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The Political
Situation in Georgia
in the 11th-12th Centuries (up to the 1180 s)
1. STRUGGLE FOR
THE UNIFICATION OF THE GEORGIAN LANDS
Early in the eleventh century, after the death of King of Kings Gurgen
(1008), the united kingdom of Georgia consisted of the whole of Western
Georgia, Kartli and the Kartvelian kingdom excluding Southern Tao, which was
incorporated in Byzantium.
Bagrat III failed to gain possession of Tao after the death of the kurapalat
David (1001). Suffering defeat on the south-western boundary, Bagrat began
an energetic offensive on Kakheti and Hereti. As his first act, he demanded
the Kartli fortresses of Grua and Tsirkuali in the valley of the Ksani River
which had been seized by the rulers of Kakheti. King David refused to return
the fortresses, and Bagrat moved against Kakheti. The struggle for Kakheti
and Hereti lasted for two years (1008-1010). Bagrat laid waste the
countryside as for as Kakheti, occupied Hereti and appointed Abulali
governor of the province. But as soon as Bagrat departed, the "didebulis" of
Hereti expelled Bagrat's appointees and turned their country over to David.
Bagrat set out again and after a hard struggle captured Kvirike, son of the
deceased David and subjugated Hereti and Kakheti, incorporating them into
his kingdom. This was a major triumph for the central power, but Bagrat's
successors were unable to consolidate his acquisitions on account of the
unfavourable international situation. Bagrat Ill's successor King Giorgi I
(1014- 1027) spent most of his reign in a fruitless war against Byzantium.
In the years of his reign, Kakheti and Hereti dropped out of the united
kingdom. The "didebulis" of Kakheti and Hereti evidently took advantage of
the fact that the king's attention was absorbed by the war against the
Byzantine empire with the objective of retrieving Southern Tao. But the war
against the empire was unsuccessful. Southern Tao was not retrieved, and
Kakheti and Hereti were lost. Subsequently, the struggle for Kakheti and
Hereti was the keynote of Georgia's history in the eleventh-century.
In the first quarter of the eleventh century, the King of Kakheti Kvirike
(1010 - 1037) conquered Hereti and incorporated it into Kakheti. Then the
united kingdom of Kakheti-Hereti was an ally of the kings of Georgia in
their struggle against Byzantium and against the emirs of Tbilisi and
Gandza. This situation persisted as long as the united Georgian kingdom,
engaged in the war against Byzantium and in other affairs, laid no claims to
the Kakheti-Hereti kingdom. King Bagrat IV (1027- 1072) began a struggle for
Kakheti-Hereti as soon as the situation changed. In response to this, the
king of Kakheti helped Liparit Baghvashi, who had started a war against the
central power in order to weaken Bagrat. In his turn, Bagrat found allies
among the Kakheti feudal lords, who were dissatisfied with the pursued by
King Kvirike. With the support of these feudal lords Bagrat took more
energetic steps for the conquest of Kakheti and Hereti. He achieved some
successes in this struggle (1040s), taking Kvirike's supporters captive, and
sacking and burning the Bodoji Palace, the residence of the Kakheti kings
(near Tianeti) following which the Kakheti "eristavis" began surrendering
their fortresses to him one after another. But this time, too, Kakheti was
not re-united with Georgia, for Liparit Baghvashi again took the field
'against the king.
The orientaton of the kings and "didebulis" of Kakheti determined the actual
position of the kings of united Georgia. At first the Kakheti kings
supported Bagrat IV in his war against Liparit Baghvashi, but, as soon as
Bagrat showed any sign of wanting to unite all the Georgian lands, they
betrayed him and sided with Liparit.
Defeating Liparit, Bagrat began to advance on Kakheti and gained control of
almost the whole of Kakheti and Hereti by the beginning of the 1060s.
However, upon receiving the news that the Seljuk Turks had invaded Georgia
(1064), Bagrat left Kakheti and returned to Kartli. King Aghsartani: of
Kakheti took the field against him on the side of the Seljuks. With the
establishment of Seljuk rule, the re-union of Kakheti and Hereti with
Georgia was postponed for a long time.
The Tbilisi-emirate, ruled by the Jafarid family, was also outside the
united kingdom. At the beginning of the eleventh century, the territory of
the Tbilisi-emirate was confined to the town and a narrow strip of adjoining
land. As might have been expected, the incorporation of the emirate was an
urgent task of the first kings of united Georgia, and in Bagrat IV's wars
for the unification of the Georgian lands, Tbilisi was one of the main
objectives. However, a keen interest in the emirate was also displayed by
Liparit Baghvashi, whose realm directly adjoined the territory of the
emirate. Liparit knew the actual situation well and was aware that he would
be unable to conquer the Tbilisi emirate without the support of the king. He
therefore sought to initiate the seizure of Tbilisi and fight the emirate
jointly with the king so as to obtain a larger part of it when the territory
was divided. In 1032 Liparit Baghvashi and the "eristavi" of Kartli, Ivane
Abazasdze, seized the Tbilisi-emir Jafar, captured the fortress of Birtvisi
from him and took the captive emir to the king. But the king released the
emir, evidently fearing any further strengthening of his already strong
vassal, Liparit Nonetheless, the problem of Tbilisi brooked no delay, and
when some years later Liparit Baghvashi proposed a war against Tbilisi, the
king summoned his allies and besieged the town. But after a two-year siege
(1037-1039), when the town was about to surrender and the emir was getting
rafts together to depart, Bagrat unexpectedly offered peace. He reserved the
fortresses of Orbeti and Partskhisi, situated near Tbilisi, for himself and
recognised Jafar as emir. According to a chronicler, this step was taken in
secret from Liparit, evidently on the advice of a group of feudal lords
hostile to the latter. Tbilisi's liberation was vital to Georgia, but
apparently not at the price demanded by Liparit for his participation in the
siege of the town. Liparit could not forgive this step, and began an open
struggle against the king.
But it is surmised that, in his decision, King Bagrat was influenced not
only and not so much by fear of Liparit becoming stronger as by the news of
the approach of reinforcements for the emir.
The struggle to liberate Tbilisi was compounded by Liparit Baghvashi's
undisguised efforts to hinder the attainment of the king's plans.
In 1046, when emir Jafar died, power in Tbilisi passed to the hands of the
town's elders. In the then obtaining situation, the town's elders were
compelled to look for a strong patron. They appealed to the Georgian king,
offering the town to him. At this time Bagrat was in Western Georgia, where
he was laying siege to the fortress of Anakopiya that had been seized by
Byzantine troops. Although the battle for Anakopiya was nearing its end, the
question of Tbilisi was so important that the king lifted the siege and
immediately moved to the town. The Tbilisi-elders turned the keys of the
town-citadels over to the king. Bagrat occupied these citadels, garrisoning
them with his troops, but the left-bank section of the town, where the
Moslem feudal aristocracy had entrenched itself in the fortress of Isani,
offered savage resistance. Meanwhile, taking advantage of the confusion in
Tbilisi, Liparit Baghvashi again made war on the king. Bagrat was compelled
to leave and fight Liparit with the result that the town was lost once more.
In 1048 the town elders again requested Bagrat to take over Tbilisi. At the
time, Liparit Baghvashi was held captive by the Seljuks. Bagrat occupied
Tbilisi and ruled the town for three years, but in 1051, as soon as Liparit
was released from captivity, he had to leave the town again.
The situation in Tbilisi was complex. After the death of emir Jafar, his
heirs Mansur and Abul-Heija and the town elders fought for power. The emir's
heirs were eventually driven out of the town, and power passed to the
elders.
The king of united Georgia could not ignore Tbilisi, but the difficult
situation in the country compelled him to postpone the struggle for the
town. .
In the meantime, the events in Tbilisi unfolded rapidly and turbulently. The
town needed a strong patron, and since King Bagrat could not give such
patronage, in 1062 the inhabitants offered the town to Shaddadid Abul-Asvar,
but the latter feared Bagrat and turned down the offer. The town then
appealed to Aghsartani, king of Kakheti, son of Gagik, who occupied Tbilisi,
but Bagrat IV soon redeemed the town from him for a large sum of money.
Bagrat sent a garrison to the town and provided his viceroy with men,
weapons and food The affairs of the town evidently remained in the hands of
the elders, with Bagrat exercising supreme power: he instituted the office
of governor of the town and garrisoned it with his troops. But this time,
too, the town was lost, now on account of the Seljuk invasion.
The struggle by the Crown for the reunification of the Georgian lands
yielded some results. In the period from the 980s to the 1060s Kakhet-Hereti
and the emirate of Tbilisi were reunited with Georgia, but the invasion of
the Seljuks gave Bagrat TV no possibility of consolidating these successes
2. DOMESTIC
POLICY OF THE MONARCHY
The territory ruled by Bagrat III (975- 1014), the first
king of united Georgia, consisted of Western Georgia (kingdom of
Egris-Abkhazeti) and "Shida" Kartli. At the beginning of the eleventh
century. Kakheti and Hereti were united in the kingdom of Kakhet-Hereti.
Part of "Kvemo" Kartli, with the town of Tbilisi, was ruled by the
Tbilisi-emir. Since the close of the tenth century Lore-Tashiri had
comprised the Georgian-Armenian kingdom of the Kvirikids, the rulers of
which bore the title of Armenian kings. The Bagrationi kingdom was ruled by
Gurgen Bagrationi, father of Bagrat III, but after the death of Gurgen
(1008) it passed to his son and was incorporated in the united kingdom.
Such was the political map of Georgia at the beginning of the eleventh
century, and the. main task of the first kings of united Georgia was to
re-unite the other Georgian lands and thus complete the formation of a
single feudal monarchy.
Bagrat's proclamation as king of Western and Eastern Georgia only gave him
the judicial right to unite the entire country under his rule, which in a
feudal state did not signify that it was actually possible to achieve such
unity; Bagrat III had to realise his formal rights himself. The most acute
problem was that of Egris-Abkhazeti and "Shida" Kartli, because in those
regions many of the feudal lords refused to recognise Bagrat's authority.
When Bagrat was proclaimed king of Egris-Abkhazeti, that region was under
the suzerainty of blind Teodosi, his maternal uncle, and this created
considerable difficulties for Bagrat. But Bagrat got rid of Teodosi by
sending him to the kurapalati David in Tao.
As at the initial stages of the struggle to unite the Georgian lands, the
main region where Bagrat Ill's authority had to be asserted was "Shida"
Kartli. It was nominally ruled by Bagrat's mother, Queen Gurandukhti whose
residence was in the town of Uplis-Tsikhe. The territory of Kartli was
divided among powerful "aznauris" - Tbeli, Dzameli, Pavneli, Korinteli,
Pkhveneli and others - who ruled their dominions independently and, as a
Georgian historian comments, were not at all delighted at the prospect of
Bagrat asserting his power in Kartli. The struggle of the Kartli "aznauris"
against Bagrat was headed by Kavtar Tbeli, whose family was claiming the
office of "eristavi" of Kartli. In 980 Bagrat crossed into Kartli from
Western Georgia and camped at Tigva, where he was engaged in battle by the "aznauris"
led by Kavtar Tbeli. The battle was fought at Moghrisi. The king was
victorious and subordinated the unsubmissive "aznauris".
An end was thus put to the political rule of the feudal nobility in Kartli,
and this historical centre again passed to the hands of the royal house. The
queen gave Uplis-Tsikhe to her son. Bagrat removed the recalcitrant feudal
lords and appointed loyal "eristavis" in their place, following which he
returned to Western Georgia.
The big feudal lords of Western Georgia were not slow in taking advantage of
the difficult situation in Kartli. They refused to accept the royal power.
The king took drastic measures removing them from their high offices and
replacing them with his supporters.
In 989 Bagrat declared war on the Kldekari "eristavi;" Rati Baghvashi, who,
we are told by a chronicler, ruled Trialeti, Manglisis-Khevi, Skoreti and
Ateni and "refused to submit to King Bagrat graciously". In order to lull
Rati's vigilance, the king marched to Western Georgia, and in the winter
suddenly attacked the fortress of Klde-Kari. Rati surrendered, turned his
Kartli-possessions over to the king and retired to Argveti, the Baghvashi
family-estate. The king appointed Zviad Marushiani as "eristavi" of Trialeti.
Bagarat HI scorned no method to unite the country and centralise the
state-power. Seeing that it was futile to expect his cousins, the rulers of
Klarjeti, submit peacefully, he used the pretext of reconciliation to invite
them to the Panaskerti. He imprisoned them and subordinated Klarjeti to his
rule (1010).
In his policy of centralising the state-power, Bagrat sought to make all the
big feudal lords officials of the Crown.
Early in the eleventh century, he was in virtual control of the Kartvelian
kingdom, including "Shida" Kartli, and of Egris-Abkhazeti. The measures
taken by him in relation to the Baghvashi-family were only temporarily
successful-members of that family made their weight felt already during the
reign of Bagrat's immediate successors. Zviad Marushiani, the "eristavi" of
Trialeti, was utterly devoted to Bagrat and his son King Giorgi I. In the
war against the Byzantine emperor Basil II, Zviad headed the vanguard of the
Georgian forces. But then a conflict evidently arose between Giorgi I and
Zviad, and the king made Zviad a prisoner. It may be assumed that the rights
of the Baghvashi as "eristavis" of Trialeti were restored at precisely this
time. After the death of Giorgi I and the early years of the reign of Bagrat
IV (1027- 1072), Liparit, a powerful member of the Baghvashi-family, joined
the king in defending Georgia against Byzantine incursions. He supported the
king also in the war against the Gandza-emir Padlon and then with the king's
assistance endeavoured to enlarge his own dominions. In this context
attention must be drawn to the struggle against the Tbilisi-emir first in
1032 and then in 1037. But Bagrat IV understood what his powerful vassal
wanted and obstructed the latter's plans on both occasions. The
incorporation of the Tbilisi-emirate Was of vital importance to the Georgian
kingdom, but to achieve this aim on the initiative and with the support of
Liparit would have meant adding to the latter's power. This was probably why
the king twice blocked the almost consummated reunification of Tbilisi, and
this spoiled the relations between him and Liparit. These events are given
consecutively by a Georgian historian, who tells us that the enmity between
Liparit and the emir Jafar began in 1032, when the king released the emir
who had been taken prisoner by Liparit and the Kartli-eristavi" Ivane
Abazasdze. At this stage Liparit did not feel it was necessary to show that
he bore a grudge against the king, but in 1039, when, without notifying
Liparit, Bagrat IV lifted the siege of Tbilisi, "Liparit hardened his heart
against his sovereign". From that time onwards he fought the king openly. He
was supported by the Byzantine empire, which sent him troops, money and
claimants to the throne. In the 1040s Liparit fought a bitter war against
Bagrat IV. His allies were not only the Byzantine empire but also the
Kakheti-kingdom. Liparit and his allies put forward the king's step-brother
Demetre as claimant to the throne and laid siege to the fortress of Ateni.
But the defenders resisted courageously, and the fortress was not taken.
With the onset of winter, the Byzantine troops departed, and without them
Liparit did not venture to continue the struggle. He decided to make peace
with the king. Bagrat IV evidently had to reckon with his strong vassal and
preferred to have peaceful relations with him. To placate him, he appointed
him to the high office of "erismtavari" of Kartli However, the king
miscalculated, and Liparit again declared war on him.
His allies were the Kakhi and the Armenian king David, The Byzantine empire
again went to his aid with troops and money.
Once more the king's step-brother, Demetre claimed the throne.
The intensity of the struggle mounted. Liparit Baghvashi emerged victorious
and became the virtual ruler of the country. However, in 1049, when as an
ally of the Byzantine empire, he marched against the Seljuks and was taken
prisoner by them, "the nobles of this country and the, sons of Liparit,
Ivane and Niania, sought peace and recognised the power of the king". Bagrat
regained his throne, occupied Tbilisi once more and then helped the
Byzantine empire against the Seljuks. But in 1051 when the Byzantines
rescued Liparit and the latter arrived in Ani, Bagrat IV again had renounce
Tbilisi.
Bagrat was well aware that he could not oppose Liparit when the latter had
the support of Byzantium, and he decided to appeal to the emperor. He
crowned his baby-son and in 1064 set out for Constantinople. He was well
received but was virtually held in honourable captivity, and, according to a
Georgian historian was unable to return home for three years on account of
Liparit's intrigues. During these years Liparit Baghvashi was
the sole ruler of the country. In going to Byzantium Bagrat apparently felt
that he would persuade the imperial court that it was more to the empire's
advantage to be in alliance with him, the king of Georgia, than with a
strong feudal lord, who was nonetheless a vassal of the king. But the
imperial court did not as yet take the threat of the Seljuk expansion
seriously, and instead of helping Georgia (or, in any case, abstaining from
hindering her) and using her as a buffer against the Seljuks, Byzantium did
everything possible to weaken her. In the mean-time, internal difficulties
in the empire helped Bagrat IV to return home. Although under the treaty
concluded between Bagrat IV and Liparit Baghvashi, with the mediation of the
emperor.
Bagrat was recognised king of all Georgia (Iberia and Abkhazeti, i. e.,
Eastern and Western Georgia), Liparit was established as the ruler of all
Meskheti with the obligation to recognise Bagrat as his master and king to
the end of his days. Liparit thus became the supreme ruler of the whole of
South-western Georgia (Meskheti), which, in fact, signified recognition of
his independence in the Georgian kingdom. This was a major setback for the
central power. But Bagrat IV evidently had no alternative.
However, this excessive growth of Liparit's might antagonised the Meskheti
feudal lords and, headed by Sula; Kalmakheli, they seized Liparit and his
son and turned them over to the king. Liparit was deprived of all his
possessions, shorn and sent to Byzantium. His son Niania died in Armenia,
but his second son, Ivane, received the "Argveti and Kartli patrominies"
from the king. Although this crushing of the might of the Bagvashi family
was a major victory for the central power, it did not of course resolve the
problem of feudal particularism. It must be remembered that the central
power was fought not only by the Baghvashi family. As soon as Bagrat IV
ascended the throne, some of the "aznauris" of Tao, including the big
feudal, lords Vache Karichisdze and Iovane, Bishop of Bana, emigrated to
Byzantium, while in 1028, when troops of the empire approached Georgia, the
powerful feudal lords, Chan-chakhi Paleli and Arjevan Hololisdze, defected
to Byzantium and surrendered their fortresses to the enemy.
In the struggle by the central power against feudal particularism, the
king's victory over the powerful Abazasdze - family was of great
significance. Five Abazasdze-brothers went to war against the king and even
planned to take him prisoner. During the early years of Bagrat IV's reign,
one of the brothers, Ivane, was "eristavi" of Kartli and, as we have already
mentioned, together with Liparit Baghvashi, captured the Tbilisi-emir Jafar
in 1032 and brought him to the king. The king released the emir and made
Liparit Baghvashi "eristavi" of Kartli in the 1040s. We do not know what
induced the king to take this step, but there had evidently been discord
between the king and the Abazasdze-family. The office of "eristavi" of
Kartli and the territory of the Tbilisi-emirate were time and again the
couse of internal dissension in feudal Georgia.
The defeat of the Abazasdze-brothers was an important step by the king in
centralising the state-power. But the victories of Bagrat IV cannot, of
course, be regarded as the solution to the problem of subordinating the
higher feudal nobility, as subsequent events eloquently showed.
Meanwhile, the Baghvashi-family returned to power and caused considerable
unpleasantness to the Crown in the reign of Giorgi II (1072- 1089). The
seventies and eighties of the eleventh century were a difficult period from
the stadpoint of the inner class-struggle and the arbitrary rule of the
feudal lords. In principle, the big feudal princes were not against the
monarchy. Bagrat IV's most rabid enemy always named some claimant to the
throne. Liparit Baghvashi was not against the country's unification - this'
was not popular at the time. His aim was to weaken the king and render him
harmless to himself. This was distinctly seen in the terms of the peace,
which was unquestionably concluded with Bagrat IV in accordance with his own
plans through the mediation of the Byzantine emperor. Liparit recognised the
king's sovereignty only outwardly. This was what set a large group of
Meskheti feudal lords against him and brought about his downfall.
The struggle by the feudal nobility against the Crown grew particularly
savage in the reign of Giorgi II. After having remained at peace "for a
winter, summer and half a summer", writes a chronicler, the tavadis of this
kingdom, Niania Kvabulisdze, and Ivane Liparitisdze, and Vardan, eristavi of
Svaneti, took advantage of King Giorgi's youth and sowed discord in :he
land". The rebels and their allies occupied part of Kartli, sacked Egrisi,
while Niania Kvabulisdze seized the royal town of Kutaisi and emptied the
treasury. Although he gained the upper hand over the rebels, Giorgi II
failed to assess the difficulty of the situation and, instead of punishing,
decided to placate the unsubmissive feudal lords, granting them new land and
fortresses. The fruits of this policy were seen quickly. Ivane Baghvashi
rose in arms again, and although the king defeated him once more, he left
him in possession of the fortresses of Samshvilde and Klde-Kari. Then this
same Ivane seized the royal fortress of Gagi and sold it to the emir of
Gandza, Padloni, and, when sultan Malik-Shah approached Georgia, he decided
to use him in his own interests and sent his son Liparit to meet him.
The first kings of the united Georgian feudal monarchy thus had strong
opposition in the country in the person of the great feudal, nobility, who
had the support of external forces. Albeit with difficulty, the central
state-power managed to maintain an equilibrium and strengthen its position.
At this stage in the history of Georgia's feudal monarchy, the king was
still not strong enough to curb the wilfulness of the feudal lords, with his
own forces. Moreover, he did not stable socio-political basis on which he
could rely in his struggle against the feudal nobility. Therefore, at this
stage it proved to be possible to maintain an equilibrium only by relying on
the great feudal lords themselves and by using the dissensions between
individual groups. When some of the "aznauris" of Tao sided with Byzantium
and turned their fortresses over to the empire, Bagrat IV was supported by
another group of feudal lords: Saba Mtbeva-ri, Ezra Ancheli and others. It
will be recalled that Liparit Baghvashi defeated the king with the help of
the Meskheti feudal lords. In addition ,to assistance from some feudal
princes, the Crown had the support of the middle and small gentry ("aznauris"},
who regarded the king as their protector against the claims of the big
feudal princes and who often won promotion in the service of the Crown.
Bagrat III, for example, promoted loyal "aznauris" and gave them the offices
of unsubmissive nobles. Subsequently, the king and the great feudal nobility
fought for influence over the small gentry, and a heavy blow was struck at
Georgia's unity when this struggle ended with the victory of the great
nubility.
However, by the 1060s one of the stages of the king's struggle against the
feudal nobility had ended with the victory of the central power, although
this victory did not lead ,to the final suppression of feudal opposition.
An acute problem was that of the position of the Church. The Georgian Church
had at one time supported the striving for the unification of all the
Georgian lands. At a certain stage this conformed to the interests of the
Church, for it led to the proliferation and strengthening of the Church's
jurisdiction in the re-united lands. But after the country was united, the
Georgian Church was the first feudal organisation to begin a struggle for
immunity and made considerable headway. Early in the eleventh century (1011
- 1014), Bagrat III, the first king of the united Georgian kingdom, who had
fought perseveringly to centralise the state-power, was compelled to yield
to the Church, and, for the support that it had given him, granted it the
immunity that was demanded by the patriarch Melkisedeki.
The higher clergy gradually became the mainstay of reactionary forces.
Bagrat III attempted to subordinate the Church to the central, power,
summoning from Byzantium for this purpose Giorgi Mtatsmindeli, the Father
Superior of the Iberia Monastery of mount Athon. But this attempt failed on
account of the generally prevailing difficult situation.
Nonetheless, the long, struggle between the king and the great secular
feudal aristocracy yielded some results by the 1060s. Bagrat IV's victory
over Baghvashi and the Abazasdze-family gave him a stronger hand in the
country itself and beyond it, and, with the change in the international
situation in the Middle East, this elevated his role in the eyes of the
Byzantine empire. Whereas during the early years of his reign Bagrat had to
ask the emperor for the title of "kurapalati", he was granted the title of "novelissimus"
in 1040 and of in 1060.
3. FOREIGN
POLICY OF THE GEORGIAN KINGDOM RELATIONS WITH BYZANTIUM
Relations with Byzantium were one of the basic problems
of Georgia's foreign policy in the eleventh century.
Byzantium supported the Christian states of the Transcaucasus as long as it
needed them to counter-balance the Arab-caliphate. In the Middle East the
balance of strength changed in the early 11th century. The Arab-caliphate
and the Moslem-emirates that sprang up on its ruins were not a serious
threat to the empire. But the unity and growing strength of Georgia and
Armenia were now a menace to the long-established supremacy of Byzantium in
the Middle East, and for that reason the empire could no longer afford to
support them. Although in the course of the eleventh century (until the
invasion of the Seljuks) the Georgian state achieved certain successes in
establishing its internal and external position, it failed to deliver itself
from the empire's supremacy and interference in its internal affairs.
Moreover, in the Transcaucasus and on the international scene, increasing
importance was attached to the empire's support and favours, the outward
signs of which were the Byzantine court-titles of the Transcaucasian rulers.
In the eleventh century there were signs that Byzantium had begun to weaken,
but in the first half of that century the empire managed to maintain an
equilibrium in external and internal affairs.
The empire pursued an energetic offensive-policy towards Georgia and
Armenia. It was not content with merely formal recognition of its
sovereignty but wanted a real assertion of its supremacy, which it partially
achieved relative to Armenia. This purpose was pursued by the seizure of the
kingdom of Tao, the heritage of ...David Kurapalati, the creation of the
thema of Iberia, and the vigorous offensive on Armenia. But the relations
between Georgia and Byzantium deteriorated sharply at the beginning of the
eleventh century, when the Georgian state began to grow stronger. The
largest factor hindering the further consolidation of the Georgian state
throughout the eleventh century was the inner class-struggle fanned and
sustained by the empire.
It is unquestionable that, without the empire's support, the Baghvashi
family would have been unable to inflict serious harm on Georgia's
unification, in the same way as Byzantium would hardly have been able to
interfere actively in Georgia's internal affairs without the support of the
Bagvashi. A result of the interlacing of these internal and external factors
was that in the eleventh century (until David IV) the Georgian kings not
only accepted but did themselves seek Byzantine court-titles.
The title of "kurapalat" was one of the highest at the imperial court. The
granting of this or some other title was not always evidence that the
recipient was a subordinate. Up to the close of the eleventh century (until
the reign of David the Builder), the Georgian kings sought these titles. The
title of "kurapalat " evidently carried international prestige, because the
Byzantine emperors granted it also to European rulers, while, in the twelfth
century, to their brothers as well. Although this title entailed no
privileges, it signified Byzantine recognition of the hereditary rights of
the Georgian kings to Tao and Klarjeti.
As we have noted, in the eleventh century Georgian-Byzantine relations began
with the empire wresting away Southern Tao (called "Imier" Tao in Georgian
records) and the creation of the thema of Iberia. In the eleventh century,
the empire's aggression against Georgia followed two directions. On the one
hand, the empire strove to interfere in Georgia's internal affairs, for
which it had to have an obedient king on the Georgian throne. To achieve
this aim, the empire supported the big feudal lords fighting the king and
gave refuge to the children of the Bagrationi-family, who were later set up
in opposition to the legitimate kings as claimants to the throne. The
imperial power did not disdain to resort to deceit, bribery, promises and so
on. On the other hand, Byzantium seized Georgian lands. Although the
struggle for the heritage of the kurapalat David was started by the Georgian
state, during the wars between Georgia and Byzantium some Georgian feudal
lords sided with Byzantium, turning their fortresses over to it.
From the aforesaid it follows that, in the eleventh century, the empire
pursued two objectives relative to Georgia:
1) the seizure of Georgian lands, and
2) interference in its internal affairs.
Southern Tao, the heritage of the kurapalati David, was the largest
territory wrested by the empire from Georgia at the beginning of the
eleventh century.
Bagrat III had no legal rights to the heritage of the kurapalati David,
because David had promised it to Basil II not only verbally; he sent his
emissaries to the empire to formalize the agreement, which they sealed with
vows and signatures. By virtue of this agreement, after David's death the
Tao-"aznauris" surrendered their fortresses to the Emperor Basil, who then
set up the therna of Iberia governed by a Byzantine official. This seizure
of Southern Tao by Byzantium left the Southern of Georgia exposed. It was
from her, that the empire expanded into Georgia and Armenia. By forming the
thema of Iberia the empire created a stronghold on Georgian territory
proper; at 'the same time, it laid claim to Khlati, Archeshi and Berkri,
thereby endeavouring to form a buffer on the south. Byzantium's, seizure of
Southern Tao was a heavy blow to the Georgian state.
We already know that Bagrat III tried to halt this action, but had to
retreat. Naturally, the Georgian state seized very first opportunity to try
to retrieve the lost lands. In 1001 Bagrat III* father, King of Kings
Gurgen, who ruled Northern Tao, invaded Southern Tao. The outcome of this
invasion is not at all clear. Having steered towards unification, Georgia
could not reconcile herself to the loss of her territories and took every
opportunity to win them back. Giorgi I (1014-1027) felt that such an
opportunity came when the Emperor Basil II was engaged in a war with the
Bolgars. Giorgi invaded Southern Tao and, according to Yahya of Antioch,
occupied the fortresses and regions which his uncle, David had ceded to the
Emperor Basil.
Aristakes Lastivertsi gives a different account of the beginning of the war.
According to him, when Giorgi I ascended the throne, the emperor Basil sent
him the following message: "Leave everything that I had granted your father
from the possessions of the kurapalat and rule only your own patrimonies."
In the content of this account fry Aristakes, considerable attention is
demanded by Asokhik's account of the invasion of Southern Tao by King Gurgen
(1001) and his statement that, after the death of Gurgen (1008), his son
Bagrat III ruled the region of Tao. Although the possibility is not to be
excluded that in this ease the Georgian historian meant only Northern Tao,
against the background of Aristakes' account it is quite conceivable that he
had in mind the entire historical province of Tao-both southern and
northern. In this case it must be assumed that Gurgen achieved his
objective, and that Basil, returned Southern Tao to him. But even if Georgia
received Southern Tao from Basil as a result of Gurgen's invasion (1001),
the emperor evidently ceded these lands to Bagrat HI (in whose name his
father should have acted) only for his lifetime. From this standpoint the
accounts of Aristakes Lastivertsi, Yahya of Antioch and the Georgian
eleventh-century historian complement each other.
It may be assumed that the invasion of Southern Tao fey Georgian forces
under Gurgen compelled Basil II to make certain concessions, notably the
transfer of part (or the whole?) of Southern Tao to Bagrat III as a
hereditary possession. But Giorgi I ignored this, and, after his father's
death, he did not fulfil the terms Of the treaty. This was evidently due to
Basil's demand that Giorgi should leave all that he had granted to his
father from the possessions of the kurapalati to which Giorgi replied; "I
shall not surrender a single house of what belonged to my father!" This was
followed by Basil's invasion of Southern Georgia, but his forces were
repulsed. This interpretation of the accounts of historians gives us a
clearer picture of the causes of the Georgian-Byzantine war.
Basil planned to invade Georgia. In preparing for a war against the empire
Giorgi I conducted negotiations with the Egyptian sultan Al-Khakim, offering
to carry out joint military operations against Byzantium. The Egyptian
Fatimids were the empire's main enemies in the East at the time. This put
Basil in a difficult situation, and he refrained from invading Georgia. But
as soon as Al-Khakim, the ally of the Georgian king, died, Basil moved his
troops into Georgia (1021).
The exhausting war against Byzantium dragged on for two years. It was fought
with alternating success. Through negotiations, protracted military
operations, the enlistment of new allies and so on, Giorgi tried to defeat
Basil. In this war Georgia's allies were the kings of Kakheti and Hereti and
the Armenian Bagratids. But the war against Byzantium was' lost, and under
the peace-treaty signed in 1023, the tree-year-old prince Bagrat (the future
Bagrat IV) was sent to Constantinople as a hostage for two years. The empire
took over all the fortresses it had occupied by force or by treaty: Basil
took over all that David kurapalat had ruled in Tao, Basiani, Kola-Artaani
and Javakheti.
Basil took no further steps against Georgia and, by the terms of the treaty,
permitted prince Bagrat to return home two years later: but a conspiracy led
by Nikifor Komnin, the ruler ("arkhont") of Vaspurakan, and involving the
Georgian king Giorgi I, was brought to light upon the death of Basil, and
the new emperor, Constantine, activated his policy towards Georgia. This
conspiracy was evidently a response to Constan-tine's decision to return
prince Bagrat, who had been sent home, but, when the imperial messenger
overtook the prince, the latter proved to be out reach - he was in his
father's kingdom.
As ruler of Iberia the emperor appointed the eunuch Nikita, who enlisted
some Georgian nobles to the side of the empire. In Iberia confusion and
discord apparently reigned among the Local nobility, and this made some of
the Georgian feudal lords side with the empire and transfer their fortresses
to it. Other feudal lords were exiled from their patronimies, and their
towns and fortresses were seized by the empire, which thereby strengthened
its position. The exiled nobility were given new possessions in the empire
itself.
The struggle for the Georgian lands wrested by Byzantium continued. Upon
ascending the throne, Bagrat IV (1027 - 1072) demanded the return of these
lands from Constantine. In reply Constantine sent a large force to Georgia.
This army devastated the same lands that had been laid waste by the emperor
Basil and besieged the fortress of Kldekari. Liparit Baghvashi, the "eristavi"
of Kldekari, stood firm in the fortress, but the feudal princes, Chanchakhi
Paleli and Arjevan Ololisdze, went over to the empire and surrendered the
fortresses of Garkloba and Tserpti (in Shavsheti and Klarjeti) to the
Byzantines. In this time of stress, Sabba Bishop of Tbeti, built a fortress,
rallied patriots and entrenched to fight the Byzantines. In this fortress he
was joined by Ezra, Bishop of Anchi, and by the Shavsheti-"aznauris". The
Byzantines suffered defeat, but then had recourse to tried and tested means,
promises and bribes, and backed the claims of Demetre Klarji, a member of
the Klarji branch of the Bagrationi-family, to the throne. This strongly
influenced a segment of the population. An extremely difficult situation
arose, from which the country was saved by the death of Constantine. The
imperial troops were recalled. The bickerings in the empire self somewhat
eased the situation for Georgia.
At the begining of the 1030s Georgia faced considerable difficulties. The
acute problems confronting her were that of uniting Georgian lands (Kakheti,
Hereti and Tbilisi-emirate) and of curbing the great feudal princes. It was,
therefore, more expedient temporarily to renounce "Imier". Tao in order to
avoid inevitable war with Byzantium, for which Georgia was unprepared. An.
embassy led by Queen Mariam (mother of Bagrat IV) and the Patriarch of
Georgia Melkisedeki was sent to settle relations with Byzantium. The
peace-terms proposed by Georgia were acceptable to Byzantium. Bagrat IV was
granted the title of "kurapalati" and Mariam brought her son a bride, Helen,
niece of emperor Roman III. But the situation did not suit either side.
Georgia was on the road of political rejuvenation. The Crown had united
around itself all the Georgian lands and was preparing to play a vigorous
part on the political scene in the Transcau-casus. A strong Georgia would
undoubtedly impinge upon Byzantine interests in Transcaucasia, while, for
its part, despite the peace, Byzantium looked for allies against Georgia in
add outside that country. This was the time when the empire gained
possession of the Anakopiya - fortress, an important stronghold in
North-western Georgia.
-The Anakopiya-fortress was part of the patrimony of prince Demetre, a
foster-brother of Bagrat IV. The king and his mother, Queen Mariam, tried to
win over Demetre, but he evidently had no particular trust in them. Bagrat's
enemies likewise sought Demetre's support against the king, promising the
throne to him. The prince wavered tot a long time, but then turned Anakopiya
over to Byzantium, for which he received the appropriate reward and the
title of "magister". The empire now invaded Georgia's north-western
outskirts as well. Yet another cause for a conflict between Georgia and
Byzantium was maturing, although the peace-treaty, bearing the gold-seal,
was not, formally broken.
In the recalcitrant vassal, Liparit Baghvashi, the empire found a reliable
ally against Bagrat IV. The Kldekari-fortress was the key to the invasion of
Kartli, but it was almost-impossible to take it by force. The significance
of this fortress and of its ruler was appreciated by the empire, and every
effort was made to win over Liparit Baghvashi. The conflict between Bagrat
IV and Liparit over Tbilisi helped to strengthen Liparlt's alliance with
Byzantium.
In 1044-45, when Bagrat IV was fighting for the reunification of Kakheti,
Byzantine troops invaded Kartli, devasting that province. Now that the "eristavi"
Liparit, ruler of Kldekari, was its ally, it was easy for the empire to
penetrate the heartland-legions of Georgia. In order to sow discord and
confusion, Liparit backed Prince Demetre's claims to the throne. At first
the situation deteriorated, because some other feudal princes sided with
Liparit. But eventually this invasion, too, yielded no results, and Georgia
gradually strengthened her position and even brought pressure to bear.
In 1045 Byzantium abolished the independence of the Ani-kingdom, in advance
decoying Gagik, the last king of the Armenian. Bagratid dynasty, to
Constantinople. This act generated foment in Armenia. The various political
groups fought over the question of foreign-policy-orientation. Georgian
diplomacy evidently had a hand in this, too. The Ani-nobles placed the town
under the suzerainty of Bagrat IV, thus striking a heavy blow at Byzantine
policy in the Transcaucasus. After this, Bagrat decided to win back the
Anakopiya - and Khupati-fortresses in order to deprive the empire of its
strongholds in the north and south of the Georgian Black Sea coast. He
achieved considerable successes in Tbilisi. Gagik, King of Kakheti, and his
nobles went to Bagrat with a petition. This growth of Bagrat's power was
resented by the empire and its ally, Liparit, and Prince Demetre was then
again proposed for the throne. As might have been expected, there was a
split in the country, part of it siding with Demetre and the other part with
Bagrat.
We have noted that the nomination of a claimant to the Georgian throne was a
tested method of imperial diplomacy. It led to a regrouping of forces and
complicated the situation in the country. After Demetre's death the empire
had no formal excuse, but it did not cease its efforts to weaken Bagrat's
position. To this end it used the services of Liparit and other traitors.
In 1049 when Liparit Baghvashi fell into the hands of the Seljuks, Bagrat IV
attempted to settle his relations with the empire and regulate affairs in
the country. Liparit's imprisonment forced Constantino to look for another
ally. Bagrat took advantage of this and helped the empire against the
Seljuks. But for the empire, the alliance with Liparit had an entirely
different significance: he was needed by Byzantium not so much against the
Seljuks as against Bagrat, and the empire therefore made every effort to
secure his release. The emperor obtained Liparit's release, and this again
complicated the situation for Bagrat.
Many state-measures were disrupted by the empire's support for traitorous
Georgian feudal lords, particularly Liparit Baghvashi. Georgia lost Ani,
could not win back the Khupati-and Anakopiya-fortresses and had to abandon
her plans for the reunification of Tbilisi. Matters reached a stage where
Bagrat IV was compelled to appear personally before the emperor. This was
the second embassy sent to the empire in the reign of Bagrat IV. The king's
suite included his mother, Mariam, who had experience of diplomacy.
The political situation in the Transcaucasus took a drastic turn for the
worse. Georgia was steadily growing stronger on the road to unification, and
this prejudiced the interests of the empire. Although he was formally a
vassal of the empire, the kurapalati Bagrat denied recognition to the power
of the emperor in Georgia, endeavoured to drive the Byzantines out of their
strongholds (Anakopiya, Khupati) and challenged Byzantine rule in Armenian
lands (Ani).
Georgia was a rival of the empire in the Transcaucasus, and this Byzantium
could not tolerate and thus it strove to get rid of Bagrat. The imperial
power knew it could not abolish the kingdom in Georgia and did not set
itself that aim. It also knew that it could not deprive the
Bagrationi-family of the throne, and it did not even try. It confined itself
to efforts to get rid of the strong and energetic Bagrat IV and place a
docile king on the Georgian throne in his place. For that reason the empire
gave refuge to all discontented members of the branches of the royal house
of Bagrationi in order to proclaim them claimants to the throne at the
appropriate moment. A claimant with little legal entitlement would carry out
the will of the emperor upon receiving the throne from him. For this purpose
the empire also needed Georgian nobles, and it did not relax its efforts to
win them over.
In the eleventh century (Bagrat III, Bagrat IV), the Georgian court pursued
an active policy of centralising the state-power and waged an uncompromising
struggle against unsubmissive feudal princes. Some large feudal units were
abolished, and this intensified the inter-class-struggle. Innumerable agents
of the empire recruited feudal lords who were dissatisfied with the Crown's
policy. Once again recourse was had to bribes and promises. At the time when
Georgia was taking steps to centralise the state-power, in Byzantium the
top-echelon-nobility was receiving considerable privileges. Defectors
counted on special privileges, and these were indeed received by many of
them. The defection of a number of Georgian feudal lords was prompted by the
inter-class-struggle that became acute in eleventh-century Georgia on
account of the steps taken to centralise the state-power.
It must be borne in mind that by no means all the big feudal princes went
over to the empire. On the contrary, a powerful group supported the Crown in
its struggle against external and internal enemies. In the reign of Bagrat
IV Vache Karichisdze, the Bana bishop, Ioane, and others sided with
Byzantium, but Sabba bishop of Tbeti, and other "aznauris" supported the
king and saved the country from ruin. When the Byzantines used Demetre
Klarji as a claimant to the throne of Bagrat IV and enlisted the aid of some
feudal princes, Ezra Ancheli, Ioane (son of Sumbat, the "eristavi" of
Artanuji), and some other nobles remained loyal to the king and defended the
country. When the Byzantine aggression against Georgia was supported by
Liparit Baghvashi and other feudal lords, Bagrat IV, aided by another group
of great feudal princes offered resistance to the enemy and upheld the
kingdom. As a matter of fact, not very many feudal lords defected, because
support for the empire ultimately led to exile.
While Byzantium clung to its conquests in the Transcauca-sus, Georgia fought
to assert her sovereign-rights. As we have noted earlier, in the 1050s the
situation compelled Bagrat IV to go to the imperial court. The treaty
concluded between Georgia and Byzantium unequivocally indicated the special
role played by Liparit Baghvashi in the relations between Georgia and
Byzan-ium. In the political situation obtaining in Middle East at the time,
recognition of Liparit Baghvashi's power by the Byzantine empire and the
Seljuk sultan was decisive in giving him increasing political weight. He was
the empire's agent in Georgia. The empire had no intention of giving him the
Georgian throne, and this goal was not pursued by him because the House of
Bagrationi was so firmly established on the Georgian throne that the idea of
deposing it was not popular. The Byzantines , and Liparit sought to replace
Bagrat with his relatives, and now Liparit counterposed Giorgi to Bagrat.
The character of the treaty concluded between the empire and Georgia, made
it obvious that Byzantium was preparing for the latter a fate similar to
that which overtook Armenia. Indeed, if we closely examine the empire's
policy towards Georgia and Armenia, we shall find that it strove to bring
all Georgian and Armenian lands gradually under its control. As early as at
the close of the tenth century, when conditions ripened, the empire
juridically consolidated its rule in Southern Tao and similarly consolidated
its rule in the Ani, Vaspurakan and Vanand kingdoms.
While the empire sought to seize Georgian lands and subordinate the king of
Georgia, in the long term counting on luring Bagrat IV into the empire and,
as in the case of Gagik Bagratuni and Senekerim Artsruni, granting him lands
there and turning the Georgian kingdom into a province, the king of Georgia
had no intention of submitting to the empire; rather he endeavoured to
regain the Georgian fortresses held by the empire and came forward as the
empire's rival in the struggle for Armenia. However, Bagrat IV was defeated
in the long struggle and went to Constantinople to give himself up. The
emperor Constantine and Liparit skilfully utilised their advantage and
reduced Bagrat's rights. However, Liparit's capture by the king radically
changed the situation in Georgia. The headway then made by the king in
uniting the country gave Georgia a new international standing.
This was accompanied by a change in the character of the relations between
Georgia and Byzantium. The empire had to treat Georgia with greater care.
Soon afterwards the Seljuks appeared on the Transcaucasian scene, and this
changed the alignment of forces in the Middle East for a Song time.
Relations with Armenia. In the foreign policy of the Georgian feudal
monarchy an important place was held by the question of relations with
neighbouring Armenia.
These were long-standing relations, and they became particularly intensive
in the ninth-tenth centuries, when the struggle for the unification of
Georgia, following the incorporation of Armenian kingdoms and
principalities, developed into a struggle for a single Christian state in
the Transcaucasus. Although the Armenian kingdoms were active in this
struggle in the first half of the tenth century and achieved major
successes, superiority in the Transcaucasus gradually passed to the
Georgians. In this connection, Bagrat Ill's accession to the throne of a
united (Western and Eastern) Georgian state was an act of great importance.
The unification of a large proportion of the Georgian lands spelled out the
final collapse of the Transcaucasian policy pursued by the Armenian kings.
This act signified the rejection of the claims of the Armenian kings to
Georgian lands and laid the beginning of the claims of the Georgian feudal
state to Armenian lands proper. But these were as yet long-term aims, and
the Armenian kings continued their attempts to interfere in Georgian
affairs.
In the context of Armenian-Georgian relations, the fact that the Armenian
king Sumbat Bagratuni attended the coronation of Bagrat III was of immense
significance. Asokhik, the eleventh-century Armenian historian, wrote that
the kurapalati David and the Armenian king Sumbat placed Bagrat, son of
Gurgen, on the Georgian throne. That Submat Bagratuni (977 - 990)
participated in the coronation of Bagrat III was quite possible and
justified: Sumbat had been an ally of the kurapalati David in many of his
actions, and since Bagrat Bagrationi's elevation to the West-Georgian throne
was linked with certain difficulties, David could have invited Sumbat to
support him. In addition to being a token of support, Sumbat's presence
(possibly, with the appropriate retinue) was of political importance. It
meant the recognition of Bagrat's kingdom by a neighbouring state.
Conflicts between Georgian and Armenian states continued in the
tenth-eleventh centuries over abjoining lands. By that time part of "Kvemo"
Kartli ("Kartvelta veli" - "Vrats dasht") and Tashiri were ruled by David,
son of Gurgen, brother of the Armenian kings Sumbat and Gagik I (990 -
1020). The residence of David, king of Tashir-Dzorageti, was in Samshvilde.
David seized Dmanisi and subordinated the Tbilisi-emir. He made war also on
the emir of Gandza Paldoni. But his mounting strength evidently hit the
interests of neighbouring rulers, particularly the "marzpan" Demetre, ruler
of Gagi, who had sided with the Georgian king, adopted the Georgian (Chalce-donian)
faith and set up his son, the "mampali". Tashir, in Hyune-vanky. However,
David attacked him, drove him out of the Gagi-fortress and divested him of
all his fortresses and patrimonies. Feeling his strength, David refused to
submit to the Armenian king Gagik, who took the field against him and gained
his submission once again.
Early in the ninth century a large part of Southern Georgia ("Kvemo" Kartli)
was thus ruled by Armenian kings, but Georgia had more important and urgent
tasks at the time and, for that reason, the Georgian kings preferred to
maintain peaceful relations with Gagik I. Bagrat III sought to use Gagik
against the common enemy - the emir Paldoni. We already know that David of
Tashir-Dzorageti went to war against Paldoni (of course, he acted on orders
from Gagik), but we do not know the outcome of that campaign. It probably
ended without any clear result.
But after Kakheti and Hereti were united (1008 - 1010), the emir Padlon
began to raid the Georgian frontier-regions and Bagrat III decided to punish
him. But before engaging the strong emir, Bagrat had to have the help of
Armenia, He sent an emissary to Gagik, who responded to the Georgian king's
request, for Padloni was encroaching upon his interests as well.
The alliance between Georgia and the Ani-kingdom was not violated for a long
time. In 1021-1022, when Georgia fought Byzantium, Gagik's successor Ioann,
king of Ani, was an ally of Giorgi I.
The first kings of the united Georgian state appreciated the significance of
their alliance with the Armenian kingdom in the struggle against Byzantium
and Gandza. This explains Giorgi I's intervention in the internal affairs of
the Ani-Bagratids. A dynastic struggle for the throne flared up between the
brothers loann-Sumbat and Ashot after the death of their father, Gagik I.
Giorgi I intervened in this struggle on the side of loann-Sumbat, who by
right of seniority received the fortress of Ani and the surrounding
territory, while Ashot was given an interior region.
This internecine struggle coincided with the Georgian-Byzantine war, and it
was totally undesirable to lose the Armenian Bagratids as allies at this
time. Although Giorgi 1 had taken three fortress from Ioann-Sumbat
(apparently in compensation for assistance), the latter supported Giorgi I
in the war against Byzantium. Subsequently, Sumbat had to bequeath his
possessions to the empire in writing. Along with Georgia's defeat in the war
with Byzantium, this was a major setback in foreign policy. Meanwhile, with
the backing of the empire Ashot enlarged his domains.
The empire demanded that Gadik II fulfil the terms of the will left by
Ioann-Sumbat. Regrettably, there is nothing in the records to show what role
the Georgian kingdom played in the events which in 1045 resulted in the
empire abolishing the power of the Bagratids in Armenia and conquering the
Ani-kingdom. the political situation in Georgia (the actions by Liparit
Baghvashi, the Byzantine invasion of Georgia, and so on) was hardly
conducive to active Georgian participation in Armenian affairs. But
Georgia's overall attitude towards Armenia and the pro-Georgian stand of a
segment of the Armenian population is seen in the fact that people of Ani
turned their kingdom over to Bagrat IV. When the Byzantine authorities
detained Gagik II in the empire, the urban nobility of Ani decided to give
the kingdom to King David of Tashir-Dzorageti, to Shaddadid Abu-Asvar, ruler
of Dvin, or to the Georgian king Bagrat IV. The issue was evidently settled
in favour of the Georgian king, who took over the town of Ani and the
adjoining regions.
In Ani Bagrat IV appointed governors, but there the Georgian power was
shortlived (lasting about three months). The Byzantine empire could not
reconcile itself to this situation. All forces were mobilised: in
particular, on orders from the emperor. Liparit Baghvashi seized the
Ant-rulers appointed by Bagrat IV, while Byzantine troops entered Georgia.
Bagrat had to renounce Ani, which was annexed by Byzantium in 1045. At this
stage the historical situation in Georgia excluded the possibility of
further Georgian intervention in Armenian affairs.
Relations with the Gandza emirate. The Gandza emirate, one of
Georgia's neighbours, became active at this time. The emirs of Gandza laid
claim to Kakheti and Hereti because these lands directly adjoined their
domains and the unification of Kakhet-Hereti with the rest of Georgia
created a threat to the emirate.
. In the 1010s, Emir Fadl I ibn Muhammad Shaddadid (985 - 1031) began
piratical raids in Kakheti and Hereti. Bagrat III decided to go to war
against him and called upon the king of Ani, Gagik I, to take joint-action.
The allies joined forces at Dzorageti and attacked the Gandza emir. Padlon
took refuge in Shamkori. The allied troops invested the town and within a
few days destroyed its fortifications. When they were about to break into
the town, Padlon 's envoys appeared. The emir asked for peace on terms of
vassalage to Georgia, pledging to pay tribute and place his troops at the
disposal of the Georgian king. Bagrat III summoned his council (consisting
of "didebulis") and it was decided to accept these terms.
At first Padlon abided by the terms of the peace, but in the early years of
Bagrat IV's reign he renounced his allegiance. Kakheti and Hereti were not
yet part of the united Georgian state and were ruled by Kvirike III the
Great (1010- 1037). The latter initiated a new campaign against Padloni.
This was quite understandable, for the kingdom of Kakhet-Hereti bordered
upon the emirate and the insubordination of the emir worried Kvirike more
than anybody else. The troops of King Kvirike, the Tashir-Dzorageti king
David and the Tbilisi-emir Jafar united under the standard of the Georgian
king. They were probably annoyed by the emir's growing strength. The allies
defeated Padloni, putting him to flight and capturing considerable booty.
However, they failed to subjugate the emirate. Padloni nursed his
bitterness, and in 1037 - 1039, when Bagrat IV was besieging Tbilisi,
Padloni's son Ali Lashkari (1034- 1049) went to the aid of the Tbilisi-emir.
In the 1040s the emir of Gandza was thus no longer a vassal of the Georgian
state. But when the Seljuks invaded the Transcausus and surrounded Gandza,
Bagrat IV gave battle to the Seljuks in alliance with the empire in 1049-50,
and the allies repulsed them.
This was in the period when Liparit Baghvashi was a prisoner of the Seljuks
and Bagrat IV was trying to settle his relations with the empire and was
therefore glad to render Byzantium a service by fighting the Seljuks. But
apart from other considerations, the Seljuks were a treat to Georgia herself
and therefore in defending Gandza, the Georgian king was protecting the
approaches of his own kingdom against a formidable enemy.
4. THE SELJUK
INVASION OF THE TRANSCAUCASUS
Seljuk troops appeared in the Transcaucasus for the first
time in the 1030s. Their first raids were undertaken for the sake of
pillage, but already at that time Turks were beginning to settle in lands
neighbouring on Georgia, and this explains the participation of the troops
of Bagrat IV in the struggle to expel them.
In the 1040s, when the Turks began their conquest of Armenia, there was no
independent Armenian state on the political map of Transcaucasia - the
Armenian lands were ruled by Byzantium. As far as it could, the Byzantine
empire protected the approaches to Transcaucasia- Some historians believe
that, in the beginning the combined forces of Liparit Baghvashi and the
empire inflicted a series of defeats on the Seljuks, but then military
fortune frowned upon the empire. The battles of Dendanekan (1040) and
Mancikert (1071) and the internecine struggle predicated Byzantium's
political decline in the 1070s.
Georgia found herself single-handed against the Seljuks. It is surmised
that, although Seljuk raiders appeared in regions neigbouring upon Georgia
as early as the 1030s, the first major Seljuk invasion of Georgia with the
objective of seizing that country and asserting Turkish rule took place in
1064 in the reign of sultan Alp-Arslan {1063- 1072). This invasion was
unexpected. The Seljuks devastated Kangari and Trialeti. In a single day
Alp-Arslan's raiders reached Kvelis Kuri, crossed into Shavsheti, Klarjeti
and Tao and reached Panaskerti. On the same day they descended into Tori and
Ghvi-viskhevi, while the sultan himself camped for three days in Trialeti.
Bagrat IV and his family were in Tao, but he quickly returned to Kartli. The
Seljuks crossed into Javakheti and invested Akhalkalaki. Georgia had
evidently been preparing for the Turkish invasion and had fortified her
towns, but she had not completed the Akhalkalaki-fortifications. The troops
courageously defended the town's uncompleted walls and then the fighting
continued in the town itself. The Turks seized countless Christians, booty
and many prisoners. The Akhaikalaki River ran red with blood.
Despite this success, the sultan ceased his invasion of Georgia. This was
perhaps due to the resistance encountered by him. From Akhalkalaki the
sultan sent an envoy to Bagrat IV requesting the hand of the latter's niece
(daughter or his sister). He then marched to Ani, took the town and set up
Manuche. son of Abulsuar, as the governor.
Bagrat IV's niece, whose hand had been asked for by the sultan, was also the
niece of the Armenian (Tashir-Dzorageti), King Kvirike, (daughter of his
brother), and for that reason Bagrat requested his consent to the marriage.
But Kvirike refused. Bagrat took advantage of this. By that time the sultan
was no longer in Georgia, and Bagrat sent Varaz-Bakur Gamre-keli to Kvirike
at the head of a large host. Gamrekeli won over Kvirike's followers, and
seized him and his brother Sumbat. Bagrat sent his niece to the sultan,
thereby establishing blood lies with his powerful neighbour. Shortly before
this he had given his daughter Mariam (Marta) in marriage in Byzantium. He
hoped that this would secure him on both sides of his frontiers.
However, kinship did not for long, and in 1068, when Bagrat was fighting for
Kakheti, the sultan entered Hereti through Ran. Hereti was ruled by the king
of Georgia, and, upon receiving news of the Turkish invasion, Bagrat left
Kakheti and at once returned to Kartli. All of his enemies went over to the
sultan. The king of Kakheti Aghsartan who was being pressured by Bagrat,
went to the sultan with rich gifts, adopted Islam and pledged to pay
tribute. In return the sultan gave him all the fortresses of Kakheti. When
the sultan attacked Georgia, his entourage included the Armenian king
Kvirike, the Tbilisi-emir Jafar, and the king of Kakheti, Aghsartan .
The combined forces entered Kartli. The Georgian historian gives a sombre
picture of the situation. Kartli was devsted and most of the population was
exterminated, expelled or taken into captivity. This time the Seljuks
crossed into Western Georgia as well and laid it waist as for as Argveti;
some of their forces reached the fortress of Sveri.
The Seljuk invasion began on December 10; within six weeks the Turks ruined
the country, but then sever frosts set in, and Bagrat, evidently counting on
the Seljuks encountering difficulties, sent Ivane, son of Liparit, to the
sultan with an offer of peace. But the sultan sent him back to Bagrat,
demanding a tribute for peace. But due to the heavy frost, he was unable to
stay and wait for the reply, and he departed from Kartli. Before leaving
Georgia, the Sultan took Tbilisi and Rustavi and transferred them to Padlon
, the Georgian king's implacable enemy and strongest rival. The purpose of
this act was to aggravate the differences between Padlon and Bagrat and to
weaken the latter.
Padlon began raiding Bagrat's domains. He skilfully used his position,
entrenched himself strongly in Tbilisi and from there wrought destruction in
Kartli. Georgian troops gave battle to Padloni and defeated him; Padlon fell
into Bagrat's hands and was released only through the mediation of the
sultan. Nevertheless, the emir did not calm down, and Bagrat decided to
punish him again. He called for the assistance of his brother-in-law, the
Ossetian King, Dorgholeli, who arrived at the head of an army of 40,000 men.
The combined Georgian-Ossetian forces ravaged Paldoni's possessions and
returned with large booty.
Georgia was evidently able partially to heal the wounds inflicted by the
Seljuk invasions. The victory over Padlon was likewise of no little
importance to her. Bagrat recovered a number of towns and fortresses.
Since at this stage sultan Alp-Arslan's main objective was to expel
Byzantium from Anatolia, he could not take decisive steps against Georgia,
and rested content with sending emissaries and gifts to the king but
demanded tribute from him. Bagrat likewise acted diplomatically: he also
sent emissaries and rich gifts but avoided paying tribute.
Peace reigned in the land for some time. This was due to the situation in
the Seljuk kingdom. In 1072 conspirators assassinated Alp-Arslan; Bagrat IV
died in the same year.
in 1073-74 sultan Malik-Shah renewed the invasion of Georgia. The "eristavi"
of Kldekari, Ivane Baghvashi, sent his son Liparit to meet the sultan.
Having recovered from their defeat the Baghvashi-family took advantage of
the kingdom's difficulties to build up their strength with foreign
assistance, but Ivane failed to win the sultan's good graces and fled. Malik-Shah
entered Georgia, taking Samshvilde; Ivane Baghvashi and his family and
entourage were taken captive by the sultan, who ravaged Kartli, taking many
prisoners and considerable booty. He then withdrew and sent his general
Sarang, son of Sategin, with troops to Gandza. Padlon was defeated and
likewise taken prisoner. When the sultan's general had devasted Gandza and
marched into Georgia, his forces were reinforced with the troops of Padloni
and also of the emirs of Dvin and Dmanisi. Giorgi II (1072- 1089) mustered
his troops and called upon the king of Kakheti, Aghsartan to help him. The
opposing armies met near Partskhisi, and the enemy was beaten back.
Encouraged by this victory, Giorgi II decided to turn the empire's
difficulties to his advantage and recover the Georgian lands wrested by
Byzantium. He retook from the Greeks Anakop-iya, the main fortress of West
Georgia, and also the fortresses of Klarjeti, Shavsheti, Javakheti and
Artaani.
The Georgian king evidently planned to re-unite all of Georgia's
south-western provinces. Grigol, son of Bakurian, a famous Georgian
statesman of Byzantium, went to Giorgi, when the latter was in the town of
Bana, Tao, and turned over to him the town of Kari (Kars) and the adjoining
regions. Giorgi occupied the town and garrisoned it with troops under
Shavsheti-"aznauris". This gave Georgia another short respite, but at the
close of the 1070s and in the early 1080s the Seljuks invaded Georgia again
and plunged her into a difficult situation.
Malik-Shah entered Georgia in 1076 and took Tbilisi. The Seljuks could not
tolerate any expansion or strengthening of the Georgian state. At the close
of the 1070s the sultan sent more troops into Georgia. Led by the emir Ahmad
, they occupied Arzrum and Oltisi, following which Ahmad attacked the
fortress of Kveli, where king Giorgi was staying at the time and nearly
captured him. According to David the Builder's historian, the Seljuks were
helped by Georgian feudal princes who had defected to them. The Turks seized
immense booty: they raided more and more frequently. Giorgi found himself
compelled to move to Western Georgia. Like locusts, the Seljuks descended
upon the entire land and set fire to the towns of Kutaisi and Artanuji and
also monasteries in Klarjeti.
Every spring Seljuk hordes overran Georgia, pillaging the country, but left
in the winter, taking everything they could with them. But some remained,
settling on Georgian land. According to King David's historian, the Turks
devasted the country and annihilated the population, killing even those who
hid in forests, ravines and caves. This was the first great invasion by the
Turks("didi Turkoba"), and it took place in the year 1080.
King David's historian gives a very sad account of the situation caused by
the Seljuk domanation in Georgia, writing that the country was ruined and
turned into a forest, where instead of people there were only wild beasts.
He noted that never before had such a calamity befallen the Georgian people.
The Turks turned churches into stables, desecrated Christian shrines, killed
priests, raped women and slaughtered small children, letting rivers of blood
flow in the land. This was a gruesome picture. The Armenian historian
Aristakes Lasti-vertsi gave a similarly staggering account of the misery to
which Armenia was reduced.
This difficult situation was further aggravated by the settlement of the
Seljuks on conquered land. The Seljuks came with their families and
livestock, settled on conquered land and turned all ploughland into
pastures. Branches of agriculture that had age-old traditions were uprooted.
The growing of fruit, vine and grain was replaced with intensive nomad
livestock-breeding, and the indigenous feudal class was ousted by the
nomad-aristocracy.
The nomads settled down and won supremacy in Iran, and the Iranian rulers
endeavoured to direct the nomads towards Georgia and Byzantium.
As distinct from the years of the reign of the sultans Torghil-beg and Alp-Arslan,
when wars of conquest were fought and land was redistributed among the
nomad-aristocracy, in the 1070s the Seljuks began to strengthen their rule
in conquered territories. In order to assert his political supremacy, Malik-Shah
demanded that the conquered peoples determine exactly the forms of their
dependence and the size of the tribute paid by them. These measures still
further worsened Georgia's position, for Bagrat IV had not committed himself
to paying tribute: this brought further Seljuk invasions of Georgia also in
the reign of Malik-Shah. Massive Turkish settlement began in Georgia in the
1080s. Giorgi II was powerless to organize resistance to the Seljuks,
recognized his defeat and had to appear before sultan Malik-Shah in order to
ensure peace and tranquility at the price of an annual tribute. The terms
refused by Bagrat IV had to be asked by his son. But the situation had
changed inauspiciously for Georgia, and an annual tribute could bring only
some relief to her people because the continuous invasions had taken much
more from them. This, evidently, was the view of Giorgi II and the council
of noblemen whose consent he requested.
It is believed that in accordance with the understanding, Giorgi II
undertook to pay tribute to the sultan and, if necessary, place his troops
at the latter's disposal. Under the treaty Malik-Shah should have recalled
the hordes of nomads from Georgia, because the tribute was paid punctually.
However, the expectations of Georgia's ruling circles were not justified.
Instead of withdrawing, the nomads were joined by new hordes. Pillage
continued and the situation grew from bad to worse.
The "magnanimous" sultan granted Kakheti and Hereti to Giorgi, but these had
to be won from King Aghsartan and the sultan gave Giorgi a large army in
order to conquer these regions. The Georgian king Giorgi II thus entered
Georgia at the head of a large new Seljuk army. The combined Georgian and
Seljuk forces laid siege to the fortress of Vezhini. The siege became
protracted, and when snow fell, the king lifted the siege. According to King
David's historian, Giorgi decided to hunt in the forests of Western Georgia,
and, when he went there, he left the Turks at the Vezhini fortresses. The
latter ravaged the entire basin of the Iori River. Beginning with King
David's historian, almost everybody in devastated Kakheti blamed King
Giorgi. But it would be perhaps correct to assume that Giorgi had no
alternative to agreeing to the sultan's suggestion (which was tantamount to
an order) and led the Seljuk host into Georgia against his will. Then, in
order not to participate in the country's ruin, he withdrew.
The situation steadily grew more and more complicated. Following the
appearance of the Seljuk forces, the king of Kakheti
Aghsartan went to the sultan to declare his submission, and in token of
loyalty embraced Islam. The sultan now presented Kakheti and Hereti to the
"more loyal" Aghsartan. The danger of internecine war overhung the land. The
Georgian people were threatened with physical extermination and there was
the danger that the ethnical composition of the population would change. The
situation was further aggravated by a disastrous earthquake that lasted for
a whole year: fortresses, palaces, churches and towns crumbled, and people
died.
The Turks occupied most of the country. The records tell us that the power
of the Georgian king was limited virtually to Western Georgia. The foreign
political complications fostered inter-class-discord. The feudal nobility
organised some actions against the king, as we noted earlier. Although
Giorgi had some successes, it was obvious that the resistance of the feudal
aristocracy had not been broken and that the central power had to take
resolute measures.
The difficult situation in the country demanded the total mobilisation of
forces for a determined struggle against internal and external enemies. In
1089, at this critical moment, a patriotic group of feudal lords staged a
palace coup, and. the still young Giorgi had to cede (he throne to his
16-year-old son David. United only recently, Georgia was thus on the brink
of destruction. The successful wars of conquests gave the Seljuks extensive
territory extending from Central Asia to the Mediterranean, including, in
addition to Central Asia, the whole of Iran, Arab Iraq, Asia Minor, Armenia,
Georgia, Azerbaijan, Derbent and many Byzantine towns.
The Seljuk Turks, whose level of development was quite low, defeated much
more developed peoples with relative ease. They were not numerically
superior to the peoples conquered by them and were not better armed. But the
feudal decentralization of the Middle Eastern states created favourable
conditions for the conquest of these states. Of no little importance was the
organization of the Seljuk forces into a permanent army entirely dependent
on the central power. The adversaries of the Seljuks had mainly
undisciplined feudal units.
Georgia's conquest by the Seljuks was due to many internal and external
political factors. The long process of forming a ingle Georgian feudal
monarchy and of the centralization of the state - power had been in the main
completed when the Seljuks began their invasion. On the eve of the Seljuk
invasion of Georgia (1060s), King Bagrat IV ruled most of the Georgian lands
and had emerged victorious in the long struggle against the
particularistically-inclined group of feudal aristocrats, who were hindering
the strengthening of the central power. This inter-class-struggle, as we
have already noted, interwined with the relations with Byzantium, against
which Georgia had fought almost continuously in the eleventh century.
Although Georgia had, in fact, won that war, the victory cost her. dear.
Thus, at the time of the Seljuk invasion, Georgia had not healed the wounds
suffered by her in foreign and internal wars. The struggle to unite the land
had not been consummated: Tbilisi and Rustavi with their adjoining regions
were still in the hands of Muslims, while the struggle to reunite Kakheti
and Hereti was only nearing its final phase. However the Seljuk invasion set
all disaffected elements in motion and created the conditions for the
seizure of Kakheti and Hereti.
An unfavourable situation had taken shape also in the regions bordering on
Georgia. The Tbilisi and Gandza-emirs feared the aggressive Seljuks and
joined them. By the 1080s the Turks had conquered the whole of Ran and
Shirvan. They garrisoned Gandza with 48,000 troops, compelling the local
population to feed them, while Shirvani was made to pay an annual tribute of
40,000 dinars. Armenia, as we know, had lost her independence, so that the
approaches to Georgia were not protected from that direction. In the 11 th
century, Byzantium had spent all her forces in the wars against the Bulgars
and the North Caucasian nomads, and also against the Armenians and Georgians
in the Transcaucasus. The Seljuks owed much of their success to Byzantium's
efforts to conquer the Transcausus and to the abolition of Armenia
independence.
Thus, alone, without allies, surrounded on all sides by the Seljuks and torn
by internal strife, Georgia ultimately suffered defeat despite her tenacious
resistance and some successes in this war.
5. KINGDOM OF
DAVID THE BUILDER
David IV, the Builder (1089- 1125), inherited a bitter
legacy: the country lay divided and in ruins, and its population had been
drastically long and unequal struggle; people had been driven out of their
homes and were hiding in the mountains and forests.
David pursued a purposeful policy, taking no unconsider-ed step. He was
determined to bring order to the land, subjugate the class-enemy, bridle the
unsubmissive secular and ecclesias-tical feudal lords, centralise the
state-administration, form a new type of army that would stand up better to
the Seljuk military organization, and then go over to a methodical offensive
with the aim of expelling the Seljuks first from Georgia and then from the
whole of the Transcaucasus.
Internal policy. First and foremost, it was imperative to clear the Seljuks
out Kartli proper and give the surviving population the possibility of
returning to their homes and restore the dislocated economy.
King David began reforming his army, which had been disorganized and
demoralized by innumerable setbacks. He mustered units consisting mainly of
Crown-peasants and small gentry. Employing surprise tactics, these troops
attacked the Seljuk settlements and gradually pushed the invaders out of "Shida"
(Inner) Kartli. "And the people began returning to their homes", writes the
chronicler.
King David himself and his closest associates were well aware that, before
they could launch large-scale operations against the Seljuks, it was vital
to ensure peace at home, in other words, to subordinate the unsubmissive
nobility to the throne. Here again, the House of Baghvashi, in particular
the "eristavi" of Kldekari, Liparit IV, were conspicuous among the
recalcitrants.
As we have already noted, Bagrat HI and his direct successors had futilely
endeavoured to bring this strong feudal family to submission. During the
early years of David IV's reign the domains of Liparit IV consisted of
Trialeti, Kldekari and abjoi-ning lands. According to the chronicler,
Liparit was disloyal to his sovereign; indeed, in 1093 David learned that
Liparit was conspiring against him. Liparit was imprisoned, but two years
later he was released on oath of fidelity to the king. But soon afterwards,
David was informed of his new intrigues. Liparit was seized and then exiled
to Byzantium. The "Eristav-ship" of Kldekari was abolished and incorporated
within the Grown-possessions. Trialeti's significant strategic location made
it immensely important to the unity of Georgia. That explains the efforts
first of the Egris-Abkhasian kings and then of the kings of united Georgia
to gain control of that province. The abolition of that strong "eristavship"
and its incorporation within the Crown-domains greatly undermined the
opposition and gave the king a stronger hand.
Moreover, David waged a long and unremitting struggle against the feudal
lord, Dzagan Abuletisdze, brother of the Bishop Modistos. What happened to
Liparit, Dzagan and others evidently served as a warning.
The efforts to centralise state-power could not be confined to the struggle
with secular feudal lords. The question of the place, held by the Church in
the state-system, was also of the utmost importance. Georgia's final
unification and the establishment of a single administration necessarily
implied the Church's subordination to the state.
At one stage, as we have shown, the Georgian Church had supported the
Georgian kings in their efforts to unite the country, for it felt that such
unity would give it political control of all the churches in Georgia and of
their possessions. Moreover, it was believed that this would help to assert
the influence of the Mtskheta Patriarch over the West Georgian church. As a
result of the steps taken by the kings of West Georgia, the West Georgian
had been subordinated to the Mtskheta Cathedral. But, subsequently, the
strengthened Church began to demand immunity, which it finally obtained
early in the 11th century. In the course of the 10th and 11th centuries,
after the occupancy of high positions had become hereditary., the feudal
aristocracy gradually acquired increasing power in the Georgian Church.
With its power enhanced, it no longer suited the Church to have a strong
secular monarch endeavouring to keep it in the status of a subordinate ally.
Of special significance in this context was the establishment of the
Patriarchate in Georgia in the 1120s and the attempts of Giorgi Mtatsmindeli
to uproot the practice of hereditary appointments to high office in the
Church. But the 1060s, when Giorgi Mtatsmindeli came to Georgia on the
invitation of King Bagrat IV and sought to introduce innovations, proved to
be an unpropitious time for measures of this kind, and Bagrat IV, who was
assisted by Giorgi Mtatsmindeli failed to purge the Church and install his
supporters in high ecclesiastical office. The situation continued to
deteriorate in the period from the 1060s to the close of the century; most
of the high posts in the Church were taken over by the feudal aristocracy,
and the alliance of the ecclesiastical and secular nobility grew stronger
and was directed against the throne. Early in the 11th century the bishops
of Bana and Atskuri sided with invading Byzantium-forces. During the first
years of King David IV's reign the big feudal lord, Dzagani rose against the
king with the support of his brother, Bishop Modistos. The monasteries and
churches opposed the central state-power; King David took determined steps
against them.
In describing the situation in the Church, historical sources give us a very
unsavoury picture. A system under which posts in the Church were sold was
evidently widespread in the rnid-11th century (this system had been attacked
by Giorgi Mtatsmindeli), but towards the end of that century the situation
worsened still further. It is possible that in their desire to justify the
harsh measures taken by David, historical sources somewhat exaggerate, but
by and large the situation was serious and it was very difficult to fight
the Church. However, it is riot to be excluded that the king had supporters
in the Church. In those ays there was a strong group of progressive
Church-leaders on whom David could rely. They included the "mtsignobar-ukhutsesi"
Giorgi, who was a close associate of the king,- the Patriarch Ioann, the
king's confessor Yevstrati and the monk Arseni.
David decided to enforce a radical reform with the purpose of subordinating
the Church to the state. This was vital for the final centralization of
state-power. But before this* reform could be put into effect, undesirable
hierarchs had to be Swept from the highest posts in the state. The king was
well aware that this would not be an easy task, and he: therefore laid his
preparations carefully, He gradually enlisted more supporters, attracting to
his side prominent Church-leaders working outside Georgia, correspondingly
moulded public opinion and, finally, in 1103 convened an ecclesiastical
congress, known as the Ruis-Urbnisi- synod.
David's supporters won an overwhelming victory at this synod, taking over
all the undesirable highest Church-offices. As a non-ecclesiastic, the king
formally had no authority to intervene in Church-affairs, but by placing his
supporters in key Church-offices he made considerable headway in actually
subordinating the Church to the state, and the Church had to reconcile
itself to this fact. However, this triumph had to be consolidated and the
power of the state over the Church finally asserted. For this purpose David
combined two offices: courtial ("mtsignobar-tukhutsesi") and clerical
(Bishop of Chkondidi). This was a significant step towards centralizing
state-power.
At the Georgian court there 'had long been the office of head of the royal
chancellery - "mtsignobartukhutsesi". This office had always been held by a
monk. The "mtsignobartukhutsesi" was a privy-counsellor of the king, and was
devoted to the Crown by virtue of the character of his office.
The higher civilian officials at the royal court were given conditional
possession of estates and, naturally, sought to turn these estates into
hereditary property together with the office that went with them. The "mtsignobartukhutsesi"
was a monk and had no ambitions of this kind.
The Bishop of Chkondidi was similarly loyal to the Crown. The Ckhondidi
Cathedral was founded in the first half of the 10th century by Giorgi, king
of Egris-Abkhazeti. As the other cathedrals founded in Western Georgia by
the kings of Egris-Abkhazeti, this cathedral was set up to counter the Greek
Cathedrals, and, by virtue of this, it was a mainstay of the central
state-power against external and internal enemies. The bishops of Chkondidi
enjoyed the greatest prestige among the bishops of Western Georgia and they
had been faithful to the throne for two centuries. Because of the Chkondidi
bishop's considerable influence in Church affairs, David the Builder united
the two abovernentioned offices in one person soon after the Ruisi-Urbnisi
synod, and created the institution of "mtsignobartukhutsesi Chkondideli".
The authority of the Chkondidi bishop was thus greatly enhanced in the
Church, and whereas the "mtsignobartukhutsesi", the head of the royal
Chancellery, was the most powerful figure in the state-apparatus after the
king, the "chkondideli" became the highest dignitary in the Church after the
patriarch. Through the "mtsignobartukhutsesi Chkondideli", the king was thus
able to interfere in the affairs of the Church and dictate his will to it.
This situation existed permanently throughout the period while the single
Georgian feudal monarchy was in existence (with the exception of short
intervals). This was further evidence of the timeliness and expediency of
this step in the conditions obtaining at the time.
Since it was clear from the very beginning that this step was designed to
strengthen the central state-power, it naturally evoked the disaffection of
the reactionary feudal nobility. An echo of the struggle over this issue
between the king and the reactionary nobles was quite possibly the fact that
in the period from 1118 (after the death of the first "mtsignobartukhutsesi
Chkondideli" Giorgi) to 1125 the Bishop of Chkondidi had no favour with the
king. After the death of the "mtsignobartukhutsesi" Giorgi, David IV
appointed his nephew Svimon, Bishop of Bedia and Alaverdi, to the post but
secured his enthronement as the Bishop of Chkondidi only in 1125.
Thus, as a result of these steps, the Georgian Church was subordinated to
state-control, and instructions on divine service and on internal
arrangement . were received from the court. Moreover, the top-dignitaries of
the Church - the patriarch, the fathers superior of monasteries, and so on -
took part in the affairs of the supreme state-council, the "Darbazi". At the
same time, the king showed considerable concern for churches and
monasteries, built new churches, granted estates to them, gave them complete
immunity from taxation, and so forth. These considerable benefits to the
Church could be granted by the king of a country that was strong politically
and economically.
The subordination of the Church was of immense significance in that it
strengthened the state-system as a whole. The Church-reforms were followed
by substantial changes in the state-administration, changes that
strengthened the Georgian state and the centralized power of the king.
The measure taken by King David to centralize the state-power were not
confined to establishing the office of "mtsignobartukhutsesi Chkondideli".
David the Builder led the Georgian feudal state to a new road of
development. Quite naturally, this radical remounding of the state-system
entailed changes in the rights and duties of other categories of officials.
An integral system of administration began to take shape together with
Georgia's unification and the creation of a single feudal monarchy.
Evidently, much remained in this system from .. the early Georgian feudal
states, but basically the administrative apparatus was "formed along new
lines.
The institution of the office of "vaziri" was one of the most important
measures in the reform of the administrative apparatus:
In Georgian historical sources "vaziris" are mentioned only from the 12th
century onwards, but it is assumed that all the
officials("mtsignobartukhutsesi, "mandaturtukhutsesi", "mechurchletukhutsesi"
and so on), who were later called "vaziri", had existed in Georgian since
remote times and were known as "elders" ("ukhutsesi") of individual
departments. After the united Georgian feudal monarchy was formed, new
departments were set up and some of the "ukhutsesis" became directly linked
to the bureaucratic apparatus, in which they were department-heads. In the
12th-l3th centuries some, who handled matters of vital significance to the
state, were given the rank of "vaziri". The "mtsignobartukhutsesi" was the
first of the "ukhutsesis" to receive the rank of "vaziri" - the "msachurt-ukhutsesi"
was the last.
The "mtsignobartukhutsesi" was elevated to the rank of "vaziri" by David the
Builder with the purpose of placing him above all the other officials of the
court. This rank was later received by other "ukhutsesis".
The reform of the judiciary was one of the most important reforms enforced
by David with the aim of recognizing the administration,
Prior to David, all court proceedings were directed by the king and all
cases coming up before the supreme court had to be tried personally by the
king. At an earlier stage there was evidently justification for this simple
court procedure. But with the enlargement of the Georgian kingdom, the
growth of the administrative apparatus and the intensification of central
power, this traditional court-procedure was no longer consonant with the new
situation. The condition of the peasants deteriorated as the Georgian feudal
state grew stronger; they were brutally oppressed by the state, the
landowners and the officials, and this led to increasing resistance from
the, masses. This situation required a reform of the judiciary and the
creation of an organ that would be more in keeping with the requirements of
the times.
In Georgia the supreme court of appeal was the "Saajo kari" (the court of
petitions), which was presided over by the king himself. King David
appointed a "mtsignobartukhutsesi" to head the "Saajo kari". With two "mtsignobaris"
(notaries public) the latter precided over this court.
The "Saajo kari" safeguarded internal law and order. To quote King David's
historian, its purpose was "to protect the oppressed and humiliated". In a
feudal state there were innumerable pretexts for violence and injustice. The
oppressors were the big feudal lords, the "eristavs" and their myrmidons,
tax-collectors, tenants, customs-officials, and so on. Needless to say, the
oppressed were "protected" in the interests of the feudal state-power.
The chief function of the "Saajo kari" was to combat feudal anarchy and
safeguard state-interests; it protected the interests of the king and his
social mainstay from the "mtavars" and, particularly, from the oppressed
people.
The work of the judiciary was supervised by the king himself, who guided it
in the manner required by state-interests, The institution of informer, set
up by David, was of no little importance in strengthening and centralising
the power of the Georgian state, The king had informers at the courts of the
big feudal lords, in the churches and monasteries, in his own army, in the
Seljuk hordes roaming Georgia and also in neighbouring regions. He had
informers even at the courts of neighbouring kingdoms. The espionage-system
and well organized shadowing in and outside the kingdom kept the king
informed of everything around him.
The espionage-system in all important internal and external affairs acquired
special importance at this time because this institution was well developed
and widely used in the states ruled by the Seljuks.
The organization of the army was of particularly great significance in the
history of the Georgian state. On account of the long and devastating wars
against the Seljuks. Georgia lost much of her military strength. The general
decline of economic opportunities and the diminution of the population led
to a reduction of the army's numerical strength. The waning of the royal
power, the growth of the power of the feudal lords, particularly in the
reign of Giorgi II, undermined discipline in the feudal army and
disorganized it. The army had to be reorganized and trained, and discipline
had to be tightened. Moreover, the military organization of the Seljuks had
to be taken into account because they were the foe at this stage.
As King David's historian notes, the king had only a small contingent of
staunch troops. Most of the army was demoralised, the soldiers believing
that the Seljuks were invincible. Discipline fell to the extent that the
soldiers spent their time in idle pursuints. King David strictly forbade any
entertainment in the units, tightened control and infiltrated informers into
the army.
He mustered his most faithful troops and formed a bodyguard, "mona-spa",
which took part in the most important and difficult operations. The "mona-spa"
was entirely dependent on the king and had no bonds whatever with the feudal
nobility. The king personally directed the training and equipment of his
troops. Control was strengthened over the feudal volunteer-forces and this,
together with the other measures instituted to centralize the state-power,
ensured order among these forces as well.
David divided the entire Georgian army into three main parts. One, as we
have noted, consisted of the royal bodyguard, the second were the garrisons
of towns and fortress, and the third consisted of the main body of troops,
which, King David's historian writes, "were constantly at war, winter and
summer".
These measures ensured the mobilization of the country's entire military
potential. David began his struggle against the Seljuks with small raids
against nomads wandering in Georgia. These operations were led by the king
himself. He inspired the troops by personal example, encouraged those who
distinguished themselves and punished cowards (they were dressed in women's
clothes and paraded in front of all the troops). A well-organized,
disciplined and trained army began pressing the Seljuks and in the period
from the beginning of the 12th century to 1118 almost the whole of Georgia
was cleared of the Turkish hordes. But this was not enough: the liberated
lands had to be solidly consolidated. Moreover, King David saw that the army
was not strong enough to fulfil his plans, and that, because of the
man-power-shortage, the required number of troops could not be raised.
In addition, the uneceasing efforts to expel the Seljuks from Georgia
prevented the peasants from working the land with considerable loss to the
economy. Furthermore, it must be remembered that the Georgian army consisted
of feudal volunteers, or which reason it was not always possible for the
entire army to respond to the summons of the king. True, most of the
recalcitrant feudal lords were brought into line by the measures instituted
by David, but this state of affairs had to be sustained to which end the
king's forces had to be numerically stronger than the forces of any
individual feudal lord. The country needed a standing-army, but this the
economy of feudal Georgia could not ensure at the time. King David IV solved
this problem very circumspectly and effectively. He resettled a Kipchak
tribe of 40. 000 families from the Northern Caucasus in Georgia. The
settlers were given plots of land and also summer-and winter-pastures, and
every family was obligated to provide one soldier with a horse and weapons.
This 40,000 strong Kipchak-army was entirely dependent on the king, with no
ties with the feudal lords, and this gives the king considerable advantages.
David did not accidentally select the Kipchak. They were well known in
Georgia as good fighting-men who demanded little for themselves. Further,
the Georgian royal court had ties of kinship with the Kipchak: King David
was married to the daughter of the Kipchak chief, Otrok, called Ataraka
Sharaganisdze in Georgian chronicles. In addition, the Georgian court knew
that the rising power of Kiev Rus was pressing and driving the Kipchaks out
of the lands they had earlier conquered reducing them to great hordship.
AH these circumstances influenced the king's choice. He negotiated with the
Kipchaks and, in 1118, upon reaching agreement, set out for the Daryal
Ravine at the head of his troops, accompanied by the 'mtsignobartukhutsesi"
Giorgi, to organize their resettlement personally. But the Ossetian kingdom,
with which the Kipchaks were at war, lay between Georgia and the Kipchak-domains.
The Ossetians refused to let them pass across their country. But when King
David arrived, the Ossetian kings went to him and "sank to their knees in
submission". King David got the two sides to conclude peace, occupied all
the fortresses along the road the Kipchaks were to pass and ensured their
unhindered resettlement.
They were settled in different regions of Georgia. Some were settled in
Inner Kartli, where most of the population had been exterminated by the
Seljuks, others were given land along the border of Northern Armenia and
Hereti, where part of their duties was to fortify and guard the
state-boundary.
They were quickly assimilated in Georgia. They adopted Christianity and the
Georgian language, went over to a sedentary way of life and gradually mixed
with the local inhabitants. But some later left Georgia.
In addition to receiving land they were, by order of the king, divided into
small detachments that constantly raided enemy-territory. This brought them
a large income in the shape of booty.
The resettlement of the Kipchaks and the formation of a standing army
greatly enchanced Georgia's military strength. This was evidently what
incensed by the official historian.
The new mercenary force had to help consolidate earlier successes and carry
out David's further plans for a broad offensive against the Seljuks in the
Transcaucasus (Armenia, Shirvan, Ran). It must be noted that a military
reform, which led to the formation of a standing-army wholly dependent on
the ventral authority, had been enforced by the Seljuks in the latter half
of the 11th century. One of the reasons including King David to form a
standing-army of his own was, quite possibly, that he wanted to build up a
military force that could match the new organization of the Seljuks.
In addition to the 40,000 Kipchaks, the king had a standing-army of 20,000
Georgians; consequently, his army numbered 60,000 troops. Moreover, when
necessary he enlisted mercenaries from among the Ossetians, the Daghestan-highlanders,
the Kurds and other peoples.
The resettlement of the Kipchaks was unquestionably a measure of immense
state-significance and yielded positive results, but it would be wrong, of
course, to attribute Georgia's successes in the reign of King David,
particularly the establishment of internal order, mainly to foreigners
serving in the Georgian army.
Besides its many positive aspects, the resettlement of the Kipchaks had
negative aspects: it was dangerous to rely entirely on the Kipchaks, who
were accustomed to a nomadic way of life. Moreover, it was habitual for them
to serve as mercenaries in the armies of different states, and also to
defect to the enemy. Although King David gave them land, thereby inducing
them to adopt a sedetary life and providing them with the incentive of
defending that life, they nevertheless gave him plenty of trouble. Time and
again they betrayed him, even going so far as to plot his assassination.
The Kipchaks were resettled in 1118, when most of Georgia had been cleared
of the Seljuks and order had been established in the country. State-reforms
had been put into effect at the very beginning of the 12th century, and the
reform of the army was conducted at the same time. The Kipchaks were
resettled later, and only because these troops were needed by David for the
foreign conquests begun by him in the early 1120s. The Kipchak like the
Ossetian, Lezghin, Kurd and other mercenaries, were in effect
auxiliary-troops. The permanent Kipchak cavalry was never the backbone of
the army. Its core consisted of the royal guards and the Georgian feudal
units. At the Didgori-battle. there were 15, 000 Kipchak in Georgian army of
40, 000. The burnt of the battle was borne by Georgian troops. After the
army-reform, the Georgian army thus consisted of the royal guards ("monaspa")
numbering 5,000 horsemen, 60,000 regular troops, the feudal contingents and
mercenary-units (formed when necessary). This organization of the army
created by David remained practically unchanged throughout the 12th century.
King David enforced a series of measures to subordinate local authorities
entirely to the central government. Integrated Georgia was formed through
the unification of several historical Georgian regions. At the time this
unification was achieved each region had its own system of administration.
In turn, the kingdoms of Kakheti, Hereti, South and West Georgia had been
formed as a result of the unification of smaller Georgian provinces. Each of
these provinces was incorporated in the united kingdom with its own
administrative system, for which reason united Georgia required not only the
subordination of all the political units to the throne but also the
establishment of a uniform system of state-administration. This could not be
achieved at once, but ultimately the establishment of that system was
decisive for the country's final unification.
The first steps in that direction had been taken by Bagrat III, the first
king of united Georgia, when he took the kings of Kakheti and Hereti
captived and appointed his own "eristavs" to govern these lands. However,
regarding to the ruling families, measures of this kind did not
fundamentally change the situation. As I. Javakhishvili pointed out, only
rulers were changed, with the old system of administration rarely undergoing
modification, it was still necessary to abide by long-standing traditions,
to keep intact local creatures and distinctions. Indeed, there was generally
little appreciation of the need for a centralized government to consolidate
the country's unity. The main thing as that large resources were needed to
fight the traditional forms administration, and this was what Bagrat III did
not have. In the epoch of feudalism, the provincial system of administration
was not eradicated entirely, and, even after the measures intimated by King
David, the administration was based not only on the departmental but also on
the provincial principle. Nothing more could be expected in feudal times.
The provincial system of administration was never abolished entirely in
feudal states: this held true at subsequent stages of development. But the
subordination of key-departments to the supreme authority was attainable in
centralized feudal monarchies. In the reign of David military affairs,
finances, the court and other key-state-departments were subordinated to the
king's "vaziri", the "mtsignobartukhutsesi Chkondideli".
The great political significance and timeliness of David's reforms are borne
out by the fact that throughout the subsequent existence of the united
Georgian state the administration remained in the form given to it by David.
King David's foreign policy. As we have noted earlier, the power of the king
of Georgia did not range east of the Likhi Range. When he began to
centralize the state-power. David's first step was to rally loyal strata of
the population around himself.
Before beginning his large-scale campaign against the Seljuks, he had taken
steps to drive the Turks out of Georgia. He led small detachments in raids
against the Seljuks settled in Kartli. The population gradually returned to
their homes, and the Seljuk nomads could no longer winter in Kartli.
These raids continued unabated for four years. Sultan Malik-hah died in
1092. This was a landmark in the land of the Great Seljuks, and it was
specially noted by King David's historian. The situation in the
Seljuk-kingdom had grown extremely complication in the last years of Malik
Shah's reign, the first signs of the kingdom's disintegration being the
struggle for the throne among the sultan's heirs. The internal conflicts
gradually mounted. Nizam-al-Mulk, the vazir and the sultan's chief
lieutenant, was assassinated in 1902; the death of the sultan himself
remained shrouded in mystery. The Ismailite sect stepped up its struggle,
the khalif took increasingly hostile action against the sultan, the
class-struggle grew in intensity, and individual provinces began to secede
from the kingdom of the Great Seljuks.
These difficulties created favourable opportunities for Georgia to strike
effectively at the Turks.
By that time Georgia's international standing had improved in yet another
respect. At the synod in Clermont in 1095, Pope Urban II proclaimed
commencement of the crusades. Two years later Europe's feudal chivalry
reached Asia Minor, seized Edessa, forming their first' state, the duchy of
Edessa, and overrunning the whole region of Antioch.
King David was evidently well-informed of all this and duly assessed the
situation. Relying on his successes against the great feudal lords and the
Seljuks entrenched in Georgia, he ceased paying tribute to the sultan in
1097. Translated into diplomatic language, this was a declaration of war,
but the sultan did not respond to this challenge. Georgia was freed of the
large and shameful tribute, which David's father, Giorgi II, had regarded as
salvation for his people.
King David's historian was conversant with the complicated situation that
had taken shape around Georgia and which King David skilfully utilised. He
saw the bond between Georgia's internal situation and international
developments. He linked the Georgian king's growing power and the cessation
of the payment of tribute to the Seljuks with the capture of Antioch and
Ierusalem by the Crusaders.
True, the Seljuks staunchly resisted the Crusaders, who had invaded Asia
Minor, and in the 11th century their position in the Transcaucasus was very
weak, for by that time the Crusaders were mainly fighting the sultans of Rum
and other domains of the kingdom of the Great Seljuks. However, the invasion
of that large force in the Middle East was a factor of great significance,
and it was not accidental that King David’s historian made special note of
the seizure of Antioch and Jerusalem by the “Frangs," i. e., the crusaders.
Georgia's international standing in those years was unquestionably due
mainly to the weakening of the Iranian Seljuk state, but there were good
grounds for the Georgian assessment of the crusades.
After the Seljuks had been driven out of Kartli proper, David the Builder
was faced with the problem of reuniting the Georgian lands outside the
Georgian kingdom. Before attacking the Turks all along the line it was
necessary to mobilise all of Georgia's forces.
David's first objective was the capture of Kakheti and Hereti. In 1101 he
took the fortress of Zedazeni. Before marching into Kakheti and Hereti he
cleared the way for victory by rallying his supporters in that region. A
large group of Hereti nobles ("didebulis") seized Aghsartan, king of Kakheti
and Hereti, and turned him over to King David, after which the latter
occupied Hereti and Kakheti.
The neighbouring Muslim sovereigns could not reconcile themselves to the
incorporation of Kakheti and Hereti in Georgia. With the emir of Gandza at
their head, they marched against Georgia. Part of the population of Kakheti
evidently sided with the invaders. In a fiercely fought battle near Ertsukhi,
King David defeated and pushed back the enemy, and Hereti-Kakheti was
finally incorporated within Georgia.
After the reunification of Kakheti-Hereti, the Seljuks were still in
possession of the cities of Tbilisi and Rustavi and the whole of Lower
Kartli, The campaign opened with an offensive against Lower Kartli, where
the Seljuks were still roaming. The ultimate objective of the campaign was
to liberate Tbilisi, where the enemy's main forces were concentrated. But
before
that objective could be achieved, the southern approaches to the city had to
be taken. In 1110 Georgian troops captured Samshvilde. The loss of that
fortresstown was a heavy blow to the Seljuks, and they were compelled to
leave the abjoining territory. The Georgians then took the fortress of
Dzerna. A counter-attack by the sultan's troops was repulsed. The fortress
of Rustavi fell in 1115.
At the same time there was fighting on the western and eastern boundaries of
Georgia. In 1116 the Seljuks were expelled from Tao, and in 1117 David
marched against Asat and Shota, rulers of the fortress of Gishi (in Southern
Hereti) and sons of Grigol, taking them prisoner and consummating the
reunifica-fion of Hereti. In 1118 the Georgian troops routed the Seljuks
wintering on the banks of the Arak and in the same year they took the
fortresses of Lore and Agarani, completing the reunification of "Kvemo"
Kartli. But Tbilisi and Dmanisi were still in the hands of the Turks.
The Tashiri Kvirikids (a beranch of the Armenian Bagratids) had been making
inroads in "Kvemo" Kartli since the close of the 9th century. Taking
advantage of the weakening of the Ani-kingdom of the Bagratids, Gurgen, a
brother of the Armenian king, Sumbat II (977 - 989), founded a kingdom in
Tashiri with the capital at Samshvilde. The Georgian Bagrationis (Gvaram "mampali")
fought the Tashiri Kvirikids, and in the 1060s King Bagrat IV took
Samshvilde, following which the fortress of Lore was made the capital of the
kingdom. But the situation was such that Bagrat IV was unable to retain
Samshvilde and the town was occupied by the Seljuks. David the Builder
regained possession of Samshvilde only in 1110, while in 1118 this kingdom
was abolished with the capture of Lore. The significance of the
reunification of Lore was not only political but also strategic: the
Georgian king was now in control of the road leading from the south to
Eastern Georgia and Tbilisi. This cut the Muslims off from the southern
approaches to Tbilisi.
With his position thus strengthened, David the Builder began a general
offensive against the Seljuks.
His historian gives a laconic but extremely vivid picture of David's
military tactics. With Seljuk spies watching every movement of the Georgian
army, the king moved his main forces into Western Georgia in order to delude
them. This occurred, for instance in 1120. The king moved to Western Georgia
and, when the Turks began pillaging Georgian lands, he suddenly attacked
them. Only insignificant Seljuk forces escaped. The king then entered
Shirvan and took the town of Kabala. He then went to Kartli, but soon after
had to return to Shirvan: the population had evidently refused to submit to
him.
In the period from the early spring (February) of 1120 to June 1121 Georgian
troops attacked the Seljuk settlements on the eastern and south-western
approaches to the Transcaucasus and drove the Seljuks out their strongholds.
At the same time, the Georgian king attacked them in the large towns of the
Transcaucasus. In 1120 he began the assault of Tbilisi.
In the 1080s, when the Seljuks established themselves in Georgia, Tbilisi
had passed to their hands. The Jafarid emirs of Tbilisi had been deposed and
the city was ruled by a council of eiders ("berni"). In 1110 - 1115 David
captured the towns and fortresses around Tbilisi, thus in effect surrounding
the city. The Muslim merchant-elite had considerable influence in the city
and looked for protection against the Georgian king. They sent an envoy to
Torgil ibn-Mukhammed, ruler of Arrana, who dispatched an official, "shikhna",
to Tbilisi. David continued the struggle for the city and compelled the
population to pay him 10,000 dinars and agree to the presence of a Georgian
"shikhna" with a guard of ten horsemen. Of course, this was only a symbol of
the Georgian king's power in the city, but it was a step towards the
subjugation of Tbilisi. However, this situation did not suit either of the
sides, and the people of Tbilisi offered to place their city under the
suzerainty of Nejm ad-Din il-Ghazi ruler of Maiyafarikin.
The position of the Turks in the Transcaucasus steadily grew weaker. They
were losing their strongholds, and the Georgian king was vigorously
advancing against the Seljuk towns, villages and pastures. A delegation of
Seljuk rulers and merchants
of Gandza, Tbilisi and Dmanisi went to Sultan Mahmud. The Seljuks were
seriously alarmed for their rule in the Transcaucasus was threatened and
this required resolute measures. Acting on orders from the Sultan, a
coalition force took the field under Nejm ad-Din il-Ghazi.
The Seljuks invaded Georgia along the Manglis-Trialeti road. On August 10,
1121 their army (300,000 strong, according to approximate estimates)
encamped in the vicinity of Manglisi-Didgori. King David had 40,000 Georgian
troops, 15,000 kipchak, about 500 Ossetian mercenaries and a force of 200
European Crusaders. This numerical breakdown of the Georgian army clearly
indicates that its main force consisted of Georgians. This was only natural,
for the destiny of the Georgian state was at stake in the battle of Didgori.
The involvement of Crusaders (200 soldiers) was of some practical
importance: the Crusaders had considerable experience of fighting the Turks,
but of still greater significance was their symbolic and political role in
this battle - it emphasized that Georgia and the Western countries had
common interests in the struggle against the Seljuks,
The Georgian army encamped in the Nichbisi Gorge and on orders from the king
the road for a retreat was cut off - the exit from the ravine was blocked.
The main force, winch was to bear the brunt of the enemy - assault was
commanded personally by the king. The rest of the army, commanded by Prince
Demetre, was kept in reserve and was to launch a sudden attack on the enemy
at the crucial moment.
Before the battle commenced, David exhorted the troops to fight bravely,
reminding them that there was no retreat.
The Georgians won a crushing victory at Didgori on August 12. Not satisfied
with the victory on the battlefield, the Georgians pursued and decimated the
enemy. The Seljuks suffered huge losses, while the Georgians won the day
with relatively few casualties. Many prisoners were taken. The Georgians
captured considerable quantities of weapons and jewelry. One piece of booty
was particularly important: this was the gold - collar of Dubeis ibn - Sadak,
ruler of the town of Khila (on the Euphrates) - symbol' of his strenght and
power. To commemorate this victory David presented this jewelstudded collar
to the Gelati Monastery.
The importance of the Didgori victory was that it dispersed the myth about
invicibility of the Turks and inspired the peoples subjugated by them with
the hope of liberation. Moreover, this battle showed that the Muslim world
of the Middle East now had a serious rival in Georgia. Further, it opened
for David the road to Tbilisi and new victories. Hence forth steered a
direct course towards Tbilisi.
The city's destiny was in fact predetermined, but its ruling elite refused
to surrender their positions without resistance. In 1122, after heavy
fighting, the Georgian troops entered Tbilisi. According to the Georgian
chronicler, "the king took Tbilisi in the very first assault".
After this battle the king moved his residence from Kutaisi to Tbilisi,
making it his capital. He abolished the local self-government and appointed
officials to govern the city.
The next objective was Dmanisi. It was taken in March, 1123.
Thus ended the Georgian people's long and bitter struggle to reunite their
country. The last strongholds of the Seljuks in Georgia fell with the
seizure of Tbilisi and Dmanisi.
Following the liberation of the whole of Georgia David the Builder shifted
military operations to territory outside Georgia: the land could not be
guaranteed against the threat of attack as long as the approaches to it were
in the hands of the Seljuks. Georgia's further political interests were
linked with Armenia and Shirvan.
A circumstance that must be borne in mind is that, after capturing Tbilisi,
King David advanced against Dmanisi and Gandza, cities which had invited
external forces against Georgia. For the time being Gandza escaped merely
with being attacked, But Dmanisi was, as we have noted, reunited with
Georgia. Then began the decisive battle for Shirvan and Armenia.
The struggle for Armenia and Shirvan, as in the case of the struggle for the
Northern Caucasus, pursued both strategic and economic objectives. On the
one hand, the seizure of Armenia and Derbent would make Georgia's frontiers
secure and, the other, possession of these territories would give Georgia
control of Caucasian Middle Eastern and international trade-routes.
King David began his campaign against Shirvan early in the 12th century, but
was unable to envigorate it because before beginning the struggle for the
liberation of the Transcaucasus, he had to complete Georgia's unification
and then mobilize the local population for the war against the Seljuks.
The reunification of Kakheti and Hereti gave Georgia frontiers abutting
Shirvan, with the result that relations with the Shirvan-shahs occupied an
important place in King David's foreign policy.
In 1116, after the Seljuks were expelled from Tao, David sent his daughter,
Kata, to Byzantium as the bride of the emperor. Prior to this, his elder
daughter, Tamar, had been given in marriage to the shah of Shirvan, so that
as two celestial bodies, one would illumine the East and other the West.
The Georgian king's last step pursued the aim of forming a political
alliance with Shirvan to insure a joint struggle against the Seljuks.
Seljuk sultans were likewise seeking the support of the shah of Shirvan, for
the latter's attitude would be of considerable importance in the imminent
war between Georgia and the Seljuks. But David evidently failed to win over
the shah of Shirvan, and went to war against him in 1117.
Before beginning his campaign against Shirvan, the Georgian king subjugated
the Grigolisdze feudal possession with its capital, the fortress of Gishi,
on the westernmost outskirts of Georgia. This fortress had evidently
retained its independence with the aid of the Turks. After capturing the
fortress of Gishi, David sent Prince Demetre to Shirvan at the head of a
large army (1117).
Raids into Shirvan followed one another in quick succession. The Georgian
king had apparently succeeded in winning over the ruler of Derbent. The shah
of Shirvan was killed in one of the battles with Derbent-forces. A candidate
who enjoyed the favour of the Georgian king and had been his ally in the
Didgori-battle was installed on the Shirvan-throne. To avenge the defeat at
Didgori, Sultan Makhmoud decided, as a first step, to punish the shah of
Shirvan. He invaded Shirvan, took the town of Shemakha, captured the shah
and sent the Georgian king an insulting message, informing him of the
capture of the shah Shirvan and demanding tribute ("kharaja"). He offered
David two alternatives: either make the proper gifts or accept
open battle. David took the field against the sultan and en-route put to
flight the atabag of Ran, who was marching to the sultan's assistance. The
frightened sultan fled from Shirvan under cover of darkness, but David was
unable to take advantage of this on account of the bickering in his army
between Kipchaks and Georgians.
As we have noted earlier, the Shirvan issue was of great importance to both
Georgia and the Seljuks, The struggle for Shirvan dragged on and sapped the
strength of both sides. The Georgian king waged an unending struggle for
Shirvan, now seizing towns and fortress and then retreating again. While the
Christians in Shirvan supported the king of Georgia, the Muslims begged the
Seljuk sultan to protect them against the intrusions of the "infidel" king.
In this situation it was vital to consolidate the Georgian power in Shirvan.
Also, it must be borne in mind that the shah of Shirvan was the sultan's
prisoner and no longer figured in subsequent events, in other words, the
local ruling dynasty was no longer represented. In 1124, when David finally
conquered Shirvan, he subjugated that country directly to the Crown. The
towns and fortresses were garrisoned with Georgian troops, and the country
was governed by officials appointed by the Georgian court.
The struggle for Armenia proceeded in parallel with the conquest of Shirvan,
In May 1124 King David took a number of fortresses in Northern Armenia. The
account given by David's historian about the capture of the fortress-towns
of Gagi, Teruna-kan and Mankaberd and a large part of Armenia is
corroborated by the Armenian historians, Vardan the Great and Stepanos
Orbeli.
This did not end the struggle for Armenia. On August 20, 1123 "envoys of the
elders of Ani came (to David - M. L.) and said (they wished - M. L.) to turn
the town over to him". According to Vardan the Great, the Ani-elders were
motivated by the intention of Shaddadid Abul-Aswar, the emir of Ani, to sell
the town to the emir of Kars for 60,000 dinars. Moreover, Abul-Aswar had
turned the Ani-Cathedral into a mosque. Altho-ughn the people of Ani had
invited David, the Shaddadids refused to yield the town. David mustered an
army of 60,000 troops and seized Ani and the regions adjoining it. Together
with eight sons and relatives, Emir Abul-Aswar was taken prisoner and sent
to Georgia. According to Matteois Urkhayetsi, King David defeated the Muslim
army (nearly 20,000 troops were killed) and liberated the Armenian town of
Ani from its 60 years' Muslim captivity. In the liberation of Bagratid
Armenia from Muslim tyranny a large contribution was made by the Armenian
population, which fought side by side with the Georgian troops.
King David appointed officials to govern both the town and region and left a
Georgian garrison there. The former Shirak-kingdom of the Ani-Bagratuni was
incorporated in Georgia. "The defense of Ani was entrusted to the Meskheti-"aznauris",
- writes a Georgian historian, that was when the Georgian kings took the
title of Shahan-sha, i. e. the title of the Armenian Bagratids. Although the
Georgian king wrested the Shirak-kingdom from the Shaddadids, he did not
regard the latter the legitimate rulers, and, since there were no
representatives of the Armenian Bagratids, he considered that his step was
legally justified.
Relations with northern neighbours held an important place in Georgia's
political history. A vital issue in these relations was the possession of
the passes in the Caucasian Mountains, particularly across the Daryal
Ravine. The fortificaion of the Daryal pass was one of the main problems of
the kings of united Georgia from the beginning of the 11th century onwards.
This problem was resolved in the reign of David. In order to secure the
Daryal route, Khevsureti was made a Crown-possession, royal palaces and
fortresses were built in the Aragvi and Ter ravines, and fortifications were
erected in Mukhrani.
In 1118 David occupied the Daryal fortresses, and all the "gates of the
Ovseti and Caucasian mountains". King David built a fortress below Gveleti,
and nearby he constructed a palace, which he used during his campaigns in
Ossetia.
Possession and fortification of this route were indispensable for the
maintenance and development of the flourishing economic, political and
cultural relations that Georgia had with the Northern Caucasus.
In the Northern Caucasus Georgia had the closest relations with the
Ossetians. The Georgian kings frequently used Ossetian mercenaries against
internal and external enemies.
David the Builder showed a particularly keen interest in the Darubandi - (Derbendi
-) route, which explained his interest in Northern Azerbaijan. The struggle
between Georgia and the Seljuks for Shirvan and the Derbent pass reached a
high pitch. David appreciated the great strategic and commercial value of
the Caspian gates.
In his relations with the peoples of the Northern Caucasus, David abided by
the traditions laid down by his predecessors. Georgia had always close
contacts with her northern neighbours. Here attention must be drawn to the
relations of the kingdom of Egris-Abkhazeti with Ossetia and Jiketi and to
Georgia's relations with the Vainakh people (Durdzuki). These were
political, economic and cultural relations. By spreading the Georgian
language, culture and literature, and also Christianity (in particular, by
the building of Georgian churches), Georgia strove to bind these peoples to
herself and draw them into the Georgian. cultural and political world. Via
the Northern Caucasus Georgia maintained her most distant ties - with Kiev
Rus.
The Kipchaks inhabiting the South Russian steppes were constantly at war
with Kiev Rus. In 1103 some of them crossed the Don and others settled in
the Northern Caucasus as neighbours of the Ossetians. David entered into
relations with the latters, who were led by Otrok. He married Otrok's
daughter and then resettled the tribe in Georgia.
In the Northern and Western Christian world, Georgia was known as a strong
Christian kingdom. Evidence of this was the marriage of the Kiev prince
Isyaslav to a daughter of King David (or of his son Demetre). This marriage
gave the Kiev prince added prestige and brought him the support of a strong
Orthodox state. It strengthened his hand in his intention to settle the
difficulties in the Church without Byzantine interference and to subject it
to his power. An interesting point is that the Kiev state concluded a
political alliance precisely with Georgia, which at the time had become a
rival and successor of the Byzantine empire in the Middle East.
A further indication of Georgia's growing prestige was the contact that she
established with the Crusaders. Georgia and the Crusaders were drawn
together by the circumstance that they had a common enemy - the Seljuks.
True, they had entirely different aims and interests, but the wars of
Georgia and the Crusaders at the close of the 11th and beginning of the 12th
centuries objectively pursued one and the same purpose. For that reason the
reports about King David's contacts with one of the Crusader-leaders, the
king of Jerusalem, Baldwin, are quite credible. The participation of a
contingent of Crusaders in the Didgori-battle is evidence of these contacts.
Thus, as a result of the steps taken in Georgia at the end of the 11th and
beginning of the 12th century, David's words that he was bequeathing to his
son Demetre a land extending "from Nikopsia to Derbent and from Ossetia to
Aragatsi", are well founded. Also well founded but somewhat exaggerated is
the record of King David's historian that David made the sultan a tributary,
that the Greek king became his kinsman, that he destroyed the barbarians,
subjected kings, enslaved rulers, forced the Arabs to flee, pillaged Ismail,
and reduced the Persians to dust and their princes to peasants.
In the first quarter of the 12th century (in the reign of David the
Builder), Georgia was completely liberated from the Seljuks. The long
process of uniting the Georgian lands and the creation of a united Georgian
feudal monarchy was consummated. Moreover, Georgia annexed Northern Armenia,
Shirvan and a large part of the Northern Caucasus.
These major successes were due to a number of internal and external factors.
In Georgia rapid economic, cultural and political development began in the
9th century. The general upsurge and ultimate unification were fostered by
the further expansion of intensive branches of agriculture and handicrafts,
the economic union of various provinces and the bustling domestic and
foreign trade.
The Seljuk invasion was a heavy blow to the united country holding up its
further development. Nevertheless, Georgia shook off the foreign yoke, even
if, in so doing, it had to make a considerable sacrifice.
Before taking the field against the Seljuks, King David subordinated the
powerful secular feudal lords and made the Georgian Church, a strong feudal
organisation in its own rights, his ally. Actions against the Crown were
regarded as high treason. At a time when the people were waging a life-and
death struggle against the Seljuk invaders, any weakening of the stand
against internal and external enemies was also regarded as tantamount to
high treason. This gave David a strong hand against particularist trends and
was used by him to justify his ruthless repressions.
The war against the Seljuks was a war of liberation. The Georgian people
fought to recover the land taken by the Seljuks, to recover the homeland of
their fathers. The Georgian peasants defended their farms from ruin and
their families from annihilation. When this movement was headed by a gifted
organizer, strategist and statesman, the entire nation rose against the
enemy.
King David united the scattered forces and devoted all his energy to the
national cause.
Although David championed the interests of the ruling class, he relied on
the masses, on the petty and military middle nobility, who regarded him as
their deliverer from the foreign invaders and their defender against the
great feudal lords; also, he depended on the peasants, who looked to the
Crown to deliver them from the external enemy. The king had the support of
the Georgian towns, which had grown stronger and bigger and found that it
was not to their advantage to be outside a strong Transcaucasian state.
The Seljuk domains were disintegrating: the endless wars between the
political units that emerged on the ruins of these domains obstructed
international trade and hindered the further development of towns and urban
life. In the Middle East, feudal Georgia was really the only growing state
with a strong centralized power. Hence the gravitation of the towns towards
her. This is strikingly illustrated by the history of Tbilisi and Ani. The
elders of Tbilisi had turned the city over to the Georgian king on many
occasions in the 11th century, while the elders of Ani had offered their
town first to Bagrat IV and to David the Builder. True, in 1122 King David
had to take Tbilisi by assault but this resistance was due to his policy of
abolishing the city's self-government and also to the existence of large
Muslim population, which included a military-feudal aristocracy. Whenever
the Tbilisi-elders offered the city to the Georgian king, this step was
resisted by the Muslim military-feudal-elite, entrenched in Isani. Thus,
this example hardly changes the overall picture.
In his struggle to complete Georgian's unification and expel the Seljuks,
David thus relied on the petty and middle military nobility, the Church and
the great feudal lords, who were subordinated to the central power. The
reorganized army was his immediate military buttress.
The entire might of the people was directed towards one goal, and the
desired objective was attained.
The mobilisation of all forces ensured the success of David's struggle for
Armenia and Shirvan. In this struggle he championed the liberation of
neighbouring peoples from foreign oppression, and this brought him the
support and military assistance of the local Christian population.
Not only Georgian but also many non-Georgian lands came under the Georgian
Crown as a result of David's wars against internal and external enemies. As
could have been expected, all the annexed regions were subordinated to
Georgian state-power.
Characteristic in this respect was David's policy in Georgia, relative to
the possessions of recalcitrant feudal lords. For instance, when the power
of the Baghvashi-family was finally broken, the king incorporated all its
possessions in his domains. The Kldekari-"eristavship" was abolished. The
same fate overtook other big feudal possessions.
David pursued an analogous policy with regard to the countries conquered
from the Seljuks. When he captured the town of Ani, he sent its ruler,
Abdul-Aswar, together with the latter's son, Shaddad, and entire family, to
Western Georgia, placed that part of Armenia under his direct rule and
garrisoned it with Georgian troops. Shirvan was also subordinated directly
to the king's chancellor.
Although David depended on the towns, he subordinated them to his
chancellor. Ani, Samshvilde, Rustavi, Dmanisi and other towns were thus
subordinated to the central power. This policy was due to the changed
attitude of some Transcaucasian towns. As we know, in 1121, a delegation of
the merchants of Gandza, Tbilisi and Dmanisi went to the sultan to request
assistance against the Georgian king. These towns concluded a political
alliance among themselves against King David.
David was determined to centralise state-power to the utmost.
A different policy was adopted towards northern neighbours. For instance, he
concluded an alliance with the rulers of Ossetia under the terms of which
they became his vassals. When the Kipchaks were resettled, the Georgian king
occupied the entire Daryal route and still further strengthened his good
neighbourly relations with the Ossetian rulers. The Durdzuki, Didois and
other highland-tribes of the Northern Caucasus were likewise tributaries of
Georgia.
The aim this policy was primarily to strengthen Georgia's northern frontier
and ensure her further advance northwards. Although in the north, Georgia
was protected by the lofty mountains of Caucasian Range, the passes were of
enormous economic and strategic significance. For that reason David held
these passes firmly and made vassals of the inhabitants of the northern
slopes.
As David saw it, the entire country had to belong to the Crown, with "aznauris"
installed as governors, on condition they personally served in the army
(military nobility). As N. Berdzenishvili justifiably notes, although David
could not entirely implement his policy, there is no doubt that he pursued
it and subordinated the administration of domestic and external affairs to
the Crown.
He united the country not only by bringing remote regions . under
Crown-control but also by his far-sighted policy of centralising the
state-power. In this context, the reorganisation of the court, namely, the
enlargement of the office of "mtsignobartukhu-tsesi" was of particularly
great importance. He opposed the power of the "eristavi", typical of the
epoch of early-feudal dismemberment, with the power of the highest
court-official, the "vaziri" "mtsignobartukhutsesi", giving the latter
prominence.
Among the steps taken to unite remote regions and subordinate, them to the
Crown, interest is centred on the unification of the episcopal sees of Bedia
and Alaverdi. By subordinating two episcopal sees situated in different
parts of the country (Bedia in Egrisi, West Georgia, Alaverdi in Kakheti,
East Georgia) to one and the same person, the highest representative of the
Crown, King David stressed the unity of all the Georgian regions and their
subordination to the central authority.
Georgia's expansion brought it not only Georgian lands proper but also
non-Georgian regions (Armenia, Shirvan) together with their non-Georgian
population: Muslims, Jews, Gregorian Armenians and others. Muslims,
Armenians and Jews lived also in Georgian towns (particularly Tbilisi).
This raised the problem of the status of people of other nationalities and
religions. The Georgian court adopted a policy of ethnic-and
religious-tolerance. This is vividly illustrated by the benefits grated to
Muslims of Tbilisi; Christians were forbidden to slaughter pigs, Muslims
were given complete freedom to profess their faith, and one of the city's
baths was reserved exclusively for them.
Also noteworthy is the fact that the per-capita-taxes paid to the state by
the urban population was: Georgians 5 dinars, Armenians 4 dinars, and
Muslims 2 dinars. David showed his' respect for Muslims by building a palace
for them in Tbilisi. Although this was an unusual policy in feudal times, it
was dictated by the need to strengthen the internal unity of the
multinational state in the interests of the ruling class.
King David was perfectly well aware of Tbilisi's place and significance in
Georgia's subsequent history. In those days it was one of the most important
commercial centers in the Middle East. Long Muslim rule had given prominence
to Muslim merchants in the city's life. It was the desire to maintain normal
relations with these merchants that mainly predetermined David's policy. He
reckoned with the fact that in the middle East all trade was in the hands of
Muslims. Tbilisi was a trade-hub, and this benefited Georgia most of all.
Also, King David reckoned with the circumstance that Muslim states were
powerful in the Middle East, and, as an enlightened and perspicacious ruler
of a civilized state, he showed respect for the religious faith of his
neighbours and did not persecute other nationalities and religions.
He showed similar respect for the large Armenian population, but it must be
noted that from David's day, Georgia's rulers made every effort to draw the
annexed countries into the Georgian world and bind them to Georgian
statehood. Various means were used to achieve this aim. In this context,. a
consistent policy was pursued towards Armenia from the very beginning.
Most of Armenia was incorporated within Georgia in the reign of David the
Builder. Armenians and Georgians fought shoulder to shoulder to liberate
their land from Turkish invaders.
The Armenian historians of those days paid tribute to King David for
liberating the Armenians from foreign oppression and regarded him as the
saviour of their people. King David did much to restore Armenian towns,
build good roads and promote the welfare of the population. This was only
natural, for he regarded Armenia as part of his kingdom. He helped to
resettle Armenians in Georgia, large numbers of whom made their homes in
Gori, where they were provided with facilities for handicrafts and trade.
The policy towards people of their religions and nationalities was evidence
of Georgia's high cultural level and its great political strength,
But in considering this general policy, it must be borne in mind that, in
those years, Georgia emerged as the force uniting the Caucasian peoples,
politically and culturally rallying kindred and neighbouring Caucasian
peoples around herself. She under-took this mission as soon as the process
of uniting the land was started. In order to spread its religion, language
and culture, the Georgian state built churches in the North Caucasus, making
Georgian inscriptions on their walls. The purpose of this was to Georgianize
some of the peoples inhabiting the Caucasian Mountains. Most of the Kipchaks
settled in Georgia were Georgianized: they adopted the Georgian religion,
language and culture, and subsequently many became leading Georgian
statesmen.
The Ossetians came under strong Georgian influence. In the 10th century
their conversion to Christianity was fostered actively by King Giorgi of
Ergris-Abkhazeti. But Christianity was not finally established in Ossetia,
and for that reason in the 11th - 12th centuries secular and ecclesiastical
leaders sought to consolidate Christianity by building churches and by other
measures. This was a period when Georgian influence in Ossetia was spreading
intensively. In Ossetia, Christianity brought with it the Georgian language
and Georgian culture, and this drew the two peoples closer together. Thus,
in addition to her political influence, Georgia exercised a cultural
influence on her neighbours.
However, in parallel with her policy of religious toleration, Georgia
carefully and consistently sought to convert other Christian denominations
particularly the Gregorian Armenians, into the Chalcedon denomination.
The same policy was pursued very vigorously by the Byzantine empire in the
11th century.
This attitude to the Armenians was due to Armenia's political position. She
was pressured by both Byzantium and Georgia, Along with other methods, both
sides made active use of ideological means and endeavoured to strengthen
their position by achieving religious unity. There were two tendencies in
this clash of dogmas. Some Church-leaders maintained that there was no
essential difference between the Armenians and the Orthodox Chalcedonians
and considered that it was possible to unite these two Churches. Others
insisted that there were fundamental distinctions between them and on these
grounds contended that they could not be united.
The leadership of the Armenian Church in Kilikia was not opposed to unity
with the Orthodox (Byzantine) Church. This is borne out by the Statement of
Principles of the Armenian Church compiled by the Armenian patriarch Nerses
in the 12th century (circa 1170) and submitted to the emperor Manuel I (Comnenos).
In relation to Kilikian Armenia, Byzantium pursued the same objectives as
were pursued by Georgia towards the part of Armenia annexed by her. While
the emperor Manuel I attempted to consolidate his position in the Kilikian
Armenian kingdom, the Armenian patriarch hoped to strengthen his own
position with the assistance of the Byzantine emperor. Both considered that
religious unity was one of the basic preconditions for the attainment of
their aims.
Attempts to unite the Chalcedonian and Grigorian Churches were made as early
as the 11th century, when in a dogmatic polemic at the court of Constantine
X (Ducas) (1059- 1068) the Armenian religious leader, Jakob Kerabi, sided
with the Chalcedonians. He wrote the Book of Faith, in which he showed that
these two denominations could be united. A similar document
was written in the 12th century by the patriarch Nerses following the talks
he had with the emperor. In this document he endeavoured to prove that no
fundamental difference existed between the Armenian and Chalcedonian
Churches.
As we have already noted, the tendency to unite the Armenian and Georgian
Churches emerged in Georgia in the 12th century.
A factor influencing the religious relations with Armenia was that there was
a large number of Chalcedonian Armenians in Georgia. Moreover, these
relations were influenced by the historical situation.
Initially, following the schism between the Georgian and Armenian Churches,
the Georgians only defended themselves, and even the polemical Church-split
between Georgia and Armenia did not affect the attitude towards the
Armenians.
A representative of the Armenian clergy, the scholarly monk Sosten, went to
Georgia in the 11th century to accuse the Georgian Church of heresy. In this
case the Georgian Church did nothing more than defend itself against
Sosten's attacks. But, after Armenia came under Georgia's political
influence, the situation changed, and the Armenian clergy had to defend
itself against the confessional expansion of the Georgians.
Naturally, after winning political supremacy, Georgia sought unity with the
Armenians on the basis of the Chalcedonian faith. For reasons that can be
easly appreciated, she endeavoured to achieve that aim cautiously. It was
believed that the most desirable way was to pursuade the Armenians that
their faith was ,,mis-guided".
The striving to subjugate the Armenian Church began manifesting itself in
the reign of David the Builder, and an organised drive to that end was
conducted in the latter half of the 12th century. This is shown by the
synods that took place in the days of David the Builder and, particularly,
of Queen Tamar. The Georgian-Armenian polemic was the main point of
discussion.
Georgian wanted to unite the surrounding regions and peoples around herself,
but this was seriously hindered by the religious particularism of the
Armenians. Georgian leaders were well aware that religious unity with
Armenia would create a solid foundation for the further strengthening of
Georgian-Armenian political relations. But this unity were strongly resisted
and they had to act with circumspection and officially pursue a policy of
religious toleration.
In the first quarter of the 12th century Georgia became
the strongest power in the Caucasus, while in the Near East it came forward
as a rival, and also heir, to the Byzantine empire. In this situation, the
Georgian kings naturally considered few of their neighbours and even members
of the Byzantine imperial family as their equals. A noteworthy fact is that,
while in the 11th century they regarded the receipt of Byzantine
court-titles as a great honour and even sought the title of "kurapalati",
David the Builder who bore the titles of "sebastos" and "paniper-sebastos"
when he was a prince, renounced these titles when he ascended the throne,
considering them humiliating.
In 1085 he is mentioned as a "sebastos" in 1089- 1091 he is called a "panipersebastos",
but in the acts of the Ruis-Urbnisi synod, in which his father is called the
"king of kings" and "caesaros" of East and West, David is mentioned by the
title: "King of Abkhazians and Kartvelians, Ranians and Kakhians, Autocrat".
Thus, after consolidating his position in Georgia, ceasing to pay tribute to
the Seljuks and reuniting most of the Georgian lands, David renounced
Byzantine titles and adopted the title of King of Abkhazians and Kartvelians,
Ranians and Kakhians, styling himself an autocrat.
The titles of the Georgian kings mirror the historical process of the
unification of the Georgian lands and the enlargement of the Georgian
kingdom. The titles of the first kings of united Georgia had the following
sequence: King of Abkhazians (i. e. King of Western Georgia), King of the
Kartvelians (i. e. King of Kartli and Meskheti) and then an indication of
the relationship with Byzantium, the title of "kurapalat". Thus, Bagrat III
was called: King of the Abkhazians and Kartvelians, "kurapalat ", Bagrat IV,
who was also called King of the Abkhazians and Kartvelians, at first had the
title of "kurapalati" then "novelissimus" (40s) and from the 60s onwards "sebastos"
Giorgi II was also styled King of the Abkhazians and Kartvelians, and his
title of "novelissimus" was at first replaced by the title of "sebastos" and
then by that of "caesar".
A radical change in titulature is introduced in the reign of David the
Builder. At first he was called King of the Abkhazians and Kartvelians and
bore Byzantine titles, but then these titles were dropped, and he added the
title of King of the Ranians and Kakhians (which was an indication of the
reunification of Hereti and Kakheti). The title of King of the Abkhazians,
Kartvelians, Ranians, Kakhians and Somekhians is to be seen on coins minted
in David's day and on the royal standard.
The addition of the title of "King of the Armenians" ("mepe somekhta")
indicates the conquest of the kingdom of Tashir - Dzorageti, whose kings
were called "mepe somekhta" in Georgian, and not of the Ani - kingdom of the
Armenian Bagratids, who bore the title of "Shahansha". The latter title
should have appeared when David conquered the Ani - kingdom, but it is
recorded in annals dating from the reign of King Giorgi III (1156-1184). The
titles of "Shahansha" and "Sharvansha" should have appeared in the latter
years of the reign of David the Builder, when he conquered Shirvan, but it
is recorded only in the charter of King Giorgi III. We feel that the titles
given in the charter of Giorgi III, namely, King of the Abkhazians,
Kartvelians, Ranians and Kakhians, "Sharvansha" and "Shahansha" were adopted
in the last years of the reign of David the Builder. That is when the word
"autocrat" must have appeared. The tendency to use that title was shown by
the first kings of united Georgia, an expression of this being the proud
statement of the Bagrationi-family's historian that King Bagrat III
"autocratically conquered the whole of the Caucasus from Jiketi to Gurgan".
Although some neighbouring regions were indeed dependent upon Bagrat III, he
"autocratically" ruled only a large part of Georgia. However, this tendency
became real in the reign of King David, who was the first "autocratic" king
(in a centralized feudal kingdom), and he bore the corresponding title early
in the 12th century.
The important component of "Sword of the Messiah" also appeared in the title
of the Georgian kings in the reign of King David. It is engraved in Arabic
on a copper coin of David's day: "King of Kings, David, son of Giorgi, Sword
of the Messiah, which expressed the policies pursued by David. By calling
himself the "Sword of the Messiah" he made it clear that in his actions he
had divine guidance, and that any act against the king was an act against
God. This "Sword of the Messiah" was directed against internal and external
enemies. In the eyes of neighbouring Christian peoples. David's expulsion of
the Seljuk invaders from the Transcaucasus made him the "Sword of the
Messiah" in the struggle against Muslim conquerors. This was a happy formula
by which the king justified his clearly pronounced internal and external
policy. The "Sword of the Messiah" was, a religious symbol of the political
struggle and a weapon of the feudal class in strengthening their social and
political supremacy. It was not accidental that King David caused the title
"Sword of the Messiah" to be engraved on coins in Arabic. These coins were
in circulation throughout the Middle East and were a splendid means of
popularizing this title. It showed the Muslims that as the "Sword of the
Messiah" David was the protector of Christians and to be feared by all the
enemies of Christendom.
The titles adopted in the reign of King David fully mirrored the gradual
growth of Georgia's international influence.
The hereditary character of the throne and the coronation-procedure were of
no little importance in consolidating the autocratic powers of the king. The
kings of united Georgia evidently sought to legalise the passage of the
throne to their elder sons, and for that reason in most cases they crowned
their sons in their lifetime. This pursued other aims as well. The prevaling
coronation-procedure obviously underpinned the role and significance of the
feudal autocracy. The procedure itself had evidently been laid down in the
early-mediaeval period in Western Georgia, when the king received his power
not only formally but in fact largely from the feudal nobility.
King David personally crowned his son Demetre, and Demetre and Giorgi III
acted likewise. After the death of Giorgi III, the supreme state-council ("darbazi")
consented, some hesitation, to enthrone Tamar but declared invalid after her
coronation by her father and crowned her a second time. By this act the
council in effect retrieved its right to crown its kings, the right to
present the king the dignities of royal majesty (sword and sceptre) with its
own hands. It is noteworthy that although the feudal council crowned Tamar a
second time, she declared that she had received the crown first from God and
then from her kin. The importance of the coronation-ceremony is shown also
by the fact that in the 13th century a new coronation-procedure was
instituted, under which the privileges of the feudal families in
accomplishing this act were abolished. Henceforth the coronation of the king
was the privilege of the heads of individual departments. For instance, the
king received his sword from the "amirspasalari" (Minister of War)
regardless of his lineage. The striving of the Georgian kings to cancel the
old coronation-procedure and thereby instal their heirs on the throne
themselves was thus a sign of the trend towards the establishment of
autocratic rule.
This elevation of the royal power required appropriate ideological
justification. Here assistance came from Georgian Christian ideology, which
declared that the supremacy of royal authority sprang from the divine origin
of the royal power and dynasty.
With the emergence of a class-society and the state, there appeared the
legend of the "superhuman", "divine", origin. Georgia, too, emulated that
example, evolving the theory of the divine origin of the Bagrationi-family.
In Georgia and Armenia this family acquired political prominence, early, and
various legends were created about it. The further evolution of these
legends is linked with the period when the Bagrationi became monarchs of
united Georgia. Sumbat Davitisdze wrote the Chronicle of the
Bagrationi-Family, giving the family's history and genealogy, according to
which the Georgian Bagrationi were the direct descendants of the prophet
David.
This legend, as all similar legends, pursued the aim of exalting the royal
family. It placed this family above others and, most important,
ideologically justified the class-rule of the reigning family. At the next
stage of the consolidation of the royal power, the Georgian Bagrationi
proclaimed that their kingdom was under divine guidance and patronage. This
dogma was in existence during the reign of King David. In his testament he
stated bluntly that his kingdom had been entrusted to him by God. To quote
his own words, God had helped him to rule the kingdom and sanctioned the
destruction of his enemies; true, he, David, ruled the country corporeally,
but it was ruled spiritually by the Lord. Since Georgia was ruled by God,
anybody raising his hand against the Crown raised it against God. At this
stage of the development of the state - power, in accordance with its actual
position and for the purpose of consolidating that position, the personality
of the king was elevated to the level of a divinity.
At the next stage, the ideological theory of elevating the royal power was
further developed and, in accordance with its new variant, evolved in the
reign of Queen Tamar, the Georgian kings were the "flesh of the flesh of the
tree of David and Chosroes." Origin from David was now complimented with
origin from the Chosroes kings of Persia. According to Queen Tamar's
historian, her marriage was consummated "as befitted their Olympic majesty
and royal radiance". Whereas origin from David gave the Georgian kings their
"Olympic majesty", their origin from the Persian kings gave them a "royal
radiance". Thus, as the Bagrationi-family was gradually elevated, legend
proclaimed them as being first of divine origin and then as equal to
divinity. In the reign of David the Builder the acts of the king were
proclaimed as being divine acts. To this was subsequently added their origin
from the Chosroes and the title "Most August".
Consciousness that the royal power was "autocratic" took root in the royal
family as early as the reign of King David and was mirrored in the king's
title.
6. POLITICAL
SITUATION IN THE 1120s-1170s FOREIGN POLICY
IN THE REIGN OF DEMETRE I AND GIORGI III
In the second and third quarters of the 12th century, i.
e. in the reign of King David's successors, Demetre I (1125- 1156) and
Giorgi III (1156-1184), feudal Georgia's foreign policy was directed mainly
towards Armenia, Ran and Shirvan. David the Builder had conquered Armenia
and Shirvan and incorporated them in the Georgian kingdom, but the
neighbouring Muslim rulers refused to yield their position and the struggle
for these countries was bitter and protracted, and marked by alternating
successes.
King David's foreign policy, which called for the incorporation of all
conquered lands within 'Georgia, was violated under his very successors by
reason of fierce resistance. Although Georgia was successful in her struggle
with neighbouring Muslim countries under queen Tamar, the foreign policy of
her government, i. e. the reduction of conquered countries to the status of
tributaries, was due not to the queen's benevolence, as is asserted by her
historian, but to the bitter internal struggle and the fierce resistance of
the neighbouring Muslim states to Georgia's policy of conquest. True,
Georgia's international position improved considerably at the close of the
11th century; internal social crisis and the Crusader-incursions weakened
the Seljuks, and their empire disintegrated. But the new Muslim kingdoms
formed on the ruins of the Seljuk empire did not cede their positions in the
Transcaucasus. Georgia found the struggle against them extremely difficult.
However, her position was strengthened by her ability to rally around
herself all the Christian peoples in the Transcaucasus to fight on her side.
But this struggle sometimes lasted for decades, and towns and regions
changed hands time and again.
In the latter years of his reign, David captured important strongholds from
the Seljuks in the Transcaucasus: the large Georgian trade-and
artisan-centre of Dmanisi, the former Armenian capital of Ani, and Shirvan.
Although he incorporated these conquered regions in Georgia, the struggle
for them continued after his death. The chronicles do not say exactly when
the Seljuks captured Dmanisi, but Demetre retook it in the very first year
of his reign. According to the Armenian historian Vardan, Demetre enlarged
the possessions inherited from his father with Dmanisi and Khunani (the
struggle for Dmanisi evidently did not end in 1125, because the town had to
be retaken again in the 1130s. Khunani was captured by King Demetre in
1128). With Dmanisi and Khunani in his possession, Demetre stengthened the
approaches to Trialeti. Henceforth, these two strongholds were evidently
incontestable parts of the Georgian kingdom.
After David's death, the neighbouring Muslim rulers began attacking Georgia
from all sides. In 1130 she was attacked by the sultan of Khlati, Shah-Armen
Nasir ad-Din Sukman II (1128- 1183). This war was started by the passage of
Ani into the hands of the Georgians; Demetre put the enemy to flight.
The fact that Georgia was growing stronger affected the position of the
Shah-Armen, the Muslim ruler of Armenia, who had his capital at Khlati. The
relations between Georgia and the Shah-Armen were strained first in the
1130s and then in the 1160s. It may be said that the Shah-Armen took part in
almost all the campaigns undertaken against Georgia in these years. Moreover,
he enlisted the assistance of Georgian feudals disaffected with the Crown
and gave them asylum. This, evidently, was the reason for Giorgi Ill's
invasion of the domains of the Shah-Armen soon after his accession to the
throne.
A particularly bitter struggle raged over Ani. It will be recalled that in
1123 King David had taken Ani from the Muslim emirs, placing it under the
governorship of the feudal lord, Abulet, and his son, Ivane, and garrisoning
it with "aznauris". Ani was the key to the final conquest of Northern
Armenia. For Georgia this was of immense economic and military-strategies
importance. But the Muslim rulers had no intention of reconciling themselves
to the loss of Ani, for this considerably weakened their position in the
Transcaucasus and endangered their strongholds in Central and Southern
Armenia. The town was recaptured by Padlon , who was in Khorasan at the time
his father the emir Abdulsaur was taken prisoner by David and died in
Georgia.
Padlon besieged Ani, and the town elders demanded that Abulet surrender the
town to him. In this difficult situation, Abulet surrendered the town. We do
not know if Ani was surrendered with the Georgian king's consent or if
Abulet acted on his own. Padlon then strengthened his position by occupying
Dvin and Gandza, but the Georgian king evidently set him terms which he
pledged to fulfill. In particular, Padlon and his descendants vowed not to
desecrate the Ani-Cathedral and leave it at the disposal of the Armenians.
This further exemplified the striving of the Georgian kings to pose as the
defenders of Christianity.
As we have already noted, the chronicles say nothing specific about Abulet's
actions when Ani was turned over to Padlon , but further developments, in
particular Abulet's participation in plots against King Demetre, give
grounds for believing that there was treachery.
Demetre had to give up Ani to Shaddad's descendant Padlon on terms of
vassalage and inviolability of the Christian churches. But Padlon's
successor, Pakhrad-Din Shaddad, decided to free himself of dependence on the
Christian king. He offered tribute to Saldukhi, ruler of Arzrum and asked
the latter to acccept him as a vassal. In 1153-1154 Emir Saldukh marched on
Ani, but Shaddad informed his suzerain, the King of Georgia, of this.
Demetre marched to Ani, defeated and captured the emir. At the request of
neighbouring Muslim rulers and local feudal lords he then released Saldukh
for a ransom of 100,000 dinars.
In Ani there was evidently conflict between the Christian clergy and the
Shaddadids. King Demetre's demand that the rights of the Christian
population should be protected was not always complied with. In 1155 - 1156
the town's Christian population rose against the emir and turned the town
over to his brother Padlon. But Padlon, too, apparently could not satisfy
the claims of the people of Ani, and this time the town was offered to the
Georgian king Giorgi III, who took advantage of this offer, occupying the
town, taking Padlon and his family prisoner and appointing Sadun as the
ruler (emir). However, Sadun broke with the king and began fortifying the
town. He was seized and taken to the king, who ordered his execution. After
this Giorgi subjugated Ani, appointing the "amirspasalari" Ivane Orbeli, as
governor and Sargis Mkhargrdzeli as his assistant. The king evidently left
intact the office of emir of Ani, giving if to Sargis Mkhargrdzeli. But this
did not prove to be the final settlement of the problem of Ani. A long
struggle ensued for this important Transcaucasian town. A coalition
consisting of the ruler of Khlati, Shah-Armen Nasir ad-Din Sukman II, the
ruler of Diyarbekir, Kotb ad-Din il-Ghazi, Al-Malik of Arzrum, and others
was formed as soon as the Georgians seized the town, but the latter defeated
the allies. King Giorgi liberated the people of Ani who had been taken
captive and gave the devastated town assistance. He then marched against one
of the members of the coalition, the king of Arsrum, and in the same year,
1161, defeated and made him prisoner, but then released him for a large
ransom.
The Armenian question was not confined to the problem of Ani. The capture of
Ani and the defeat of the Arzrum-forces enabled the Georgian king to march
on Dvin. The Dvin-campaign was completed in 1162. The town was sacked, the
non-Christian population was pillaged and the Georgian troops returned home
loaded with booty. The king appointed Ananiya, a member of the local feudal
nobility to govern the town.
Georgia's clear-cut policy required a response from the Muslim rulers. Shams
ad-Din il-Ghazi,ruler of Southern Azerbaijan and some other regions,
embarked upon a campaign against Georgia in early 1163. He was joined by the
Shah-Armen Sukman, ruler of Khlati, As-Sunkur, ruler of Maragha, and others.
With an army of 50,000 troops they marched on Georgia. The Georgian army was
defeated. The enemy took the fortress of Gagi, laid waste as far as the
region of Gagi and Gelakuni, seized prisoners and booty, and then moved to
Ani. The Muslim rulers were jubilant, and they prepared for a new campaign.
However, this time they were forestalled by Giorgi III, who marched into
Azerbaijan at the close of 1165 (or the beginning of 1166), occupied a
region extending to Gandza, devastated the land and turn back with prisoners
and booty. Meanwhile, the struggle for Ani continued. For four long years
Ani was attacked ceaselessly. The population was reduced to misery, the land
was not tilled and the economy was dislocated. There seemed to be no end to
the war between Giorgi III and atabagi Eldiguz. But the belligerents were
exhausted to such an extent that Eldigus proposed an armistice. Giorgi had
no alternative but to make concessions. He restored Ani to its former rulers,
the Shaddadids, who became his vassals. The Shaddadids, ruled the town for
about 10 years, but in 1174 King Giorgi took the "Shahansha" Shaddadid
prisoner and occupied Ani once again. And again the "amirspasalari", Ivane
Orbeli, was appointed governor of the town.
As might be expected, this act provoked a response: in 1174-5 atabag Eldiguz
and Sultan Arslan attacked Ani, ravaged the Shiraki valley, but were then
repulsed. In these events, Ivane Orbeli, who had been made governor of the
town and region, betrayed Giorgi - he was prepared to surrender the town to
the enemy, but his intentions became known in time and the corresponding
counter-measures were taken. Ivane Orbeli evidently wanted the town to be
dependent to himself personally, which he felt was preferable to being an
official of King Giorgi. For their part, the Muslim rulers had reconciled
themselves to Ani being a vassal of the Georgian king, but were not prepared
to see that region incorporated within Georgia.
In this situation, too, King Giorgi supported the Ani-clergy as represented
by Bishop Barsegh , whose brother, Apirit, he rescued from captivity by
paying a ransom and then appointed emir of Ani.
In 1175 the southern provinces of Georgia were again overrun by a united
Muslim host. This marked the beginning of another long struggle for Ani. The
chronicles do not allow the reconstruction of any coherent picture of this
struggle, but we can assume that the town and region frequently changed
hands. In any case, at the close of the 12th century, Ani was ruled by the
Shaddadids and finally passed to Georgia after 1199.
A long struggle also raged for Dvin. In the latter half of the 12th century,
the town and region also changed hands [several times, finally becoming part
of Georgia only in the early [13th century.
David IV's successors endeavoured to consolidated their [position in Shirvan
and Ran, as they had done in the case of Armenia. Tbilisi and Dmanisi had
been reunited with Georgia by David, but the question of Gandza remained
unresolved for a long time.
In 1136 the emirate in Azerbaijan (which included Ran) was seized by Shams
ad-Din Ildigizid, with whom King Demetre had fought for Ran. The struggle
for Ran continued in the reign of Giorgi III and Queen Tamar.
A severe earthquake hit Ran in 1139. Gandza was destroyed, and many of its
inhabitants perished. King Demetre took advantage of this disaster to attack
Gandza. He returned victorious, with considerable booty, and, in token of
his victory, tore down the town-gates and took them with him to Georgia. To
perpetuate this victory he caused an appropriate inscription to be engraved
on these gates. In reply to this, the Seljuk sultan and atabag of Azerbaijan
attacked Gandza several times, and in 1143 the town again jell to the
sultan. According to Mkhitar Gosh, Demetre ultimately gained possession of
Gandza, but, when he gave his daughter in marriage to the sultan, he
presented the latter with the town as dowry, and the sultain appointed his
own emir to rule it.
A complex situation took shape also in Shirvan. After it was incorporated
into Georgia, the Seljukid sultans fought to restore the rule of the
Shirvan-shahs. Shirvan's large Muslim population rose against Georgia, and
here too King Demetre had to agree to a compromise: the Shirvan-shahs were
restored to power in the eastern part of the region (Shemakha-Shamkor ) as
vassals of Georgia. This situation persisted for nearly a century. The
western part of the region (Kabala - Shaki) was incorporated in Georgia,
with the result that her boundary extended somewhat west of Shemakha, along
the Ak-Su river. This probably happened in 1129 or 1130, when Demetre
restored the Shirvan-shahs to power in Shirvan, installing on the throne
Manuchihr II, the husband of his daughter Rusudan. At the Georgian court the
Shirvan-shah was regarded "as a son and noble" and had to provide the
Georgian king with troops whenever the latter demanded it.
Derbend, too, was a vassal of Georgia. The struggle for ' Derbend was
started by David the Builder, who regarded Derbend as among his possesions,
and in his legacy to his son noted that he was leaving him a "country
extending from Nikopsia to Derbend. This is borne out by the chronicle of
Al-Farik, who accompanied King Demetre on an inspection of the royal
possessions (1154-5) and wrote: "The king travelled from one region to
another, from one place to another in his domains. I accompanied the king,
and we spent a few days in the regions of Derbend and Khazaran. And the
governor of Derbend Emir Abul-Muzaffar, came to pay his respects to the
Abkhasian king". This is direct testimony that Derbend was ruled by the king.
Another circumstance to be noted is that Emir Muzaffar was a son-in-law of
the Georgian king. Like his predecessors, Demetre strengthened his political
links through relations kinship.
Derbend protected the Caucasus in the north and its was therefore imperative
to maintain friendly relations with its rulers or hold them in subjugation.
But when, together with the rulers of the Northern Caucasus, the emir of
Derbend attacked Shirvan, Georgia helped the Shirvan-shah. Thus, Shirvan was
protected against raids from the north by David the Builder, Demetre and
Giorgi III. In 1173, when the Shirvan-shah Aghsartani requested Giorgi who
was the latter's cousin (son of Demetre's sister) to help him, the latter
went to his aid. "Giorgi went to war devastating the land up to the gates of
Derbend took the town of Shaburan and turned it over to the nephew of his
father". In the latter half of the I2th century, the Shirvan-shahs ruled
part of the Derbendi-emirate possibly with the assistance of Georgia.
Thus, in the reign of Demetre, Georgia waged bitter wars for Ran, but fell
short of her objective, especially after the establishment of the
Ildigizid-dynasty in the Transcaucasus The founder of that dynasty, Shams
ad-Din il-Ghazi, virtually subjugated Southern Azerbaijan, Arran,
Nakhechevan and the western provinces of Iran. Georgia's efforts to
subjugate Ran proved to be abortive. In the 1160s the Ildigizids formed an
alliance against Georgia with the Seljuks, but the chronicles do not tell us
whether he captured Shirvan and drove Georgia out of that region. The
Shirvan-shahs figure as tributaries of Georgia in the reign of Giorgi III
and Queen Tamar, "whom they regarded as suzerains and whom they served
faithfully".
In parallel with the major campaigns conducted in the reign of Giorgi III to
subjugate Armenia and Shirvan, Georgian troops raided the Seljuks living in
regions bordering on Georgia in an effort to dislodge and drive them out. In
describing the reign of King Giorgi, the Georgian historian proudly writes
that "Giorgi raised the sword against the Agaryans".
In the 1170s, when one of the phases of the struggle for Armenia ended and
temporary peace was established, the troops and the nobles told the king
that they did not desire a long period without wars of conquest. Giorgi had
to cede to this demand, and after establishing order in the land sent his
troops in various directions. Troops from Tao, Shavsheti and Klarjeti were
ordered to pillage the regions of Oltisi and Bana, the Meskhi-and
Toreli-troops were sent to Kars and Ashornia, the amirspasalari led a force
of Somkhitars from "Kvemo" (Lower) Kartli to the right-bank region of the
Mtkvari up to Gandza, Imereti-and Kartli-forces were ordered to sack the
land on either side of the Mtkvari from Gandza to Khlati the Hers and Kakhs
were sent to the region from the mouth of the Alazani to Shirvan. According
to the chronicles, in the western and southeastern regions, the Georgian
troops stuck at the Seljuks settled on Georgian land (Bana, ,Oltisi) or in
abjacent regions. These raids pursued a twofold purpose: to obtain booty and
reconnoitre the land in order finally to expel the enemy. It was necessary
to annex the above-mentioned regions or to establish Georgian political
influence in them in order to enchance feudal Georgia's might.
From the chronicles we know exactly the extent of the Georgian kingdom in
the 1170s. In the south-west, Southern Tao was still in the hands of the
Seljuks, who also ruled the Kars-region. In the south, the former
Ani-kingdom - the object of countless wars - was again in the hands of the
Shaddadids; Shirvan was a vassal of Georgia. These were more or less stable
boundaries. Georgia sought to move her boundaries southwards, but the
struggle for Ran ended without result. Giorgi III left it to his descendants
to settle the problems of Ant, Oltisi and Kars.
Internal situation. David the Builder curbed the unsubmissive feudal
lords for a time, but it proved impossible to uproot the characteristic
feature of feudalism solely by acts of repression. The central authority did
not have the strength to oppose feudal particularism effectively. Every
feudal lord wanted seignoral rights. A great feudal lord receiving the
governorship of a region from the king sought to make that region his vassal.
Moreover, the strong feudal states that sprang up (in Azerbaijan the kingdom
of the Shah-Armens in Southern Armenia, and in other kingdoms) on the ruins
of the Seljuk empire were Georgia's rivals in the struggle for Shirak
Armenia, Ran and Shirvan. This not only hindered the expansion of external
conquests but also the implementation of measures to bring order in the
country and create normal conditions in the incorporated regions. David did
much to enable the inhabitants of Georgia's central regions to return to
their ruined homes and restore normal life. It was left to David's son,
Demetre, to rebuild Hereti, "kvemo" Kartli, Javakheti and Artaani, i. e. the
peripherial regions that had suffered most from the Seljuk invasions. The
steps instituted by him helped to restore the economy of these regions and
facilitated the return of the scattered population.
Laws against brigandage were among the most important steps to normalize the
internal situation and restore order. Brigandage reached huge proportions in
Georgia in the 12th century; this was a purely social phenomenon typical of
feudal society. Prior to the reign of Giorgi III, there were agencies whose
function it. was to hunt down and punish thieves and brigands; under Giorgi
III the authority and powers of this agency were extended and measures were
taken to eradicate brigandage. Strict punishment up to hanging was meted out
to robbers and highwaymen by decision of the state-council ("darbazi"). The
legislation passed under Giorgi III against brigandage remained in operation
also in the 13th century.
In those days brigandage was not only of a criminal but also of a
socio-class-character, and for that reason the above-mentioned legislation
was directed also against the class-enemy.
David the Builder had reorganized the courts to some extent, making the
supreme court ("Saajo kari") an independent agency and subordinating it to
the Crown, and then the practice of investigation was started in relation to
some kinds of crime.
A special investigation-agency, whose duty it was to prosecute criminals,
was set up in Georgia in the 12th century; investigation and prosecution was
independent of the victim, and this was an indication of the high level of
statehood and consciousness of the law. Moreover, the existence of the
investigative agency testifies to the strength of the central state-power,
which used it, along with other means, against all who hindered its
consolidation and centralization.
The intra-class-struggle was an extremely acute problem in Georgia in the
1130s - 1170s.
From the reign of Bagrat III on wards, as a consequence of a tense struggle,
the position of the central royal power gradually grew difficult. The
socio-economic situation of that period ruled out the existence of
non-feudal social forces. Feudalization covered the whole of Georgian
society. The new force opposed to the feudal system and which could be
utilized against feudal particularism had not yet taken shape. For that
reason, in the 11 th-12th centuries, the Crown made use of the
contradictions within the feudal aristocracy, and, in its struggle against
especially strong feudal lords, it relied on other feudal lords. The
intra-class-struggle raged throughout the period that the feudal system
existed in Georgia, but at various stages it acquired different forms and
intensity.
King David IV died in 1125, and his son Demetre ascended the throne.
The feudal lords disaffected with the Crown's policy plotted against Demetre
from the very outset of his reign. They made use of the conflict between
King Demetre and his brother Vakhtangi. The chronicles are vague and
fragmentary on this issue, but the fact that there were contradictions is
beyond question. Moreover, the plotters took advantage of Demetre's
preference for his younger son Giorgi, of his intention to place him on the
throne instead of his older son, David, who was the legitimate heir. The
discord in the royal family gave the feudal nobility a good pretext for
attaining its particularist objectives, and for that reason it fanned this
strife and sought to make the most of it. One of the arguments against King
Demetre was the conflict over the question of Ani. As we have already noted,
King David had appointed Abulet and his son, Ivane, as the rulers of Ani.
But when Shaddadid Abdulasuar approached Ani, Abulet surrendered the town to
him.
The conflict between Abulet and Demetre deepened, and the ground for this
was. created by the claims of Vakhtang (Demetre's younger brother) to the
throne. According to Vardan, in approximately 1130, the prince and Ivane,
son of Abulet, plotted the murder of King Demetre, but this was prevented by
Abulet, who evidently informed the king. The prince was blinded, while
Abulet, despite his services, was imprisoned together with his son in the
Dmanisi-fortress. Although in 1131 Ivane, son of Abulet, took part in the
campaign against Garni, he was put to death soon afterwards. Ivane's second
son, Tirkashi, fled to the Shah-Armen, who gave him the Arsharuniki region,
from where he raided Georgia. But Demetre soon captured Tirkash as well.
The struggle for the throne between King Demetre and his older son David was
complicated. Although the king preferred his young son Giorgi, prince David
had the support of a group of feudal lords who had evidently sided with
prince Vakhtang (who probably died soon after he was blinded, for he is no
longer mentioned in the chronicles). The feudal lords disaffected with the
king's policies used legitimate claims to reinstate (or support) David, who
rose against his father in 1150. Demetre suppressed the rising, and punished
the unsubmissive feudal lords. However, another revolt occurred in 1155.
This time David was victorious. He occupied the throne, punished his
adversaries, released Abulet's son, Tirkashi, from prison and appointed him
"amirspasalari".
David reigned for only six months and was, its is believed put to death by
supporters of his father and brother, Sumbat and Ivane Orbeli, The murder
was committed in conspiracy with prince Giorgi, who, after his enthronement,
appointed Ivane Orbeli "amirspasalari". Upon his reassumption of the throne,
Demetre personally crowned his younger son Giorgi. This was not fortuitous:
David had a son, Demetre (Demna), who was the legitimate heir to the throne
after the death of his father. This created further ground for conspiracies
and revolts.
Several court-conspiracies were organized during the reign of Demetre and
Giorgi III. The struggle for court-posts was one of the forms of the
struggle between the great feudal lords. It was the continuation of the
struggle that began as early as the 11th century. After Georgia's
unification and the creation of a single royal power, the feudal nobility
sought to gain control of the court, occupy the highest posts and influence
the king, thereby protecting their class - interests. But Demetre did not
allow- the nobles to interfere in matters of state, and the latter grouped
themselves around David, the heir to the throne. There were many outstanding
issues of internal and foreign policy. The chronicles do not state precisely
what the quarrel between father and son was about and what aspect of their
conflict was made use of by the feudal lords, but there is little doubt that
this conflict was prompted by extremely vital issues.
Ani posed a difficult problem. After the death of David the Builder, the
town and region became the object of unceasing clashes, in which both
Georgian and Armenian nobles were involved. It is certain that the Armenian
nobility had no desire to turn the town over to the Muslims, but it is not
clear what status for the town was acceptable to them - its direct
incorporation within Georgia or a status of vassal age. It may only be
assumed that the Armenian nobility preferred vassalage. A noteworthy fact is
that, in one way or another, almost all the plots against the Crown were
linked with the Ani-problem. When, in the reign of Demetre, Abulet
surrendered the town to Fadlon, this act was followed by the plot of prince
Vakhtangi, Abulet and his son, Ivane, against King Demetre.
In the question of Ani, the Demetre-Giorgi, policy was opposed also by
prince David. During the struggle for Ani, King Demetre took the Arzrum-emir,
Saldukh, prisoner. A prominent role in Demetre's subsequent release of
Saldukh was played by the "mtavari" Vasak, whom Giorgi III had imprisoned
when he ascended the throne, for Vasak was known as a supporter of his older
brother and rival, David. It was evidently not accidental that as a
supporter of prince David, Vasak helped the emir in the struggle for Ani.
Attention is also attracted by the fact the Armenian historians Vardan,
Mkhitar Gosh and Stepanos Orbeliani usually wrote sympathetically about
prince David. Even. Vardan, who adopted a neutral stand in his assessment of
the Demna-Orbeli-conspiracy, extolled Demetre's son, David, while Mkhitar
Gosh wrote of prince David's sympathy for the Armenians.
The Ani-rulers, appointed by the Georgian kings; did not rest content with
the status of Crown-officials. Sadun, who governed Ani in 1161 wanted to be
the town's sovereign-ruler, and was condemned to death for this. Following
Sadun's. execution, King Demetre appointed Ivane Orbeli governor of Ani. In
the struggle between the brothers David and Giorgi, Orbeli sided with Giorgi
and for this was raised to the office of "amirspasalari". But prince Demna
(son of the murdered David) was brought up in the family of Ivane Orbeli and
then became his, Orbeli's, son-in-law. It is quite possible that initially
this was done to render Demna harmless, for as son-in-law of Orbeli he could
not claim the throne. The ambitious Ivane Orbeli apparently did not rest
content with the office of "amirspasalari" and sought to become the
sovereign-ruler of Ani. Another circumstance that must be noted is that, as
"amirspasalari" Orbeli was in possession of Lore-Tashiri, i. e. the former
Tashir-Dzorageti-kingdom: the province of Ani bordered on these possession.
In 1174 Ivane Orbeli suggested a campaign against Ani, having the intention
of consolidating himself in that region. After Ani was captured, the king
turned the town over to him. But the role of viceroy did not suit Orbeli,
and he associated himself with the Muslim rulers, offering Ani to them as
tributary. But the townspeople deprived Ivane Orbeli of the possibility of
surrendering the town to the Muslims, and King Giorgi repulsed the invading
sultan. Ivane Orbeli was stripped of his gubernatorial post, but he remained
the "amirspasalari," of Georgia. King Giorgi was evidently unable to deal
summarily with this disloyal feudal lord, and the relations between them
remained strained. The Ani-events were followed by a plot by prince Demna
and Ivane Orbeli: this time, Ivane Orbeli made use of his kinship with Demna
against Giorgi.
King Giorgi Ill's vigorous steps to centralize state-power and his policy of
incorporating conquered lands in Georgia provoked the discontent of the
Great feudal lords. In conquered and annexed regions, Giorgi did not grant
feudal lords immunity-rights, and did not give them larger privileges at the
court either. The young prince Demna, who was to receive the throne from the
hands of the great feudal lords, was more acceptable to them, and this
explains the participation of most of them in the conspiracy. Also
noteworthy is that to some extent the violation of the succession to the
throne (Demna was the victim of the alliance of King Demetre and Giorgi
against David) was also one of the reasons for the discontent. It is quite
possible that the long struggle for Ani was lost by Giorgi in the 1170s
because of the strong opposition of the "amirspasalari" Ivane Orbeli.
In Georgian historiography it is noted that the Georgian and Armenian
chronicles about the Demna-Orbeli-rising are extremely biased. The Georgian
historians sought to give a legal foundation for the enthronement of Giorgi
III, while the Armenians, particularly Stepanos Orbeliani explained the
Demna-Orbeli-conspiracy as being solely an aspiration to defend the rights
of the prince against encroachment.
Since it was not easy to fight Giorgi III, the rising was painstakingly
prepared over a long period. It began in 1177. The king's opponents were
Ivane Orbeli and all His family and supporters, as well as some great feudal
lords: the "eristavi" of Kartli, Sumbat Liparitisdze, Ananiya Dvineli,
Mkhargrdzeli, Hasan, the ruler of Kayen, and others.
The plotters assembled near Kojori and planned to seize the king suddenly at
a suitable moment. But somebody informed the king, and he managed to get to
Tbilisi and entrench himself there. Kubassari, chief of the
Kipchak-mercenaries, was loyal to the king and joined him with 5,000 troops.
This failure caused waverings among the plotters. The king took the
offensive and captured the Samshvilde-fortress. The plotters fled to Kojori
and took refuge in Lore. The strengthening of the king's position sowed
discord among them. Gamrekeli, Grigol Aneli and Mkhargrdzeli went over to
the king, who received them with honours instead of punishing them. This
increased the number of defectors.
The plotters decided to request aid from neighbouring kingdoms. In
particular, they requested aid from Shakh-Armen, the atabagi of Azerbaijan,
Eldigizidi, but no assistance was forthcoming. The "atabagi" evidently acted
cautiously, adopting a wait and see attitude, and, when it became obvious
that the plotters were in a hopeless position he denied them assistance, not
wishing to spoil relations with King Giorgi.
The plotters had roughly 30,000 troops. Initially they planned to depose
Giorgi and place prince Demna on the Georgian throne, but after the
situation changed, Ivane Orbeli demanded a division of the kingdom. The long
struggle ended with the king emerging victorious. The plotters besieged in
Lore surrended. The prince went to his uncle, but was punished. He was
blinded and castrated, and died soon afterwards. The plotters were punished
sternly. The sentence was passed by the supreme council ("darbazi") and
endorsed by the Church. Those censured by the Church were not permitted to
serve in the army, and their estates were confiscated. The king gave these
estates to loyal nobles, whom he appointed to high offices, from which his
adversaries were removed. The office of "amirspasalari" went to the chief of
the Kipchak-mercenaries, Kubassari, the office of "Msakhurtukhutsesi" and "eristavi
- eristavi" went to the commoner Afridon. But this was and could not be the
final settlement of the intra-class-contradictions, although it was a major
triumph of the strong royal power. Evidently Giorgi III had no delusions
either.
The relationship between the state and the Church was also a major
intra-class-problem. The Church was subordinated to the state in the reign
of David the Builder, but at the same time it was granted tax-immunity,
which inflicted a considerable loss on the state. For that reason Giorgi III
abolished that immunity. When the king defeated the plotters, the Church
congratulated him and the synod requested him to restore tax-immunity. This
request came at a propitious time. Although the king had been victorious,
this victory was won at a high price, and at the time it gave him no
advantage to spoil relations with the clergy. He issued a decree restoring
the tax-immunity. However, he - sought to make it look as though he had
decided upon this act himself.
The armed action of the secular feudal lords was thus followed by an action
by the Church-nobility. Whereas the former action was crushed by armed force,
in the second case the king had to make a concession. It was evident to
Giorgi that discontent was rife among the feudal nobility. He was well aware
that the aristocratic families would not reconcile themselves to defeat,
that they had only grown quiet in expectation of more suitable occasion.
The inheritance of the throne again posed the king with a thorny problem.
Although he had removed his nephew, he did not have a direct male heir. All
his children were female. Feudal Georgia had never before known a
female-claimant to the throne, but Giorgi decided to enthrone his daughter
in his lifetime so that her rights would not be disputed after his death.
His daughter, Tamar, was crowned in 1178. Because the situation was complex,
Giorgi observed all the formalities. Tamar was crowned with the consent of
everybody: the patriarch, the bishops and the nobles. Tamar was thus
enthroned with the approval of all the secular and ecclesiastical nobility,
but she was crowned personally by Giorgi. The purpose of all this, as we
have pointed out, was to avoid excesses after Giorgi's death and also to
consolidate the tradition, established by David the Builder, to belittle the
role of feudal nobility in the coronation ceremonial.
CONTINUE ...
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