odh5312.PDF

DoD 51 OO.52-M

CHAPTER 15

WEAPON RECOVERY OPERATION

15-1 GENERAL

A mixture of weapons, weapon components, contam-

inants, and other hazardous debris may be at a nuclear
weapon accident site. The number and type of weapons,
the extent of damage, and the location of weapons,

weapon components, and hazards are of primary

concern. If the weapons appear to be intact, and

radioactive contaminants have not been dispersed, the

complexity of the problem is lessened considerably.

However, even intact weapon(s) may pose significant

recovery problems with potential explosive and
contamination hazards. A continuing assessment of the
situation is needed to determine the best method for
conducting weapon recovery.

15-2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE

This chapter provides information about weapon

operations following a nuclear weapon accident. Also,

requirements and planning are discussed to develop
operational plans for recovery of nuclear weapons,
weapon components, and other hazardous materials.

15-3 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

Service responsibilities for weapon recovery operations
include all actions through transfer of weapon custody

to a designated Department of Energy (DoE) represen-
tative. During weapon recovery operations, personnel:

a. Determine the status and location of the weapon(s),

including whether high explosive detonations occurred.

b. Assess weapon(s) damage.

c. Perform render safe procedures on the weapon(s).

d. Initiate a systematic search until the location for

the weapon(s) and all weapon components is known.

e. Establish an area and develop procedures for

processing/ packaging contaminated weapon(s) and

components.

f. Perform necessary actions for transport or shipping

of the weapon(s) and components for interim storage
and/ or final disposition.

15-4 RESOURCES

The On-Scene Commander

can request many

types of support during the

response operation.

The principal resources available to meet weapon
recovery responsibilities are Explosive Ordnance
Disposal

Teams and the DoE Accident Response

Group

a. Explosive Ordnance Disposal. EOD personnel are

responsible for the actual performance, supervision, and

control of hands-on weapon recovery operations. The
following guidelines apply to the employment of EOD
teams:

(1) The Service or Unified Commander having

primary responsibility for command and control on-site
at the accident provides, or obtains from the appropriate
Service, EOD teams that are Service certified on the
weapon(s).

(2) All Service or Unified Command EOD teams

provide emergency support until the designated EOD
team arrives.

(3) Navy EOD teams recover weapons located

under water because only Navy EOD personnel are
trained in diving techniques.

(4) EOD personnel, officer and enlisted, are

graduates of the Navy School, Explosive Ordnance
Disposal at Indian Head, MD. They are trained in access
techniques and are the only personnel qualified to
perform render safe procedures. Also, they are trained
to identify, detect, contain and/or eliminate explosive,
radiological and toxic hazards associated with nuclear
weapons. Intensive training is conducted on render safe
procedures for weapons unique to their individual
Service. .

(5) The EOD team provided, or obtained, by the

Service having primary command and control

will safe the weapon(s). If an extremely hazardous

situation exists, the initial responding EOD team with

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the publications and capabilities to safe the weapon

should do so. The continuation of any render safe
procedures are conducted by an EOD team qualified
on the particular weapon(s) involved.

(6) The organization of EOD teams varies among

Services as does the number and seniority of personnel

assigned; however, all teams have the same basic
capabilities and are trained in radiological control and
monitoring techniques applicable to their operations.
They have the necessary communications and personal
safety equipment to operate in an accident environment.

Moreover, teams have a background in weapon design

information enhanced by coordination with DoE
scientific advisors on arrival at the accident scene. Navy

EOD teams maintain a complete inventory of all U.S.
nuclear weapon “publications, and Army EOD units

maintain publications for render safe procedures
for all Services nuclear weapon systems. While tasks

assigned to EOD personnel are clearly in the realm of

weapon

and disposal, they must operate within

the framework of the overall response group and conduct
operations only as directed by the OSC.

(7) The EOD teams actions, by priority are:

(a) Prevention of nuclear detonation.
(b) Prevention of a nuclear contribution or a high

explosive detonation.

required,

elimination of explosive and radiological

hazards resulting from the accident or incident.

(d) Protection of personnel against hazards noted

in (a) through (c) above.

b. Department of Energy. The DoE ARG includes

weapon design personnel and explosive experts familiar
with weapons and associated hazards. The ARG

provides technical advice and assistance in the collection,

identification, decontamination, packaging, and
disposition of weapon components, weapon debris, and
resulting radioactive materials; and technical advice and
assistance to EOD teams in render safe and recovery

procedures. Each nuclear weapon has render safe
procedures developed, evaluated, coordinated, and

authenticated as binding jointly by the DoD and DoE.
Since weapons may have been subjected to extreme stress

during an accident, consideration may be given to the

DoE unique equipment to assess the applicability of these

procedures.

(1) DoE radiographic capabilities are available for

field diagnostics of damaged weapons in the event of

an incident/ accident. The Los

National

Laboratory

has

radiographic units

with accompanying film, film processing, and viewing

equipment. LLNL has an equivalent radiographic

capability which serves as a back-up to the LANL unit.

(2) DoE aerial radiological surveys by the Aerial

Measurement System

assist in locating weapons

and weapon components. This capability is addressed

in Appendix 5-C.

(3) Additional information concerning the ARG,

DoE radiographic capabilities, the AMS, and other DoE

capabilities may be obtained from the

15-5 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

Weapon recovery begins with the initial reconnaissance,
proceeds through the conduct of render safe procedures,
and ends with hazard removal and disposal of the
weapons and components. These operations are
discussed in this concept of operations. The two-person

policy must be strictly enforced when working with
nuclear weapons. In the early stages of accident response,
personnel may find it difficult to follow all of the required
security measures however, the OSC should implement
necessary security procedures as soon as possible.

a. Initial Entry. During the initial entry, weapons and

the aircraft, vehicle, or missile wreckage present several
hazards. Nuclear weapons and some components contain

conventional explosives and other hazardous materials.

Nuclear material may have been dispersed on impact,

during detonation of explosives, or by combustion in

a fire. Weapons may need stabilizing to prevent further

damage or explosions. Other explosive items which may
be encountered include conventional munitions, aircraft

fire extinguisher cartridges, engine starter cartridges,

pyrotechnics, and egress or extraction devices. Leaking

fluids, liquid oxygen, propellants, oxidizers, shredded

or torn metals, and composite materials/fibers present
additional hazards. The initial reconnaissance team
should mark hazards clearly.

b. Render Safe Procedures. The OSC is responsible

ultimately for the proper implementation of any render

safe procedures. The EOD team evaluates and analyzes
the accident situation and advises the OSC of the safest
and most reliable means for neutralizing weapon
associated hazards. Render safe procedures may begin,
if required, as soon as the reconnaissance has been
completed. Handling of nuclear weapons in an accident
must be done according to written procedures. If the
weapon is in a

environment, no immediate actions

occur until a coordinated weapon recovery

procedure has been developed by EOD personnel and

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DoE ARG representatives. These procedures must be
approved by the OSC after coordination with the DoE
Team Leader and the senior member of the EOD Team.
Consideration must be given to the following when
determining a course of action:

(1) Explosive ordnance and accident debris are

inherently dangerous, but some minimum number of
personnel may have to be exposed to hazards to complete
the mission.

(2) Consequences should be evaluated before

exposing personnel to hazards.

(3) When available, DoE radiographic equipment

is used to assess internal damage and aid standard EOD
procedures. ARG capabilities and knowledge, combined
with EOD team procedures and experience in render
safe procedures under hazardous conditions, provide the
best method of determining a weapon’s condition before

it is moved.

(4) Staging, decontamination, packaging, and the

method, type, and final disposition of shipment should
be an integral part of the RSP planning phase.

(5) The high priority given to weapon recovery

operations does not inherently imply a need for rapid
action. Personnel and public safety must never be

sacrificed solely for speed.

c. Nuclear Weapon Security. The two-man rule must

be enforced strictly when working with nuclear weapons.
The OSC should ensure that all personnel are familiar
with the rule and that it is strictly enforced. Physical
security safeguards required to prevent unauthorized

access to classified information and proper control and

disposition of classified material must be strictly enforced
during all operations involving the weapon(s) or weapon
components. Because of the technical information

requirements during nuclear weapon operations, some
documents at the accident scene may contain critical
nuclear weapon design information

The

sensitive information contained in these documents
requires that security measures be implemented
consistent with the highest classification assigned.

Personnel working in an area containing

should

be properly cleared and authorized until recovery

discussions are complete and the items have been covered

or removed.

d. Search Techniques. The location of

weapons

and components

must

determined.

Depending upon

the accident circumstances, weapons and weapon

components may be scattered and/or buried over a large
area. A systematic search may be required over a large,.
area until accountability for all the weapons and weapon

components is re-established. The search may become

a time consuming operation requiring numerous

personnel. The search method used by the OSC depends
on many factors including the number of personnel

available, topography, and environmental conditions.
Metal detectors and

equipment maybe needed

to locate all weapons and components. As components

are found, their location should be marked, the position

recorded on a map, and photographed. The items should
be removed to a storage area after coordination with
accident investigators, safety and security permitting. If

all components are not found, the EOD team leader

should coordinate with the ARG and make recommen-
dations to the OSC concerning additional search
procedures which can be tried, and at what point the
search for components will cease. Search techniques that

may be employed are:

(1) Coarse Search. A search in loose crisscrossing

patterns designed to locate weapon components rapidly.
This technique is used by EOD and radiological
monitoring personnel to search the accident area soon
after the accident has occurred.

(2) Aerial Radiological and Photographic Survey.

This technique is used to identify areas of
radioactive intensity to assist in locating missing weapon
components and to provide high resolution pho-
tography.

(3) Instrument Search. Metal and radiation

detectors monitor those areas where weapons or
components were found previously. This method may
supplement the visual search.

(4) Visual Search. A search normally conducted by

a slow-moving line of personnel positioned abreast at

various intervals dependent upon the object to be

located.

(5) Scarifying Procedure. Components may have

been buried during the accident or subsequently covered

by wind action. A road grader equipped with scarifies
(large steel teeth) is used to plow a surface. Search teams

should follow the graders and conduct a visual and/
or instrument search for missing components. This
system has proven successful in past search operations.
Coordination must be made with the Joint Hazard
Evaluation Center

prior to implementing

techniques to

personnel protection requirements

due to resuspension and the potential impact on site
decontamination and restoration.

e. Hazard Removal. Another major step in weapon

recovery begins with the removal of identified hazards.
The OSC establishes priorities for removing all hazards
so that other response personnel may conduct opera-

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It is unsafe for anyone but task trained personnel

under EOD supervision to clear an area of broken,

scattered, or resolidified high explosives.

f. Disposal. After the weapons are evaluated by EOD

and DoE as safe for movement and in coordination with
accident investigators, weapons are moved to a
designated weapon storage area.

(1) On-site disposal of high explosives depends on

available space and hazards presented, including

resuspension of contaminants. Storage area or disposal
sites should be large enough to minimize hazards to

personnel in the event of a detonation. The distances

that storage areas are separated from other operations
is determined by the type and amount of explosives

“ stored. An isolated and segregated area should be set

aside for the exclusive storage of

or damaged

explosives.

(2) If open storage is used, protection from the

elements and information sensors, including satellite
surveillance, must be provided for weapons and weapon

components.

g. Storage of Explosives. If explosive items cannot

be stored separately, a balance of safety and practical

considerations requires assignment of each item to a

storage group based on compatibility characteristics.

h. Custody. Each Service has publications that

address the storage, security, and safety aspects

associated with nuclear weapons, these publications also

address requirements for the custody of nuclear weapons
and weapon components. Moreover, performance of
EOD procedures does not, in itself, constitute transfer
of custody to the EOD team. Final disposition of

damaged weapon(s) and/ or components involves return

of these devices to the DoE. Therefore, close coordi-
nation between the

and the DoE team leader is

necessary throughout the weapon recovery phase.

Custody of damaged weapon(s) and components is

transferred to the DoE at a point determined jointly

by the

and the DoE team leader.

i. Packaging and Marking. Transportation specialist

consultation is required for weapon(s), weapon
components, and/ or explosives damaged or subjected
to extreme forces during accidents. Before weapon(s),

weapon components, and/ or explosives are shipped,
they must be packaged to ensure that no contamination
breaches the container and that the environment
experienced during shipment will not cause further
damage or explosions. To ensure this requirement,
special packing, shipping, marking and safety instruc-
tions must be obtained to comply with transportation
regulations from the DoD, DoE, and DoT.

j. Shipment. When the disposition decision has been

made, DoD or DoE may be assigned the primary

responsibility for moving the weapons. Nuclear weapons

will be moved by the safest means and over the safest
routes. Movement should be kept to a minimum.
Shipments of weapons/weapon components will be
routed to a DoE facility for examination, analysis, and

final disposition.

15-6 ACCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN ANNEX

The weapon operations annex/ recovery plan should

establish the procedures used during weapon operations.
This annex should include:

a. Definition of the relationship between EOD

personnel and DoE weapon experts and their respective

responsibilities.

b. Procedures for locating and identifying weapon

components and debris.

c. Procedures for establishing a secure staging/

storage area.

d. Procedures for moving weapons and components

to the secure staging/storage area.

Procedures for packaging weapon components.

f. Procedures for shipping weapons and components.

g. Guidelines for establishing electromagnetic radia-

tion hazard areas.

h. Procedures for re-establishing accountability for

weapons and weapon components.

15-4