The
Fourth Round -
A Critical Review of 1973 Arab-Israeli War
Columnist Hamid Hussain
does an exhaustive overview of the 1973 war.
Introduction
‘We live in a world of facts and we can’t
build on hopes and fantasy. The fact is that you have been defeated so
don’t ask for a victor’s spoil’. Dr. Henry Kissinger’s
advice to Anwar Sadat, 1973.
October 2002 is the twenty ninth anniversary of the Arab-Israeli
war fought in 1973. Like any other war, this war also had its highs and
lows. Each party tried to give its side of the story. Many myths were
created depending on who was narrating the story. Some minor events were
exaggerated while the major ones ignored depending on the perspective
of the evaluator. ‘In battle, as in so many areas of life, the slightest
element may appear in retrospect to have had major importance. The magnification
is real, not accidental’.1 Some with the hindsight, tried to make
sweeping judgements which were also not fair. Like any war, it has its
own lessons, both positive and negative.
This article will evaluate the events of 1973 war, looking at various
aspects. I will discuss the three main combatants (Israel, Egypt and Syria),
looking at the immediate background to hostilities, war and its aftermath.
In addition, the regional Arab and international scene especially the
role of two super-powers will be discussed under a separate heading and
in the end a summary of the war will be presented.
Ramadan War
‘If matters are conducted in this way and evaluated on this kind
of a basis, with no responsibility for the words spoken and the actions
undertaken, then we deserve what has happened to us’. Remarks of
the presiding judge of the court of inquiry at the trial of Egyptian Minister
of War Shams Badran, February 1968.
Gathering of the Storm
From Egyptian point of view, the cause of October offensive was the humiliating
defeat in 1967. The words of Abdul Ghani El-Gamasy (he was Chief of Operations
of Egyptian Armed Forces in 1973 and later became Chief of Staff) correctly
represent the general Egyptian mood. He stated, “The battle was
a battle of honour for Egypt. We had to go through with it both to liberate
our land and to erase the shame of the 1967 defeat”.2 Even with
all the hindsight, Egyptians could not admit that they have been routed
by the Israelis. In the aftermath of 1967, Egyptians were unable to critically
evaluate their organization and performance. Just a cursory look at the
life of the commanders of their forces will give some insight into the
problems of high command and dilemmas of a highly politicized army. In
1967 Field Marshal Abdul Hakim Amer was the commander of the forces. At
the time of July 1952 coup, Amer was a Major. In less than a year he was
a Major General. In June 1953, he became commander-in-chief. In February
1958, he was a Field Marshal and deputy supreme commander of the armed
forces. His only qualification was that he was the most trusted ally of
Egyptian President Gemal Abdul Nasser. It is no wonder that when real
war came, Amer who had climbed the promotion ladder with a dizzying speed
(From Major to Field Marshal in less than six years, probably a world
record), got a rude awakening when he suffered defeat literally in hours.
He later committed suicide. Lieutenant General Sidqi Mahmud is the only
head of the air force in world history under whose command, his air force
was almost completely wiped out on the ground twice by the enemy, in 1956
and again in 1967.
Egyptians tried to explain their defeat in elaborate web of conspiracies
hatched by Americans, Soviets, Europeans, Israelis and fellow Arabs. Luckily,
for Egypt, at least at the higher policy level, this denial did not last
for long. Once they decided that next round was inevitable, they got to
the business of re-arranging the whole deck for the coming clash. Egyptians
very well knew their limitations. Though rhetoric and public statements
were for big clash with Israel, practically it worked for a plan to cross
the Suez canal, hold some territory and then involve the super powers
to bring peace and return of Sinai through negotiations. This was the
reason that operation was code named ‘Spark’. The spark was
to ignite the fire of an international crisis in which super powers are
involved and hopefully Egypt would gain something out of this crisis.
(Later the name was changed to Operation Badar, referring to the first
battle of Prophet Muhammad). El-Gamasy has described this plan in detail
in his memoirs. He states that, “The Egyptian general command now
developed an offensive plan in cooperation with the Syrian forces in which
Egypt would storm the Suez canal, defeat the main concentrations of enemy
forces in Sinai, reach mountain passes, and hold this position in preparation
for other combat missions’.3 In the initial phase, the air forces
of Egypt and Syria will attack simultaneously Israeli targets in Sinai
and Golan. Then under the cover of artillery barrage, Egyptian forces
will storm the Suez Canal using Second and Third Armies, supported by
air force. Five Divisions will set up bridgeheads and in coordination
with forces in Port Said sector will try to penetrate 15 to 20 kilometers
in Sinai. With or without a tactical halt, in second stage, Egypt will
try to capture mountain passes and hold the line there.4 There was no
plan for any further goals. The strategic directive which was issued by
Sadat on October 5, 1973 was also vague stating that, “liberate
the occupied territory in progressive stages according to developments
and the abilities and potential of the armed forces”.5 Lieutenant
General Sad El Shazly (he was Chief of Staff of Egyptian Armed Forces
in 1973) gives a different picture of the actual plan. He was convinced
that Egypt didn’t had the capacity to reach the passes. He states
that there were two plans. The real Egyptian plan knowing their limitations
was code named ‘The High Minarets’. According to this plan
after the successful crossing, Egyptian forces will penetrate only five
to six miles and dig in for defense which will ensure the safety umbrella
of fixed Surface to Air (SAM) batteries against Israeli air force. A second
plan which was forwarded was only to deceive Syrians. Egyptians had no
desire to implement it. Syrian President Hafiz el Asad would neither forget
nor forgive this. He later sarcastically told US National Security Advisor,
Henry Kissinger about this Egyptian ‘treachery’ and ‘duplicity’.6
This was code named ‘Operation 41’. According to this plan,
only on paper, after crossing he canal, Egyptians will go for the key
Sinai passes which were about 30-40 miles east of the canal.7 Operation
41 was discussed with Syrians, so that they agree for the offensive because
if Asad knew that Egyptians had no desire to go more than five miles east
of canal, he would never had agreed to the attack. In addition, Operation
41 was discussed with Soviets because being a more ambitious one, it will
help to get more military hardware. The level of any coordination between
Egypt and Syria can be judged from the fact that Supreme Joint Council
with members from armed forces of both countries was formed in August
1973, less than sixty days before the war started. Both countries did
not have ‘the unified communications that would allow them to exploit
their early gains to the fullest advantage’.8 The result was that
when hostilities started none of them knew what other party was doing
or planning.
In 1972, the detente between US and Soviet Union was viewed apprehensively
by President Anwar Sadat. In that year, he invited himself three times
to Moscow to push for more weapons and Soviet re-assurances about his
attack on Israel. Sadat had made the decision of going to war in a high
level meeting on October 24, 1972. Egypt had received a large amount of
weaponry from Soviets. Sadat confided to Egyptian journalist Muhammad
Husnain Haikal that, “They are drowning me in new arms. Between
December 1972 and June 1973 we received more arms from them than in the
whole of the two preceding years’.9 Sadat made changes in the armed
forces at highest level for preparation of war, some of which were odd
and may have put strain on relationship between senior officers. The most
significant one was the re-instatement of two senior officers (Major General
Ahmad Ismail and Vice Admiral Mahmud Fahmi) who have been retired in 1969
and placing them at the highest level in chain of command. Major General
Ahmad Ismail had been retired in September 1969. In 1971, he was heading
General Intelligence. He was re-instated, promoted to General and made
Minister of War, replacing General Muhammad Sadeq. The Chief of Staff,
Lieutenant General Sad el Shazly had long standing differences with Ismail.
This didn’t affect the preparation phase but during war, the opposing
tactical and strategic views of these two high officials had a significant
impact on the operations.10 Vice Admiral Abu Zikri, who had been retired
in 1969 was also re-instated and replaced Vice Admiral Mahmud Fahmi as
commander of naval forces. Deputy Minister of War, Lieutenant General
Abdul Qadir Hassan was also relieved. The appointments and dismissals
of some of the highest offices of Egypt were done by one man in such a
casual and erratic manner that an ordinary person would not do to his
personal servants but then in an autocratic regime, all others are considered
as personal servants of the pharaoh.11
At the political level, a more general and vague line was followed. The
Kuwait Conference held on November 15, 1972 stated the goal of removing
the effects of the June 1967 aggression without prejudicing the Palestinian
cause and the national rights of the Palestinian people. The fact is that
planning on both Syrian and Egyptian front had nothing to do with Palestinian
issue. The operations were designed to recover lands which both countries
had lost to Israelis in 1967. Palestinian leadership was neither consulted
nor had any significant role in these operations. In March 1973, Sadat
reshuffled his cabinet and made himself Prime Minister. He was now ready
for the showdown.
Showtime
Egypt put up an impressive and enormous arsenal for the showdown. On Sinai
front Egyptian army was divided into two corps called armies. Third army
in the south consisted of two infantry divisions (19th & 7th) with
4th and 25th Armoured Division standing in ready reserve. Third Army was
commanded by Major General Abdul Munim Wassel. Second Army in north had
three infantry divisions (16th, 2nd & 18th) with two divisions (21st
& 14th Armoured and 23rd Mechanized Infantry) in ready reserve. Second
Army was headed by Major General Saaduddin Mamun. In the reserve was the
First Army (6th and 3rd Mechanized Divisions), deployed near Cairo and
controlled by General Headquarters (GHQ). The infantry divisions were
not organized on ordinary lines. Each infantry division was reinforced
with a brigade (three battalions) of tanks; one battalion of self-propelled
SU-100 anti-tank guns; and an anti-tank guided weapon (ATGW) battalion.
In addition infantry had its own anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons.12
Egypt deployed about 1,700 tanks, 2,500 armoured vehicles, 2,000 artillery
pieces, 1,500 anti-tank guns and 700 anti-tank guided weapons. Air Force
had 400 combat aircraft, 70 transport aircrafts and 140 helicopters (about
220 MIG-21s, 200 MIG-17s & 19s, 120 Sukhoi-7 fighter-bombers, 18 Yupolov
bombers, 10 Ilyushin-28s and over 100 Mi-1, Mi-4, Mi-6 and Mi-8 helicopters).
Navy had 12 submarines, 5 destroyers, 3 frigates, 12 submarine chasers,
17 missile boats and 14 landing craft. Air Defense consisted of 150 SAM
battalions and 2,500 anti-aircraft guns.13
On October 6 at 2:00pm, Egyptian air crafts attacked various Israeli military
targets in Sinai starting the hostilities. Egyptians threw a tremendous
amount of fire at Israelis. According to El-Gamasy about 200 aircrafts
participated in initial attacks. More than two thousand guns of various
calibers supported by surface to surface missiles bombarded the Bar-Lev
line. In the first minute 10,500 rounds were fired at an average rate
of 175 per second.14 After this initial softening, Egyptian infantry and
commandos crossed the canal at various points. Five bridgeheads were constructed
and by the end of the day Egyptians were about three to four kilometers
east of the canal. In 24 hours, Egypt had poured 100,000 men, 1,020 tanks
and 13,500 vehicles across the canal.15 Two bridges for each division
were built. In the next few days, the gains were consolidated. Egyptians
got full control of the 102 miles long east bank. The deepest penetration
was about ten miles in the Mitla Pass region. Crossing of the canal was
the high time for Egyptians, skyrocketing their morale. Once on the east
bank of the canal, Egyptians set themselves well for the Israeli counter
attack. Israeli counter attacks were piecemeal which were successfully
stopped by Egyptians. Israeli Defense Forces (I.D.F.) 190th Armoured Battalion
(led by Colonel Assaf Yagouri) charged headlong and was decimated. Once
Israeli tanks crossed the camouflaged infantry trenches, Egyptian ‘infantry
jumped out of trenches like devils’ and all tank and anti-tank fire
was concentrated on the ill fated battalion destroying it within minutes
with its commander taken prisoner.16
In view of the priority given by Israeli high command to Golan front,
the tactics on Egyptian front was more of a holding operation in early
phases of war. By October 11, Israelis were back in business on Syrian
front putting severe pressure on Syrians. Asad was asking Sadat to intensify
attacks in Sinai to relieve pressure on Syrian front. The idea of pressing
towards passes in Sinai beyond the air cover provided by air defense batteries
made Egyptians uncomfortable. Shazly opposed the idea, stating that Israeli
air force was strong and posed a dangerous threat to his forces if they
moved in open terrain without air cover.17 Shazly was correct in his assessment
and a proof of that was that on October 10, Ist Infantry Brigade (attached
to 19th Division) moved beyond the air defense umbrella and was severely
mauled by Israeli air force. Commander-in-Chief and Minister of War, Ahmad
Ismail was a bit ambiguous but frantic calls from Syria had also got Soviets
worried. Soviet ambassador in Cairo, Vladimir Vinogradov in a conversation
with Heikal on October 10 gave the general thought of Soviet leadership.
He stated that Leonard Brezhnev (President) and Marshal Grechko (Minister
of Defense) had told him that Israel wanted to first knock Syria out of
the game and then turn all their forces on Egypt which may be disastrous.
He proded Heikal that ‘why haven’t you consolidated your gains
and begun to push on to the passes? This is not only the sensible thing
for your army to do, but it would help take pressure off the Syrians’.18
Neither Heikal nor Vinogradov knew that Egypt had no plan for the advance
towards passes. The changed situation had forced Egypt to take a decision
for which they were not prepared. The result was a rift between the military
high command. Shazly was totally against any forward push while Ismail
was for the go while acknowledging that it was a political decision. Shazly
called it the ‘first catastrophic blunder by GHQ’. When on
October 14, Egypt re-started the offensive, Israelis were waiting for
them. As expected, Israeli air force severely mauled Egyptian ground forces,
once they left the safety umbrella of their air defense. Israelis paid
back Egyptians that day by effectively using their SS-11 anti-tank guided
missiles and causing significant damage to armour. All four Egyptian thrusts
were halted within ten miles and they withdrew to their bridgeheads. On
that fateful day, Egypt lost 250 tanks.19 The Second Army commander General
Mamun collapsed, unable to function, when his men were fighting the most
important battle. Whether this was from a genuine medical problem (heart
trouble) or nervous breakdown, both ways it shows the serious flaw in
selection of officers for highest posts in Egypt. Shazly has objectively
evaluated Egyptian weaknesses and mistakes and I.D.F. strengths of this
battle but El-Gamasy rather than objectively evaluating the situation
delves into conspiracies. He states, “Enemy defenses and resistance
were so conspicuously strong that it was evident that they had been expecting
the confrontation. The immediate thought was that details from the US
air reconnaissance of the previous day had reached Israel, allowing it
to take steps to block our advance”.20 He didn’t venture to
describe how Israelis should have reacted? By October 14, Israel had been
able to assemble about fifteen brigades (about five divisions) with 60,000
men and between 500 to 600 tanks on Sinai opposing Egyptians.21 If Egyptian
high command didn’t know what they were up against, it was their
fault. When Egyptians were mauled on October 14, the usual rhetoric was
used. The commander of air defense forces, Lt. General Muhammad Ali Fahmi
said, “From these events we can deduce that the Egyptian Forces
were now facing the United States of America and not Israel on its own”.22
The fact remains that Western Europe refused to deliver supplies to Israel
despite contractual obligations.23 It was extremely naive on part of Egyptian
leadership to think that while they can summon Soviet pilots to fly combat
missions and man their air defenses and expect that US would sit idle
and do nothing.
First Army was deployed on west bank of the canal as part of general reserve
and was the main defense against any enemy breakthrough towards Cairo.
High command had made a grave error by committing elements of two tank
divisions - the core of First Army in an offensive across the canal. (General
Shazly states that he vehemently opposed this move). Ariel Sharon (he
was recalled and was serving as a division commander on Sinai Front) was
straining at the leash and was asking the permission for the crossing
of canal right from day one. Once Israeli high command knew that Egypt
had committed its strategic reserve, they gave permission to Sharon to
cross. Sharon and his men did a great job in turning the tables on Egyptians.
Egyptians were not fully aware of the strength of Israeli penetration
on the west bank nor its implications. On October 16, Soviet Premier Kosygin
arrived on a secret visit to Cairo (He stayed for three days).24 Soviets
had the correct information from their reconnaissance. Sadat was still
not convinced but Soviet photographic evidence along with expert interpretation
showed that Israel had about 270 armoured vehicles in the gap. Israelis
pushed on the west bank until they were about six miles from Ismailiya.
On 19, Sadat sent Shazly to the front to assess the situation. When Sadat
visited the Command Headquarters with General Ismail, he found Shazly
collapsed. Sadat used the words, ‘nervous wreck’.25 Shazly
said that the disaster had struck and that Egypt have to withdraw from
Sinai. Sadat immediately relieved Shazli and appointed El Gamasy for fear
of panic among the high command (Dismissal was not made public).26 Shazly
did not commented about this in his memoirs. By October 20, Israelis had
one paratroop and two armoured brigades (about 10,000 men and 300 tanks)
on the west bank of the canal. Ismail (C-in-C) and Shazly (COS) were at
loggerheads about the issue of withdrawing some troops to the west bank
of the canal to strengthen the defenses and counter Israeli penetration.
Shazly wanted to withdraw some troops and armour to reinforce the defense
on the west in view of the successful Israeli crossing of the canal. Ismail
rejected it for the fear that it may cause panic among the troops. Egyptian
assault (116th & 25th Infantry Brigade and 21st Division) to close
the Israeli breach near Deversoir on October 17 was unsuccessful. Sadat
concurred with Ismail and on October 19 said in a high level meeting of
military high command that, ‘We will not withdraw a single soldier
from the east to the west’.27 Sadat gives a conflicting account
of the events in his memoirs. He states that in a high level meeting (attended
by Sadat, C-in-C Ismail, Chief of Operations Gamasy, Commander of air
defense Fahmi and air force chief Husni Mubarak) on October 19, he and
all others were of the opinion that ‘there was nothing to worry
about’ and he gave the order that ‘there should be no withdrawal
at all (not a soldier, not a rifle, nothing) from the East Bank of the
canal to the West’. At the same time, he writes that on the same
day with all this bravado, he decided to accept ceasefire.28 Sadat informed
Asad on October 19 that he was going to accept ceasefire. The reason he
gave was that, ‘I would not confront United States. I would not
allow the Egyptian Forces or Egypt’s strategical targets to be destroyed
again’.29 After the first cease fire on October 22, Israelis broke
it to encircle Third Army (about 20,000 men and 250 tanks. Shazly gives
the number of about 45,000 men and 250 tanks and admits that by October
24, the Third Army was completely encircled and cut off).30 As expected,
Sadat in his memoirs cried wolf. He stated that, “If the United
States hadn’t intervened in the war and fully supported Israel,
the situation could have been far different’.31 He is mute about
what would have been the outcome if Soviet Union had not given the massive
military and diplomatic support to Egypt. After an intense diplomatic
activity, threats and counter threats, another ceasefire was implemented
on October 24.
Balance Sheet
On Egyptian part the strong points of their operations included successful
deception about the initiation of attacks thus taking the initiative.
This relatively high degree of tactical surprise owed much to Israeli
arrogance and misreadings. Close attention to technical matters especially
engineering including bridgehead equipment, use of water hoses attached
with pumps to bore through sand embarkements paid dividends in battle.
Many officers of Corps of Engineer died including Brigadier Ahmad Hamdi
but their sacrifices and courage made the Egyptian breakthrough possible.
Good operational planning, successful use of commandos in the enemy’s
rear and more importantly the successful use of anti-tank weapons (Egyptians
used Sagger, Snapper & RPG-7 against tanks) helped to blunt Israel’s
best offensive weapon - tanks. Sharon acknowledged this fact and stated
that on October 8 ‘the Egyptians did not simply melt away in front
of the Israeli tank attack. On the contrary, the soldiers who faced us
that day were the first truly modern infantry - equipped and trained to
fight and even hunt tanks with their own organic weapons’.32 Adopting
some novel ideas like building dummy bridges to draw Israeli aircrafts
into missile killing zones were impressive. One factor which has not been
widely known and which had a significant impact on qualitative improvement
of Egyptian officer corps was the study of the enemy. Nasser had banned
any study of Israeli strategy and methods, indeed an absurd decision.
This policy was reversed and officers were encouraged to study the Israeli
defense establishment, its doctrines and policies, even to learn and speak
Hebrew.
In real terms, the huge human and material resources which Egypt geared
for the October war did not produce the desired results. Egypt’s
armed forces on the eve of war stood at 1.2 million men. This also meant
a top heavy army. GHQ had 20,000 men and 5,000 officers including 40 generals.
A top heavy army can be a handicap. It is like an elephant, able to carry
a lot of weight but not good for quick movement. In battle, they were
able to stop Israeli counter-attacks but were not mobile enough to outmanouver
Israelis. In addition, there had been a rapid expansion of Egyptian armed
forces from 1971 to 1973 which has its own drawbacks especially the loss
of quality. In May 1971, Egypt had 36,000 officers and 764,000 soldiers.
By October 1973, there were 66,000 officers and 134,000 soldiers. This
meant that in two and a half years, 30,000 officers and 370,000 men had
been added.33 Despite that, Egyptian soldiers overall fought good and
regained some of the respect from their own people and the world. In the
first three days of war after crossing the canal, Egyptians successfully
repulsed about twenty three armoured attacks of battalion size or larger.
Egyptians also used the combination of air force and air defense to their
advantage. Knowing the technical superiority of Israeli air force, they
avoided dog fights. Egyptian air crafts would attack Israeli targets and
return quickly. The air defense barrier was then switched on. When furious
Israeli pilots will come head long for retribution, they were brought
down in alarming numbers. In fact on October 6, the unexpected and staggering
losses forced Lietenant General David Elazar (I.D.F. Chief of Staff in
1973) to suspend temporarily all aerial operations just after 1600 hours.34
Egyptians showed greater proficiency of using sophisticated air defense
systems without Soviet crew.
The rout of 1967 had a deep psychological impact on Egyptian high command
and no amount of hardware could erase it completely. Egyptian COS, Shazly
was not willing to even consider any other option than to follow his original
plan of sticking only to five mile area after the crossing. He thought
that even an additional 100 MIG-21s and a brigade of mobile SAM-6s would
be insufficient to protect his forces if they dared to leave the safety
umbrella of static SAMs.35 When Sadat got rid of Soviet advisors in 1972,
the high command was apprehensive about the abilities of their men. Egypt
turned to North Korea in 1973 for help which sent 20 pilots and some ancillary
staff to fly Egyptian fighter aircrafts.36 Similarly, when on October
24, Israelis effectively encircled Third Army, Sadat panicked and asked
Brezhnev to send a special force to help the Third Army. Another example
of such panicky decision is rushing of a Morroccan brigade based in Cairo
to join Third Army on October 16 when Third Army was in mortal danger
of being cut off from rear.37
Highly centralized strong control of operations on ground by high command
far behind the front had its negative impact. Egyptians also suffered
from inflexibility and were unable to adjust themselves to changing events
on ground. The initial operation of crossing the canal was different in
nature and a meticulous planning by a handful people and strong central
control of all details of crossing was a main contributory factor to its
success and prevented any chaos. After the crossing, in attacks and counter
attacks, the fluidity of battle demanded more independence of local commanders
who could take decisions on spot depending on their assessment of the
rapidly changing situation on ground. This aspect was the weakest in Egyptian
army. One example will suffice the importance of this aspect. On the critical
day of October 16, when Sharon’s forces had crossed over to west
bank of canal, immediate Egyptian action could have herald disaster for
I.D.F. ‘To coordinate an operation involving both Second and Third
Armies, it was necessary to circulate orders bearing signatures from four
different staff officers’.38 In addition to many factors, this inflexibility
of Egyptian command and control was the single most contributor to Sharon’s
success.
Hyperbole and rhetoric, a common trait among most Muslim leaders and nations
were also abound in Egypt. In 1972, on the birthday of Prophet Muhammad,
Sadat bragged, “When we celebrate the birthday of Mohammad next,
not only Sinai but Jerusalem too will be liberated, and the Israelis reduced
to the abasement and submissiveness decreed for them”.39 Humility
was a rare commodity. Sadat worried about increasing Israeli pressure
on Syrian front when decided to address the nation said, “Let’s
go to the people and tell them that we are going to fight even alone.
I can talk to them as Churchill talked to the British in 1940”.40
Sadat was sadly mistaken as neither he was Churchill nor Egypt was Britain.
When Third Army was encircled, and Sadat had to face the bitter reality,
he now lamented that, “I cannot fight the United States or accept
the responsibility before history for the destruction of our armed forces
for a second time”.41 Israeli defenses at Bar-Lev line were exaggerated
to inflate the performance of Egyptian forces. Shazly labeled the strong
points as ‘forts’ which were a ‘formidable barrier’,
although he admits that all these ‘forts’ were manned by only
one Israeli brigade.42 On the political front, there was lot of ambiguity
about Soviet Union. Despite being heavily dependent on Soviets both for
military and diplomatic support, Sadat didn’t informed them of his
strategy. This created a lot of misgivings among Soviet leadership which
affected overall operation. Haphazard course adopted by Sadat, first having
a large number of Soviets in Egyptian army at every level (Soviet Military
mission was headed by General Vasilii Okunev), then abruptly asking them
to leave, then somersaulting to sign a friendship treaty and so on greatly
confused not only the enemies but also allies and Egyptians themselves.
In any politicized army, the negative impact on operations due to personal
clashes and most important question of loyalty to the regime is a universal
phenomenon and Egypt was no exception. The allocation of most advanced
T-62 tanks was partly based on the loyalty of the commander. At least
in one case, about 100 T-62 tanks were not given to an armoured division
against militarily sound judgment because the loyalty of the commanding
Brigadier was suspect.43 This Brigadier was soon sent to a diplomatic
exile as defense attache to a European country. Even opinion on professional
matters, if it was not in line with the official set line aroused suspicion.
In late 1970, Sadat told the eight member Supreme Executive Committee
of the Arab Socialist Union that he had signed an agreement of unity with
Libya and then asked them to vote. When five out of eight voted against
it, Sadat saw it both as a personal insult and a conspiracy. Later, all
five were unceremoniously removed from corridors of power.44 Lt. General
Abul Qadir Hassan (Deputy Minister of War) and General Abdul Khabir (Commander
of Central District) during a high level meeting had expressed their frank
opinion about the war operations which upset Sadat. After a heated debate
at the Armed Forces Supreme Council in October 1972, Sadat decided to
sack all those senior officers who had disagreed with parts of the plan
on professional grounds. The list included Sadiq (Minister of War), Hassan
(Deputy Minister of War), Abdel Khadir (Commander of Central District),
General Mahmud Fahmy (Navy Commander) and General Mehrez (Director of
Defense Intelligence Service). He also wanted to fire Abdul Muneem Wasel
(Commander of Third Army) but was persuaded not to do so by others. Sadat
openly accused his former War Minister Sadiq as agent of Saudi Arabia
who was bribed by King Faisal. Sadat accused his other former colleagues
(Vice President Ali Sabri, Minister of Interior Sharawi Gomah, Sami Sharif)
as Soviet agents.45 Personal loyalties and being on the right side were
main consideration for promotion to higher posts rather than professional
competence. In 1972, Sadat made Ahmad Ismail Ali Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief.
Ismail had an interesting career. In 1967, he was chief of staff in Sinai
which was lost to Israel. Few days after the war, he was summarily dismissed
from army by Nasser. Ismail had connections with some officers close to
Nasser. Few days later he was re-instated. In March 1969, Nasser made
him Chief of Staff. In September 1969, in a daredevil operation, Israelis
landed in Red Sea district. Egyptian high command had no clue about this
operation which lasted whole day. This humiliation and utter incompetence
forced Nasser to fire Ismail second time. When Sadat took power, he made
Ismail head of National Intelligence Service in May 1971. When he was
made C-in-C in 1972, he was suffering from cancer and this fact was known
to Sadat (Ismail died in December 1974 from advanced cancer). Such was
the method of picking up officers for the highest posts and serious business
of war. In November 1972, a coup plot in the armed forces was discovered
which resulted in arrest of a large number of officers including General
Abdul Khadir and many important officers (The list included a division
commander, chief of staff of a division and commander of a Ranger group).
The huge army was not only getting ready for the showdown with Israel
but was preparing to take out their own leadership. The result was that
most of the intelligence was now diverted for internal surveillance of
Egyptian rather than Israeli army. The sad testimony to the level of trust
is quite evident from the fact that the man who served as COS of Egyptian
army in 1973 and was serving as Egypt’s ambassador to London have
to acquire a Libyan passport in false name (and one for his wife) as he
was worried that his own government (which he was representing in London)
may dispatch assasins to eliminate him.46 These were the real reasons
for Egyptian failure to achieve its objectives through war and not what
Sadat wanted people to believe. As not uncommon among the dictators who
can’t see beyond their boots, Sadat also was unable to face the
facts and delved into his fantasies. About accepting ceasefire, he stated
that, “For the previous ten days I had been fighting - entirely
alone - against the Americans with their modern weapons, most of which
had not ever been used before’.47 About the presence of Israelis
on the West Bank of canal, he boasted that, ‘In December 1973 I
was ready to liquidate the Deversoir pocket’. He then dismissed
Israeli presence as insignificant and stated, “I didn’t bother
about the Israeli pocket because I knew that they were my prisoners on
the West Bank and that their presence there meant their death”.
All this he was doing because, ‘I didn’t want more than to
maintain the real magnitude of my victory on the ground’.48 Truly
he was suffering from delusions but alas this is the most common ailment
of all dictators.
Aftermath
In November 1973, rewards and punishments were given on the basis of personal
inclinations of Sadat rather than the result of any thorough investigation.
Ismail was promoted to Field Marshal (a rank very liberally used by Muslim
nations). Gamasy became Lieutenant General and Chief of Staff (he later
became C-in-C and Minister of Defense). Air Force Chief Husni Mubarak
became Vice President. Commander of air defense Fahmi later became Chief
of Staff. The commanders of Second (General Abdul Munem Khalil who had
replaced Mamun) and Third Armies (Wassel) were fired. Mamun was also later
dismissed. After the war, no serious analysis of the operations was carried
out. The Israeli breach, a serious setback was never thoroughly investigated.
The higher command simply passed the buck to others and absolve themselves
of any responsibility. Those who were blamed took the defense of accusing
others. Shazli stated that, “instead, to explain away this disaster,
the President and his acolytes tried to heap all the blame upon me - and,
by swift extension, upon the gallant men whom I had the honour to lead’.49
As happens in a politicized army, even those who are removed for their
professional blunders have to be rewarded in other ways to prevent any
possibility of a coup. An angry soldier can be a very dangerous one, especially
to his own bosses. Shazli served as Egyptian ambassador to London and
then Portugal in 1974-75 with a rank of minister. Shazly despite being
humiliated by Sadat didn’t had the moral courage to refuse his ambassadorial
assignment and went along. He gives the bizarre reason in his memoirs
that he accepted the job because Sadat told him that as ambassador to
London, he will somehow work to get weapons from Germany.50 Indeed, a
very flimsy ground and hard to accept on its face value. Similarly, Khalil
and Mamun were offered civilian governorships. Arab leaders had neither
the moral courage to hold their military leadership accountable for the
mistakes nor the clue on how to reward their soldiers. Some of the actions
are so bizarre and mind boggling that one has to wonder about the level
of leadership material in these countries but at least this explains why
these leaders have become the laughing stock of the world. Sadat fired
his COS Shazly for presumably failures in war. At the same time he promoted
him to the rank of full general and sent him as ambassador with a rank
of minister. Several months later, Shazly was awarded Military Star of
Honour supposedly for his good work in war but government didn’t
want to announce it. In London, Shazly’s embarrassed Defense Attache
presented to him his award and citation which Shazly quietly put in his
pocket.
Syrian Front
‘You are selling out Vietnam; you will abandon Taiwan. And we will
be here when you grow tired of Israel’. Hafiz al Asad to Henry Kissinger
1973.
Gathering of the Storm
Just like Egyptians, Syrians have been humbled in 1967 losing strategic
Golan Heights. Since then, Syria had been busy re-building it’s
armed forces for the next round. Soviet Union pumped all types of military
gadgets to resurrect Syrian armed forces. By 1972, SAM-2 and SAM-3, state
of the art mobile SAMs, several hundred T-34 and about one thousand T-54s
and T-55 tanks and many self-propelled guns were delivered to Syria. Syrian
air force received about three hundred MIG-17s, MIG-21s, IL-28 bombers
and SU-7 fighter bombers.51 In May 1973, Asad visited Moscow for more
hardware and received 40 MIG-21s, 40-50 batteries of SAM-3s and SAM-6s,
new T-62 tanks and ten missile boats. The Syrian arsenal included three
mechanized divisions and two armoured divisions with about 1,300 tanks.
There were about 600 artillery pieces. Air Force consisted of 300 combat
aircrafts and air defense forces included 400 anti-aircraft guns and 200
batteries of anti-aircraft missiles.52 Syrian Chief of Staff was Major
General Yusuf Shakkour. The combat troops consisted of three mechanized
infantry divisions, two armoured divisions, seven artillery regiments,
a paratroop and a Special Forces brigade.53
As a prelude to war, on September 13, Syrians sent MIGs to intercept Israeli
reconnaissance missions. The dog fight which followed ended in downing
of thirteen Syrian and one Israeli plane.54 On October 4, Asad told Soviet
ambassador, Nuritdin Mukhitdinov that war will start on October 6 and
requested that Soviet Union should work towards a ceasefire forty eight
hours at the most from the beginning of operations.55 When Sadat asked
Syria to confirm this, Asad denied that.56 Israelyan states that in this
meeting, Asad frankly discussed his strategy with Soviet ambassador. Asad
was of the view that a massive surprise attack executed in a short period
of time will wake Israel up to the reality. After this blow, he was of
the view that war should stop and second part should be achieved by political
means. In his view, the military part should take only one or two days.
Asad admitted that Syrian forces were not ready for a protracted campaign.
For this reason, he believed that ‘it was of utmost importance for
Syria that there be a ceasefire immediately after the initial stage of
the war’.57
Showtime
The Golan plateau is about thirty five miles long and about twenty miles
wide. Israelis had built about fifteen strongholds. Syrian objective was
to recover Golan and reach the Jordan valley. On October 6 about 100 Syrians
fighters fired the opening shots of the war followed by artillery barrages
at the Golan Heights. The Syrian offensive was divided in three sectors
on Golan. 7th Mechanized Division (led by Brigadier Omar Abrash) in north,
9th Mechanized Division (led by Colonel Hassan Tourkamani) in centre and
5th Mechanized (led by Brigadier Ali Aslan) in south. First Armoured Division
(led by Colonel Taufique Jehne) and 3rd Armoured Division (led by Brigadier
Mustapha Sharba) were standing in ready reserve. The Syrian initiative
and boldness took Israelis by surprise. Syrians commandos landed by helicopter
and took the most important stronghold at Mount Chermon (Jabal-el-Shaikh)
which had a variety of surveillance equipment. By October 7, I.D.F’s
famous ‘Barak Brigade’ was annihilated and among the list
of dead included it’s commander Colonel Shoham.58 Syrians made headway
in south and threw in their armoured reserve which forced General Raphael
Eytan to evacuate his headquarter. Syrians appeared to be on offensive
and Israelis on defensive. Israelis were offering a brave resistance and
were involved in small scale ambushes to slow Syrian advance while waiting
for their reserves to reach the frontline. On the eve of October 7, the
fateful decision to halt the Syrian assault was made by the Syrian high
command (At the Syrian field HQ at Katana, General Shakkour, Minister
of Defense Mustapha Talas and commander of air force Naji Jamil with other
senior officers made that decision). Suddenly, first the Syrian forces
in the rear and then tanks turned around and retreated. The cause of this
turnaround is still not known. Later when General Talas was asked about
this decision, he replied, “The time is not yet ready to discuss
the reasons for this decision”.59 This allowed Israelis to re-group,
bring their reserves and supplies and start the counter attack. The main
Israeli thrust was on Kuneitra-Damascus axis. The three headlong armour
attacks of Israel against Tel Shams were unsuccessful. Israelis changed
their tactics and used 131st Paratroop Brigade which moved in from the
rear and took Tel Shams very easily. On October 9, at the battle of Red
Ridge, Syrians were severely mauled. By October 8, due to setbacks, Asad
got worried and sent his deputy premier to Baghdad for help. Israelis
planned to advance about twelve miles, so that Damascus could be in the
range of their guns. Syrians defense lines were well organized and well
manned. Syria had three defense lines. The first one was few miles behind
the armistice line and was to provide protection for advancing armoured
divisions. The second line (also called Saasa Line) was 10-12 miles behind
the first one with heavy fortifications and artillery revetments. The
third line was eight to ten miles from Damascus. The Israeli counter attack
and break of first defense line greatly alarmed Syrian high command. The
horrible memories of 1967 and the possibility of a total rout was always
on the back of their mind, although ground situation was different than
1967. The withdrawal from first defense line was well organized and planned.
Two armoured divisions controlled the line and held it sufficiently well
for the retreating mechanized divisions to pass through in good order.
The armoured divisions covered the retreat and then withdrew to the second
defense line. Saasa line was never breached by Israelis throughout the
war.60 The sagging morale at the high command and impression that they
have lost took away all steam. On October 21, Syrian commandos were ordered
to evacuate Mount Hermon (the small special forces contingent of Syria
was the most well trained unit and had secured and held Mount Hermon)
and Israelis took control without any fight. The reason given is that
Syria didn’t want to lose its best elite unit. There is another
account of Mount Hermon by Aker who states that just before the ceasefire,
this position was taken after a heavy fight in which Israeli losses were
substantial. In fact he is of the view that this was one of the most expensive
operations of the war.61 There was no shortage of men or equipment but
the will to continue to fight had gone and no amount of weaponry could
replace it. In fact, by October 22, most of Syrian armour losses had been
replaced (about 600 tanks from Soviet Union, seventy from Yugoslavia and
90 from Iraq had arrived).62 In the early part of the battle, Syrians
didn’t pay attention to Soviet military advisors. When in Moscow,
some one asked question about why the Soviets were not correcting Syrian
mistakes, Victor Kulikov (Soviet Chief of General Staff) replied that,
“They do not listen to us. They pretend to be their own military
strategists”.63 When Israeli counter attack started, only then at
the suggestion of Soviet advisors, Syrians decided to abandon vehicles
and equipment and withdraw to Saasa Ridge and make a strong defense line
there to prevent Israeli breakthrough. When Israeli planes hit Damascus
airport, Syrians cried wolf alleging that American pilots with Vietnam
experience were flying these missions which of course was not true. The
real fear was that if Israelis were able to breakthrough the Saasa line,
they will be parked in the outskirts of Damascus which may result in the
total military and political collapse.
Balance Sheet
The initial Syrian success was due to overwhelming numerical and equipment
superiority of the Syrians on the front. They had taken the initiative
and if they had continued the thrust for a day or two, they may have achieved
the breakthrough forcing an Israeli retreat. The major plus point was
their ability to fight at night. By evening of 7, Israelis were sending
all supplies to the Golan front and a reserve division (led by Major General
Moshe Peled) intended to be used in canal zone was diverted to northern
sector. After a visit to the front on 7, Dayan recommended to the Prime
Minister that I.D.F. should be withdrawn from the plateau and a strong
defense line be formed at the Jordan River itself.64 Once Israelis recovered
from the shock, they went on offensive resulting in panic in Syria. The
major drawback of Syrian offensive was that like Israelis they heavily
depended on armour. The Golan plateau was not an ideal ground for a large
tank assault. In leading assaults, Syria used over 500 tanks. Despite
these negative points, the heavy weight of Syrian armour had achieved
the breakthrough but Syrian infantry was a dismal failure. In fact, many
a times, it was in open mutiny not willing to move. A Syrian infantry
brigade when ordered to move forward, refused to move. A Druz infantry
formation (led by Lt. Colonel Omah Abu Shalash) and a Moroccan infantry
brigade (about 1,800 strong) also refused to move forward.65 Inflexibility
of the command and running operations from a highly centralized high command
far behind the front resulted in a kind of predictability of the Syrians
and Israelis took full advantage of that. Despite successful ambushes
by Israeli tanks, Syrians didn’t change their strategy. They stayed
on roads and attempted to constantly move westward in a set pattern. This
allowed Israeli combat teams to move in and out of Syrian formations at
times and places that were most advantageous to them.66
Some decisions about operations were made without thought of the consequences.
Risk and benefit analysis of the use of a given weapon was not done. On
October 7, Syria launched sixteen Frog-7 missiles (Russian surface to
surface missiles with the range of 37 miles) hitting a large Kibbutz with
significant damage but no casualties. The act had no military value but
gave Israel excuse to retaliate. Israeli jets came over Damascus hitting
buildings of Air Force and Ministry of Defense. A residential street in
diplomatic enclave was also hit resulting in civilian casualties. This
just showed the Syrian vulnerability to Israeli Air Force and affected
the morale.
Aftermath
When ceasefire occurred, Syria had lost about 300 square miles of area
to Israelis.
Asad executed a senior Druz Brigadier General during the war. Brigadier
Omah Abrash, GOC of 7th Infantry Division, who had entered the battle
with 230 tanks returned with only four tanks. He later committed suicide.
As expected in a highly politicized army, there was no serious investigation
of the Syrian war operations. Asad kept ruling the country with iron hand
for decades thus there was no hope for meaningful study of the war. Who
was to say that ‘Emperor is naked’?
Yom Kippur War
There is so much evidence of the Arab military preparations that only
a stone-blind person could miss it. Vasilii Kuznetsov, Soviet Deputy Minister
of Foreign Affairs in 1973.
Gathering of the Storm
‘The Israeli high command had been aware for a long time
that in any war it had to force a decision before the powers could intervene
and prevent a military decision, imposing a ceasefire. This was, in fact,
one of the basic tenets in Israeli strategic thinking’.67 This thinking
was complicated by the fact that Israel had to fight at more than one
front. This meant that Israel had to take the initiative to prevent any
gains for the enemy. Israel had no ‘strategic depth’, hence
no room for tactical withdrawal. The action plan which evolved from these
considerations meant that right from the first shots are fired, Israel
had to take the battle into the enemy’s territory. ‘An enemy
attack resulting in penetration into Israel, its containment on Israeli
soil, and a subsequent counterattack were contrary to the spirit of this
doctrine’.68 The success of 1967 resulted in firm belief in this
concept with no periodic evaluation as time passed. In addition, in the
years 1970-73, the main attacks on Israeli interests especially civilian
ones were from extremist Palestinian groups. Israeli high command saw
the major danger of these attacks on civilians and was planning to counter
it. The military threat from any Arab nation was considered a low possibility.
Israeli military strategy which was essentially ‘Tankomania’
ran supreme. After the 1967 war and acquisition of new territories, there
have been a debate in I.D.F. about the defense strategy. One school led
by General Yisrael Tal (he was incharge of development of Israeli tank)
and General Ariel Sharon (tested battle commander who was now in charge
of training and doctrine) promoted ‘mailed fists’ strategy.
They argued that the forward area should be held lightly by patrols with
no heavy static defense establishment. The tanks should be concentrated
in the rear out of Egyptian artillery range and used for a massive counteroffensive.
The other school, led by Chief of Staff Chayim Bar Lev agreed with armoured
reserves but argued for a system of permanent strongholds constructed
along the water line of canal.69 For political and military reasons, the
later school won. Total of thirty one strongholds called Meozim were built
along the canal. Each stronghold had nearby earthen ramps to cover tanks
and provided cover for 15 to 60 soldiers. In 1971 when David Elazar replaced
Bar Lev as Chief of Staff, the defense strategy debate was re-started.
In a compromise, about half of meozims were closed. A second line of defense
about ten miles in rear called taozim were constructed and connected by
roads. A mobile armoured division of three brigades was for main offensive.
The Israeli plan of repelling any invasion (code named ‘Dovecoat’)
was based mainly on the assumption that there will be a forty-eight hour
warning for any Arab attack. This was the time essential for grouping
of the forces in rear to take up forward positions.70 On October 6, 1973,
the Bar Lev line was manned by about 600 men from a reserve Brigade from
Jerusalem (116th Infantry Brigade). Total of about 8,000 men, 300 tanks
and 70 self propelled guns were in Sinai peninsula which could be rushed
forward in 30 minutes to two hours.71 Israeli defense line in Sinai was
in three layers. The first was the fortifications on canal, the principal
function of which was to channel any major incursion into desirable areas
for I.D.F. counter attacks. The second line was few miles behind. The
main function was to pin down the incursion with artillery fire while
armoured units will maneuver for flanking attacks. The third line near
the passes had battalion sized fortresses.
Showtime
On the eve of October 6 1973, Israel had about 1,750 tanks, 1,000
APCs, 175mm, 155mm and 120 mm guns and howitzers. I.D.F. chief of staff
was Lt. General David Elazar. Deputy Chief of Staff and Director of Operations
was Major General Israel Tal. The General Officer Commanding (GOC) of
Northern Command was General Yitzhak Choffi and GOC of Southern Command
was Major General Shmuel Gonen. Major General Avraham Adan commanded armoured
corps. On the Golan Front, on the eve of war, Israel had about 200 tanks
divided between two brigades (Barak Brigade commanded by Colonel Benyamin
Shoham and 7th Armoured Brigade commanded by Major General Raphael Eytan).72
On Bar Lev line there were about 300 tanks.
There was no shortage of information about Arab military build up prior
to war. All early warnings of an impending attack were dismissed by Israeli
high command. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan and Director of Intelligence
Major General Eliahu Zeira were convinced that Arabs would never dare
to attack Israel and brushed aside many obvious signs of military build
up. On October 3, the cabinet meeting discussed the Arab military build
up but the general consensus was that there was no imminent danger of
an Egyptian attack and Syrians would not attack alone. An emergency meeting
on October 5 didn’t change the previous assessment. In view of the
coming weekend holiday, the cabinet gave Prime Minister and defense minister
authority to call full-scale mobilization. On October 6, between 06:00
and 08:00 am, there was a flurry of activity at the highest level in Israel
as by now everybody had sensed the coming of the earthquake. Elazar in
his meeting with Prime Minister Golda Meir and Dayan recommended full
mobilization and a pre-emptive strike but he was over-ruled.
The successful canal crossing by Egyptians threw Israelis off balance.
There was total confusion and shock on the canal front. In a meeting held
on October 6 at 10:00 pm, Dayan advocated withdrawing to a second line
about twelve miles from canal. He gave three reasons for his conclusion.
First, the large size of Egyptian and Syrian forces, in addition, they
were not the armies he had known in 1967; second, strong Egyptian air
defense system near canal which was preventing full use of Israeli air
force and third, the time needed by Israeli reservists to reach the fronts.
Israeli cabinet rejected this proposal and ordered army to drive the enemy
back across the canal. On October 7, Dayan visited the canal front again
and when he came back, he again recommended pulling back to the second
line of defense. Elazar disagreed with him and flew to the frontlines
to assess the situation himself. He was accompanied by former army chief
Yitzhak Rabin. There was 100 miles of desert between Israeli border and
canal. I.D.F. could easily allowed Egyptians to advance until they were
out of the range of their anti-aircraft missile range but this was not
considered. The cabinet approved the counter attack to be launched on
October 8.
24 hours after the attack, Israel had lost more than 150 tanks. All strongholds
along the canal had either fallen or surrounded by Egyptians. The Israeli
counter attack started on October 8. The two main objectives were to destroy
bridgeheads and neutralize Egyptian Air Defense System.
El-Gamasy falling pray to usual conspiracy theory mind of Arab states
that it was an American Plan.73 He doesn’t give any argument of
what Israel should have done in the face of the attack? This was the obvious
choice for Israelis, which should be clear to even a person on the street
with no military knowledge. If El-Gamasy expected that Israelis will simply
run away (just like his fellows had done in 1956 and 1967) then he was
totally off the mark. In Sinai, two armoured divisions were now in position.
In the northern axis in the direction of al-Qantara, General Avraham Adan’s
division was positioned while in the central axis towards Ismailiya, General
Ariel Sharon headed the division. The counter-attack was carried piecemeal
due to lack of reservists, therefore, it didn’t achieve its objectives.
In addition, Israeli tanks charged head long in their usual brash manner
thus falling prey to Egyptian tank hunting teams. Egyptians annihilated
the first two battalions, which attacked. This was the first time that
I.D.F. high command had the reality check and were convinced that victory
this time will not be that easy. Israeli soldiers were surprised at the
tenacity of Egyptian soldiers. This was in total contrast to their previous
experiences with Arab soldiers. The surprise was natural as ‘the
commanding idea seemed to be that the business of the Israeli tanks was
to charge and the business of the Arab infantry was to run away in horror’.74
Instead, Egyptian soldiers had put their foot hard and were nailing down
Israeli tanks. The October 9 attack of I.D.F. was also repulsed with significant
losses. On October 10, Elazar sent Bar Lev (former I.D.F. Chief of Staff
who was recalled during the war) to take charge of southern front from
Gonen.75
Sharon was the lonely voice for crossing the canal and unbalance the Egyptians
who were on offensive. The more cautious high command rejected that. In
addition, in the early phase, the priority was Golan Front. When Egyptian
attack was blunted and Israelis regained their balance, on 12th, a general
decision was reached that if coming counter attack of Egyptians is blunted
then crossing can be undertaken. The October 14 attack of Egyptian armour
was effectively blunted resulting in loss of more than 250 Egyptian tanks
in a single day. The final go ahead was given on October 15. The plan
was the brainchild of Sharon and named Operation Gazelle (Sharon has planned
this operation when he was commander of the Southern Command). Sharon
had three brigades (his three brigade commanders were - Amnon Reshef,
Haim Erez and Tuvia Raviv) of his own division and a paratroop brigade
(led by Colonel Danny Matt). In the early phases, 2,000 men and thirty
tanks crossed over to the western bank of the canal in Deversoir area.
The most important task, which this crossing accomplished, was knocking
out the SAM radars thus putting them out of action. Egyptians had to move
some SAMs to alternative position and even withdraw some to prevent the
capture. This made a hole in the sky in Egyptian air defense barrier thus
allowing Israeli air force to come into action. Israeli plan was to split
this force, one going north towards Ismaiylia and other south towards
Suez and fold Egyptian defenses on the western bank and cut off Egyptian
forces on East Side. Sharon had captured the three most important cross-roads
- Ahmad Osman crossroad at the back of Fayid and two 101 km cross roads
west of Suez.76 Napoleon had said long time ago that ‘he who controls
the cross-roads of the battlefield will be master of the ground’.
Sharon split his small force, which has crossed into raiding parties and
turned them loose. They attacked SAM sites, convoys and fuel dumps.77
Sharon took full advantage of his surprise before Egyptians could launch
their counter attack. Later, Adan and Magan’s forces crossed to
the west bank of canal. Israelis failed to cut off Isamiliya-Cairo road
(Sharon’s forces) while Adan and Magan’s forces were successful
in south blocking the Suez-Cairo road. After the first ceasefire, Israelis
broke it to completely encircle Third Army to gain an upper hand at negotiations.
On October 23, Sharon’s troops showed up at the surprised Egyptian
naval base of Adabiyah and occupied it. Israelis achieved effective encirclement
and blocked Cairo-Suez road by October 24. It was only after strong pressure
from US that Israeli breach of ceasefire was stopped.
On Syrian front, Israelis were mauled in the first three days. The arrival
of reservists from Major General Moshe Peled’s division (Peled’s
division was facing Jordanians. Once Israel was sure that King Hussain
will not repeat his 1967 blunder, they moved some of these forces to Syrian
front) stabilized the situation. Also the reserve division headed by Major
General Dan Lanner had advanced in the centre of the Golan.78 Dayan advocated
withdrawal from Golan but Meir sent Bar Lev to assess the situation. Bar
Lev met commanders, officers and men and infused confidence. He came back
on October 7 and gave his report to Meir. He was of the view that ratio
of forces was dangerous but not hopeless and suggested a counter attack
which should start next day.79 The urgency of counter attack was due to
the fact that Israelis wanted to hit back before Syria could replace its
losses from Soviets. Second, Israelis were in no position in view of a
two front war for a prolonged conflict tying up its forces on one field.
They wanted to knock Syria out of contest by threatening Damascus so that
they can concentrate on Sinai front. In Dayan’s words, “We
have to teach the Syrians that the same road that leads from Damascus
to Tel Aviv also leads from Tel Aviv to Damascus”.80 I.D.F. successfully
rolled back the initial advance of Syrian armour. However, it was unable
to breach the second defense line at Saasa which was firmly held by Syrians
till the end of hostilities. I.D.F’s main disadvantage was that
it was fighting a two front war and could not put all its weight on one
front without seriously jeopardizing the other.
Balance Sheet
Overall, Israeli soldiers and officers fought bravely and showed
their ability to maneuver according to changing battle situation. Some
at the Bar Lev line fought to death when completely surrounded by Egyptians.
Similarly, when on October 17 Egyptians found about the Israeli bridge
on the canal, they shifted a huge amount of firepower to the area. Artillery
of both Second and Third Army, mortars, katushyas, air attacks and helicopters
dropping barrels of napalm converted the area into a hell hole but Israelis
stubbornly and bravely stuck to their positions. Senior officers stayed
close to the men. Sharon crossed over to the western bank with the first
wave of his troops. Within twenty-four hours of crossing, Dayan flew by
helicopter and visited troops there. Brigadier Amnon commanded a small
section of his tanks from the front in a dare devil rescue operation and
brought back thirty three soldiers from a strong point engulfed by Egyptian
forces. General Albert Mandler was killed when his mobile command APC
was hit directly by Egyptian artillery shell very close to his fighting
men. On October 24, when two I.D.F. parachute units were isolated and
trapped in Suez city, General Gonen established himself outside the city
and guided the survivors out of the city.81 The presence of some commanders
near the front lines helped Israelis tremendously not only for reasons
of morale of the troops but due to the nature of the battle, saw changes
themselves and acted immediately. The engagement of large number of troops
and armour, enormous fire power, swiftness of changes on
battlefield meant that the usual methods of transmitting these changes
to commanders far in rear to devise a plan meant delaying of action. The
commanders on the spot saw the changes firsthand and responded quickly
and effectively. ‘Mobile warfare demands a level of initiative among
junior officers, a level of confidence in senior ones, and the willingness
of both to communicate’.82 In this aspect, I.D.F. was much superior
to it’s foes. The independence of local commanders paid dividends.
On Syrian front, despite heavy odds, Eytan and Colonel Janos Avigdor used
their maneuverability against a large number of Syrian armour and performed
a good task for the holding action until reserves were consolidated for
a counter attack. They fought a kind of guerrilla war but with tanks full
with ambushes, flanking hit and run and enticing Syrians into traps. This
strategy was unplanned and was an ‘on-spot improvisation’
by local commanders.83 On October 15, when Egyptian were pulling back
their armour after the failed offensive of the previous day, Israelis
were able to make great use of a company of captured T-62 tanks with Egyptian
markings. These tanks driven by Israelis mixed with the retreating Egyptian
columns and were waved across the bridge by Egyptian Military Police to
the west of the canal . This Israeli company immediately established a
defensive perimeter. Egyptians realizing their error, rather than eliminating
the company, blew up the bridge to prevent reinforcements.84 On battleground,
I.D.F. was much more efficient than the Arabs. The maintenance units of
I.D.F. had a significant role in the success of Israeli counterattacks
keeping in mind the numerical superiority of the Arabs. ‘Of Israel’s
total of 900 tank losses, over one-third had been returned to service
before the ceasefire’.85 Same was true for Israeli Air Force. In
addition, Israelis were very quick to integrate and effectively use new
weapons. Many captured vehicles and tanks (all were Soviet made) were
integrated into I.D.F. service within few days. Israel had earlier rejected
American TOW anti-tank missiles (I.D.F.s philosophy was that ideal anti-tank
weapon is only another tank). During the war, a large number of TOWs were
airlifted urgently and were effectively used by Israelis despite being
not familiar with the weapon.
The dare devil operation of Sharon crossing the canal in Deversoir region
was the most astonishing feat. It was truly the ‘single, spectacular
tactical coup of the war’.86 On October 9, his reconnaissance battalion
found a gap between 2nd and 3rd Armies. Sharon asked Tal (Elazar’s
deputy) for permission to cross but he was told to wait. He was allowed
to cross on October 14 which he did brilliantly. Sharon accomplished it
with his own three brigades and a paratroop brigade.
The single most important factor which was responsible for laxed attitude
of Israeli high command was psychological. In a high level meeting held
on October 4 and 5, David Elazar was ambiguous. The Chief of Intelligence
played down all signs of military build up along Israeli frontiers. There
was increased level of preparation but clear cut decision was lacking.
At 04:30 on October 6, Israeli intelligence informed Golda Meir’s
military secretary, Yisrael Lior that Egypt and Syria will attack this
evening. At 08:00, in a high level meeting (Attended by Meir, Elazar,
Dayan, Allon and Galili), Elazar advocated for full mobilization and suggested
pre-emptive strike by air force. Meir agreed to mobilization of four divisions
but rejected the Elazar’s demand of pre-emptive strike against Arab
airfields and antiaircraft defenses.87 The sense of superiority and despise
of Arabs due to the 1967 victory was a single most important factor for
Israeli attitude. The Egyptian infantry was ridiculed as ‘chiri
biri’ (rotten infantry). Some have said that in case of an Egyptian
attack, Israelis will ‘wave’ them across the canal. General
Ariel Sharon had bragged that, ‘Israel is now a military superpower......
We can conquer in one week the area from Khartoum to Baghdad and Algiers’.88
Sharon later admitted that October 8 was a ‘black day’ for
IDF and a major contributing factor was ‘an attitude of overconfidence
that since the Six Day War had hardened into arrogance’.89 Moshe
Dayan would often talk humorously about his ‘Bird Theory’.
Dayan was of the view that Arab armies come in like a large flock of birds
but at the first shot they disperse in minutes.
The Israeli higher command had too many talented generals. Many senior
officers were recalled and put in command of troops. There were many personality
clashes which impacted on the operations. Elazar was concerned about many
of his ‘wild’ subordinates (especially Gonen and Sharon) and
he forbade a canal crossing without his prior permission. This affected
the operations on the field. Ordered not to cross without permission,
commanders like Gonen, Adan, Colonel Natan Nir (commander of Adan’s
leading brigade) stayed in the rear so they can stay in contact with superiors.90
On the canal front, Gonen had problems with his two subordinates, Sharon
and Adan. ‘Sharon presented an extreme example of a recalled retired
officer who had nothing to lose by disagreeing with the high command,
and he never missed an opportunity to do so’.91 At many times, Sharon
disobeyed his orders. On October 9, Sharon attacked opposite to Ismailiya
without orders. Gonen flew by helicopter to Sharon’s HQ and asked
him to stop the attack. When Gonen left, Sharon continued with his offensive.
When Gonen found that he sent a request to Elazar to remove Sharon.92
Elazar sent Bar Lev as overall commander of the Southern Zone. Sharon
recalled his differences with other senior officers and compared it to
‘Spanish Republic’ where infighting and backstabbing resulted
in its destruction.93 These clashes at higher command level clearly affected
operations on the ground.
Israeli main strategy was based on tank warfare. Israelis failed to recognize
the changing scenario where effective guided anti-tank weapons used by
infantry can significantly damage the armour. Israelis paid a heavy price
in men and tanks for this costly oversight. Sharon (a paratrooper) later
admitted that, “the Army had ceased to be brilliant and had substituted
for military thought, initiative, and intelligence, a blind belief in
the qualities of steel”.94 In the early part of the battle on Sinai
front, against their own doctrine of ‘armoured fists’, Israelis
used their armour piecemeal rather than in a large force resulting in
gradual destruction of their main offensive weapon. These ‘uncoordinated
and piecemeal Israeli counterattacks, especially in the Sinai, were indicative
of poor planning and excessive confidence in I.D.F. proficiency’.95
Aftermath
Israeli President was right when during the war, he told Israeli military
command in the Operations Room, “You will have to pay the price
of your arrogance and I do not know how you will face the people of Israel
after what has happened”. Immediately after the war, there was an
outcry in Israel for investigation of the operations. The reason was not
that Israel had lost any territory but the issue was un preparedness of
I.D.F. and high casualties. After criticizing the conduct of war, minister
of Justice, Yacov Shapiro resigned. In November 1973, Gonen requested
Chief of Staff to appoint an officer for court martial of Sharon. He resubmitted
his request few days later. Two days Dayan removed Gonen. On November
18, Israeli government appointed a judicial commission (it was a five-man
commission headed by president of Israeli Supreme Court, Shimon Agranat).
The commission issued its first interim report on April 2, 1974 blaming
Elazar and Zeira for mistakes and misjudgment. It also recommended suspension
of General Gonen. In July, the commission issued its second report (only
part of it was made public). This report recommended dismissal of Elazar.
General Hofi became COS. General Tal resigned. Sharon’s reserve
appointment of command of a division was changed to a non-combatant one.
There were demonstrations against Dayan which finally resulted in the
fall of Golda Meir government in June 1974. In the final analysis, it
is not the Israel’s military strength but its inherent more stable
political structure which may look chaotic outwardly which makes it a
much stronger country in the middle east. The contrast is quite obvious.
Israel didn’t loose. It just suffered higher casualties and the
nation asked for the accountability of its high command as a result of
which the army chief had to go (although his personal fault may be less).
In contrast, despite numerical and material superiority and initial success,
the Arab high command was never brought to accountability. Instead they
saw some more Field Marshals appearing on national scene.
International Scene
Cold War between United States and Soviet Union was at its peak in 1960s
and 70s. 1972 was the year of detente between two super powers. In May
the two powers signed SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks). While both
powers were willing to support their allies in Middle East to maintain
a balance, they were not going to actively support a new war in the region
which could spin out of control. The increasing military activity in the
region alerted both powers. US launched a satellite on September 27 while
Soviets launched their reconnaissance satellite on October 3 for the area
surveillance. The 1967 rout of Arabs, supported by Soviets and victory
of Israel supported by US had hurt Soviet international position. Support
of a superpower is one thing but inviting them to defend one’s country
is an altogether different matter. In January 1970, Nasser made a secret
trip to Moscow and requested them to take the responsibility of the air
defense of Egypt. The background of this request rests on the utter incompetence
of Egyptians to defend themselves against Israeli raids despite getting
state of the art equipment. Few examples will be suffice to show Egyptian
vulnerability. Israeli paratroopers destroyed Nag Hamadi power station
in Upper Egypt. In July 1969, Israeli air force destroyed the air defenses
in northern sector, creating a breach between Ismailia and Port Said.
In September 1969, a sea-borne force landed near port of Zafarana and
in an operation lasting whole day destroyed all defense installations.
The most humiliating show was when in December 1969, Israelis landed on
the Red Sea coast, raided a radar station, dismantled the equipment and
carried it off to Israel in a helicopter. These events showed the helplessness
of Egyptians in preventing Israeli raids deep into their territory.
Soviets re-armed Egypt with all kinds of weapons. As a general rule, every
party tries to portray itself as underdog and enemy as all strong and
omnipotent, so that any success in battlefield can exaggerated to boost
the morale. No one can proudly brag about beating up a weak fellow. El-Gamasy
in his memoirs tried to play down the soviet help stating that Soviet
Union was ‘providing the kind of military support to Egypt and Syria
which precluded any advantage over Israel’.96 From 1967 to 1973,
Egypt received state of the art equipment from Soviets. It included SMALTA
and TAKAN electronic jamming devices. In addition, a large number of military
advisors also arrived. By 1970, Soviets were manning antiaircraft batteries
and were flying not only reconnaissance but also combat missions. El Shazly
gives the specific details of Soviet involvement. In February-March 1970,
80 MIG-21 fighters, four MIG-25 high-altitude reconnaissance aircrafts,
27 battalions of surface to air missiles batteries and electronic equipment
and crew to man all this equipment had arrived in Egypt. The total Soviet
force consisted of two air force brigades and an air defense division.
Soviets were flying about 30 percent of MIG-21s, an electronic reconnaissance
and jamming squadron and operating 20 percent of SAMs.97 International
Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) estimated that in 1971, Egypt received
100 MIG-21s, 25 SU-7s, 55MIG-17s and MIG-15s, 70 Mi-8 helicopters and
unspecified numbers of SAM-2s and SAM-3s.98
El Shazly has summarized the role of Soviet weaponry in these words, “
Thanks to the Soviet Union, whatever else the Arabs may lack, it is not
weaponry”.99 Despite all this Sadiq was still complaining about
not getting enough. In January 1972, addressing several thousand officers,
he stated that Soviets were not giving them required weapons and were
deliberately blocking Egypt’s offensive. Such measures irritated
Soviets. Sadat later adopted the same line of denouncing the Soviets for
not giving enough. Years after the war, Sadat, after dumping Soviets and
befriending US tried to re-write the history. The massive Soviet air and
naval bridge which brought several thousand tons of military supplies
to Egypt during war, Sadat considered it as ‘overdue equipment’
which should have been delivered before the war. In Sadat’s expert
opinion, the equipment which Soviets supplied was not ‘up to date’.100
Israel and US has a long standing understanding about many issues affecting
the region but the relationship is a bit complex. Contrary to popular
belief and myths in Arab world, US role in 1973 was not blatantly biased
towards Israel especially in the early phase (Military supplies to Israel
were an undeniable fact and if this was taken in account by Arab military
planners, this was their oversight). On the morning of October 6, Israelis
were pretty sure about the imminent attack and General Elazar had recommended
a pre-emptive strike. At 10:00 am, US ambassador Kenneth Keating met with
Prime Minister Meir and warned her against a pre-emptive strike against
Arabs. He pointedly told her that if such a course of action was taken
by Israel, it will be very difficult for US to send military aid.101 On
the basis of this US threat to Israelis to not to open fire, Kissinger
called Anatolii Dobrynin (Soviet ambassador in Washington) and told him
to urgently inform Soviet leadership that war is imminent and on behalf
of Israeli leadership, Kissinger assured Moscow that Israel would not
strike first against the Arabs but that Israel’s response would
be very strong if attacked.102 The urgency of the message is evident from
the fact that Dobrynin used White House telephone system to send it to
Moscow. In the early phase of war US response was very cautious. US refrained
from accusing Arabs of provoking the war. Israeli request of military
supplies on October 7 was rejected by Kissinger. When Britain stopped
arms supplies to Middle East, it only affected Israel as it had Centurion
tanks. Arab countries had no British military hardware (with the exception
of Jordan).
Sadat in justification of his acceptance of ceasefire cites three evidences
of US involvement. First, he gives the bizarre argument that US military
supplies were landing at Al-Arish, which he calls an Egyptian city. Al-Arish
was the capital city of Sinai and occupied by Israelis. Second reason
he gives that ‘every time I destroyed a dozen tanks, more tanks
were to be seen in the battlefield. The United States was taking part
in the war to save Israel’. The Third reason he gives is that two
American rockets were fired at two Egyptian missile batteries and put
them out of action completely’.103 US would supply Israel with all
necessary military supplies as it would not let its ally defeated by Soviet
arms by Soviet allies. US had already been humbled in Vietnam and there
was no way that they would let Israel squarely defeated by Arabs (although
that possibility was very low). Sadat’s second argument of huge
supplies to Israel has to be balanced by the Soviet supply of lost equipment
to Egypt and Syria which also helped them to continue the war that long.
The fact is that both powers supplied their proxies well, who supplied
more will always be debated. Sadat is not clear about what he meant by
destruction of his missile batteries by American rockets. Does he mean
American pilots fired or an American weapon was used. Everybody knows
that main weapons of I.D.F. were US made. To date there has been no evidence
that US forces in any way participated directly in combat. The fact is
that Egyptian SAM radars were knocked out by I.D.F. forces which have
crossed the canal and were operating behind the Egyptian lines.
Soviet leadership became aware of the date and time of attack on October
4. Sadat suggests that Asad informed Soviets about date but Israelyan
states that it was from the inner circle of Arab leadership and not through
government channels that Soviets came to know about the plan.104 Despite
heavy military and political dependence on Soviets and obligation under
the friendship treaty of 1971, Egypt didn’t inform Soviets about
the start of a war. It was the Soviet Union which started a heavy airlift
of military equipment to its allies during the war (Soviet airplanes started
to arrive on October 9 and within three days about three thousand tons
of Soviet war material had arrived in Syria and Egypt.). Soviets made
this decision after reviewing the reconnaissance photos which had showed
heavy material losses. Soviet aircraft (Anatov-12 & 22) were given
permission by Yugoslavia and Turkey and brought hardware from Warsaw Pact
stockpiles in Kiev and Budapest.105 In addition, Soviet ships from Odessa
started delivering heavy equipment. The Arabs didn’t have the far
sightedness to see the consequences of this. In addition, Sadat admits
that President Tito of Yugoslavia sent 140 tanks with fuel and ammunition
and delivered them directly to the battlefield.106 Despite the reports
of Soviet supplies, US played down this factor in the beginning. A Pentagon
spokesperson stated that, ‘The Arabs have gotten some of their honour
back, and we don’t want the Israelis to take it away. It’s
time to settle’.107 The opinions at different branches of US government
were different. The State Department, a small faction at Pentagon and
some legislatures (Senator Fulbright and Senate Majority leader, Mansfield)
were of the view that if a stand off occurs in Sinai with no clear winner,
there will be room for diplomatic maneuvering as no victor was going to
relinquish its gains thus making any negotiations very difficult. This
approach didn’t mean that US would allow Israel to be defeated decisively
(the chances of which were almost nil) by Arabs supported by Soviet arms.
Since October 10, limited supplies to Israel had started (an Israeli 707
loading at Oceana Naval Air Station was photographed).108 On October 13,
the films of US reconnaissance of the Sinai were reviewed. The analysts
were of the view that Egyptians were about to pour many hundreds of tanks
into the battle which may be the decisive factor. The decision of Nixon
to start supplying Israelis on large scale was based on increasing Soviet
supplies to Arabs, refusal of Soviets to coordinate with US to bring a
ceasefire and report of this reconnaissance. The first US supplies arrived
at Lod airport on October 14. By October 17, twenty Phantoms had arrived
in Israel followed by an air bridge which brought a large amount of military
supplies (it included laser-guided smart bombs, cluster bombs, A-4E Skyhawk
fighters, CH-53 helicopters, tanks, TOW anti tank missiles and ammunition)
to Israel. None of the NATO allies allowed facilities for this airlift
which caused friction of their relations with US. The downed Israeli aircrafts
were quickly replaced, some even taken from the US active air force units
(F-4s from Air Force Base in North Carolina and Sixth Fleet in Mediterranean
and Skyhawk A-4s from Navy Fighter Weapons School at Miramar, California).109
as US was fully aware of the importance of air operations. US supplies
continued to arrive till November 14.
The diplomatic activity started to defuse the tensions and find a middle
ground where all parties would have some face saving. ‘Both great
powers saw a military stalemate as the most realistic approach to a durable
political settlement’.110 Despite this underlying understanding,
various actions of one power were evaluated by the other and appropriate
counter measures instituted to keep balance. When Soviets started large-scale
supplies to it’s allies, US got concerned about the outcome on the
ground. Soviet reason for the supplies was to make sure that Egyptians
hold on to their gains on the east of canal. Similarly, when Syrians were
mauled and Israel began shifting the centre of gravity to Sinai and later
encirclement of Third Army made Soviets apprehensive and they read it
as no change in US position of guaranteeing Israeli military superiority
rather than favouring a military stalemate.111
The issue of ceasefire is also not a straightforward pre-determined decision
but there was a lot of maneuvering by both super-powers depending on how
the operations on the battlefield were going on. At the outbreak of war
on October 6, Moscow instructed its representative at United Nations (Yakov
Malik) to veto any ceasefire resolution if asked by Egypt and Syria. In
case of difference between the two countries (Egypt & Syria), he should
act in accordance with the position of Egypt.112 In the early phase of
war, when Arabs were on the offensive, the surprised Soviets decided to
wait and see, rather than push for early ceasefire. On October 7, Asad
met Soviet ambassador and told him that the situation at Israeli-Syrian
front was critical and asked for a ceasefire. Asad admitted that Syrian
offensive has come to a halt and now he expected the much-dreaded Israeli
counter attack. On October 11, due to deteriorating situation on Syrian
front, Moscow wanted some concrete steps towards a possible ceasefire.
Dobrynin talked to Kissinger several times but US didn’t show any
great interest at that time as Israel had recovered from the initial shock.
Kosygin visited Cairo on October 16. Brezhnev urgently requested that
Kissinger be sent to Moscow to negotiate the terms for a ceasefire and
sent a letter to Nixon on October 16. By October 21, Sadat was now aware
of the real and present danger to Egyptian forces. Sadat met with Vinogradov
along with his National Security Advisor, Hafiz Ismail. Ismail acknowledged
a serious threat to Cairo in view of Israeli breakthrough through the
canal. Sadat pleaded to ‘make use of all Soviet contacts with Washington
and New York to bring about a ceasefire in the Middle East’.113
Kissinger flew to Moscow on October 21. After the first ceasefire on October
22, Israel broke it to complete the encirclement of Third Army. By October
24, the attempt by Third Army to breakthrough had failed and Israel had
cut off all supply routes to this army. Soviets saw it as unwillingness
or inability of US to restrain Israel which could alter military balance
on ground. Soviets alerted their airborne divisions and diverted transport
aircraft to the staging bases of seven airborne divisions. This in view
of already heavy naval presence of both super powers in the Mediterranean
raised the tensions. Brezhnev sent a letter to Nixon on October 25 morning.
One sentence in the letter would result in sudden rise in temperature
between the two powers. It stated, “I will say it straight that
if you find it impossible to act jointly with us in this matter, we should
be faced with the necessity of urgently to consider taking appropriate
steps unilaterally. We cannot allow arbitrariness on the part of Israel”.114
Soviet leadership probably didn’t expected a strong US response.
US was in a difficult position. It has to take bold action against both
Soviet Union (to show that US will not be intimidated by the threat of
force) and Israel (to force it to accept and observe ceasefire to prevent
escalation of tensions between super powers). On Israeli front, US slowed
the airlift and told Israeli leadership in low tones that US had to reconsider
the entire issue of arms deliveries. In Security Council, US voted for
a resolution calling for a restitution of the October 22 ceasefire line.
After a blunt rebuke from US, Israeli cabinet met in an extraordinary
session on October 25, and Israeli military activity stopped immediately.
On the Soviet front, Nixon called a phase three alert (Defense Condition
3 known as DefCon-3 or Red Alert) of all American armed forces on October
25.115 Another account suggests that National Security Council took this
decision at 11:30 p.m. in a meeting in which neither the President nor
Vice President was present.116 On October 26, Dobrynin met Kissinger and
conveyed Soviet concerns about the fate of Third Army. Kissinger was fully
aware of the risks and US put pressure on Israelis to open supplies to
Third Army. Henry Kissinger in his usual diplomatic maneuvers walked a
tight rope. To Egyptians he told that a renewed war would mean destruction
of Third Army and Egypt may loose all war gains. To Israelis, he stressed
the point that destruction of Third Army would gain nothing for them but
result in their total international isolation and oil pressure would turn
the whole world against them.117 In fact, when Israelis hesitated, US
threatened to supply Third Army by helicopters if Israelis didn’t
agree. (This was disclosed by Moshe Dayan in December 1974)
Arab World
As expected, there was no meaningful cooperation or general consensus
about the overall strategy among Arab nations. The fault lines between
various countries were too deep to be patched by the anti-Israel rhetoric.
Many countries gave support to Egypt and Syria but most of it was lofty,
rhetorical statements. The military help was too little, too confused
and too late to have any impact on the events on ground. It was mainly
for political and domestic consumption.118 Saudi Arabia promised two squadrons
of Lightnings but didn’t want to send their pilots. No body thought
of the complexity and utter stupidity of these decisions. Egypt had plenty
of aircrafts, they were short of pilots. At a time when many of their
fighters were flown by Soviets, they sent seven pilots and 33 mechanics
to learn about a totally different aircraft in Saudi Arabia. After wasting
a year in Saudi Arabia, they came back empty handed. The instructions,
support services and other issues about Lightnings were too complex to
be easily sorted out. Algeria sent three squadrons (one squadron each
of MIG-21, MIG-17 and SU-7) to Egypt. Iraq sent a Hawker Hunter squadron
to Egypt. It is not clear if they played any role in operations. Asad
was confidant in the beginning and didn’t want anybody else to share
the glory. When going got tough, he asked for Iraqi help. Iraq sent four
squadrons of aircraft (3 MIG-21 & one MIG-17) to Syria. In addition,
Iraq sent 6th Armoured Brigade, 8th Mechanized Infantry Brigade and 3rd
Armoured Division piecemeal in the heat of the battle. 12th Armoured Brigade
arrived on 15 along with a Special Forces Brigade (3 Battalions). This
just added to the confusion. There was no planning of how to use these
troops and no coordination. Iraqis were simply told to ‘go forward
and fight’.119 The total Iraqi contribution to Syrian front was
about 20,000 men and 250 tanks. Jordan sent 40th Armoured Brigade (led
by Brigadier Haled Hajhoui) on October 14 to Syria (later 90th Armoured
Brigade was also dispatched). Jordanian contribution was about 8,000 men
and 150 tanks. The same day, Saudi Arabia airlifted a lorried infantry
brigade (about 2,000 men). Kuwait sent an artillery battery to Syria.
The outcome of such hotchpotch amateurish efforts against all military
norms and rules should not surprise anybody. The Jordanians tanks with
their tank commanders riding with their heads out of their turrets walked
into an Israeli ambush (17th Brigade was waiting for them) and mauled.
Iraqis artillery opened fire on advancing Jordanians. To Jordanians luck,
the fire was not accurate and fell short of actual target. When Syrian
aircrafts were called for ground support, they strafed Iraqi armour. On
October 19, poor Jordanian tanks came under fire not only from Israelis
but also Syrians and Iraqis. Jordan had Centurion tanks which Israel also
had. Arab countries had Soviet tanks so Jordanian Centurions were mistaken
for Israeli tanks. In this battle Jordanian armoured brigade was shelled
by Syrian artillery that was itself under attack from Iraqi soldiers.120
Iraqi Special Forces got caught in front of advancing Israeli tanks and
a number of them were crushed by tanks. Iraqi brigade got into an accidental
firefight with Saudi contingent. Similarly, the two Iraqi squadrons of
Mig-21s which arrived in Syria went into action immediately. Four of them
were shot down by Syrian air defense because neither the pilots had been
briefed nor friend or foe identity had been properly implemented. The
Moroccan soldiers in Syria (one tank regiment) quarreled with Syrians
and after the second week of war, several hundred disaffected troops deserted
to Lebanon.121 Gaddafi of Libya gave $500 million to the Egyptian war
chest and sent two Mirage III squadrons. He kept openly criticizing Egyptian
plans. He called King Hussain of Jordan coward because he was not joining
the fight. In the middle of raging battle, Gaddafi sent a telegrame to
Sadat complaining that, ‘our people take it somewhat amiss that
their political contribution to the battle is being ignored in all broadcasts
from Cairo while Feisal’s contribution is magnified’.122 Tunisia
sent an Armoured unit of 900 men on a 1,800 mile journey on October 10
(It participated in the defense of Port Said). Egyptian war minister Ismail
correctly called this ‘more of a military nuisance than of any value’.123
Morocco had an infantry brigade in Syria. A Kuwaiti infantry detachment
and a brigade of Palestinians was in Egypt (They were stationed in the
area of Israeli breach on canal front). There were few late shows. An
Algerian Armoured brigade (200 tanks) after a ten day road journey reached
on October 24, the day of ceasefire. The Sudanese infantry battalion arrived
on 28 and a Moroccan detachment (one brigade of 2,000 men) after the firing
had stopped completely. Almost all of these military units (except Iraqi)
arrived without any logistic support expecting their hosts to feed them
and provide them with fuel and supplies.124 Pakistan sent a field ambulance
unit to Syria and one to Egypt and asked its citizens to pray for the
victory of Arabs (a practical and realistic gesture as 90,000 of their
soldiers were POWs in India after the 1971 war). Sheikh Mujeeb ur Rahman
of Bangladesh announced that fifty thousand guerrillas were ready to be
sent to Egypt on minutes notice. After few days of contemplation, he changed
his mind and instead sent fifty thousand tons of Bengal tea to Egypt.
In early 1973, King Hassan of Morocco had promised Egypt a squadron of
F-5s and an independent armoured brigade for war effort. In late September
1973, when Shazly went to Morocco to collect the promised help, he found
out that the pilots of F-5 squadron were under arrest as they had attempted
a coup against their King. The king told that he will send the armoured
brigade to Egypt in November. Shaikh Zaid Bin Sultan Al Nayyan of Abu
Dhabi who was relaxing in London sent a check of $100 million to Egypt
on October 11, so that he is not left out of the blessings of this adventure.
The only positive contribution was that of the 12th Armoured Brigade of
Iraq and 40th Armoured Brigade of Jordan. These two brigades helped to
strengthen the Syrian defense lines in south and prevented Israeli flanking.
The reason for their success was that both these brigades had taken part
in exercises conducted by Unified Arab Command in past and were familiar
with the terrain of the battlefield.
Conclusion
October 1973 war was between foes with different philosophies
of war. Arabs were more tuned to a ‘meat grinding’ conduct
of war (which was in line with Soviet military thought process) while
Israelis were going for a ‘blitzkrieg’.125 The material and
human loss of this three week conflict was enormous. There is a wide margin
of difference between rival claims of the combatants. The rough figures
are: Israel: dead: 2,355; wounded: about nine thousand; tank loss: about
500; airplanes: 115. On Arab side no official figures have been released
but rough estimates are: Dead: 5,000; wounded: ten thousand; tank losses:
1,200; airplanes: 370. The carnage touched even die hard nationalists
like Sharon. After one of fierce close tank battle, he had a large number
of dead in front of him and he later recalled, “Somebody had to
determine who was an Egyptian, who an Israeli among those boys lying there,
almost in each other’s arms”.126 Overall, the war can be best
described as a stalemate. Each side had gained something and lost something.
These gains and losses can be explained in various ways and depends on
the perspective and bias of the person evaluating the events. The ironies
were also there. It was the fasting month of Ramadan for Muslims. When
operations started, Egyptian high command had told soldiers not to fast
(based on expert opinion in Islamic law). Yom Kippur (the day of atonement
is a holy day for Jews and many Israeli soldiers were also fasting. Many
broke their fast (based on expert opinion in Jewish law).
On Egypt’s part, it was Sadat who perceived that if rapprochement
between US and Soviet Union occurs, this may result in freezing of status
quo and permanent loss of Egyptian territories. This prompted him to speed
up the process of preparation for war. There was no meeting of minds between
Egypt and Syria. Mutual suspicions and different objectives of the two
countries seriously hampered their war efforts. Sadat and Asad ‘tried
to put the blame for their differences in military and political strategy
and perceptions on the Soviet ambassadors’.127
On the Israeli part, some of their leaders (Deputy Prime Minister Yigal
Allon and Finance Minister Pinhas Sapir) had been advocating for a while
that status quo was dangerous for Israel and should not be continued and
steps should be taken on diplomatic front to address the basic issues
concerning its Arab neighbours. But then when had a victor taken a major
decision of giving up what it has achieved by force of arms. The October
War proved Israeli strategy of putting Arabs in ‘a political straightjacket’
with no room for maneuvering while maintaining their own overwhelming
military superiority wrong.128 It was on the basis of this strategy that
Israel had thwarted the efforts of both powers for a political settlement.
The argument of safe and defensible borders in Israel was complex due
to silence on part of Arabs about their war plans. If Arabs were for the
annihilation of Israel then it made sense to have as much buffer between
the enemy and Israel proper, so that land could be traded for time and
give I.D.F more maneuverability. On the other hand, if Arabs were fighting
only to recover their lost land (Sinai and Golan) and honour, then Isarel
was fighting merely for land it had been attempting to exchange for security.
‘In this case Israel fought the wrong war, at the wrong time, for
the wrong aims’.129 The October War convinced Israel that it has
to accept a settlement where security is achieved through more stress
on political stability rather than overwhelming military dominance. Even
after signing peace treaties with Jordan and Egypt, the problem of Palestinians
has not disappeared. At the end of the day, Israelis have to deal directly
with Palestinians for a political settlement in a give and take manner.
Time has proven again and again that the solution is political which can’t
be solved only with military means regardless of how overwhelming that
power is.
Arabs in general and Palestinians in particular had no strategic vision
or plan. No serious study of the problems, changing regional and international
environment and a well thought out plan for fulfillment of their goals
was taken. When they were not sure about their own destiny, how could
one expect from them to plan for negotiating with Israelis. In the early
phase, Palestinians mainly banking on other Arab states had an inflexible
stand in total disregard of ground realities. ‘When they talked
about a “democratic secular Palestinian state” to replace
Israel, they meant an Arab state, in which the Jews would have the right
to be buried in their own cemeteries’.130 ‘The Arab posture
of implacable hostility had given Israel no incentive to engage in diplomacy;
with their country’s existence permanently on the line, Israeli
leaders clung to strategic positions of strength’.131
A very important aspect which has been neglected by almost all Arab policy
makers and intellectuals is the vital question of aims of any military
operation or political initiative. In 1973, ‘Syria never formally
voiced its war aims or confirmed that it sought only the recovery of Golan
Heights’. Egypt publicly proclaimed its position on October 16.
Sadat insisted that ‘the Arabs were seeking not the extermination
of Israel but only the restoration of national honour and the recovery
of Arab lands lost in the June War’.132 The problem was that this
proclamation was made on October 16, when Egyptians had already failed
in their October 14 offensive. Same was true for Palestinians. They were
forced by Israelis to come to negotiating table when Jordan and Egypt
made peace with Israel but this also meant that they will be asked to
give up more and more of their rights. Just as in 1973, even today, Arab
and Palestinian citizens don’t know what are their objectives. The
result is that they were unable to achieve their objectives with war and
if current behaviour is any indicator, it is unlikely that they will achieve
it by peace. Arabs have to go a long way both in terms of military and
political re-structuring of their own societies before they can be in
a position to prepare for an effective response to Israel both on military
and diplomatic fronts.
Arab-Israeli conflict is not only military and political but also psychological.
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is an important factor in destabilization
of the region but by no means it is the only one. The crisis of body politic
of Arab societies is multifactorial and deep. The fact that Sadat, man
who planned and executed a fairly good military operation against Israel
to break the dead lock, was assassinated by his own soldiers ironically
on the ceremonial occasion commemorating that war on October 6, 1981,
demands a much introspection by Arabs. The bogey of Israel has overshadowed
all other factors in Arab political consciousness. An astute observer
had predicted long time ago in 1974 that the rich oil producing Arabs
‘have to defend themselves and their riches against far more immediate
and real dangers than Israel’.133 Iran-Iraq war in 80s, Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait in 1990 and presence of US forces in Saudi Arabia is a grim
testimony to that prophecy.
Notes
1Aker, Frank. October 1973:
The Arab-Israeli War (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1985), p. 36
2El-Gamasy, Mohamed Abdel-Ghani. Field Marshal. The October War - Memoirs
of Field Marshal El-Gamasy of Egypt (Translated by Gillian Potter, Nadra
Morcos & Rosette Frances (Cairo: The American University Press, 1993),
p. 167
3El-Gamasy. The October War, p. 131
4El-Gamasy. The October War, p. 139
5El-Gamasy. The October War, p. 191
6Kissinger, Henry. Years of Renewal (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999),
p. 411
7El Shazly, Saad. Lieutenant General. The Crossing of the Suez (San Francisco:
American Mideast Research, 1980), p. 28-29
8Aker. October 1973, p. 84
9Heikal, Mohamed. The Road To Ramadan (New York: Quadrangle/New York Times
Book Co., 1975), p. 181
10El-Gamasy. The October War, p. 154
11For details of some of these deci- sions, see Sadat, Anwar. In Search
of Identity (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1978), p. 224-25,
236
12El-Shazly. The Crossing, p. 225-26
13El-Shazly. The Crossing, p. 271-72
14El-Gamasy. The October War, p. 206-207
15El-Shazly. The Crossing, p. 234
16Aker. October 1973, p. 95
17El-Gamasy. October War, p. 266
18Heikal. Road To Ramadan, p. 218
19El-Gamasy. October War, p. 277 & Shazly. The Crossing, p. 248
20El-Gamasy. The October War, p. 277-78
21Whetten L. Lawrence. The Canal War: Four-Power Conflict in the Middle
East (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1974), p. 266
22quoted in El-Gamasy. The October War, p. 278
23Laqueur, Walter. Confrontation: The Middle East and World Politics (New
York: Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co. 1974), p. 169
24O,Balance, Edgar. No Victor, No Vanquished: The Yom Kippur War (San
Rafael, California & London: Presidio Press, 1978), p. 241
25Sadat. In Search, p. 262
26O,Balance. No Victor, p. 245 and Sadat. In Search, p. 263
27El-Sahzly. The Crossing, p. 266
28Sadat. In Search of Identity, p. 260-61
29Sadat. In Search of Identity, p. 261
30Shazly. The Crossing, p. 270
31Sadat. In Search, p. 256
32Sharon, Ariel and Chanoff, David. Warrior: The Autobiography of Ariel
Sharon (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989), p. 304
33El Shazly. The Crossing, p. 48
34O,Balance. No Victor, p. 290
35El Shazly. The Crossing, p. 29
36El Shazly. The Crossing, p. 83
37Aker. October 1973, p. 111
38Aker. October 1973, p. 110
39Laqueur. Confrontation, p. 17
40Heikal. Road to Ramadan, p. 217
41Sadat’s message to Asad on accep- tance of ceasefire sent on October
20, 1973 cited in Heikal. Road to Ramadan, p. 239
42El-Shazly. The Crossing, p. 8
43El Shazly. The Crossing, p. 141
44Sadat. In Search, p. 218
45Sadat. In Search, p. 216
46Shazly. The Crossing, p. 303
47Sadat. In Search, p. 263
48Sadat. In Search, p. 268 & 270
49El-Shazly. The Crossing, p. 3
50El-Shazly. The Crossing, p. 301
51Laqueur. Confrontation, p. 24
52Creveld, Martin van. The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of
the Israeli Defense Forces (New York: Public Affairs, 2002), p. 222
53O,Balance. No Victor, p. 35
54Creveld. The Sword, p. 223
55El-Gamasy. The October War,
p. 229 and Heikal. Road to Ramadan, p. 208-209
56Sadat. In Search of Destiny, p. 253
57Israelyan, Victor. Inside The Kremlin During The Yom Kippur War (University
Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), p.
14
58Creveld. The Sword, p. 229
59 O,Balance. No Victor, p. 136
60Whetten. The Canal War, p. 279
61Aker. October 1973, p. 92
62 O,Balance. No Victor , p. 215
63Israelyan. Inside the Kremlin, p. 55
64O,Balance. No Victor, p. 136
65 O’Balance. No Victor, p. 133
66 Aker. October 1973, p. 75
67Laqueur. Confrontation, p. 92
68Laqueur. Confrontation, p. 93
69Creveld. The Sword, p. 211-212
70Creveld. The Sword, p. 225
71O,Balance. No Victor, p. 67-68
72Creveld. The Sword, p. 223
73El-Gamasy. The October War, p. 232
74 Sharon. Warrior, p. 304
75 Creveld. The Sword, p. 229
76Heikal. Road to Ramadan, p. 229
77Aker. October 1973, p. 108
78Creveld. The Sword, p. 231-32
79Aker. October 1973, p. 86-87
80 Newsweek, October 22, 1973
81 Aker. October 1973, p. 122
82 Aker. October 1973, p. 82-83
83 Aker. October 1973, p. 83
84Whetten. The Canal War, p. 267-68
85Whetten. The Canal War, p. 281
86Aker. October 1973, p. 101
87Creveld. The Sword, p. 224
88O’Balance. No Victor, p. 34
89Sharon. Warrior, p. 303
90Creveld. The Sword, p. 228
91Aker. October 1973, p. 77
92 O,Balance. No Victor, p. 108
93 Sharon. Warrior, p. 305
94cited in O,Balance. No Victor, p. 117
95Whetten. The Canal War, p. 280
96El-Gamasy. The October War, p. 129
97El-Shazly. The Crosssing, p. 13 & 83
98IISS estimates cited in O,Balance. No Victor, p. 14
99El Shazly, Saad. General. The Arab Military Option (San Francisco: American
Mideast Research, 1986), p. 114
100Sadat. In Search of Identity, p. 258-59
101O,Balance. No Victor, p. 61
102Israelyan. Inside the Kremlin, p. 22
103Sadat. In Search of Identity, p. 260-61
104Israelyan. Inside the Kremlin, p. 2
105O,Balance. No Victor, p. 275
106Sadat. In Search of Identity, p. 255
107New York Times, October 15, 1973 cited in Laqueur. Confrontation, p.
167
108Whetten. The Canal War, p. 285
109Aker. October 1973, p. 57
110Whetten. The Canal War, p. 286
111Whetten. The Canal War, p. 287
112Israelyan. Inside the Kremlin, p. 38
113Israelyan. Inside the Kremlin, p. 129
114Israelyan. Inside the Kremlin, p. 169-70
115Whetten. The Canal War, p. 292-93
116Israelyan. Inside the Kremlin, p. 174
117Laqueur. Confrontation, p. 216-17
118For details of Arab military contribu- tion towards war, see Shazly.
The Crossing, p. 277
119O,Balance. No Victor, p. 195
120Aker. October 1973, p. 88
121Whetten. The Canal War, p. 271-72
122Gaddafi’s telegram to Sadat on October 11, 1973 quoted in Heikal.
Road to Ramadan, p. 222
123O,Balance. No Victor, p. 173
124O,Balance. No Victor, p. 270-71
125Aker. October 1973, p. 97
126Sharon. Warrior, p. 320
127Israelyan. Inside the Kremlin, p. 47
128Whetten. The Canal War, p. 273
129Whetten. The Canal War, p. 278
130Laqueur. Confrontation, p. 285
131Kissinger. Years of Renewal, p. 354
132Whetten. The Canal War, p. 288
133Laqueur. Confrontation, p. 293
Selected Readings
The October War by Abdel Ghani el Gamasy. Gamasy was Chief of
Operations of Egyptian armed forces during 1973 and was instrumental in
detailed planning of various aspects of the operations. Very good and
detailed account of the Egyptian side of the story especially the preparatory
phase of the war.
The Crossing of the Suez by Lt. General Saad el Shazly. Shazly was Chief
of Staff of Egyptian army during 1973. This work is a good account of
the Egyptian preparations for war by a person close to operations. It
gives details about battles from Egyptian point of view. Shazly has given
more objective analysis of Egyptian weaknesses. Shazly fell from favour
of Sadat, therefore, the work also gives a good insight of the dynamics
of a politicized army.
The Arab Military Option by Saad al Shazly. This work is a kind of surprise
from an Egyptian commander who has very good reputation. Shazly is respected
as a good commander. In 1967, he successfully outmaneuvered Sharon and
brought back his troops intact. His contribution to 1973 preparation on
sound professional and practical grounds cannot be disputed. With this
background, it is a surprise to see this hotchpotch collection of confusing
thoughts. He gives elaborate details of military strengths of everybody
in the world which has no relevance to Arab problems. He then builds up
his thoughts about imaginary military unified power totally oblivious
to the ground realities and extreme schism among various Arab countries.
This account displays the mediocry of Arab high level officers and gives
some insight into why they were repeatedly defeated. It is also comic
to read the virtues of ‘freedom of expression, ‘democracy’,
and ‘human rights’ from the pen of a general who had faithfully
served two most repressive and absolute rulers (Nasser & Sadat) without
any qualms. Indeed, a common trait among this lot, these virtues are suddenly
revealed to these generals when they fell out of favour.
In Search of Identity by Anwar el Sadat. Sadat makes a history by being
the only head of the state who published his memoirs while in office.
As expected, the account is full of megalomaniac ideas, giving all credit
to himself and blaming others for all mistakes. Good insight into the
dynamics of an autocratic ruler.
October 1973: The Arab Israeli War by Frank Aker. Good account of the
details of operations on all fronts.
The Canal War by Lawrence Whetten. This is the account of the 1973 war
looking at international perspective especially super power rivalry and
maneuvering in Middle East. The section on military lessons of the war
is a good synopsis.
The Road to Ramadan by Muhamad Husnain Heikal. Heikal was the most influential
Arab journalist who had personal relationship with many Arab leaders.
This account gives some insight into happenings at the highest level in
Egypt as he had close relationships with Sadat and senior military high
command. As it was written when Sadat was still President, therefore,
the account suffers from any objective analysis of policy decisions of
the government which had an impact on operations. As usual, the account
denounces the dead and those condemned by the ruling regime but absolves
those still wielding power.
No Victor, No Vanquished: The Yom Kippur War by Edgar O’Balance.
A well balanced account of the events of 1973 war, not biased towards
any party. O’Balance visited the battlefield three years after the
war and met many officers on both sides who participated in war.
The Sword and the Olive by Creveld. Excellent work on detailed history
of I.D.F. from early days to today. Must read for anybody interested in
I.D.F. Author has done a remarkable job by giving a detailed and critical
account of I.D.F. despite the fact that four of his own children are serving
in I.D.F.
Inside The Kremlin During The Yom Kippur War by Victor Israelyan. A good
account of the diplomatic efforts of Soviet Union during war. Israelyan
was Director of Department of International Organizations in Ministry
of Foreign Affairs. During war, he was member of a four man task force
which was set up to provide data to Politburo. In this position, he attended
many high level meetings of Soviet leadership during the war. Must read
for anybody interested in the role of super powers in regional conflicts.
Gives a good insight into working of a complex equation where several
balls of different aims are juggled by the diplomats of a super power.
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