor in an election.

14

Once the Recurso has been filed, the CNE’s

legal department (

Consultoría Jurídica

) is charged

with investigating the allegation. This department
can either dismiss the challenge if it is groundless,
or ascertain the truth if the challenge has merit.

However, the CNE will call for a new election

only if an impropriety materially could have altered
the outcome of an electoral contest. For example,
if the legal department determines electoral fraud
was committed on tally sheets covering 5,000
votes, but the victor in that election won by
40,000 votes, the CNE would not call for a new
election. In handling the 1998 regional elections,
the CNE had a 

Comité de Sustanciación

 to speed the

investigation of legal challenges to the totaling and
adjudication of votes and the proclamation of
victors, while the investigation of fraud committed
regarding tally sheets remained in the hands of the

Consultoría Jurídica

.

Voters or parties who are dissatisfied with a

decision made by the CNE regarding a 

Recurso

Jerárquico

, or who wish to challenge the administra-

tive decisions, actions, or omissions of the CNE can
file a 

Recurso Contencioso Electoral

. Article 235 of

the Electoral Law specifies that this is a rapid means
of challenging CNE decisions in regard to parties,
candidates, nominations, the electoral registry, and
referendums.

A 

Recurso Contencioso 

must be filed within 15

days of the CNE action being challenged. If it
addresses actions concerning the nomination and
election of candidates for governor, state assembly,
or municipal posts, this 

Recurso

 must be heard by

the 

Corte Primera de lo Contencioso Administrativo

(an appeals court). If a 

Recurso Contencioso

addresses elections to federal positions, the
functioning of electoral bodies, the recognition of
national parties, the adjudication or totalization of
votes in a presidential election, or CNE decisions, it
is heard directly by the Political-Administrative
chamber of the Supreme Court.

In other words, the 

Recurso Contencioso

 can be

filed both as an appeal to a CNE decision on a

Recurso Jerárquico

, or to challenge any other deci-

sion, action, or omission by the CNE.  The courts
have the authority to order the CNE to remedy any
of the faults presented in a 

Recurso Contencioso

.

Should these faults be of such a magnitude to alter
the result of a previous electoral process, a new
election must be held within 60 days of the court’s
decision.

While the new 1997 Electoral Law sets fairly

short deadlines, legal challenges to previous elec-
tions have not been quickly resolved. As General
Martínez, commander of the 1998 Plan República,
pointed out, the armed forces still are storing ballots
from elections held over a decade ago because the
legal challenges in these case have not been re-
solved. While this is unusual, more recently, the
CNE held new elections for governors two years
after the challenged vote in 1993.

It is hoped that, under the provisions of the new

Electoral Law, the process of appealing the 1998
election results will occur more quickly. However,
some delays already have been introduced into the
process since the investigation into the initial
challenges was suspended for one month during the
CNE’s winter holidays. Nevertheless, as the previ-
ous table shows, most governors whose elections are
being challenged were elected by substantial
margins, which makes it unlikely that the CNE will
overturn the official results. The elections to the
legislative assemblies, typically decided by a small
number of voters due to the limited size of the

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electoral districts, are likely to provide more fertile
grounds for successful electoral challenges.

P

OLITICS

 

IN

 

THE

 W

AKE

 

OF

 

THE

1998 E

LECTIONS

Venezuela faced a difficult economic and

political situation in 1999. The gap between
President-elect Chávez’s campaign promises and the
economic realities of Venezuela appeared intrac-
table. Arguments over the process of convening a
constituent assembly generated intense political
disagreement among political parties and in civil
society. However, the presidential elections were
universally viewed as legitimate, and Chávez was
the unquestioned winner. Whatever the political
and economic disagreements Venezuela faced, there
was no question of Chávez’s constitutional mandate
to govern.

Reactions to Chávez’s victory were initially

positive. The President-elect’s first messages to
Venezuelans, both on television and at his victory
rallies were conciliatory. His erstwhile opponents
responded in a similar fashion. Most major political
parties, including AD and COPEI, agreed to coop-
erate with the new government in the legislature to
facilitate convening the constituent assembly, the
centerpiece of Chávez’s agenda. There was even
some discussion among opposition parties with
regard to granting the new president emergency
powers to address the deepening economic crisis.
Chávez’s initial appointments of General Raúl
Salazar as minister of defense, and Luis Miquilena,
the executive coordinator of the Movimiento
Quinta República, as minister of interior, were well-
received. The economic markets also reacted well
at first, with a sharp “relief” rally in the Caracas
stock exchange, a reduction in interest rates, and an
improvement in the exchange rate, following
Chávez’s initial conciliatory statements.

This early euphoria began to dissolve as Ven-

ezuelans confronted their profound economic crisis.
One technical report by the Venezuelan Congress
estimated that the 1999 fiscal deficit would reach
10.4 percent of GDP, the equivalent of nearly $10
billion.

15

 Analysts estimated that the deficit could

be even larger if the new president fulfilled his
campaign promises to raise salaries and wages.
Chávez argued that the deficit gap could be closed
through improved tax collection, a reform of the
customs agency, a broader value-added tax, and a
renegotiation of the foreign debt.

However, knowledgeable private sector econo-

mists estimated that these measures would not close
the deficit by more than 2 percentage points in the
medium term, leaving a substantial gap in govern-
ment spending that would have to be closed by
other means, including loans from international
financial institutions. Since economic policy was
not at the center of the presidential campaigns and
did not dominate discussion after the election,
many Venezuelans were uncertain about the eco-
nomic direction of their country.  This uncertainty
was then reflected in a weakening of both the
exchange rate and the stock market.

 Also, politicians began to realize there was less

consensus on the issue of the constituent assembly
than had been previously. As a candidate, Chávez
had promised to convene a referendum on a con-
stituent assembly by executive decree on Feb. 15,
1999. His opponents argued that the existing
constitution did not allow for the convening of a
constituent assembly, nor for a referendum in the
matter. They argued instead that the constitution
needed to be reformed to permit such a procedure.

Chávez and his supporters denied a referendum

would be unconstitutional, basing their arguments
on their interpretation of the constitution and the
electoral law. They also questioned the legitimacy

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of the legislature elected in November 1998, since
it was selected under rules governing the existing
“discredited” political system.  They further argued
that voters in the regional elections were uncertain
about who they had voted for due to the
complexity of the electoral system.

In the wake of the election, AD and COPEI

legislators offered to cooperate in a reform of the
constitution to permit the convening of a constitu-
ent assembly, and newly elected Senator (and
former President) Carlos Andrés Pérez stated that
he would introduce such a reform once the new
Congress convened Jan. 23, 1999.

Initially, President-elect Chávez seemed open to

such a process, as long as the reform occurred by his
Feb. 15 deadline for convening a referendum.
However, Chávez and his supporters later rejected
reforming the existing constitution. Only hours after
his Feb. 2 inauguration, he issued a decree conven-
ing the referendum. This decree rejected a prior
constitutional reform on the grounds that the
“status quo” parties would use this opportunity to
diminish the scope and the power of any constitu-
ent assembly. The Supreme Court ruled in January
that using a referendum to convene a constituent
assembly was indeed constitutional. 

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 E

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T

he elections confirmed Venezuela’s rich
tradition of democratic choice of
leadership. They also confirmed the deep

desire for change among Venezuelans. As
Venezuelans strive to improve their political and
economic systems, we offer our congratulations and
gratitude for being privileged to witness this
demonstration of faith in democratic principles.

In the same spirit, we would like to offer our

observations not only about the strengths, but also
the weaknesses of the electoral process that could
be improved in future elections. Our mission
focused on the preparations for and conduct of the
elections and did not include a systematic monitor-
ing of the voter registration process or the cam-
paign. Further, the suggestions below focus on
procedural and legal aspects of the elections, rather
than the structure of the electoral authorities.

P

ROCEDURAL

 R

ECOMMENDATIONS

R

EGISTRO

 E

LECTORAL

Although most political parties seemed satisfied

with the current electoral registration process, The
Carter Center heard some concerns about the
adequacy of the Registro Electoral. Even though the
CNE registered numerous new voters in 1998, The
Carter Center would encourage Venezuelans to
expand the number of opportunities for citizens to
register. The program for computerized registry,
introduced on a limited basis before the 1998
elections, should be expanded. Also, in the 1998
elections, the audit of the Registro Electoral began
late, and results were not available before the
November vote. In future elections, the CNE
should audit the registry earlier in its preparations.

E

DUCATING

 V

OTERS

Venezuela overcame a major hurdle by success-

fully holding elections using a fully automated
voting system for the first time. Council observers
generally thought voters were sufficiently well-
informed about the new voting system to cast a
ballot that accurately reflected their preferences.
However, given the complexity of the voting
system and the ballots, the CNE should consider an
earlier start to its voter education campaign than
the one carried out during the 1998 elections,
which began Oct. 21.

T

RAINING

 P

OLL

 W

ORKERS

The replacement of party poll workers with

those selected by lottery was a success during the
1998 elections. However, many delays associated
with the voting process were caused by poor train-
ing of voters conscripted to operate the polling
stations. This problem resulted not from any fault of
the poll workers, but rather from the delays in their
notification and in the haphazard nature of their

R

ENATO

 C

APPELLETTI

A technician discusses her role with President and Mrs.
Carter at a voting center in Caracas.

R

ECOMMENDATIONS

 A

ND

 S

UGGESTIONS

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training which began in October 1998. Notification
and training of these workers should begin at a
considerably earlier date in future elections.

S

UPPORTING

 

THE

 A

UTOMATED

 V

OTING

 S

YSTEM

Between the regional and presidential elections,

there was a clear improvement in support for the
voting machines and in the quality of the techni-
cians.  The CNE should take steps to ensure that, in
future elections, technicians are properly trained
and a pool of replacement voting machines is
available, as done during the 1998 presidential
elections.

I

NCREASING

 A

UTOMATION

 

OF

 

THE

 V

OTE

In general, automation of the voting system

accomplished its purpose: increasing transparency
of the vote, reducing fraud, and reducing political
tensions by providing accurate early electoral
returns. To further this process, Venezuela should
complete the process of automating the remaining
voting centers that used manual voting during the
1998 elections. It also should further develop the

telecommunications infrastructure supporting the
electronic transmission of voting results.
Alternative means of reaching rural areas that lack
this infrastructure, such as through satellite and
cellular telephone, should be explored.

R

E

-

ENGINEERING

 

THE

 V

OTING

 P

ROCESS

Congestion in polling sites was clearly one of

the main problems during the 1998 Venezuelan
elections. This partially resulted from the decision
to locate up to three 

mesas electorales

 and their vote

tabulating machine in the same room. The flow of
voters through the polling sites could be improved
by adding more vote tabulating machines. This
would allow the CNE to reduce the number of

mesas electorales

 assigned to a given room.

Alternatively, the CNE should consider locat-

ing voting machines in a different room from the
mesas assigned to it for small voting centers. By
reducing congestion in the rooms where the voting
takes place, the CNE could improve access for
party witnesses and provide a higher degree of
ballot secrecy for voters.

LEGAL
RECOMMENDATIONS

C

AMPAIGN

  F

INANCE

Although the CNE is clearly empowered to

supervise campaign and party finances, little effort
was made in this area during the 1998 elections.
This was reflected in violations of the restrictions on
political advertising through the mass media. As
part of the effort to increase transparency of the
electoral process, the CNE should demand greater
accountability from parties and candidates as to the
sources of their funding. Some of this could be
accomplished by enforcing current electoral law.
However, increasing transparency and reducing
corruption in this area may require further legisla-
tion, as well as upgrading the CNE’s technical

R

ENATO

 C

APPELLETTI

President Sánchez de Lozada (left) and Chuck Costello
observe a mesa worker explaining the ballot and voting
process to a voter in Caracas.

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capabilities to supervise the parties and candidates.

C

LARIFYING

 S

UBSTITUTION

 R

ULES

 

FOR

 C

ANDIDATES

Clearly, one of the major crises faced by the

CNE during the electoral process was caused by the
AD’s and COPEI’s last-minute decision to substitute
their presidential nominees. The CNE should
reaffirm its ruling to reserve control over the ballot
spot for the party, rather than the candidate. The
CNE should decide permanently to restrict voters
to selecting a single oval in the presidential elec-
tion. This would help reduce complexity in the
voting process. However, Venezuelans should
consider reforming the present electoral law to set
reasonable deadlines for candidate substitutions.
This would allow the CNE to provide accurate
ballots to the voters and ensure that tabulating
software is up to date.

R

EDUCING

 B

ALLOT

 C

OMPLEXITY

The ballot in the regional elections could be

considerably simplified by reducing the number of
parties allowed to participate. Although this was
not a problem during the presidential elections, the
number of parties allowed on the ballot during
regional elections greatly complicated voting (86 in
Miranda state, for example).

Venezuelans may want to consider raising the

requirements for registering new parties and altering
electoral law to encourage smaller regional parties
to merge. This would allow the CNE to give each
party greater visibility on the ballot, reduce conges-
tion due to the presence of large numbers of party
witnesses, and reduce voter confusion regarding the
ballot’s complexity. 

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1

 This report was made possible through support

provided by the U.S. Agency for International Development

(USAID) under the terms of Grant No. AEP-5468-A00-

5038-00. Additional funding was provided by the Canadian

International Development Agency (CIDA). The opinions

expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not

necessarily reflect the views of USAID or CIDA.

2

 Venezuela is a federal republic, divided into 22 states

and a federal district. Each state elects a governor

and state legislative assembly. The terms of office for federal

positions (presidency, Senate and Chamber of Deputies) are

five years.

3

VenEconomy special publication, Elections 1998 –

Meet Your President, pp. 55-56. Polls conducted by

Datanálisis.

4

Datanálisis poll, released Oct. 30, 1998, published in El

Universal. Poll conducted between 19 and 23 of October. A

Mercanálisis poll released on Oct. 21, 1998,  showed Hugo

Chávez at 39 percent and Henrique Salas Römer at 38

percent.

5

 There are currently 196 electoral districts

(circunscripciónes electoral) in Venezuela.

6

 This apparent violation of electoral rules was partially

verified by a local NGO, Queremos Elegir, which studied

television advertising by the campaigns. Queremos Elegir

found that candidates were exceeding the maximum amount

of airtime allowed to any candidate on any given day (four

minutes on any one station).

7

 Following the 1993 elections, legal challenges in two

gubernatorial elections led to new elections, but only after a

two-year delay.

8

 The Senate is elected by proportional representation,

calculated on the basis of two seats per state. In other words,

for a party to capture both seats in a given state, it must win

twice as many votes as any other contender. Deputies are

elected by a mixed system, with half of the positions

available in a given state elected nominally and the other

half selected by a closed party list.

9

 Andrés Stambouli, Demoscopio poll, October 1998.

10

 Opinion polls by Datanálisis, Mercanálisis and Datos,

published Nov. 23 to 29, 1998. The short time period

between the regional and presidential elections prevented

most Venezuelan polling organizations from conducting

more than one survey of public opinion, and the results of

these were all hurriedly published the last week of Novem-

ber, since Venezuelan electoral law forbids publication of

poll results in the final week before an election.

11 

“Impugnada elección en 22 gobernaciones,” El

Universal, Jan.  27, 1999.

12

 Voters or organizations located outside Caracas are

allowed to submit a Recurso to the local Regional Electoral

Council. This council must transmit the complaint within

one day to the CNE.

13

 The law establishes an exception to these time limits

when a challenge alleges that a candidate was not eligible to

run for the position to which he or she was elected. For

example, a candidate’s election might be challenged on the

grounds that he or she does not meet the age or citizenship

requirements. In this case, there is no time limit for filing a

Recurso Jerárquico.

14

 Information on the legal procedures described in this

section was provided by the Consultoria Jurídica of the CNE

and drawn from the relevant articles (216-250) of the Ley

Orgánica del Sufragio.

15

 “Estado requiere $9,984 millones,” El Universal, Jan.

15, 1999

.

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PPENDICES

Appendix 1: Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government,

60

Members List

Appendix 2: Map of Venezuela

61

Appendix 3: CNE Invitation to The Carter Center,

62

Sept. 30, 1998

Appendix 4: Preliminary Statement, Nov. 4, 1998

64

Appendix 5: Dec. 6 Presidential Ballot

66

Appendix 6: Carter Center Deployment Teams

67

Appendix 7: Preliminary Statement, Dec. 7, 1998

68

Appendix 8:  Checklist — Venezuela Presidental Elections

70

Appendix 9: Venezuelan Elections Results

72

Appendix 10: Selected News Articles

73

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OUNCIL

 O

F

 F

REELY

 E

LECTED

 H

EADS

O

F

 G

OVERNMENT

   Jimmy Carter, Chairman, former President of the United States of America (1977-81)
   George Price, Vice-Chairman, former Prime Minister of Belize (1981-84, 1989-93;

Premier, 1965-81)

   

Incumbents

   Fernando Henrique Cardoso, President of Brazil (1995-present)
   Leonel Fernández Reyna, President of the Dominican Republic (1996-present)
   Jamil Mahuad, President of Ecuador (1998-present)
   Carlos Saúl Menem, President of Argentina (1989-present)
   P.J. Patterson, Prime Minister of Jamaica (1992-present)
   Ernesto Pérez Balladares, President of Panama (1994-present)
   Arthur Robinson, President of Trinidad and Tobago (1997-present)
   Miguel Angel Rodríguez, President of Costa Rica (1998-present)
   Julio Maria Sanguinetti, President of Uruguay (1985-89, 1995-present)
     

Former presidents and prime ministers

   Raúl Alfonsín, former President of Argentina (1983-89)
   Nicholas Ardito-Barletta, former President of Panama (1984-85)
   Oscar Arias Sánchez, former President of Costa Rica (1986-90)
   Jean-Bertrand Aristide, former President of Haiti (1991-96)
   Patricio Aylwin Azocar, former President of Chile (1990-94)
   Fernando Belaúnde Terry, former President of Peru (1963-68, 1980-85)
   Belisario Betancur, former President of Colombia (1982-86)
   Rafael Caldera, former President of Venezuela (1969-74, 1994-1999)
   Rodrigo Carazo, former President of Costa Rica (1978-82)
   Vinicio Cerezo, former President of Guatemala (1986-90)
   Joseph Clark, former Prime Minister of Canada (1979-80)
   John Compton, former Prime Minister of St. Lucia (1987-96)
   Gerald Ford, former President of the United States (1974-77)
   Osvaldo Hurtado, former President of Ecuador (1981-84)
   Luis Alberto Lacalle, former President of Uruguay (1989-95)
   Alfonso López Michelsen, former President of Colombia (1974-78)
   Carlos Andrés Pérez, former President of Venezuela (1974-79, 1989-93)
   Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, former President of Bolivia (1993-1997)
   Erskine Sandiford, former Prime Minister of Barbados (1987-94)
   Edward Seaga, former Prime Minister of Jamaica (1980-88)
   Pierre Trudeau, former Prime Minister of Canada (1968-79, 1980-84)
   Juan Carlos Wasmosy, former President of Paraguay (1993-1998)

Appendix 1

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Appendix 3

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Appendix 4

P

RELIMINARY

 S

TATEMENT

Statement by former Presidents Jimmy Carter and

Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada

Nov. 4, 1998

PRESIDENT CARTER: It is an honor for my wife and me to be here in Venezuela to observe the

elections in a country with a long and deep democratic tradition.  We have been invited by the National
Electoral Council as international observers.  At the Carter Center we work with a group of thirty-one
leaders from around the hemisphere, called the Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government.  I have the
pleasure of presenting a member of this group, former president of Bolivia, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada.

We are coming in order to support the democratic process, without any authority to determine the

results, but with the ability to observe, and to inform the national and international community.  It is a
historic moment in the political development of Venezuela with the emergence of new parties and move-
ments and independent candidates.  It is an honor for us to be witnesses to the celebration of democracy in
the coming weeks.

On this trip we have visited the National Electoral Council to learn about the electoral system here,

and we watched a demonstration of the voting machines.  We are very interested in seeing how this innova-
tion functions during the elections.  In addition, we have confidence that it will facilitate the vote-counting
process and ensure a clean and honest tabulation.

We have also met with six of the presidential candidates, including Luis Alfaro Ucero, Hugo Chávez,

Henrique Salas Römer, Irene Saez, Alfredo Ramos, and Miguel Rodríguez.  All of them have told us that
they respect the authority of the electoral council and that they will respect the results of the elections no
matter who wins.

We will have a small group observing the November 8 (parliamentary and gubernatorial) elections and

an international delegation of about 25 persons for the (presidential) elections on December 6.

In all elections, there are some problems and technical difficulties.  In Sunday’s elections, with the

innovations in the ballot and the electoral system, and with the large number of parties and candidates, you
are sure to see some irregularities.  But if everyone remains calm and aware, no matter what anxieties may
arise, we are confident that the elections are going to be an important celebration of the democracy in this
country.

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Now I would also like to present Dr. Jennifer McCoy, director of the Latin American Program at The

Carter Center, and Dr. Harold Trinkunas, our representative during the election period.

I would now like to ask President Sánchez de Lozada to offer some brief comments.

PRESIDENT SÁNCHEZ DE LOZADA:  Thank you, President Carter.  We are all looking forward to

being here in December.  It is going to be a very important election; it has generated considerable anticipa-
tion throughout the hemisphere.  Above all, I would like to emphasize that we are truly surprised at the
number of candidates and parties – you are world champions in political parties, and the candidates are
widely diverse.  There are extremely novel and experimental systems that are going to be useful for all of
Latin America.

We all accept that in the globalized society we have to exchange goods and services, but we also need

to exchange knowledge.  I am coming to see with great interest the large successes and the small defects,
and hopefully to take away knowledge that will be useful for my country and other nations on the conti-
nent.  You are going to have some complaints; we are here to try to clear them up, and we will go forward
with great interest. 

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  Appendix 5

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EPLOYMENT

 T

EAMS

1. 

Caracas

   President Carter, Mrs. Carter, Nancy Konigsmark, Jennifer McCoy, Curtis Kohlhaas

2. 

Caracas and Baruta, Miranda State

   Nicholas Brady, Harold Trinkunas

3. 

Caracas and La Guaira and Catia la Mar, Vargas State

   President Aylwin, George Jones

4. 

Caracas

   President Sánchez de Lozada, Chuck Costello

5. 

Caracas, San Antonio de los Altos and Los Teques, Miranda State

   Ron Burkle, John Burkle, John Hardman, Ken Abdalla, Ari Swiller

6. 

Caracas

   Becky Castle or Tanya Mujica, Deanna Congileo, Kent Spicer

7. 

Maracay, Aragua State

   Terrance Adamson, Jonathan Hartlyn

8. 

San Juan de los Moros, Guárico State

   Pablo Galarce, Neil Gaudry

9. 

Barcelona, Anzoátegui State

   Mary Anne Chalker, Jason Calder

10. 

Barquisimeto, Lara State

   Ed Casey, Fidel Chávez Mena

11.

  San Cristóbal, Táchira State

   Rodrigo Chávez Palacious, Annamari Laaksonen

12. 

Cumaná, Sucre State

   John Newcomb, Horace Sibley

13. 

Maracaibo, Zulia State

   Rafael Torribio, Ken Roberts

14. 

Ciudad Bolívar, Bolívar State

   Jesús Ortega, Vanessa Marti

15. 

Maturín, Monagas State

   Jaime Areizaga, Esther Low

16. 

Barinas, Barinas State

   Shelley McConnell, Debbie Palmer

17. 

Mérida, Mérida State

   Harry Vanden

Appendix  6

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P

RELIMINARY

 S

TATEMENT

Election Observer Delegation of The Carter Center

and the Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government

1998 Venezuelan Presidential Elections

Dec. 7, 1998

We congratulate the Venezuelan people for their enthusiastic participation in yesterday’s election,

and for their demonstration of faith in the democratic process.  They voted calmly and peacefully, but
definitively for change.  We congratulate Venezuela’s National Electoral Council and all of those who
worked to ensure a smooth and efficient electoral process.  The automated vote count system — the first
national electronic system in the hemisphere — brought a new level of transparency and confidence to the
process.

We were invited by the National Electoral Council and welcomed by the candidates to observe

these elections, the 18th that we have monitored in this hemisphere.  We are a delegation of 43 persons
representing nine different countries of the Western Hemisphere and Europe.  The delegation is led by three
ex-presidents representing the Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government, based at The Carter Cen-
ter: Patricio Aylwin of Chile, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada of Bolivia, and myself.  We were joined by former
secretary of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Nicholas Brady.

As part of our observation activities, we made two pre-election visits in October and November,

opened a field office in mid-October, and deployed a small staff observer team for the Nov. 8 elections.
Immediately before the Dec. 6 elections, the delegation leaders met with the top three candidates, President
Caldera, and the minister of defense.  After the elections, the leaders spoke with both President-elect
Chávez and the second-place finisher Henrique Salas Römer.  We applaud their expressions of conciliation
and calls for all Venezuelans to work together for the future of the country.

On election day, our delegation visited 252 voting sites in 13 states and the federal district of

Venezuela.  We will publish a final report in the coming weeks.  Our preliminary findings include the
following:

·

The voting started before 8 a.m. in more than 93 percent of the sites we visited.

·

Polling officials were professional and impartial.  In more than 86 percent of the sites we visited,
they were assigned their posts by lottery and had had experience in the Nov. 8 elections.

Appendix 7

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·

Our delegates overall reported that the soldiers working under the Plan República did an
outstanding job in providing security and logistical support.

·

In 94 percent of the sites with voting machines that we visited, the machines functioned well.

·

Both electoral officials and party witnesses reported that the process was going smoothly in more
than 95 percent of the sites we visited.

Overall, we found that the voters, poll workers, party witnesses and soldiers all worked together
harmoniously to make this a transparent and peaceful election that clearly reflected the will of the
Venezuelan people.  We congratulate President-elect Hugo Chávez and the newly elected
Congress and governors, and we urge them to address together the difficult challenges that face
Venezuela. 

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C

HECKLIST

 — V

ENEZUELA

P

RESIDENTIAL

 E

LECTION

D

EC

. 6, 1998

Team names

: ______________________________________

Time of visit:

 ______

State: ______________ Circumscription: ____ Center: ______________ Table: _____

Voters registered: _______  Number who have voted: _______

Please write any descriptive comments on the back of the form.

Outside the Polling Center

1. How long has the first person in line been waiting to vote?

____  hrs.

2. Are the Plan República soldiers adequately regulating the flow of voters?

Y

N

Inside the Polling Center (select only one table per machine)

3. At what time was the first vote cast? (circle one)

6 – 7 a.m.
7 – 8 a.m.
8 – 9 a.m.
9 – 10 a.m.
after 10 a.m.

4. Are witnesses from at least two parties that support different candidates

present and watching the procedures at the table?

Y

N

5. Did witnesses from at least two parties that support different candidates

verify that the machine registered zero votes when voting started?

Y

N

6. The officials were: a) assigned their post by lottery

_______

              b) party witnesses who became polling officials

_______

               c) some of both

_______

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7. Did the polling officials receive training from the CNE and/or

the Universidad Simón Rodríguez?

Y

N

8. Do the polling officials appear to be nonpartisan?

Y

N

9. Do the polling officials appear to be well-trained?

Y

N

10. Do the voters appear to understand the process?

Y

N

11. Is ballot secrecy assured?

a) yes, completely

____

b) except for Indra official

____

c) no, unsatisfactory

____

12. If the table is automated, is the machine functioning smoothly?

NA

Y

N

(If the answer is no, please specify why not.)

13. Do 

polling officials

 say the process is:

a) going very well

____

b) satisfactory

____

c) unsatisfactory

____

14. Do at least two 

witnesses

 from parties supporting different candidates

say the process is:

a) going very well

____

b) satisfactory

____

c) unsatisfactory

____

15. If they are present, do 

domestic observers

 (Queremos Eligir) say the

process  is:

a) going very well

____

b) satisfactory

____

c) unsatisfactory

____

16. In 

your

 view, is the voting process characterized by:

a) no significant problems

____

b) a few significant problems that will not affect the outcome

____

c) serious flaws that could affect the outcome of the vote

____

PLEASE ADD ANY DESCRIPTIVE COMMENTS BELOW
(Elaborate on the above questions, or discuss any evidence of poor organization, partisan procedure, or

      an intimidating or violent election climate.)

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Appendix 10

Copyright(c) 1998, 

The Washington Post

. Reprinted with permission.

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Copyright(c) 1998, 

El Universal

. Reprinted with permission.

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Copyright(c) 1998, 

The Economist

. Reprinted with permission.

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Copyright(c) 1998, 

The Dallas Morning News.

 Reprinted with permission.

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Copyright(c) 1998, 

El Globo

. Reprinted with permission.

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Copyright(c) 1998, 

El Nacional

. Reprinted with permission.

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Copyright(c) 1998, 

El Nacional

. Reprinted with permission.

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Copyright(c) 1998, 

The New York Times

. Reprinted with permission.

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Copyright(c) 1999, 

The Irish Times

. Reprinted with permission.

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Copyright(c) 1999, 

The New York Times

. Reprinted with permission.

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T

he Carter Center  strives
to relieve suffering by
advancing peace and

health worldwide. With a
fundamental commitment to
human rights, the Center is
guided by the
principle that
people, with the
necessary skills,
knowledge, and
access to resources,
can improve their
own lives and the
lives of others.

Founded in

1982 by Jimmy and
Rosalynn Carter in
partnership with
Emory University,
the nonprofit
Center works to
prevent and resolve
conflicts, enhance freedom and
democracy, and improve health.
The Center collaborates with
other organizations, public or
private, in carrying out its
mission. In this way, the Center
has touched the people’s lives in
more than 65 countries.

Charitable contributions

from individuals, foundations,
corporations, and other donors
support the Center’s activities.
Programs are directed by resident
experts or fellows. They design

and implement activities in
cooperation with President and
Mrs. Carter, networks of world
leaders, and partners in the
United States and abroad.

The Center is located in a

35-acre park, two miles east of
downtown Atlanta. Four circular

pavilions house offices for the
former president and first lady
and most of the Center’s program
staff. The complex includes the
Ivan Allen III Pavilion and the
nondenominational Cecil B. Day

Chapel, other confer-
ence facilities, and
administrative offices.
Adjoining the Center
is The Jimmy Carter
Library and Museum,
a repository for the
records of the Carter
administration.  It is
operated by the
National Archives
and Records Adminis-
tration of the federal
government and is
open to the public.
The Center and the
Library and Museum

are known collectively as The
Carter Presidential Center.

More information about The

Carter Center is available on the
World Wide Web at www.
cartercenter.org. 

■

The Carter Center is located in a 35-acre park two miles east of
downtown Atlanta.

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◆

 O

NE

 C

OPENHILL

 

◆

 453 F

REEDOM

 P

ARKWAY

A

TLANTA

, G

EORGIA

 30307 

◆

 (404)420-5100 

◆

 F

AX

 (404)420-5196

WWW

.

CARTERCENTER

.

ORG