Shock and Awe
Achieving Rapid Dominance
By:
Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade
With:
L.A. âBudâ Edney
Fred M. Franks
Charles A. Horner
Jonathan T. Howe
Keith Brendley, Executive Secretary
Prepared by Defense Group Inc. for
The National Defense University
iii
Table of Contents
Foreword.................................................................................. v
Prologue................................................................................. vii
Introduction to Rapid Dominance...................................... xvii
Chapter One: Background and Basis......................................1
Chapter Two: Shock and Awe...............................................19
Chapter Three: Strategic, Policy,
and Operational Application ................................................37
Chapter Four: An Outline for System
Innovation and Technological Integration............................65
Chapter Five: Future Directions............................................91
AppendicesâViews of Three Former Unified CINCs
Appendix A: âThoughts on Rapid Dominanceâ
by Admiral Bud Edney .....................................................99
Appendix B: âDefense Alternatives: Forces Requiredâ
by General Chuck Horner..............................................117
Appendix C: âEnduring Realities and Rapid Dominanceâ
by General Fred Franks ..................................................135
Biographies of the Study Group Members .........................141
v
Foreword
e are in the early stages of what promises
to be an extended debate about the
future of conflict and the future of our defense
establishment. Few will deny that the winds of
change are blowing as never before, driven by a
radically altered geopolitical situation, an evolv-
ing information-oriented society, advancing tech-
nology, and budgetary constraints. How our
nation responds to the challenge of change will
determine our ability to shape the future and
defend ourselves against 21st century threats.
The major issue, however it may be manifested,
involves the degree of change that is required.
Advocates, all along the spectrum from a military
technical revolution to a revolution in military
affairs to a revolution in security affairs, are
making their cases. Military institutions are by
their very nature somewhat conservative. History
has shown that success has often sown the seeds
of future failure. We as a nation can ill afford to
follow in the footsteps of those who have rested
on their laurels and failed to stretch their imagi-
nations.
W
vi
Often, those who are the most knowledgeable and experienced
about a subject are not in the most advantageous position to
understand a new world order. Yet these same individuals are
often among the most credible voices and therefore are essen-
tial to progress. The authors of
Shock and Awe
are a highly
accomplished and distinguished group with the credibility that
comes from years of front line experience. Thus, this work is
important not only because of the ideas contained within, but
because of the caliber and credibility of the authors.
ACTIS seeks to articulate and explore advanced concepts. In
sponsoring this work and in disseminating its initial results, we
hope to contribute to the ongoing dialogue about alternatives,
their promises, and their risks. As the authors note, this is a work
in progress meant not to provide definitive solutions but a pro-
posed perspective for considering future security needs and
strategies. To the extent that vigorous debate ensues we will be
successful.
David S. Alberts
Washington, D.C.
October 1996
vii
Prologue
he purpose of this paper is to explore alter-
native concepts for structuring mission
capability packages (MCPâs) around which future
U. S. military forces might be configured. From
the very outset of this study groupâs deliberations,
we agreed that the most useful contribution we
could make would be to attempt to reach beyond
what we saw as the current and commendable
efforts, largely but not entirely, within the Depart-
ment of Defense to define concepts for strategy,
doctrine, operations, and force structure to deal
with a highly uncertain future. In approaching
this endeavor, we fully recognized the inherent
and actual limits and difficulties in attempting to
reach beyond what may prove to be the full
extent of our grasp.
It is, of course, clear that U. S. military forces are
currently the most capable in the world and are
likely to remain so for a long time to come. Why
then, many will ask, should we examine and even
propose major excursions and changes if the
country occupies this position of military superi-
ority? For reasons noted in this paper, we believe
T
viii
that excursions are important if only to confirm the validity of
current defense approaches.
There are several overrarching realties that have led us to this
conclusion. First, while everyone recognizes that the Cold War
has ended, no one has yet been able to describe or predict what
this means for more precisely defining the nature of our future
security needs. Despite this absence of both clairvoyance and a
galvanizing external danger, the United States has become
refreshingly open in examining new strategic options and
choices. The variety of conceptual efforts underway in the Pen-
tagon to deal with this uncertainty exemplifies this reality.
At the same time, the current dominance and superiority of
American military power unencumbered by the danger of an
external âpeer competitorâ have created a period of strategic
advantage during which we have the luxury of time, perhaps
measured in many years, to reexamine with safety our defense
posture. On the other hand, potential adversaries cannot be
expected to ignore this predominant military capability of the
United States and fail to try to exploit, bypass, or counter it. In
other words, faced with American military superiority in ships,
tanks, aircraft, weapons and, most importantly, in competent
fighting personnel, potential adversaries may try to change the
terms of future conflict and make as irrelevant as possible these
U. S. advantages. We proceed at our own risk if dismiss this pos-
sibility.
Second, it is relatively clear that current U.S. military capability
will shrink. Despite the pledges of the two major American
political parties to maintain or grow the current level of defense
capability, both the force structure and defense infrastructure
are too large to be maintained at even the present levels and
ix
within the defense budgets that are likely to be approved.
Unless a new menace materializes, defense is headed for âless
of the same.â Such reductions may have no strategic conse-
quences. However, that is an outcome that we believe should
not be left to chance.
This shrinkage also means that the Pentagonâs good faith stra-
tegic reviews aimed at dealing with our future security needs
may be caught up in the defense budget debate over downsizing
and could too easily drift into becoming advocacy or marketing
documents. As the services are forced into more jealously
guarding a declining force structure, the tendency to âstove-
pipeâ and compartmentalize technology and âspecialâ pro-
grams is likely to increase thereby complicating the problem of
making full use of our extraordinary technological resources.
This means that some external thinking, removed from the
bureaucratic pressures and demands, may be essential to stim-
ulating and sustaining innovation.
Third, the American commercial-industrial base is undergoing
profound change propelled largely by the entrepreneurial
nature of the free enterprise system and the American person-
ality. Whether in information or materials-related technology,
or for that matter in other areas too numerous to count, the
nature of competition is driving both product breadth and
improvement at rates perhaps unthinkable a decade ago. One
sign of these trends is the reality that virtually all new jobs in this
country are being created by small business. In the areas of
commercial information and related management-information
systems, these changes are extraordinary and were probably
unpredictable even a few years ago.
x
On the so-called information highway, performance is increas-
ing dramatically and quickly while price, cost, and the time to
bring to market new generation technology are diminishing.
These positive trends are not matched yet in the defense-indus-
trial base. One consequence of this broad commercial transfor-
mation is that any future set of defense choices may be
inexorably linked to and dependent on this profound, ongoing
change in the commercial sector and in learning to harness pri-
vate sector advances in technology-related products. It must
also be understood that only America among all states and
nations has the vastness and breadth of resources and commer-
cial capability to undertake the full exploitation of this revolu-
tionary potential.
These structural realities are exciting and offer a major oppor-
tunity for real revolution and change if we are able and daring
enough to exploit them. This, in turn, has led us to develop the
concept of Rapid Dominance and its attendant focus on
âShock and Awe.â Rapid Dominance seeks to integrate these
multifaceted realities and facts and apply them to the common
defense at a time when uncertainty about the future is perhaps
one of the few givens. We believe the principles and ideas
underlying this concept are sufficiently compelling and differ-
ent enough from current American defense doctrine encapsu-
lated by âoverwhelming or decisive force,â âdominant
battlefield awareness,â and âdominant maneuverâ to warrant
closer examination.
Since before Sun Tzu and the earliest chroniclers of war
recorded their observations, strategists and generals have been
tantalized and confounded by the illusive goal of destroying the
adversaryâs will to resist before, during, and after battle. Today,
xi
we believe that an unusual opportunity exists to determine
whether or not this long-sought strategic goal of affecting the
will, understanding, and perception of an adversary can be
brought closer to fruition. Even if this task cannot be accom-
plished, we believe that, at the very minimum, such an effort
will enhance and improve the ability of our military forces to
carry out their missions more successfully through identifying
and reinforcing particular points of leverage in the especially
complex and always uncertain world of conflict and by identi-
fying and creating additional options and choices for employing
our forces more effectively.
Perhaps for the first time in years, the confluence of strategy,
technology, and the genuine quest for innovation has the poten-
tial for revolutionary change. We envisage Rapid Dominance
as the possible military expression, vanguard, and extension of
this potential for revolutionary change. The strategic centers of
gravity on which Rapid Dominance concentrate, modified by
the uniquely American ability to integrate all of this, are these
junctures of strategy, technology, and innovation which are
focused on the goal of affecting and shaping the will of the
adversary. The goal of Rapid Dominance will be to destroy or
so confound the will to resist that an adversary will have no
alternative except to accept our strategic aims and military
objectives. To achieve this outcome, Rapid Dominance must
control the operational environment and through that domi-
nance, control what the adversary perceives, understands, and
knows, as well as control or regulate what is not perceived,
understood, or known.
In Rapid Dominance, it is an absolutely necessary and vital
condition to be able to defeat, disarm, or neutralize an adver-
xii
saryâs military power. We still must maintain the capacity for
the physical and forceful occupation of territory should there
prove to be no alternative to deploying sufficient numbers of
personnel and equipment on the ground to accomplish that
objective. In pursuing the loftier objective of applying our
resources to controlling, affecting, and breaking the will of an
adversary to resist, should this goal remain illusive, we believe
that Rapid Dominance can still provide a variety of options and
choices for dealing with the operational demands of war and
conflict.
To affect the will of the adversary, Rapid Dominance will apply
a variety of approaches and techniques to achieve the necessary
level of Shock and Awe at the appropriate strategic and military
leverage points. This means that psychological and intangible,
as well as physical and concrete, effects beyond the destruction
of enemy forces and supporting military infrastructure will have
to be achieved. It is in this broader and deeper strategic appli-
cation that Rapid Dominance perhaps most fundamentally dif-
ferentiates itself from current doctrine and offers revolutionary
application.
Flowing from the primary concentration on affecting the
adversaryâs will to resist through imposing a regime of Shock
and Awe to achieve strategic aims and military objectives, four
characteristics emerge that will define the Rapid Dominance
military force. These are noted and discussed in later chapters.
The four characteristics are: near total or absolute knowledge
and understanding of self, adversary, and environment; rapidity
and timeliness in application; operational brilliance in execu-
tion; and (near) total control and signature management of the
entire operational environment.
xiii
Whereas decisive force is inherently capabilities-drivenâthat
is, it focuses on defeating the military capability of an adversary
and therefore tends to be scenario sensitiveâRapid Domi-
nance would seek to be more universal in application through
the overriding objective of affecting the adversaryâs will beyond
the boundaries traditionally defined by military capability
alone. In other words, where decisive force is likely to be most
relevant is against conventional military capabilities that can be
overwhelmed by American (and allied) military superiority. In
conflict or crisis conditions that depart from this idealized sce-
nario, the superior nature of our forces is assumed to be suffi-
ciently broad to prevail. Rapid Dominance would not make
this distinction in either theory or in practice.
We note for the record that should a Rapid Dominance force actually be
fielded with the requisite operational capabilities, this force would be neither
a silver bullet nor a panacea and certainly not an antidote or preventative
for a major policy blunder, miscalculation, or mistake. It should also be fully
appreciated that situations will exist in which Rapid Dominance (or any
other doctrine) may not work or apply because of other political, strategic,
or other limiting factors.
We realize some will criticize our focus on affecting an adver-
saryâs will, perception, and understanding through Shock and
Awe on the grounds that this idea is not new and that such an
outcome may not be physically achievable or politically desir-
able. On the first point, we believe use of first principles of strat-
egy can stand us in good stead even and perhaps especially in
the modern era when adversaries may not elect to fight the
United States along traditional or expected lines. On whether
this ability can and should be achieved, we believe that should
be part of a broader examination.
xiv
Finally, we argue that what is also new in this approach is the
way in which we attempt to integrate far more broadly strategy,
technology, and innovation to achieve Shock and Awe. It is this
interaction and focus that we think will provide the most inter-
esting results.
For these and other reasons, we have embarked on an ambi-
tious intellectual excursion in making a preliminary definition
of Rapid Dominance. For the moment, we view Rapid Domi-
nance in the formation stage and not as a final product. Over
the next months, we believe further steps should be taken to
refine Rapid Dominance and to develop âpaperâ systems and
force designs that will add crucial specificity to this concept.
Then, this Rapid Dominance force can be assessed against five
sets of questions:
â˘
First, assuming that a Rapid Dominance force can be
fielded with the appropriate capabilities of Shock and Awe
to affect and shape the adversaryâs will, how would this
force compare with and improve on our ability to fight,
win and deal with a major regional contingency (MRC)?
â˘
Second, what utility (if any) does Rapid Dominance and its
application of Shock and Awe imply for Operations Other
Than War? Where might Rapid Dominance apply in
OOTW, where would it not, and where might it offer
mixed benefits?
â˘
Third, what are the political implications of Rapid Domi-
nance in both broad and specific applications and could
this lead to a form of political deterrence to underwrite
future U. S. policy? Would this political deterrence prove
acceptable to allies and to our own public?
xv
â˘
Fourth, what might Rapid Dominance mean for alliances,
coalitions, and the conduct of allied operations?
â˘
Finally, what are the consequences of Rapid Dominance
on defense resource investment priorities and future bud-
gets?
From this examination and experimentation, we believe useful
results will flow.
We also would like to acknowledge the support and role of the
National Defense University in sponsoring this first effort. In
particular, we owe a huge debt of gratitude to Dr. David Alberts
of NDU whose intelligence, enthusiasm, and wisdom, as well as
his full support, have been invaluable and without which this
project would have been far less productive.
Washington, DC
1 September 1996
L.A. Edney
F.M. Franks
C. A. Horner
J.T. Howe
H.K. Ullman
J.P. Wade
xvii
Introduction to
Rapid
Dominance
he military posture and capability of the
United States of America are, today, domi-
nant. Simply put, there is no external adversary
in the world that can successfully challenge the
extraordinary power of the American military in
either regional conflict or in âconventionalâ war
as we know it once the United States makes the
commitment to take whatever action may be
needed. To be sure, the first phase of a crisis may
be the most difficultâif an aggressor has attacked
and U.S. forces are not in place. However, it will
still be years, if not decades, before potential
adversaries will be able to deploy systems with a
full panoply of capabilities that are equivalent to
or better than the aggregate strength of the ships,
aircraft, armored vehicles, and weapons systems
in our inventory. Even if an adversary could
deploy similar systems, then matching and over-
coming the superb training and preparation of
American service personnel would still be a
daunting task.
T
xviii
Given this reality that our military dominance can and will
extend for some considerable time to come, provided we are
prepared to use it, why then is a re-examination of American
defense posture and doctrine important? The answers to this
question involve (1) the changing nature of the domestic and
international environments; (2) the complex nature of resolving
inter- and intra-state conflict that falls outside conventional war,
including peacekeeping, and countering terrorism, crime, and
the use of weapons of mass destruction; (3) resource constraints;
(4) defense infrastructure and technical industrial bases raised
on a large, continuous infusion of funding now facing a future
of austerity; and (5) the vast uncertainties of the so-called social,
economic, and information revolutions that could check or
counter many of the nationâs assumptions as well as public sup-
port currently underwriting defense.
It is clear that these so-called grey areas involving nontradi-
tional Operations Other Than War (OOTW) and law enforce-
ment tasks are growing and pose difficult problems and
challenges to American military forces, especially when and
where the use of force may be inappropriate or simply may not
work. The expansion of the role of UN forces to nationbuilding
in Somalia and its subsequent failure comes to mind as an
example of this danger. It is also arguable that the formidable
nature and huge technological lead of American military capa-
bility could induce an adversary to move to a strategy that
attempted to circumvent all this fighting power through other
clever or agile means. The Vietnam war is a grim reminder of
the political nature of conflict and how our power was once out-
flanked. Training, morale, and readiness to fight are perishable
commodities requiring both a generous expenditure of
resources and careful nurturing.
xix
Thus, the greatest constraints today to retaining the most dom-
inant military force in the world, paradoxically, may be in over-
coming the inertia of this success. We may be our own worst
enemy.
During the Cold War when the danger was clear, the defense
debate was often fought over how to balance the so-called
âstrategy-force structure-budgetâ formula. Today, that formula
has expanded to include âthreat, strategy, force structure, bud-
get, and infrastructure.â Without a âclear and present dangerâ
such as the Axis Powers in 1941, or later the Soviet Union, to
coalesce public agreement on the threat, it is difficult to con-
struct a supporting strategy that can be effective either in setting
priorities or objectives. Hence, today's âtwo warâ or two nearly
simultaneous Major Regional Contingency (MRC) strategy has
been criticized as strategically and financially excessive. As
noted by administration officials, the current force structure
does not meet the demands of the âtwo warâ MRC strategy,
and in any event, the budget will not support the planned force
structure. Finally, it is widely recognized that the United States
possesses far more infrastructure such as bases and facilities
than it needs to support the current force, thereby draining
scarce resources away from fighting power. As a result, there is
a substantial defense imbalance that will erode fighting power.
In designing its defense posture, the United States has adopted
the doctrine of employing âdecisive or overwhelming force.â
This doctrine reinforces American advantages in strategic
mobility, pre-positioning, technology, training, and fielding
integrated military systems to provide and retain superiority,
and responds to the minimum casualty and collateral damage
criteria set first in the Reagan Administration. The Revolution
xx
in Military Affairs or RMA is cited as the phenomenon or pro-
cess by which the United States continues to exploit technology
to maintain this decisive force advantage, particularly in terms
of achieving âdominant battlefield awareness.â Through this
awareness, the United States should be able to obtain perfect or
near perfect information on virtually all technical aspects of the
battlefield and therefore be able to defeat or destroy an adver-
sary more effectively, with fewer losses to ourselves, and with a
range of capabilities from long-range precision strike to more
effective close-in weapons.
Before proceeding further, an example is useful to focus some of
the as yet unknowable consequences of these broader realities,
changes, and trends. The deployment of American forces to
Bosnia is a reaction to and representation of major shifts occur-
ring in the post-Cold War world. With these shifts, this deploy-
ment is suggestive of what may lie ahead for the use, relevance,
and design of military force. The legacy of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, and then the start of the Cold War, caused the West
to adopt policies for containing and deterring the broad threat
posed by the Soviet Union and its ideology. Thermo-nuclear
weapons, complemented over time by strong conventional
forces, threatened societal damage to Russia. Conventional
forces backed by tactical nuclear weapons were later required,
in part to halt a massive Soviet ground attack in Europe and in
part to provide an alternative to (immediate) use of nuclear
weapons.
Today, the First Armored Division, the principal American unit
serving in Bosnia is, in essence, the same force that fought so
well in
Desert Storm
and, for the bulk of the Cold War along with
our other units, had been designed to defend NATO against
xxi
and then defeat a numerically superior, armored, and mecha-
nized Soviet adversary advancing across the plains of Germany.
Now these troops, as well as others from both sides of the
former Iron Curtain, are engaged in OOTW for which special
training, rules of engagement, command arrangements, and
other support structures have been put in place at short notice,
few of which were even envisaged a few years ago. These are
also operations that, because of intense, instantaneous media
coverage, can have huge domestic political impact especially if
events go wrong.
Whether or not this armored division is the most optimally con-
figured force for such an operation is not relevant for the
moment even though this unit probably was the most appropri-
ate for this task. However, it is prudent to examine the conse-
quences of changing tasks presaged by Bosnia, in which the
enemy is instability rather than an ideological or regional
adversary we are trying to contain or defeat and neutrality on
our part may be vital to the success of the mission. Do these
changes mean that we should alter our traditional approach to
the doctrine for and design of forces? If so, how? Are there alter-
native or more effective ways and means to conduct these
peacekeeping-related operations? And, in this evaluation, are
there alternative doctrines we should consider to fight wars
more effectively as we envisage scenarios under the construct of
the MRC?
With the end of the USSR and absent a hostile Russian super-
power, there is no external threat to the existence or survival of
the United States as a nation and there will not be such an
immediate threat for some time to come. This means that there
is a finite window of opportunity when there is no external
xxii
adversary threatening the total existence of American society;
that our forces are far superior to any possible military adver-
sary choosing to confront us directly; and that, with innovative
thought, we may be able to create a more relevant, effective,
and efficient means to ensure for the common defense at the
likely levels of future spending.
At the same time that the Bosnia operation is underway, the
fundamental changes occurring at home and abroad must be
addressed. The industrial and technical base of the United
States is changing profoundly. The entrepreneurial and techni-
cal advantages of the American economy were never greater
and it is small business that is creating virtually all new jobs and
employment opportunities. Commercial technology and prod-
ucts are turning over on ever shortening cycles. Performance,
especially in high-technology products, is improving and costs
are being driven downwards.
Sadly, the opposite trends are still found in the defense sector,
where cost is high and will create even tougher choices among
competing programs, especially as the budget shrinks. Cycle
time to field new generation capabilities is lengthening and per-
formance, especially in computer and information systems, is
often obsolete on delivery. The defense industrial base will con-
tinue to compress and it is not clear that the necessary level of
efficiencies or increases in effectiveness in using this base can be
identified and implemented, suggesting further pressures on a
defense budget that is only likely to be cut.
Indeed, the question must be carefully examined of whether the
military platforms that served us so well in both cold and hot
wars such as tanks, fixed wing aircraft, and large surface ships
and submarines represent the most effective mix of numbers,
xxiii
technology, strategic mobility, and fighting capability. Our
national preference for âattritionâ and âforce on forceâ warfare
continues to shape the way we design and rationalize our mili-
tary capability. Therefore, it is no surprise that in dealing with
the MRC, American doctrine, in some ways, remains an exten-
sion of Cold War force planning. While the magnitude and
number of dangerous threats to the nation have been remark-
ably reduced by the demise of the USSR, we continue to use
technology to fill traditional missions better rather than to iden-
tify or produce new and more effective solutions for achieving
military and strategic/political objectives.
While there is much talk about âmilitary revolutionsâ and win-
ning the âinformation war,â what is generally meant in this lex-
icon and discussion is translated into defense programs that
relate to accessing and âfusingâ information across command,
control, intelligence, surveillance, target identification, and pre-
cision strike technologies. What is most exciting among these
revolutions is the potential to achieve âdominant battlefield
awareness,â that is, achieving the capability to have near-per-
fect knowledge and information of the battlefield while depriv-
ing the adversary of that capacity and producing âsystems of
systemsâ for this purpose.
The near- and mid-term aims of these ârevolutionsâ largely
remain directed at exploiting our advantages in firepower and
on fielding more effective ways of defeating an adversary's
weapons systems and infrastructure for using those systems.
The doctrine of âdecisive or overwhelming forceâ is the con-
ceptual and operational underpinning for winning the next war
based largely on this force-on-force and attrition model, and
winning the information war is vital to this end. Few have asked
xxiv
whether the pattern of employing more modern technology for
traditional firepower solutions is the best one and if there are
alternative ways to achieve military objectives more effectively
and efficiently. In other words, can the idea of dominant battle-
field awareness be expanded doctrinally, operationally, and in
terms of fixing on alternative military, political, or strategic
objectives?
Rapid Dominance, if realized as defined in this paper, would
advance the military revolution to new levels and possibly new
dimensions. Rapid Dominance extends across the entire
âthreat, strategy, force structure, budget, infrastructureâ for-
mula with broad implications for how we provide for the future
common defense. Organization and management of defense
and defense resources should not be excluded from this exami-
nation although, in this paper, they are not discussed in detail.
The aim of Rapid Dominance is to affect the will, perception,
and understanding of the adversary to fit or respond to our stra-
tegic policy ends through imposing a regime of Shock and Awe.
Clearly, the traditional military aim of destroying, defeating, or
neutralizing the adversary's military capability is a fundamental
and necessary component of Rapid Dominance. Our intent,
however, is to field a range of capabilities to induce sufficient
Shock and Awe to render the adversary impotent. This means
that physical and psychological effects must be obtained.
Rapid Dominance would therefore provide the ability to con-
trol, on an immediate basis, the entire region of operational
interest and the environment, broadly defined, in and around
that area of interest. Beyond achieving decisive force and dom-
inant battlefield awareness, we envisage Rapid Dominance
producing a capability that can more effectively and efficiently
xxv
achieve the stated political or military objectives underwriting
the use of force by rendering the adversary completely impo-
tent.
In Rapid Dominance, ârapidâ means the ability to move
quickly before an adversary can react. This notion of rapidity
applies throughout the spectrum of combat from pre-conflict
deployment to all stages of battle and conflict resolution.
âDominanceâ means the ability to affect and dominate an
adversary's will both physically and psychologically. Physical
dominance includes the ability to destroy, disarm, disrupt, neu-
tralize, and render impotent. Psychological dominance means
the ability to destroy, defeat, and neuter the will of an adversary
to resist; or convince the adversary to accept our terms and
aims short of using force. The target is the adversary's will, per-
ception, and understanding. The principal mechanism for
achieving this dominance is through imposing sufficient condi-
tions of âShock and Aweâ on the adversary to convince or
compel it to accept our strategic aims and military objectives.
Clearly, deception, confusion, misinformation, and disinforma-
tion, perhaps in massive amounts, must be employed.
The key objective of Rapid Dominance is to impose this over-
whelming level of Shock and Awe against an adversary on an
immediate or sufficiently timely basis to paralyze its will to
carry on. In crude terms, Rapid Dominance would seize con-
trol of the environment and paralyze or so overload an adver-
saryâs perceptions and understanding of events so that the
enemy would be incapable of resistance at tactical and strategic
levels. An adversary would be rendered totally impotent and
vulnerable to our actions. To the degree that nonlethal weap-
xxvi
onry is useful, it would be incorporated into the ability to Shock
and Awe and achieve Rapid Dominance.
Theoretically, the magnitude of Shock and Awe Rapid Domi-
nance seeks to impose (in extreme cases) is the non-nuclear
equivalent of the impact that the atomic weapons dropped on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki had on the Japanese. The Japanese
were prepared for suicidal resistance until both nuclear bombs
were used. The impact of those weapons was sufficient to trans-
form both the mindset of the average Japanese citizen and the
outlook of the leadership through this condition of Shock and
Awe. The Japanese simply could not comprehend the destruc-
tive power carried by a single airplane. This incomprehension
produced a state of awe.
We believe that, in a parallel manner, revolutionary potential in
combining new doctrine and existing technology can produce
systems capable of yielding this level of Shock and Awe. In most
or many cases, this Shock and Awe may not necessitate impos-
ing the full destruction of either nuclear weapons or advanced
conventional technologies, but must be underwritten by the
ability to do so.
Achieving Rapid Dominance by virtue of applying Shock and
Awe at the appropriate level or levels is the next step in the evo-
lution of a doctrine for replacing or complementing over-
whelming force. By way of comparison, we have summarized
how we view the differences between the doctrines of Rapid
Dominance and Decisive Force in terms of basic elements that
apply to the objectives, uses of force, force size, scope, speed,
casualties, and technique. We recognize that there will be
debate over the relative utility and applicability of these doc-
trines and readers are encouraged to participate.
xxvii
In considering the differences between the concepts of Rapid
Dominance and Decisive Force, it is important to define the
terms as precisely as possible.
The goals of achieving Rapid Dominance using Shock and
Awe must be compared with overwhelming force. âRapidâ
implies the ability to âownâ the dimension of timeâmoving
more quickly than an opponent, operating within his decision
cycle, and resolving conflict favorably in a short period of time.
âDominanceâ means the ability to control a situation totally.
Rapid Dominance must be all-encompassing. It will require the
means to anticipate and to counter all opposing moves. It will
involve the capability to deny an opponent things of critical
value, and to convey the unmistakable message that uncondi-
tional compliance is the only available recourse. It will imply
more than the direct application of force. It will mean the abil-
ity to control the environment and to master all levels of an
opponent's activities to affect will, perception, and understand-
ing. This could include means of communication, transporta-
tion, food production, water supply, and other aspects of
infrastructure as well as the denial of military responses. Decep-
tion, misinformation, and disinformation are key components
in this assault on the will and understanding of the opponent.
Total mastery achieved at extraordinary speed and across tacti-
cal, strategic, and political levels will destroy the will to resist.
With Rapid Dominance, the goal is to use our power with such
compellance that even the strongest of wills will be awed. Rapid
Dominance will strive to achieve a dominance that is so com-
plete and victory is so swift, that an adversary's losses in both
manpower and material could be relatively light, and yet the
xxviii
message is so unmistakable that resistance would be seen as
futile.
âDecisive Force,â on the other hand, implies delivering massive
enough force to prevail. âDecisiveâ means using force with
plenty of margin for error. âForceâ implies a traditional âforce-
on-forceâ and attrition approach. This concept does not
exclude psychological and other complementary damage
imposition techniques to enhance the application of force; they
have been used throughout the history of warfare. But such
nondestructive means would have an ancillary role. Military
force would be applied in a purer form and targeted primarily
against the military capabilities of an opponent. Time is not
always an essential component. As in
Desert Shield/Storm
,
enough time would have to be allowed to assemble an over-
whelming force. Such a luxury is not always feasible.
The differences become clearer if broken down into their essen-
tial elements:
Elements Rapid Dominance
Decisive Force
Objective
Control the adversary's will, per-
ceptions, and understanding
Prevail militarily and decisively
against a set of opposing capa-
bilities defined by the MRC
Use of
Force
Control the adversary's will, per-
ceptions, and understanding and
literally make an adversary impo-
tent to act or react
Unquestioned ability to prevail
militarily over an opponent's
forces and based against the
adversary's capabilities
Force Size Could be smaller than opposition,
but with decisive edge in technol-
ogy, training, and technique
Large, highly trained, and
well-equipped. Materially
overwhelming
Scope
All encompassing
Force against force (and sup-
porting capability)
Speed
Essential
Desirable
xxix
Four general categories of core characteristics and capabilities
have been identified that Rapid Dominance-configured mis-
sion capability packages must embrace. These are identified
briefly and discussed in later chapters.
First, Rapid Dominance seeks to maximize
knowledge
of the
environment, of the adversary, and of our own forces on politi-
cal, strategic, economic, and military/operational levels. On
one hand, we want to get into the minds of the adversary far
more deeply than we have in the past. Beyond operational intel-
ligence required for battlefield awareness, Rapid Dominance
means cultural understanding of the adversary in ways that will
affect both ours and their planning and the outcome of the
operation at all appropriate tactical and strategic levels.
Second, Rapid Dominance must achieve
rapidity
in the sense of
timeliness. Rapid Dominance must have capabilities that can
be applied swiftly and relatively faster than an adversary's.
Third, Rapid Dominance seeks to achieve total
control of the envi-
ronment
from complete âsignature managementâ of both our
and the adversary's information and intelligence to more dis-
crete means to deceive, disguise, and misinform.
Fourth, Rapid Dominance aims to achieve new levels of opera-
tional competence that can virtually institutionalize
brilliance.
In
some cases, this may mean changing the longstanding principle
Casualties Could be relatively few in number
on both sides
Potentially higher on both
sides
Technique Paralyze, shock, unnerve, deny,
destroy
Systematic destruction of mili-
tary capability. Attrition appli-
cable in some situations
xxx
of military centralization and empowering individual soldiers,
sailors, and airmen to be crucial components in applying and
directing the application of force.
As we move to turn this concept into specific doctrine and capa-
bilities for future evaluation, there is another emerging reality
to consider. If the commercial-economic sector is transforming
at the current rate and breadth, it could be that, over the course
of many years, the defense-industrial base would follow suit, or
face irrelevance and extinction. Clearly, there are certain areas
in defense that will never or may never be eliminated or
replaced. Nuclear systems are a current example.
Should this trend of commercial dominance play out, it may
mean that military force design and procurement will become
dependent on the private sector and commercial technology.
Rapid Dominance is a first conceptual step to deal with this
possibility.
The purpose of this paper is to outline the beginnings of the
concept of Rapid Dominance, its concentration on strategy,
technology, and innovation, and its focus on Shock and Awe.
Based on this, subsequent steps will involve expanding mission
capability package concepts consisting of operations harmo-
nized with doctrine, organization, and systems, and then move
on to field prototype systems for further test and evaluation as
advanced concept technology demonstrations.
1
Chapter 1
Background
and Basis
n both relative and absolute terms, since the
end of World War II, the military strength
and capability of the United States have never
been greater. Yet this condition of virtual mili-
tary superiority has created a paradox. Absent a
massive threat or massive security challenge, it is
not clear that this military advantage can (always)
be translated into concrete political terms that
advance American interests. Nor is it clear that
the current structure and foundations for this
extraordinary force can be sustained for the long
term without either spending more money or
imposing major changes to this structure that
may exceed the capacity of our system to accom-
modate. As a consequence, the success of the cur-
rent design and configuration of our forces may
ironically become self-limiting and constraining.
That is not to claim automatically that there are
better military solutions or that the current
defense program is not the best that our political
I
2
Shock and Awe
system can produce. It is to say, however, that we are well-
advised to pursue alternate ideas and concepts to balance and
measure against the current and planned program.
To stimulate and intrigue the reader, we note at the outset that
one thrust of Rapid Dominance is to expand on the doctrine of
overwhelming or decisive force in both depth and breadth. To
push the conceptual envelope, we ask two sets of broad ques-
tions:
1. Can a Rapid Dominance force lead, for example, to a
force structure that can win an MRC such as
Desert
Shield
and
Desert Storm
far more quickly and cheaply with
far fewer personnel than our planned force both in
terms of stopping any invasion in its tracks and then
ejecting the invader?
2. Can Rapid Dominance produce a force structure with
more effective capacity to deal with grey areas such as
OOTW?
Second, if achievable, can Rapid Dominance lead to a form of
political deterrence in which the capacity to make impotent or
âshut downâ an adversary can actually control behavior? What
are the possible political implications of this capability and
what would this power mean for conducting coalition war and
for how our allies react and respond?
Because Rapid Dominance is aimed at influencing the will,
perception, and understanding of an adversary rather than
simply destroying military capability, this focus must cause us
to consider the broadest spectrum of behavior, ours and theirs,
Chapter 1
3
and across all aspects of war including intelligence, training,
education, doctrine, industrial capacity, and how we organize
and manage defense.
We observe at first that even with the successful ending of the
Cold War, the response of the United States in reevaluating its
national security and defense has been relatively and under-
standably modest and cautious. In essence, while the size of the
force has been reduced from Cold War levels of 2.2 million
active duty troops to about 1.5 million, and the services have
been vocal in revising doctrine and strategy to reflect the end of
the Soviet threat, with the exception of emphasis on jointness,
there are few really fundamental differences in the design and
structure of the forces from even 10 or 15 years ago.
Throughout the Cold War, the defense of the United States
rested on several central and widely accepted and publicly sup-
ported propositions. The âclear and apparent dangerâ of the
Soviet threat was real and seen as such. The USSR was to be
contained and deterred from hostile action by a combination of
political, strategic, and military actions ranging from the forg-
ing of a ring of alliances surrounding the USSR and its allies to
the deployment of tens of thousands of nuclear and thermonu-
clear weapons.
Following the truce ending the Korean war, a large standing
military force was maintained and defined by the operational
requirements of fighting the large formations of military forces
of the USSR and its allies with similar types of military forces,
albeit outnumbered. The role of allies, principally NATO, was
assumed and taken into account in planning, although the par-
adox of the issue of planning for a long-versus-short war in a
nuclear world remained unresolved.
4
Shock and Awe
Mobilization, as in World War II, was likewise assumed if the
Cold War went hot while, at the same time, it was hoped that
any war might be ended quickly. The largely World War II
defense, industrial, and basing structure was retained along
with the intent to rely on our technological superiority to offset
numerical or geographical liabilities.
It was not by accident that this Cold War concept of defense
through mobilization was similar to the strategy that won
World War II and the literal ability of ultimately overwhelming
the enemy using the massive application of force, technology,
and associated firepower. Two decades later, Vietnam exposed
the frailty of this approach of dependence on massive applica-
tion of firepower, especially when political limits were placed
on applying that firepower.
Currently,
Desert Storm
and the liberation of Kuwait in 1991
have been taken as the examples that confirm the validity of the
doctrine of overwhelming or decisive force and of ensuring that
both strategic objectives and tactical methods were in congru-
ence. We argue that now is the time to reexamine these pre-
mises of reliance on overwhelming or decisive force as currently
employed and deployed in the force structure, if only as a pru-
dent check.
Beyond prudence, however, it is clear that without a major
threat to generate consensus and to rally the country around
defense and defense spending, the military posture of the
United States will erode as the defense budget is cut. Hence,
relying in the future on what is currently seen to be as sufficient
force to be âdecisiveâ could easily prove unachievable and the
results problematic or worse for U.S. policy.
Chapter 1
5
The absence of a direct and daunting external security threat
is, of course, a most obvious aspect of the difficulty in defining
the future defense posture of the nation. The United States has
long resisted maintaining a large standing military and the
Cold War years could prove an aberration to that history.
Extending this historical observation of small standing forces, it
is clear that there is no adversary on the horizon even remotely
approaching the military power of the former USSR. While we
might conjure up nominal regional contingencies against
Korea or Iraq as sensible planning scenarios for establishing the
building blocks for force structure, it will prove difficult to sus-
tain the current defense program over the long term without a
real threat materializing to rally and coalesce public support.
Allocating three percent or less of GDP for defense could easily
prove to be a ceiling and not a floor. It should be noted that in
Europe, defense spending is closing in on one to two percent of
GDP.
Ironically, as the Department of Defense seeks to come to grips
with this new world, the structural limitations and constraints
in how we develop systems and procure weapons based on cur-
rent technological and industrial capacity for producing them
will be exacerbated by downward fiscal pressure giving us little
room for mistakes and flexibility. Air, land, space, and sea
forces are currently limited in the actual numbers and types of
systems that are available for purchase and more limited in that
there are virtually no new major systems on the horizon. That
could change.
The M1A1 tank is in production only for foreign sales. Despite
the allure of the Arsenal Ship, the Navy still has only four active
classes of warships from which to replace its capability and, for
6
Shock and Awe
the first time this century since aircraft entered the inventory, is
without a new aircraft in development. The Air Force can be
placed in similar straits if the F-22 program is deferred or can-
celed because of rising cost and fiscal constraints. Time will tell
what happens to the Joint Strike Fighter. Assumptions about
reliance on technology and R&D providing insurance policies
for future defense needs may prove ill-advised if and as DOD is
forced to cut back and reduce those programs even further.
Indeed, over time, commercial R&D could become the main
source for procuring software and other systems needed to
upgrade today's weapons systems and for so-called âleap-
aheadâ technologies that may prove elusive to create.
There is also the crucial issue of revising or indeed developing
new doctrine and military thought to deal with these changing
circumstances. But, without a compelling rationale and with
the clear bureaucratic and political pressures of preparing and
defending an annual budget, more of the same (or more likely,
less of the same) becomes an almost irresistible outcome. While
the JCS or OSD or CINCs may have genuine need for jointly
packaged forces that are rapidly deployable irrespective of
Army, Navy, Marine, or Air Force labels, the services cannot
be expected to reverse the years of viewing the world through
service-specific arguments and doctrine.
Although the absolute danger has been dramatically reduced
with the end of the USSR, it would be the height of folly to
assume that there are no risks to the nation nor an absence of
evildoers wishing this nation harm. It would also be short-
sighted to expect that potential adversaries are unintelligent
and would not rely on superior knowledge of their environment
and simplicity to overcome our current military and technical
Chapter 1
7
superiority, much as the North Vietnamese did. In addition, as
technology diffuses around, over, and under borders, our
assumptions about guarantees of permanent technological
superiority should welcome thoughtful examination.
Lenin asked the question, âWhat is to be done?â As a start, the
United States should act to exploit the several major advan-
tages it possesses. First, we have time. The clarity and danger of
future threats is sufficiently removed for us to take a longer
view. While we may have deferred adding to the inventory of
future systems in development, current systems possess more
than enough military capability to get us through this transition
period, even if this period were to last for more than a decade.
This does not mean we can rest on our oars; if we take advan-
tage of this opportunity, time is on our side. If we squander this
opportunity, then we could ultimately find ourselves in trouble.
Second, the combination of American technical know-how, the
luxury of the best technically educated and trained society in
the world, and the entrepreneurial spirit of our system offers
vast potential if we are clever enough to exploit this extraordi-
nary resource.
Third, because of significant changes in law and organization
regarding the military, particularly the Goldwater-Nichols Act,
and through a willingness to examine alternatives, the Depart-
ment of Defense has actively sought new ideas and concepts.
The enhanced role of the CINCs and the acceptance of joint-
ness are positive illustrations. Yet, for understandable structural
and political realities noted above, assuring productive innova-
tion continues will not be automatic. Against these conducive
signs, vision, true joint thinking, and tactical advances still are
premium commodities to be nourished and encouraged.
8
Shock and Awe
In building an alternative intellectual concept, it is useful to rely
on successful lessons of the past. For five decades, we have been
successful in applying containment and deterrence in the Cold
War. When deterrence or diplomacy failed as in Kuwait, then
the use of force was inevitable. A first-order issue is how can we
augment or improve the use of existing military capability
should it be required.
Should force be needed, our proposal calls for establishing a
regime of Rapid Dominance throughout the area of strategic as
well as operational concern. By Rapid Dominance, we are
seeking the capability to dominate, control, and isolate the
entire environment in, around, over, and under the objective
area as quickly as possible, and with fewer forces than currently
envisaged, although direct insertion of forces is an important
component depending upon the tactical situation. In many
cases, this capacity need not be the traditional firepower solu-
tion of only physically destroying an adversary's military capa-
bilities. Our focus is on the Clausewitzian principle of affecting
the adversaryâs will to resist as the first order of business, quickly
if not nearly instantaneously. A second goal would be to stop an
attack during the first stages. A third goal, should it be achiev-
able, would be to promote a regime of political deterrence that
might restrain aggression in the first place.
To accomplish the rendering of an adversary incapable of
action means neutralizing the ability to command, to provide
logistics, to organize society, and to function, as well as to con-
trol, regulate and deny the adversary of information, intelli-
gence, and understanding of what is and what is not happening.
This means we must control all necessary intelligence and
information on our forcesâthe ultimate form of stealthâand on
Chapter 1
9
an adversaryâs forces as well and then exploit total situational
awareness for rapid action.
Regarding the emergence of current military thought and doc-
trine, as implied earlier, warfare today may be in the early and
far less mature stages of a major revolution than is generally
assumed. It is understandable that despite major strategic reas-
sessments, current doctrine is still highly influenced by Cold
War tactics and strategy and perhaps by the iron grip of the his-
tory of conflict since the early 19th century.
Since Napoleon, the conduct of war between major states has
been largely dominated by combining industrial might with
vast amounts of manpower over time and space. The United
States advanced Napoleonâs use of industry and mass armies in
the Civil War and our planning up to the Cold War tended to
follow this same pattern. World War II, of course, exemplified
the triumph of this industrial, mobilization, and massive use of
force approach.
In the evolution of U.S. military theory, it can be argued that
this model combining massive industrial might and manpower
finally ended in 1989. Although, by then, technological
advances to conventional military capabilities seemed to be
approaching the destructive power, or more precisely, the
system lethality of nuclear weapons. In other words, modern
non-nuclear precision weapons perhaps could produce effects
against enemy targets roughly comparable to the military
lethality of theater-level nuclear weapons. If this condition
proves true, could this new lethality fundamentally change the
construct for designing American doctrine and strategy? This
question is at the heart of the âprecision and battlefield aware-
10
Shock and Awe
nessâ school of decisive force thinking that believes that this
fundamental change is in place.
Since the end of the Cold War and, with it, the end of the need
to prepare our forces to fight a more or less equally powerful
adversary, the United States military has conducted two post-
Cold War crises against lesser adversaries quite differently than
it fought the Cold War. In the Panama intervention in 1990
and in Kuwait shortly thereafter, the suggestion of newer and
different methods of warfare was present. Perhaps both will
turn out to be transition campaigns, where there is much of the
old, but also signs of the new. But there are specific pieces of
evidence that should command our attention.
Underlying the planning for
Operation Just Cause
in Panama and
Desert Shield/Storm
in Kuwait was the premeditated incorpora-
tion of a series of rapid, simultaneous attacks designed to apply
decisive force. The aim was to stun, and then rapidly defeat the
enemy through a series of carefully orchestrated land, sea, air,
and special operating forces strikes that took place nearly simul-
taneously across a wide battlespace and against many military
targets. The purpose of these rapid, simultaneous attacks was to
produce immediate paralysis of both the national state and its
armed forces that would lead to prompt neutralization and
capitulation.
In both
Just Cause
and
Desert Storm
, the United States (plus coa-
lition forces in
Desert Storm
) had such overwhelming military
capabilities that, in retrospect, the outcome was largely a
matter of drafting a cogent and coordinated operation plan
based on using the entire system of capabilities, and then exe-
cuting that plan to produce a decisive victory. The Haitian
incursion in 1995 used similar principles of intimidation to
Chapter 1
11
eliminate any real fighting. However, in
Desert Storm,
unlike
Haiti, it took the U.S. and its allies nearly 6 months to deploy
over a half million troops before the fighting began.
The recently published JCS Pub 3.0 and the U.S. Army's 525-
5 Pamphlet reflect and exploit operational rapidity and simul-
taneity. Yet, progress in these operational directions may be in
danger of faltering if only old Cold War yardsticks are used to
make future force investments and to direct studies about
future force structure and associated infrastructure. As in any
transition period, innovation must be joined by a willingness to
experiment. This means that the establishment and cultivation
of an experimental apparatus to test and evaluate new concepts
are important both to foster innovation and assess its applica-
tion.
We build on the trends of rapidity and simultaneity and seek to
emphasize control and time. Control is necessary to force
behavioral change in adversaries to achieve strategic or politi-
cal ends. Control and then influence come from a range of
threats and outcomes, including putting at risk the targets an
adversary holds dear, to imposing a hierarchy of Shock and
Awe, to affecting will, perception, and understanding. Achiev-
ing control may now be theoretically possible in even more
compressed or shortened time periods because of the potential
superiority of enhanced U.S. military capability and further
training and education. To obtain this level of military superi-
ority that can affect the adversaryâs will and perception, or at
least achieve the practical military consequences, a great deal
of thought, debate, and experimentation over new concepts
will be needed, if only to test and validate contemporary doc-
trine.
12
Shock and Awe
If the political objective is to achieve a level of Shock and Awe
beyond only temporary paralysis, then further actions must fol-
low. The end point will be to dominate the enemy in such a way
as to achieve the desired objectives. From this concept follows
the need to shut down either a state or an organized enemy
through the rapid and simultaneous application (or threat of
application) of land, sea, air, space, and special operating forces
against the broadest spectrum of the adversaryâs power base
and center or centers of gravity and against the adversaryâs will
and perception at tactical and strategic levels.
In
Desert Storm,
the objectives were first to evict Iraqi forces from
Kuwait and then to restore the legitimate government. From
these objectives, more limited strategic and political objectives
followed, some for purposes of maintaining coalition solidarity
and UN-imposed sanctions. Not occupying Baghdad was one
such political limitation. These strategic objectives led to iden-
tification of the enemyâs centers of gravity as the basis for the
application of force to destroy these centers. This planning led
to the repeated, rapid, and simultaneous use of massive force
with great effect.
One obvious tactical objective was to eliminate Saddam Hus-
seinâs command and control. This was accomplished by simul-
taneous and massive attacks. Once command and control was
destroyed, Iraqi forces in the Kuwait Theater of Operations
(KTO) would be destroyed as quickly as possible with over-
whelming force and with minimum casualties. As General
Colin Powell simply stated, "My plan is to cut off Saddamâs
army and then kill it."
There was no sanctuary for Iraqi forces in the KTO. They
were completely vulnerable to unrelenting and devastating
Chapter 1
13
attack. Outside the KTO, targeting was more selective, not
because the means were unavailable for imposing sufficient
damage but because our military objectives were purposely
limited. Given the effectiveness of the air campaign and the
overwhelming superiority on the ground, coalition land forces
required only 4 of the 41 days of the war to defeat and to eject
Iraqâs forces from Kuwait.
Suppose a
Desert Storm
-type campaign were fought 20 years
from now based on a plan that exploited the concept of Rapid
Dominance. Further assume that Iraq has improved (and
rebuilt) its military and that, in a series of simultaneous and
nearly instantaneous actions, our primary objective was still to
shut Iraq down, threaten or destroy its leadership, and isolate
and destroy its military forces as we did in 1991. However, two
decades hence, Rapid Dominance might conceivably achieve
this objective in a matter of days (or perhaps hours) and not
after the 6 months or the 500,000 troops that were required in
1990 to 1991. Rapid Dominance may even offer the prospect
of stopping an invasion in its tracks.
Shutting the country down would entail both the physical
destruction of appropriate infrastructure and the shutdown and
control of the flow of all vital information and associated com-
merce so rapidly as to achieve a level of national shock akin to
the effect that dropping nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki had on the Japanese. Simultaneously, Iraqâs armed
forces would be paralyzed with the neutralization or destruc-
tion of its capabilities. Deception, disinformation, and misinfor-
mation would be applied massively.
This level of simultaneity and Rapid Dominance must also
demonstrate to the adversary our endurance and staying
14
Shock and Awe
power, that is, the capability to dominate over as much time as
is necessary, lest an enemy mistakenly try to wait it out and use
time between attacks to recover sufficiently. If the enemy still
resisted, then conventional forms of attack would follow, result-
ing in the physical occupation of territory. Control is thus best
gained by the demonstrated ability to sustain the stun effects of
the initial rapid series of blows long enough to affect the
enemyâs will and his means to continue. There must be a stay-
ing power effect on the enemy or else they merely absorb the
blows, gain in confidence and their ability to resist, and change
tactics much as occurred during the WWII bombing cam-
paigns and the air war over North Vietnam.
Achieving these levels of Shock and Awe requires a wide versa-
tility and competence in employing land, sea, air, space, and
special operating forces and in investment in technology to pro-
duce Rapid Dominance. Different methods for commanding
the battle using both hierarchical and nonhierarchical com-
mand to control and direct our forces are likely to be required,
especially given the simultaneous application of capabilities
throughout the given battlespace by the full spectrum of our
forces. To use these combinations of forces will require adjust-
ment of current service doctrine and prescribed roles and func-
tions. Rapid Dominance also means looking to invest in
technologies perhaps not fully or currently captured by the
Cold War paradigm.
To develop the proper combination of forces and future tech-
nology investments for Rapid Dominance, extensive experi-
mentation with this core concept will be required. This
experimentation must apply to all levels of military educational
institutions, it must be joint, it can be accelerated by availability
Chapter 1
15
of recent advances in simulation technology, and it must have
operational trials in the field.
To advance this concept, technology and its infrastructure and
application are vital. Here, understanding several facts is
important. The U.S. today is graduating through its college
and universities system approximately 200,000 American and
foreign scientists and engineers per year. This is a great
national resource. This technology infrastructure is dimensions
larger in number and scope than the aggregate of anywhere
else in the world. Through appreciation and exploitation of this
potential, a U.S. position of preeminence in science and tech-
nology could be assured for the foreseeable future.
One adjunct of this technology revolution is in the information
and information management areas, which in the U.S. are
heavily commercially oriented. Future military application
may well be analogous to the impact of the internal combustion
engine and wireless radio on land, sea, and air forces in the
1920s and 1930s. The size of this technological lead between
ourselves and the rest of the world, especially in the base for
new information products and services, should widen further in
knowledge and in application. The âSilicon Valleyâ revolution
is likely to continue increasing computer capacity on an almost
annual basis. By the year 2005, computing power should be
many times todayâs capacityâperhaps ultimately beginning to
close in on the ability of humans to handle data flow as well as
the ability to condense and synthesize data.
In parallel to advances in computing power will be the ability
to transfer information into and out of the hands of individual
users. The addition of virtual reality and other technical aids
will enhance and potentially quicken individual decisionmak-
16
Shock and Awe
ing ability. Technologies associated with bioscience and
bioengineering are likely to be of particular importance in
enhancing these capabilities and are also an area of American
predominance. Material sciences, software, and communica-
tions are all American strengths, and should remain so well into
the next century.
A significant element supporting this explosion in applied infor-
mation and other technologies is the American free enterprise
system and its entrepreneurial character. This drive is needed
to translate this technology into military hardware. The nature
of the U.S. market and its competitive basis reinforce this ele-
ment. The largest challenges may be to shape and exploit this
commercial potential and then to ensure that its enduring
advantages become fundamental in the makeup of our military
forces. Unlike the defense industrial base required during the
Cold War, this new commercial base is neither heavy nor is it
a massive industry relying on producing large things. Indeed,
its edge has depended on getting âsmaller, smarter, and
cheaper.â
The fundamental technology thrust for channeling this new
American industrial base to support Rapid Dominance must be
toward the control and management of everything that is sig-
nificant to the operations bearing on the particular Area of
Interest (AOI). And we mean everything! Control of the envi-
ronment is far broader than only the objective of achieving
dominant battlefield awareness. Control means the ability to
change, to a greater or lesser degree, the âsignaturesâ of all of
the combat forces engaged in the AOI. With this concept, the
operational frameworks in applying force across the entire
spectrum of platforms (satellites, aircraft, land vehicles, ships)
Chapter 1
17
can be measured (and controlled) from many minus decibels of
cross-section, to many plus decibels; communications can be
entirely covert, i.e., many dB less than the ambient environ-
ment, or that approaching âwhite noise.â The location of both
the individual and his unit can be measured in real time in
meters, if not feet, anywhere in the world. Through virtual real-
ity, movement in three-dimensional grids over hundreds of
square kilometers offer precise location and movement control,
both during day and night in conditions of unprecedented con-
fidence. This occurs in real time. Denying or deceiving the
adversary, including real-time manipulation of senses and
inputs, is part of this control.
A Rapid Dominance-configured force would enter an AOI and
immediately control the operational/environmental signatures
both individually and in the aggregate. As needed, line and
non-line-of-sight weapons of near pin-point accuracy would be
delivered across the entire area of operation. Stealthy UAVs
and mobile robotics systems, together with decoys, would be
deployed in large numbers for surveillance, targeting, strike,
and deception and would produce their own impact of elec-
tronic Shock and Awe on the enemy. This application of force
can be done as rapidly as political and strategic conditions
demand.
The effects mean literally âturning on and off â the âlightsâ that
enable any potential aggressor to see or appreciate the condi-
tions and events concerning his forces and ultimately, his soci-
ety. What is radically different in Rapid Dominance is the
comprehensive system assemblage and integration of many
evolving and even revolutionary technical advances in domi-
nant battlefield awareness squaredâmaterials application,
18
Shock and Awe
sensor and signature control, computer and bioengineering
applied to massive amounts of data, enable weapon application
with simultaneity, precision, and lethality that to date have not
been applied as a total system. Deception, disinformation, and
misinformation will become major elements of this systemic
approach.
The R&D reality is that technology advances will likely come
from the commercial world as the DoD base continues to
shrink. It is clear that in certain areas, DoD must remain
involved where there is no private R&D or to fill gaps in R&D.
Warships, fighter aircraft, tanks, and missile defense are exam-
ples. However, advances in commercial technology in the Infor-
mation Age are unlikely to be matched by DoD.
Of equal importance is how we train, organize, and educate
our combat officers and key enlisted personnel. Command
must be geared to achieving the best of the bestânot the best
among the good. Assimilating in real time the vast amount of
information and putting information to use will no doubt lead
to major changes in the composition, competence, and author-
ity of individual military unit commanders, perhaps down to
the squad or private soldier level.
Of course, even with the most perfect information, an unqual-
ified, inexperienced, or unprepared military commander may
not win except with extraordinary luck or an incompetent foe.
And, we repeat that there are cases where NO military force
may be able to succeed if the objectives are unobtainable. The
match of the entrepreneurial individual with the potential of
the technology base is key. Optimizing and integrating all ele-
ments into a total system is a certain way to exploit the oppor-
19
Shock and Awe
tunity that we can perceive becoming more visible in the
coming years.
20
Shock and Awe
19
Chapter 2
Shock and Awe
he basis for Rapid Dominance rests in the
ability to affect the will, perception, and
understanding of the adversary through impos-
ing sufficient Shock and Awe to achieve the nec-
essary political, strategic, and operational goals
of the conflict or crisis that led to the use of force.
War, of course, in the broadest sense has been
characterized by Clausewitz to include substan-
tial elements of "fog, friction, and fear." In the
Clausewitzian view, "Shock and Awe" were nec-
essary effects arising from application of military
power and were aimed at destroying the will of an
adversary to resist. Earlier and similar observa-
tions had been made by the great Chinese mili-
tary writer Sun Tzu around 500 B.C. Sun Tzu
observed that disarming an adversary before
battle was joined was the most effective outcome
a commander could achieve. Sun Tzu was well
aware of the crucial importance of achieving
Shock and Awe prior to, during, and in ending
battle. He also observed that âwar is deception,â
T
20
Shock and Awe
implying that Shock and Awe were greatly leveraged through
clever, if not brilliant, employment of force.
In Rapid Dominance, the aim of affecting the adversaryâs will,
understanding, and perception through achieving Shock and
Awe is multifaceted. To identify and present these facets, we
need first to examine the different aspects of and mechanisms
by which Shock and Awe affect an adversary. One recalls from
old photographs and movie or television screens, the comatose
and glazed expressions of survivors of the great bombardments
of World War I and the attendant horrors and death of trench
warfare. These images and expressions of shock transcend race,
culture, and history. Indeed, TV coverage of
Desert Storm
vividly
portrayed Iraqi soldiers registering these effects of battlefield
Shock and Awe.
In our excursion, we seek to determine whether and how Shock
and Awe can become sufficiently intimidating and compelling
factors to force or otherwise convince an adversary to accept
our will in the Clausewitzian sense, such that the strategic aims
and military objectives of the campaign will achieve a political
end. Then, Shock and Awe is linked to the four core character-
istics that define Rapid Dominance: knowledge, rapidity, bril-
liance, and control.
The first step in this process is to establish a hierarchy of differ-
ent types, models, and examples of Shock and Awe in order to
identify the principal mechanisms, aims, and aspects that differ-
entiate each model as unique or important. At this stage, histor-
ical examples are offered. However, in subsequent stages, a task
will be to identify current and future examples to show the
effects of Shock and Awe. From this identification, the next step
in this methodology is to develop alternative mission capability
Chapter 2
21
packages consisting of a concept of operations doctrine, tactics,
force structure, organizations, and systems to analyze and
determine how best each form or variant of Shock and Awe
might be achieved. To repeat, intimidation and compliance are
the outputs we seek to obtain by the threat of use or by the
actual application of our alternative force package. Then the
mission capability package is examined in conditions of both
MRCs and OOTW.
For discussion purposes, nine examples representing differing
historical types, variants, and characteristics of Shock and Awe
have been derived. These examples are not exclusive categories
and overlap exists between and among them. The first example
is âOverwhelming Force,â the doctrine and concept shaping
todayâs American force structure. The aims of this doctrine are
to apply massive or overwhelming force as quickly as possible
on an adversary in order to disarm, incapacitate, or render the
enemy militarily impotent with as few casualties and losses to
ourselves and to noncombatants as possible. The superiority of
American forces, technically and operationally, is crucial to suc-
cessful application.
There are several major criticisms and potential weaknesses of
this approach. The first is its obvious reliance on large numbers
of highly capable (and expensive) platforms such as the M-1
tank, F-14, F-15, and F-18 aircraft, and CVN/DDG-51/SSN-
688 ships designed principally to be used jointly or individually
to destroy and attrite other forces and supporting capabilities.
In other words, this example has principally been derived from
force-on-force attrition relationships even though command
and control, logistical, and supporting forces cannot be disag-
gregated from this doctrine.
22
Shock and Awe
The other major shortcoming of a force-on-force or a platform-
on-platform attrition basis is that with declining numbers of
worthy and sufficiently equipped adversaries against whom to
apply this doctrine, justifying it to a questioning Congress and
public will prove more difficult. While it is clear that âsystem of
systemsâ and other alternative military concepts are under con-
sideration, for the time being, these have not replaced the cur-
rent platform and force-on-force attrition orientation. It should
be noted that there will be no doctrinal alternatives unless
ample effort is made to provide a comprehensive and detailed
examination of possible alternatives.
Second, this approach is based on ultimately projecting large
amounts of force. This requires significant logistical lift and the
time to transport the necessary forces. Rapidity may not always
follow, especially when it is necessary to deliver large quantities
of decisive force to remote or distant regions. Third, the costs of
maintaining a sufficiently decisive force may outstrip the money
provided to pay for the numbers of highly capable forces
needed. Finally, at a time when the commercial marketplace is
increasing the performance of its products while also lowering
price and cycle time to field newer generations systems, the
opposite trends are still endemic in the defense sector. This will
compound the tension between quality and quantity already
cited. None of these shortcomings is necessarily fatal. However,
none should be dismissed without fuller understanding.
Certainly, Rapid Dominance seeks to achieve certain objectives
that are similar to those of current doctrine. A major distinction
is that Rapid Dominance envisages a wider application of force
across a broader spectrum of leverage points to impose Shock
and Awe. This breadth should lead to a more comprehensive
Chapter 2
23
and integrated interaction among all the specific components
and units that produce aggregate military capability and must
include training and education, as well as new ways to exploit
our technical and industrial capacity. It is possible that in these
resource, technical, and commercial industrial areas that Rapid
Dominance may provide particular utility that otherwise may
constrain the effectiveness of Decisive Force.
The second example is âHiroshima and Nagasakiâ noted ear-
lier. The intent here is to impose a regime of Shock and Awe
through delivery of instant, nearly incomprehensible levels of
massive destruction directed at influencing society writ large,
meaning its leadership and public, rather than targeting
directly against military or strategic objectives even with rela-
tively few numbers or systems. The employment of this capabil-
ity against society and its values, called âcounter-valueâ in the
nuclear deterrent jargon, is massively destructive, strikes
directly at the public will of the adversary to resist, and ideally
or theoretically, would instantly or quickly incapacitate that will
over the space of a few hours or days.
The major flaws and shortcomings are severalfold and rest in
(1) determining whether this magnitude and speed of destruc-
tion can actually be achieved using non-nuclear systems to
render an adversary impotent, (2) quickly destroying the will to
resist within acceptable and probably unachievably low levels of
societal destruction, and (3) whether a political decision would
be taken in any case to use this type of capability given the mag-
nitude of the consequences and the risk of failure.
It can be argued that in the bombing campaign of
Desert Storm
,
similar objectives were envisioned. The differences between
this example and
Desert Storm
are through the totality of a soci-
24
Shock and Awe
ety that would be affected by a massive and indiscriminate
regime of destruction and the speed of imposing those strikes as
occurred to those Japanese cities. This example of shock, awe,
and intimidation rests on the proposition that such effects must
occur in very short periods of time.
The next example is âMassive Bombardment.â This category
of Shock and Awe applies massive and, perhaps today, relatively
precise destructive power largely against military targets and
related sectors over time. It is unlikely to produce an immediate
effect on the will of the adversary to resist. In a sense, this is an
endurance contest in which the enemy is finally broken through
exhaustion. However, it is the cumulative effect of this applica-
tion of destruction power that will ultimately impose sufficient
Shock and Awe, as well as perhaps destroy the physical means
to resist, that an adversary will be forced to accept whatever
terms may be imposed. As noted, trench warfare of World
War I, the strategic bombing campaign in Europe of the World
War II (which was not effective in this regard), and related B-52
raids in Vietnam and especially over the New Year period of
1972-73, illustrate the application of massive bombardment.
Massive Bombardment, directed at largely military-strategic
targets, is indeed an aspect of applying âOverwhelming Force,â
even though political constraints make this example most
unlikely to be repeated in the future. There is also the option of
applying massive destruction against purely civilian or
âcounter-valueâ targets such as the firebombing of Tokyo in
World War II when unconditionality marks the terms of surren-
der. It is the cumulative impact of destruction on the endurance
and capacity of the adversary that ultimately affects the will to
resist that is the central foundation of this example.
Chapter 2
25
The shortcoming with this example is clear, and rests in the
question of political feasibility and acceptability, and what cir-
cumstances would be necessary to dictate and permit the use of
Massive Bombardment. Outright invasion and aggression such
as Iraqâs attack against Kuwait could clearly qualify as reasons
to justify using this level of Shock and Awe. However, as with
Overwhelming Force, this response is not time-sensitive and
would require massive application of force for some duration as
well as political support.
Fourth is the âBlitzkreigâ example. In real Blitzkreig, Shock and
Awe were not achieved through the massive application of fire-
power across a broad front nor through the delivery of massive
levels of force. Instead, the intent was to apply precise, surgical
amounts of tightly focused force to achieve maximum leverage
but with total economies of scale. The German Wehrmacht's
Blitzkreig was not a massive attack across a very broad front,
although the opponent may have been deceived into believing
that. Instead, the enemyâs line was probed in multiple locations
and, wherever it could be most easily penetrated, attack was
concentrated in a narrow salient. The image is that of the
shaped charge, penetrating through a relatively tiny hole in a
tankâs armor and then exploding outwardly to achieve a maxi-
mum cone of damage against the unarmored or less protected
innards.
To the degree that this example of achieving Shock and Awe is
directed against military targets, it requires skill if not brilliance
in execution, or nearly total incompetence in the adversary.
The adversary, finding front lines broken and the rear vulnera-
ble, panics, surrenders, or both. Hitlerâs campaign in France
and Holland and the seizure of the Dutch forts and the occupa-
26
Shock and Awe
tion of Crete in 1940 are obvious illustrations. The use of Spe-
cial Operations forces in significant numbers is an adjunct to
imposing this level of Shock and Awe.
Desert Storm
could have been a classic Blitzkreig maneuver if the
attack were mounted without the long preparatory bombard-
ment and was concentrated in a single sectorâeither the âleft
hookâ or the Marine attack âup the middle,â and with total sur-
prise. The major differences between the operation in Kuwait
and Germanyâs capture of France in 1940 were that the allies in
Saudi Arabia had complete military and technical superiority
unlike the Germans and that, once under attack, Iraqâs front
line collapsed virtually everywhere, giving the coalition license
to pick and choose the points for penetration and then domi-
nate the battle with fire and maneuver. The lesson for future
adversaries about the Blitzkreig example and the United States
is that they will face in us an opponent able to employ techni-
cally superior forces with brilliance, speed, and vast leverage in
achieving Shock and Awe through the precise application of
force.
It must also be noted that there are certainly situations such as
guerilla war where this or most means of employing force to
obtain Shock and Awe may simply prove inapplicable. For
example, the German Blitzkreig would have performed with
the greatest difficulty in the Vietnam war, where enemy forces
had relatively few lines to be penetrated or selectively savaged
by this type of warfare.
The shortcomings of Blitzkrieg ironically rest in its strengths.
Can brilliance and superiority be maintained? Is there a flexible
enough infrastructure to ensure training to that standard, and
can the supporting industrial base continue to produce at
Chapter 2
27
acceptable costs the systems to maintain this operational and
technical superiority? Rapid Dominance requires a positive
answer to these questions, at least theoretically.
The fifth example is named after the Chinese philosopher-war-
rior, Sun Tzu. The âSun Tzuâ example is based on selective,
instant decapitation of military or societal targets to achieve
Shock and Awe. This discrete or precise nature of applying
force differentiates this from Hiroshima and Massive Destruc-
tion examples. Sun Tzu was brought before Ho Lu, the King of
Wu, who had read all of Sun Tzuâs thirteen chapters on war and
proposed a test of Sunâs military skills. Ho asked if the rules
applied to women. When the answer was yes, the king chal-
lenged Sun Tzu to turn the royal concubines into a marching
troop. The concubines merely laughed at Sun Tzu until he had
the head cut off the head concubine. The ladies still could not
bring themselves to take the masterâs orders seriously. So, Sun
Tzu had the head cut off a second concubine. From that point
on, so the story goes, the ladies learned to march with the pre-
cision of a drill team.
The objectives of this example are to achieve Shock and Awe
and hence compliance or capitulation through very selective,
utterly brutal and ruthless, and rapid application of force to
intimidate. The fundamental values or lives are the principal
targets and the aim is to convince the majority that resistance is
futile by targeting and harming the few. Both society and the
military are the targets. In a sense, Sun Tzu attempts to achieve
Hiroshima levels of Shock and Awe but through far more selec-
tive and informed targeting. Decapitation is merely one instru-
ment. This model can easily fall outside the cultural heritage
and values of the U.S. for it to be useful without major refine-
28
Shock and Awe
ment. Shutting down an adversaryâs ability to âseeâ or to com-
municate is another variant but without many historical
examples to show useful wartime applications.
A subset of the Sun Tzu example is the view that war is decep-
tion. In this subset, the attempt is to deceive the enemy into
what we wish the enemy to perceive and thereby trick, cajole,
induce, or force the adversary. The thrust or target is the per-
ception, understanding, and knowledge of the adversary. In
some ways, the ancient Trojan Horse is an early example of
deception. However, as we will see, the deception model may
have new foundations in the technological innovations that are
occurring and in our ability to control the environment.
The shortcomings with Sun Tzu are similar to those of the Mas-
sive Destruction and the Blitzkreig examples. It is questionable
that a decision to employ American force this ruthlessly in
quasi- or real assassination will ever be made by the U.S. Fur-
ther, the standard to maintain the ability to perform these mis-
sions is high and dependent on both resources and on
supporting intelligence, especially human intelligenceânot an
American strong point.
Britain's Special Air Service provides the âSASâ example and
is distinct from the Blitzkreig or Sun Tzu categories because it
focuses on depriving an adversary of its senses in order to
impose Shock and Awe. The image here is the hostage rescue
team employing stun grenades to incapacitate an adversary, but
on a far larger scale. The stun grenade produces blinding light
and deafening noise. The result shocks and confuses the adver-
sary and makes him senseless. The aim in this example of
achieving Shock and Awe is to produce so much light and
sound or the converse, to deprive the adversary of all senses,
Chapter 2
29
and therefore to disable and to disarm. Without senses, the
adversary becomes impotent and entirely vulnerable.
A huge âbattlefieldâ stun grenade that encompasses large areas
is a dramatic if unachievable illustration. Perhaps a high alti-
tude nuclear detonation that blacks out virtually all electronic
and electrical equipment better describes the intended effect
regardless of likelihood of use. Depriving the enemy, in specific
areas, of the ability to communicate, observe, and to interact is
a more reasonable and perhaps more achievable variant. This
deprival of senses, including all electronics and substitution of
false signals or data to create this feeling of impotence, is
another variant. Above all, Shock and Awe are imposed
instantly and the mechanism or target is deprivation of the
senses.
The shortcomings of the SAS approach mirror in part short-
comings of other approaches. Technological solutions are cru-
cial but may not be conceivable outside the EMP effects of
nuclear weapons. Intelligence is clearly vital. Without precise
knowledge of who and what are to be stunned, this example will
not work.
The sixth example of applying Shock and Awe is the âHaitianâ
example (or to the purist, the Potemkin Village example). It is
based on imposing Shock and Awe through a show of force and
indeed through deception, misinformation, and disinformation
and is different from the U.S. intervention in Haiti in 1995. In
the early 1800s, native Haitians were seeking to extricate their
country from French control. The Haitian leaders staged a
martial parade for the visiting French military contingent and
marched, reportedly, a hand full of battalions repeatedly in
review. The French were deceived into believing that the native
30
Shock and Awe
forces numbered in the tens of thousands and concluded that
French military action was futile and that its forces would be
overwhelmed. As a result, the Haitians were able to achieve
their freedom without firing a shot.
To be sure, there are points of similarity between the Haitian
example and the others. Deception, disinformation, and guile
are more crucial in this regime. However, the target or focus is
the will and perception of the intended target. Perhaps the Sun
Tzu category comes closest to this one except that while Sun
Tzu is selective in applying force, it is clear that imposing actual
pain and shock are essential ingredients and deception, disin-
formation, and guile are secondary. Demonstrative uses of force
are also important. The issue is how to determine what demon-
strations will affect the perceptions of the intended target in line
with the overall political aims.
The weakness of this form of Shock and Awe is its major depen-
dency on intelligence. One must be certain that the will and
perceptions of the adversary can be manipulated. The classic
misfire is the adversary who is not impressed and, instead, is
further provoked to action by the unintended actions of the
aggressor. Saddam Hussein and the Iraqisâ invasion of Kuwait
demonstrate when this Potemkin Village model can backfire.
Saddam simply let his bluff be called.
The next example is that of âThe Roman Legions.â Achieving
Shock and Awe rests in the ability to deter and overpower an
adversary through the adversaryâs perception and fear of his
vulnerability and our own invincibility, even though applying
ultimate retribution could take a considerable period of time.
The target set encompasses both military and societal values. In
occupying a vast empire stretching from the Atlantic to the Red
Chapter 2
31
Sea, Rome could deploy relatively small numbers of forces to
secure each of these territories. In the first place, Roman forces
were far superior to native forces individually and collectively.
In the second place, if an untoward act occurred, the perpetra-
tor could rest assured that Roman vengeance ultimately would
take place. This was similar to British âGunboat Diplomacyâ of
the 19th century when the British fleet would return to the
scene of any crime against the crown and extract its retribution
through the wholesale destruction of offending villages.
There were several vital factors in Romeâs ability to achieve
Shock and Awe. The invincibility of its Legions, or the percep-
tion of that prowess, and the inevitability of retribution were
among the most significant factors. In other words, reprisals
and the use of force to exact a severe punishment, as well as the
certainty that this sword of Damocles would descend, were
essential ingredients. The distinction between this category and
the others is the ex post facto nature of achieving Shock and
Awe. In the other categories, there is the need for seizing the ini-
tiative and applying contemporaneous force to achieve Shock
and Awe. With the Roman example, the Shock and Awe have
already been achieved. It is the breakdown of this regime or the
rise of new and as yet unbowed adversaries that leads to the
reactive use of force.
The major shortcoming is the assumption of the inevitability of
reprisals and the capacity to take punitive action. That is not
and may not always be the case with the United States,
although we can attempt to make others believe it will be. The
takeover of the Embassy in Tehran by dissident âstudentsâ in
1979 and American impotence in the aftermath are suggestive
of the shortcoming. That aside, the example or perception of
32
Shock and Awe
the invincibility of American military power is not a bad one to
embellish.
The next category for achieving Shock and Awe is termed the
âDecay and Defaultâ model and is based on the imposition of
societal breakdown over a lengthy period, but without the
application of massive destruction. This example is obviously
not rapid but cumulative. In this example, both military and
societal values are targets. Selective and focused force is
applied. It is the long-term corrosive effects of the continuing
breakdown in the system and society that ultimately compels an
adversary to surrender or to accept terms. Shock and Awe are
therefore not immediate either in application or in producing
the end result. Economic embargoes, long-term policies that
harass and aggravate the adversary, and other types of punitive
actions that do not threaten the entire society but apply pres-
sure as in the Chinese water torture, a drop at a time, are the
mechanisms. Finally, the preoccupation with the decay and dis-
ruption of society produces a variant of Shock and Awe in the
form of frustration, collapsing the will to resist.
The significant weakness of this approach is time duration. In
many cases, the time required to impose such a regime of Shock
and Awe is unacceptably long or simply cannot be achieved by
conventional or politically acceptable means.
The final example is that of âThe Royal Canadian Mounted
Police,â whose unofficial motto was ânever send a man where
you can send a bullet.â The distinction between this example
and the others is that this example is even more selective than
Sun Tzu and implies that standoff capabilities as opposed to
forces in place can achieve the required objectives. There
should not be too fine a point, however, in belaboring differ-
Chapter 2
33
ences with the other examples in this regard over standoff. A
stealthy aircraft bombing unimpededly is not distinct from a
cruise missile fired at 1,000 miles regarding the effect of ord-
nance on target.
A few observations about these examples offer insights on
which to test and evaluate means of applying Rapid Domi-
nance. It is clear that the targets in each category include mili-
tary, civilian, industrial, infrastructure, and societal
components of a country or group. In certain cases, time is the
crucial consideration in imposing Shock and Awe and in most
of the examples, emphasis is on a rapid or sudden imposition of
Shock and Awe. However, in several examples, the effects of
Shock and Awe must be and are cumulative. They are either
achieved over time or achieved through earlier conditioning
and experiences. Not all of these categories are dependent on
technology or on new technological breakthroughs. What is rel-
atively new or different is the extent to which brilliance and
competence in using force, in understanding where an adver-
saryâs weak points lie, and in executing military operations with
deftness are vital. While this recognition is not new, emphasis is
crucial on exploiting brilliance and therefore on the presump-
tion that brilliance may be taught or institutionalized and is not
a function only of gifted individuals.
There is also a key distinction between selective or precise and
massive application of force. Technology, in the form of âzero
CEPâ weapons, may provide the seemingly contradictory capa-
bility of systems that are both precise and have the net conse-
quence of imposing massive disruption, destruction, or
damage. This damage goes beyond the loss of power grids and
other easily identifiable industrial targeting sets. Loss of all
34
Shock and Awe
communications can have a massively destructive impact even
though physical destruction can be relatively limited.
In some of the examples, the objective is to apply brutal levels
of power and force to achieve Shock and Awe. In the attempt
to keep war âimmaculate,â at least in limiting collateral dam-
age, one point should not be forgotten. Above all, war is a nasty
business or, as Sherman put it, âwar is hell.â While there are
surely humanitarian considerations that cannot or should not
be ignored, the ability to Shock and Awe ultimately rests in the
ability to frighten, scare, intimidate, and disarm. The Clause-
witzian dictum concerning the violent nature of war is dis-
missed only at our peril.
For a policy maker in the White House or Pentagon and the
concerned Member of Congress with responsibility for provid-
ing for the common defense, what lessons emerge from these
examples and hierarchies? First, there are always broader sets
of operational concepts and constructs available for achieving
political objectives than may be realized. Not all of these alter-
natives are necessarily better or feasible. However, the examples
suggest that further intellectual and conceptual effort is a
worthwhile investment in dealing with national security options
in the future.
Second, time becomes an opportunity as well as a constraint in
generating new thinking. In many past cases, time was generally
viewed as an adversary. We had to race against several clocks to
arrive âfirstest with the mostest,â to prevent an enemy from
advancing, or to ensure we had ample forces on station should
they be required. Rapid Dominance would alleviate many of
these constraints as we would have the capacity to deploy effec-
tive forces far more quickly. Therefore, in this case, we can view
Chapter 2
35
time as an ally. The political issue rests in longstanding argu-
ments to limit the President from having the capacity to deploy
or use force quickly, thereby involving the nation without con-
ferring with full consultation with Congress. While this is an
obvious point, it should not eliminate alternative types of force
packages derived from Rapid Dominance from full consider-
ation and experimentation. Indeed, our experience with
nuclear weapons and emergency release procedures shows that
delegating instant presidential authority can be handled
responsibly.
Responding to the precise, rapid, and massive criteria of several
models, it is clear that one capability not presently in the arse-
nal is a âzero-CEPâ weapon, meaning one that is precise and
timely. It is also clear that, while deception, guile, and brilliance
are important attributes in war, there are no guarantees that
they can be institutionalized in any military force.
Another capability that Rapid Dominance would stress relates
to the Sun Tzu example. Suppose there are âEMP-likeâ or
High Powered Microwave (HPM) systems that can be fielded
and provide broad ability to incapacitate even a relatively prim-
itive society. In using these weapons, the nerve centers of that
society would be attacked rather than using this illustrative
system to achieve hard target kills because there were few hard
targets. To be sure, HPM and EMP-like systems have been and
are being carefully researched.
Finally, to return to the idea that deception, disinformation,
and misinformation are crucial aspects of waging war, Rapid
Dominance would seek to achieve several further capabilities.
By using complete signature management, larger formations
could be made to look like smaller, and smaller formations
36
Shock and Awe
made to seem larger. At sea, carrier battle groups could be dis-
guised and smaller warships could be made to appear as large
formations. This signature management would apply across the
entire spectrum of the senses and not just radar or electronic
ranges. Indeed, gaining the ability to regulate what information
and intelligence are both available and not available to the
adversary is a key aim. This is more than denial or deception.
It is control in the fullest sense of the word.
The next step is to match the four significant characteristics
that define Rapid Dominanceâknowledge, rapidity, brilliance,
and controlâwith Shock and Awe against achievable military
objectives in order to derive suitable strategies and doctrines,
configure forces and force packages accordingly, and determine
those integrated systems and innovative uses of technologies
and capabilities that will provide the necessary means to
achieve these objectives in conditions that include both the
MRC and OOTW.
37
Chapter 3
Strategic, Policy,
and Operational
Application
n assessing the future utility and applicability
of Rapid Dominance, it is crucial to consider
the political context in which force is likely to be
employed. As we enter the next century, the
probability is low that an overriding, massive,
direct threat posed by a peer-competitor to the
U.S. will emerge in the near term. Without com-
pelling reasons, public tolerance toward Ameri-
can sacrifice abroad will remain low and may
even decrease. This reluctance on the part of
Americans to tolerate pain is directly correlated
to perceptions of threat to U.S. interests. Without
a clear and present danger, the definition of
national interest may remain narrow.
Americans have always appreciated rapid and
decisive military solutions. But, many challenges
or crises in the future are likely to be marginal to
U.S. interests and therefore may not be resolvable
before American political staying power is
I
38
Shock and Awe
exhausted. In this period, political micromanagement and fine
tuning are likely to be even more prevalent as administrations
respond to public sentiments for minimizing casualties and,
without a threat or compelling reason, U.S. involvement.
Future actions and measures may likely reflect âpolitically cor-
rectâ alternatives. In 1991, the Gulf War came close to present-
ing the nearly optimal situation for prosecution to a decisive
and irreversible conclusion. Such a course, however, was not
politically feasible because it would have shattered the allied
coalition while exceeding the authority of the UN mandate.
Military operations that impact across a whole population or
cause âinnocent civiliansâ to suffer (e.g., some economic sanc-
tions, collateral damage from raids) also are likely to be only
politically acceptable in aggravated situations. For example, if
economic sanctions cause malnutrition or other health prob-
lems or collateral damage from bombing or shelling impacts
hospitals, schools, orphanages, or refugee camps, the policy
may be the ultimate victim.
The U.S. military is more likely to find itself in a supporting for-
eign policy role with discrete missions that are only one facet of
a larger political context. This context is almost certainly going
to expand into militarily grey areas of OOTW, including those
impinging on law enforcement and ensuring political stability.
Forces may be called upon to deal with or control situations on
the margin rather than to achieve total submission or defeat of
an opponent. The prevailing political preference is likely to
continue to be to try to bound these complex challenges
through fine tuning, artificial constructs, and discretely limited
tasks, often performed in the midst of internal conflict. Eco-
nomic sanctions (e.g., Serbia, Iraq), âno flyâ zones (e.g., south-
Chapter 3
39
ern and northern Iraq and Bosnia), âsafe havensâ (e.g., Bosnia),
humanitarian relief delivered by âall means necessaryâ (e.g.,
Somalia, Bosnia), and embassy protection and evacuation (e.g.,
Liberia in 1991 and again in 1996) are the kinds of OOTW
tasks more likely to be assigned by policy makers. Such tasks
tend to be inconclusive and of long duration. They also increase
vulnerability to terrorist attack such as the bombing of the
Kolbah Barracks in Riyadh in June 1996.
Americans prefer not to intervene, especially when the direct
threat to the U.S. is ambiguous, tenuous, or difficult to define.
Therefore, when intervention is necessary there is likely to be
both a political and practical imperative to have allied or inter-
national involvement or at least the political cover of the UN,
NATO, or appropriate NGOs.
As more states (and subnational groups) acquire nuclear, chem-
ical, and biological weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capa-
bilities and longer range delivery means, the ability for rogues
to inflict pain will increase, as will the ability to ratchet up the
political risks. WMD can easily complicate our ability to influ-
ence positive and constructive behavior of possessors. Because
of the threat of retaliation, WMD capabilities may become
politically acceptable targets provided collateral damage to
civilians is minimized. Preemption may become a more realis-
tic option along the lines of Israelâs strikes against Syriaâs
nuclear reactors in 1982. It is, however, a responsible stateâs
worst nightmare to have successfully struck a chemical, biolog-
ical, or nuclear production facility with precision only to learn
the next day that hundreds of civilians have been killed due to
the inadvertent release of chemical, biological, or nuclear mate-
rials.
40
Shock and Awe
There must also be an appropriate political context that justifies
the use of preemptive force, as opposed to less destructive or
nonlethal types of sanctions (e.g., responses to terrorism in the
case of Libya, invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, exports of WMD to
a threatening country such as Iran, the North Korean threat to
South Korea and Japan).
The U.S. will, nevertheless, need to maintain the capability to
deter and defeat both strategic and other direct threats to its
vital interests, preferably on a decisive basis. In an unsettled,
less structured, and volatile world, the ability to use force with
precision, effectiveness, impunity, and, when needed, rapidity,
will still be a powerful influence on cooperation, stability, and,
where relevant, submission.
Imposing Rapid Dominance on a nation, group, or situation, if
achievable, will be a highly desirable and relevant asset in this
turbulent period. Bosnia offers an example. At the outset of the
breakup of Yugoslavia, if we had had this type of capability,
without potentially high costs, to counter effectively the widely
predicted invasion of Bosnia, the U.S. strategy for dealing with
that tangled and messy situation might have been much differ-
ent. Thousands of lives might have been spared. In other grey
or marginal situations Rapid Dominance could make the dif-
ference between a politically acceptable response or inadequate
action with consequences similar to what happened in Bosnia.
In considering how Rapid Dominance might apply and might
be used, it is first important to know what it is that we want to
achieve with military force. We need to consider whether the
application of force will allow us to influence and control an
adversaryâs will or merely exacerbate a bad situation. There-
fore, it is essential to know what is of value to that adversary. An
Chapter 3
41
objective, realistic, and indepth situational grasp will be essen-
tial to such an understanding. For example, disarming or
destroying may produce unintended consequences. For a con-
ventional foe that values its military and depends on technol-
ogy, Rapid Dominance should be particularly effective and
persuasive. In the case of less developed nations, however, the
opportunity for exercising influence in this way and against mil-
itary formations may be considerably less and must be carefully
assessed.
As noted, in cases of marginal direct threats to U.S. security, the
cost in casualties needs to be low. To be effective, we must take
away an opponentâs ability to make it cost us in terms of casu-
alty levels we consider intolerable. In applying Rapid Domi-
nance, we also must be defending something that is of value to
us. The lower the value in terms of our national interests, the
lower the price we are likely to be willing to pay.
In MRC situations, we need to have the capability to defeat,
destroy, or incapacitate an opponent. On the other hand, in
OOTW, other nonmilitary factors are likely to be involved and
goals made more limited. For example, it may be necessary to
intimidate or capture the leadership in order to restore order or
reverse an action, or it may simply be necessary to anticipate,
prevent, and counter opposition to conduct of a more limited
mission (e.g., feeding the starving or protecting innocent people
from genocide).
In U.S. planning for OOTW, it is a virtual given that risk will be
minimized and there will be a discrete and proportional use of
force with minimal collateral damage. This means that there
must be a belief that a mission can be accomplished and is
worth the resources necessary to do so. Before initiating action
42
Shock and Awe
in these often confusing situations, objectives must be clearly
established and, once engaged, there should be a willingness to
persevere through the inevitable rough patches.
Whether in an MRC or in OOTW, we first will need to know
what we want to achieve with Rapid Dominance. This is a task
for political leadership that is informed with military advice
concerning what is feasible, what is not, and what is uncertain.
The extent of the mission must be clearly defined. Is it to defeat
an enemy so that it will no longer pose a threat? Do we only
need to stop an adversary from carrying out a particular act?
Must we control a situation entirely or only sufficiently to be
able to carry out a specific mission? Can we really affect the
adversaryâs will?
Recent events give us examples of outcomes likely to be relevant
in the future. MRCs call for the full spectrum of outcomesâfrom
reversing military action (e.g., the invasion of Kuwait) to estab-
lishing a government more acceptable to the U.S. and the
world, probably using military coercion (Haiti, Panama), to
eliminating a threat to the U.S. or its allies. We may want to per-
suade an adversary to cease an aggression or act of interference
or otherwise change behavior we cannot accept or tolerate.
Political expectations in MRCs are for the effective use of force
and for rapid success or at least steady progress. Casualties
should be moderate or at least acceptable, with the threshold of
American pain dependent on the directness of the threat to U.S.
interests and with the degree of compellance appropriate to the
political rationale.
Operations Other Than War present a different set of chal-
lenges. These challenges are likely to require discrete domi-
nance of specific circumstances rather than total dominance.
Chapter 3
43
The general tasks may include a wide variety of requirements.
For example, it may be necessary to try to prevent or stop geno-
cide (e.g., Rwanda) and ethnic cleansing (e.g., Bosnia). The task
may be to cooperate with a humanitarian relief effort (e.g., pre-
vention of starvation in Somalia or Bosnia). The goal of
employing force may be free and fair elections (e.g., Cambodia,
Bosnia). The requirement could be to destroy a limited objec-
tive (e.g., an above-ground or underground chemical weapons
plant or documented nuclear weapons facilities developed by
hostile or unfriendly states).
Other tasks could simply be to preserve international rights
(e.g., protecting the neutral shipping of the western oil flow in
the Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war). A more testing challenge
might be to accomplish a limited political goal (e.g., gesture to
deal with Israeli incursion in Lebanon in 1982). We undoubt-
edly will face the future requirement to reverse a potential
threat to Americans or to a region of importance with a limited
military action (e.g., in Grenada in 1983 or the Mayaguez
rescue in Cambodia in 1975). Discrete moves to bolster preven-
tive diplomacy and/or overt measures to demonstrate pre-
paredness to assist (e.g., forces sent to Sudan to support Chad
under threat of invasion from Libya and recent Navy opera-
tions in the Taiwan Strait) will still be relevant.
Countering terrorism also will be part of a continuing agenda
(hostage rescueâe.g., Iran, Lebanon; hijackingâe.g.,
Achille
Lauro
; deterrent to further movesâe.g., the Higgins operation,
Libyan raids, missile attack on Iraq after the threat to former
President Bush). We may also need to interdict weapons, terror-
ists, or other discrete cargoes moving between nations (e.g.,
44
Shock and Awe
North Korean missile shipments to Iran, Iranian and Libyan
arms exchanges).
Economic sanctions are likely to continue to be a preferable
political alternative or a necessary political prelude to an offen-
sive military step (e.g., implemented as the first step in actions
to counter Libyan-sponsored terrorism; tried first as an alterna-
tive to war with Iraq; used ineffectively against the Serbs to try
to convince them not to continue to support Bosnian Serb
aggression; and tried with Haiti as an unsuccessful alternative
to occupation). Our past experience has been that we seldom
have had decisive or immediate results from these economic
measures, sanctions, and embargoes. Considerable time is
required to have impact and we have not been particularly effi-
cient in controlling the leakage and spillover in these situations.
Sanctions almost always require full international cooperation
that cannot be assumed or guaranteed. In Bosnia, of course,
some portions of the arms embargo were deliberately allowed
to be permeable and the U.S. turned a blind eye to Iranâs sup-
port of the Bosnians.
Past experience also has taught us some relevant lessons about
the potential of Shock and Awe. Improvements in the capabili-
ties enhancing these outcomes could make a decisive difference
in dealing with future challenges. History also cautions us as
well that there will be restraints in employing Rapid Domi-
nance and that there are fundamental differences between
MRC and OOTW applications.
Shock and Awe, when properly applied, have been very effec-
tive in the past. They will be effective in the future, even when
applied in limited ways that do not reflect the more encompass-
ing impact envisioned by Rapid Dominance. There are many
Chapter 3
45
examples of how a very limited application of force made a sig-
nificant difference through the mechanisms of Shock and Awe.
Experiences, including successes and failures, illustrate some of
the potential of Rapid Dominance if implemented effectively.
The Vietnam War provides certain lessons. When B-52 strikes,
which made the ground rumble, were added to the equation
during the Christmas 1972 bombing of Hanoi, dragging nego-
tiations with the North Vietnamese on a peace agreement
moved swiftly to an acceptable conclusion. Daily reports follow-
ing the controversial B-52 âcarpet bombingâ raids in Cambo-
dia talked of North Vietnamese/Viet Cong soldiers wandering
around in a daze due to shock and concussion. Both B-52s and
naval gunfire, especially from the 16-inch guns of a battleship,
had a similar impact on invading North Vietnamese troop con-
centrations. The mining of Haiphong Harbor, although initi-
ated late in the war, was equally effective in immediately
stopping shipping in and out of North Vietnam.
When President Nixon wanted to deal with the perplexing
problems of our POWs and failing domestic morale, as well as
take away substantial political leverage from the North Viet-
namese, he directed the raid to rescue prisoners jailed just out-
side Hanoi. The raid itself was well executed. American forces
reached and searched the prison and returned safely. But no
Americans were freed because a last minute transfer of the
POWs from the prison had not been detected. If there had been
prisoners still there to be rescued, the operation would have
been a highly dramatic and influential event. The point is that
accurate and timely intelligence remains crucial.
There seems to be little doubt that the combined F-111 and
naval air strike against Libya in 1986 in response to the disco-
46
Shock and Awe
theque terrorist attack in Germany gave Gadhafi pause. The
perception that he personally might be targeted appeared to get
Gadhafiâs attention.
When our troops were having difficulty dislodging Grenadian
soldiers from their main fortress, Marine tanks were sailed
around the island to confront them. At the sight of tank guns,
the seemingly stubborn occupants surrendered almost immedi-
ately without a fight.
The cease-fire in the bloody Iran-Iraq war was quick to follow
after the commencement of daily Iraqi long-range rocket bom-
bardments of Tehran that amounted to a reign of terror. Given
that both sides were exhausted at that point, a show of force
could have been convincing. Strong U.S. action in response to
Iranâs mining of neutral waters may also have had a sobering
effect on the mullahs. Not only were Iranâs vulnerable oil-pro-
ducing platforms in the Gulf boarded and destroyed with impu-
nity by the U.S., but Iranian naval forces that had come out to
challenge the U.S. Navy were destroyed. Iraqâs reign of terror,
and the strong American message to Iran, possibly helped end
the war.
In our troublesome stay in Somalia, AC-130 gunships earned
immediate respect from potential troublemakers with their
ability to see wide areas night or day, remain on station for
hours as night patrols, and strike with precision and relative
impunity. The methodical drone of AC-130s circling in the air
was enough to restore some order, although a few civilians
found the noise unsettling. In another situation, the aftermath
of systematic UN efforts to destroy faction leader Mohamed
Aideedâs illegal arms facilities generated an unexpected reac-
tion from other warlords, including those colluding with him,
Chapter 3
47
which was to volunteer to hand over their own weapons storage
areas. For a fleeting moment, Shock and Awe created an impor-
tant opportunity.
During the many vagaries of the Bosnia tragedy, it would
appear that when NATO accurately delivered potent doses of
air power, rather than occasional pin pricks, the Serbs seemed
finally to understand that an appearance of cooperation rather
than defiance was in their interest. This NATO message in the
form of air power, of course, was strengthened by the effective-
ness of the accompanying Croatian/Muslim counteroffensive
and the fatigue of Bosnian Serb fighters. Sustaining the shock
effect with forces on the ground was a necessary combination
to gain the staying power effect to change the will of the Serbs.
It was not accomplished by air alone. Timing remains impor-
tant.
Past failures also offer examples of how Rapid Dominance
might have made a difference in reacting to those difficult situ-
ations. Rapid Dominance might have provided a better
response to those setbacks or might have offered a more effec-
tive alternative that would have avoided the vulnerabilities in
those situations in the first place (e.g., Bay of Pigs, Iran embassy
rescue in 1980, Lebanon Marine barracks bombing in 1983,
response to the Pueblo seizure by North Korea in 1968, and the
reaction to the downed helicopters during the Ranger raid in
Somalia).
We should also learn from other states who have demonstrated
effective application of the characteristics of Rapid Dominance.
Israelâs rout of Syriaâs air force and missile defenses in Leba-
nonâs Baaka Valley shows how dramatic success can have polit-
ical spillover. On the other hand, Japanâs surprise attack on
48
Shock and Awe
Pearl Harbor produced the reverse effects of Shock and Awe
and had the unintended consequence of galvanizing the U.S.
into action.
Even without a Rapid Dominance capability or when facing a
more technologically dependent opponent, it is clear from these
examples and many others in recent U.S. experiences that cer-
tain improvements in capabilities would provide us with greater
flexibility in the future. This is especially true in OOTW situa-
tions, which require a multiplicity of effective instruments at
our disposal. It is also true that certain operations such as
peacekeeping tend to be manpower intensive.
If we are to stay ahead of an adversary and deny things of value
to that adversary, dynamic, accurate, and integrated intelli-
gence is essential. Intelligence needs to move to levels unprece-
dented in scope, timeliness, accuracy, and availability in real
time. The Gulf War, despite its success, showed classic limita-
tions in intelligence. Even though we had nearly every intelli-
gence asset designed to deal with the USSR available for use,
we were unable to detect the full extent of Iraqâs WMD capa-
bility; unable to find mobile missile launchers even with a major
expenditure of onscene assets. In some cases, we could only
âseeâ kilometers in front of our advancing forces; and we mis-
takenly attacked targets we thought were legitimate but had
civilians inside. In some instances, only reliable human intelli-
gence may provide the necessary information (for example, in
order to understand what is happening in deep underground
facilities).
Another important capability we should try to achieve in the
future is the ability to intimidate, capture, convince, or signifi-
cantly influence the perceptions and understanding of individ-
Chapter 3
49
ual troublemakers. This need has been demonstrated
repeatedly in recent years (e.g., Gadhafi in Libya, Aideed in
Somalia, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Noreiga in Panama). Such a
perception is particularly relevant when the problem appears
not to be caused by a unified population but by the ambitions
of individual leaders who have intimidated or killed off any
likely internal opposition. Such a capability requires effective
real-time intelligence and a variety of methods for accomplish-
ing the task (from exceptionally precise weapons to effective
âsnatchâ operations).
In a world in which nonlethal sanctions are a political impera-
tive, we will continue to need the ability to shut down all com-
merce into and out of any country from shipping, air, rail, and
roads. We ought to be able to do this in a much more thorough,
decisive, and shocking way than we have in the past. The ability
to apply pressure or cause acquiescence employing nonlethal
means also will be important in some circumstances. Weapons
that shock and awe, stun and paralyze, but do not kill in signif-
icant numbers may be the only ones that are politically accept-
able in the future. This also means that crowd control with
minimum violence may be needed. In certain circumstances,
the costs of having to resort to lethal force may be too politically
expensive in terms of local support as well as support in the U.S.
and internationally.
As is already well recognized, we need to be able to shut down
key electronic communications to, from, and within a country
(or within a specific subgroup or faction). We also need the abil-
ity to control radio and television within a country. It is impor-
tant in all cases, however, to be able to deny an adversaryâs
50
Shock and Awe
ability to communicate and to have our own means of reaching
the population with appropriate messages.
In addition to being able to eliminate military capabilities selec-
tively, including weapons systems, overt and covert stockpiles,
fuel, WMD, and related logistics, we will need to have the capa-
bility selectively to incapacitate, neutralize, or destroy other
things considered of great value to opponents. Increased target-
ing precision will compound effectiveness as well as help to
avoid the political pitfalls of using force such as the inevitable,
unintended collateral damage that has been the pattern of the
past.
More surgical and carefully crafted applications of force, how-
ever, will only partially reduce the restraints and limits on utiliz-
ing Rapid Dominance in MRCs and OOTW. There are
substantial differences in the political constraints likely to be
imposed in dealing with MRCs and with OOTW. For example,
there is much greater latitude to use dominant force and Shock
and Awe in MRCs than in OOTW.
In MRC situations, we are often likely to face conventional
powers that are well organized, well equipped, and broadly
dependent on technology. Although more powerful, these
developed states are also likely to be especially vulnerable to a
technologically sophisticated approach such as Rapid Domi-
nance as long as we maintain this military edge and the ability
to neutralize their military systems. Even in the most compel-
ling circumstance where a Rapid Dominance force is used,
however, support from other nations will be politically desir-
able.
Chapter 3
51
In most circumstances there will be limits to the targets of value
to an adversary that can be destroyed, as well as to the numbers
and types of weapons that can be employed. For example, the
political circumstances in which nuclear weapons could be
employed are quite limited. In both MRCs and OOTW, certain
actions are politically as well as morally unacceptable except in
extreme cases. Such restrictions are likely to apply to targets
affecting control of access to food, water, and clean air, and to
destruction of religious and cultural centers, even if there is low
collateral damage.
In OOTW situations, we are much more vulnerable to criticism
of using excessive force, especially if there is civilian or collateral
damage. The concept of proportionality is likely to remain an
operative principle in U.S. policy and may be taken to extremes,
especially if the marginal nature of a situation leads to a mar-
ginal and ineffective response. Some people, both military and
civilian, even argue that superior technology should not be
employed in such situations and that an adversary should be
fought on his own terms. While such arguments should be
rejected, they nonetheless sometimes have a political influence
that must be considered. We should always use technology to
minimize our casualties, give us every advantage, reduce collat-
eral damage, and make us look more formidable. At the same
time, there needs to be sufficient provocation to warrant
destruction or denial. Our actions must always be consistent
with our own system of values.
The ârapidâ component of Rapid Dominance is one of the
most appealing aspects of the concept, both politically and mil-
itarily. The ability to take action that is timely and decisive mul-
tiplies substantially the chances of ultimate success. Action
52
Shock and Awe
needs to be taken precisely when it will have greatest impact.
Often initial public outrage and political support for action in
response to a provocation subsides if a prolonged buildup is
necessary in order to prepare to take action.
The ability to react faster than an adversary, to assimilate infor-
mation and act on it effectively, is also an important advantage.
In a NATO region-wide dynamic computer war game a few
years ago, it was clear that the simulated enemy was advancing
faster than the defensive chain of command could make
counter moves. The tradition of sending decisions up the line
was simply too slow to cope with the dynamic challenge posed
by the adversary. Commanders onscene lacked the authority to
respond and adjust to rapidly changing situations. The exercise
graphically demonstrated to the country involved the need to
institute fundamental command and control streamlining. It
also demonstrated the advantages of being able to make local
decisions in real time while still effectively coordinating and
optimizing the overall effort.
The Navyâs âcommand by negationâ concept evolved in the
1980s in order to deal with the rapidity of the air/missile threat
and the need to integrate dynamically the offensive and defen-
sive missile, air, sea, and undersea capabilities of a battle group
and its joint components (e.g., AWACs). This concept was one
way of solving the time problem while keeping the overall com-
mander in the picture. The commander could then intervene
and modify actions as necessary to conform to the broader
strategy. This type of control was helped by the evolution of
electronic links and secure communications and the availability
of satellites.
Chapter 3
53
Commanders employing Rapid Dominance will need to
orchestrate it using similar principles, while applying greater
selective ability to turn on and off a variety of systems, sensors,
and devices influencing the whole operational picture. Tech-
nology should also give commanders a much better grasp of
what is evolving during a battle. Just as the American military
of today has made âowning the nightâ part of its tactical advan-
tage, âowningâ the dimension of time will be critical to the suc-
cess of Rapid Dominance.
In conceptual terms, the following is suggestive of a future force
configuration and the design of a mission capability package
(MCP) based on Rapid Dominance.
OPERATIONAL CONSTRUCT
Rapid Dominance is based on affecting the adversaryâs will,
perception, and knowledge through imposing sufficient Shock
and Awe to overcome resistance, allowing us to achieve our
aims. Four characteristics are vital: knowledge, rapidity, bril-
liance, and control of the environment.
Application of all or of selective capabilities within the Rapid
Dominance systems of systems will then decisively direct the
application of military/defense resources and produce the req-
uisite outcome. Rapid Dominance envisages the execution of
specific actions in real or near-real time to counter actions or
intentions deemed detrimental to U.S. interests. On the high
end of conflict, Rapid Dominance would introduce a reaction
of Shock and Awe in areas of highest value to the threatening
individual, group, or state. In many cases, prior understanding
of the power of Rapid Dominance would act as a deterrent to
54
Shock and Awe
the objectionable action. When used, Rapid Dominance would
ensure favorable early resolution of issues with minimal loss of
lives and collateral damage. The concept theoretically should
be able to impact adversarial situations that apply across the
board to high, mid, low, no, or minimal technology threats.
Rapid Dominance expands the art of joint combined arms
warfighting capabilities to a new level. Rapid Dominance
requires a sophisticated, interconnected, and interoperable grid
of netted intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, communi-
cations systems, data analysis, and real-time deliverable action-
able information to the shooter. This network must provide
total situational awareness and supporting nodal analysis that
enables U.S. forces to act inside the adversaryâs decision loop in
a manner that on the high end produces Shock and Awe among
the threat parties. Properly detailed nodal analysis of this
knowledge grid will enable the shutting down of specific func-
tions or all essential functions near simultaneously. This will
often times be netted pieces of data where the sum of the parts
gives the answer and the battlefield advantage to the force pos-
sessing this rapidly netted information.
The ârapidâ part of the equation becomes the ability to get
real-time actionable targeting information to the appropriate
shooter, whether the shooter is a tank division, an individual
tank, an artillery battery, an individual rifle man, a naval battle
group, an individual ship, an air wing/squadron, or an aircraft
in flight. This means the need to have the right shooter in the
right place, locating and identifying the target correctly and
quickly, allocating and assigning targets rapidly, getting the
âshootâ order or general authority to the shooter, and then
assessing the battle damage accurately.
Chapter 3
55
At whatever the unit level, Shock and Awe are provided by the
speed and effectiveness of this cycle. Then, the ability to do this
simultaneously throughout the battlefield creates a strategic
Shock and Awe on the opposing forces, their leadership, and
populace. This simultaneity and concurrency are central tenets
of imposing Shock and Awe. When the video results of these
attacks are broadcast in real time worldwide on CNN, the pos-
itive impact on coalition support and negative impact on poten-
tial threat support can be decisive.
The first priority of a doctrine of Rapid Dominance should be
to deter, alter, or affect the will and therefore those actions that
are either unacceptable to U.S. national security interests or
endanger the democratic community of states and access to free
markets. These political objectives are generally those envi-
sioned in the major and lower regional conflict scenarios (MRC
& LRC). Should deterrence fail, the application of Rapid Dom-
inance in these circumstances should create sufficient Shock
and Awe to the immediate threat forces and leadership as well
as provide a clear message for other potential threat partners.
The doctrine of Rapid Dominance would not be limited to
MRC and LRC scenarios. It has applications in a variety of
areas such as countering WMD, terrorism, and perhaps other
tasks. The challenge is that should deterrence fail, the execution
of a response based on Rapid Dominance must be proportional
to the threat, yet decisive enough to convey the right degree of
Shock and Awe. Rapid Dominance cannot solve all or even
most of the worldâs problems. We repeat our disclaimer that this
is not a silver bullet. However, Rapid Dominance and its capac-
ity for achieving Shock and Awe could be applied for egregious
threats or violations of international law, such as:
56
Shock and Awe
â˘
Direct military threats to the territory of the U.S., its
friends, and allies;
â˘
Blatant aggression involving a large state crushing a small
state;
â˘
Rogue leader/state sponsored terrorism/use of WMD;
â˘
Egregious violations of human rights on a large scale; and
â˘
Threat to essential world markets.
Clearly, the Information Highway is crossing all sovereign bor-
ders and penetrating even the most closed societies. The ineq-
uities and benefits in all societies are becoming known to the
masses as well as the power brokers. The requirement for Rapid
Dominance to develop sophisticated capabilities to penetrate
the Information Highway and create road blocks as well as con-
trol inputs/outputs to the Highway both overtly and covertly is
fundamental to the concept.
These same techniques also apply to law enforcement agencies
targeting international crime and drug cartels using the High-
way. Closer interagency cooperations and coordination
between military and law enforcement activities and capabili-
ties must be established. Experience with the military involve-
ment in the drug war revealed considerable cultural differences
between these organizations. Overcoming these cultural differ-
ences among organizations is not easy. The required trust and
confidence for sharing sensitive information and support
between these agencies and the military needs to be developed
further. Interagency coordination and cooperation must be
raised to a new level of sophistication. Some laws may need to
be changed. War in Cyberspace does not recognize domestic or
foreign boundaries. In this environment the subjects of Infor-
Chapter 3
57
mation Warfare and Information In Warfare take on new
meaning and require focused development. We must become
proficient within this environment.
OPERATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS
â˘
The enemy picks the time and place to initiate the conflict
(i.e., we are surprised).
â˘
We then attain control of the initiative through superior
speed, knowledge, and capacity to act and react.
â˘
Our forces are perceived to be invincible; engagements
must convince the enemy that there is no hope.
â˘
Combat must be unrelenting and omnipresent at times,
places, and tempo of choosing.
â˘
Allied operations must be thoroughly integrated, from
political objectives through combat to include psychologi-
cal warfare.
â˘
The enemy must be hit in those areas of greatest impor-
tance to him and devastated by the ferocity and swiftness
of our attack.
From these assumptions, certain operational criteria follow that
help to define a Rapid Dominance Force with more specificity
in improving:
â˘
Intelligence, indications, and warning on an aggressorâs
actions
â˘
The length of time required for a decision to react
â˘
Decisive responses at various levels and times after the
crises or conflict begins to develop:
58
Shock and Awe
âRespond in 1 to 3 days with air and missile strikes and
special forces
âRespond in 5 to 10 days with more massive power up
to and including a joint task force of corps size
âRespond in 10 to 30 days with a second corps
THE RAPID DOMINANCE MCP
As a next step, we need to sketch out what a Rapid Dominance
Force might look like for a corps-sized air, ground, sea, and
space joint task force supported by necessary intelligence assets
that can impose sufficient Shock and Awe to break the will of
the adversary. First, this force will emphasize capabilities to
maximize the core characteristics of (1) knowledge of self,
adversary, and environment, (2) rapidity, (3) brilliance in execu-
tion, and (4) control of the environment.
Knowledge means more than dominant battlefield awareness.
It means understanding the adversaryâs mind and anticipating
his reactions. It means targeting those things that will produce
the intended Shock and Awe. It also means having feedback
and good, timely battle assessment to enable knowledge to be
used dynamically as well as to know how our forces will react.
Rapidity means moving and acting as quickly as necessary and
always on a timely basis. Rapidity can be instant or as required.
Brilliance in operations means achieving the highest standards
of operational competence and, through a superiority of knowl-
edge, maintaining the ability to impose Shock and Awe through
Chapter 3
59
continuously surprising and psychologically and physically
breaking the adversaryâs will to resist. This will require training
and exercising of joint land, sea, air, space, and special forces to
new standards of excellence and competence. It is mainly in
training where the difference lies in achieving operational bril-
liance. This desired standard of performance can be achieved
by making innovations to permit new levels of battlefield fidelity
for training units and developing leaders.
Control of the environment would include complete signature
control on the entire battle area out to hundreds of miles. We
would control our signatures as well as what we wanted the
adversary to see or hear and what we do not want the enemy to
know. Destruction of the adversaryâs systems would begin with
long-range stealthy, or âstandoff â zero CEP weapons, extend to
FOG-M-type battlefield weapons to close-in systems. Small
units would be able to call in âfiresâ for 360 degrees on a nearly
instant basis.
Attacks from all aspects would be complemented by deception,
disinformation, surveillance, targeting, and killing. âPulseâ
weapons would be used to disarm and actively deceive the
enemy through disrupting and attacking all aspects of the
adversaryâs electronics, information, and C4I infrastructure. It
is this âlay downâ of total power across all areas in rapid and
simultaneous actions that would impose the Shock and Awe.
The remainder, roughly a third of this Joint Task Force, would
consist of traditional platforms including conventional ground,
air, and amphibious forces, naval battle group forces, and the
necessary supporting logistical, C4I, medical and other capa-
bilities and ground forces to conduct and sustain conventional
or traditional operations if needed and to support or defend tra-
60
Shock and Awe
ditionally vulnerable targets such as ports, roads, and other
infrastructure.
Tactical employment is, of course, dependent on the conditions
of the MRC. In general, the most rapidly deployable units of
this corps, the future equivalent of the 18th Airborne Corps,
would be sent to secure or reinforce a limited area into which
the remainder of the force would flow. This AOR would be self-
protected. Our goal is that perhaps a Rapid Dominance force
of as few as 2,000 troops could successfully defend against an
enemy of 10-20,000 in an MRC and that a full corps could be
deployed within 5 to 10 days.
These units would arrive quickly and, as directed, begin dis-
arming, destroying, and disabling the enemyâs military where-
withal using âstandoff â capabilities. Forward-based or long-
range reconnaissance units could be employed/supported by
UAVs and overhead surveillance.
Units would be forward deployed in accordance with their time
phased plan. These units would be used either to complete the
attack or to carry it to the adversary, occupy selective territory
physically, or carry out the requirements of the post-war occu-
pation campaign. Should traditional forces be needed, they
would of course be available.
Protection and self-defense would partly be provided by con-
trolling the environment. In effect, we would cast a cloak
around the adversary and permit the adversary to see and know
what we alone provided. This would leave an adversary blind,
deaf, and dumb. With superior and rapid firepower, the
blinded, deafened enemy would be destroyed and defeated as
Chapter 3
61
we saw fit. This would maximize Shock and Awe and help
break the adversaryâs will.
In OOTW, the Rapid Dominance JTF might function as fol-
lows. First, the ability to deploy a dominant force rapidly to
attack or threaten to attack appropriate targets could be
brought to bear without involving manpower-intense or
manned sensors and weapons. Second, once deployed, since
self-defense is likely to be required against small arms, mines,
and shoulder carried or mortar weapons, certainly some form
of âarmorâ or protective vehicles and shelters would be neces-
sary. However, through the UAVs, C4I, and virtual reality sys-
tems, as well as through signature management and other
Shock and Awe weapons including High Powered Microwave
(HPM) and âstun-likeâ systems, this force would have more
than dominant battlefield awareness.
There are, of course, caveats. Unless strategic or policy objec-
tives are in line with operational capabilities, military force is
unlikely to be a useful instrument. It is also unlikely that any
operational construct, no matter how brilliantly conceived,
could overcome such a disconnect. Vietnam and Somalia
remind us of these limitations.
The assimilation of intelligenceâstrategically, culturally, and
operationallyâis a central thrust and component of the knowl-
edge aspect of Rapid Dominance. Our forces must not only
fight smarter; these forces, at all or most levels, must be edu-
cated and trained differently with far more emphasis on intelli-
gence, broadly defined. This knowledge, when applied rapidly
under conditions of brilliance and in a controlled environment,
is a centerpiece of Rapid Dominance.
62
Shock and Awe
There must be full comprehension of the adversary across stra-
tegic, political, military, cultural, intellectual, and perceptual
lines. This understanding must go beyond how an adversary
might use military force. Those crucial values that motivate and
underlie a nation or a group must be understood if the appro-
priate level of Shock and Awe is to be achieved.
There are also obvious questions that must be answered. Does
Rapid Dominance apply only or mostly to the high end of the
conflict spectrum involving more traditional applications of
force to achieve political objectives, as envisioned in the MRC
and LRC scenarios? Yet to be explored is the degree to which a
concept of Rapid Dominance with Shock and Awe applies to
OOTW, countering terrorism against U.S. interests, controlling
rogue states/leaders, etc. What are the political and military
prerequisites to apply Rapid Dominance? Are they applicable
and realistically achievable in the increasingly complex interac-
tion of national nongovernment organizations (PVOs/NGOs)
present worldwide to provide health and humanitarian care to
refugees and other disenfranchised people? Would the concept
of Rapid Dominance with a degree of Shock and Awe offend
and generate counterproductive public relations backlash from
those who believe force should only be used as a last resort and
then with a measurable degree of proportionality?
At this point, we can only raise questions and expect to have
them answered at a later date. This line of questions, concerns,
and issues as well as a host of others, needs to be examined up
front and answered in the Rapid Dominance concept develop-
ment process. We must be careful that we do not overvisualize
Rapid Dominance versus the reality of credible/affordable
capabilities to execute the concept. Rapid Dominance must still
Chapter 3
63
confront the fog of war. Decisions will still be made based on
judgment and confidence in the intelligence provided, the esti-
mate of threat intentions, knowledge of true center of gravity
targets, and confidence in our own force capabilities to inflict
Shock and Awe. In fact, the key will be the ability to penetrate
this fog with increased clarity and to control events now
unmanageable through more rapid gathering, analyzing, and
distributing actionable information. Complicating the issue is
the fact that the U.S. has not clearly defined its role in the post-
Cold War era. As the worldâs only credible superpower, the U.S.
cannot avoid a leadership role but neither can it avoid the
focused criticism applied to all leaders. This is the classical
âdamned if you do and damned if you donâtâ syndrome.
At this stage, the concept of Rapid Dominance is a work in
progress. It needs to be âoperationalized.â By designing a nom-
inal MCP and fitting with it paper systems and capabilities, we
can explore the answers to many of the questions we raised
above. Three steps are needed to proceed down the road on the
way to a real capability. First, feasibility of the requisite techni-
cal capabilities needs to be established. Second, wargaming of
the MCP must be done. Third, and perhaps most difficult,
deriving the means for implementing the most promising
aspects of Rapid Dominance must occur.
65
Chapter 4
An Outline for
System
Innovation and
Technological
Integration
chieving Shock and Awe is central to Rapid
Dominance, and therefore must serve as
the key organizing principle for any rigorous
examination and exploitation of system concepts
and technologies for Rapid Dominance. Under-
standing the interplay between technology and
doctrine is not only or simply a straightforward
matter of establishing operational requirements
and then seeking to attain them through inven-
tion and design. It is a complex and interactive
process of experimentation and discovery
wherein intellect, hard work, endurance, and
innovation must drive the use of technology.
Rather than make changes, however significant,
A
66
Shock and Awe
to modify current capabilities or build newer, similar ones,
Rapid Dominance seeks to identify and field systems specifi-
cally designed to achieve Shock and Aweâsystems that may
break the mold much as the Model T Ford once did years ago.
The genetic decoders in bioengineering laboratories, com-
puter-aided design tools used by engineers, vast database man-
agement systems in place in corporate offices, computer-
controlled machines enabling composite materials, and the
countless academic, business, and personal computers are all
evidence of the prominent and ever increasing role information
technologies have assumed in modern economies. Many of the
technologies underlying the Information Age are being spear-
headed by U.S. small business and its entrepreneurial culture.
Certainly, from the huge consumer electronics firms in Japan to
software development businesses in India, the rest of the world
participates and competes. But few can deny that U.S. industry
provides the leadership in and is the preeminent developer of
information technologies as they are most broadly defined.
This leadership position, properly leveraged, provides the
United States with an ever-increasing military advantage over
competing nations.
Leveraging technology requires more than merely incorporat-
ing it into U.S. forces; it is likely to include a significant redesign
of both forces and leadership to embrace these rapidly evolving
technologies. Many of the technologies that will support Rapid
Dominance are already discernible. Unlike the impact of
nuclear weapons, it is unlikely that a single technology or
system will emerge to produce Rapid Dominance. It will only
be attainable through the broadest integration of strategic con-
cepts, doctrine, operational needs, technological advances,
Chapter 4
67
system design, and appropriate organization of command, con-
trol, training, and education. And only a large, immensely
capable country such as the U.S. may be able to achieve this.
Rapid Dominance seeks to integrate this confluence of strategy,
technology, and innovation. Four core characteristics were
defined earlier as crucial:
â˘
Complete knowledge of self, adversary, and the environ-
ment;
â˘
Rapidity;
â˘
Brilliance of execution; and
â˘
Control of the environment.
What follows is illustrative rather than exhaustive of how tech-
nology can be used in a broad system approach. Many of these
technologies are currently being addressed within the defense
community. Analysts, military strategists, acquisition planners,
and even âfuturistsâ are wrestling with the meaning and conse-
quences of the Information Age. Our focus on systems and
technologies begins with these four characteristics.
KNOWLEDGE OF SELF, ADVERSARY,
AND ENVIRONMENT
In the modern threat environment, it is difficult to estimate
where the next crisis may occur, let alone the next war. Even 5
years ago, who would have foreseen the significant involvement
of the U.S. military in places like Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Bos-
nia, and the South China Sea? To which hot spots can we
expect to see U.S. troops deployed over the next 5 years? Over
68
Shock and Awe
the next 20? In this section we argue that, in addition to improv-
ing our force capabilities, the U.S. must develop an intelligence
repository far more extensive than during the Cold War, cover-
ing virtually all the important regions and organizational struc-
tures throughout the world.
During the Cold War, intelligence agencies focused more on a
bipolar world and built sizable organizations to collect informa-
tion on âthe other side.â This same intelligence structure, in the
main, is in place today facing a multipolar world, where any
number of power structuresâwhether they be states, interna-
tional organizations, or even small groups of individualsâmust
be monitored with an understanding that extends to their lead-
ership, culture, economic direction, and military capability.
As the technologies relevant to knowing the adversary and his
environment are examined, an emerging theme is the clear shift
from technology developments that once resided within our
government to those driven by commercial demands. For
example, the information technologies used by U.S. intelligence
agencies are of such complexity, importance, and expense that
they are referred to as ânational assetsâ and are developed and
managed by large, dedicated organizations. Even here, com-
mercial companies are rapidly encroaching on what once
seemed to be an unassailable market position in Earth observa-
tion systems. One may already purchase synthetic aperture
radar interferometry images from any number of sources, and
panchromatic visual images with 1-meter resolution will soon
be available over the counter for remarkably little cost. Indeed,
the only real barrier to this burgeoning market is the under-
standable concerns that governments have with allowing such
technology to be widely available. In areas such as encryption
Chapter 4
69
and data security, commercial developers are more likely to
reach limits of government acceptance before those of techno-
logical capability.
With untold billions invested in communications systems, even
the most modern U.S. military communication systems often
compare poorly with commercial systems. While this has long
been the case for fielded systems, it is becoming true for even
the most sophisticated research and development programs
being undertaken by defense organizations.
As a case in point, one may consider a program recently initi-
ated by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) called Battlefield Awareness and Data Dissemination
(BADD). At the heart of this program, large amounts of data
are collected within a vast database residing on commercial
computers and enterprise management systems. This informa-
tion is then disseminated to the troops through the commercial
Global Broadcast System (GBS) onto âset-topâ boxes, an
enabling technology that was developed commercially. Even
with this leveraging of private industry, there is a real question
as to whether DARPA will be able to field a system that would
compete well with surprisingly similar commercial systems.
Internet channels planned by media industry giants such as
BSkyB will offer multimegabit, interactive, digital data connec-
tions to the Internet merely as an enticement for subscribers to
enroll for their full digital broadcasting service (200 to 300
channels of digital video and sound). Understanding that there
is much more to BADD than the little discussed here, one still
almost wonders whether DARPA could simply buy a subscrip-
tion and connect it to an appropriate, commercial, network
management system. More to the point, if even well-funded
70
Shock and Awe
and aggressive technology development organizations such as
DARPA find it difficult to remain ahead of commercial
advancements, there may be a fundamental lesson to be
learned regarding the management of defense-related technol-
ogies.
KNOWLEDGE AND INTELLIGENCE
âIntelligenceâ is comprised of five categories of knowledge and
understanding: a societyâs leadership; culture and values; the
strategic, political, economic, and physical environment; mili-
tary capabilities and orders of battle; and comprehensive bat-
tlefield information. Examples of technologies and system
approaches of potential relevance in these areas are discussed
below.
Understanding potential adversaries, coalition partners, and
involved neutral countries implies an infrastructure for acquir-
ing an indepth knowledge about cultures, leadership values,
and other driving factors that allow us, when needed and on a
timely basis, to get âinto their minds.â Applicable technologies
include automated language translators, interactive and auton-
omous computer simulations, advanced database systems for
organizing and understanding data and transactions of individ-
uals and institutions, and computerized educational systems for
training and learning these skills.
Collecting sufficient and timely environmental information is
crucial to Rapid Dominance. Logistics, demographics, and
infrastructure are broad areas of collection along with geogra-
phy, road/rail/ship lanes, utility sites and corridors, manufac-
turing, government sites, military and paramilitary facilities,
Chapter 4
71
population demographics, economic and financial pressure
points (such as oil wells or gold mines), and major dams and
bridges. Technologies used to provide environmental awareness
include traditional means such as satellites that can be aug-
mented with dynamic sensor management tools for optimizing
observation routines. The vast quantities of data that reside on
the worldâs computer networks, if properly exploited, provide
another rich source of information. Data mining tools such as
Web crawlers, gatherers, brokers, and repositories that pull and
organize data from public networks will be essential to building
a more complete picture of potential adversaries. Since not all
databases and host computers are cooperative with these meth-
ods, offensive information warfare tools will be required to
obtain specific pieces of information that are vital for national
security purposes.
Once data are collected, they must be processed and dissemi-
nated and then stored for future access. Enterprise data storage
and retrieval systems that are capable of working with many
terrabytes (1,000 gigabytes) of information are already com-
monplace. Since it is impossible for humans to comprehend
such vast quantities of information without some assistance,
data exploitation tools (filters, fusion, automatic target recogni-
tion, image understanding, etc.) will be crucial technologies.
Finally, the information, once processed, will be of little use if
not disseminated to the right people in a timely fashion. âIntel-
ligent dataâ dissemination and wide-bandwidth communica-
tions are examples of essential technologies emerging in this
area.
In addition to knowledge about regions and locations where
U.S. force may be applied, it is important to maintain vigilance
72
Shock and Awe
and up-to-date knowledge on specific âhot spotsâ and to have
sufficient flexibility within the system to shift attention rapidly
to new areas. Systems addressing this more time-sensitive set of
tasks would include light, quickly deployable satellites, high alti-
tude and endurance unmanned aerial vehicles, manned plat-
forms, and unattended ground sensors.
As a crisis unfolds and the insertion of U.S. troops or other mil-
itary action becomes more probable, information needs and
the number of information consumers both increase dramati-
cally. Information that must be collected and correlated include
targeting, battle damage assessment (BDA), weather, terrain,
infrastructure, tracking of special targets, logistics, position and
status of our own troops, identification friend or foe (IFF), and
status of material. It is vitally important that sufficient sensor
systems work in all weather conditions and at night to maintain
the âoperations tempoâ required by Rapid Dominance.
Battlefield awareness requires three information technologies:
collection, fusion, and dissemination of real-time actionable
information to a shooter. Rapid Dominance requires an
unprecedented level of real-time information collection that
will be provided by sensor systems such as space platforms,
UAVs, unattended ground sensors, and advanced manned
reconnaissance platforms. In addition, the entire infosphere of
the adversary will be monitored, not only for classic informa-
tion such as operational commands, but also to determine the
shock effect being created by Rapid Dominance operations.
Collecting data from cooperative sources such as oneâs own
troops, allies, and friendly noncombatants is also critical. While
Operation Desert Storm
showed the value of self-location sensors
such as GPS, the friendly fire casualties demonstrated that there
Chapter 4
73
is still work to be done in terms of giving each commander and
soldier sufficient information to operate effectively. Much of
this information, such as the physiological status of individual
combatants, is not currently collected, and much of what is
sensed is not properly disseminated.
It would be hard to overstate the importance of information
dissemination within Rapid Dominance. Administering Shock
and Awe requires a spectrum of attacks that the adversary is
unable to fathom, but our own forces must operate effectively,
even aggressively, within an environment that could easily lead
to serious information bottlenecks and overload. Commercial
technologies will be key to the U.S. developing a structure to
effectively disseminate information. Already, commercial com-
munications technologies such as global broadcast satellites and
protocols like those underlying the Internet have been used as
stop gaps by the U.S. military in major deployments.
Merely transmitting the right information at the right time will
not be sufficient for operations enabling Rapid Dominance.
Information will need to be fused to create knowledge-based
displays. The technologies that will be important in this area go
beyond the data fusion algorithms currently in place and should
leverage heavily off of technologies in fields such as computer
image generation, virtual reality, and advanced simulation.
RAPIDITY
In a technology sense, rapidity includes the speed of opera-
tional planning, determining appropriate action, deployment,
and employment all focused toward minimizing response time.
Three factors combine to make military planning far more dif-
74
Shock and Awe
ficult today than in the Cold War era. First, there is great uncer-
tainty early on in the location of a conflict, who the adversary
may be, and with whom one may be allied. Second, there is
normally very little time available for planning, with the mili-
tary sometimes having only weeks or days before committing
troops to an unanticipated mission. Third, vastly more infor-
mation is available to the planner, which is both a blessing and
a curse. Several technologies that partially define Intelligent
Dynamic Planning will make it easier for the commander to
plan Rapid Dominance:
â˘
Model based planning
â˘
Machine intelligence
â˘
Dynamic planning based upon feedback and new infor-
mation
â˘
Selectively automated decision aides (commanders associ-
ate)
â˘
Embedded rehearsal and training
BRILLIANCE IN EXECUTION
It is impossible to institutionalize brilliance. However, the stan-
dard can be set. The Dynamic Planning noted above is part of
the capability for this characteristic as are the systems and tech-
nologies discussed below.
Chapter 4
75
Technologies Critical to Achieving
Brilliance in Rapid Dominance
For shock to be administered with minimum collateral damage,
key targets of value must be neutralized or destroyed and the
enemy must be made to feel completely helpless and unable to
consider a meaningful response. Furthermore, the enemyâs
confusion must be complete, adding to a general impression of
impotence. Most importantly, strategic targets, military forces,
leadership and key societal resources must be located, tracked,
and targeted. This will require substantial sensor, computa-
tional, and communication technologies. Designated targets
must be destroyed rapidly and with assurance. Finally, the status
and position of friendly forces must be known at all times, and
the logistics supporting them must be sufficiently flexible to
allow for rapid movement, reconfiguration, and decentraliza-
tion of location.
Several technologies that can help in this are discussed below,
as divided into the following subsections: sensors, computa-
tional systems, communications and system integration.
Sensor Technologies
Sensor technologies are grouped into four areas: active, passive,
embedded, and processing.
Active sensors:
By far, the most important of the energy-emitting
sensors is radar. Among the best all-weather capabilities of any
type of sensor, the role for and capabilities of radar have steadily
increased since the Second World War. Radar systems are used
for early warning, air defense, air asset management, air traffic
76
Shock and Awe
control, naval fleet defense, detection and tracking of moving
ground targets, missile targeting, missile terminal guidance, ter-
rain data development, and weather prediction. For Rapid
Dominance, radars and other active sensors must operate with
low probability of intercept. Particularly with stealthy systems,
this will present a unique challenge to military systems where
one may not expect a great amount of âspin-onâ from the com-
mercial sector. It is vitally important to be able to sense the
enemy under all conditions and environments. Sensors must
penetrate foliage and walls and detect threats such as under-
ground and underwater mines.
There are many other important active sensor classes, three of
which are active acoustics, lidar, and magnetic anomaly detec-
tors. Broadband underwater active acoustics could address
pressing needs such as shallow water antisubmarine warfare
and mine detection (both buried and silt covered). The practi-
cal application of lidar is a relatively recent development
enabled by advances in laser, power management, and data
processing technologies. Lidar can be used for fire control,
weapon guidance, foliage penetration (vegetation is translucent
in the near infrared (NIR) regime), and target imaging/recog-
nition. Lidar detects shape directly and shape fluctuations such
as vibration and motion and has proven very hard to spoof.
Magnetic anomaly detectors will continue to find application in
areas of antimine and antisubmarine warfare and in screening
for weapons at security checkpoints and elsewhere.
Electronic emissions are of themselves a liability only where
they create a signature of use to an enemy. The ability to emit
energy, yet in ways that are less discernible, should be an attrac-
tive avenue to explore for the future. The coordinated applica-
Chapter 4
77
tion of many sensor platforms, some of which may be
completely passive, in conjunction with emitting sensors is a
potentially major area of exploration.
Passive sensors:
Among the passive sensor types, the most impor-
tant for U.S. forces is forward-looking infrared (FLIR). FLIR
technology has allowed the U.S. to âown the night,â as was
handily displayed in
Operation Desert Storm
. Some of the signifi-
cant technology advancements underway in this area include
multiple wavelength sensors, very large focal planes, and the
increasing performance of uncooled sensors. Particularly in the
area of uncooled sensors, commercial developments are under-
way that promise to drastically reduce the cost of competent IR
sensors.
Other passive sensor technologies of note include hyperspectral
visible/NIR collection and processing and inexpensive, scatter-
able, unattended ground sensors (acoustic, seismic, âhot spot,â
etc.). Hyperspectral imaging allows target searches to be con-
ducted in the frequency domain, as opposed to the spatial
domain as is the norm today. This provides a powerful new
input for automatic target recognition (ATR) systems, is useful
for addressing low observables (LO), and is especially important
for remote imaging assets.
Unattended ground sensors allow critical areas to be monitored
continually. For example, the actual area of operations for
Scuds in ODS was relatively small, but it was very difficult for
then-current sensing systems to oversee. Technologies being
developed in the area of microelectromechanical systems, in
particular, hold promise for enabling capable and inexpensive
sensor fields.
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Shock and Awe
Imbedded sensors:
Monitoring the position and status of Blue and
friendly forces and assets is of equal importance in tracking the
enemy. GPS presented a tremendous advantage to troops in
ODS. This capability needs to be extended down to the indi-
vidual soldier, and the status of all critical material and person-
nel needs to be tracked.
Sensor signal processing:
Finally, the signals from modern sensors
are of limited use without proper processing and presentation
to the user. This area will be developed further in the computa-
tional technologies section. Technologies that are historically
grouped with sensor systems include automatic target recogni-
tion, embedded multisensor fusion and correlation, and dis-
plays.
Computational Technologies
The capabilities of the integrated circuit (IC), and in particular
the microprocessor, continue to increase unabated. Certainly,
physical limits must be approached at some point, but each
looming barrier has so far been met by technological innova-
tion. Nevertheless, should the march of IC improvements slow
somewhat, the software and networking technologies that are
being developed at an accelerating pace will permit the vision
of Rapid Dominance to become of ever increasing utility.
Rapid Dominance requires the collection, management, and
fast access of enormous quantities of information. Technologies
that will enable this include computational hardware advances
such as increasingly powerful workstations, reduced-cost image
generators, massively parallel machines, compact displays,
reduced-cost memory devices (i.e., DRAM, RAID, and optical
Chapter 4
79
jukeboxes), client/server-specific database engines, reconfig-
urable simulation cells, âwearableâ PCs, advanced human-
computer interface (HCI) techniques (i.e., voice interfaces and
those coming to define âvirtual realityâ), and PCMCIA tech-
nology for peripherals (i.e., digital comms boards, miniaturized
hard drives, and modems).
Software advances will be even more critical for Rapid Domi-
nance. Areas of importance include:
â˘
Network data engines
â˘
Object-oriented architectures
â˘
Advanced modeling and simulation
â˘
Machine intelligence
â˘
Automatic target recognition
â˘
Computer-aided software engineering (CASE) tools
Network technologies are just now emerging but are being
driven at a frenzied pace in the commercial marketplace. A
variety of advanced tools beyond âhot linkâ browsing are being
introduced daily. Data browsers, brokers, gatherers, and net-
work repositories are being released, as demonstrated by prod-
ucts like
Harvester
and
Netscapeâs Catalog Server
. Platform
independent languages such as JAVA and their associated vir-
tual computational engines promise the same network flexibil-
ity for programs that is now enjoyed by data.
Perhaps the most important area of technology development
for Rapid Dominance is the development of practical object-
oriented architectures and protocols. Protocols such as
CORBA, OLE, ALSP, HLA and DIS
1
are changing the face of
80
Shock and Awe
computing, making it much easier to link programs and data-
bases, and access and correlate information that was previously
âentombedâ within its legacy application.
One interesting application area migrating toward an object-
oriented approach is geospatial databases. In the past, geospa-
tial data were stored as either raster-based or vector informa-
tion, and significant processing was required for users to make
queries regarding roads, areas, or objects such as building sites.
A new approach, called a spatial database engine, creates intu-
itive objects from standard geospatial databases and uses com-
mercial databases to add attributes to the objects. This is a very
powerful technique that allows geospatial data, a key element of
warfighting, to be managed quickly and efficiently using com-
mercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) software. It is particularly useful
for distributed databases such as one would find on a network.
Modeling and simulation is also benefiting from object-ori-
ented technologies. Simulations were once stand-alone codes. If
one wanted to simulate a joint battle, one began with an exist-
ing model (i.e., land combat) and then modified it to include
other components (i.e., aircraft and ships). Similarly, if a new
technology were to be modeled, new code normally had to be
written, even in cases where good, validated, stand-alone tech-
nology models existed. The obvious drawbacks to this
approach are that it is costly, often produces inferior simulations
for the new additions, and quickly results in extremely large
codes with commensurate large code management problems.
Object-oriented approaches allow models and simulations to
be linked to form a richer environment for examining new tech-
nologies and joint force structures.
Chapter 4
81
Linking force-on-force simulations with design tools such as
computer-aided design (CAD) programs and physics-based
simulations presents a new type of tool referred to as simula-
tion-based design. Once fully realized, this capability will allow
new technologies to be much more easily evaluated, introduc-
ing a source for greater efficiency into todayâs somewhat hap-
hazard acquisition system.
Simulations based on object-oriented architectures also prom-
ise more flexibility that will enable scenarios and unexpected
situations to be made as inputs and simulated rapidly, forming
the core for a battlefield visualization system capable of model-
ing âwhat if â situations. Outputs from these simulations could
be used for mission rehearsal. Even today, pilots and special
operations forces often âfly throughâ crude, three-dimensional
renderings of a mission area to familiarize themselves with
information such as surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites and land-
marks.
The promise of computational technologies brings with it
potential vulnerabilities that must be protected against threats.
In a world where information plays a vital role in warfare, infor-
mation collection and processing tools will become targets.
Defenses against information warfare must be developed. The
threat is real and is growing, especially in the commercial and
private sectors. Even today, malicious hackers devise data-
destroying viruses and distribute them through a plethora of
electronic media; numerous sites on the Internet are dedicated
to the discussion and development of offensive computer
viruses, with ample tools for even the novice to download and
employ. Moreover, computer crimes cost the world economy
billions of dollars annually. Although information warfare poses
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Shock and Awe
serious threats, the realm of information is where operations
underlying Rapid Dominance primarily reside, and the enemy
will find himself fully engaged should he choose to fight on our
terms. Rapid Dominance is essentially information warfare on
a grand scale in all dimensions of offensive, defensive, and lever-
aging effective use of available information.
Communication Technologies
One of the modern communication devices being fielded
within U.S. forces today is the SINGCARS radio. With a data
rate of somewhat less than 10 kbps, SINGCARS is woefully
inadequate for supporting Rapid Dominance. However, more
appropriate technologies are emerging:
â˘
GBS and other satellite broadcast services
â˘
Wider bandwidth, digital communication protocols
â˘
Asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) switches
â˘
Advanced comm relay platforms (UAV, Lightsat, Iridium,
etc.)
GBS, for example, figures prominently in the BADD (battlefield
awareness and data dissemination) program that aims at pro-
viding close to 30 Mbps of data broadcast bandwidth. This will
be supported by multiterrabyte databases, advanced data
browsers, and query managers, and will be linked to the Joint
Tactical Internet.
Networking must also be supported by communications tech-
nologies. The basic problem of a battlefield network is that
while some nodes may support very large data pipes, a number
Chapter 4
83
of nodes will be operating at SINGCARS data rates. This led
to the BADD notion of one-way data broadcasting via GBS of
large data files (such as UAV video and overhead imagery) and
very low bandwidth data querying back to the data sources.
Modern communications will tend to be more multimedia-
based, which is particularly important for Rapid Dominance,
where decisions must be made quickly based upon very large
quantities of data, some of which will be collected and transmit-
ted in real time. Technologies such as digital video teleconfer-
encing, virtual whiteboards, and even 3D virtual environments
where commanders may participate in collaborative planning
sessions will become important.
Finally, battlefield communications must be secure and, where
feasible, nonobservable to the enemy.
CONTROL OF THE ENVIRONMENT
The actual attack of targets in order to induce Shock and Awe
may, in some sense, be considered a subset of controlling the
enemyâs perception. It will not always be necessary to destroy
numerous targets in order to induce shock. However, it would
be vitally important to give the appearance that there are no
safe havens from attack, and that any target may be attacked at
any time with impunity and force. Furthermore, as discussed
earlier, confusion must be imposed on the adversary by supply-
ing only information which will shape the adversaryâs percep-
tions and help break his will. Finally, the enemy must be
displaced from selected key positions, for if he is allowed to
occupy those areas that he considers strategically important, it
is difficult to imagine how his shock could be complete.
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Shock and Awe
Controlling an enemyâs perception of the battlespace includes
manipulating his view of the threat, his own troops and status,
and the environment in which he operates. This will be accom-
plished by selectively denying knowledge to the enemy while
presenting him with information that is either misleading or
serves our purposes. Sensing and feedback of an enemy leader-
shipâs perception of the situation will be critical.
Technologies of interest here include those that allow systems
and entire force units to modify their signature from being very
stealthy to being completely obvious. An ability to attack enemy
information systems will also be critical, encompassing system
technologies from laser-based countersensor weapons to
embedded computer viruses, commonly referred to as Trojan
Horses. In all cases, the goal will be to deny the enemy any
information that would be useful to him and to impose a con-
struct of deception and misinformation at all levels of opera-
tions.
Clearly, technologies necessary to achieve battlefield awareness
already mentioned will be crucial in allowing a âperception
attackâ (a form of information warfare) to be successfully car-
ried out. The need and requirements for Battlefield Damage
Assessment (BDA) will increase dramatically. It will be neces-
sary to understand not only whether a target was killed but also
how enemy leadership, troops, and society viewed this destruc-
tion.
So far, primarily information technologies have been discussed.
Obviously, there will continue to be requirements for numerous
other types of systems. Among the more important system tech-
nologies critical to achieving control of the environment
include:
Chapter 4
85
â˘
Weapons platforms with stealth technology
â˘
Weapons systems
â˘
Robotic systems
Weapons platforms
One of the fundamental rationales for weapons platforms is to
move people and ordinance to within an effective range of the
target. Centuries before smart weapons and robotic systems,
this reasoning was understood intuitively. Since ordinance must
still be placed on the target, weapons platforms such as
described below still demand consideration.
â˘
Stealthy bombers and strike aircraft, either land or sea
platform-based
â˘
Arsenal ships
â˘
Submarines with conventional cruise missiles
â˘
Stealthy land vehicles
â˘
Stealthy observation/attack helicopters
Stealth, combined with standoff, will contribute strongly to the
protection of manned systems on the modern battlefield and
will also be used extensively for other, high-value unmanned
systems. However, protection of the force is inherent within the
concept of Rapid Dominance, and it will rely upon the control
of information and the enemyâs perception of events, stealth
being one of the elements enabling this control.
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Shock and Awe
Weapons systems
Smart munitions will be required on the future battlefield.
Linked with information technologies, the combination will
allow killing any target that can be identified. The main ele-
ment Rapid Dominance requires of weapons systems is the
ability to be rapidly focused on objectives as identified and tar-
geted by commanders using the information management sys-
tems already discussed. Commanders will require the flexibility
to call massive, precision strikes or to attack individual, high-
priority targets with near zero CEP. This implies a mixture of
weapons comprised of systems such as those mentioned below.
â˘
Cruise missiles
â˘
Zero CEP, long-range cruise missile (âPresidentâs
weaponâ)
â˘
Standoff submunition platforms
â˘
Smart submunitions
â˘
Brilliant submunitions
â˘
Wide area smart mines
â˘
Long-range and short-range surface attack missiles
Robotic systems
Robotic systems are an important area of consideration within
Rapid Dominance. First, selected robotic systems will enable
the force by making it more responsive in concentrating sensors
and weapons. Second, they will make fighting a 24-hour battle
feasible even with reduced manpower within the force struc-
ture. Third, robotic systems can provide force presence even in
Chapter 4
87
areas considered too dangerous for a large manned element.
Finally, since the ultimate operational goal of Rapid Domi-
nance is to create shock, one may consider the effect that fight-
ing robotic systems may have on the enemy.
In examining the utility of robotic systems within Rapid Dom-
inance, one must first consider that, by any measure, robotic
systems have not lived up to the optimistic expectations placed
on them in the past. From the overburdening of the Aquilla
UAV to the massive and poorly planned investment in robotics
made by General Motors in the early 1980s, robotics has been
an area of unfulfilled promises. However, the reasons for a
string of spectacular failures lie more with plannersâ faulty
attempts to understand and incorporate the technology than by
egregious shortcomings of the technology itself. Robots have
been seen as replacements for manned systems rather than
extremely complicated and capable machines suitable for a set
of tightly defined tasks. Robotic systems, or taskable machines
as some are beginning to refer to them, hold promise for the
future simply because they represent the intersection of a
myriad of fast-moving technology areas such as information
technologies, communications, microelectronics, microelectro-
mechanical systems, simulation, and computer-aided design
and manufacturing. In some sense, taskable machines are the
physical embodiment of information technologies. It may well
be that in the future the joke will be, âNever send a robot to do
a manâs job.â But even so, there will be ample jobs for taskable
machines and the society that learns to properly design, build,
control, and integrate these systems into their force structure
will gain significant advantage over any potential opponent.
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Shock and Awe
CONCLUSION
The technologies and systems presented in this section are not
extraordinary, nor do they comprise a complete list. Indeed,
entire fields such as materials, bioengineering, and microelec-
tronics are left for future consideration, although they are of
obvious and vital importance. Also not addressed here are the
training, education, and organizational implications required
under a regime of Rapid Dominance. Given the overriding
importance of information collection and management, these
will need to be addressed across the defense community as it is
most broadly defined.
Rapid Dominance combines a doctrine and operational con-
cept that challenges the current process of how new technolo-
gies invented in the commercial sector are incorporated into
defense, and provides an affirmative methodology for research,
development, and system integration. We must learn to exploit
the potential of these technologies even though, in many cases,
this development process in the private sector is profoundly
independent from how we conduct the business of defense. It is
this environment of innovative upheaval that any useful founda-
tion for strategic and operational thought must address. Rapid
Dominance capitalizes on, and may even require, this rapid
and chaotic development of technology.
We believe that what will distinguish Rapid Dominance from
other doctrines is first that it uses an intellectual construct to
drive innovation and innovation to drive exploiting and inte-
grating technology into new and perhaps somewhat differently
constructed systems. Second, it is the comprehensive quality of
Rapid Dominance in which strategies, doctrine, technology,
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Shock and Awe
systems, operations, training, organization, and education are
dealt with together that may make the most significant differ-
ence. But, as the reader will discern, specific identification and
design of Rapid Dominance systems is part of the next step.
Notes
1
CORBA (common object request broker architecture), OLE (object link-
ing and embedding), ALSP (aggregate level simulation protocol), HLA
(high-level architecture), DIS (Distributed Interactive Simulation).
These are all protocols or the architectures defining protocols that, in
part, enable disparate software and/or hardware components to be
linked or otherwise share information and logical elements.
91
Chapter 5
Future
Directions
t this stage, Rapid Dominance is an intel-
lectual construct based on these key points.
First, Rapid Dominance has evolved from the
collective professional, policy, and operational
experience of the study group covering the last
four decades. This experience ran from Vietnam
to
Desert Storm
and from serving with operational
units in the field to being part of the decision-
making process in the Oval Office in Washing-
ton. It also included immersion in technology
and systems from thermonuclear weapons to
advanced weapons software.
Second, Rapid Dominance seeks to exploit the
unique juncture of strategy, technology, and
innovation created by the end of the Cold War
and to establish an alternative foundation for mil-
itary doctrine and force structure.
A
92
Shock and Awe
Third, Rapid Dominance draws on the strategic uses of force as
envisaged by Sun Tzu and Clausewitz to overpower or affect
the will, perception, and understanding of the adversary for
strategic aims and military objectives. But, in Rapid Domi-
nance, the principal mechanism for affecting the adversaryâs
will is through the imposition of a regime of Shock and Awe suf-
ficient to achieve the aims of policy. It is this relationship with
and reliance on Shock and Awe that differentiates Rapid Dom-
inance from attrition, maneuver, and other military doctrines
including overwhelming force.
Shock and Awe impact on psychological, perceptual, and phys-
ical levels. At one level, destroying an adversaryâs military force
leaving the enemy impotent and vulnerable may provide the
necessary Shock and Awe. At another level, the certainty of this
outcome may cause an adversary to accept our terms well short
of conflict. In the great middle ground, the appropriate balance
of Shock and Awe must cause the perception and anticipation
of certain defeat and the threat and fear of action that may shut
down all or part of the adversaryâs society or render his ability
to fight useless short of complete physical destruction.
Finally, in order to impose enough Shock and Awe to affect an
adversaryâs will, four core characteristics of a Rapid Domi-
nance-configured force were defined. First, complete knowl-
edge and understanding of self, of the adversary, and of the
environment are essential. This knowledge and understanding
exceed the expectations of dominant battlefield awareness and
DBA becomes a subset of Rapid Dominance.
Rather like the wise investor and not the speculator who is only
familiar with a particular company and not the stock market in
general, the Rapid Dominance force must have complete
Chapter 5
93
knowledge and understanding of many likely adversaries and
regions. This requirement for knowledge and understanding
will place a huge, new burden on the military forces and neces-
sitate fundamental changes in policy, organization, training,
education, structure, and equipage.
Second is rapidity. Rapidity combines speed, timeliness, and
agility and the ability to sustain control after the initial shock.
Rapidity enables us to act as quickly as needed and always
more quickly than the adversary can react or take counter-
actions. Rapidity is also an antidote to surprise. If we cannot
anticipate surprise, or are surprised, rapidity provides a correct-
ing capacity to neutralize the effects of that surprise.
Third, and most provocatively, is setting the standard of opera-
tions and execution in terms of brilliance. The consequences
and implications of setting brilliance as the standard and
achieving it are profound. Reconfiguration of command
authority and organization possibly to decentralization down to
individual troops must follow. Allowing and encouraging an
operational doctrine of the âfirst to respondâ will set the tempo
provided that effective deconfliction of friendly on friendly
engagements has been assured.
This, of course, means that complete revision of doctrine, train-
ing, and organization will be required. The matter is not just
âfighting smarter."â It is learning to fight at even higher stan-
dards of skill and competence.
Fourth is control of the environment. Control is defined in the
broadest sense: physical control of the land, air, sea, and space
and control of the âetherâ in which information is passed and
received. This requires signature management throughout the
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Shock and Awe
full conflict spectrumâdeception, disinformation, verification,
information control, and target managementâall with rapidity
in both physical and psychological impact. By depriving an
adversary of the physical use of time, space, and the ether, we
play on the adversaryâs will and offer the prospect of certain
destruction should resistance follow.
The next step in this process must be specifically defining this
Rapid Dominance force in terms of force structure, capabilities,
doctrine, organization, and order of battle. We have begun this
effort and are focusing on a joint task force sized somewhere
between a reinforced division and a full corps (i.e., a strength of
75,000 - 200,000). We also have the aim of being able to deploy
this force within 5 to 10 days of the order to move and, of
course, will be able to send smaller force packages on a nearly
instantaneous basis. We appreciate the mobility and logistical
implications of this requirement.
Once we design this âpaperâ force and equip it with âpaperâ
systems, we must evaluate it against the five basic questions and
tests we noted in the Prologue.
The first test of this Rapid Dominance force will be against the
MRC. The comparison, in the broadest sense, must be with the
programmed force and whatever emerges from the Quadren-
nial Defense Review of 1997. We will need to examine closely
how and where and why Rapid Dominance and Shock and
Awe work and where they do not. At the very least, we expect
that this will help strengthen the current force and improve cur-
rent capabilities. Of course, it is our hope that this test will val-
idate Rapid Dominance as a legitimate doctrine.
Chapter 5
95
Second, the Rapid Dominance force must be tested across the
entire spectrum of OOTW. These are the most difficult tests
because, in some of them, no force may be suitable and no force
may work.
Third, the test of determining the political consequences of
Rapid Dominance must be conducted. On one hand, if this
force capability can be achieved and Shock and Awe adminis-
tered to affect an adversaryâs will, can a form of political deter-
rence be created? In the most approximate sense, and we
emphasize
approximate
, the analogy with nuclear deterrence
might be drawn. An adversary may be persuaded or deterred
from taking action in the first instance. On the other hand, this
capacity may be seen as politically unusable and allies and
others within the United States may not be fully trusting of the
possessor always to employ this force responsibly.
Fourth is the test of the implications of Rapid Dominance for
alliances and for waging coalition warfare. Our allies are
already concerned that the United States is leaving them far
behind in military technology and capability. If we possess this
force and our allies or partners do not, how do we fight
together? Our view is that this can be worked out through tech-
nology sharing and perhaps new divisions of labor and mission
specialization. However, these are important points to be con-
sidered.
Finally, what does all this mean for resource investments in
defense?
It is also likely that because Rapid Dominance will cause pro-
found consequences, the iron grip of the political bureaucracy
will make a fair examination difficult. It is no accident that
96
Shock and Awe
other attempts at change, especially those that ask for or are
tainted with reform, have had a short life span. It is interesting
to note in this regard that the Presidentâs Commission on Intel-
ligence and its fine report that recommended changes and
refinements to the U.S. intelligence community, despite a very
positive initial reception, led to only a few meaningful actions.
This discussion leads to two final points. We are all too well
aware that all strategy and force structures have vulnerabilities
and potential weaknesses. The experiences that this study
group collectively had in Vietnam makes this concern very
strongly held. We observe that in the private sector, the vulner-
ability of information systems is real and is being exploited. A
former director of the FBI has told us that in New York, for
example, the number one recruiting target for organized crime
is the teenage computer whiz. We think that this âhacking,â
writ large in the private sector, must be assumed as part of the
defense problem. Hence, sensitivity to vulnerabilities must be
even greater, perhaps ironically, than it was during the Cold
War, because exploitation can come from many more sources
in the future.
Second, wags may criticize Rapid Dominance as attempting to
create a âMission Impossible Force.â To be sure, we emphasize
and demand brilliance as the operational goal. However, we
also know that the military today is seen as a leading example
of the best American society has to offer. We wish to build on
this reality. We note the experience and the performance, albeit
under highly unusual circumstances, of
Desert Storm
. We see no
reason why that level of performance cannot be made a perma-
nent part of the fabric of the American military.
Chapter 5
97
Because we have entered a period of transition in which we
enjoy a dominant military position and a greatly reduced
window of vulnerability, this is the right time for experimenta-
tion and demonstration. Rapid Dominance is still a concept
and a work in progress, not a final road map or blueprint. But
the concept does warrant, in our view, a commitment to
explore and an opportunity that could lead to dramatically
better capabilities.
We believe that through Rapid Dominance and the commit-
ment to examine the entire range of defense across all compo-
nents and aspects, a revolution is possible. If Rapid Dominance
can be harnessed in an affordable and efficient way and an
operational capability fielded to impose sufficient Shock and
Awe to affect an adversaryâs will, then this will be the real Rev-
olution in Military Affairs. We ask those who are intrigued by
this prospect to join us.
99
Appendix A
Thoughts on
Rapid
Dominance
by ADM Bud Edney, USN (Ret.)
hy the need for a concept of Rapid Dom-
inance? The answer lies in the combined
realities of modern technology, economics, and
politics.
TECHNOLOGY
The evolution or revolution of information tech-
nology is impacting everything we do and how
we do it on a worldwide basis. The far-reaching
effects of the resulting information highway that
crosses all boundaries are already impacting the
strategic decisions, economics, and politics of the
world of nation states. Borders are no defense for
the penetration of information, even in highly
controlled or authoritarian societies. Similarly,
the exploration and use of high technology in
W
100
Shock and Awe
space, together with the advent of sophisticated, highly accu-
rate ballistic and cruise missiles, means that borders between
states are not as important for strategic and impenetrable
defenses indepth as they used to be. The rapid advancements
in telecommunications technology, combined with the explora-
tion and use of space vehicles to saturate a world hungry for
information, means that leaders can no longer shield their
people from the outside world. Thus, information will pene-
trate whatever curtain or wall that is erected in a futile attempt
to block it out. New centers of gravity are being created as are
new vulnerability choke points. The country or power structure
that harnesses the capabilities and dimensions of the informa-
tion revolution as it applies to issues of national security will
remain in control of its own destiny. The United States pos-
sesses a qualitative and quantitative lead that, when combined
with a properly focused and coordinated (harmonized) indus-
try, defense, and national security policy, should ensure success
for the foreseeable future. Harnessing information technology
and applying it to new strategic and doctrinal thought in appli-
cation of military force is the essence of Rapid Dominance.
ECONOMICS
With the end of the Cold War and the dismantling of the Soviet
Union, there is no major power capable of destroying the U.S.
mainland. Given this absence of devastating threat, defense
expenditures will continue to be squeezed to address more
pressing domestic priorities. Voter demands for a balanced
budget, national health care, social security reform, educational
reform, family values, crime and drug use reduction, lower
taxes, etc., will combine to put increasing pressure on the
defense bottom line in the out years. The result will be a steady
Appendix A
101
decline in warfighting readiness and force structure that will
place our security interests at risk unless we leverage our tech-
nology leadership to achieve military advantage with lower
force levels but increased warfighting effectiveness. This is also
the essence of Rapid Dominance.
POLITICS
The reality of current politics is that the trauma of Vietnam, the
results of the Gulf War, and our status as the only remaining
superpower after the Cold War equate to some new constraints
(real or perceived) on the application of military force to sup-
port our foreign policy. These political sensitivities need to be
understood up front and include the following:
â˘
The U.S. is not the worldâs policeman.
â˘
Involvement of U.S. forces must be justified as essential to
vital U.S. security interests.
â˘
The support of Congress and the people is a necessary pre-
requisite.
â˘
Avoid the commitment of ground forces.
â˘
Offer instead U.S. intelligence, air lift, sea lift, logistics sup-
port, etc.
â˘
Avoid risk of loss of U.S. lives at almost all costs.
â˘
Ensure decisive force applied for mission assigned.
â˘
Rules of Engagement allow U.S. forces to defend them-
selves aggressively.
â˘
Minimize civilian casualties, loss of life, and collateral
damage.
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Shock and Awe
â˘
Specify achievable mission objectives up front with an end
in the not-too-distant future sighted before committing.
â˘
U.S.-led coalition force preferredâU.S. forces remain
under U.S. command. These political restraints may limit
the application of Rapid Dominance to major and minor
regional conflicts. This is an issue that needs further explo-
ration and analysis.
WHAT IS RAPID DOMINANCE?
Rapid Dominance is the full use of capabilities within a system
of systems that can decisively impact events requiring the appli-
cation of military/defense resources through affecting the
adversaryâs will. Rapid Dominance envisions execution in real
or near-real time to counter actions or intentions deemed det-
rimental to U.S. interests. On one end of the spectrum, Rapid
Dominance would introduce a regime of Shock and Awe in
areas of high value to the threatening individual, group, or
state. In many cases the prior knowledge of credible U.S. Rapid
Dominance capabilities would act as a deterrent. Rapid Dom-
inance would ensure favorable early resolution of issues at min-
imal loss of lives and collateral damage. The concept ideally
should be able to impact adversarial situations that apply across
the board, addressing high-, mid-, low-, and no-technology
threats. Some of these aims may not be achievable given the
political and technology constraints, but need to be explored.
Rapid Dominance expands the art of joint combined arms
warfighting capabilities to a new level. Rapid Dominance
requires a sophisticated, interconnected, and interoperable grid
of netted intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, communi-
Appendix A
103
cations systems, and data analysis to deliver actionable infor-
mation to the shooter in real time. This network must provide
total situational awareness and nodal analysis that enables U.S.
forces to act inside the adversaryâs decision loop in a manner
that, on the high end, produces Shock and Awe among the
threat parties. Properly detailed nodal analysis of this grid of
knowledge and vulnerability will enable the shutting down of
specific or all essential functions nearly simultaneously. We
expect that through these netted pieces of data, often, the sum
of the parts will yield profound battlefield advantages to the
possessor. The âRapidâ part of the equation becomes the abil-
ity to get real-time actionable targeting information to the
shooter, whether the shooter is a tank division, an individual
tank, an artillery battery, an individual rifleman, a naval battle
group, an individual ship, an air wing/squadron, or an aircraft
in flight. At whatever unit level, Shock and Awe are magnified
by the speed and effectiveness of targeting. The ability to
achieve Rapid Dominance simultaneously throughout the bat-
tlefield will create strategic Shock and Awe on the opposing
forces, their leadership, and society. When the video results of
these attacks are broadcast real time worldwide on CNN, the
positive impact on coalition support and negative impact on
potential threat support can be decisive.
The top priority of Rapid Dominance should be to deter, alter,
or affect those actions that are either unacceptable to U.S.
national security interests or endanger the democratic commu-
nity of states and access to free markets. These political objec-
tives are generally those envisioned in the major and lesser
regional conflict scenarios (MRC & LRC). Should deterrence
fail, the application of Rapid Dominance should create suffi-
cient Shock and Awe to intimidate the enemy forces and lead-
104
Shock and Awe
ership as well as provide a clear message for other potential
aggressors. Rapid Dominance would not be limited to MRC
and LRC scenarios. It has application in a variety of areas,
including countering WMD, terrorism, and other political
problems. The challenge is that should deterrence fail, the exe-
cution of a response based on Rapid Dominance must be pro-
portional to the threat yet decisive enough to convey the
appropriate degree of Shock and Awe. Rapid Dominance
cannot solve all or even most of the worldâs problems. It initially
appears that Rapid Dominance should be applied sparingly for
egregious threats or violations of international law, such as:
â˘
Blatant aggression involving a large state crushing a small
state;
â˘
Rogue leader/state sponsored terrorism/use of WMD;
â˘
Egregious violations of human rights on a large scale; or
â˘
Threat to essential world markets.
Clearly the information highway is crossing all sovereign bor-
ders and penetrating even the most closed societies. The ineq-
uities and benefits in closed societies are becoming known to
both the public as well as the bosses. The requirement for
Rapid Dominance to develop sophisticated capabilities to pen-
etrate the information highway and create roadblocks as well as
control input/outputs to the highway both overtly and covertly
is fundamental to the concept.
These same techniques also apply to law enforcement agencies
targeting international crime and drug cartels using the high-
way. Closer interagency cooperation and coordination between
military and law enforcement activities and capabilities must be
established. Experience with the military involvement in the
Appendix A
105
drug war revealed considerable cultural differences between
these organizations. Overcoming these cultural differences is
not easy. The required trust and confidence for sharing sensitive
information and support between these agencies and the mili-
tary needs to be developed further. Interagency coordination
and cooperation must be raised to a new level of sophistication.
Some laws may need to be changed. War in Cyberspace does
not recognize domestic versus foreign boundaries. In this envi-
ronment, the subjects of Information Warfare and Information
In Warfare take on new meaning and require focused develop-
ment. We must become proficient within this environment.
This breakdown of traditional boundaries requires a great deal
more thought with regard to the issues of security, vulnerabili-
ties (theirs and ours), and the concept of Rapid Dominance.
Does Rapid Dominance apply only or mostly to the high end
of the spectrum, involving more traditional applications of force
to achieve political objectives as envisioned in the MRC and
LRC scenarios? Yet to be explored is the degree to which a con-
cept of Rapid Dominance applies to OOTW, countering ter-
rorism against U.S. interests, controlling rogue states/leaders,
etc. What are the political and military prerequisites to apply
Rapid Dominance? Are they applicable and realistically
achievable in the increasingly complex interaction of national
governments/law enforcement organizations and international
as well as local private venture or nongovernment organiza-
tions (PVOs/NGOs) present worldwide to provide health and
humanitarian care to refugees and other disenfranchised peo-
ple? Would the concept of Rapid Dominance offend and gen-
erate a counterproductive public relations backlash from those
who believe force should only be used as a last resort and then
with a measurable degree of proportionality?
106
Shock and Awe
At this point, one can only raise these types of issues to be
addressed at a later date. This line of questions, concerns, and
issues, as well as a host of others, needs to be raised up front
during the concept development phase of the development of
specific Mission Capability Package concepts. We must be care-
ful that we do not overvisualize Rapid Dominance versus the
reality of credible/affordable capabilities to execute the con-
cept. Rapid Dominance does not eliminate the fog of war. Deci-
sions will still be made on the leaderâs judgment and confidence
in the intelligence provided, the estimate of threat intentions,
knowledge of true center-of-gravity targets, and confidence in
our own force capabilities to inflict Shock and Awe. In fact, the
ability to penetrate this fog is the key to Rapid Dominance.
Complicating the issue is the fact that the U.S. has not clearly
defined its role in the post-Cold War era. As the worldâs only
credible superpower, the U.S. can not avoid a leadership role,
but neither can it avoid the focused criticism applied to all lead-
ers. We are in the classical âdamned if we do and damned if we
donâtâ syndrome. One of the serious side effects of Rapid Dom-
inance could be that if you adapt a strategy of Rapid Domi-
nance and succeed, you may now own the problem and be
responsible for the solution. Do we know the funding tail to
such a policy and are we as a nation ready to accept this cost
when/if Rapid Dominance is applied in situations that are less
than of vital interest? This subject needs further development
beyond the limitations of this book.
Appendix A
107
RAPID DOMINANCE AND THE FUTURE
BATTLEFIELD
What will the battlefield of the future really look like? The
Desert
Storm
conflict indicated to many who analyzed it that the real
focus of battle will no longer be force-on-force as we have tradi-
tionally considered it. By the time the Allied Forces engaged the
opposing Iraq forces, the enemy force for all practical purposes
had already been demoralized and smashed. This was accom-
plished by establishing air superiority followed by a carefully
orchestrated campaign of precision air strikes (including Tom-
ahawk missiles). The Iraqi ground forces were isolated by cut-
ting off logistic support, severing communications with its
leadership, and stinging them with the Shock and Awe
achieved by B-52 strikes on the entrenched Iraqi forces in the
open desert. Shock and Awe was introduced in the manner that
stealth aircraft penetrated enemy air defenses and surgically
attacked center-of-gravity targets with impunity. Shock and
Awe was also present in the degree that coalition forces owned
the night and could rapidly maneuver large units in terrain
thought to be foreign, imposing, and unforgiving for the pre-
dominantly U.S. forces. Instead, as Colin Powell noted, the coa-
lition forces cut off the head and life lines to the Iraqi Army in
the field and then set about killing it. The fact that a democrat-
ically led coalition could choose not to massacre the remnants
of Iraqâs army during its panic-induced retreat underscores that
we knew how much power we had and could employ restraint.
The impact of real-time video media coverage of these events,
beamed simultaneously into government headquarters and
civilian living rooms worldwide, is a phenomenon that
impacted events on the battlefield and further highlighted the
108
Shock and Awe
compassion of that decision. In dealing with a âbutcherâ we
could not fall to that level.
The battlefield of the future will not be a neat 200x200 mile box
where you will know everything that is going on inside the box
(although that would be an extremely helpful first step). The
battlefield of the future will encompass every pressure point that
controls or influences the elements of the battle. In examining
this battlefield and the application of force and Shock and Awe,
we seek to mass devastatingly accurate and simultaneous fire-
power on critical nodes/targets that count for the mission at
hand, rather than necessarily having to mass large armies in the
field to engage one another. Clearly, the Gulf War raised war-
fare to a new level with the demonstrated effectiveness and
application of air to ground/water and surface to ground/
water launched precision-guided weapons. No longer will com-
manders count sorties and tonnage of ordnance dropped, but
rather targets destroyed per sortie! Note: there may well be an
issue of affordability here. We may not be able to get (1) high
tech, (2) MRC/OOTW, and (3) large armies. This does not
eliminate the requirement for sufficient force in the field to
defend against an all-out assault or eject another force and
occupy the contested land to ensure that the objectives of the
conflict are carried out. Air power can punish, simultaneously
destroy center-of-gravity targets, and so demoralize the oppos-
ing forces that land campaign objectives can be achieved with
smaller forces. In some cases, the Shock and Awe achieved by
the air campaign may result in an early cessation of conflict
before the land campaign is necessary. This is more likely
against a modernized, developed state than an underdeveloped
government.
Appendix A
109
The confluence of several technologies, including all aspects of
stealth aircraft, satellite global positioning, improved weapon
targeting and terminal guidance, cruise missile technology,
space relayed command & control, real-time surveillance from
space, the introduction of JSTARS, and massive application of
night vision techniques, are the first phase of these changes.
With elements of this technology now more and more on the
open market to whomever has the cash or friends, the advan-
tage of obtaining greater situational awareness and real-time
processing of available data cannot be taken for granted.
In future environments, and short of all-out war, it is clear that
political and military decisionmaking will have to establish
close control of the actionable information distributed to shoot-
ers in the field. It is legitimate to ask why Israeli forces that had
air superiority, UAV surveillance, and extremely accurate fire-
power capabilities in the most recent incursion into southern
Lebanon against Hezbolla terrorist attacks had to respond with
an artillery barrage to one Kaytusha rocket fired from close to
a known UN encampment. When this artillery response
resulted in killing more than 100 refugees fleeing the Israeli
operation, the result was a public relations disaster and mission
failure for the stated limited Israeli objectives. This represents a
case of ill-conceived application of Rapid Dominance that
resulted in counterproductive Shock and Awe generating
adverse public opinion focused against Israel. This was also a
case of applying high technology and state-controlled Rapid
Dominance against a low-technology guerrilla warfare force.
Clearly, the Hezbolla appeared to win more than they lost in
this exchange. The lessons learned from this tragic incident as
well as the applicability of Rapid Dominance techniques in this
environment need further study. The massing and movement of
110
Shock and Awe
refugees in large numbers is a reality and a planning factor that
must be dealt with upfront. The fact that the value of life itself
is viewed differently by warring factions must also be consid-
ered. If one side willingly uses refugees as a shield and the other
is trying to protect their lives, then operations to achieve Rapid
Dominance require clear (and perhaps restrictive) rules of
engagement in the field. The rapidity of response may not
always be the right tactic and an escalation of targeting differ-
ent centers of gravity rather than responding directly to events
in the field promises to be more effective. The theory of Rapid
Dominance clearly needs further development, gaming, and
simulation. Each decision to apply Rapid Dominance will be
unique, complex, risky, and different from the previous one.
Knowledge and information on the battlefield as well as that
concerning center-of-gravity targets will be incomplete, even
with a goal of total situational awareness.
INSTRUMENTS TO ACHIEVE SHOCK AND
AWE
Shock and Awe are actions that create fears, dangers, and
destruction that are incomprehensible to the people at large,
specific elements/sectors of the threat society, or the leadership.
Nature in the form of tornadoes, hurricanes, earthquakes,
floods, uncontrolled fires, famine, and disease can engender
Shock and Awe. The ultimate military application of Shock and
Awe was the use of two atomic weapons against Japan in
WWII. The Shock and Awe that resulted from the use of these
weapons not only brought an abrupt end to the war with Japan
(through unconditional surrender), but have deterred the fur-
ther use of these weapons for over 50 years. Not unexpectedly,
Appendix A
111
these events did not stop the proliferation or increase in the
destructive power of these weapons by a factor of ten. The holo-
caust was a state policy of Shock and Awe that stunned the
world in its brutality and inhumanity. Yet it has not deterred the
world from executing or tolerating atrocities of equal brutality
and inhumanity (Cambodia, Syria, Rwanda, etc.). Similar
applications of Shock and Awe have differing toleration levels
and impacts depending on the environment and political
system against which it is applied. As an example, the massive
bombing raids of WWII by Germany and the U.S. did not
result in a sufficient level of Shock and Awe to end the fighting.
The fear of the unknown created by the atomic attacks rather
than their actual destruction was the deciding factor in that the-
ater. The B-52 raids in Vietnam provided localized elements of
Shock and Awe, but until applied to the capital city of Hanoi,
had no impact toward war termination. When applied in con-
centrated repetitive strikes in November/December of 1972
under
Operation Rolling Thunder III
, the cease-fire followed in
short order. In fact, throughout history there have been weap-
ons and tactics designed to create varying degrees of Shock and
Awe. While there has always been shock, awe, and fear associ-
ated with warfare, unless the fear or losses are focused and great
enough, a quick cessation of hostilities under favorable terms is
not certain. How to apply elements of Shock and Awe against
rogue states, terrorist elements, international drug and crime
cartels, as well as in the more traditional MRCs and LRCs
needs much further study and analysis. Shock and Awe, to
reach the level required to achieve Rapid Dominance, must
also bring fear to those who are in charge. It must be applied
quickly, decisively, and preferably with impunity (such as stealth
bombing with air superiority). The element of impunity, that is
the other side is powerless to stop the damage, is a key element
112
Shock and Awe
of this strategy. If, on the other hand, attacks are directed at the
general public, a backlash could be unleased because of the
excessive and brutal losses of innocent civilians.
Much more study and analysis is needed to identify and exam-
ine the pros and cons of a policy that initiates a doctrine of
Shock and Awe for limited objectives rather than responds in
kind to a provocation. What are the limits of the doctrine of
Shock and Awe? What circumstances merit the application?
Can Shock and Awe be used to achieve limited objectives with
little or no risk of life to allied forces or innocent civilians? Can
true center of gravity targets be identified for ideological/ter-
rorist groups? Can levels of Shock and Awe be categorized by
effectiveness and priority of weapons systems? If so, what are
the key enabling technologies? What types of Shock and Awe
would be both impressive and generate high returns? A few
desirable capabilities from a former CINCâs perspective are
listed below:
â˘
Blow up an entire minefield simultaneously in its entirety
immediately after it had been laid.
â˘
Destroy the mine-laden minelaying vehicles at their load-
ing point.
â˘
Destroy (in real time) terrorist training camps or publicity
generating threats such as the recent display of 70 bomb-
laden suicide terrorists pledging to wreak havoc world-
wide. (This probably requires inside penetration of the tar-
geted organization.)
â˘
Destroy simultaneously all/selective WMD launchers,
storage/production facilities of a rogue state.
Appendix A
113
â˘
Selectively target rogue terrorist leaders, as was apparently
done by the Russians in Chechnya recently when they
killed the top rebel leader by detecting and homing in on
his satellite phone conversation (helicopter rocket attack).
â˘
Stop, divert, or capture the cash flow to terrorist elements.
THOUGHTS ON APPLICATIONS OF
SHOCK AND AWE
It is the use of Shock and Awe to achieve Rapid Dominance
that is so fascinating and has the greatest potential for leverage
if it can be harnessed in a variety of situations. This basis for
Rapid Dominance requires a clearer understanding of what
our end objectives are than we usually have when we stumble
into the use of military force, often it seems by default and at the
last possible minute. At this point, I have more questions than
answers. How does Rapid Dominance differ by the goals and
missions assigned? What are the key elements to apply Rapid
Dominance for each envisioned threat? What are the most
likely threats for the next 20 years? Is Rapid Dominance appli-
cable to all these threats? Can we separate Rapid Dominance
into categories with and without Shock and Awe?
In addition to answering these and other questions, it seems to
me that it would be helpful to generate a list of desirable capa-
bilities that would help me to select a response option. This list
of capabilities would be useful to focus (1) scarce R&D dollars
to fill in the holes with technology, (2) intelligence and surveil-
lance collection priorities, (3) innovative thought to further
develop the concept (War College papers and Wargaming
114
Shock and Awe
series), and (4) development of CINC plans and requirements
to meet these capabilities. Examples of such capabilities are:
â˘
Deploying highly effective TBMD and Cruise Missile
Defense.
â˘
Severing all/selective communications between leader-
ship and field as well as selective elements by call in the
field.
â˘
Intercepting and transmitting revised orders to selective
threat field units.
â˘
Projecting false radar pictures on selective key threat
scopes.
â˘
Inserting fouled fuel in threat storage facilities to generate
engine failures.
â˘
Inserting metal/material fatigue to failure attachments on
key threat systems.
â˘
Identifying specific locations and determining strength
and material of protected targets of value.
â˘
Developing âdial a settingâ ordnance capable of destroy-
ing all hardened targets.
â˘
Detecting and tracking (destroying at will) all targets of
value including mobile targets.
â˘
Detecting and targeting key threat launch systems before
launch.
â˘
Detecting plot and simultaneously destroying an employed
minefield (land & sea).
â˘
Making threat submarine movements transparent to tar-
geting at will.
Appendix A
115
Obviously, such a wish list should be prioritized and tailored to
the limits of achievable near/mid-term technology and afford-
ability. This may not even be the right type of capabilities one
might want. That is, we may need a totally nonstandard list. My
judgment is that we should develop one or two black âsilver bul-
letâ capabilities, if we get too far afield, the system will not be
able to digest the recommendations. However, the concept of
Rapid Dominance requires stepping to a new level of getting
inside the oppositionâs decision loop. Rapid Dominance at the
ultimate level would enable stopping, diverting, or changing the
decision process and decision executing machinery/systems
either preemptively or reactively in time to ensure core U.S.
security requirements are met.
RAPID DOMINANCE INFRASTRUCTURE
The current direction and speed of downsizing and acquisition
reform is adequate for the type of forces and capabilities neces-
sary to implement a Rapid Dominance strategy. I would like to
reserve comments in this area until the project is further devel-
oped. We do not need to raise reasons to discard the concept as
too hard before it is sufficiently defined. I have the feeling that
bringing these conceptual capabilities to realities within a
system of systems is neither cheap nor easy. There is still too
much waste and inefficiency in our defense acquisition process
as well as in the overlap between service requirements and
capabilities. Rapid Dominance will not be service-unique and
requires a synergistic approach from planning to execution.
116
Shock and Awe
FINAL THOUGHTS
The implications of the ongoing revolution in telecommunica-
tions and information processing as it applies to our national
security interests dictate that we need new imaginative concepts
of operation to ensure the efficacy of our international leader-
ship in a multipolar world. With technology upgrading capabil-
ities by factors of 10 or more every 18 months, we can no longer
afford to have concepts of operations wait for the technology to
reach the field. The concept of Rapid Dominance requires
innovative thought and different directions than those embed-
ded in our military hierarchy. We need to introduce the concept
at all levels of military professional education and training. The
best results of this effort will be generated from the younger
minds brought up on the leading edge of the information revo-
lution. The challenge is to engage those minds in the solution
and to take the risks required to fund priorities enabling the
development of this capability now. Such a cultural change is
not easy. One thing is certainâbusiness as usual will not get us
there. The window of opportunity will close faster than we
think.
117
Appendix B
Defense
Alternatives:
Forces
Required
by GEN Chuck Horner, USAF (Ret.)
he end of the Cold War will require a
review of United States National Security
Policy and a concomitant change in our National
Defense Strategy. This strategy will respond to
the changes in the worldâs security environment,
including the dissolution of the Soviet Union and
Warsaw Pact, the evolution in U.S. security alli-
ances such as NATO and NORAD, the increased
and unique threat posed by the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, and the widening
of the spectrum of conflict that will challenge the
peace and security of our nation and its allies.
The causes of conflict and the modes that threats
to our security interests will take have multiplied
with the end of the Cold War. The nuclear weap-
T
118
Shock and Awe
ons of the Cold War remain and will remain for some consider-
able time, even though there is a growing appreciation as to the
declining utility of these devices. For sure there will be continu-
ing pressure throughout the world to eliminate the presence of
nuclear weapons in conjunction with efforts to halt the produc-
tion, stockpiling, and deployment of chemical and biological
weapons. It is likely that START II will be followed by START
III and IV as nations who claim ownership of nuclear weapons
realize ownership has a high cost and marginal payoff. How-
ever, progress will be slow due to the immense importance of
achieving symmetry during nuclear disarmament and the cum-
bersome and exacting safeguards associated with the disarma-
ment process. Therefore, for the foreseeable future, the threat
of nuclear war must be addressed even though it will be less
likely than before. The spectrum of national security challenges
will expand as the threat of nuclear annihilation subsides.
The decisive victory achieved by the coalition forces over Iraq
during
Desert Storm
should give future aggressors of major
regional conflict cause to pause. While this does not mean that
the threat of conventional warfare has vanished, it does mean
that the national leader intending to use major conflict to
achieve political aims must carefully craft strategy that will
avoid the opportunity for confrontation with a large coalition
force led by the United States. Such a strategy might include
surprise attack; short intense military action; the threat or use
of nuclear, biological and/or chemical weapons; advanced sur-
veillance measures and precision munitions; and warfare car-
ried out on a fragmented battlefield that includes attacks on the
capitals of other nations by means of ballistic missiles or uncon-
ventional warfare forces. This will be warfare for which the
United States is ill-trained and ill-equipped.
Appendix B
119
Other challenges to the worldâs security will take many forms to
which the military forces of the United States can play a con-
structive role. These are commonly referred to as Operations
Other Than War, even though they may include the use of force
to achieve desired political goals. They include the increasingly
familiar peacemaking, peacekeeping, show of force, and
humanitarian relief efforts. Success in these operations may
well require retraining, reequipping, or reorganizing our mili-
tary forces. Each mission should be evaluated with respect to
what is required to accomplish its unique challenges. However,
the basic doctrine, training, or equipage of the military forces
should be based on what is required to fight the residual Cold
War, as well as deal with the growing demands of a major
regional conflict.
The political goals upon which our national security strategy
should be crafted are fairly straightforward. First, we should
seek to preserve and invigorate the role of leadership that the
United States has maintained since the end of World War II, or
the end of the Cold War (you take your pick). Second, and not
apart from the first goal, the United States must be sufficiently
strong to prevent or deter use of effective military power against
us. It is not inconceivable that our so-called superpower status
could be defeated in battle by a crafty and well-prepared adver-
sary. Witness what happened to the powerful victors of WW II
in Vietnam. Third, U.S. military forces must be of sufficient
size, configuration, and readiness to bring a major conventional
conflict to a successful termination. It goes without saying that
during this process we need to reduce nuclear weapons to num-
bers that do not threaten the virtual destruction of the world.
Nuclear deterrence forces also must remain in place. Fourth
and lastly, our military forces must be capable of responding to
120
Shock and Awe
all the other tasks and functions for which the national com-
mand authority calls upon the military. This first of challenges
should be used to define the military forces we field, how we
train them, and the methods we use to employ them.
The strategic geographic depth that the United States enjoys,
bounded by two oceans on the east and west and nonthreaten-
ing nations to the north and south, means that our nation is
somewhat immune from attack, other than by means of infiltra-
tion such as a terrorist, or from the skies by means of long-range
aircraft, and cruise or ballistic missiles. We will require some
actions and defenses that address these threats, but the major
portion of our national defense effort must be placed on build-
ing and sustaining offensive forces for combat in environments
other than our own soil. This dictates that our projection forces
must be capable of rapidly responding to an unforeseen crisis
anywhere in the world, keeping in mind that quick, decisive sur-
prise favors our potential enemies. Given that we have proven
unable to predict the outbreak of conflict in the past, these
forces must also be ready at all times to carry out combat oper-
ations in most any place. There will not be time to modernize
their equipment or train reserve force units. They must be
capable of projecting and sustaining their military power over
long distances and operating in the environment of the enemyâs
choosing. Last but not least, when required, they must be capa-
ble of decisive combat, not by attrition of the enemy force in
head-to-head combat as was our nature in past wars, but by
Shock and Awe so that conflict resolution is achieved with a
maximum of success at the minimum loss of life in the shortest
time. These characteristics for our projection force cannot be
achieved easily, as the processes that defined our Cold War doc-
Appendix B
121
trines, force structures, equipment, and ways of doing business
are loath to change.
The Servicesâ and joint requirements oversight processes that
define the equipment provided our military forces place
emphasis on force structure and the traditional roles for those
forces. This inertia can freeze our land, sea, air, and space capa-
bilities at current or near current levels, but may prove inade-
quate to carry out new strategies. There are few incentives for
a Service or the Joint Staff to reward innovation or divestiture
of roles or missions in order to change the character and mix of
land, sea, air, and space forces and to prepare them to fight the
battles we must envisage for the twenty-first century.
For example, the Services claim lessons learned from
Desert
Storm
that reinforce late twentieth century ways of fighting and
ignore the troublesome aspects that loom in the future and
threaten our traditional view of the battlefield. Many acclaim
the role of precision weapons for our forces, but ignore the
threat they pose if they are in the hands of the enemy. What
would be the lessons learned if several hundred canisters of live
Sensor Fused Weapons were released by a Red force ballistic
missile on the 24th Division during a Fort Irwin engagement?
Certainly there would be profound changes in tactics, doctrine,
and equipment indicated for the surviving U.S. Army force.
What if radar-homing surface-to-air missiles were employed by
the Red force during a Red Flag exercise in the Nevada desert,
not using centralized Soviet tactics/doctrine, but instead using
decentralized yet cooperative engagement operations as would
be used by our best and brightest if unleashed from their stag-
nant doctrines? I doubt that the Air Force would be spending
millions of dollars trying to build electronic countermeasures to
122
Shock and Awe
hide the large number of expensive and very nonstealthy air-
craft they continue to build, such as the F-15E.
Imagine the shock on our populace if a single cruise missile
were actually allowed to score a direct hit on the Carl Vinson
aircraft carrier during a Solid Shield joint exercise with the
attendant loss of life numbering in the 4,000 to 5,000 range.
You would think the maritime force would reexamine the
method it provides air power from the sea, vital yet today too
vulnerable.
How many times do we hear that the space forces are config-
ured to provide intelligence from overhead only to find in Iraq
or Bosnia that the front line forces receive products that are old,
inaccurate and altered to keep our Soviet foes from gaining
knowledge of our capabilities? Perhaps if we would dual-hat the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to the position of J-
2, or even Commander-in-Chief of a regional unified com-
mand, there would be vast improvements in the tasking, evalu-
ation, and delivery of space-derived intelligence to regional
combat forces. Then we might see full understanding of the
increasing role of space forces and implement change to make
them more relevant to our national security strategies of the
next century. Innovation, not size, must be sought because we
do not have the resources to do both. Moreover, large forces
drive our operational level strategy to force-on-force engage-
ments in the attrition warfare model of the last century with its
attendant causalities and destruction of equipment. George
Pattonâs dictum still stands that directed his troops not to die for
their country, but to get the other SOB to die for his.
Military operations will also place less emphasis on dying and
destruction. The ever-present television camera ensures that
Appendix B
123
the horrors of war are broadcast worldwide. Warâs immorality
should some day lead to its banishment. Unfortunately, that day
is probably a long way away. Nonetheless, weapons of war and
their employment tactics must minimize death and destruction.
This is not a call for nonlethal weapons; it is a call for military
forces to get right to the heart of the enemy and conclude oper-
ations as rapidly and efficiently as they possibly can given their
equipment, training, and doctrine. This means there must be
wide flexibility in how they may function. Military operations
will be across a wide spectrum of warfare and will demand flex-
ibility. Modern war will require our military leadership to nav-
igate through a changing spectrum of political constraints and
ever-changing political goals as each scenario unfolds. We must
make our forces capable of dampening the capacity of the
enemy to use force by controlling the conflict rapidly, even
when surprised. We failed to do that tactically in
Desert Storm
in
the case of the SCUD missile attacks, but were fortunate that
the Iraqis were equally inept at taking political advantage of this
card they held and skillfully employed on the battlefield. We
must also look for efficiency before we even join in battle.
Defense spending has declined as a percent of federal outlays
since the end of the Cold War. Given the leadership role that
the United States plays in the world, one could think a reason-
able sum to devote to defense might be three percent of our
gross national product, certainly an amount much smaller than
what an average family expends for its security by means of life,
health, causality, car, medical insurance, and retirement bene-
fits. Given the prospect of long-term, constant funding, the
Department of Defense could then give more thought to how
to build the most modern, efficient military force within the
dollars available. We would no longer define our forces against
124
Shock and Awe
some mythical threat or scenario which generates impetus to
protect force size rather than quality. The Army, Navy, Air
Force, Marine Corps, and space forces would be required to
build a team based on a salary cap. You might be willing to pay
big bucks for a B-2 superstar quarterback, but you will also
need lower cost and capable riflemen or destroyers to block and
tackle. Most of all, you would reward the Service or Agency
who would innovate to provide efficiency.
Manpower has become the driving cost in the all-volunteer mil-
itary force. Investment cost of a ship, tank, aircraft or satellite
might be high, but it is the operations and maintenance costs
that will drive how much in resources we are required to
expend to gain and maintain a given military capability. Again
turning to
Desert Storm
, the huge advantages of overflight preci-
sion munitions dropped from stealth aircraft has not been
understood or accepted by the operations analysts who argue
what we should build or buy next. If it had been, would the
Navy have allowed the A-12 program to fail, would the Air
Force be pouring hundreds of millions if not eventually billions
of dollars into equipping 40-year-old B-52s with conventional
missiles, or would the Army be maintaining heavy divisions at
a personal cost of $60 billion for 35 years of ownership? Why
not build a Division force equivalent using technology and doc-
trine to provide a âheavy division equivalentâ force using far
fewer troops featuring speed, shock, and precision fire while
avoiding the manpower costs of dollars that in peacetime
include added costs for recruitment, training, and sustaining
and in war have an even greater added cost computed in blood?
Why donât we do this? The answer is because it would require
rare innovation, trust, and support from the equally intransi-
gent federal funding authorities. Most importantly, the Services
Appendix B
125
are not rewarded for innovation, which recognizes the contri-
butions of another Service or Ally.
Jointness has become an altar at which all military personnel
must worship even if they donât understand or believe. Defend-
ers of the status quo argue that there is merit in duplication or
redundancy and these arguments have some validity. The ques-
tion becomes how much overlap or redundancy between land,
sea, air, and space forces can the nation afford, and what is the
opportunity cost to the core competency of the land, sea, air, or
space force that builds and/or maintains the duplicative force
structure. A second yet vastly different question arises when
considering the unique capabilities a Service provides to sup-
port itself and the other services. For example, how much the
Air Force should spend on airlift forces is not cast in terms of
what the envisaged requirement is for airlift, ton miles per day,
to support the mythical scenarios. The alternative sea, land,
and space lift requirements can be postulated; however, if the
Navy, Army, or Air Force do not satisfy those sea, land, and
space lift requirement, then there is a shortfall which will in
turn generate a need for more airlift!
During
Desert Storm
, nearly 90 percent of the deployed equip-
ment arrived by sea, but not in time if the Iraqis had continued
their first attack in August. A majority of overland movement
was provided by Saudi Arabian civilian trucks and drivers, and
the Army had neither the resources nor the responsiveness to
activate reserve forces needed to meet the truck and rail support
requirements of our military forces. As a result, costly airlift was
used to move forces that should have traveled by land and sea.
If added space capabilities had been needed, there was almost
no capability for the timely launch of a satellite. Would it not be
126
Shock and Awe
wise to index spending on land, sea, air, and space launch on
one and other, postulate lift requirements on what the new force
needs as it innovates and slims down? The need to respond on
a momentâs notice adds to the value of airlift and prepositioned
ships. The outcome though would be not to allow any of the
Services to divert general support money into core competen-
cies and thereby shift the jointness burden to another Service.
Innovate. Use the carrier to haul the army to war, and then fly
the fighters aboard after the helicopters or tanks are unloaded.
Accept the benefits of Federal Express that can be federalized
during times of national emergency as a costly, but ready aug-
mentation to military supply lines that has no cost during the
much longer periods of peacetime. Our nation has other indus-
trial capacities that also have duplicate military capabilities.
They may be 80 percent solutions, but the cost of ownership
could prohibit creation and maintenance of a military-owned
and -operated 100 percent solution. Iridium telephones may
not be jam-resistant or secure, but 80 percent of the time they
will satisfy the need for 2 percent of the cost. Of course, this
avoids the problem we have created for ourselves with our
medieval acquisition system.
Finally, we must acquire hardware of a type and at a pace that
will assure that the future force capability will be enduring. We
cannot keep up with technology using our current ways of
acquiring military hardware and training our people in how to
use and maintain it. In many areas we would be better off to
throw it away when it breaks given the low cost, durability, and
reliability of modern solid state electronics. Why train techni-
cians? Give the troops a gold card and a telephone number and
they know how to spend money more efficiently than do our
Appendix B
127
government agencies. Make sure the equipment we do buy not
only integrates with that of other services and functions, but
that it can integrate with both older and newer equipment des-
ignated to do the same function. The fighter aircraft secure
radio must be capable of communicating with the ground- and
sea-based forces command and control, as importantly it must
be able to communicate with the next generation fighter air-
craft radio.
The added dimension is the realization that we are unlikely to
fight alone in the future. We gain valuable legitimacy from
forming coalitions, plus it makes up for the growing feeble force
structure we maintain in declining budget years. An enduring
force must also recognize the necessity to operate cooperatively
with the forces of other nations. This means we must more
freely release our technologies to foreign nations so that our
military forces can fight side by side, so that our deployment
forces can draw from stocks of others while our logistics system
seeks to catch up with the rapidly deployed combat force.
In the final analysis, all of this shaping and sharpening of our
military forces will be for naught if there is not an equal change
in the policy side of the equation. What good are highly trained,
efficient, and capable land, sea, air, and space forces if the
implementing authorities are incapable of defining principles,
goals, and integrating strategies for their employment? While
this is not the province of the military to solve, the military must
understand how disjointed policy, weak political leadership, or
dysfunctional international cooperation will preclude success
on the battlefield.
Again, one of the missed lessons of
Desert Storm
was the difficult
and successful integration of international leadership achieved
128
Shock and Awe
by the President, Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Congressional leaders, and allied National
Command Authorities as well as many others. It was this lead-
ership, coupled with the ineptness of the enemy, that covered
over the failures of our Cold War-equipped and trained forces
that fought
Desert Storm
. This does not take anything away from
the military victory, but it does make it difficult to glean the
right lessons for the future. Perhaps that is why we are so loathe
to change our forces at a time when change is demanded by a
new strategic environment and new threats to our national
security. Defining alternative forces in light of the changed
national security environment, goals, and strategy raises two
questions: (1) what kind or mix of military force and (2) how
much best balances the requirements and funds available?
DEEP STRIKE: A KEY TO SHOCK AND
AWE
In the world of surprise attack and withdrawal from foreign
bases, all initial responses to combat operations will be some
form of Deep Strike. Given strategic warning (donât bet on it)
after deployment of our military forces, Deep Strike is a term
that relates to the political boundaries or proximity to military
forces. The geography of the area of conflict will further define
Deep Strike. But a rule of thumb might be attacks on a target
beyond range of surface-based fires except for ballistic or cruise
missiles. More important than range are the characteristics of
the Deep Strike targets. Deep Strike targets could be classified
as ones that the enemy does not wish to place at high levels of
risk. They can be characterized by the functions they perform,
such as:
Appendix B
129
â˘
Leadership
â˘
Command and Control (a function of leadership)
â˘
Control of Military Forces, especially air and space
â˘
Logistics and Sustainment
â˘
National Economic Base
â˘
Internal Security/Political
â˘
National Will, Theirs and Ours
Intelligence used to nominate the targets for these strikes must
examine the functions and then define the physical objects or
people who comprise the system that is responsible for the suc-
cessful operation of the function. You define the system and
then attack the critical elements in order to achieve economy of
force. Often these target sets are difficult to define, as these
functions often represent the enemyâs most valuable and there-
fore protected elements. The intelligence collection associated
with each function will vary from target set to target set. Large,
fixed infrastructure, such as associated with an electrical grid,
lends itself to traditional reconnaissance and evaluation of tech-
nical analysis. Leadership targets are better defined by using
human intelligence and subjective analysis. In all cases success
starts with innovative intelligence products, which have not
been a hallmark of United States operations. Such intelligence
products must be examined through the eyes of the enemy, their
values and concerns. Too often we apply judgments based on
our viewpoint.
One target system may serve the attainment of a number of dif-
ferent goals. For example, attacks on the electrical power system
of the enemy may debilitate his capacity to command and con-
trol his military forces, operate vital elements of the economy
130
Shock and Awe
and thus degrade the political support required to sustain the
conflict. This same target system may be attacked in a variety
of ways. Most common methods would be using stealth aircraft
and cruise missiles to bomb power plants and switching centers.
Areas with isolated populations lend themselves to using special
operations forces infiltrated to destroy an isolated power grid
node for transmission of energy from one highly populated area
to another. Now it is obvious that computer signals used to
command the power grid are targets as intrusion into the
enemyâs control system provides the means to simply turn off
electricity to selected areas. Attacks by all these means achieves
even greater results than the sum of their parts because enemy
responses to restore electrical power will be confused as ele-
ments such as computer intrusion are confused with bombing
destruction.
The characteristics of value in attacking these important targets
systems are simultaneity, impunity, and timing. The greatest
effect will be achieved when the strikes are coordinated in such
a manner as to inflict maximum Shock and Awe on the enemy
element. This means that operations must be coordinated and
orchestrated carefully and flexibly as enemy reaction to the
attack is evaluated. Moreover, presence is projected when a
combination of functions or target sets supporting a variety of
functions are struck at the same time with impunity. In order to
achieve maximum results, the attacks will need to be evaluated
quickly in order to define previously unknown elements of the
system or how the enemy perceives the impact on his system.
Finally, the attacker must be alert to the interactions of the func-
tions as the effects of these Deep Strikes begin to take hold. In
order to achieve desired levels of Shock and Awe, the attacker
must know the current and projected effects of his strikes
Appendix B
131
against elements of the enemyâs residual system. If the trick is to
define the system of targets needed to conduct successful Deep
Strike, it is even more important to know how to alter the initial
plan as the battle unfolds and timing becomes everything.
The characteristics of forces needed to carry out Deep Strike
are long-range, flexibility, precision, survivability, and speed.
Cost of the operation is a factor; however, system cost must
include peacetime operations and maintenance costs as well as
the costs during actual combat. There is also a human element
in the cost of combat operations that escalates rapidly as mili-
tary force is misused. The total cost of these operations must
also address the cost of intelligence used to support Deep
Strikes. Intelligence operations may be the most costly due to
the importance of these targets to the enemy. Alternatively, the
human intelligence associated with these attacks may be the
most inexpensive since their national importance makes them
vulnerable to knowledgeable dissidents.
STAND-OFF
Deep Strike is defined by distance, albeit relative distance.
Some of the target sets may lend themselves to circumstances
beyond the nationâs control; for example, Seoul borders on
North Korea. Our protective oceans mean that likely conflict is
offshore. The likelihood our next adversary may have access to
surveillance, precision munitions, and long-range delivery sys-
tems dictates that much of our operations will be at long range,
lest our forces come under attack at their ports, camps, and
bases. There will be a need for systems capable of projecting
military force from distances of 10,000km. A sizable portion of
the force must be able to deliver ordnance of enemy targets
132
Shock and Awe
from ranges in excess of 5,000km. Launching attacks from
inside 1,000km of the enemy forces will demand that friendly
forces be protected from attack by means of active and passive
defenses and dispersal. This latter constraint will preclude
achieving levels of Shock and Awe through simultaneous
attack.
SURVIVABILITY
Great cost benefits are attained if the vehicle used to deliver the
attack is reusable. Keep in mind that the force built for the most
demanding conflict must also be flexible for other operations.
Therefore, while ballistic missiles provide great range, speed,
and survivability in reaching their target, their cost becomes
prohibitive in large-scale operations that endure beyond a few
hours, or in smaller-scale operations where the goals are modest
and the demands on other military forces are low. Simultaneous
combat operations require a number of expensive, expendable
platforms in the opening hours of the conflict if our response is
to be timely and induce shock. Awe is not achieved if the enemy
is permitted to gain experience in being attacked; at best you
may make them numb. Alternatively, reusable long-range sur-
vivable systems provide needed flexibility to alter the Deep
Strike plan as it unfolds. The food chain of weapons systems
ranges from the most valuable systems such as ballistic missiles,
cruise missiles, and stealth bombers, to less valuable, but useful,
stealth fighter and long-range surface-to-surface high trajectory
fires.
Appendix B
133
FIREPOWER
Discriminate fires are important due to the likelihood of people
and structures being in close proximity to the desired target. It
is not improbable that the national command center is located
next door to a childrenâs hospital.
Discriminate fires require precision in target coordinate identi-
fication and location. Precision does not mean âsmall war-
head,â although there is a beneficial impact as the right amount
of explosive is placed on the target due the penalties imposed
on the delivery vehicle required to carry the warhead long dis-
tances. All operations involving the use of firepower must also
understand and evaluate the beneficial aspects of using non-
destructive elements in conjunction with the attack to include
all aspects of the so-called information warfare.
135
Appendix C
Enduring
Realities and
Rapid
Dominance
by GEN Fred M. Franks, USA (Ret.)
apid Dominance, as we see it, is a markedly
different concept for the use of force to gain
national security objectives. At its core, Rapid
Dominance blends the unique capabilities of
land, sea, air, space, and special operating forces.
It is important to note the vital role of jointness in
using forces from all elements and resisting the
lure of gimmicks and cost-free options that may
appear within the reach of high technology but
are not.
Examining current joint force capabilities reveals
some enduring truths that should be used to eval-
uate future concepts. Joint force commanders
today benefit from the wide array of capabilities
available to the joint warfighting team. The abil-
R
136
Shock and Awe
ity to combine and use forces from all dimensions in a variety
of powerful combinations to fit mission circumstances presents
a versatility of capabilities that makes defense by adversaries
difficult. Balance and versatility are key. Balance in capabilities
and the inherent versatility to combine them in unpredictable,
yet highly effective ways has served U.S. national security inter-
ests well since the end of the Cold War. One has only to look at
the variety of methods employed in Panama (1989),
Desert Storm
(1991), Somalia (1992), Rwanda (1993), Haiti (1994), and
Bosnia (1995) in both war and Operations Other Than War.
Joint force commanders employed, and in some cases invented,
new combinations of balanced capabilities and were willing to
go beyond the confines of service doctrines to fit mission cir-
cumstances. For example, a U.S. Army brigade of the 10th
Mountain Division with helicopters replaced much of the car-
rier air wing and flew off the carrier
Eisenhower
during the Haiti
operation. This force packaging capability is an advantage
unique to the U.S.
As we look beyond the present to future and bolder defense
concepts such as Rapid Dominance, the key will be to maintain
that balance in land, sea, air, space, and special operating forces
combinations available to the joint force commander. U.S. mil-
itary forces are now multidimensional in capabilities, able to
use force in ways unpredictable to an adversary. U.S. forces also
have enormous versatility, able to be used in war and what have
become termed Operations Other Than War. Balance permits
that.
Moreover, joint force commanders, recognizing this capability,
have found ways to introduce land forces even more rapidly
given todayâs methods. Recently, a brigade of the 1st Cavalry
Appendix C
137
Division rapidly deployed by air from Ft. Hood, Texas, to
Kuwait and was able to fall in on equipment forward positioned
and be available for combat soon after arrival. A recent article
in
Navy Times
pointed out, âIn fact, as each wave of soldiers
arrived in Kuwait, they were heading northâcombat readyâ
within six hours.â This was a dramatic example of the rapid
ability to combine land forces with air and sea forces using both
distant forces with those already in the theater. That combina-
tion in that set of strategic circumstances provided a rapid
deterrent in an area of vital national security interests to the
U.S.
Another enduring truth is the need for staying power and
ensuring that this capacity is perceived by a potential adversary.
âStaying powerâ means the ability to press the initial advantage
gained until the strategic objective is achieved. On-the-ground
presence, in addition to forces in theater, as demonstrated in
Kuwait in 1993 and again in 1996, provided commitment and
staying power to convince Iraq that it would be disastrous to
consider any form of military action. The inherent staying
power of land forces, wherever future tactical concepts may
lead, makes them a powerful contributing partner in our Rapid
Dominance concept.
Finally, there is the issue of physical control. Control combines
with staying power to defeat the enemyâs will. One of the many
lessons of
Desert Storm
is that it was not until after land forces
attacked Iraq and Kuwait that Iraqi forces were expelled from
Kuwait. Despite the awesome shock and destructive effects of
attacks from the air and sea, it was only after coalition ground
attacks to extend control to both Kuwait and southeastern Iraq
by defeat and destruction of defending Iraqi forces that strate-
138
Shock and Awe
gic objectives were secured. Control on land was extended past
the cease-fire until such time in April as the UN passed a per-
manent cease-fire and sanctions resolution. Land forces
remaining in southeastern Iraq provided the staying power and
control.
The size, shape, and composition of forces that will fight in all
elements will assuredly change in the future. Early work done
in advanced warfighting experiments out of TRADOC's Battle
Labs beginning in 1992 and growing into the current Force
XXI and other promising capabilities, as well as by the USMC
at MCCDC at Quantico, are the precursors of how change
may be discovered and implemented. The challenge is to
ensure that all components of our fighting power are properly
balanced and combined into the most effective and lethal mixes
of land, sea, air, space, and special operating forces. This is the
heart of the Rapid Dominance force of the future.
Extension of real and perceived control over the will and ability
of any adversary to oppose or threaten us will ensure and guar-
antee success of initial operations, thereby maximizing Shock
and Awe. Indeed, getting forces on land rapidly and operation-
ally will be a major factor in achieving the enduring effects of
Shock and Awe. Certainly, as forces on land evolve and change,
they must meet the requirements of rapidity and sustainment
and are vital components of any mix of forces that seek by
Shock and Awe to stun and then rapidly dominate an adversary
to achieve U.S. national security objectives.
We strongly feel that we as a nation cannot stand still in explor-
ing defense alternatives. We must seize this time to be bold in
our thinking. More thought and hypotheses with operational
methods that break through or expand current service doc-
Appendix C
139
trines are needed from a joint perspective even as services look
to the future from their own service perspective. Then there
must be rigorous experiments using both high fidelity simula-
tions and actual joint field trials to determine the worth of these
hypotheses to blend the wide array of technology available to
the total joint force and according to bold new concepts. The
results will determine the worth of Rapid Dominance concepts
by judging whether they will permit even more balanced, ver-
satile, and lethal combinations to fit known and anticipated
future strategic circumstances.
141
Study Group
Members
L.A. "Bud" Edney
is a retired Navy admiral
and naval aviator. A veteran of over 350 combat
missions in Vietnam, Admiral Edney's senior bil-
lets included Vice Chief of Naval Operations and
Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Command/
Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic. Admiral
Edney has an advanced degree from Harvard
and was a 1970 White House Fellow.
Fred M. Franks
is a retired Army general and
a highly experienced combat armor officer.
During the Gulf War, he commanded VII Corps
and last served as Commanding General of the
Training and Doctrine Command. He has two
master's degrees from Columbia and is a gradu-
ate of the National War College. He is the author
of
Into the Storm, a Study in Command,
written with
Tom Clancy to be published by G.P. Putnam's
Sons in 1997.
Charles A. Horner
is a retired Air Force gen-
eral and a highly experienced combat fighter and
attack pilot. During the Gulf War, General
Horner commanded all allied air forces. His last
assignment was Commander-in-Chief, Space
142
Shock and Awe
Command. A graduate of the National War College, he now
serves as consultant to government and industry.
Jonathan T. Howe
is a retired Navy admiral and both a sub-
marine and surface warfare qualified officer. He has served as
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs,
Deputy Chairman of NATO's Military Committee, Com-
mander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe/CINC U.S.
Naval Forces Europe, and was Special Representative of the
Secretary General of the UN to Somalia. He has a Ph.D. from
the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and currently heads
a charitable foundation.
Harlan K. Ullman
divides his time between the worlds of
business and public policy. A former naval person, he is with the
Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Center
for Naval Analyses. His last book,
IN IRONS: U.S. Military Might
in the New Century,
was published by the National Defense Uni-
versity Press in 1995.
James P. Wade, Jr.
, a scientist by training, is a West Point
graduate and infantry officer. He has held many senior posi-
tions in DoD, including head of Policy Planning, Assistant to
SECDEF for Atomic Energy, Assistant Secretary for Acquisi-
tion, and Acting Head of Defense Research and Engineering.
He is Chairman and CEO of DGI which conducted this study.
Keith Brendley
is a Vice President with Defense Group Inc.
He was formerly with Sarcos Research Corporation, RAND,
System Planning Corporation and NASA, Ames Research
Center. He holds mechanical engineering degrees from the
University of Illinois (B.S.) and the University of Maryland
(M.S.).