1.IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
)
)
v.
)
)
CRIMINAL NO.
ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN,
)
a/k/a âBâ
)
a/k/a âRamon Garciaâ
)
a/k/a âJim Bakerâ
)
a/k/a âG. Robertsonâ
)
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT, ARREST WARRANT AND SEARCH WARRANTS
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I. SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
II. KEY TERMS AND ENTITIES
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
III. BACKGROUND OF ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN . . . . . . . . .
11
A. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION EMPLOYMENT
AND DUTIES
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
12
B. OATHS OF OFFICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
15
C. SECURITY CLEARANCES AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . .
17
D. RESIDENCES
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
19
IV. BASIS FOR THE INFORMATION IN THIS AFFIDAVIT . . . . .
20
V. THE KGBâs âBâ OPERATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
21
VI. FACTS ESTABLISHING THAT âBâ IS ROBERT PHILIP
HANSSEN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
79
A. FORENSIC EVIDENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
79
B. MATERIAL OBTAINED FROM HANSSENâS FBI OFFICE
AND VEHICLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
80
C. RECORDING OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION . . . . . .
82
D. DEAD DROP SITES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
82
E. PALM III
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
83
F. CORRELATION OF HANSSENâS WORK ASSIGNMENTS
TO âBââs DISCLOSURES TO THE KGB/SVR . . . . . .
84
G. HANSSENâS USE OF THE FBI AUTOMATED CASE
SUPPORT SYSTEM
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
87
H. âBââS âOLD FRIENDâ
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
90
ii
VII. LOCATION OF EVIDENCE, FRUITS, INSTRUMENTALITIES,
AND PROCEEDS
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
91
VIII. SPECIAL NEEDS AND JUSTIFICATION TO SEIZE
COMPUTERS AND RELATED HARDWARE AND ELECTRONIC
STORAGE DEVICES FOUND AT HANSSENâS RESIDENCE
FOR OFF-SITE EXAMINATION
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
95
IX.
REQUEST FOR AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE SEARCH WARRANTS
DURING NIGHTTIME HOURS
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
97
X. CONCLUSION AS TO PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH . . . . . .
99
XI. WARRANTS REQUESTED
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
XII. ATTESTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
)
)
v.
)
)
CRIMINAL NO.
ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN,
)
a/k/a âBâ
)
a/k/a âRamon Garciaâ
)
a/k/a âJim Bakerâ
)
a/k/a âG. Robertsonâ
)
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT, ARREST WARRANT AND SEARCH WARRANTS
I, Stefan A. Pluta, being duly sworn, depose and state as
follows:
1. I am presently employed as a Special Agent of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and am assigned to the
Washington Field Office in the District of Columbia. I have been
employed as an FBI Special Agent for approximately 13 years. I
have completed FBI training in foreign counterintelligence
matters. As a result of my training and experience, I am
familiar with the tactics, methods, and techniques of foreign
intelligence services and their agents.
2.
This affidavit is in support of applications for the
following:
A)
A warrant for the arrest of ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN
(DOB 4/18/44) for violations of Title 18 United
2
States Code, Sections 794(a) (Transmitting
National Defense Information) and 794(c)
(Conspiracy to Commit Espionage); and
B)
Search warrants for:
1)
The residence of ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN, such
premises known and described as a single
family residence located at:
9414 Talisman Drive
Vienna, Virginia 22182
as more fully described in Attachment B, and
which is within the Eastern District of
Virginia;
2)
One silver 1997 Ford Taurus, bearing VIN
1FALP52U9VG211742 and Virginia license plate
number ZCW9538, which is owned by ROBERT
PHILIP HANSSEN and anticipated to be within
the Eastern District of Virginia;
3)
One 1993 Volkswagen van, bearing VIN
WV2KC0706PH080424 and Virginia license plate
number ZCW9537, which is owned by ROBERT
PHILIP HANSSEN and anticipated to be within
the Eastern District of Virginia;
4)
One 1992 Isuzu Trooper, bearing VIN
JACDH58W7N7903937 and Virginia license plate
YRP3849, which is owned by ROBERT PHILIP
HANSSEN and anticipated to be within the
Eastern District of Virginia.
3. In my capacity as case agent assigned to this matter, I
have examined documents and other records pertinent to this
investigation from numerous sources. Searches and various forms
of surveillance have also been conducted pursuant to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and orders of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC).
3
I. SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION
4. The results of this investigation to date indicate that
there is probable cause to believe that, beginning in 1985 and
continuing to the present, ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN (hereinafter
âHANSSENâ), a United States citizen, has conspired with officers
and agents of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(hereinafter âUSSRâ or âSoviet Unionâ) and with its principal
successor state, the Russian Federation (hereinafter âRussiaâ) to
commit espionage against the United States on behalf of a foreign
government, specifically the Soviet Union or Russia, and has in
fact engaged in such espionage.
5. The evidence establishes that between 1985 and the
present, HANSSEN â- who the KGB/SVR referred to as âBâ â- has
engaged in the following conduct in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§794(a) and (c):
(a) He compromised numerous human sources of the United
States Intelligence Community. Three of these sources were
compromised by both HANSSEN and former CIA officer Aldrich Ames,
resulting in their arrest, imprisonment and, as to two
individuals, execution. HANSSEN compromised these three
individuals expressly in order to enhance his own security and
enable him to continue spying against the United States.
(b) He compromised dozens of United States Government
classified documents, including documents concerning the National
MASINT (Measurement and Signature Intelligence) Program
4
(classified TOP SECRET/SCI), the United States Double Agent
Program (classified SECRET), the FBI Double Agent Program
(classified TOP SECRET), the United States Intelligence
Communityâs Comprehensive Compendium of Future Intelligence
Requirements (classified TOP SECRET), a study concerning KGB
recruitment operations against the CIA (classified SECRET), an
assessment of the KGBâs effort to gather information concerning
certain United States nuclear programs (classified TOP SECRET), a
CIA analysis of the KGBâs First Chief Directorate (classified
SECRET), a highly classified and tightly restricted analysis of
the foreign threat to a specific named highly compartmented
classified United States Government program (classified TOP
SECRET/SCI), and other classified documents of exceptional
sensitivity.
(c) He compromised United States Intelligence Community
technical operations of extraordinary importance and value. This
included specific electronic surveillance and monitoring
techniques and precise targets of the United States Intelligence
Community. In one case, he compromised an entire technical
program of enormous value, expense and importance to the United
States Government. In several other cases, he compromised the
United States Intelligence Communityâs specific communications
intelligence capabilities, as well as several specific targets.
(d) He compromised numerous FBI counterintelligence
investigative techniques, sources, methods and operations, and
5
FBI operational practices and activities targeted against the
KGB/SVR. He also advised the KGB/SVR as to specific methods of
operation that were secure from FBI surveillance and warned the
KGB/SVR as to certain methods of operation which were subject to
FBI surveillance.
(e) He disclosed to the KGB the FBIâs secret investigation
of Felix Bloch, a Foreign Service Officer, for espionage, which
led the KGB to warn Bloch that he was under investigation, and
completely compromised the investigation.
(f) HANSSENâs conspiratorial activities continue to the
present. HANSSEN continues to monitor a particular SVR signal
site, doing so on numerous occasions in December 2000, January
2001 and February 2001. A recent search of HANSSENâs personal
vehicle, pursuant to court authorization, disclosed a number of
classified SECRET documents, entries in a personal journal
concerning matters related to the instant investigation, and
items typically used to mark signal sites. It has also been
determined that HANSSEN continues to attempt to ascertain whether
he has become the subject of FBI investigative interest,
including checking FBI records to determine whether there have
been recent entries as to his own name, his home address, or the
signal site.
(g) Over the course of HANSSENâs espionage activities, he
communicated on numerous occasions with KGB/SVR personnel. This
Affidavit cites 27 letters he sent to the KGB/SVR, and it
6
describes 33 packages the KGB/SVR left for HANSSEN at secret
locations, and 22 packages HANSSEN left for the KGB/SVR at secret
locations. The Affidavit also describes two telephone
conversations HANSSEN had with KGB personnel. The Affidavit
describes 26 computer diskettes that HANSSEN passed to the
KGB/SVR, containing additional disclosures of information, and 12
diskettes that the KGB/SVR passed to âBâ. HANSSEN provided the
KGB/SVR more than 6,000 pages of documentary material.
(h) For his services to the KGB/SVR, HANSSEN was paid over
$600,000 in cash and diamonds. In addition, the KGB/SVR placed
funds in escrow in a Moscow bank on HANSSENâs behalf. Some time
in the last two years, the KGB/SVR informed HANSSEN that the
escrowed funds are now worth at least $800,000.
II. KEY TERMS AND ENTITIES
6. The term counterintelligence means information gathered
and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other
intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassination conducted for
or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons.
7. The KGB (
Komitet Gosudarstvenoy Bezopasnosti
, or
Committee for State Security) was the intelligence service of the
former Soviet Union. The KGBâs First Chief Directorate (FCD) was
responsible for foreign intelligence, active measures, and
counterintelligence. KGB FCD intelligence officers assigned to
Soviet diplomatic missions could be assigned to Line KR (Foreign
7
Counterintelligence), Line N (Illegals Operations), Line PR
(Political), or Line X (Science and Technology), among others.
The KGBâs Second Chief Directorate (SCD) was responsible, among
other things, for domestic counterintelligence, that is,
counterintelligence activities within the Soviet Union. The
KGBâs Moscow headquarters was referred to as the Moscow Center.
8. Since December 1991, the SVR (
Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki
Rossii
, or Russian Foreign Intelligence Service) has been the
Russian Federationâs successor agency to the KGBâs foreign
intelligence arm.
9. The GRU (
Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravlenie
, or Chief
Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff) was the military
intelligence agency of the former Soviet Union, and continues to
serve that function for the Russian Federation.
10. The Soviet/Russian Embassy in Washington, D.C., is
located at 1125 16
th
Street, N.W.; the Soviet/Russian Diplomatic
Compound is located at 2650 Wisconsin Avenue, N.W. The KGB/SVR
presence in a Soviet/Russian diplomatic mission is called the
Rezidentura
, headed by the KGB/SVR
Rezident
.
11. An agent-in-place is a person who remains in a position
while acting under the direction of a hostile intelligence
service, so as to obtain current intelligence information. It is
also called a recruitment-in-place.
8
12. An illegal is an intelligence officer or a recruited
agent who operates in a foreign country in the guise of a private
person, and is often present under false identity.
13. A double agent is an agent engaged in clandestine
activity for two or more intelligence services who provides
information about one service to another.
14. A dead drop is a prearranged hidden location used for
the clandestine exchange of packages, messages, and payments,
which avoids the necessity of an intelligence officer and an
agent being present at the same time.
15. A signal site is a prearranged fixed location, usually
in a public place, on which an agent or intelligence officer can
place a predetermined mark in order to alert the other to
operational activity. Such a mark may be made by, for example,
chalk or a piece of tape. The operational activity signaled may
be the fact that a dead drop has been âloadedâ and is ready to be
âcleared.â A call-out signal may be used to trigger a contact
between an agent and an intelligence officer.
16. An accommodation address is a âsafeâ address, not
overtly associated with intelligence activity, used by an agent
to communicate with the intelligence service for whom he working.
17. The FBI has documented the use by the KGB/SVR of
agents-in-place, illegals, double agents, dead drops, signal
sites, call-out signals, and accommodation addresses, including
9
their use in the Northern Virginia area, in the Eastern District
of Virginia.
18. The United States Intelligence Community is the
aggregation of those Executive Branch entities and programs that,
in accordance with applicable United States law and the
provisions of Executive Order 12333, conduct intelligence
activities that are necessary for the conduct of foreign
relations and the protection of the national security of the
United States, and that make up the total national intelligence
effort. It includes the FBIâs National Security Division, the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency
(NSA), the National Reconnaissance Organization (NRO), the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research of the Department of State (DOS/INR), and the
intelligence elements of the military service branches, among
other entities.
19. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), Title
50, United States Code, Sections 1801-1811 and 1821-1829,
provides for electronic surveillance and searches within the
United States directed at persons for whom there is probable
cause to believe they are knowingly engaged in clandestine
intelligence gathering activities for or on behalf of a foreign
power, which activities involve or may involve a violation of the
criminal statutes of the United States, as authorized by the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC).
10
20. Aldrich Hazen Ames is a former CIA officer who in 1994
was arrested and subsequently pled guilty to having committed
espionage as an agent of the KGB and SVR. Ames volunteered to
the KGB in April 1985, and provided information to the KGB and
the SVR until the date of his arrest in February 1994.
21.
Classified information is defined by Executive Order
12958 and its predecessor orders (including E.O. 12356), as
follows: information in any form that (1) is owned by, produced
by or for, or under the control of the United States Government;
(2) falls within one or more of the categories set forth in
Section 1.5 of the Order (including intelligence sources or
methods, cryptology, military plans, and vulnerabilities or
capabilities of systems, installations, projects, or plans
relating to the national security), and (3) is classified by an
original classification authority who determines that its
unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to result in
damage to the national security. Where such unauthorized release
could reasonably result in âseriousâ damage, the information may
be classified as SECRET. Where such damage is âexceptionally
grave,â the information may be classified TOP SECRET. Access to
classified information at any level may be further restricted
through compartmentation in SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION
(SCI) categories. Dissemination of classified information at any
level may also be restricted through caveats such as: NOFORN (Not
Releasable to Foreign Nationals), NOCONTRACT (Not Releasable to
11
Contractors or Contractor/Consultants), WNINTEL (Warning Notice:
Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved), and ORCON
(Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by
Originator).
III. BACKGROUND OF ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN
22. ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN was born on April 18, 1944, in
Chicago, Illinois, where he was raised. He is a United States
citizen.
23. HANSSEN received an AB degree in Chemistry from Knox
College, in Illinois, in 1966. He studied dentistry at
Northwestern University, in Chicago, Illinois, from 1966 to 1968,
and received an MBA degree in Accounting and Information Systems
from Northwestern University in 1971. He became a Certified
Public Accountant in 1973.
24. From 1971 to 1972, HANSSEN was employed as a junior
accountant at an accounting firm in Chicago, Illinois. In 1972,
HANSSEN joined the Chicago Police Department as an investigator
in the Financial Section of the Inspection Services Division.
25. HANSSEN studied the Russian language during college.
A. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION EMPLOYMENT AND DUTIES
26. On January 12, 1976, HANSSEN entered on duty as a
Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He has
served as an FBI Special Agent continuously since that date.
27. After initial training, HANSSEN was assigned to the FBI
Field Office in Indianapolis, Indiana, and served on a White
12
Collar Crime squad at the Resident Agency in Gary, Indiana, until
August 1, 1978.
28. From August 2, 1978 to January 10, 1981, HANSSEN was
assigned to the FBI Field Office in New York, New York, initially
working on accounting matters in the Field Officeâs criminal
division.
29. In March 1979, HANSSEN was detailed to the New York
Field Officeâs intelligence division to help establish the FBIâs
automated counterintelligence data base in that office. At that
time, this was a new automated database of information about
foreign officials, including intelligence officers, assigned to
the United States. Its contents were classified up to the SECRET
level.
30. From January 12, 1981, to September 22, 1985, HANSSEN
was assigned to FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C., as a
Supervisory Special Agent in the Intelligence Division. From
January 1981 to August 1983, HANSSEN was assigned to the Budget
Unit, which managed the FBIâs portion of the United States
Intelligence Communityâs National Foreign Intelligence Program,
and prepared budget justifications to Congress. This office had
access to the full range of information concerning intelligence
and counterintelligence activities involving FBI resources. From
August 1983 until September 1985, HANSSEN was assigned to the
Soviet Analytical Unit, which supported FBI FCI operations and
investigations involving Soviet intelligence services, and
13
provided analytical support to senior FBI management and the
Intelligence Community.
While at FBI Headquarters, HANSSEN was assigned to the
intelligence component of a particular highly-compartmented
classified United States Government program. He also served on
the FBIâs FCI Technical Committee, which was responsible for
coordinating technical projects relating to FCI operations.
31. From September 23, 1985, to August 2, 1987, HANSSEN was
assigned to the intelligence division of the FBI Field Office in
New York, New York, as supervisor of an FCI squad.
32. From August 3, 1987, to June 24, 1990, HANSSEN was
reassigned to FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C., where he
again served as a Supervisory Special Agent in the Intelligence
Divisionâs Soviet Analytical Unit.
33. From June 25, 1990, to June 30, 1991, HANSSEN was
assigned to the FBI Headquarterâs Inspections Staff as an
Inspectorâs Aide. In this assignment he traveled to FBI Field
Offices, Resident Agencies, and FBI Legal AttachĂŠ offices in
United States Embassies abroad.
34. On July 1, 1991, HANSSEN returned to the Intelligence
Division at FBI Headquarters, where he served for six months in
the Soviet Operations Section as a program manager in the unit
responsible for countering efforts by the Soviets (and
particularly the KGBâs Line X) to acquire United States
scientific and technical intelligence.
14
35. From January 6, 1992, to April 11, 1994, HANSSEN served
as Chief of the National Security Threat List (NSTL) Unit in the
Intelligence Division (renamed the National Security Division, or
NSD, in 1993) at FBI Headquarters. There he focused the Unitâs
efforts on economic espionage.
36. In April 1994, HANSSEN was temporarily assigned to the
FBIâs Washington Metropolitan Field Office (now called Washington
Field Office).
37. In December 1994, HANSSEN was reassigned to FBI
Headquarters, in the Office of the Assistant Director for NSD.
38. From February 12, 1995, to January 12, 2001, HANSSEN
was detailed to serve as the FBIâs senior representative to the
Office of Foreign Missions of the United States Department of
State (DOS/OFM). In that position he functioned as the head of
an interagency counterintelligence group within DOS/OFM, and as
FBIâs liaison to the State Departmentâs Bureau of Intelligence
and Research (DOS/INR). His office was in an area designated
Suites 106, 107 and 108 of Room 2510C of the State Department
building at 2201 C Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.
39. Effective January 13, 2001, HANSSEN was assigned to a
newly-created position in the Information Resources Division, at
FBI Headquarters, in order that the FBI could more effectively
monitor his daily activities without alerting him to the ongoing
investigation of his activities. His current office is Room 9930
15
of FBI Headquarters, 935 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington,
D.C.
40. At no time during his employment with the FBI was
HANSSEN ever authorized, directly or indirectly, to deliver,
communicate, or transmit the classified information and documents
described in this Affidavit to agents, officers, or employees of
the KGB, SVR, or any other hostile foreign intelligence service.
B. OATHS OF OFFICE
41. On January 12, 1976, upon entering service with the
FBI, HANSSEN signed an Oath of Office in which he swore that:
I will support and defend the Constitution of the
United States against all enemies, foreign and
domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to
the same; that I take this obligation freely, without
any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that
I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the
office on which I am about to enter. So help me God.
42. On January 12, 1976, HANSSEN also signed the FBI Pledge
for Law Enforcement Officers, in which he pledged, in part, as
follows:
Humbly recognizing the responsibilities entrusted to
me, . . . . I accept the obligation in connection with
my assignments to . . . consider the information,
coming into my knowledge by virtue of my position as a
sacred trust, to be used solely for official purposes.
. . . In the performance of my duties and assignments,
I shall not engage in unlawful and unethical practices
. . . . While occupying the status of a law enforcement
officer or at any other time subsequent thereto, I
shall not seek to benefit personally because of my
knowledge of any confidential matter which has come to
my attention. I am aware of the serious
responsibilities of my office and in the performance of
my duties . . . I shall wage vigorous warfare against
the enemies of my country, of its laws, and of its
16
principles; . . . I shall always be loyal to my duty,
my organization, and my country.
43. On January 12, 1976, HANSSEN also signed an Employment
Agreement in which he stated, in part:
I hereby declare that I intend to be governed by and I
will comply with the following provisions:
(1) That I am hereby advised and I understand that
Federal law such as Title 18, United States Code,
Sections 793, 794, and 798; Order of the President of
the United States (Executive Order 11652); and
regulations issued by the Attorney General of the
United States (28 Code of Federal Regulations, Sections
16.21 through 16.26) prohibit loss, misuse, or
unauthorized disclosure or production of national
security information, other classified information and
other nonclassified information in the files of the
FBI;
(2) I understand that unauthorized disclosure of
information in the files of the FBI or information I
may acquire as an employee of the FBI could result in
impairment of national security, place human life in
jeopardy, or result in the denial of due process to a
person or persons who are subjects of an FBI
investigation, or prevent the FBI from effectively
discharging its responsibilities. I understand the
need for this secrecy agreement; therefore, as
consideration for employment I agree that I will never
divulge, publish, or reveal either by word or conduct,
or by other means disclose to any unauthorized
recipient without official written authorization by the
Director of the FBI or his delegate, any information
from the investigatory files of the FBI or any
information relating to material contained in the
files, or disclose any information or produce any
material acquired as part of the performance of my
official duties or because of my official status. . . .
(4) That I understand unauthorized disclosure may
be a violation of Federal law and prosecuted as a
criminal offense and in addition to this agreement may
be enforced by means of an injunction or other civil
remedy.
17
C. SECURITY CLEARANCES AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
44. HANSSEN received his initial TOP SECRET security
clearance on January 12, 1976, and has held various SCI accesses
since his initial SCI indoctrination on June 23, 1980.
45. On June 23, 1980, HANSSEN signed a Nondisclosure
Agreement for Sensitive Compartmented Information, in which he
acknowledged receiving a security indoctrination for a particular
SCI program, and further acknowledged, among other things:
3. I have been advised that direct or indirect
unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized retention, or
negligent handling of the designated Sensitive
Compartmented Information by me could cause irreparable
injury to the United States, and be used to advantage
by a foreign nation. . . .
4. In consideration of being granted access to
the designated Sensitive Compartmented Information, I
pledge that I will never divulge such information, in
any form or any manner, to anyone who is not authorized
to receive it, without prior written authorization from
an appropriate official of the United States
Government.
5. I have been advised that any unauthorized
disclosure of the designated Sensitive Compartmented
Information by me may be a substantial violation of
this agreement, and may result in the termination of my
employment. In addition, I have been advised that any
such unauthorized disclosure by me may constitute
violations of United States civil or criminal laws,
including, as to the latter, the provisions of Sections
793, 794, and 798, Title 18, United States Code, and of
Section 783, Title 50, United States Code. . . . I
acknowledge that the briefing officer has made
available Sections 793, 794, 798, and 1001 of Title 18,
United States Code, Section 783 of Title 50, United
States Code, Executive Order 12065, as amended and the
Information Security Oversight Office Directive of 2
October 1978, as amended, which implements this
Executive Order, so that I may read them at any time,
if I so choose. . . .
18
I make this agreement without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion.
HANSSEN signed further iterations of this SCI Nondisclosure
Agreement, in order to have access to additional SCI program
information, on the following dates: October 1, 1981; March 1,
1982; September 9, 1983; April 10, 1985; and May 31, 1991.
46. On October 15, 1984, HANSSEN signed a Classified
Information Nondisclosure Agreement in which he stated, in part:
1. Intending to be legally bound, I hereby accept
the obligations contained in this Agreement in
consideration of my being granted access to classified
information. . . .
2. I hereby acknowledge that I have received a
security indoctrination concerning the nature and
protection of classified information . . . .
3. I have been advised and am aware that direct
or indirect unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized
retention, or negligent handling of classified
information by me could cause irreparable injury to the
United States or could be used to advantage by a
foreign nation. I hereby agree that I will never
divulge such information unless I have officially
verified that the recipient has been properly
authorized by the United States Government to receive
it or I have been given prior written notice of
authorization from the United States Government
Department or Agency . . . last granting me a security
clearance that such disclosure is permitted. I further
understand that I am obligated to comply with laws and
regulations that prohibit the unauthorized disclosure
of classified information.
4. . . . I have been advised and am aware that
any unauthorized disclosure of classified information
by me may constitute a violation or violations of
United States criminal laws, including the provisions
of Sections 641, 793, 794, 798, and 952, Title 18,
United States Code, the provisions of Section 783(b),
Title 50, United States Code, and the provisions of the
Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982. I
19
recognize that nothing in this Agreement constitutes a
waiver by the United States of the right to prosecute
me for any statutory violation. . . .
10. I have read this Agreement carefully and my
questions, if any, have been answered to my
satisfaction. I acknowledge that the briefing officer
has made available to me Sections 641, 793, 794, 798,
and 952 of Title 18, United States Code, Section 783(b)
of Title 50, United States Code, the Intelligence
Identities Protection Act of 1982, and Executive Order
12356, so that I may read them at this time, if I so
choose.
D. RESIDENCES
47. From 1981 until 1985, HANSSEN owned a house and resided
with his family on Whitecedar Court in Vienna, Virginia.
48. In approximately August 1987, after returning from his
tour of duty in New York City, HANSSEN purchased a residence at
9414 Talisman Drive in Vienna, Virginia, where he and his family
have lived continuously since.
IV. BASIS FOR THE INFORMATION IN THIS AFFIDAVIT
49.
This Affidavit is based on numerous different types and
sources of information, including the following:
A. Letters and other forms of communications from âBâ to
the KGB/SVR, and from the KGB/SVR to âBâ;
B. A recording of a telephone conversation between âBâ and
a KGB/SVR officer;
C. Computer media, including hard drives and storage
devices;
D. The actual plastic material that constituted the inner
wrapping of a package that âBâ passed to the KGB/SVR;
20
E. Information provided by former KGB/SVR personnel;
F. Records of the FBI, the CIA, and other agencies of the
United States Intelligence Community;
G. The contents of an actual package that the KGB/SVR
passed to âBâ;
H. Forensic testing and examination;
I. Interviews;
J. Physical searches and electronic surveillance conducted
by the FBI pursuant to FISC authority;
K. Public records;
L. Other law enforcement and intelligence techniques,
sources and methods; and
M. KGB/SVR operational and production files.
V. THE KGBâs âBâ OPERATION
50.
The sources of information described in the foregoing
section have established the following regarding âBâ:
51. On or about October 4, 1985, a KGB Line PR officer in
Washington, D.C., named Viktor M. Degtyar, received an envelope
by mail, at his residence in Alexandria, Virginia, in the Eastern
District of Virginia. The envelope was postmarked âPrince
Georgeâs Co, MDâ on October 1, 1985. Inside was an inner
envelope, marked: âDO NOT OPEN. TAKE THIS ENVELOPE UNOPENED TO
VICTOR I. CHERKASHIN.â At that time, Viktor Ivanovich Cherkashin
was the Line KR Chief at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C.
Inside the inner envelope was an unsigned typed letter from the
21
person whom the KGB came to call âB.â The letter read in part as
follows:
DEAR MR. CHERKASHIN:
SOON, I WILL SEND A BOX OF DOCUMENTS TO MR.
DEGTYAR. THEY ARE FROM CERTAIN OF THE MOST SENSITIVE
AND HIGHLY COMPARTMENTED PROJECTS OF THE U.S.
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. ALL ARE ORIGINALS TO AID IN
VERIFYING THEIR AUTHENTICITY. PLEASE RECOGNIZE FOR OUR
LONG-TERM INTERESTS THAT THERE ARE A LIMITED NUMBER OF
PERSONS WITH THIS ARRAY OF CLEARANCES. AS A COLLECTION
THEY POINT TO ME. I TRUST THAT AN OFFICER OF YOUR
EXPERIENCE WILL HANDLE THEM APPROPRIATELY. I BELIEVE
THEY ARE SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY A $100,000 PAYMENT TO
ME.
I MUST WARN OF CERTAIN RISKS TO MY SECURITY OF
WHICH YOU MAY NOT BE AWARE. YOUR SERVICE HAS RECENTLY
SUFFERED SOME SETBACKS. I WARN THAT MR. BORIS YUZHIN
(LINE PR, SF), MR. SERGEY MOTORIN, (LINE PR, WASH.) AND
MR. VALERIY MARTYNOV (LINE X, WASH.) HAVE BEEN
RECRUITED BY OUR âSPECIAL SERVICES.â
âBâ proceeded to describe in detail a particular highly sensitive
and classified information collection technique. In addition,
âTO FURTHER SUPPORT MY BONA FIDESâ he provided specific closely-
held items of information regarding then-recent Soviet defectors.
âBâ added:
DETAILS REGARDING PAYMENT AND FUTURE CONTACT WILL
BE SENT TO YOU PERSONALLY. . . . MY IDENTITY AND ACTUAL
POSITION IN THE COMMUNITY MUST BE LEFT UNSTATED TO
ENSURE MY SECURITY. I AM OPEN TO COMMO SUGGESTIONS BUT
WANT NO SPECIALIZED TRADECRAFT. I WILL ADD 6, (YOU
SUBTRACT 6) FROM STATED MONTHS, DAYS AND TIMES IN BOTH
DIRECTIONS OF OUR FUTURE COMMUNICATIONS.
The information concerning the FBIâs recruitment of Yuzhin,
Motorin, and Martynov was classified at least at the SECRET
level, as was the defector information. The sensitive
22
information collection technique described above was classified
at the TOP SECRET level.
52. Valeriy Fedorovich Martynov was a KGB Line X officer
assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., from October
1980 to November 1985. In April 1982, the FBI recruited Martynov
to serve as an agent-in-place, and he was debriefed jointly by
the FBI and the CIA. Martynov was compromised to the KGB by Ames
in June 1985 and by âBâ in October 1985, as described above.
Based in part on the information provided by âBâ, the KGB
directed Martynov to return to Moscow in November 1985,
ostensibly to accompany KGB officer Vitaliy Yurchenko, who was
returning to the Soviet Union after his August 1985 defection to
the United States. Upon arriving in Moscow on or about November
7, 1985, Martynov was arrested, and he was subsequently tried on
espionage charges. Martynov was convicted and executed.
53. Sergey Mikhailovich Motorin was a KGB Line PR officer
assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Washington D.C., from June 1980
to January 1985. In January 1983, the FBI recruited Motorin to
serve as an agent-in-place, and he was debriefed by the FBI.
Motorin returned to Moscow at the end of his tour of duty in
January 1985. Motorin, like Martynov, was compromised to the KGB
by Ames in June 1985 and by âBâ in October 1985, as described
above. Based in part on the information âBâ gave the KGB,
Motorin was arrested in November or December 1985, tried and
23
convicted on espionage charges during the period of October-
November 1986, and executed in February 1987.
54. Boris Nikolayevich Yuzhin was a KGB Line PR officer
assigned to San Francisco under cover as a student from 1975 to
1976, and then as a TASS correspondent from 1978 to 1982. The
FBI recruited him to serve as an agent-in-place, and debriefed
him. After returning to the Soviet Union, Yuzhin became the
subject of an internal KGB investigation. Yuzhin was compromised
to the KGB by Ames in June 1985 and by âBâ in October 1985.
Based in part on the information âBâ gave the KGB, Yuzhin was
arrested in December 1986, convicted of espionage, and sentenced
to serve 15 years in prison. In 1992, he was released under a
general grant of amnesty to political prisoners, and subsequently
emigrated to the United States.
55. On or about October 15, 1985, Degtyar received by mail,
at his residence in Alexandria, Virginia, in the Eastern District
of Virginia, a package from âBâ containing a large number of
classified documents, including some original documents, of the
United States Intelligence Community.
56. At 8:35 am on October 16, 1985, FBI surveillance
personnel observed Degtyar arriving at the Soviet Embassy
carrying a large black canvas bag which he did not typically
carry.
57. Thereafter, Degtyar received by mail, at his residence
in Alexandria, Virginia, in the Eastern District of Virginia, a
24
typed message from âB,â in an envelope bearing a handwritten
address and postmarked âNew York, NYâ on October 24, 1985. The
message included the following text:
DROP LOCATION
Please leave your package for me under the corner
(nearest the street) of the wooden foot bridge
located just west of the entrance to Nottoway
Park. (ADC Northern Virginia Street Map, #14, D3)
PACKAGE PREPARATION
Use a green or brown plastic trash bag and trash
to cover a waterproofed package.
SIGNAL LOCATION
Signal site will be the pictorial âpedestrian-
crossingâ signpost just west of the main Nottoway
Park entrance on Old Courthouse Road. (The sign
is the one nearest the bridge just mentioned.)
SIGNALS
My signal to you: One vertical mark of white
adhesive tape meaning I am ready to receive your
package.
Your signal to me: One horizontal mark of white
adhesive tape meaning drop filled.
My signal to you: One vertical mark of white
adhesive tape meaning I have received your
package.
(Remove old tape before leaving signal.)
The message established a date and times for the signals and
drops, and concluded: âI will acknowledge amount with my next
package.â
25
The KGB designated this dead drop site by the codename
âPARKâ. It is located in Fairfax County, Virginia, in the
Eastern District of Virginia.
58. On Saturday, November 2, 1985, the KGB loaded the
âPARKâ dead drop site with $50,000 in cash and a message
proposing procedures for future contacts with âBâ.
59. On or about November 8, 1985, Degtyar and Cherkashin
received a typed letter from âBâ, which read in part as follows:
26
Thank you for the 50,000.
I also appreciate your courage and perseverance in
the face of generically reported bureaucratic
obstacles. I would not have contacted you if it were
not reported that you were held in esteem within your
organization, an organization I have studied for years.
I did expect some communication plan in your response.
I viewed the postal delivery as a necessary risk and do
not wish to trust again that channel with valuable
material. I did this only because I had to so you
would take my offer seriously, that there be no
misunderstanding as to my long-term value, and to
obtain appropriate security for our relationship from
the start.
âBâ then rejected the contact plans proposed by the KGB, and
suggested a particular communications scheme based on âa
microcomputer âbulletin boardââ at a designated location, with
âappropriate encryption.â Meanwhile, he wrote: âLet us use the
same site again. Same timing. Same signals.â âBâ proposed that
the next dead drop occur on âSeptember 9" which, according to the
â6" coefficient that he established with the KGB in his first
letter, actually meant that the dead drop operation would take
place on March 3, 1986.
âBâ also wrote:
As far as the funds are concerned, I have little
need or utility for more than the 100,000. It merely
provides a difficulty since I can not spend it, store
it or invest it easily without triping [sic] âdrug
moneyâ warning bells. Perhaps some diamonds as
security to my children and some good will so that when
the time comes, you will accept by [sic] senior
services as a guest lecturer. Eventually, I would
appreciate an escape plan. (Nothing lasts forever.)
27
Referring to Yuzhin, Motorin, and Martynov, whom he had
identified in his first letter as United States intelligence
recruitments, âBâ wrote:
I can not provide documentary substantiating
evidence without arousing suspicion at this time.
Never-the-less, it is from my own knowledge as a member
of the community effort to capitalize on the
information from which I speak. I have seen video
tapes of debriefings and physically saw the last,
though we were not introduced. The names were provided
to me as part of my duties as one of the few who needed
to know. You have some avenues of inquiry.
Substantial funds were provided in excess of what could
have been skimmed from their agents. The active one
has always (in the past) used a concealment device -- a
bag with bank notes sewn in the base during home
leaves.
In conclusion, âBâ warned of a ânew techniqueâ used by NSA, which
he described.
60. On March 3, 1986, the KGB loaded dead drop site âPARKâ,
but âBâ did not appear and the KGB removed its package from the
dead drop site the same day.
61. On or about June 30, 1986, Degtyar received a typed
letter from âBâ at his residence in Alexandria, Virginia, in the
Eastern District of Virginia. The letter read in part as
follows:
I apologize for the delay since our break in
communications. I wanted to determine if there was any
cause for concern over security. I have only seen one
item which has given me pause. When the FBI was first
given access to Victor Petrovich Gundarev, they asked
. . . if Gundarev knew Viktor Cherkashin. I thought
this unusual. I had seen no report indicating that
Viktor Cherkashin was handling an important agent, and
here-to-fore he was looked at with the usual lethargy
awarded Line Chiefs. The question came to mind, are
28
they somehow able to monitor funds, ie., to know that
Viktor Cherkashin received a large amount of money for
an agent? I am unaware of any such ability, but I
might not know that type of source reporting.
âBâ then described a United States Intelligence Community
technical surveillance technique. He concluded:
If you wish to continue our discussions, please
have someone run an advertisement in the Washington
Times during the week of 1/12/87 or 1/19/87, for sale,
âDodge Diplomat, 1971, needs engine work, $1000.â Give
a phone number and time-of-day in the advertisement
where I can call. I will call and leave a phone number
where a recorded message can be left for me in one
hour. I will say, âHello, my name is Ramon. I am
calling about the car you offered for sale in the
Times.â You will respond, âIâm sorry, but the man with
the car is not here, can I get your number.â The
number will be in Area Code 212. I will not specify
that Area Code on the line.
âBâ signed the letter: âRamonâ.
According to the established â6" coefficient, the weeks the
advertisement was actually to run were July 6, 1986, or July 13,
1986.
62. Viktor Gundarev was a KGB Line KR officer who defected
to the United States on February 14, 1986. A classified FBI
debriefing report, dated March 4, 1986, reports that FBI
debriefers showed Gundarev a photo of Cherkashin and asked if he
knew Cherkashin.
63. The following advertisement appeared in the Washington
Times from July 14, 1986, to July 18, 1986:
DODGE - â71, DIPLOMAT, NEEDS ENGINE WORK, $1000. Phone
(703) 451-9780 (CALL NEXT Mon., Wed., Fri. 1 p.m.)
29
64. The number 703/451-9780 at that time belonged to a
public telephone located in the vicinity of the Old Keene Mill
Shopping Center, in Fairfax County, Virginia, in the Eastern
District of Virginia. On Monday, July 21, 1986, âBâ called that
number and gave the number 628-8047. The call was taken by
Aleksandr Kirillovich Fefelov, a KGB officer assigned to the
Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C.
65. One hour later, Fefelov telephoned 212/628-8047 and
told âBâ that the KGB had loaded the âPARKâ dead drop site. The
KGB mistakenly placed the package under the wrong corner of the
wooden footbridge at the âPARKâ site.
66. On or about August 7, 1986, Degtyar received a letter
from âBâ stating that he had not found the package at the dead
drop site, and indicating that he would phone 703/451-9780 on
August 18, 20, or 22. The KGB then retrieved its package from
the âPARKâ dead drop site.
67. On Monday, August 18, 1986, âBâ telephoned 703/451-
9780, and spoke with Fefelov. The latter portion of the
conversation was recorded as follows: ([UI] = unintelligible)
âBâ:
Tomorrow morning?
FEFELOV:
Uh, yeah, and the car is still available for you
and as we have agreed last time, I prepared all
the papers and I left them on the same table. You
didnât find them because I put them in another
corner of the table.
âBâ:
I see.
30
FEFELOV:
You shouldnât worry, everything is okay. The
papers are with me now.
âBâ:
Good.
FEFELOV:
I believe under these circumstances, mmmm, itâs
not necessary to make any changes concerning the
place and the time. Our company is reliable, and
we are ready to give you a substantial discount
which will be enclosed in the papers. Now, about
the date of our meeting. I suggest that our
meeting will be, will take place without delay on
February thirteenth, one three, one p.m. Okay?
February thirteenth.
âBâ:
[UI] February second?
FEFELOV:
Thirteenth. One three.
âBâ:
One three.
FEFELOV:
Yes. Thirteenth. One p.m.
âBâ:
Let me see if I can do that. Hold on.
FEFELOV:
Okay. Yeah.
[pause]
âBâ:
[whispering] [UI]
FEFELOV:
Hello? Okay.
[pause]
âBâ:
[whispering] Six . . . . Six . . . .
[pause]
âBâ:
That should be fine.
FEFELOV:
Okay. We will confirm you, that the papers are
waiting for you with the same horizontal tape in
the same place as we did it at the first time.
âBâ:
Very good.
31
FEFELOV:
You see. After you receive the papers, you will
send the letter confirming it and signing it, as
usual. Okay?
âBâ:
Excellent.
FEFELOV:
I hope you remember the address. Is . . . if
everything is okay?
âBâ:
I believe it should be fine and thank you very
much.
FEFELOV:
Heh-heh. Not at all. Not at all. Nice job. For
both of us. Uh, have a nice evening, sir.
âBâ:
Do svidaniya.
FEFELOV:
Bye-bye.
According to the established â6" coefficient, the operation
discussed in this conversation was actually scheduled to occur on
August 19, 1986, at 7:00 am.
The KGB then loaded the âPARKâ dead drop site with $10,000
in cash, as well as: proposals for two additional dead drop sites
to be used by âBâ and the KGB; a new accommodation address
codenamed âNANCYâ; and emergency communications plans for âBâ to
personally contact KGB personnel in Vienna, Austria. The âNANCYâ
address was the residence of KGB Line PR officer Boris M.
Malakhov in Alexandria, Virginia, in the Eastern District of
Virginia, who was to become Degtyarâs replacement as the Soviet
Embassy press secretary. âBâ was instructed to mis-spell
Malakhovâs name as âMalkow.â âBâ subsequently cleared the dead
drop.
32
68. Thereafter, Degtyar received an envelope at his
residence in Alexandria, Virginia, in the Eastern District of
Virginia. The envelope bore a handwritten address and return
address: âRamon Garcia, 125 Main St, Falls Church VA.â It was
postmarked from âNO VA MSC 22081" on August 19, 1986. MSC
designates the Merrifield Service Center, located in the Eastern
District of Virginia. Inside the envelope was a handwritten
note: âRECEIVED $10,000. RAMON.â
69. On or about September 11, 1987, Malakhov received an
envelope at his residence in the Eastern District of Virginia.
The envelope bore a handwritten address to âB.N. MALKOWâ at the
âNANCYâ address, and a handwritten return address of âR. GARCIA,
125 MAIN ST, ALEXANDRIA, VAâ, and was postmarked September 8,
1987. Inside was the following typed letter:
Dear Friends:
No, I have decided. It must be on my
original terms or not at all. I will not
meet abroad or here. I will not maintain
lists of sites or modified equipment. I will
help you when I can, and in time we will
develop methods of efficient communication.
Unless a [sic] see an abort signal on our
post from you by 3/16, I will mail my contact
a valuable package timed to arrive on 3/18.
I will await your signal and package to be in
place before 1:00 pm on 3/22 or alternately
the following three weeks, same day and time.
If my terms are unacceptable then place no
signals and withdraw my contact. Excellent
work by him has ensured this channel is
secure for now. My regards to him and to the
33
professional way you have handled this
matter.
sincerely,
Ramon
According to the established â6â coefficient, the dates
referred to in this letter were actually September 10, 12, and
16.
70. On Monday, September 14, 1987, the KGB received in the
mail a package of documents including TOP SECRET National
Security Council documents.
71. On Tuesday, September 15, 1987, the KGB loaded the
âPARKâ dead drop site with $10,000 cash. The KGB also proposed
two additional dead drop sites, one codenamed âANâ located in
Ellanor C. Lawrence Park in Western Fairfax County, in the
Eastern District of Virginia, and another codenamed âDENâ at a
different location farther away. The KGB proposed that âBâ load
the dead drop at âPARKâ or âANâ on September 26, 1987, and that
the KGB respond by loading âDENâ.
72. On Wednesday, September 16, 1987, the KGB determined
that âBâ had cleared the âPARKâ dead drop and removed the signal.
73. On September 26, 1987, the KGB recovered from the
âPARKâ dead drop site a package from âBâ. The package contained
a handwritten letter reading as follows:
My Friends:
Thank you for the $10,000.
I am not a young man, and the commitments on my
time prevent using distant drops such as you suggest.
I know in this I am moving you out of your set modes of
34
doing business, but my experience tells me the [sic] we
can be actually more secure in easier modes.
âBâ then suggested an exchange procedure involving a parked car
instead of a dead drop site, and a related communications
procedure, but stated: âIf you cannot do this I will clear this
once âANâ on your scheduled date (rather than the other).â He
then asked the KGB to âFind a comfortable Vienna VA signal site
to call me to an exchange any following Monday.â He closed the
letter, âGood luck with your workâ, and signed it âRamon.â
The package also contained a document which the KGB
described as having the title which roughly translates into
English as: âNational Intelligence Program for 87".
74. Thereafter, the KGB proposed to âBâ a signal site in
Vienna, Virginia, in the Eastern District of Virginia, on the
post of a stop sign on the shoulder of Courthouse Road near its
junction with Locust Street. This signal site was referred to as
âVâ.
75. On September 29, 1987, the KGB deposited $100,000 into
an escrow account established for âBâ in a Soviet bank in Moscow.
76. On November 10, 1987, Malakhov received a letter from
âBâ at his residence in the Eastern District of Virginia. The
envelope bore a return address of âJ. Bakerâ in âChicagoâ and was
postmarked on November 7, 1987. In the letter, âBâ advised that
Saturday for âANâ was not suitable, and he postponed the
operation for two days, until Monday, November 16. He advised
35
that he had an urgent package for the KGB, and asked the KGB to
place a signal confirming receipt of the letter. That same day,
the KGB placed a signal at the âPARKâ signal site.
Thereafter, whenever âBâ used the word âChicagoâ in a return
address, it was to signal that he intended for a dead drop
exchange to occur the following Monday.
77. On Sunday, November 15, 1987, the KGB loaded the âANâ
dead drop site with a package. It was not cleared by âBâ and, on
November 17, the KGB removed the package.
78. On Thursday, November 19, 1987, the KGB received a
handwritten letter from âBâ. The envelope bore a return address
of âG. Robertsonâ in âHoustonâ and was postmarked on November 17,
1987. The letter read as follows:
Unable to locate AN based on your description at night.
Recognize that I am dressed in business suit and can
not slog around in inch deep mud. I suggest we use
once again original site. I will place my urgent
material there at next AN times. Replace it with your
package. I will select some few sites good for me and
pass them to you. Please give new constant conditions
of recontact as address to write. Will not put
substantive material through it. Only instructions as
usual format.
Ramon
79. On Monday, November 23, 1987, âBâ and the KGB carried
out an exchange operation at the âPARKâ dead drop site.
The package from âBâ to the KGB contained: a cable-type
report about a meeting in October 1987 with a valuable source,
whom the KGB referred to as âMâ; a survey of information provided
36
by Vitaliy Yurchenko; and an official technical document
describing COINS-II.
In 1987, COINS-II was the then-current version of the United
States Intelligence Communityâs âCommunity On-Line Intelligence
System,â which constituted a classified Community-wide intranet.
The package from the KGB to âBâ contained $20,000 cash and a
letter conveying âregardsâ from the KGB Director and advising
that $100,000 had been deposited in a bank at 6-7% interest. The
letter also asked âBâ for a variety of specific classified
information. The KGB gave âBâ two new accommodation addresses
and asked âBâ to propose new dead drop sites.
80. On February 4, 1988, the KGB received a note from âBâ
at one of the new accommodation addresses it had given to âBâ in
the November 23, 1987, dead drop. The address was the residence
of a Soviet diplomatic official known to the FBI as a KGB co-
optee, located in the Eastern of Virginia. The note read simply:
âOKâ. It was in an envelope bearing a return address of âJim
Bakerâ in âLangleyâ and postmarked in Washington, D.C., on
February 3, 1988.
81. On Monday, February 8, 1988, âBâ and the KGB carried
out an exchange operation at the âPARKâ dead drop site in
Nottoway Park, which the KGB had now renamed âPRIMEâ.
The package from âBâ to the KGB contained a typed, unsigned
letter. In the letter, âBâ acknowledged receipt of $20,000 and
identified two additional drop sites. He then went on to provide
37
detailed information concerning a Soviet defector, and advised
the KGB that he had arranged time to review the defectorâs file.
âA full report will follow as soon as possible.â He then
disclosed to the KGB certain specific information concerning the
United States Intelligence Communityâs communication intelligence
capabilities.
Enclosed with the letter was the first computer diskette âBâ
passed to the KGB. Also in the package from âBâ were classified
documents.
The package from the KGB to âBâ contained $25,000 cash, and
a letter conveying thanks of the KGB Chairman, Vladimir
Kryuchkov, for the information about the valuable source âMâ.
The KGB also asked âBâ for more information about âMâ and the
âagent networkâ in New York City, and about a particular KGB
officer.
On the next day, February 9, 1988, the KGB observed that the
signal at âPARK/PRIMEâ had been removed, indicating that âBâ had
cleared the dead drop.
82. On March 16, 1988, the KGB received a second computer
diskette from âBâ at an accommodation address in the Eastern
District of Virginia. The envelope bore a return address of âJim
Bakerâ in âChicagoâ and was postmarked in Washington, D.C., on
March 15, 1988.
83. On March 17, 1988, the KGB received a letter from âBâ
at an accommodation address in the Eastern District of Virginia.
38
The envelope bore a return address of âJim Bakerâ in âChicagoâ
and was postmarked in Northern Virginia on March 16, 1988. In
the letter, âBâ instructed the KGB to use the âPARK/PRIMEâ dead
drop site until the KGB approved the other sites.
84. On Monday, March 21, 1988, the KGB observed a signal
from âBâ at the âPARK/PRIMEâ site, but was unable to check the
dead drop site because strangers were present in the park.
85. On March 26, 1988, the KGB received a third computer
diskette from âBâ at an accommodation address in the Eastern
District of Virginia. The envelope bore a return address of âJim
Bakerâ in âChicagoâ and was postmarked in Washington, D.C., on
March 24, 1988. The KGB found no text on the diskette, which it
referred to as âD-3".
86. On Monday, March 28, 1988, âBâ and the KGB carried out
an exchange operation at the âPARK/PRIMEâ dead drop site.
The package from âBâ to the KGB included his fourth computer
diskette (âD-4â), a TOP SECRET document entitled âThe FBIâs
Double Agent Programâ and a document that the KGB described as a
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) document entitled âStealth
Orientation.â
The package from the KGB to âBâ included $25,000 cash and a
letter explaining why the KGB had not been able to check the
âPARK/PRIMEâ dead drop site on March 21. In the letter, the KGB
also advised it had been unable to read the diskettes âBâ had
passed to the KGB. The KGB asked âBâ for information about codes
39
and cryptograms, intelligence support for the Strategic Defense
Initiative, submarines, and other classified material.
The next day, the KGB observed that âBâ had removed the
signal from the âPARK/PRIMEâ site, indicating he had removed the
package.
87. On April 4, 1988, the KGB received an envelope from âBâ
at an accommodation address in the Eastern District of Virginia.
The envelope bore a return address of âJim Bakerâ in âAlexandriaâ
and was postmarked in Northern Virginia, on March 31, 1988. The
envelope contained a note from âBâ reading: âuse 40 TRACK MODE,
this letter is not a signal.â
The term âuse 40-track modeâ refers to a technical process
for re-formatting a computer diskette in order to conceal data by
putting the data onto specific tracks on the diskette. Unless a
person uses the correct codes to decrypt such a diskette, the
diskette would appear to be blank.
88. On April 6, 1988, the KGB received a package from âBâ
at an accommodation address in the Eastern District of Virginia.
The envelope bore a return address of âJim Bakerâ in âFairfaxâ
and a postmark of âMSC NO VAâ (Merrifield Service Center,
Northern Virginia, in the Eastern District of Virginia) on April
5. The package contained a fifth diskette (âD-5â). On the
diskette, âBâ provided what the KGB characterized as âeverythingâ
about a particular KGB officer, additional information about a
KGB defector named Victor Sheymov, and information about two
40
specific Soviet FBI recruitments. âBâ also explained why the KGB
had been unable to read his diskettes. âBâ also asked the KGB
for diamonds. The KGB subsequently purchased several diamonds
for use in the âBâ operation.
89. On May 24, 1988, the KGB received a letter from âBâ at
an accommodation address in the District of Columbia. The
envelope bore a return address of âJim Bakerâ in âChicagoâ and
was postmarked in âMSC NO VAâ on May 17, 1988. With the letter
was âBââs sixth diskette (âD-6â), which contained information
about a number of matters. The diskette also contained
information about a specific recent FBI Soviet recruitment
operation.
90. On Monday, May 30, 1988, a KGB officer arrived at the
âPARK/PRIMEâ dead drop site at 9:03 pm, three minutes after the
end of the prearranged dead drop exchange period. The KGB
officer saw a man who apparently removed the signal, got into his
car, and drove away.
91. On July 15, 1988, the KGB received a letter from âBâ at
an accommodation address in the Eastern District of Virginia.
The envelope bore a return address âChicagoâ and was postmarked
âWDC 200" on July 13, 1988. The zip codes for Washington, D.C.,
begin â200". The typed letter read as follows:
I found the site empty. Possibly I had the time
wrong. I work from memory. My recollection was for
you to fill before 1:00 a.m. I believe Viktor Degtyar
was in the church driveway off Rt. 123, but I did not
know how he would react to an approach. My schedule
41
was tight to make this at all. Because of my work, I
had to synchronize explanations and flights while not
leaving a pattern of absence or travel that could later
be correlated with communication times. This is
difficult and expensive.
I will call the number you gave me on 2/24, 2/26
or 2/28 at 1:00 a.m., EDST. Please plan filled
signals. Empty sites bother me. I like to know before
I commit myself as Iâm sure you do also. Letâs not use
the original site so early at least until the seasons
change. Some type of call-out signal to you when I
have a package or when I can receive one would be
useful. Also, please be specific about dates, e.g.,
2/24. Scheduling is not simple for me because of
frequent travel and wife. Any ambiguity multiplies the
problems.
My security concerns may seem excessive. I
believe experience has shown them to be necessary. I
am much safer if you know little about me. Neither of
us are children about these things. Over time, I can
cut your losses rather than become one.
Ramon
P.S. Your âthank youâ was deeply appreciated.
92. On Monday, July 18, 1988, âBâ and the KGB carried out
an exchange operation at the âPARK/PRIMEâ dead drop site.
The package from âBâ contained over 530 pages of material,
including:
(A) A CIA document concerning certain nuclear programs,
dated approximately November 1987, classified TOP SECRET and
with the caveats NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON.
(B) A DCI document entitled âCompendium of Future
Intelligence Requirements: Volume IIâ, dated September 1987,
prepared by the Staff of the Intelligence Producers Council
and classified TOP SECRET/SCI with the caveat NOFORN.
(C) A CIA Counterintelligence Staff Study entitled âThe
Soviet Counterintelligence Offensive: KGB Recruitment
42
Operations Against CIA,â dated March 1988 and classified
SECRET with the caveats NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON. This
document contains the following preface:
Warning Notice
Intelligence Sources
or Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
National Security
Unauthorized Disclosure
Information
Subject to Criminal Sanctions
and also specifically defining âNOFORNâ as âNot Releasable
to Foreign Nationals.â
(D) A TOP SECRET comprehensive historical FBI review of
allegations from recruitments and defectors over a period of
years that the Soviet intelligence services had penetrated
the United States Intelligence Community. It identified
Soviet recruitments and defectors with specificity, and
describes particular information they provided. It
contained the following warning:
IN VIEW OF THE EXTREME SENSITIVITY OF THIS DOCUMENT,
THE UTMOST CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN ITS HANDLING. THE
CONTENTS INCLUDE A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF SENSITIVE SOURCE
ALLEGATIONS AND INVESTIGATIONS OF PENETRATION OF THE FBI BY
THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, THE DISCLOSURE OF WHICH
WOULD COMPROMISE HIGHLY SENSITIVE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
OPERATIONS AND METHODS. ACCESS SHOULD BE LIMITED TO A
STRICT NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.
The package from the KGB to âBâ contained $25,000 cash and a
letter asking for information about surveillance systems, the
agent network in New York City, illegal intelligence, and several
specific FBI recruitment operations. The KGB proposed two new
dead drop and related signal sites. One, named âBOBâ, was under
43
a footbridge in Idylwood Park, between Vienna and Falls Church,
in the Eastern District of Virginia. The other, named âCHARLIEâ,
was under a footbridge in Eakin Community Park, south of Vienna,
in the Eastern District of Virginia. For these dead drop sites,
the KGB instructed âBâ to load the dead drops by 9:00 pm on the
designated day; the KGB would clear it by 10:00 pm and load it
with a package which âBâ was to clear after 10:00 pm.
93. On July 31, 1988, the KGB received an envelope from âBâ
at an accommodation address in the Eastern District of Virginia.
The envelope bore a return address of Alexandria and contained a
letter dated July 29 and âBââs seventh diskette (âD-7â), which
contained information on technical surveillance systems, a new
recruitment in New York City, illegal intelligence, and several
other specific Soviet recruitment targets.
94. On August 22, 1988, the KGB deposited $50,000 in an
escrow account for âBâ at a Moscow bank.
95. On September 21, 1988, the KGB received an envelope
from âBâ at an accommodation address in the Eastern District of
Virginia. The envelope bore a return address of âChicagoâ and
was postmarked âWDCâ on September 20. The envelope contained
âBââs eighth diskette (âD-8â) and a note that read: âAt BOBâ.
The diskette contained information about particular Soviet
recruitment targets of the FBI.
96. On Monday, September 26, 1988, âBâ and the KGB carried
out an exchange operation at the âBOBâ dead drop site.
44
The package from âBâ contained approximately 300 pages of
material, including an FBI memo about a particular individual
believed at the time to be a KGB Line KR officer in New York
City, information on technical means of Soviet intelligence, a
transcript of a Counterintelligence Group meeting, and
information on several other matters.
The package from the KGB contained a diamond valued at
$24,720, and a letter advising âBâ that $50,000 had been
deposited in his account. The letter also expressed gratitude to
âBâ from the KGB Chairman (Vladimir A. Kryuchov). The letter
also discussed communications procedures, security measures, a
personal meeting, and passports. It also asked âBâ to provide
information about classified technical operations in the Soviet
Union, agent network details, alliesâ sources, FBI programs, past
cases, and a certain missile technology.
97. On December 1, 1988, the KGB received a package from
âBâ at an accommodation address in the Eastern District of
Virginia. It bore a return address of âG. Robertson, Bakerâs
Photoâ and was postmarked âWDCâ on November 30, 1988. The
package contained a letter and his ninth diskette (âD-9â), which
contained information about a number of classified matters.
98. On Monday, December 26, 1988, âBâ and the KGB carried
out an exchange operation at the âCHARLIEâ dead drop site in the
Eastern District of Virginia.
45
The package from âBâ contained his tenth diskette (âD-10â)
and approximately 356 pages of material. On the diskette, âBâ
provided additional classified information. He also provided six
recent National HUMINT Collection Plan (NHCP) documents, and a
document whose title the KGB noted as âSoviet Armed Forces and
Capabilities for Conducting Strategic Nuclear War Until the End
of the 1990s.â
The package from the KGB to âBâ contained $10,000 cash, a
second diamond, valued at $17,748, and a message in which the KGB
asked âBâ for additional specific information about a wide
variety of classified technical and recruitment matters.
The next day, the KGB observed that the signal at the
âCHARLIEâ site had been removed, indicating âBâ had removed the
KGBâs package.
99. On Tuesday, January 31, 1989, the KGB observed an
emergency call-out signal at a signal site that it had issued to
âBâ, located at the intersection of Q Street and Connecticut
Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. By prearrangement, the KGB
immediately unloaded a package from âBâ at the âBOBâ dead drop
site. The package contained a cable, with a note reading: âSend
to the Center right away. This might be useful.â Also in the
package was âBââs eleventh diskette (âD-11â), which contained
comments on the cable, as well as information on several specific
individuals about whom the KGB had asked for information.
46
100. On Thursday, March 16, 1989, âBâ marked a call-out
signal site that the KGB has issued to him, located at the Taft
Bridge in Northwest Washington, D.C.
101. On Monday, March 20, 1989, âBâ and the KGB carried out
an exchange operation at the âCHARLIEâ dead drop site in the
Eastern District of Virginia.
âBâ passed two packages to the KGB. One contained a TOP
SECRET SCI document entitled âDCI Guidance for the National
MASINT Intelligence Program (FY 1991-FY 2000),â prepared by the
Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) Committee and
dated November 1988. The document bears the caveats NOFORN and
NOCONTRACT, and contains the following preface:
47
Warning Notice
Intelligence Sources or Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
According to its Introduction, this document contains the MASINT
Committeeâs recommendations to the DCI for the collection,
processing, and reporting of MASINT, and represents the
Intelligence Communityâs consensus on specific MASINT objectives
and studies leading to needed capabilities. Its contents are
highly specific and technical. In passing this document to the
KGB, âBâ requested that it be returned.
The second package from âBâ to the KGB contained his twelfth
computer diskette (âD-12â) and approximately 539 pages of
materials including classified information on a variety of
matters.
The KGB package to âBâ contained $18,000 cash and a third
diamond, valued at $11,700. It also contained a letter that
confirmed the KGB had received âBââs packages on December 26 and
January 31, discussed a personal meeting, requested new dead drop
sites, and asked how to increase operational security. The KGB
also asked âBâ about his security precautions for the diamonds.
(âBâ told the KGB that he would say the diamonds came from his
grandmother.) The KGB also asked for information about a wide
variety of technical and operational subjects. The KGB thanked
48
âBâ for the information he provided on January 31, and asked him
âfor everything else thatâs possible.â
On Tuesday, March 21, 1989, the KGB observed that the signal
at âCHARLIEâ had been removed, indicating that âBâ had removed
the KGBâs package.
102. On March 24, 1989, the KGB marked the âVâ signal site
on Courthouse Road in Vienna, in the Eastern District of
Virginia, indicating that âBâ should pick up a package at the
âPARK/PRIMEâ dead drop site the following Monday. On Monday,
March 27, 1989, the KGB loaded the dead drop with the MASINT
document, for return to âBâ, but âBâ did not clear the drop.
103. In April 1989, the KGB presented several awards to
KGB officers involved in the âBâ operation, including the highly-
coveted Order of the Red Banner, the Order of the Red Star, and
the Medal for Excellent Service.
104. On Monday, May 22, 1989, after a call-out signal from
âBâ, he and the KGB carried out an exchange operation at the
âBOBâ dead drop site, in the Eastern District of Virginia.
The package âBâ passed to the KGB contained the first and
third diamonds the KGB had given to him and which âBâ returned
for cash, and his thirteenth diskette (âD-13â) in which he
suggested an account in Switzerland and bonds to be transferred
to it. The package also contained approximately 80 pages of
material, including a document whose title the KGB noted as
âNational Intelligence Program 90-91." The diskette contained
49
classified information about a variety of technical and
operational matters.
âBâ also provided information about United States Foreign
Officer Felix Bloch and an illegal in Vienna, Austria. This
disclosure compromised the FBIâs then-ongoing espionage
investigation of Bloch, as described below.
The package that the KGB passed to âBâ on May 22, 1989, did
not contain a payment, but in a letter the KGB promised to do so
the next time. The KGB also returned the MASINT Committee
document, and described its two prior failed efforts to return
it.
The next day, the KGB observed that the signal associated
with the âBOBâ dead drop site had been removed, indicating that
âBâ had retrieved the KGBâs package.
105. Felix Bloch had been identified as an associate of
Austria-based known Soviet illegal Reino Gikman on the basis of a
telephone call between them on April 27, 1989. One day later,
the FBI opened a classified investigation of Bloch, who at the
time was assigned to the State Department in Washington, D.C.
Meetings between Bloch and Gikman were observed in Paris on May
14, 1989, and Brussels on May 28, 1989. In early June 1989,
after âBâ had compromised the Bloch investigation, Gikman
suddenly left for Moscow. Early on the morning of June 22, 1989,
Bloch received a telephone call at his home in Washington, D.C.,
from a man identifying himself as âFerdinand Paulâ. According to
50
a recording of that call, âFerdinand Paulâ told Bloch that he was
calling âin behalf of Pierreâ who âcannot see you in the near
futureâ because âhe is sickâ, and that âa contagious disease is
suspected.â (Bloch knew Gikman as âPierreâ.) âPaulâ then told
Bloch: âI am worried about you. You have to take care of
yourself.â Having concluded that this call alerted Bloch that
his association with Gikman had been compromised, the FBI
interviewed Bloch on June 22 and 23, 1989. Bloch denied he had
engaged in espionage and ultimately declined to answer any
further questions. The FBI was unable further to develop its
investigation of Bloch.
106. On Monday, August 7, 1989, after two call-out signals
from âBâ, he and the KGB carried out an exchange operation at the
âCHARLIEâ dead drop site in the Eastern District of Virginia.
In the package from âBâ were five rolls of film containing a
highly-restricted TOP SECRET/SCI analysis of the foreign threat
to a specific and named highly-compartmented United States
Government program, dated May 1987.
Also in the package from âBâ was his fourteenth diskette
(âD-14â), which contained information from the Bloch-Gikman file,
and several FBI recruitment attempts. âBâ approved a new dead
drop site the KGB had proposed, codenamed âDORISâ, located under
a footbridge in Canterbury Park in Springfield, Virginia, in the
Eastern District of Virginia.
51
The KGBâs package to âBâ contained $30,000 cash and a letter
promising to compensate him for the returned diamonds. The KGB
rejected his suggestions for an account in Switzerland. The KGB
discussed communications plans, and proposed a new dead drop
site, codenamed âELLISâ, under a footbridge over Wolftrap Creek
near Creek Crossing Road at Foxstone Park, near Vienna, Virginia,
in the Eastern District of Virginia, with a signal site on the
âFoxstone Parkâ sign.
The next day, the KGB observed that the signal associated
with the âCHARLIEâ dead drop site had been removed, indicating
that âBâ had retrieved the KGBâs package.
107. On August 17, 1989, the KGB deposited $50,000 into an
escrow account established for âBâ in a Soviet bank in Moscow.
108. On Monday, September 25, 1989, âBâ and the KGB carried
out an exchange operation at the âDORISâ dead drop site in the
Eastern District of Virginia.
The package from âBâ to the KGB contained approximately 80
pages of material including part of a document concerning a
highly-sensitive United States technical operation classified at
the TOP SECRET/SCI level. In passing this document, âBâ
compromised a program of enormous value, expense, and importance
to the United States. Also in the package was his fifteenth
diskette (âD-15â), containing additional classified information.
52
The package from the KGB to âBâ contained $30,000 cash, a
letter, and, for the first time from the KGB, a computer
diskette.
The next day, the KGB observed that the signal associated
with the âCHARLIEâ dead drop site had been removed, indicating
that âBâ had retrieved the KGBâs package.
109. On October 2, 1989, the KGB received a letter from âBâ
at an accommodation address in the Eastern District of Virginia.
It bore a return address of âG. Robertson, 1408 Ingeborg Ct.,
McLean VAâ and was postmarked âNO VAâ on October 28, 1989. The
letter reported that: âThe disk is clean. I tried all methods â
completely demagnetized.â
110. On October 17, 1989, the KGB received an envelope from
âBâ at an accommodation address, in the Eastern District of
Virginia. It bore a return address of âG. Robertson, 1101
Kingston Ct., Houston, TXâ and was postmarked âNO VA MSC 220" on
October 16, 1989. The envelope contained âBââs sixteenth
diskette (âD-16â).
111. On Monday, October 23, 1989, âBâ and the KGB carried
out an exchange operation at the âELLISâ dead drop site in the
Eastern District of Virginia.
The package from âBâ to the KGB contained an exact duplicate
of the sixteenth diskette (âD-16â), which âBâ had sent by mail
the week before. The diskette contained additional classified
information about technical and recruitment matters. âBâ
53
requested the KGB to load the âELLISâ dead drop site at any time,
and advised that he would check the signal site periodically
about the loading.
The package from the KGB to âBâ contained $55,000 cash and a
letter advising âBâ that $50,000 had been deposited into his
escrow account in Moscow. âBâ never signaled that he had cleared
this dead drop, and on October 26 the KGB retrieved its package.
112. On Tuesday, October 31, 1989, the KGB loaded the
âELLISâ dead drop site with a package containing the $55,000 cash
and a second KGB diskette. The diskette provided a new
accommodation address, and instructions to âBâ on how to inform
the KGB which materials should be opened by the KGB in
Washington, D.C., and which should go to the Center. It conveyed
regards from the KGB Chairman and made extensive requests for
additional information concerning particular United States
intelligence activities targeting the Soviet Union. On November
11, 1989, the KGB observed that the âELLISâ signal site was
removed, indicating that âBâ had removed the KGBâs package.
113. On Monday, December 25, 1989, after a call-out signal
from âBâ, he and the KGB carried out an exchange operation at the
âBOBâ dead drop site in the Eastern District of Virginia.
The package from âBâ to the KGB contained his seventeenth
diskette (âD-17â) and several documents including a DCI National
Intelligence Estimate entitled âThe Soviet System in Crisis:
Prospects for the Next Two Yearsâ and dated November 1989. This
54
document was classified SECRET, bore the caveats NOFORN
NOCONTRACT WNINTEL, and contained the notice: âUnauthorized
Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions.â He also provided
additional documents on the highly sensitive technical operation
referred to above.
The diskette contained a message in which âBâ complimented
the KGBâs efficient actions, and provided current information
about: several ongoing FBI recruitment operations against Soviet
intelligence officers; three new tightly-protected FBI sources
within the KGB and other Soviet entities; and four defectors. He
also provided updated information on the Bloch-Gikman matter.
The package from the KGB to âBâ contained $38,000 cash as
payment for the October 16-23 period plus compensation for the
two returned diamonds, and two KGB diskettes. The diskettes
contained Christmas greetings from the KGB, discussed
communications plans, and asked âBâ for specific information
about a variety of classified technical operations.
114. On Monday, March 5, 1990, after a call-out signal from
âBâ, he and the KGB carried out an exchange operation at the
âCHARLIEâ dead drop site in the Eastern District of Virginia.
The package from âBâ to the KGB contained his eighteenth
diskette (âD-18â), on which âBâ provided classified information
on a wide variety of topics, including: four Soviet nationals, a
KGB officer, a Soviet illegal, and two KGB defectors, who were
all serving as FBI-CIA sources; communications intelligence
55
operations; and the identification of a particular named NSA
employee and the sensitive office in which the employee worked.
The package also contained a 120-page document whose title,
according to KGB records, was âSoviet Armed Forces and Strategic
Nuclear Capabilities for the 1990s,â dated February 1990.
The package from the KGB contained $40,000 cash and a KGB
diskette. The diskette discussed communications plans and asked
âBâ to provide information on a wide variety of classified
technical, operational, and recruitment matters. The KGB also
asked âBâ what the Soviets could use of the certain highly
classified and sensitive program information he had previously
disclosed.
115. On Monday, May 7, 1990, after a call-out signal from
âBâ, he and the KGB carried out an exchange operation at the
âDORISâ dead drop site in the Eastern District of Virginia.
The package from âBâ to the KGB contained his nineteenth
diskette (âD-19â) and approximately 232 pages of material,
including another document on the tightly-compartmented
classified program that was the subject of the document âBâ
passed to the KGB on August 7, 1989. âBâ also gave the KGB
permission to use the certain highly classified and sensitive
program information he had previously disclosed.
âBâ also advised that because of a promotion he would be
traveling for one year, and he discussed communications plans and
a method of renewing contact.
56
The package from the KGB to âBâ contained $35,000 cash and a
KGB diskette. The diskette contained communications plans, and
identified a new dead drop site, codenamed âFLOâ, located under a
footbridge in Lewinsville Park near the intersection of Warner
Avenue and Westbury Road in McLean, Virginia, in the Eastern
District of Virginia, and a nearby signal site. The diskette
also contained specific requests for information, including
operational leads and materials on recruitments of Soviets. It
read, in part, as follows:
Dear Friend:
. . . . We attach some information requests which
we ask Your kind assistance for. We are very cautious
about using Your info and materials so that none of our
actions in no way causes [sic] no harm to Your
security. With this on our mind we are asking that
sensitive materials and information (especially hot and
demanding some actions) be accompanied by some sort of
Your comments or some guidance on how we may or may not
use it with regard to Your security.
We wish You good luck and enclose $35,000.
Thank you.
Sincerely,
Your friends.
116. On or about May 17, 1990, the KGB received a letter
and a diskette from âBâ at an accommodation address in the
Eastern District of Virginia.
117. On Monday, May 21, 1990, the KGB loaded the âELLISâ
dead drop site with a package containing two KGB diskettes, and
marked a call-out signal for âB.â âBâ picked up the KGBâs
package, but did not leave one for the KGB.
57
The KGB diskettes contained a letter that discussed in
detail communications plans and recontact procedures. It read,
in part:
Dear Friend:
Congratulations on Your promotion. We wish You all the
very best in Your life and career.
We appreciate Your sympathy for some difficulties our
people face - Your friendship and understanding are
very important to us. Of course You are right, no
system is perfect and we do understand this.
Speaking about the systems. We donât see any problem
for the system of our future communications in regard
to this new circumstances of Yours. Though we canât
but regret that our contacts may be not so regular as
before, like You said.
We believe our current commo plan - though neither
perfect - covers ruther [sic] flexibly Your needs: You
may have a contact with us anytime You want after
staying away as long as You have to. So, do Your new
job, make Your trips, take Your time. The commo plan
we have will still be working. Weâll keep covering the
active call out signal site no matter how long itâs
needed. And weâll be in a ready-to-go mode to come
over to the drop next in turn whenever You are ready:
that is when You are back home and decide to
communicate. All Youâll have to do is to put Your call
out signal, just as now. And You have two addresses to
use to recontact us only if the signal sites for some
reason donât work or canât be used. . . . But in any
case be sure: You may have a contact anytime because
the active call out site is always covered according to
the schedule no matter how long youâve been away. . . .
Thank You and good luck.
Sincerely,
Your friends.
The KGB particularly asked âBâ to âgive us some good leads to
possible recruitmentsâ among âinteresting people in the right
58
places.â The KGB also asked for information about a Soviet
Embassy employee who âBâ had previously identified as an FBI
recruitment-in-place, and who the KGB believed was about to
defect.
118. On August 20, 1990, the KGB received from âBâ an
envelope, containing his twentieth diskette (âD-20â), at an
accommodation address in the Eastern District of Virginia. The
envelope bore the return address âJ. Baker, Box 1101, Alexandria
VAâ. The diskette contained classified information about several
matters. âBâ instructed the KGB to load the âFLOâ dead drop site
on September 3, 1990.
119. On Monday, September 3, 1990, the KGB loaded the âFLOâ
dead drop site with a package containing $40,000 cash, and a KGB
diskette containing a letter which identified more call-out
signal sites and contained numerous specific requests for
classified information. The letter noted that some of the
materials âBâ had provided about âpolitical issues of interest .
. . were reported to the very top.â âBâ subsequently picked up
the KGBâs package.
120. On Saturday, February 2, 1991, in response to an
emergency call-out signal from âBâ, the KGB retrieved a package
from âBâ at the âCHARLIEâ dead drop site in the Eastern District
of Virginia. The package contained âBââs twenty-first diskette
(âD-21â), which included a letter in which âBâ acknowledged
receipt of the $40,000, which he characterized as âtoo generous.â
59
He disclosed to the KGB that the FBIâs chief of
counterintelligence in the New York Field Office had told him
that the FBI had recruited a specific number of sources at a
particular Soviet establishment. âBâ also advised that he would
be ready for an operation on February 18, 1991.
In exchange, the KGB left a package for âBâ but he did not
pick it up and the KGB later retrieved it.
121. On Monday, February 18, 1991, the KGB loaded the
âCHARLIEâ dead drop site with a package containing $10,000 cash
and a KGB diskette. The diskette established two new dead drop
sites, one of which was codenamed âGRACEâ and located under a
footbridge in Rock Creek Park in Washington, D.C. It also asked
âBâ to provide specific classified technical and operational
information, and instructed that the next contact would be at the
âDORISâ dead drop site.
122. On Monday, April 15, 1991, in response to a call-out
signal from âBâ, he and the KGB carried out an exchange operation
at the âDORISâ dead drop site in the Eastern District of
Virginia.
The package from âBâ to the KGB contained his twenty-second
diskette (âD-22â) in which he confirmed receipt of cash. âBâ
also provided classified FBI material about a specific
recruitment operation about which the KGB had previously asked.
The package from the KGB to âBâ contained $10,000 and a KGB
diskette which read, in part, as follows:
60
Dear Friend:
Time is flying. As a poet said: âWhatâs our life,
If full of care
You have no time
To stop and stare?â
Youâve managed to slow down the speed of Your running
life to send us a message. And we appreciate it.
We hope Youâre OâK and Your family is fine too. We are
sure Youâre doing great at Your job. As before, weâll
keep staying alert to respond to any call from You
whenever You need it.
We acknowledge receiving one disk through CHARLIE. One
disk of mystery and intrigue. Thank you.
Not much a business letter this time. Just
formalities. We consider Site-9 cancelled. And we are
sure You remember: our next contact is due at ELLIS.
Frankly, we are looking forward to JUNE. Every new
season brings new expectations.
Enclosed in our todayâs package please find $10,000.
Thank You for Your friendship and help.
We attach some information requests. We hope Youâll be
able to assist us on them.
Take care and good luck.
Sincerely,
Your friends.
The KGB asked âBâ for information about several specific
classified matters, including United States Intelligence
Community plans to respond to domestic turmoil in the Soviet
Union and new United States communications intelligence efforts.
123. On Monday, July 15, 1991, after a call-out signal from
âBâ, he and the KGB carried out an exchange operation at the
âELLISâ dead drop site in the Eastern District of Virginia.
61
The package from âBâ to the KGB contained his twenty-third
diskette (âD-23â) and approximately 284 pages of material. The
diskette read, in part: âI returned, grabbed the first thing I
could lay my hands onâ and âI was in a hurry so that you would
not worry, because June has passed, they held me there longer.â
He also noted that he had at least five years until retirement,
and remarked: âMaybe I will hang in there for that long.â âBâ
also reported on a particular FBI-CIA operation. The classified
documents passed by âBâ included FBI documents, human
intelligence plans, and documents concerning nuclear and missile
weapons proliferation.
The package from the KGB to âBâ contained $12,000 cash and a
KGB diskette reading, in part, as follows:
Dear friend:
Acknowledging the disk and materials . . . received
through âDORISâ we also acknowledge again Your superb
sense of humor and Your sharp-as-a-razor mind. We
highly appreciate both.
Donât worry. We will not steam out incorrect
conclusions from Your materials. Actually, Your
information grately [sic] assisted us in seeing more
clearly many issues and we are not ashamed to correct
our notions if we have some. So, thank You for Your
help. But if some of our requests seem a bit strange
to You, please try to believe us there were sufficient
reasons to put them and that what we wanted was to sort
them out with Your help.
In regard to our âmemoâ on Your security. Just one
more remark. If our natural wish to capitalize on Your
information confronts in any way Your security
interests we definitely cut down our thirst for profit
and choose Your security. The same goes with any other
62
aspect of Your case. Thatâs why we say Your security
goes first. . . .
We are sure You remember our next contact is due at
âFLOâ.
As always we attach some information requests, which
are of current interest to us.
We thank You and wish You the very best.
Sincerely,
Your friends.
Enclosed in the package please find $12,000.
The KGB gave âBâ new communications plans, and numerous specific
requests for classified technical, operational, and recruitment
matters. The KGB also asked follow-up questions about
information âBâ had previously provided, and requested specific
United States Intelligence Community activity towards the Soviet
Union.
124. On Monday, August 19, 1991, after a call-out signal
from âBâ, he and the KGB carried out an exchange operation at the
âFLOâ dead drop site in the Eastern District of Virginia.
The package from âBâ to the KGB contained a recent FBI
memorandum concerning specific methods of surveillance of a
particular Soviet intelligence officer. It also contained âBââs
twenty-fourth diskette (âD-24â) on which he discussed
communications plans and provided information about classified
technical and operational matters. On this diskette, he also
discussed how the Soviet Union could benefit from a thorough
63
study of the period of Chicagoâs history when the city was
governed by Mayor Richard J. Daley.
The package from the KGB to âBâ contained $20,000 cash and a
message welcoming âBâ back and advising that the next exchange
would be at the âGRACEâ dead drop site.
125. On Monday, October 7, 1991, after a call-out signal
from âBâ, he and the KGB carried out an exchange operation at the
âGRACEâ dead drop site in the Eastern District of Virginia.
The package from âBâ to the KGB contained his twenty-fifth
diskette (âD-25â) and a classified document entitled âThe US
Double-Agent Program Management Review and Policy
Recommendationsâ dated September 10, 1991. On the diskette, âBâ
provided information about various classified recruitment
operations. âBâ also identified by name a particular âold
friendâ whom he suggested the KGB try to recruit; he explained
that the man was a military officer who had recently been told he
would not be promoted.
The package from the KGB to âBâ contained $12,000 cash and a
KGB diskette reading, in part, as follows:
Dear friend:
Thanks for the package of 02.13. [The] materials are
very promising, we intend to work on the scenario so
wisely suggested by You. And the magical history tour
to Chicago was mysteriously well timed. Have You ever
thought of foretelling the things? After Your
retirement for instance in some sort of Your own
âCristall [sic] Ball and Intelligence Agencyâ (CBIA)?
There are always so many people in this world eager to
get a glimpse of the future.
64
But now back to where we belong. There have been many
important developments in our country lately. So many
that weâd like to reassure You once again. Like we
said: weâve done all in order that none of those events
ever affects Your security and our ability to maintain
the operation with You. And of course there can be no
doubt of our commitment to Your friendship and
cooperation which are too important to us to loose
[sic]. . . .
Please note: our next contact is due at HELEN.
Enclosed in the package please find $12,000 and
attached as always are some information requests which
weâd ask Your kind attention to.
Thank You and good luck.
Sincerely,
Your friends.
The KGB provided new communications plans and asked âBâ for
specific information about a variety of classified technical,
operational, and analytical matters. The KGB also asked for the
current 1991 issue of a particular document reporting on Soviet
knowledge of United States satellite reconnaissance systems,
commenting that: âItâs fun to read about the life in the Universe
to understand better whatâs going on on our own planet.â Asking
about some pages that appeared to be missing from âBââs July
package, the KGB noted: âSometimes it happens, we understand.
Life is becoming too fast.â
126. On December 12, 1991, the KGB received an envelope
from âBâ at an accommodation address in Alexandria, Virginia, in
the Eastern District of Virginia. The envelope, which was
addressed by hand, bore a handwritten return address of âJ.
65
Baker, Box 1101, Houston, TXâ and was postmarked Washington, D.C.
The envelope contained a handwritten note reading: ââ @ BOB on
6/22; T. DEVICE APPROVED 6/16, COMING SOONâ. Using the
established â6" coefficient, the reference to â6/22" actually
refers to December 16. The reference to âT. DEVICEâ related to
information âBâ had previously passed to the KGB regarding a
classified technical operation.
127. On Monday, December 16, 1991, âBâ and the KGB carried
out an exchange operation at the âBOBâ dead drop site in the
Eastern District of Virginia.
The package from âBâ to the KGB contained several documents,
including:
(A) A DCI Counterintelligence Center research paper
entitled âThe KGBâs First Chief Directorate: Structure,
Functions, and Methods,â dated November 1990. The document
was classified SECRET with the caveats NOFORN NOCONTRACT
ORCON. It also bore the following notices:
WARNING NOTICE
This document should be disseminated only to
persons having both the requisite clearances
and a need to have access to its contents for
performance of their duties. No further distri-
bution or reproduction is authorized without
the approval of the Associate Deputy Director
for Operations for Counterintelligence, CIA.
and
National Security
Unauthorized Disclosure
Information
Subject to Criminal Sanctions
66
(B) A current volume of the DCI Congressional Budget
Justification that detailed the programs and resource needs
of the FBIâs Foreign Counterintelligence Program. The
document was classified SECRET with the caveats NOFORN
NOCONTRACT ORCON, and the warning: âUnauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions.â
The package from âBâ also contained his twenty-sixth diskette
(âD-26â) in which he expressed embarrassment over the pages
missing from his earlier package, and advised that he had been
promoted to a position of increased salary and authority that had
moved him temporarily out of direct responsibility for Soviet
matters. He noted that a new mission for his new group had not
yet been defined, and he quoted a particular remark by General
Patton about the Japanese. âBâ discussed communications plans,
and provided information about various classified technical and
operational matters. He also proposed a new communications
system, in which he would set up an office at a location in town
not subject to electronic surveillance, where he and the KGB
could communicate directly using a computer that would be
specially-equipped with certain advanced technology.
The package from the KGB to âBâ contained $12,000 cash and a
KGB diskette discussing communications plans and asking for
specific information about various classified matters.
128. In one message to âBâ the KGB warned him to: âExamine
from the point of security Your practice of copying materials.â
67
129. On or before October 6, 1999, âBâ received the
following letter from the SVR:
68
Dear friend: welcome!
Itâs good to know you are here. Acknowledging
your letter to V.K. we express our sincere joy on the
occasion of resumption of contact with you. We firmly
guarantee you for a necessary financial help. Note,
please, that since our last contact a sum set aside for
you has risen and presents now about 800.000 dollars.
This time you will find in a package 50.000 dollars.
Now it is up to you to give a secure explanation of it.
As to communication plan, we may have need of some
time to work out a secure and reliable one. This why
we suggest to carry on the 13th of November at the same
drop which you have proposed in your letter to V.K. We
shall be ready to retrieve your package from DD since
20:00 to 21:00 hours on the 12th of November after we
would read you [sic] signal (a vertical mark of white
adhesive tape of 6 - 8 cm length) on the post closest
to Wolftrap Creek of the âFoxstone Parkâ sign. We
shall fill our package in and make up our signal (a
horizontal mark of white adhesive tape).
After you will clear the drop donât forget to
remove our tape that will mean for us - exchange is
over.
We propose a new place where you can put a signal
for us when in need of an urgent DD operation.
LOCATION: the closest to Whithaven [sic] Parkway wooden
electricity utility pole at the south-west corner of T-
shaped intersection of Foxhall Road and Whitehaven
Parkway (map of Washington, DC, page 9, grid B11). At
any working day put a white thumb tack (1 cm in
diameter, colored sets are sold at CVS) into the
Northern side of the pole at the height of about 1.2
yards. The tack must be seen from a car going down
Foxhall Road. This will mean for us that we shall
retrieve your package from the DD Foxstone Park at the
evening of the nex [sic] weekâs Tuesday (when itâs
getting dark).
In case of a threatening situation of any kind put
a yellow tack at the same place. This will mean that
we shall refrain from any communication with you until
further notice from your side (the white tack).
We also propose for your consideration a new DD
site âLewisâ. DD LOCATION: wooden podium in the
69
amphitheatre of Long-branch Nature Center (map of
N.Virginia, page 16, grid G8). The package should be
put under the FAR-LEFT corner of the podium (when
facing the podium). Entter [sic] Longbranch Nature
Center at the sign from Carlin Springs Road (near 6th
Road south) and after parking your car in the lot
follow the sign âTo Amphitheatre.â LOCATION OF THE DD
SIGNAL: a wooden electricity utility pole at the north-
west corner of the intersection of 3d Street and Carlin
Springs Road neaqr [sic] the Metrobus stop (the same
map, grid F7). The signals are the same as in the
âFoxstone Parkâ DD. The white adhesive tape should be
placed on the NORTHERN side of the pole, so that it
could be noticed fro [sic] a car moving along Carlin
Springs Road in the southern direction from Route 50.
Please, let us know during the November operation
of your opinion on the proposed places (the new signal
and DD âLewisâ).
We are intending to pass you a permanent
communications plan using drops you know as well a new
portion of money. For our part we are very interested
to get from you any information about possible actions
which may threaten us.
Thank you. Good luck to you. Sincerely,
Your friends.
The initials âV.K.â are those of a known SVR Line KR senior
officer in Washington, D.C.
130. On or before March 14, 2000, âBâ wrote a letter to the
SVR, reading, in part, as follows:
....I have come about as close as I ever want to come
to sacrificing myself to help you, and I get silence.
I hate silence....
Conclusion: One might propose that I am either insanely
brave or quite insane. Iâd answer neither. Iâd say,
insanely loyal. Take your pick. There is insanity in
all the answers.
I have, however, come as close to the edge as I can
without being truly insane. My security concerns have
70
proven reality-based. Iâd say, pin your hopes on
âinsanely loyalâ and go for it. Only I can lose.
I decided on this course when I was 14 years old. Iâd
read Philbyâs book. Now that is insane, eh! My only
hesitations were my security concerns under
uncertainty. I hate uncertainty. So far I have judged
the edge correctly. Give me credit for that.
Set the signal at my site any Tuesday evening. I will
read your answer. Please, at least say goodbye. Itâs
been a long time my dear friends, a long and lonely
time.
Ramon Garcia
131. On or before June 8, 2000, âBâ wrote a letter to the
SVR which read, in part, as follows:
Dear Friends:
Administrative Issues:
Enclosed, once again, is my rudimentary cipher.
Obviously it is weak in the manner I used it last â-
reusing key on multiple messages, but I wanted to give
you a chance if you had lost the algorythm [sic].
Thank you for your note. It brought me great joy to
see the signal at last. As you implied and I have
said, we do need a better form of secure communication
â- faster. In this vein, I propose (without being
attached to it) the following:
One of the commercial products currently available is
the Palm VII organizer. I have a Palm III, which is
actually a fairly capable computer. The VII version
comes with wireless internet capability built in. It
can allow the rapid transmission of encrypted messages,
which if used on an infrequent basis, could be quite
effective in preventing confusions if the existance
[sic] of the accounts could be appropriately hidden as
well as the existance [sic] of the devices themselves.
Such a device might even serve for rapid transmittal of
substantial material in digital form. Your FAPSI could
review what would be needed, its advisability, etc.,
obviously â- particularly safe rules of use. While
FAPSI may move with the rapidity of the Chinese army,
71
they can be quite effective, in juggernaut fashion,
that is to say thorough. . . .
New topics:
If you are wise, you will reign [sic] in the GRU. They
are causing no end of grief. But for the large number
of double-agents they run, there would be almost no
ability to cite activity warranting current foreign
counterintelligence outlays. Of course the Gusev
affair didnât help you any. If Iâd had better
communications I could have prevented that. I was
aware of the fact that microphones had been detected at
the State Department. (Such matters are why I need
rapid communications. It can save you much grief.)
Many such things are closely held, but that closeness
fails when the need for action comes. Then the
compartments grow of necessity. I had knowledge weeks
before of the existence of devices, but not the country
placing them. . . . I only found out the gruesome
details too late to warn you through available means
including the colored stick-pin call. (Which by the
way I doubted would work because of your ominous
silence.) Very frustrating. This is one reason I say
âyou waste meâ in the note. . . .
The U.S. can be errantly likened to a powerfully built
but retarded child, potentially dangerous, but young,
immature and easily manipulated. But donât be fooled
by that appearance. It is also one which can turn
ingenius [sic] quickly, like an idiot savant, once
convinced of a goal. The [ ] Japanese (to quote
General Patten [sic] once again) learned this to their
dismay. . . .
I will not be able to clear TOM on the first back-up
date so donât be surprised if we default to that and
you find this then. Just place yours again the
following week, same protocol.
I greatly appreciate your highly professional inclusion
of old references to things known to you in messages
resulting from the mail interaction to assure me that
the channel remains unpirated. This is not lost on me.
On Swiss money laudering [sic], you and I both know it
is possible but not simple. And we do both know that
money is not really âput away for youâ except in some
vague accounting sense. Never patronize at this level.
72
It offends me, but then you are easily forgiven. But
perhaps I shouldnât tease you. It just gets me in
trouble.
thank you again,
Ramon
132. On or before July 31, 2000, âBâ received the following
letter from the KGB/SVR:
Dear Ramon:
We are glad to use this possibility to thank You
for Your striving for going on contact with us.
We received Your message. The truth is that we
expended a lot of efforts to decipher it.
First of all we would like to emphasize that all
well known events wich [sic] had taken place in this
country and in our homeland had not affected our
resources and we reaffirm our strong intentions to
maintain and ensure safely our long-term cooperation
with You.
We perceive Your actions as a manifestation of
Your confidence in our service and from our part we
assure You that we shall take all necessary measures to
ensure Your personal security as much as possible.
Just because proceeding from our golden rule - to
ensure Your personal security in the first place - we
have proposed to carry out our next exchange operation
at the place which had been used in last august [sic].
We did not like to give You any occasion to charge us
with an inadequate attention to problems of Your
security. We are happy that, according to the version
You have proposed in Your last letter, our suggestions
about DD, known as âEllisâ, coincided completely.
However a situation around our collegues [sic] at the
end of passed [sic] year made us to refuse this
operation at set day.
1. We thank You for information, wnich [sic] is
of a great interest for us and highly evaluated in our
service.
73
We hope that during future exchanges we shall
receive Your materials, which will deal with a [sic]
work of IC, the FBI and CIA in the first place, against
our representatives and officers. We do mean its
human, electronic and technical penetrations in our
residencies here and in other countries. We are very
interested in getting of the objective information on
the work of a special group which serches [sic] âmoleâ
in CIA and FBI. We need this information especially to
take necessary additional steps to ensure Your personal
security....
2. Before stating a communication plan that we
propose for a next future, we would like to precise
[sic] a following problem. Do You have any possibility
to meet our collegues [sic] or to undertake the
exchange ops in other countries? If yes, what are
these countries? Until we receive Your answer at this
[sic] questions and set up a new communication plan, we
propose to use for the exchange ops DD according to the
following schedule:
= DD âLEWISâ on 27 of may 2001 (with a coefficient
it will mean on 21 of november 2000). We draw Your
attention on the fact that we used a former coefficient
- 6 (sender adds, addressee subtracts). A time will be
shown at real sense. We will be ready to withdraw Your
package beginning by 8 PM on 27 may 2001 after we shall
read Your signal. After that we put DD our package for
You. Remove Your signal and place our signal by 9 PM
of the same day. After that You will withdraw our
package and remove our signal. That will mean an
exchange operation is over. We shall check signal site
(i.e., its absence) the next day (28 of May) till 9 PM.
If by this time a signal had not been removed we shall
withdraw our package and shall put it in for You
repeatedly dates with DD âELLISâ â- in each seven days
after 28 May till 19 of June 2001 (i.e., 13 of December
2000).
= We propose to carry out our next operation on 16
of october 2001 (i.e., 10 of April) at the DD âLINDAâ
in âRound Tree parkâ (if this place suits for Your
[sic] we would like to receive Your oppinion [sic]
about that during exchange in may). A time of
operation from 8 pm to 9 pm, signals and schedule of
alternate dates are the same. In the course of
exchange ops we shall pass to You descriptions of new
DD and SS that You can check them before. You will
74
find with this letter descriptions of two new DD
âLINDAâ and âTOMâ. Hope to have Your opinion about
them.
In case of break off in our contacts we propose to
use DD âELLISâ, that you indicated in your first
message. Your note about a second bridge across the
street from the âFâ sign, as back up, is approved. We
propose to use âELLISâ once a year on 12 August (i.e.,
with coeff. it will be 18 February) at the same time as
it was in August 1999. On that day we can carry out a
full exchange operation â- You will enload your package
and put a signal, we shall withdraw it, load our
package and put our signal. You will remove our
package and put your signal. Alternate dates - in
seven days âtil next month.
= As it appears from your message, you continue to
use post channel as a means of communication with us.
You know very well our negative attitude toward this
method. However if you send by post a short note where
date (i.e., with coefficient), time and name of DD for
urgent exchange are mentioned, you could do it by using
address you had used in September (i.e., with coeff.)
putting in a sealed envelope for V.K.
In future it is inexpedient to use a V.K. name as
a sender. It will be better to choose any well known
name in this country as you did it before.
3. We shall continue work up [sic] new variants
of exchanging messages including PC disks. Of course
we shall submit them to your approval in advance. If
you use a PC disk for next time, please give us key
numbers and program you have used.
4. We would like to tell you that an
insignificant number of persons know about you, your
information and our relationship.
5. We assess as very risky to transfer money in Zurich
because now it is impossible to hide its origin...
133. On or before November 17, 2000, âBâ wrote a letter to
the KGB/SVR, reading, in part, as follows:
Dear Friends:
75
Bear with me. It was I who sent the message trying to
use TOM to communicate material to you. On reflection,
I can understand why you did not respond. I see that I
failed to furnish you sufficient information for you to
recognize that the message you left for me in ELLIS did
not go astray. You do this often (communicate such
assurances through the mention of items like the old
date offset we used), and believe me, it is not lost on
me as a sign of professionalism. I say bear with me on
this because you must realize I do not have a staff
with whom to knock around all the potential
difficulties. (For me breaks in communications are
most difficult and stressful.) Recent changes in U.S.
law now attach the death penalty to my help to you as
you know, so I do take some risk. On the other hand, I
know far better than most what minefields are laid and
the risks. Generally speaking you overestimate the
FBIâs capacity to interdict you, but on the other hand,
cocksure officers, (those with real guts and not as
much knowledge as they think) can, as we say, step in
an occasional cowpie. (Message to the translator: Got
a good word for cowpie in Russian?? Clue, donât
blindly walk behind cows.). . . .
I have drawn together material for you now over a
lengthy period. It is somewhat variable in import.
Some were selected as being merely instructive rather
than urgently important. I think such instructive
insights often can be quite as valuable or even more
valuable long-term because they are widely applicable
rather than narrow. Others are of definite value
immediately.
My position has been most frustrating. I knew Mr.
Gusev was in eminent [sic] danger and had no effective
way of communicating in time. I knew microphones of an
unknown origin were detected even earlier and had no
regular way of communicating even that. This needs to
be rectified if I am to be as effective as I can be.
No one answered my signal at Foxhall. Perhaps you
occasionally give up on me. Giving up on me is a
mistake. I have proven inveterately loyal and willing
to take grave risks which even could cause my death,
only remaining quiet in times of extreme uncertainty.
So far my ship has successfully navigated the slings
and arrows of outrageous fortune.
I ask you to help me survive. . . .
76
On meeting out of the country, it simply is not
practical for me. I must answer too many questions
from family, friends, and government plus it is a
cardinal sign of a spy. You have made it that way
because of your policy. Policies are constraints,
constraints breed patterns. Patterns are noticed.
Meeting in this country is not really that hard to
manage, but I am loath to do so not because it is risky
but because it involves revealing my identity. That
insulation has been my best protection against betrayal
by someone like me working from whatever motivation, a
Bloch or a Philby. (Bloch was such a shnook. . . . I
almost hated protecting him, but then he was your
friend, and there was your illegal I wanted to protect.
If our guy sent to Paris had balls or brains both would
have been dead meat. Fortunately for you he had
neither. He was your good luck of the draw. He was
the kind who progressed by always checking with those
above and tying them to his mistakes. The French said,
âShould we take them down?â He went all wet. Heâd
never made a decision before, why start then. It was
that close. His kindred spirits promoted him. Things
are the same the world over, eh?)
On funds transfers through Switzerland, I agree that
Switzerland itself has no real security, but insulated
by laundering on both the in and out sides, mine
ultimately through say a corporation I control loaning
mortgage money to me for which (re)payments are
made.... It certainly could be done. Cash is hard to
handle here because little business is ever really done
in cash and repeated cash transactions into the banking
system are more dangerous because of the difficulty in
explaining them. That doesnât mean it isnât welcome
enough to let that problem devolve on me. (We should
all have such problems, eh?) How do you propose I get
this money put away for me when I retire? (Come on; I
can joke with you about it. I know money is not really
put into an account at MOST Bank, and that you are
speaking figuratively of an accounting notation at best
to be made real at some uncertain future. We do the
same. Want me to lecture in your 101 course in my old
age? My college level Russian has sunk low through
inattention all these years; I would be a novelty
attraction, but I donât think a practical one except in
extremis.)
77
So good luck. Wish me luck. OK, on all sites detailed
to date, but TOMâs signal is unstable. See you in
âJulyâ as you say constant conditions.
yours truly,
Ramon
134. On the evening of Tuesday, December 12, 2000, FBI
surveillance personnel observed HANSSEN driving four times past
the Foxstone Park sign on Creek Crossing Road in Vienna,
Virginia. As described above, the Foxstone Park sign is the
signal site associated with the âELLISâ dead drop site, which was
used from early on in the KGBâs âBâ operation.
135. Also on the evening of Tuesday, December 12, 2000, FBI
surveillance personnel observed HANSSEN walking into a particular
store at a shopping center near Foxstone Park at the same time as
a known SVR officer was in front of the store.
136. On Tuesday, December 26, 2000, FBI surveillance
personnel observed HANSSEN three times at the Foxstone Park
signal site:
a) At approximately 5:42 pm, HANSSEN stopped his
vehicle in front of the Foxstone Park sign for approximately
ten to fifteen seconds.
b) At approximately 8:53 pm, HANSSEN parked his car on
a street off Creek Crossing Road and walked to the Foxstone
Park signal site. HANSSEN stopped in front of the Foxstone
Park sign, holding a lit flashlight, and swept the
flashlight beam in a vertical motion over some wooden pylons
78
located near the sign, between the road and the sign. He
appeared to the FBI surveillance personnel to focus his
flashlight beam on one of the pylons. He then turned and
walked away, shrugging his shoulders and raising his arms in
a gesture of apparent disgust or exasperation. HANSSEN
returned to his vehicle, and drove away to a nearby Tower
Records store.
c) At approximately 9:32 pm, HANSSEN drove back past
the Foxstone Park signal site, stopped his vehicle in front
of it for approximately two to three seconds, and then drove
away.
137. During January 2001, FBI surveillance personnel
observed HANSSEN drive past the Foxstone Park signal site, and
either slowing or stopping at the site, on three occasions. At
approximately 8:18 pm on Tuesday, January 9, 2001, HANSSEN drove
past the Foxstone Park signal site, came to a complete stop in
front of it for approximately 10 seconds, then drove away.
Shortly before 6:00 pm on Tuesday, January 23, 2001, HANSSEN
drove past the Foxstone Park signal site, came to a rolling stop
near it, and then drove away. After 5:00 pm on Friday, January
26, 2001, HANSSEN drove past the Foxstone Park signal site,
slowing down near it.
138. On the evening of Monday, February 5, 2001, FBI
surveillance personnel observed HANSSEN driving past the Foxstone
79
Park signal site three times between approximately 5:37 pm and
approximately 7:44 pm.
139. On Monday, February 12, 2001, FBI surveillance
personnel checking the âLEWISâ dead drop site found a package
concealed at the site. FBI personnel removed the package and
transported it to the FBI Laboratory, where it was opened, its
contents were examined and photocopied, and it was restored to an
apparently intact condition. The package was then replaced at
the dead drop site. The package contained $50,000 in used $100
bills and a typed note reading: âNext 10/31/01 TOM alt. 20,27".
These were wrapped in white paper, which was taped, and which in
turn was wrapped in a taped-up black plastic trash bag inside a
second black plastic trash bag.
VI. FACTS ESTABLISHING THAT âBâ IS ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN
There is overwhelming evidence that âBâ is ROBERT PHILIP
HANSSEN.
A. FORENSIC EVIDENCE
140. When âBâ made dead drops to the KGB/SVR, he would
place the contents of the drop in a plastic garbage bag, which he
would wrap with tape. The plastic bag would then be placed
inside a second garbage bag. The FBI has come into possession of
the inner plastic bag used by âBâ on one occasion to wrap the
contents of a package to the KGB.
141. An FBI fingerprint examiner has conducted an
examination of the plastic bag and ascertained that it contains
80
two latent fingerprints of comparison value. The examiner
determined that these two fingerprints are those of ROBERT PHILIP
HANSSEN.
B. MATERIAL OBTAINED FROM HANSSENâS FBI OFFICE AND VEHICLE
142. On February 5, 2001, pursuant to court authorization,
the FBI searched HANSSENâs current personal office within Room
9930 at FBI Headquarters. HANSSENâs briefcase, located in the
office, contained (1) HANSSENâs current valid United States
tourist passport; (2) a personal address book; (3) several
personal checkbooks; (4) multiple sets of financial statements;
(5) one computer floppy disk; (6) one 8MB Versa Card Flash Memory
Adapter, which is a memory storage card for a computer; (7) one
cell phone. These items were photographed, duplicated, or
otherwise recorded, but not removed or altered. Upon
examination, the FBI determined that the memory storage card
contained several letters associated with the âBâ operation,
which are further described elsewhere in this Affidavit. That
these letters were found in HANSSENâs possession is clear and
unequivocal evidence that HANSSEN is âBâ.
143. On January 30, 2001, pursuant to court authorization,
the FBI searched HANSSENâs Ford Taurus automobile, and found the
following:
(1)
In the glove compartment were a roll of white Johnson &
Johnson medical adhesive tape, and a box of Crayola colored
chalk containing 12 pieces of chalk.
81
(2) In one of four cardboard boxes in the trunk were seven
classified documents printed from the FBIâs Automated Case
Support (ACS) system. Several pertained to ongoing FBI
foreign counterintelligence investigations and were
classified SECRET.
(3) In another cardboard box in the trunk were six green
fabric-covered United States government ledger notebooks,
containing classified information.
(4)
Also in the trunk were a roll of Superior Performance
Scotch clear mailing tape, and dark-colored Hefty garbage
bags.
These items were not removed, although small samples were taken,
and they were photographed.
144. On February 12, 2001, pursuant to court authorization,
the FBI again searched HANSSENâs Ford Taurus automobile. In
addition to the items described in part (1) of the foregoing
paragraph, the glove compartment contained a small plastic box
containing thumbtacks of various colors, including yellow and
white. It was further ascertained that at least one of the
pieces of chalk was pink. These items were not removed, although
small samples were taken, and they were photographed. During
this search, HANSSENâs briefcase was observed in the vehicle, but
it was not removed.
C. RECORDING OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
82
145. On August 18, 1986, KGB Officer Aleksander Fefelov
spoke by telephone with âBâ. A portion of that telephone call,
lasting approximately two minutes, was recorded. Two FBI
analysts, who have worked closely and routinely with HANSSEN for
at least five years, have listened to both the recording and an
FBI-enhanced version of the recording in which background noise
has been minimized. They have both concluded without reservation
that the voice of âBâ is that of HANSSEN.
D. DEAD DROP SITES
146. There is a particularly clear correlation between
HANSSENâs personal residence in Northern Virginia and two dead
drop sites used frequently in the âBâ operation.
147. In 1985, when âBâ volunteered to the KGB, HANSSEN
lived on Whitecedar Court, in Vienna, Virginia. The first dead
drop site selected by âBâ was Nottoway Park, which was less than
a five minute walk from Whitecedar Court. Between 1985 and 1989,
the Nottoway Park site was used for dead drops so frequently - 17
times - that it was designated by the KGB as the âPARK/PRIMEâ
dead drop site.
148. In November 1985, the Whitecedar Court house was sold
and HANSSEN moved to New York to undertake his new assignment in
the New York Field Office. He returned to FBI Headquarters in
August 1987, and moved into a home at 9414 Talisman Drive,
Vienna, Virginia, which he had bought in July 1987.
83
149. In August 1989, the KGB designated drop site âELLIS,â
located near Foxstone Park in Vienna, Virginia. The frequent use
of this site -- at least seven times -- suggests that âBâ lived
very close to the site or passed it routinely. A further
indication of this is that âBâ told the KGB in October 1989 that
the KGB could use the âELLISâ site at any time. In fact, the
âELLISâ site is an approximately one-mile walk from HANSSENâs
Talisman Drive residence.
E. PALM III
150. HANSSEN owns a Palm III device which is a hand-held
personal digital assistant. The FBI has determined that
HANSSENâs Palm III contains a reference to âELLISâ and the date
February 18, and the time 8:00. The term âELLISâ is the KGB/SVR
codename for the dead drop site located in the area of Foxstone
Park that was used seven times by either âBâ, the KGB/SVR, or
both.
F. CORRELATION OF HANSSENâS WORK ASSIGNMENTS TO âBââs
DISCLOSURES TO THE KGB/SVR
151. âBââs first letter to the KGB was postmarked in Prince
Georgeâs County, Maryland, on Tuesday, October 1, 1985. Although
at that time HANSSEN had recently been re-assigned to New York
City, FBI records show that on that particular day he was in
Washington, D.C., on administrative matters. Prince Georgeâs
County is located on the route between Washington, D.C., and New
York City.
84
152. In May 1990, âBâ told the KGB that, due to a
promotion, he would be traveling more and his access to materials
would be limited. In May 1990, HANSSEN was reassigned from the
Soviet Analytical Unit in the Intelligence Division to the
Inspection Division at FBI Headquarters. An Inspection Division
assignment is a typical feature of an FBI supervisory agentâs
career path and requires frequent travel to FBI field offices for
inspections. While serving in this assignment, HANSSEN traveled
frequently from June 1990 through June 1991 to conduct
inspections in various FBI offices.
153. On July 15, 1991, âBâ indicated to the KGB that he had
âreturnedâ from a trip. The KGB responded on August 15, 1991
with a message welcoming him back and noting that âitâs great for
you to touch the green, green grass of home.â HANSSEN returned
on May 24, 1991 from a lengthy overseas inspection tour.
154. On December 16, 1991, âBâ told the KGB that he had âan
increase in salary and authority [which] moved him temporarily
out of direct responsibility, but a new mission for my new group
has not been fully definedâ and that âI hope to adjust to that .
. . . As General Patton said . . . âletâs get this over with so
we can go kick the [ ] out of the [ ] Japanese.â (He quoted
the same reference to Japanese in the letter he wrote to the SVR
on or before June 8, 2000.) At that time, HANSSEN was preparing
to assume new duties as Chief of the new National Security Threat
List Unit at FBI Headquarters, where he focused the Unitâs
85
counterintelligence efforts on economic espionage. This new
assignment resulted in an increase in salary (from GS-14 to GS-
15) and authority (Unit Chief). Several FBI employees recall
that HANSSEN frequently quoted General Patton, and one employee
who worked closely with HANSSEN specifically remembers HANSSEN
once using the above-mentioned Patton quote in a discussion with
him.
155. In February 1988, âBâ told the KGB that he could read
the Viktor Sheymov file because a special project relating to
Sheymov was about to begin. At that time, HANSSEN was reviewing
the Sheymov file in preparation for his participation in upcoming
Intelligence Community debriefings of Sheymov.
156. Throughout the âBâ operation, âBâ reported on
Sheymovâs defection. HANSSEN took particular interest in the
Sheymov case and developed a personal friendship with Sheymov.
Recently, in fact, HANSSEN told FBI co-workers that he was
considering an offer of lucrative employment by Sheymov after
retirement in April 2001.
157. On August 19, 1991, âBâ passed detailed information to
the KGB on FBI coverage of a particular suspected Soviet
intelligence officer. On July 1, 1991, HANSSEN returned to the
Intelligence Division at FBI Headquarters (after his tour of duty
on the Inspection Staff) and became the Headquarters Supervisor
responsible for FBI coverage of this suspected Soviet
intelligence officer.
86
158. In his assignment to CI-3A, the FBIâs Soviet
Analytical Unit, HANSSEN had access to an extremely broad array
of highly classified material. The FBI has determined that
HANSSENâs access to classified material is consistent with âBââs
disclosure of classified material to the KGB/SVR.
159. During two extended periods when âBâ was inactive,
from November 1985 to June 1986, and August 1986 to August 1987,
HANSSEN was assigned to the FBIâs Field Office in New York City.
160. In July 1991, âBâ told the KGB that he had at least
five more years until retirement. HANSSEN was eligible for
retirement from the FBI in 1996.
87
G. HANSSENâS USE OF THE FBI AUTOMATED CASE SUPPORT SYSTEM
161. The Automated Case Support System (ACS) is the FBIâs
collected computerized databases of investigative files and
indices. ACS came online in October 1995.
The main, and most extensive ACS database, is the Electronic
Case File (ECF), which contains electronic communications and
certain other documents related to ongoing FBI investigations,
programs, and issues, and the indices to those documents. It is
the equivalent of a closed FBI intranet. ACS users can access
individual files by making full-text search requests for
particular words or terms.
162. FBI personnel who are âapproved usersâ of ACS,
including HANSSEN, must log on with a user identification number
and password unique to each user. Retrieval logs make it
possible to conduct audits of individualsâ use of ACS.
163. An audit of HANSSENâs use of ACS shows that he has
been a consistent user of ECF in particular, and that he
periodically conducted searches of the ECF database using a wide
variety of very specific search terms. Although some of
HANSSENâs ACS use appears to have been related to his official
responsibilities, he made a substantial number of ACS searches
apparently directly related to his own espionage activities.
Through these searches, HANSSEN could retrieve certain FBI
records that would indicate whether HANSSEN or his KGB/SVR
associates, or their activities or operational locations, were
88
known to or suspected by the FBI, and thus whether he was exposed
to danger.
For example, on the following dates HANSSEN searched the ECF
for the following terms, limiting some of the searches to a
specified period of time as indicated:
July 25, 1997:
HANSSEN
March 30, 1998:
DEAD DROP AND KGB
May 18, 1998:
DEAD DROP
DEAD DROP AND RUSSIA
July 6, 1998:
DEAD DROP
DEAD DROP AND WASHINGTON
FISA AND CELL PHONE
HANSSEN
July 30, 1998:
9414 TALISMAN
DEAD
DEAD DROP
DEAD DROP AND WASHINGTON
DOUBLE D
HANSSEN
ROBERT P. HANSSEN
September 3, 1998: ROBERT HANSSEN
ROBERT P HANSSEN
ROBERT P. HANSSEN
September 21, 1998: âDEAD DROPâ
âDEAD DROPâ AND RUSSIA
October 13, 1998:
DEAD DROP
DEAD DROP[Dates=08/01/1998-10/13/1998
October 27, 1998:
âDEAD DROPâ
âDEAD DROPâ AND WASHINGTON
âDEAD DROPâ WASHINGTON
December 14, 1998:
DEAD DROP
DEAD DROP AND WASHINGTON
April 7, 1999:
DROP SITE
DROP SITE AND RUSSIA
89
April 12, 1999:
ROBERT HANSSEN
TALISMAN
TALISMAN DRIVE
WHITE CEDAR
WHITECEDAR COURT
August 11, 1999:
CCTV AND VIRGINIA
CCTV AND VIRGINIA[Dates=01/01/1999-
08/11/1999
FOXSTONE
August 17, 1999:
DEAD DROP[Dates=01/01/1999-08/17/1999
August 30, 1999:
DEAD DROP
DEAD DROP[Dates=07/01/1999-08/30/1999
September 2, 1999:
CCTV
CCTV AND SVR
âDEAD DROPâ AND SVR
âDEAD DROPâ SVR
September 28, 1999: DROP SITE
DROP SITE[Dates=10/01/1999-10/21/1999
TALISMAN
October 21, 1999:
DEAD DROP[Dates=10/01/1999-10/21/1999
October 26, 1999:
VIENNA AND VIRGINIA
VIENNA AND VIRGINIA AND FCI[Dates=
01/01/1999-10/27/1999]
October 27, 1999:
DEAD DROP[Dates-1/09/1999-1/28/1999
November 3, 1999:
FOXSTONE
FOXSTONE AND VIENNA
VIENNA AND DROP
VIENNA AND DROP AND FCI
[Dates=01/01/1999-11/4/1999
VIENNA AND DROP[Dates=01/06/1999-
03/11/1999]
November 15, 1999:
DEAD DROP AND VIRGINIA
FOXSTONE
90
January 13, 2000:
DEAD DROP[Dates=01/01/2000-01/13/2000
DEAD DROP[Dates=10/01/1999-12/31/1999
January 18, 2000:
DROP SITE AND VIRGINIA
SVR AND DEAD DROP NOT GRU
March 14, 2000:
DEAD DROP AND SVR
March 31, 2000:
DEAD DROP
DEAD DROP AND RUSSIA
May 22, 2000:
TALISMAN DRIVE
September 28, 2000: DEAD DROP AND WASHINGTON
October 4, 2000:
DROP SITE[Dates=08/01/2000-10/04/2000
November 13, 2000:
DEAD DROP[Dates=10/01/2000-11/13/2000
December 21, 2000:
DEAD DROP[Dates-10/01/2000-12/22/2000
ESPIONAGE[Dates-11/01/2000-12/21/2000
January 3, 2001:
ROBERT HANSSEN
January 16, 2001:
DEAD DROP[Dates=12/01/2000-01/15/2001
ESPIONAGE[Dates=12/01/2000-01/15/2001
January 19, 2001:
DEAD DROP[Dates=12/01/2000-01/18/2001
January 22, 2001:
DEAD DROP[Dates=01/01/2000-01/12/2001
DEAD DROP[Dates=12/01/2000-01/22/2001
DEADDROP[Dates=01/01/2000-01/22/2001
FOXSTONE
H. âBââS âOLD FRIENDâ
164. In 1991, âBâ proposed that the KGB consider recruiting
a particular named individual who he described as an âold
friend.â HANSSEN had been friends with this individual since
HANSSEN was a teenager.
91
VII. LOCATION OF EVIDENCE, FRUITS, INSTRUMENTALITIES, AND
PROCEEDS
165. Based on my training and experience, and that of other
FBI personnel with whom I have consulted, and on my participation
in this investigation, I know that:
166. Persons who have engaged in espionage activities on
behalf of foreign intelligence services maintain records, notes,
bank records, financial statements, calendars, journals, maps,
instructions, classified documents, and other papers or documents
relating to the transmittal of national defense and classified
intelligence information to foreign governments and intelligence
services. Such records, notes, bank records, financial
statements, calendars, journals, maps, instructions, classified
documents, and other papers or documents are maintained, albeit
often secreted, on their persons, in and around their residences,
at their places of employment, in home and office computers, in
their automobiles, and in other remote locations such as safe
deposit boxes and storage facilities.
167. Persons who have been engaged in espionage activities
on behalf of foreign intelligence services often utilize
espionage paraphernalia, including devices designed to conceal
and transmit national defense and classified intelligence
information. These paraphernalia and devices include materials
used by espionage agents to communicate between each other and
with a foreign government, to wit: coded pads, secret writing
92
paper, chemicals used to develop coded and secret messages,
microdots, and microfiche, together with instructions in the use
of these materials; electronic recording and transmittal
equipment; computers and computer disks; cameras and film; books,
records, documents, and papers. The information that is
frequently passed or recorded through such methods often
includes: (1) national defense and classified intelligence
information; (2) the identities of other foreign espionage agents
and intelligence officers; (3) financial transactions, including
payments to foreign espionage agents and hidden financial
accounts; (4) records of previous illicit espionage transactions;
and (5) the source and disposition of national defense and
classified information.
168. Persons who have been engaged in espionage activities
on behalf of foreign intelligence services routinely conceal in
their residences large amounts of United States and foreign
currency, financial instruments, precious metals and gems,
jewelry, and other items of value and/or proceeds of illegal
espionage transactions. They also conceal records relating to
hidden foreign and domestic bank and financial records, including
accounts in fictitious names.
169. Persons who have been engaged in espionage activities
on behalf of foreign intelligence services often secrete national
defense and classified documents and materials, as well as
clandestine communications devices and instructions, contact
93
instructions, codes, telephone numbers, maps, photographs, other
papers and materials relating to communications procedures, and
proceeds and records of illegal espionage transactions, in secure
hidden locations and compartments within their residences, places
of employment, safe deposit boxes, storage facilities, and/or
motor vehicles, including hidden compartments within motor
vehicles, for ready access and to conceal such items from law
enforcement authorities.
170. Persons who have been engaged in espionage activities
on behalf of foreign intelligence services are not unlike any
other person in our society in that they maintain documents and
records, often doing so for long periods of time regardless of
whether their value to the person has diminished. These persons
maintain documents and records that will identify and corroborate
travel both in the United States and abroad made in connection
with foreign intelligence activity, including personal meets with
foreign intelligence officers. Such documents and records
include passports, visas, calendars, journals, date books,
telephone numbers, credit cards, hotel receipts, airline records,
correspondence, carbon copies of money orders and cashierâs
checks evidencing large cash expenditures, and accounts and
records in fictitious names.
171. Persons who have been engaged in espionage activities
on behalf of foreign intelligence services often maintain
identity documents, including those utilizing fictitious
94
identities, United States foreign currency, instructions, maps,
photographs, United States and foreign bank accountsâ access
numbers and instructions, and other papers and materials relating
to emergency contact procedures and escape plans.
172. The above-described results of recent court authorized
searches of HANSSENâs automobile and office demonstrate that
HANSSEN has retained evidence of his espionage activity, and that
such activity is ongoing.
173. Both the location of the dead drop site âELLISâ, and
the location of the signal site associated with the âELLISâ dead
drop site â- the Foxstone Park sign in the southern part of
Foxstone Park â- are within an approximately one-mile driving and
walking distance from HANSSENâs residence at 9414 Talisman Drive,
Vienna, Virginia.
174. âBâ had substantial communications with the KGB about
using sophisticated computer techniques for communications, and
he sent information to the KGB on encrypted computer diskettes.
HANSSEN is known to be highly skilled in the use of computers and
computer programming, and to maintain at least one computer with
its own server in his residence at 9414 Talisman Drive, Vienna,
Virginia. There is thus probable cause to believe that in
continuing espionage activities HANSSEN is using one or more
computers (in addition to his Palm III device) and related disks,
diskettes, and other equipment now located in his residence at
9414 Talisman Drive, Vienna, Virginia.
95
VIII. SPECIAL NEEDS AND JUSTIFICATION TO SEIZE COMPUTERS AND
RELATED HARDWARE AND ELECTRONIC STORAGE DEVICES FOUND
AT HANSSENâS RESIDENCE FOR OFF-SITE EXAMINATION
175. As noted above, HANSSEN has a high degree of computer
technology expertise. In addition, there is probable cause to
believe that HANSSEN is using computers as an instrumentality of
his espionage activities. This is evidenced by the letters to
and from the KGB/SVR found on the computer memory card in his
briefcase, and by the reference âELLISâ on his Palm III device,
as well as HANSSENâs extensive accessing of the FBIâs ACS system
for information relevant to his espionage activities. HANSSEN
has at least one computer and a server in his residence at 9414
Talisman Drive, Vienna, Virginia, and a portable laptop computer.
Because of the likelihood that HANSSEN will have extraordinary
amounts of information and files in his computers (including
laptops) and any computer storage devices and that such
information may be encrypted, it will be neither practical nor
reasonable to require the searching agents to examine the
defendantâs computers onsite at his residence. Given HANSSENâs
computer expertise and concern about detection, there is
considerable risk that HANSSEN has set up self-destruct programs
for his computers that could erase vital evidence and files if
his system or systems were examined by anyone other than experts.
Accordingly, the FBI intends to seize those components of
HANSSENâs computer hardware and related equipment as the FBI
determines must be seized in order to be examined in an
96
appropriate location by Computer Analysis Response Team (CART)
personnel. Seizing and disabling the defendantâs computer
hardware will also help prevent HANSSEN or any co-conspirators
from seeking to erase any data on HANSSENâs computer system
(including his server) from any remote location and through any
special destructive program.
176. In addition, it is highly probable that HANSSEN has
access to and has used the computers (including laptops) of
family members residing in the same residence. Accordingly, he
may be using these computers of family members to store or
transmit or conceal classified information or other evidence of
the espionage activity set forth in this affidavit. It will
therefore be necessary to seize and examine the computer hardware
and files within of family members. Such computers and files
therein will be speedily returned to those family members if
examination discloses that they have in fact no evidence or
documents connected to the espionage activity described in this
Affidavit.
97
IX.
REQUEST FOR AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE SEARCH WARRANTS DURING
NIGHTTIME HOURS
Based on my experience and the experience of other FBI
Special Agents known to me, I am aware that persons who have
committed serious felonies, particularly those felonies with
authorized punishments of death or incarceration for any term of
years or life, will often attempt to destroy evidence, fruits,
and instrumentalities of their crimes if alerted prematurely to
law enforcement interest. I also know that foreign intelligence
services, including the SVR, are able to communicate prearranged
âdangerâ signals to their agents to alert them to destroy
evidence, fruits and other instrumentalities of crime, as well as
to execute emergency escape plans. I am also aware that these
hostile foreign intelligence services, and in particular the SVR,
actively seek to penetrate United States intelligence and law
enforcement agencies by technical and human means to learn about
FBI counterintelligence activities. As a result, law enforcement
interest could be detected at any time and it may be necessary to
execute a search warrant during night time hours to preserve
evidence, fruits and instrumentalities of espionage from
destruction.
In addition, it is noted that as a Special Agent of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, HANSSEN is authorized to carry a
service weapon at all times, and he is known to have additional
weapons in his residence, and may in his vehicles, that could
98
pose an immediate danger and threat to any searching or arresting
agents unless seized and secured as quickly as possible.
If the FBI is unsuccessful in apprehending HANSSEN
immediately, he could return home during evening hours to destroy
incriminating evidence, obtain a weapon and other items to assist
his flight or evasion. In an undated letter to the KGB in
November 1985, HANSSEN wrote: âEventually I would appreciate an
escape plan.â HANSSEN currently carries his valid tourist
passport in his briefcase. As noted above, the SVR has
instructed HANSSEN to use a yellow tack in case of a âthreatening
situationâ, which could trigger an SVR-assisted escape, and he
has recently possessed yellow tacks. It is highly likely that
HANSSEN would have such an escape plan in place by 2001, and that
authority to search at any time of the day or night would be
essential to foil any such escape plan, especially if HANSSEN
received warning from the SVR.
Finally, as noted above, much of the operational activity of
the âBâ operation occurred at night. Recently, HANSSEN was
observed checking a known KGB/SVR signal site on several
nighttime occasions in December 2000 and January and February.
Accordingly, there is probable cause to believe that HANSSEN
would go to the signal site or related dead drop site (both
designated under the code name âELLISâ) at any time, and
especially at night to avoid detection. Because an arrest of
HANSSEN could well occur in the nighttime hours, and the searches
99
should be conducted immediately upon his arrest, authority is
requested to execute search warrants during nighttime hours.
X.
CONCLUSION AS TO PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH
177. Based on the above facts and circumstances, I believe
there is probable cause that evidence, fruits, instrumentalities,
and proceeds of espionage activity by ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN, in
violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 794(a)
(Transmitting National Defense Information) and Section 794(c)
(Conspiracy to Commit Espionage), are located in:
1)
The residence of ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN, such
premises known and described as a single family
residence located at:
9414 Talisman Drive
Vienna, Virginia 22182
as more fully described in Attachment B, and which
is within the Eastern District of Virginia;
2)
One silver 1997 Ford Taurus, bearing VIN
1FALP52U9VG211742 and Virginia license plate
number ZCW9538, which is anticipated to be within
the Eastern District of Virginia;
3)
One 1993 Volkswagen van, bearing VIN
WV2KC0706PH080424 and Virginia license plate
number ZCW9537, which is anticipated to be within
the Eastern District of Virginia;
4)
One 1992 Isuzu Trooper, bearing VIN
JACDH58W7N7903937 and Virginia license plate
YRP3849, which is anticipated to be within the
Eastern District of Virginia;
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XI.
WARRANTS REQUESTED
Based on all the foregoing, I respectfully request a warrant
for the arrest of ROBERT PHILIP HANSSEN, and search warrants for
the locations described in the immediately foregoing Section of
this Affidavit.
XII. ATTESTATION
The above facts are true and correct to the best of my
knowledge and belief.
Stefan A. Pluta
Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Sworn and Subscribed to before me
this day of February, 2001.
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE