*
For assistance with my research and for comments on previous drafts,
I am grateful to Gary Marx, Fred Pampel, Kirk Williams, Sharyn Roach Anleu,
Steve Herbert, John Bendix, Richard Featherstone, Tiffany Patterson, Yunqing
Li, Stephen Smith, Tuviah Friedman, and Simon Wiesenthal. A previous version
was presented at Indiana University, Bloomington, February 1998. This paper,
the title of which is inspired by William Brustein (1996), draws from my
forthcoming book, "Policing World Society:
Historical Foundations of International Police Cooperation." All translations
are mine. Research was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation
(#SBR-9411478). Opinions and statements do not necessarily reflect the
views of the NSF.
ABSTRACT
The evolution of the International
Criminal Police Commission (ICPC), the police organization today known
as Interpol, is investigated in the period when the organization came under
control of the Nazi regime and when, at roughly the same time, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) became the Commission’s official U.S. representative.
Confronting some of the prior historical literature on Interpol, this article
draws out the conflicting motives of Nazi police and FBI in participating
in the same international organization. It is argued that the nazification
of the ICPC occurred in two strategic stages: from seeking influence in
the organization to acquiring control of it. Although the infiltration
of the ICPC by Nazi police officials was realized in these stages, in practical
terms, it never went beyond presenting an illusion of continuity in international
police cooperation. It is concluded that theoretical models of nazification
should consider the rationality and purposive orientation of its direction
as well as its complex dynamics and historically variable determinants.
Key words: Nazism,
international police cooperation, Interpol, FBI
Introduction
This article provides an
analysis of the nazification of the International Criminal Police Commission
(ICPC), the organization today known as Interpol, against the background
of the American participation in the Commission by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI). Although the sociology of nazism has made very [*22]
important progress in recent years, especially with respect to the study
of popular support for Nazism and the reception of the holocaust (Baldwin
1990; Brustein and Falter 1994; Brustein 1996), the nazification of the
ICPC has not yet received due attention. Of all historical antecedents
of international police cooperation today, Interpol may surely count among
the most relevant and most discussed. However, several writings devoted
to uncovering the past of the police organization offer very shaky interpretations
and are more critical of Interpol than the presented evidence can support
(e.g., Garrison 1976; Greilsamer 1986; Meldal-Johnsen and Young 1979; Schwitters
1978). Relatedly, there is considerable disagreement in the literature
about the course of the ICPC since the Nazis took control. Some commentators
have suggested that the Commission no longer functioned after the "Anschluss"
of Austria in March 1938 (Fooner 1989:40; Lee 1976:19), others argue that
the Commission was effectively used to advance Nazi goals (Garrison 1976:79;
Stiebler 1981:33).
Because of the possible influences
of the gruesome Nazi regime in the International Criminal Police Commission
and the many misconceptions about it, this analysis relies largely on original
data, which was collected as part of a larger project on the history of
international policing (Deflem 2000, forth.). Available evidence indicates
that during the 1930s and early 1940s German and U.S. police representatives
in the ICPC were on a collision course in a quest for control under conditions
of anticipated and actual warfare. Nazi police infiltrated the ICPC from
1935 onwards, and by 1941, finalization of the nazification of the international
police organization was symbolized by the transfer of the Commission’s
headquarters to Berlin. The FBI was invited to become a member of the ICPC
since the mid-1930s and formally joined the Commission in 1938 as the congressionally
sanctioned representative of the United States. The motives of Nazi police
and FBI to participate in the ICPC were, of course, highly antagonistic
and of a very different ideological character. In fact, by the time Nazi
police had taken control of the international police organization, the
FBI leadership decided to discontinue participation.
In order to rectify some
of the misinterpretations that have been advanced on the Nazi take-over
of the ICPC, this paper will provide an account of the various relevant
factors that determined the course and outcome of the ICPC from the mid-1930s
until the end of the Second World War. I will first describe how the FBI
became a member of the ICPC at roughly the same time as when German participation
in the Commission was affected more and more by the Nazi seizure of power.
The next section discusses the confrontation between FBI and Nazi police
as coexistent members of the ICPC and the implications thereof in terms
of investigative work and international cooperation. Then a sociological
model is presented which can account for the dynamics of the Nazi involvement
in the ICPC.
Taking my cues from recent
sociological scholarship on the expansion of the Nazi movement, institutional
nazification can be conceived of as either the manifestation of a preconceived,
novel, and coherent Nazi ideology (Brustein 1996, 1997) [*23] or as a more
ad hoc and opportunistic process (Anheier 1997). I will argue that there
were strategic shifts in a well-directed nazification of the ICPC. This
process of nazification also depended on changing historical conditions,
especially world-political and military developments before and during
World War II, but nazification of the ICPC always remained in tune with
the broader goals of Nazi rule, especially in matters of foreign policy.
Applied insights may offer realism in analyzing some of the more problematic
aspects in the history of Interpol. More broadly, this study offers insights
into the historical antecedents of international police practices-- many
dimensions of which have been analyzed (e.g., McDonald 1997; Nadelmann
1993; Sheptycki 1998).
Interpol before World
War II: FBI and Nazi Police join the ICPC
The International Criminal
Police Commission was founded in 1923 in Vienna, Austria, with the goal
of forging international cooperation of criminal police (Deflem 2000).1
Between 1923 and 1938, the Commission held fourteen international meetings
in various European countries and steadily elaborated the organization’s
organizational structures. The ICPC was set up (and Interpol operates until
this day) as an international cooperative network of national police institutions.
Also set up were systems for international telegraphic and radio communications,
while a regularly published periodical transmitted relevant information
among the member-states. Over the years, the ICPC membership gradually
expanded, and by 1940 the Commission represented more than 40 states, including
most European powers (e.g., France, Germany, and Italy) as well as some
non-European countries, such as Bolivia, Iran, and Cuba.
In May 1934, Antonio
Pizzuto of the Italian Federal Police proposed that the ICPC presidency
should permanently reside with the Vienna Police Directorate. The motion
was carried and the Police President of Vienna, Michael Skubl, became the
new ICPC President. The new appointment procedure for the ICPC presidency
was confirmed few months later at the organization’s meeting in Vienna.
The gathering paved the way for the eventual Nazi infiltration of the ICPC.
The FBI Entry in the ICPC
Although there were some
communications from the ICPC to the FBI in the 1920s and early 1930s, it
was not until 1935 that the FBI was invited to participate in the Commission,
when FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover approved a Bureau representative to attend
the ICPC meeting in Copenhagen.2 The American presence
at the Copenhagen meeting did not immediately lead the FBI to join the
ICPC, but the Bureau did pass on information on fugitives--on at least
[*24] seven occasions between 1935 and 1937--to the ICPC headquarters for
publication in the periodical International Public Safety (FBI 1/11, 26-32,
2/32-36). A more formal initiative for the FBI to join the Commission was
first taken in 1936 when FBI Director Hoover was invited to attend the
next ICPC meeting. Hoover replied that he could not attend because of “official
duties in Washington” (1/17), but the following year FBI Assistant Director
Lester attended the ICPC meeting in London (2/37,49). Upon his return,
Lester advised that the United States should become a permanent member
of the ICPC, and Hoover approved of the plan. On June 10, 1938, President
Roosevelt enacted a bill that authorized the Attorney General to oversee
U.S. membership in the ICPC.
In December 1938, Hoover
again declined because of “official duties” to attend the next ICPC meeting,
which was planned to be held in Berlin in 1939 (5/186x). The Berlin meeting,
however, was first postponed, and then cancelled. In June 1940, the FBI
received an ICPC circular letter with the notice that Reinhard Heydrich,
the Chief of the German Security Police, had accepted the presidency of
the Commission (5/196x2). A little over a year later, on December 4, 1941,
Hoover issued an FBI memorandum stating it was “desired that in the future
no communications be addressed to the International Criminal Police Commission”
(5/201x).
The Invasion of the Swastika
When Adolf Hitler had been
appointed to the German Chancellorship in January 1933, the National Socialist
party sought to establish dictatorial rule by implementing the so-called
"Gleichschaltung," the Nazi policy that was aimed at bringing Germany’s
social institutions in line with Nazi ideology. Nazification included,
most importantly, the control of labor and politics, the manipulation of
public opinion, the passing of nationalist laws, and the control of bureaucratic
institutions, including law enforcement (Fischer 1995:278-284; Thamer 1996).
In the case of police, nazification was a remarkably smooth process, consisting
of three strategies: the removal of unwanted personnel; the establishment
of organizational connections between existing German police agencies and
relevant NSDAP organs such as the Schutzstaffel (Protective Squadron) or
SS; and centralization and nationalization of German police institutions
(Browder 1990; Gellately 1992). In June 1936, the completion of this nazification
process was symbolized by the appointment of Heinrich Himmler to the post
of Reichsführer-SS und Chef der deutschen Polizei (Reich Leader SS
and Chief of the German Police).
Nazi police officials did
not participate in the ICPC until the 11th meeting in Copenhagen in 1935.
Most of the German participants at the Copenhagen meeting, Arthur Nebe,
Hans Palitzsch, Karl Zindel, Wolf von Helldorf, and Kurt Daluege, were
not only members of a thoroughly nazified German police, they were among
its main architects. Most notably, SS-Grupenführer Kurt Daluege headed
the Ordnungspolizei, the Nazi police division that would rise to infamy
[*25] because of its involvement in mass executions in the German occupied
territories in Eastern Europe. At the next meeting in Belgrade, all resolutions
passed unanimously, except those that involved cooperation with the League
of Nations, from which the Germans abstained. The German delegates noted
that Germany was not a member of the League and said to rely on “a statement
delivered by their Führer” (AfK 1936:91). At the 13th ICPC meeting
in London in 1937, implications of the Nazi take-over in Germany were becoming
clear to the Commission membership. Although no Nazi police attended the
London meeting, the Commission there reached certain decisions which were
anything but detrimental to secure the Nazi influence in the ICPC. In particular,
it was decided that the function of the ICPC President would reside until
1942 with the President of the Federal Police in Vienna (AfK 1937).
On March 12, 1938, German
troops invaded Austria. At noon that day, the President of the ICPC, Michael
Skubl, was called to the building of the Austrian federal chancellery where
he was told that Himmler demanded his resignation. Skubl was arrested and
imprisoned until he was freed by Allied Forces in 1945 (Greilsamer 1986:46-47).
With the annexation of Austria, nothing would prevent the Nazis from taking
full control of the ICPC. By implication of the appointment procedure of
the ICPC presidency decided upon in London, the Nazi-approved President
of the police at Vienna, Otto Steinhäusl, became the new ICPC President
in April 1938. Not only was Steinhäusl’s loyalty to Nazi Germany secure,
the Germans also reckoned he would be but an interim figure, as he was
known to suffer from tuberculosis (Bresler 1992:50-51). The first meeting
under Steinhäusl’s Presidency, in Bucharest in 1938, produced only
one unanimous decision: that the next meeting was to be held in Berlin.
A preliminary program for the Berlin meeting was drafted--a copy has survived
in the FBI files on Interpol (FBI 5/179x)--but, as noted, the meeting was
canceled.
Following the death of Steinhäusl
in June 1940, Secretary General Dressler sent a report to all ICPC members
which specified that he and other police, including Nazi officials Nebe
and Zindel, had decided “to request the Chief of the German Security Police”
to accept the Presidency of the ICPC (FBI 5/197). Reportedly, twenty-seven
police officials representing 15 states consented with the suggestion (Jeschke
1971:119). Because this was less than two-thirds of the total ICPC membership,
the countries that could not be addressed were not counted and those that
had abstained were considered as not voting against the motion, so that,
the Nazi-controlled ICPC leadership reasoned, the necessary majority was
reached. In a circular letter of August 24, 1940, Reinhard Heydrich declared--in
a manner all too characteristically familiar of Nazi officialdom--that
he had been informed that his candidacy as ICPC Presidency had “passed
unanimously.” Heydrich continued that he would “lead the Commission into
a new and successful future” and that the ICPC headquarters would “from
now on be located in Berlin” (5/198x). [*26]
American Perceptions of
a Nazified World Police
Since it was several months
after the Anschluss of Austria in June 1938 that the FBI formally joined
the Commission, it could lead to the conclusion that the FBI willingly
and consciously joined the ICPC when the organization was already under
Nazi control. Some secondary studies on the ICPC have defended such unfounded
interpretations (e.g., Greilsamer 1986:55-63; Meldal-Johnsen and Young
1979:49-52; Schwitters 1978:25-26). To reach a more balanced conclusion,
attention should be paid to the increasing awareness among FBI officials
of the growing Nazi influence in the ICPC.
From Hesitation to Awareness
Ever since the FBI was first
contacted about the ICPC, the Bureau judged membership in the Commission
as a technical matter on the basis of nationally benefits, for instance,
the control of federal crimes, for which the FBI was responsible. It was
as a consequence of these practical concerns that the FBI did not contemplate
in the years before 1937 the Nazi presence in the ICPC, which at that time
was in fact relatively unpronounced. Although the FBI representative at
the London meeting in 1937 had witnessed certain politically charged animosities
between the European delegates, a more pressing matter for the Bureau was
the cost of membership. Once Hoover had managed to get the necessary budget
amendment approved, the procedural requirements to have the matter congressionally
sanctioned took up so much time that when the appropriate bills were entered
in Congress (April and May 1938) and enacted by President Roosevelt (June
1938), Nazi Germany had already annexed Austria and the ICPC Presidency
was placed with the Austrian Nazi Steinhäusl.
From 1938 onwards, the FBI
leadership gradually became aware of the Nazi presence. In March 1939,
the German question was explicitly brought up by the State Department’s
Division of International Conferences, which contacted the FBI to ask if
“the German government intended to foster the International Crime Commission
[sic], [and] whether it had taken over control of the same.” Hoover initially
responded that the ICPC was an “independent entity” but soon agreed that
the ICPC had assumed a “distinctly Austro-German atmosphere” which was
judged “the principal objection to joining the Commission” (5/162, 184x).
From Awareness to Confrontation
Antagonisms began to mount
between the FBI and the ICPC, first because of certain measures the ICPC
suggested with respect to the use of passports, not coincidentally a matter
of investigative police work. During March and April 1939, ICPC permanent
reporters, Florent Louwage, Bruno Schultz, and Secretary General Dressler
made requests to the FBI to send copies of all valid and canceled [*27]
forms of U.S. passports to the ICPC headquarters. The passports were to
be collected in line with the ICPC resolution reached at the London meeting:
the refusal of the issuance and the annulment and withdrawal of passports
were accepted as appropriate police measures in the fight against international
crime (AfK 1937:102). The ICPC had introduced, in other words, an important
technique of policing inspired by a Nazi philosophy of "pro-active" control.
Aware of the unacceptability of such measures under U.S. law, Hoover responded
that individual case records concerning passports could not be transmitted,
clarifying that in the United States “the punishment for criminals is indicated
in the laws, and additional punishment is not imposed through the refusal
of passport facilities unless there is an outstanding reason for so doing”
(5/195x). In April 1940, there was a final request from the ICPC, but then
communications on the matter were discontinued.
When an ICPC correspondence
was sent from an address in Berlin, Germany, identified as “Am Kleinen
Wannsee 16” (5/201x), the FBI leadership suggested to stop all communications
with the Commission headquarters from 1941 onwards. In December 1941, three
days before the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor, Hoover circulated the
memo that no FBI communications should be sent to the ICPC “whose present
location is Berlin, Germany” (5/201x). Clearly, concerns critical against
the Nazi involvement in the ICPC had by now sufficiently developed that
FBI participation in the Commission had become impossible.
The Path of Nazification
A gradual infiltration of
the Nazi police in the ICPC is revealed in the activities of Nazi officials
at the Commission’s meetings, the transfer of the presidency to the Nazi-appointed
head of the Austrian police, and, ultimately, Heydrich’s "election" as
ICPC President and the move of the International Bureau to Berlin. Analyzing
these phases of the ICPC’s nazification, I particularly focus on the justifications
of the Nazi police for taking command of the Commission.
Strategies of Nazification,
I: Influence Through Participation
In the immediate years after
Hitler’s appointment, Nazi police officials did not seek control of the
ICPC, but attempted to exert influence through participation in the organization.
Mere participation, however, could very well prove beneficial for the Nazi
police. The Copenhagen meeting was the first occasion where the Nazi presence
in the ICPC could be felt. Shortly before the meeting, SS-Gruppenführer
Kurt Daluege was interviewed about the ICPC for Der Deutsche Polizeibeamte,
a police magazine published under the auspices of Reichsführer SS
Himmler (Daluege 1935). It was the intention of the National-Socialists
at the meeting, Daluege argued, to communicate their experiences and to
promote the [*28] international fight against crime, the “common enemy
of every people” (p.489). Daluege furthermore emphasized the nonpolitical
nature of the ICPC and attributed its success to the meetings, which, he
argued, brought a “personal touch” to an otherwise “purely technical (sachlich)”
matter (p.490). At the Copenhagen meeting, the Nazi representatives achieved
some effective influence. Zindel delivered an address on the National-Socialist
fight against crime, which a report in Die Polizei referred to as “the
greatest result” of the gathering (Die Polizei 1935). The Commission elected
Daluege as an ICPC Vice-President and a Nazi-supported plan for the creation
of an "International Central Office for the Suppression of Gypsies" was
taken under consideration. At the Belgrade meeting in 1936, there was growing
awareness among participating police of the political sensibilities involved
with the German participation. President Skubl in his opening speech to
the meeting emphasized that the ICPC should serve “the cause of peace”
(Leibig 1936:266). But during the discussions, the Nazi police delegates
achieved relative success with their exposition on the National-Socialist
principles of law enforcement. Daluege, in particular, argued for the effectiveness
of the German measures on matters of “preparatory actions of serious criminals”
and other dangerous acts that revealed a “criminal will” (Leibig 1936:269).
As mentioned before, Nazi
police reorganization led to a centralization of the different local police
institutions in Germany. By 1935, the implications of the nazification
of police institutions in terms of international police activities included
that all provincial and regional police were no longer allowed to entertain
direct communication with foreign police (Kriminalpolizei 1937:22; Nebe
and Fleischer 1939:166-170). Cooperation with the International Bureau
in Vienna on matters of international investigation was still allowed,
but all German communication to the ICPC had to originate from the central
Nazi institution of criminal police, the Reich Criminal Police Office (RKPA).
The German police could send legal documents abroad only with the approval
of the Minister of the Interior, and a duplicate of all such documents
had to be sent to the RKPA. Centralization of German police institutions
not only involved a transfer of police powers from local to national police,
but also implied that those powers were delegated to the NSDAP. Police
communication with German consuls abroad on matters that concerned the
“disposition and implementation of the party program of the NSDAP” were
not allowed, and any exchange with NSDAP representatives abroad had to
be handled through the "Auslandsorganization" (Foreign Organization) of
the NSDAP (Kriminalpolizei 1937:24-25). In other words, not only were German
criminal police institutions centralized and harmonized, they were also
brought under control of the Nazi Party.
At the London meeting in
1937, the ICPC Presidency was fixed for a period of five years with the
President of the Federal Police of Vienna. There is no direct evidence
to substantiate the claim that the decision was reached under influence
of pressure by Nazi police, but it is to be noted that the resolution was
reached at the suggestion of a representative of the Italian fascist police,
which [*29] was not unsympathetic to the Nazi cause. In 1936, Mussolini
and Hitler had agreed on a formal treaty of alliance between Germany and
Italy, and in a speech on November 1, 1936, the Duce announced the formation
of an "axis" running between Rome and Berlin (Morris 1982:252). The Italian
initiative for the London resolution may have been suggested by Nazi police
officials at one of the international police meetings which the Italian
fascist police organized in Italy during the 1930s or at a bilateral German-Italian
police meeting in Germany in the same period.3
Strategies of Nazification,
II: Command Through Control
The annexation of Austria
left little in the way of the nazification of the ICPC. Austrian police
officials were either dismissed or allowed to remain in place when considered
sufficiently loyal to the Nazis. For Oskar Dressler, Secretary General
of the ICPC since 1923, the consequences of the "Anschluss" provided no
main obstacles. Dressler cooperated with the Nazi-appointed ICPC President
and as Editor of the ICPC periodical, which contributed to the growing
prominence of Nazi viewpoints. Since 1938, the renamed periodical "Internationale
Kriminalpolizei" (International Criminal Police) published articles on
racial inferiority and crime, praiseworthy reviews of books on racial laws,
and reports concerning preventive arrests (Bresler 1992:53).
The ICPC meeting that was
planned to be held in Berlin was initially postponed until some time in
February 1940, but eventually canceled because of the outbreak of the war
in Europe when German troops invaded Poland (National Archives, Records
of the German Foreign Office 3262/E575156). Even then, Dressler wrote to
FBI Director Hoover to affirm that despite the cancellation of the Berlin
meeting, “the International Criminal Police Commission carries on their
activities” (FBI 5/194x). The relatively intense and cordial correspondence
between a nazified ICPC and the FBI in this period reveals how the Nazi
regime during the late 1930s was still seeking to acquire the status as
a respected nation and viable partner in international affairs. When in
August 1940, Heydrich accepted the ICPC Presidency, he similarly expressed
that he would continue the work of the ICPC “in the interest of the peoples
(Völker)” (FBI 5/198x). Striking is the manner in which the Nazi rulers
sought to invade existing political and bureaucratic structures in a pseudo-legal
manner: Dressler’s motion about Heydrich’s nomination carefully pointed
out that the election was in complete harmony with the ICPC statutes (Möllmann
1969:46-47).4
The aspiration of Nazi police
to fully control the ICPC was symbolized in the take-over of the Presidency
and the placement of the headquarters in the RKPA offices in Berlin (Dressler
1943:30; Werner 1942:467). The Commission’s new leadership was, thus, institutionally
linked the ICPC with the Nazi police structures. Even then, Nazi officials
remained eager to presume continuity in the Commission’s goals and activities.
A 1940 report in Die Deutsche Polizei declared [*30] that the ICPC had
kept on functioning since the outbreak of the war in 1939, “because all
the states of the Commission--except of course England and France--continue
international criminal-police collaboration in the frame of this Commission”
(DDP 1940:305). A 1942 article promoting the Nazi police system still declared
that “despite the war, the international relationships, though often in
different forms, could be maintained and furthered” (Werner 1942:467).
And in a book published in 1943, Secretary General Oskar Dressler stated
that no less than 21 countries--including Belgium, Switzerland, France,
England, and the United States--were still cooperating with the ICPC headquarters
in Berlin (Dressler 1943:69).
On June 4, 1942, ICPC President
Reinhard Heydrich died and was provisionally replaced by Arthur Nebe (Dressler
1943:9, 120). A year later, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, the leader of the Austrian
SS, acquired the post by virtue of his appointment as Chief of the German
Security Police (DDP 1943:193). In a letter of May 29, 1943, directed to
“all members” of the ICPC, Kaltenbrunner announced that he had accepted
the ICPC Presidency “conforming to the statutes (satzungsgemäß)”
and expressed the hope that he could further the Commission’s “truly great
work of civilization (Kulturwerk)” (Dressler 1943:II, III). Later that
year, Kaltenbrunner reaffirmed that he would maintain the activities of
the ICPC, at least “as far as this is at all possible during the war” (National
Archives, Records of the Reich Leader SS [hereafter: RLSS] R450/4190151).
In October 1943, Kaltenbrunner once again emphasized the ICPC’s “noble
Kulturwerk” and asked “all members of the Commission” for their continued
cooperation (RLSS, R450/4190151).
The Rationality of a Nazified
World Police
The nazification of the International
Criminal Police Commission strategically involved a shift from seeking
partnership in the organization to taking control thereof. Nazification
of the ICPC was practically achieved by Nazi police participants seeking
to influence the Commission’s agenda and by a mixture of manipulating legality
and resorting to deceit in order to take control of the ICPC Presidency
and headquarters. The various strategies in the nazification of the ICPC
were adapted to specific needs and circumstances, mostly determined by
world-political and military developments, but always fit the overall frame
of National-Socialist policy. In this section, I offer a model to account
for this two-staged development.
The Logic of Nazification
The strategic shift in the
nazification of the ICPC generally followed the foreign policy of National-Socialist
Germany, which generally implied a transformation from international participation
to a quest for global control [*31] (Fischer 1995:394-440, 473-476; Herzstein
1989). During the first phase of this "Stufenplan" (plan in stages), Nazi
foreign policy mainly sought to abide by established diplomatic rules.
To be sure, the Nazi regime had then already developed ideas about foreign
occupation and conquest, in particular the expansion of German "Lebensraum"
in Eastern Europe, but the regime at first attempted to maintain acceptability
and partnership in world affairs. Even when it became clear that the Nazis
actively sought to achieve hegemony on the European continent, including
the destruction of France, an alliance with Great Britain was still considered
feasible. But although the Nazi plans for expansion through diplomacy had
proven relatively successful (most notably at the Munich conference in
1938), a shift to global domination through aggressive imperialism and
war was ultimately not avoided. Signaling the beginning of this second
stage, Poland was invaded in September 1939, and Great Britain and France
declared war on Nazi Germany. Once Nazi troops had swept the low countries
and France had fallen, Hitler’s foreign policy still counted on American
neutrality, but those hopes could not be maintained after the Japanese
attacked Pearl Harbor.
Corresponding to Nazi foreign
policy, the first episode of the ICPC’s nazification entailed a strategy
of influence through participation, best exemplified in the Nazi presence
at the ICPC meetings from 1935 to 1938 and culminating in the planned organization
of the meeting in Berlin in 1939. These seemingly innocent initiatives
had the purpose of influencing the Commission’s activities but also and
at the same time were part of an effort to present a respectable Nazi nation
and police. As late as June 1939, with tensions mounting in Europe, an
invitation from Dressler to Hoover for the Berlin meeting still pleaded
that the FBI Director should attend so he would become acquainted “in Germany,
with an excellent Criminal Police Organization,...with a people making
progress and intending to come into friendly relations to all the nations”
(FBI 5/179x).
The second episode of nazification
was launched when the ICPC Presidency was secured in Nazi hands (first
with the Austrian Nazi Steinhäusl, then with Reinhard Heydrich) and
when the headquarters were transferred to Berlin. But even then and throughout
the war, there was still an eagerness on the part of the Nazi police to
uphold the Commission’s continuity, at least in appearance. This presentation
of continuity was also reflected in the manner in which the Nazis took
control of the ICPC through pseudo-legal means, a tactic often preferred
by the Nazi Party in its rise to power in Germany (Thamer 1996). There
was, in fact, a clear obsession among Nazi police officials to stress compliance
with ICPC procedures, even if such compliance was fabricated, as when Heydrich
was "elected" President of the Commission.
The purpose of nazification
was tuned to specific needs but always fit the overall frame of the Nazi
ideology, even those aspects of Nazi criminal justice which were racially
motivated and lacked due process protection. This is not surprising considering
that Nazi criminal-justice policies were partly continuations of existing
measures, such as the policing of narcotics, passport forgery, as well
[*32] as political policing. German and other European police, also, were
experienced in targeting Jews and other ethnic groups as special categories
of criminal suspects. However in most countries (except Nazi Germany),
race-related police activities were not reflected in official policies
of criminal justice and could, therefore, also not formally foster international
collaboration. The formalization of racial policies in Nazi Germany, thus,
signaled a separation between Nazi police and the other ICPC members. The
so-called "Nuremberg laws" of September 1935, stripped Jews of civil rights
and citizenship and introduced a system of criminal justice that broadened
the definition of crime beyond legality and legitimated police arrests
based on the suspicion of a crime. Amongst other things, Nazi criminal
law stipulated that every crime to which no law was immediately applicable
would be punishable by a closely related law. Thus, the Nazis had replaced
the principle of "nulla poena sine lege" (no punishment without law) with
the principle of "nullum crimen sine poena" (no crime without punishment)
(Preuss 1936:848).
The implications of the Nazi
reorganization of criminal justice for the nazification of the ICPC are
not altogether clear. In terms of international cooperation, the Nazi proposals
on so-called "pro-active" principles of policing and punishment were not
widely adopted and did not seem to influence investigative work in the
various countries of the Commission. In fact, because of these issues there
was mounting tension among police at the ICPC meetings from 1935 onwards.
Nonetheless, the Nazis did achieve some results, such as the implementation
of pro-active passport measures and the control of the ICPC Presidency
with the Austrian Police. During this period, in fact, Nazi police officials
organized international meetings with representatives from several European
countries independently from the ICPC network.5
The fate of the ICPC reveals
a mode of nazification which indicates that a coherent plan was reflected
in different strategies of implementation, depending on pre-conceived planning
in tune with National-Socialist ideology, but also responding to shifting
historical conditions within an over-all masterplan of nazification. Theoretically,
this process can be framed in terms of a rationalist model of nazification
as the implementation of a preconceived and coherent Nazi ideology (Brustein
1996). The decisive and goal-oriented path of the nazification of the ICPC
hints at a coherent and a purposely-directed plan, although its various
methods, tactics, and strategic shifts reveal the historical dynamics that
a rationalist explanation of nazification must also take into account.
At the organizational level, a rationalist perspective adequately emphasizes
a logic in the making and implementation of Nazi policies. Indeed, the
manner of nazification in the case of the ICPC underscores, first and foremost,
the consistency of the Nazi seizure of power in terms of its popular and
institutional implications. This is reflected in the Nazis attempting to
take power of the ICPC, first by seeking influence through participation,
then by pursuing domination through control.
Additionally, however, the
Nazi police in their involvement with the ICPC also [*33] responded to
historical circumstances and tuned their plans to historical opportunities
and constraints, especially the anticipation and outbreak of war. Thus,
what my analysis brings forth is the value of a perspective that argues
for the embeddedness of the rationality of criminal justice policy in a
dynamic context of influencing factors. Distinguishing between the formation
of the Nazi policy and the implementation thereof can lead to transcending
a relativistic model of eclecticism of the Nazi program (Anheier 1997;
Gamson 1997). In the case of the ICPC, indeed, developmental stages involved
the two strategies of influence through participation and of command through
control in fulfillment of materializing Nazi police ideology on an international
level. This National-Socialist policy consisted of partly new, partly re-assembled
fragments from a nineteenth century “rubble of ideas” (Ideenschutt), couched
in populist terms (Thamer 1996:13). However, entirely novel or not, the
policy always served as a coherent guide for the officials who accepted
its legitimacy and was consistently sought to be implemented in the various
Nazi and nazified institutions, as demonstrated by the gradual but consistent
controlling path of the nazification of the ICPC.
Ideal and Reality of a
Nazi World Police
There is considerable disagreement
in the literature about the implications of the nazification of the ICPC
in terms of investigative work and international cooperation. In part,
this confusion is a result of the uncertain destiny of the ICPC investigative
files once the Nazi regime had taken control of the organization. Most
often repeated in the secondary literature is the conjecture that the ICPC
files were somehow destroyed or got lost at the end of the war (e.g., Fooner
1973:21; Forrest 1955:31; Möllmann 1969:47). In the memoirs of Swedish
police official, Harry Söderman, an ICPC participant before as well
as after the war, there is recounted a different story. According to Söderman,
Nazi police official, Karl Zindel left Berlin shortly before the fall of
the city in 1945 in a car filled with ICPC files. Zindel reported to the
French authorities in Stuttgart, but what then happened with the files
is unclear. Some have stated that those files survived (Fooner 1973:21),
others argue that they were destroyed (Meldal-Johnsen and Young 1979:80-87).
Analysis of the FBI "Interpol"
files reveals a different destiny of the ICPC dossiers. At the end of the
war in Europe, the FBI received a press release entitled "World Police
Files Found," which stated that on August 2, 1945, U.S. army authorities
had in Berlin discovered the ICPC records of 18,000 international criminals
(FBI 5/end). In October 1945, the FBI leadership deemed the files not useful
and recommended to take no further action (6/206). Not incompatible with
the evidence from the FBI files, some commentators have claimed that part
of the ICPC records were destroyed during the raids on Berlin but that
some were recovered from the ruins and possibly taken to Moscow by Soviet
military (Tullett 1963:30; Walther 1968:160-163). It has further been suggested
that some of the Commission’s documents were retrieved shortly after their
discovery in Berlin [*34] (Forrest 1955:31) or later during the blockade
of the airbridge from Berlin to Paris in 1948 (Möllman 1969:49-50).
Documents from the FBI "Interpol" files corroborate the recovery theory
of the ICPC records. In a letter of December 4, 1945, Director Hoover was
informed about “the recovery of the archives of the former Bureau at Vienna”
(7/257). In May 1946, Hoover was similarly told that Florent Louwage, the
first President of the ICPC after the war, had been “successful in hiding
some of the records of the Commission in Germany” and had now “in his possession
at Brussels the files of some 4,000 criminals” (6/228). Two years later,
the FBI attaché in Paris again confirmed that “a portion of the
files of the Commission” had been “recovered” (9/end).6
Partly because of the confusion
over the fate of the ICPC files, the history of the international police
organization immediately before and during World War II has been a topic
of considerable controversy. Several commentators have suggested that the
Commission no longer functioned after the Anschluss of Austria in March
1938, or that at least the nations of the free world then ceased participating
in the organization (e.g., Fooner 1989:40; Lee 1976:19; Tullett 1963:27-29).
Others, however, have argued that the Nazi regime took control of the ICPC
with the express and consequential purpose of using the organization to
further its own goals (e.g., Garrison 1976:63-85; Greilsamer 1986:45-88;
Stiebler 1981:33). This debate was additionally fueled when it was discovered
in the early 1970s that Paul Dickopf, President of Interpol from 1968 until
1972, had been a member of the SS until 1943, when he fled to Switzerland
to work for the Office of Strategic Services, the forerunner of the CIA
(Garrison 1976:66-73; Schwitters 1978:47-65). The Dickopf affair then also
led to question the involvement of other police officials in the years
before 1945. Especially two of the post-war Presidents of the ICPC, the
Belgian, Florent Louwage and the Frenchman, Jean Nepote, were targeted
because they would have collaborated with the Nazis during the war (e.g.,
Garrison 1976:66-69; Wiesenthal 1989:254-255).7 Others,
however, have downplayed the role played by Louwage and other officials
involved in the ICPC at the time of its nazification (Forrest 1955:24-26).
Söderman (1956), for instance, described Arthur Nebe and Karl Zindel
as “professional policemen,... very mild Nazis” (p.376).
In 1975, when U.S. participation
in Interpol was evaluated by Congress, the famous Nazi-hunter Simon Wiesenthal
declared that the ICPC had been used by the Nazis to track down fugitive
criminals and force them to provide information on (fellow) Jews (Garrison
1976:79). In his memoirs, Wiesenthal repeated the allegation and also claimed
that the ICPC files provided the Nazis access to the identity and whereabouts
of banknote forgers, who could be coerced to produce false foreign currency
in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp (Wiesenthal 1989:253-255).8
What the presumed continuity
of the ICPC during the war actually implied from the viewpoint of international
cooperation and investigative police work is not clear. Primarily, it seems,
nazification of the ICPC involved a presentation [*35] of continued international
police work. Effective use of the ICPC headquarters to advance the nationalist
agenda of Nazi rule is improbable because the files were few in number
and could not be of much practical benefit, especially not relative to
the extensive collections of the national police systems in the Nazi-occupied
countries.9 Also, based on available evidence, it is unlikely
that the ICPC achieved any of the Nazi-aspired continuity in investigative
work or international cooperation, especially across the Atlantic (see,
generally, Waite 1992).
Among the few tangible achievements,
the ICPC periodical, Internationale Kriminalpolizei, continued to be published
regularly during the war years.10 Yet, the publication
mostly contained general interest articles and administrative notices,
all authored by Nazi police or sympathizers (among them, Nebe, Kaltenbrunner,
Dressler, and Schultz). In a 1943 issue, there was detailed a list of countries
that had in recent years joined the Commission. The list still included
the United States. In fact, the United States was legally a member
of the ICPC throughout the war, for the enactment of membership in the
Commission was never reversed. That this was a mere formal matter became
clear when after the fall of Nazi Germany, it was discovered that the nazi-controlled
ICPC had after 1941 still forwarded about 100 wanted notices to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, an unidentified number of which had reportedly
been forwarded to the FBI after the entry of the United States into the
war (FBI 6/205). In the February 29, 1944 issue of the ICPC periodical,
there appeared a short article on "The Gathering of Members of the ICPC,
in Vienna," held from 22 to 24 November 1943 (in RLSS R450). The meeting
was likely the first held since 1938, but the article does not mention
any noteworthy events or decisions reached at the conference.
However, regardless of whether
the ICPC served investigative purposes for the Nazi regime, what the nazification
of the ICPC definitely entailed was a conscious attempt to maintain the
appearance of “at least the fiction of its ongoing existence” and “the
illusion of a normally functioning ICPC” (Jeschke 1971:118; Fijnaut 1997:118).
The portrayed appearance of continuity in the ICPC towards the end of the
war may (in anticipation of a German capitulation) also have served purposes
that took into account changing historical circumstances. An official Nazi
Aktennotiz (file memorandum) of May 2, 1944, on the "Activities of the
ICPC after the War," states that it should be endeavored to have as many
countries as possible participate in the Commission during its control
by the Nazis, so that participation of enemy countries could be used to
reach more favorable peace settlements after the war had ended (Jeschke
1971:119; Walther 1968:160-163). The remarkable continuation of the appearance
of diplomacy and pseudo-legality, even when nazification had turned from
participation to command, presents an interesting [*38] case of institutional
impression-management that is to be attributed to the Commission’s unique
international character. Not an international organization perceived as
a foreign threat to Nazi Germany (like the League of Nations), nor a German
institution that could be taken control of without [*36] foreign interference,
the ICPC was a facilitating network of national police systems with German
as well as foreign police united in a common cause against international
crime. Acquiring control of the organization, therefore, had to involve
participation of Nazi officials with police of other nations, however fabricated
and imagined such collaboration would be.
Finally, it is to be noted
that nazification of the ICPC was swiftly achieved, not only because of
pseudo-legality, but also because novel Nazi principles of policing could
be readily infused with existing police practices. After the headquarters
had moved to Berlin, for instance, the ICPC search-warrant forms were altered
in only one respect: the addition of the category "RASSE" (race) next to
the entry "RELIGION (Dressler 1943:53). Beyond such symbolic manipulation,
all that had to be done to achieve nazification of the Commission, at least
organizationally, was placement of the ICPC headquarters in the Nazi criminal
police, Office V of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt. The lack of needing
any major revisions to the already existing ICPC structures in order to
institutionally complete, nazification can be attributed to the fact that
the international police network provided for a purposive-rational machinery
that could be used by any police--loyal to whatever political purpose and
ideological persuasion--that participated in, or had taken control of,
the organization. This confirms the perspective that the ICPC was founded
as an expert technology of crime control independent from legal and political
contexts (Deflem 2000).
Conclusion
The nazification of the ICPC
set Nazi police institutions on a collision course with the Commission’s
other members, particularly the FBI. Initially, the FBI did not join the
Commission because membership in the international police network was not
thought to have many practical benefits for the agency. When Director Hoover
approved of FBI membership in the ICPC, he did so because he thought it
would be “helpful to us in our work” (FBI 3/54, my emphasis). But once
the FBI had joined the Commission in June 1938, the Bureau did not collaborate
much in the international police network--in fact, less than it had before
membership was approved. The reasons for this lack of cooperation may be
twofold. First, the FBI had little practical need to join an international
police organization because it had itself already established a vast cross-border
system of policing. Especially through the FBI fingerprinting system, the
Bureau had managed to expand its powers not only nationally (and financially)
but also internationally. A second reason for the FBI’s reluctance to collaborate
in the ICPC, especially after 1940, was the growing awareness among the
Bureau’s leadership of the increasing influence of the Nazi presence in
the Commission. And once the ICPC headquarters had been moved to Berlin,
the FBI leadership was well aware of the intolerably tainted status of
the ICPC and decided to terminate all communications. By then, the FBI
was already intensely involved in anti-Nazi espionage activities. In [*37]
May 1934, President Roosevelt had secretly ordered the FBI to launch an
investigation of the American Nazi movement. The presidential order was
twice renewed, before President Roosevelt publicly designated the FBI in
charge of espionage and sabotage activities after the outbreak of war in
Europe (Ungar 1976).
Considering the Nazi infiltration
in the Commission, Nazi police officials at first sought to participate
in the ICPC. In this seemingly benign way, it was sought to have Germany
accepted as a viable partner in international affairs, a nation among nations.
But in a second phase of nazification, the attempted control of the ICPC
displays the aggressive nationalism of the Nazi dictatorship, implying
the threat of imperialism and war. Thus, the case of the ICPC shows that
strategically there were notable shifts in the nazification process, indicating
the value of an analytical distinction between establishing and maintaining
control and a dynamic perspective that conceives of nazification as a process.
The Nazi take-over of the International Criminal Police Commission reveals
a mode of nazification which offers support for the viewpoint that Nazi
officials strategically invaded, coordinated, and controlled existing social
institutions, guided by concerns that were systematically directed at implementing
a policy of nationalism and global domination. Corresponding to Nazi foreign
policy, the nazification of the ICPC shifted in strategy, from seeking
influence through participation to striving for command through control.
Strategies of nazification were also influenced by shifting conditions
and opportunity structures in relation to world-political and military
affairs, but in terms of goal-direction they were always attuned to Nazi
ideology.
The nazification of the ICPC,
moreover, was more ambivalent than the Gleichschaltung of German institutions
(and the military conquest of enemy countries), because the Commission
was an international organization with German as well as foreign participation.
Indeed, explicitly built on an ideal of respect for nation-state sovereignty,
the ICPC was not (and Interpol today is still not) a supranational police
force, but an inter-national network for exchange and cooperation between
national police institutions, with the central headquarters functioning
as a facilitator of communication between the participating national systems
of police (Anderson 1989:168-185). Thus, the status of the ICPC "in-between"
Germany and the world not only accounted for the fact that Nazi police
in an initial phase sought to influence the Commission’s work more cautiously
through participation, but also that imperialist nazification directed
at global control was not destructive and remained deceptively committed
to uphold pseudo-legality.
In sum, this analysis brings
forth the value of a perspective that draws a distinction between the formation
of the Nazi policy and the implementation thereof. Nazification of the
International Criminal Police Commission involved strategies of influence
through participation and command through controlling the fulfillment of
a police ideology that was only partly new. Additionally, it is revealed
that there was a continued portrayal of diplomacy and semi-legality, a
case of institutional impression-management that is attributed to the Commission’s
international character. If the National-Socialist cause was to be advanced
in international police matters, the ICPC had to be invaded and managed,
ideally with the approval of its foreign members. Of course, absent any
concrete participation from the ICPC’s international membership, the nazification
of the ICPC was but an illusionary achievement without much if any effective
consequences in terms of purported Nazi objectives. Nonetheless, in view
of the relative ease with which the ICPC was subjected to nazification,
the ironic consequence is that the ICPC became amenable to be politicized
by whoever had control of the organization and wanted to use it to advance
a particular ideology (precisely because the organization was established
as an international institution independent from international political
conditions). Hence, it was the very independence of the ICPC as an expert
bureaucracy of criminal policing that paved the way for its nazification
and attempted use for political and nationalist purposes.
NOTES
1 Throughout
this paper, I rely on some academically oriented studies on Interpol (Anderson
1989; Fooner 1989; Greilsamer 1986; Hoeveler 1966), but I have mostly analyzed
primary sources, such as documents published by the ICPC and reports of
the Commission meetings (see, e.g., Archiv für Kriminologie [hereafter:
AfK] 1936, 1937, 1938; Die Deutsche Polizei [hereafter: DDP] 1940, 1943;
Die Polizei 1935; Internationale Kriminalpolizeiliche Kommission [hereafter:
IKK] 1923, 1934; Kriminalpolizei 1937; Leibig 1936).
2 My analysis
of the FBI participation in the ICPC largely relies on a collection of
relevant FBI documents (see Federal Bureau of Investigation Headquarters,
Washington, D.C., Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts Reading Room, "Interpol"
files; hereafter: FBI). References to these 1,758 pages of files, mostly
containing correspondence as well as some investigative materials, include
the section and page number. Unless otherwise stated, all references are
to the FBI "Interpol" files.
3 An
international police meeting under Italian auspices was held in Rome shortly
before the London meeting (FBI 3/90), and a German-Italian police meeting
was planned for March 1936 in Berlin (RLSS 20/2525494).
4 A report
in the SS police magazine Die Deutsche Polizei went further and stated
that the ICPC members had “delivered the request” to Heydrich to accept
the Presidency (DDP 1940). The Commission members, the report added, had
also agreed that the headquarters should be moved to Germany, the country
with the “best-organized and most exemplary police organization” (p.305).
[*39]
5 One
such police meeting was held in Berlin from August 30 to September 10,
1937. The meeting was attended by representatives from 15 countries (including
Belgium, Brazil, Finland, The Netherlands, Japan, Uruguay, and Switzerland).
Chaired by Heinrich Himmler, the meeting centered on the international
fight against Bolshevism (RLSS 21/2525789). One more anti-Bolshevist police
conference was organized by the Nazis in September 1938 and an additional
one planned by Heydrich as late as October 1941 (Doorslaer and Verhoeyen
1986:72-74; Fijnaut 1997:120-121), but the practical implications of these
meetings are not clear.
6 In a letter
of December 4, 1945, Director Hoover was informed about “the recovery of
the archives of the former Bureau at Vienna” (7/257). In May 1946, Hoover
was similarly told that Florent Louwage, the first President of the ICPC
after the war, had been “successful in hiding some of the records of the
Commission in Germany” and had now “in his possession at Brussels the files
of some 4,000 criminals” (6/228). Two years later, the FBI attaché
in Paris again confirmed that “a portion of the files of the Commission”
had been “recovered” (9/end).
7 In an FBI
memorandum of September 1, 1950, certain “derogatory allegations” against
Louwage are mentioned, but the memo is otherwise favorable (FBI 17/102-127).
Among the few corroborated facts it can be mentioned that Louwage was (in
1943) once in touch with Arthur Nebe in Berlin in order to rescue (successfully)
two Belgian police officials from Nazi captivity; he reaffirmed his position
as ICPC Permanent Reporter in December 1942; and, that he was confirmed
in the position when Kaltenbrunner became President of the Commission (Fijnaut
1993; IKP, September 30, 1943, in RLSS R450/4190151).
8 Wiesenthal
and others have also claimed that the infamous conference at which Reinhard
Heydrich and other Nazi officials discussed the practical aspects of the
implementation of the "Final Solution" was held in the headquarters of
the ICPC (Wiesenthal 1989:253). This is inaccurate. The Wannsee Conference,
as the meeting has come to be known, was held on January 20, 1942, in a
villa located at “Am Grossen Wannsee, No. 56-58.” However, the meeting
was originally planned by Heydrich to be held “on December 9, 1941, at
12:00 p.m., in the headquarters of the International Criminal Police Commission,
Berlin, Am Kleinen Wannsee No. 16” (Heydrich to Luther, in Friedman 1993).
The planned meeting was postponed because of the Japanese bombing of Pearl
Harbor and the American entry in World War II. There is no evidence to
determine whether Heydrich had scheduled the meeting in the ICPC headquarters
because he conceived of the extermination of European Jewry as a matter
of international criminal police.
9 Before
the war, the ICPC headquarters contained less than 4,000 investigative
[*40] case files. And, although the number rose rather dramatically to
18,000 at war’s end (FBI 5/end), it is still negligible relative to the
files available to the Nazis through the occupation of Europe.
10 According
to Bresler (1992:55-56), the periodical was published every month until
April 1945. The Captured German Records at the National Archives contain
an incomplete collection of Internationale Kriminalpolizei issues from
the years 1942, 1943, and 1944. Only the German version is available (which
was likely the only one printed during the war).
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