¿ABBAÚS I, styled “the Great,” king of Iran (996-1038/1588-1629) of the Safavid dynasty, third son and successor of Soltáa@n Moháammad Shah. He was born on 1 Ramazµa@n 978/27 January 1571, and died in Ma@zandara@n on Ôoma@da@ I 1038/19 January 1629, after reigning for forty-two lunar and forty-one solar years. For ¿Abba@s, the path to the throne was anything but smooth; indeed, the experiences of his early years accounted in large part for the morbidly suspicious side of his nature, which poisoned his relationships with his own sons. Only a historical accident saved ¿Abba@s from sharing the fate of his uncles and other relatives, at least nine of whom had been murdered or blinded by his reigning uncle, Esma@¿^l II. The latter had actually ordered the murder of ¿Abba@s, who was at Herat, when Esma@¿^l himself was assassinated by a group of Qezelba@Þ amirs on 13 Ramazµa@n 985/24 November 1577. A second courier was dispatched to countermand the original order; he would, however, have arrived too late to save ¿Abba@s, had not the governor of Herat, ¿Al^-qol^ Khan ˆa@mlu@, who subsequently became his la@la@ or guardian, delayed putting the order into effect as long as he dared. Esma@¿^l II was succeeded by Soltáa@n Moháammad Shah, ¿Abba@s's father. An unworldly, retiring man who suffered from poor eyesight, he was dominated first by his wife, Mahd-e ¿Olya@, and then by a junta of chiefs of the Torkma@n and Takkalu@ Qezelba@Þ tribes. In Rab^¿ I, 989/April-May, 1581, when ¿Abba@s was only ten years old, a group of rival Qezelba@Þ amirs of the Osta@èlu@ and ˆa@mlu@ tribes swore allegiance to the young prince and raised the standard of revolt in Khorasan. Coins were minted in the name of ¿Abba@s, and his name was mentioned in the kòotába. The rebel coalition disintegrated when a royal army appeared in Khorasan, and ¿Al^-qol^ Khan ˆa@mlu@ reaffirmed his allegiance to the shah and the heir apparent, H®amza M^rza@, a brother of ¿Abba@s. In 993/1585, the ambitious Qezelba@Þ chief, MorÞed-qol^ Khan Osta@èlu@, governor of K¨úa@f and Ba@kòarz, seized possession of MaÞhad. When ¿Al^-qol^ Khan ˆa@mlu@ moved against him, he gave battle and, in the course of the action, abducted the young prince ¿Abba@s. At the capital, Qazv^n, an attempted coup by the Torkma@n-Takkalu@ faction on behalf of T®ahma@sp, another brother of ¿Abba@s, had been suppressed by H®amza M^rza@. Following the assassination of H®amza M^rza@ while on campaign against the Ottomans (994/1586), the Osta@èlu@ faction at Qazv^n supported the claims of Abu@ T®a@leb, another brother of ¿Abba@s, as heir apparent, but an attempt to put Abu@ T®a@leb on the throne also proved abortive. At this point, MorÞed-qol^ Khan Osta@èlu@ sounded out the Qezelba@Þ amirs at Qazv^n to determine the probable degree of their support for ¿Abba@s as a candidate for the throne. The amirs ware favorable to the idea, but hesitated to commit themselves. While MorÞed-qol^ Khan Osta@èlu@ debated whether to take the risk of marching to Qazv^n to install ¿Abba@s M^rza@ on the throne, a major invasion of Khorasan by the Uzbeks in Moháarram, 996/December, 1587, decided the issue. Fearing that, if the Uzbeks overran Khorasan, he might lose his pawn, ¿Abba@s, MorÞed-qol^ Khan marched slowly westward, securing en route the support of the Torkma@ns of Semna@n, Ka@Þa@n, and Hamada@n, the AfÞa@rs of Yazd, Abarqu@h, and Kerma@n, and the Dòu÷l-qadars of Fa@rs. When he reached Qazv^n, a popular demonstration in favor of ¿Abba@s won over the remaining waverers, and on 10 Dòu÷l-qa¿da 996/1 October 1588, Soltáa@n Moháammad Shah handed the insignia of royalty to his son, who, at the age of seventeen, was crowned Shah ¿Abba@s I. MorÞed-qol^ Khan Osta@èlu@, to whom he owned the throne, was rewarded with the office of vak^l-e d^va@n-e ¿a@l^ (deputy of the court), which made him the most powerful man in the kingdom. The formative years of Shah ¿Abba@s had thus been marked by the factionalism of the Qezelba@Þ tribes. The young shah had seen the way in which rival amirs had used him and his three brothers as pawns in the furtherance of their own ambitions. He could have no illusions about their ruthlessness. He had seen them murder his guardian, leaving him defenseless at the age of six; he had seen them murder his own mother in 987/1579 and the vizier M^rza@ Salma@n, at GÚu@r^a@n in 991/1583, when the latter challenged their power. The fact that on this occasion the shah and the heir apparent, ¿Abba@s's father and his own brother H®amza M^rza@, had been powerless to protect the vizier from the vengeance of the Qezelba@Þ must have made an indelible impression upon the prince. From the moment of his accession, Shah ¿Abba@s realized that he must impose his authority on the Qezelba@Þ or remain their tool. But the Qezelba@Þ were still the backbone of the military strength of that Safavid state; if he weakened them, he undermined the state. He could ill afford this luxury at a time when the Ottomans were in possession of large areas of Persian territory in the northwest—areas which they had seized during the reign of his two predecessors. His solution was to form a new, standing army composed of recruits from the ranks of the g@ola@ma@n-e kòa@sásáa-ye Þar^fa (crown servants). These g@ola@ms (“youth, servant, slave”) were Georgian, Armenian, and Circassian Christians who had been taken prisoner during the Safavid campaigns in the Caucasus (a small number of Georgian nobles had joined the Safavid army voluntarily), converted to Islam and trained for service in the royal household or the administration. Except that the g@ola@ms were not levied by regular recruitment, they were in many ways analogous to the Ottoman qapi-qollari. The loyalty of the g@ola@ms was to person of the shah, not to a tribe, and they consequently constituted a valuable support to the shah in his disputes with the Qezelba@Þ. For example, the Georgian g@ola@m Alla@hverd^ Khan agreed to be party to the assassination of MorÞed-qol^ Khan Osta@èlu@, now grown too strong; and in doing so, the g@ola@m took the first step toward eventually becoming the most powerful man in the Safavid state after the shah. In the short term, the creation of the g@ola@m corps was an effective solution in the shah's dilemma. In the long term, it proved a source of weakness to the state, because the g@ola@ms, in the final analysis, did not possess the fighting qualities of the Qezelba@Þ. The creation of a standing army gave rise to a problem of a different nature—a financial one. The old-style tribal forces had been levied at need by their tribal chiefs, who were at the same time the provincial governors and authorized to use the provincial revenues to defray the cost of equipping and mounting the required number of men. Only a small proportion of the taxes levied in the provinces found its way into the royal treasury. Once again, Shah ¿Abba@s found a solution which was effective in the short term, but in the long run it constituted one of the principal causes of Safavid decline. In order to provide the necessary funds for the new corps, the shah increased the number of provinces converted from the mama@lek (“state”) to the kòa@sásáa (“crown”) lands; in the latter, he appointed intendants who collected the taxes and remitted them directly to the royal treasury. This policy, as extended by his successors, upset the balance between Qezelba@Þ and g@ola@m troops and thus seriously weakened the military strength of the kingdom. The introduction of the g@ola@ms as a third force increased the shah's opportunity to maneuver between the rival Qezelba@Þ and Ta@è^k (Persian) elements in the state and led to a considerable reorganization of the Safavid administrative system. By the end of the reign of Shah ¿Abba@s I, g@ola@ms filled about one fifth of the high administrative posts, and this proportion grew under his successors. New offices reflected the growing importance of g@ola@ms. The holders of two of these offices, the qollar-a@qa@s^ (commander of the regiments of qollar or g@ola@ms) and tofang±^-a@qa@s^ (commander of the regiment of musketeers), ranked among the six principal officers of state. As a corollary, the office of am^r-al-omara@, or commander-in-chief of the Qezelba@Þ tribal forces (and, by implication, of all Safavid armed forces), fell into desuetude; and the qu@r±^-ba@Þ^, the commander of what remained of the Qezelba@Þ units, was the best primus inter pares. In place of the office of am^r-al-omara@, Shah ¿Abba@s created the office of sarda@r-e laÞkar, or commander-in-chief of the army; the name suggests the triumph of the Persian elements in the Safavid state, but, ironically, the office went initially to the Georgian g@ola@m Alla@hverd^ Khan. Later, Shah ¿Abba@s revived the ancient Iranian title sepahsa@la@r to denote the office of commander-in-chief of the armed forces; once again, it was a g@ola@m who was appointed to the office—the Armenian Qar±aqa@y Khan. By this policy, Shah ¿Abba@s managed to weld the armed forces once more into a cohesive body and avoided the dissension which would inevitably have resulted from the appointment of either a Turk or a Persian to the office of supreme commander. Other changes in the relative importance of the principal officer of state under Shah ¿Abba@s resulted either from the increased centralization of the administration or from greater separation of the religious and political establishments. For example, the status of the vizier (vaz^r), the head of the bureaucracy and the chief spokesman for the Persian elements in the central administration, was enhanced; this change was marked by a tendency to apply to the vizier the honorific titles e¿tema@d-al-dawla or sáadr-e a¿záam. By contrast, the title vak^l (“deputy”—originally vak^l-e nafs-e naf^s-e homa@yu@n), which harked back to the theocratic origins of the early Safavid state and conferred on its possessor a special, and indeed unique, position as the alter ego of the shah, was allowed to lapse after the assassination of MorÞed-qol^ Khan Osta@èlu@. The office of sáadr, originally designed by Shah Esma@¿^l I to keep the religious classes subordinate to the political authority, declined in importance; as a result, there were a corresponding increase in the power of the clerical doctors (moètaheds). From the inception of the Safavid state in 907/1501, the problem of how to incorporate into the administration of the state the Sufi organization of the Safavid order, of which the shah was also the morÞed-e ka@mel (“perfect spiritual director”), had been acute. Because the predecessors of Shah ¿Abba@s had failed to merge this religious system into the state bureaucracy, the Sufi organization became an increasingly meaningless survival of the past. Such was the prestige of the kòal^fat al-kòolafa@, the head of the organization after the shah, that the holder of the office from time to time challenged the shah's authority. Such challenges were usually met by the shah's appeal to the principles of sáu@f^gar^ “conduct appropriate to a Sufi,” and were made tests of loyalty to himself. Thus the Safavid shahs had transferred the implicit obedience due from a mor^d (disciple) to his p^r (mentor) from the religious plane to the political level, in the form of a vote of confidence in themselves as pa@deÞa@hs. Early in the reign of Shah ¿Abba@s I (998/1598-99), the Sufis made their last serious challenge to the authority of the shah, and were crushed. Henceforth, Shah ¿Abba@s deliberately sought to reduce their importance by ignoring them and treating them with disdain. The administrative reforms of Shah ¿Abba@s gave the Safavid state new strength and vigor. The delicate balance he maintained between the various peoples, or elements, in the system—Turks, Persians, and Caucasians—was the secret of his success. Though his successors failed to maintain this balance, with ultimately disastrous results, Shah ¿Abba@s placed the administration on such a sound footing that its machinery continued to function, largely under its own momentum, for nearly a century after his death. Within a short time after his accession Shah ¿Abba@s had demonstrated his determination to rule de facto as well as de jure, but time was needed to build up the army sufficiently to be able to take the offensive against the archenemies of the Safavid state, the Uzbeks in the east and the Ottomans in the west. In the east, the Safavids suffered defeat after defeat; MaÞhad fell, and S^sta@n was overrun. Kandaha@r, in Safavid hands since 943/1537, was lost to the Mughals in 999/1590-91. In 1006/1598 the brilliant Uzbek leader ¿Abdalla@h Khan died, and the dynasty was weakened by internal contention. Shah ¿Abba@s took the offensive, routed the Uzbeks in Moháarram, 1007/August, 1598, and recaptured Herat, which had been in enemy hands for ten years. It was not until 1014/1605-06 that Shah ¿Abba@s felt strong enough to try conclusions with the Ottomans, but then success was rapid. After winning a major victory at S®u@f^a@n near Tabr^z, he proceeded in successive campaigns to expel the last Ottoman soldier from Iranian territory as defined by the Treaty of Ama@sya (962/1555), and peace was signed with the Ottomans at Sara@b in 1027/1618. At the battle of S®u@f^a@n, Shah ¿Abba@s revealed himself to be a general of consummate ability, carefully husbanding his forces, which were inferior to those of the Ottomans in numbers and firepower, and throwing in his reserves at the critical moment. After his victory over the Uzbeks in 1017/1598, Shah ¿Abba@s transferred his capital from Qazv^n to Isfahan, which he transformed into one of the most beautiful cities in the world. From the south, one approached the city by a highway which passed through the gardens and estates known as Haza@r-èar^b, where many nobles had their residences. After crossing the Za@yanda-ru@d by the Alla@hverd^ Khan Bridge (q.v.), one proceeded along the magnificent tree-line avenue, the Ùaha@r Ba@g@, to the Mayda@n-e Shah, the huge rectangular piazza overlooked by the ¿Al^ Qa@pu@ palace and two of the greatest masterpieces of Persian architecture, the Masèed-e Shaikh Lotáfalla@h (begun in 1020/1603, and Masèed-e Shah (begun in 1020/1611). This splendid city was frequented by European ambassadors; by merchants seeking trading privileges; by Catholic friars seeking permission to open convents and carry on missionary activity; by gentlemen-adventurers such as the Sherley (q.v.) brothers, one of whom, Sir Robert, distinguished himself in the shah's service against the Ottomans; and by travelers such as Pietro della Valle (q.v.), who left valuable accounts of Safavid Iran. Shah ¿Abba@s' passion for building was demonstrated not only by the transformation of Isfahan and such major projects as the restoration of the shrine of the Imam Rezµa@ at MaÞhad but also by the raising of a multitude of utilitarian structures all over the country: caravanseries, cisterns, bathhouses, bridges, roads, hospitals, schools, and other public works. His predilection for Ma@zandara@n, where he spent most winters as he grew older, led him to construct palaces at AÞraf and Faraháa@ba@d, and to attempt to defeat the mud of the Caspian littoral by the construction of the celebrated causeway along the coast. His most grandiose concept, however, was undoubtedly his plan to cut through a spur of the Zagros mountains in order to link the headwaters of the Ku@hrang and Za@yanda-ru@d (q.v.) rivers and to divert some of the waters of the former for the benefit of the city of Isfahan. The project failed because of the inadequacy of the means available at the time, but the plan was considered so sound that it was put into effect in recent years by modern engineers, who discovered that the alignment of the cut calculated by the shah's engineers was only fractionally off course. Shah ¿Abba@s took great pains to maintain the cult of the Safavid shaikhs at Ardab^l, and to show his reverence for the imams. He invariably made a visit to the tombs of his ancestors at Ardab^l before embarking on a military expedition or taking any decisive step. His avowed aim was, by means of prayer and supplication, to enlist the aid of the holy shaikhs of the Safavid order. This practice helped to maintain his position as morÞed-e ka@mel of the order, although, as time went on, he found himself obliged to repress those Sufis who challenged his directorship. He supported the shrine of the Imam Rezµa@ at MaÞhad generously, and, whenever he was in Khorasan, he would visit this holy place and perform various menial tasks there to indicate his devotion. In 1010/1601, he made the pilgrimage on foot from Isfahan to MaÞhad in twenty-eight days. Such actions strengthened the claim of the Safavid shahs to be the representative on earth of the Hidden Imam. But, since Shah ¿Abba@s was in all things a pragmatist, the development of MaÞhad as a major center of Shi¿i pilgrimage kept in Iranian hands large sums of money which might otherwise have been spent at the other principal Shi¿i pilgrimage centers, Karbala@, Naèaf, and Ka@záemayn; for during much of the shah's reign these towns were in Ottoman hands. An additional advantage of this policy was that the moètaheds, as long as they received tangible benefits in the form of awqa@f (endowments), restoration of shrines, and enhanced status and prestige, were more prepared to acquiesce in the usurpation by the Safavid shahs of their own prerogative of acting as the general agency on earth of the Hidden (i.e., Twelfth) Imam. The reign of Shah ¿Abba@s marks a high point in that remarkable final flowering of Persian classical arts which occurred in Safavid times. Under his patronage, carpet weaving was elevated to the status of fine art. It was probably during his reign that the first carpet factory was constructed in Isfahan, although carpet weaving as a cottage industry was of ancient origin in Iran. Equally outstanding were the textiles: Isfahan, as well as Yazd, Ka@Þa@n, and RaÞt, became great centers of weaving. Safavid craftsmen excelled in the making of textiles of complicated workmanship, brilliant color, and intricate design, the finished products exciting the admiration of travelers who visited the court. Especially renowned were Persian silks, damasks, and brocades. Shah ¿Abba@s made the manufacture and sale of silk a royal monopoly. In the “arts of the book”—calligraphy, the illumination of the manuscripts, and bookbinding—the productions of the period of ¿Abba@s I are unparalleled. Safavid pottery rivaled Chinese ceramics in the markets of Europe. The glazed polychrome and mosaic tiles which adorned mosques, madrasas (religious schools), ema@mza@das (shrines of the descendants of the imams), and other shrines throughout the land reached perfection in masterpieces like the Shaikh Lotáfalla@h Mosque; they display an art essentially of line, light, and color. Under Shah ¿Abba@s, Isfahan became a prosperous city. Indeed, the shah's patronage of the arts was inspired not only by esthetic considerations but also by strictly commercial motives. Merchants from China, India, Central Asia, Arabia, Turkey, and Europe flocked to his capital to buy the luxury items produced by Safavid craftsmen. Thousands of skilled Armenian artisans were transferred from Ôolfa@ in Azerbaijan to “New Ôolfa@” (q.v.), a suburb of Isfahan on the right bank of the Za@yanda-ru@d. The Qaysáar^ya or Royal Bazaar extended for acres from its entrance at the north end of the Mayda@n-e Shah. Not since the development of Baghdad in the 8that century A.D. by the caliph Mansáu@r had there been such a comprehensive example of town planning in Islamic world, and the scope and the layout of the city center clearly reflect its imperial status. Always a realist, Shah ¿Abba@s devoted his energies to developing those arts and crafts which would bring wealth to the state, and his resultant neglect of poets caused many to seek greener pastures in India at the court of the Mughal emperors. The Safavid empire, together with the Ottoman and the Mughal empires, may be regarded as the final flowering of medieval Islamic civilization before the technological superiority of the West ushered in the age of western imperialism and domination of much of the Islamic world. Shah ¿Abba@s, and his contemporaries Süleyma@n the Magnificent and the emperor Akbar, conducted diplomatic and commercial relations with the West on the basis of parity of esteem. In the Persian Gulf, Shah ¿Abba@s was able to use to his advantage the rivalry of the Portuguese, English, and Dutch for mastery of the lucrative East Indies trade; a notable example was his enlistment of English aid in 1031/1622 in expelling the Portuguese from the island of Hormoz (q.v.; see also Portuguese Empire). Shah ¿Abba@s possessed qualities which entitle him to be styled “the Great.” He was a pragmatist in all things, whether they related to religion or politics, to trade and commerce, or to civil or military matters. Unlike his forebear Shah T®ahma@sp, he never allowed religious bigotry to interfere with trade. He was a brilliant strategist and field commander whose chief characteristic was prudence. Though personally a brave man, he would never have led his cavalry in a wild charge against the Ottoman guns as did his more flamboyant ancestor Esma@¿^l I at the debacle at Ùa@ldera@n (920/1514). If Shah ¿Abba@s could attain his ends by diplomacy rather than warfare, he preferred to use peaceful means and was prepared to wait years to achieve his objectives. He was famed for his forced marches with small bodies of crack troops, in a manner reminiscent of Julius Caesar—a tactic which on many occasions gave him the advantage of surprise. His leadership enabled him to drive his men to the limits of their endurance, especially during winter campaigns. His ability to maintain his army in the field in cold weather was another reason for his successes against the Ottomans, whose Janissaries regularly forced their commanders to retire to winter quarters on November 8. His deployment of forces (usually numerically inferior) was worthy of the great commanders of history; and his excellent intelligence service, which operated as far away as Istanbul, gave him vital and frequently decisive information regarding the size and composition of the Ottoman forces. Two notable characteristics of the shah were disregard for his personal safety and concern for the lives of his men. His amirs had orders, when preparing the muster rolls, to give details of particular acts of heroism in action, so that the men concerned might be suitably rewarded. Shah ¿Abba@s was famed for the severity of his justice, and was implacable in his punishment of disloyal officers. On the other hand, his affection for old and tried retainers was strong and lasting. To men he trusted, ¿Abba@s was ready to delegate wide powers—the mark of a great leader. His informality and dislike of excessive ceremony are well attested. He was beloved of his people, because he possessed the human touch, and both Persian and Western sources describe his practice of touring the streets of Isfahan incognito and of conversing with people in teahouses. Such tactics helped him to learn much useful information which courtiers and officials might otherwise have withheld from him. As stated earlier, the youthful experiences of Shah ¿Abba@s had created in him the moribund fear that ambitious men might use his own sons against him, just as he and his brothers had been used against their father. Consequently, because of a number of revolts and plots on behalf of his sons, he ceased to follow the traditional Safavid practice of appointing his sons to provincial governorates, with each prince in the care of a Qezelba@Þ amir who acted as his guardian and was responsible for his physical and moral welfare. Instead, he confined his sons to the harem, where they were brought up by the women of the royal household and by eunuchs. This system was open to a number of serious objections: It gave rise to harem intrigues far surpassing in scale the occasional revolt of a provincial governor; it denied the royal princes the opportunity of gaining experience of government and administration, with the result that, when called to the throne, they proved incompetent; and it caused psychological deterioration and physical degeneration of the royal stock. This practice was undoubtedly one of the major causes of Safavid decline. As his obsessive fear of assassination increased, ¿Abba@s either put to death or blinded any member of his family who aroused his suspicion; in this way one of his sons was executed and two blinded. Since two other sons had predeceased him, the result was personal tragedy for Shah ¿Abba@s; when he died on 19 January 1629, he had no son capable of succeeding him. See also AÚb-anba@r, Art: Safavid period, Caravanserai, Isfahan. Bibliography : The major source for Shah ¿Abba@s's biography is Eskandar Beg MonÞ^, ¿Alama@ra@-ye ¿Abba@s^, 3 vols., Tehran, 1334-35 ˆ./1955-56; tr. Roger M. Savory, History of Shah ¿Abba@s the Great, Persian Heritage Series no. 28, 2 vols., Boulder, Colorado, 1979. (Eskandar, a secretary at Shah ¿Abba@s's court, also treats the arts and sciences of his period, as well as earlier Safavid history). The most extensive modern study of Shah ¿Abba@s and his era is Nasáralla@h Falsaf^, Zendaga@n^-ye ˆa@h ¿Abba@s-e Avval (“The life of Shah ¿Abba@s I”), 5 vols., Tehran 1334-41 ˆ./ 1955-62. The only biography in a European language is by L. L. Bellah, Chah Abbas I, Paris, 1932. Useful background material on the Safavid period is contained in the introduction and appendixes to the Tadòkerat al-molu@k, translated and explained by V. Minorsky, E. J. W. Gibb Memorial Series, n.s. 16, London, 1943. An outline of Safavid history is to be found in R. M. Savory, “Safavid Persia,” in the Cambridge History of Islam, Cambridge, 1970, I, pp. 394-429. The same author has contributed a chapter on “The Safavid Administrative System” to the Camb. Hist. Iran VI (to appear shortly). Sir John Malcolm, History of Persia, London, 1815, contains shrewd observations on the Safavid administrative system. See also Klaus-Michael Rohrborn, Provinzen und Zentralgewalt Persiens im 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts, Berlin, 1966. The European travel literature relating to the Safavid period is immensely rich and important. For a critical analysis of this literature, and references to the relevant portions of these travel accounts, see Tadòkerat al-molu@k, ed. Minorsky, pp. 6-9.
(R. M. Savory)
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