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Updated August 2008
Missile Overview
Introduction
Over the past 25 years, the Islamic Republic of Iran has pursued an aggressive ballistic missile and long-range artillery rocket development program. Since the late 1980s, this program has been assigned a national priority at least equal to that of the nuclear program and continues to attract large government financial and material resource commitments. The development of ballistic missiles and long-range artillery rockets within Iran has proceeded in a relatively steady, logical, and predictable manner. Today, it possesses the second largest (behind the Democratic People's Republic of Korea - DPRK) ballistic missile force in the developing world and remains committed to an aggressive ballistic missile development effort, which includes developing a space launch capability. Iran's ongoing research and development efforts in delivery systems together with its capability at present to employ ballistic missiles and/or long-range artillery rockets against its regional neighbors, Israel, and U.S. forces deployed in the region, continues to be a major concern for its neighbors and Western powers alike.
History
The development of ballistic missiles and long-range artillery rockets within Iran can be divided into three broad chronological stages: Pre-revolution (1977-1979); Post-revolution and the war with Iraq (1980-1988); and Post-war (1989-present). The latter two stages may themselves be subdivided into distinct phases. This development has been strongly influenced by a number of interrelated factors, all of which have varied considerably in importance over time. These include, but are not limited to,
- Necessities of war and the short distance to Iraqi strategic targets.
- Quantity and quality of missiles and missile-related technology acquired.
- Size and experience of the indigenous missile-related manpower pool.
- Capabilities of the Iranian military-industrial infrastructure.
- Desire to possess the capability to strike directly at Israel and U.S. military facilities within the region.
- Organizational, political, and religious discord amongst the various entities engaged in the design, development, and production of ballistic missiles.
Early Developments under the Shah Pahlavi (1977-1979)
The origins of the Iranian missile program date back to the late 1970s and the last years that the Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi ruled Iran.
In July 1977, Iranian Vice Minister of War General H. Toufanian traveled to Israel and met with Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan and Minister of Defense Ezer Weizmann. Among a number of joint Israeli-Iranian military projects discussed at these meetings was "Project Flower."[1] This project was focused on the development of a longer ranged (150-200km) and more heavily armed version of the Israeli Gabriel anti-ship missile. Contrary to some reports, the project did not involve the development of a ballistic missile based upon Israeli Jericho surface-to-surface missile technology. It is possible, however, that this subject was discussed, since General Toufanian apparently attended a test-launch of a Jericho missile. Also discussed at these meetings was an Iranian interest in extending Project Flower to include work on a future submarine launched variant and Iranian concerns over missile and nuclear developments in India and Pakistan.
The following year, Iran made a down payment for Project Flower by providing Israel with $280 million worth of oil. To support this project, a team of Iranian experts began construction of a missile assembly facility near Sirjan, in south central Iran, and a missile test range near Rafsanjan. During February 1979, the Imperial Iranian regime of the Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi collapsed, and along with it died Project Flower.[2]
Islamic Revolution and the War with Iraq (1980-1988)
At the time of the Islamic fundamentalist revolution in 1979, Iran had no long-range artillery rocket or ballistic missile capabilities. This situation remained essentially unchanged through the following year when Iraq launched its invasion. The continued Iraqi use of FROG-7A artillery rockets against Iranian cities led to Iran's interest in long-range artillery rockets and ballistic missiles. Thus began a see-saw race with Iraq for superiority in these weapons. This race would last throughout the eight-year-long war. It would bring about the development of an indigenous Iranian missile industry, two "wars of the cities," and the evolution of a strategic concept concerning the military and political importance of ballistic missiles. Iran, however, lost both the ballistic missile race and, arguably, the war, which only served to reinforce its desire to possess and produce ballistic missiles.
In 1982, as the war dragged on into its second year, Iraqi operations entered a new phase featuring expanded use of FROG-7As strikes and the first employment (three attacks in 1982) of the Scud-B short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) to strike at the Iranian strategic rear.[3] The casualties caused by these attacks and the Iranian inability to respond in kind resulted in an effort to acquire long-range artillery rockets and ballistic missiles - especially the Scud-B. Iran also established several indigenous ballistic missile and rocket programs. The acquisition effort was thwarted from its inception by a number of significant factors. The Soviet Union was then supplying Iraq with the Scud-B, and those countries to which the USSR had previously sold Scud-Bs were under contract not to transfer them to third parties. Of the nations with whom Iran had relations, only two were likely to run the risk reselling their Scud-Bs: Libya and Syria. Negotiations with both countries are believed to have begun during early 1983. Sometime during 1984, Iran successfully concluded a secret agreement with Libya for the purchase of a small number of MAZ-543P transporter-erector launchers (TELs) and Scud-B missiles.[4] The details of the early Iranian ballistic missile and rocket programs, as well as their immediate objectives, are presently unknown.[5] By the end of 1982, there appears to have been four major components - indigenous design and production of crude artillery rockets, the indigenous design and production of an artillery rocket comparable to the FROG-7A, the acquisition of Scud-B missiles, and the reverse engineering and production of the Scud-B. The greatest obstacle to developing any indigenous capabilities was the status of the Ministry of Defense's Defense Industries Organization (DIO), and later Construction Jihad, industrial infrastructure under the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC). As these components developed over the years, they would actually consist of a series of concurrent programs pursued semi-independently by the Air Force, DIO, and the IRGC Construction Jihad. This often resulted in unnecessary competition, the dilution of effort, and abortive programs.
It was during this period that Iran also approached both the DPRK and People's Republic of China (PRC) seeking missile technology and tactical ballistic missiles in the Scud-B class.[6] At that time, neither country possessed a system of the type requested by Iran. The DPRK, however, had acquired small numbers of Scud-Bs (i.e., R-17Es) from Egypt and was pursuing a multifaceted missile research and development program.[7] The goal was to produce both reverse-engineered and extended-range variants of the R-17E known as the Hwasong-5 and the Hwasong-6, respectively.
As a result of the 1984 agreement with Libya, approximately 20 Scud-B missiles and two MAZ-543P TELs are believed to have reached Iran during January or February 1985.[8] Upon arrival, the missiles were assigned to a newly created battalion-sized missile unit of IRGC Air Force, whose personnel had received preliminary training in both Libya and Syria. In approximately one month, the missile unit attained initial operational capability.
On 12 March 1985, Iran conducted its first ballistic missile attack against Iraq, when at 0240 hours, troops launched a Libyan supplied Scud-B at Kirkuk. This was followed two days later by an early morning attack on the Iraqi capital of Baghdad.[9] By 1 April, a total of eight Scud-Bs had been fired. The Iranians identified the unit that conducted these attacks as the Khatam ol-Anbya (a.k.a., Khatam-ul-Anbia, "Seal of the Prophets") missile unit.[10] During the next three months, both sides conducted a small-scale "War of the Cities," with Iran launching missiles at Baghdad and Iraq countering with Scud-B missile attacks upon a number of Iranian border cities. As a result of a cease-fire agreement in early June, the first "War of the Cities" came to an end and neither side is reported to have launched any missiles for the remainder of the year.
Two weeks after the cease-fire, Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, the speaker of Iran's parliament at the time, led a high-level delegation to the PRC and DPRK. It is alleged that Hashemi-Rafsanjani managed to secure increased military assistance in the form of agreements to sell Iran missiles and engage in bilateral missile technology exchanges. Specifically, during the visit to the PRC, he secured a PRC agreement in the following missile-related areas:
- The delivery of HY-1 silkworm and HY-2 seersucker coastal defense missiles beginning in 1986 and assistance in establishing an assembly facility for these missiles.
- The continued delivery of HN-5A and HQ-1/2 surface- to-air missiles (SAMs).[11]
- Technology transfer and long-term assistance in the development of Iranian ballistic missiles and artillery rockets.
The visit to the DPRK was equally fruitful, and Rafsanjani secured DPRK assistance in the following missile-related areas:
- The delivery of HN-5A SAMs and assistance in establishing an assembly facility for these and the HQ-1/2 SAMs.
- Long-term assistance in the establishment of factories to manufacture the HN-5A and HQ-2.
- Technology transfer for new Iranian missiles and artillery rockets.
- Assistance in the establishment of a factory to assemble the DPRK Scud variant missiles.
Beginning in June 1986, Iran initiated isolated Scud-B attacks against Baghdad and Kirkuk. By the end of 1986, Iran had launched an additional eight missiles, bringing its total of Scud-Bs fired against Iraq to approximately 22.
Sometime in June 1987, Iran concluded a follow-on arms agreement worth an estimated $500 million with the DPRK. The agreement called for the supply of Hwasong-5 missiles, TELs, and HY-1 silkworm coastal defense missiles, and assistance in establishing first an assembly and then production capability for the Hwasong-5 in Iran. The exact details of the agreement are unknown; however, it is estimated to have consisted of approximately 90-100 missiles and an estimated six TELs.[12] Within Iran, the Hwasong-5 was designated the Shahab-1 ("meteor" or "shooting star").[13] Upon arrival the missiles were assigned to the Missile Unit of the IRGC Air Force, which appears to have been expanded to brigade size and been responsible for all Scud operations against Iraq.
In 1987, the Missile Unit of the IRGC Air Force fired 18 Shahab-1 missiles, increasing to 40 the total number launched against Iraq to date. This probably depleted their inventory of missiles obtained from Libya and Syria.
Progress within the Shahab-1 program was relatively steady and in early 1988, Iranian officials claimed that the missile had entered production. In 1988, Colonel Rahimi, First Deputy Minister of Defense, stated "...We have also succeeded in manufacturing missiles with a range of 320km."[14] This 320km range is the range of the Shahab-1 (i.e., Hwasong-5) and is slightly greater than the 280km of the standard Scud-B. It is unlikely that the Iranians manufactured these missiles, but rather they were assembled from components provided by the DPRK. It appears that it wouldn't be until the early 1990s that Iran would advance from assembly to production of the Shahab-1.
In the early morning hours of 29 February 1988, Iran - in its largest missile attack of the war to date - launched three Shahab-1s against Baghdad. This attack was in response to a major air attack on an oil refinery in Tehran two days earlier. Iraq quickly responded that afternoon, launching five of its new long-range al-Hussein missiles against Tehran.[15] Thus began the second "War of the Cities." Iran's ability to conduct these attacks was primarily the result of two factors. First was the experience gained in missile operations during the previous three years, especially by the Missile Unit of the IRGC Air Force. Second, it had enlarged its Shahab-1, Oghab (a 40km artillery rocket), and Shahin II (a large caliber 20km artillery rocket) inventory during 1987. By 1 April, the Iranian total had reached 258; however, only 61 were Shahab-1s, in comparison to 129 Iraqi al-Hussein missiles. From this point on, the number of Shahab-1 and Oghab launches quickly declined as Iran depleted its inventory. For a variety of reasons, Iraq - feeling victorious - declared a unilateral cease-fire on 21 April 1988. The Iranians tacitly agreed and the War of the Cities was over. During the 52 days of the War of the Cities, approximately 532 rockets and missiles had been launched by both sides. Iran launched approximately 339 (80 Shahab-1s, 253 Oghabs, and 6 Shahin-IIs) and Iraq launched about 193 (189 al-Husseins and 4 Scud-Bs).
Within four months of the end of the second War of the Cities, and following a continuing string of Iraqi victories (most notably on the Fao Peninsula), Iran sued for peace. On 8 August 1988, after eight years of bitter fighting and tens of thousands of casualties, the Iran-Iraq war came to a formal end. Iran had not only been defeated on the battlefield, it had, more significantly, been defeated at home. Its economy was depleted, its civilian industry near collapse, and its population was simply exhausted from the war.
Post War Expansion (1988-Present)
Building upon the foundations established during the war, Iran's missile and long-range artillery rocket programs were reorganized during the late 1980s and have developed along two broad paths - solid-fueled and liquid-fueled systems.
The solid-fuel component built upon the foundation laid with the Oghab and Shahin-II programs and would lead to the Fajr, Nazeat, and Zelzal families of long-range artillery rockets.[16] This effort has relied heavily upon PRC assistance. Sometime during 1988, it is believed that the PRC agreed to assist Iran in modernizing and expanding its facilities at Parchin and Semnan to enable the design and manufacture of solid fuel artillery rockets and missiles of indigenous design. Initially it was believed that these facilities would eventually assemble and then produce the M-9/DF-15 and M-11/DF-11. As part of this effort, agreements were reportedly concluded between Iran and the PRC during 1991, 1992, and 1993 to provide Iran with technology, components, and complete M-9/11 missiles. Available information suggests that, with the exception of possibly one ortwo prototypes, the PRC has not delivered complete M-9/11 missiles to Iran.[17] PRC-U.S. agreements have apparently been the primary reason for the missiles not being delivered. As a result of these agreements, the PRC refocused its efforts on assisting Iran with its indigenous short-range solid fuel systems. This assistance has included the sale of production and missile component technologies, training of personnel, construction of the Shahroud Missile Test Facility, and the assembly and production of the M-7 (a.k.a., CSS-8, 8610 or B610).[18]
During the war, Iran's liquid fuel program had initially focused on the production of a reverse-engineered Scud-B. This effort quickly floundered for a variety of reasons and was refocused on the assembly and maintenance of the DPRK produced Scud-B/Hwasong-5 - known locally as the Shahab-1. This program would subsequently lead into the Shahab-2 (Scud-C/Hwasong-6) and Shahab-3 (Nodong) programs. These programs rely heavily upon DPRK and Russian technology and assistance. However, since the late 1990s, DPRK technology and assistance have been declining vis-a-vis Russian assistance.
Iran's post-war missile programs have also benefited at times from
bilateral cooperation with Pakistan
and the acquisition of production hardware, non-restricted components, and
restricted components from the former Soviet Union (e.g.,
Belarus,
Ukraine,
Kazakhstan,
and Uzbekistan)
and European countries. In addition, Iran has made a concerted effort to lure
back scientists and technical experts who fled the country at the time of the
Islamic revolution.[19]
In early 2004, Iran announced the inauguration of a
new liquid-fuel Ra'ad missile, and initiated production facilities for the
short-range, image-guided Kosar missile. The United States has cited
numerous cases of Iran receiving assistance in its missile production from
countries such as North Korea and Russia, and
has even placed sanctions on individual companies for aiding Iran. Iranian
Defense and Foreign Ministry officials continue to defend Iran's right to
protect itself from potential threats in the region, while denying any ill
intent towards countries such as the United States. As of early September 2004,
Iran was cited as testing its Shahab-3 missile for a second time, further
proving its persistence to test and develop its extended range missile
capabilities.
In December 2004, the Iranian opposition group National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) released a document in which it accused the government of secretly developing an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) under the codename Ghadr. According to the document, the Ghadr 101 and Ghadr 110 are based on the Shahab 3 single-stage liquid fuelled medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), and have an estimated range of 2,500 to 3,500km. However, experts continue to debate the veracity of the NCRI document. [20]
In February 2005, it was revealed that Turbine Engine Manufacturing Industries (TEM), a sub-firm of Iran Aircraft Industries, had finalized the concept and preliminary design stages of a new generation supersonic turbojet engine, and had now begun work on the detailed design phase. It is believed that the purported Toulloue 5 engine will be used to power a new subsonic missile or UAV. TEM also announced that the older Toulloue 4 turbojet engine used in C-802 Noor anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) had entered mass production. The Toulloue 4 is a copy of the French Microturbo TRI 60-2 turbojet engine that was acquired by China in the late 1980s, and subsequently incorporated into the YJ-82 (CSS-N-8 Saccade) ASCM, which was then sold to Iran in the 1990s. [21]
Iran continues to be interested in acquiring cruise missiles, with the most recent case being the allegations about the possible illegal acquisition of the Russian nuclear capable 3000km range strategic air-launched cruise missile KH-55 Granat (AS-15 Kent). [22] In late July 2005, it was reported that Iran had tested a Shahab 3 rocket motor using solid fuel. According to the Iranian Defense Minister Shamkani the test was a success. However, it remains unlikely that Iran will convert its current Shahab 3 missile arsenal to solid propellant technology, as it would require designing a new missile from scratch and master stage separation technology to carry the missile to its current 1,300km range. [23]
In December 2005, Iran concluded an arms deal with Russia that among other things included the transfer of 32 Almaz-Antey Tor M-1 (SA-15 'Gauntlet') low to medium altitude air defense systems (16 tracked, 16 wheeled). The Tor M-1 can detect and track up to 48 air-borne targets simultaneously, and engage enemy assets at a maximum range of 12kms and between an altitude of 10 and 6,000m. The system is especially capable against cruise missiles, UAVs, and jet fighters. Iran is planning to deploy the Tor M-1 SAMs to protect its nuclear facilities against air raids. [24] In February 2007, the IRGC conducted a two day air defense exercise to test its new road mobile SAM system, and on April 9, several wheeled units were observed patrolling the enrichment plant at Natanz. [25] The delivery of the remaining units of the Tor M-1 was completed by January 2007.[26]
In January 2006, German newspapers cited a study by the German Federal Intelligence Service alleging that Iran had signed a contract for 18 disassembled BM-25 IRBMs from North Korea. [27]. The BM-25 is a single stage liquid propellant North Korean road- mobile IRBM with an estimated range of 2,500 to 3,500km based on the Russian SS-N-6 Serb SLBM. It remains unclear whether the contract was implemented, but prominent missile experts point out that the deal would hardly make sense for Iran, given that it is trying to move away from North Korean single stage liquid fueled missile technology to Chinese multi stage solid fuelled rocket equipment. [28]
Between March 31 and April 5, 2006, Iran conducted a massive maneuver dubbed "Great Prophet". Several missile systems were tested during the exercise. An IRGC commander praised an entirely new missile system, the Fajr-3 ballistic missile, which according to the IRGC commander is "capable of hitting different targets at one time, hide from radars and evade missile defence". [29] However, regarding the Iranian claims about the new indigenously developed Fajr-3, U.S. DoD officials stated that "the Iranians have been known to boast and exaggerate." [30] Most western observers agree that the missile tested was simply a Shahab 2 SRBM. During this exercise, Iran also tested its new medium range Kosar ASM, which closely resembles the C-801 ASM that Iran deploys in coastal batteries. Reports indicate that the C-802 Noor was also tested during the exercise. The C-802 Noor is believed to be a variant of the Chinese YJ-82 ASCM, and Iranian military officials claim that the weapon has a range exceeding 200kms, including over-the-horizon targeting capabilities. [31]
In May 2006, Iran again tested its Shahab 3 MRBM, claiming its engineers had increased the missile's range to 2000km. However, according to western intelligence officials monitoring the test, there had been no improvement or changes in the flight path of the missile, casting doubt on the Iranian claims. [32]
During the "Holy Defense Week," an annual event that marks the start of the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, the military parade displayed a new triconic warhead on the Shahab 3. The warhead has a smaller diameter and a conically shaped nose (also known as "baby-bottle" warhead), which indicates the possibility that Iran has developed advanced arming and fusing technologies, which could be used to perform new missions like airburst detonations at specific altitudes.[33]
In November 2006, Iran conducted another military exercise, termed "Great Prophet 2". During the ten-day wargames, the IRGC deployed ten infantry divisions, including several mechanized and armored brigades, and launched 15 missiles including Shahab 2 and Shahab 3 ballistic missiles. Reports allege that some of the Shahab 3 missiles were equipped with cluster warheads. [34]
In March 2007, Iran launched a suborbital research rocket developed indigenously by the Aerospace Research Institute. The rocket allegedly reached an altitude of 150kms before parachuting down to earth. Orbital satellite launch capabilities would mean a huge technological leap for Iran, especially with regard to ICBM development [35] The March launch was followed by Iran claiming in October 2007, that it had developed another new indigenous ballistic missile, the Ghadr-1 MRBM with a range of about 1,800km. However, western analysts doubt this claim, saying that the alleged new missile looked identical to the Shahab 3, when displayed during a military parade in Tehran. [36]
In December 2007, western intelligence sources revealed that Iran was apparently trying to develop a two stage solid propellant MRBM with an estimated range of 2,000 to 2,500kms. It is believed that the new missile, dubbed Ashura, developed by the Shahi Bagheri Group (a subsidiary of the the Sanam Industrial Group), could utilize the Shahab 3 launcher, given similar length and design parameters.[37]
Following the March 2007 launch of a suborbital research rocket, on February 4, 2008, Iran announced that it had successfully launched its Kavoshgar 1 (Explorer 1) research rocket during the inauguration of Iran's first space center by President Ahmadinejad. Iran claimed that while the Kavoshgar 1 was based on the Shahab 3, it used a two stage solid propellant technology. However, close examination of the launch footage revealed that the Kavoshgar was a single stage liquid fuelled missile, most likely another variant of the single stage liquid fuelled Shahab 3. [38]
On July 9, 2008 Iran conducted the "Great Prophet 3" military exercise. During the exercise, nine medium and short-range missiles were fired from the Iranian desert, including an upgraded Shahab 3, the 150km range Fateh, and the 400km Zelzal. [39] A still picture showing four missiles taking off in the desert was used by the international media. However, closer examination revealed that the image had been doctored. The original image from the Iranian news website Jamejam clearly showed that one missile had not taken off, but another image altered by the PR arm of the Revolutionary Guards and widely circulated, showed otherwise.[40] While the latest tests do not reveal any new capability beyond what has already been seen, they do signal Iran's continuing determination to advance and demonstrate its missile capability.
Key Sources:
[1] Martin Bailey, "The Blooming of Operation Flower," The Observer, 2 February 1986, p. 19; Elaine Scoliono, "Documents Detail Israeli Missile Deal With the Shah," New York Times, 1 April 1986, p. A17.
[2] Given the state of internal affairs within Iran at the time, it is likely that progress within "Project Flower" came to a halt during late 1978.
[3] Missile range categories are short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) - less than 1,000km (621 miles); medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) - 1,000-3,000km (621-1,864 miles); intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) - 3,000-5,500km (1,864-3,418 miles); and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) - greater than 5,500km (3,418 miles).
[4] Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "Iraq, Iran Acquiring Chinese-Built Fighters," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 11 April 1983, pp. 16-18.
[5] Also unknown is whether the Iranian utilized any of the personnel or facilities involved with the earlier "Project Flower."
[6] Typical of these reports is "Iran Goes Shopping," Foreign Report, 19 July 1984, p. 6.
[7] Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and W. Seth Carus, "The North Korean 'Scud-B' Programme," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, Vol. 1, No. 4, April 1989, pp. 177-181; Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., "North Korea's HY-2 'SILKWORM' Programme," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, Vol. 1, No. 5, May 1989, pp. 203-207; Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., "New Developments in North Korean Missile
Programme," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, Vol. 2, No. 8, July 1990, pp. 343-345.
[8] Barry Schweid, "Washington News," Associated Press, January 9, 1986; Subhy Haddad, "Iraq Says it Has Pinpointed Iranian Missile Launching Base," Reuters, March 29, 1985. The exact number of TELs and missiles obtained from the Libyans is uncertain. Estimates range from 20-50 missiles. Given the known numbers fired during the war it would appear that an estimate of 20-30
missiles is reasonable.
[9] "Iran-Iraq," Xinhua, 14 March 1985.
[10] British Broadcasting Corporation. Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 4: The Middle East, Africa and Latin America, March 15, 1985, p. ME/7900/A/1. The name "Khatam ol-Anbya," was apparently the identity of the field headquarters of the Iranian military command at that time.
[11] "Reagan Defends Military Shipments to Iran, Restates Desirability of Worldwide Embargo," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 24 November 1986. These are PRC manufactured versions of the SA-7 and SA-2 SAMs, respectively.
[12] Pejman Peyman, "International News: Iran," UPI, 18 September 1987; "Pyongyang Missile Sale to Tehran Reported," Washington Times, 1 June 1988, p. A2; John M. Broder, "Five Key Nations Sold Arms to Iran," Los Angeles Times, 20 January 1988, p. 5; "al-Musawwar Interviews Ramadan on War," al-Musawwar, 20 May 1988, pp. 20-21, as cited in FBIS. Pejman provides two separate accounts in his report. In the first, according to an arms dealer, during June the DPRK sold the Iranians 100 Scud-B missiles. In the second, another source, allegedly drawing on information from the Iranian purchasing office in London, the Iranians purchased 90 Scud missiles from the DPRK for $500 million.
[13] Shahab means "meteor," "shooting star," or "burning star" in the Farsi language.
[14] "Radio Phone-In Program With Defense Officials," Tehran Domestic Service, 14 April 1988, as cited in FBIS.
[15] Actually this attack consisted of seven al-Hussein missiles. The first five were fired during the afternoon and evening of the 29th and two more were launched very early on the 30th.
[16] Zelzal comes from a verse in the Koran meaning "resurrection day earthquake."
[17] Numerous sources suggest a major PRC connection in the Iranian manufacture of Scud-Bs. These however, are incorrect. Farzad Bazoft and Allan George, "Missiles Armed With Chemical Warheads 'In Sight'," Observer, 13 March 1988, p. 23; Dilip Hiro, "Iran: Up in Arms With a Big Hand From the Chinese," Wall Street Journal, 5 June 1987; John M. Broder, "Five Key Nations Sold Arms to Iran Last Year," Los Angeles Times, 20 January 1988, p. 5; and "Iran Announces Development of Two New Missiles," p. 25.
[18] Press reports during the late 1980s suggesting that Iran was manufacturing the PRC versions of the FROG or Scud-B are incorrect. Bates Gill, "Chinese Arms Exports to Iran" Meria Journal, Vol. 2, Number 2, March 1998; Bill Gertz, "China Joins Forces With Iran on Short-range Missile," Washington Times, 17 June 1997, p. A3; "Israeli Report on Nuclear Targeting Priorities," Davar, 13 January 1995, p. 15, as cited in JPRS; Douglas Jehl, "Iran is Reported Acquiring Missiles," New York Times, 8 April 1993, p. A9; Arnold Beichman, "Iran's Ongoing Arms-buying Binge," Washington Times, 4 June 1992, p. G3; Lally Weymouth, "Iran Resurgent," Washington Post, 10 April 1992; John W Lewis, Di Hua, and Litai Xue, "Beijing's Defense Establishment: Solving the Arms-Export Enigma," International Security, Spring 1991, pp. 87-109. The DF-15/M-9 was reported to have first been tested during June 1988, and was expected to begin production the summer of 1990. See David B. Ottaway, "China Sale Report Concerns U.S.," Washington Post, 23 June 1988, p. A33; and Michael R. Gordon, "Beijing Avoids New Missile Sales Assurances," New York Times, 30 March 1990, p. A7.
[19] "Tehran Reportedly Wants To Use Syrian Espionage Network," Frankfurter Allgemeine, 30 May 1997, p. 8, as cited in FBIS; "Russia Denies SS-4 Technology Sale to Iran," Segodnya, 15 February 1997, p. 2, as cited in FBIS; "Paper Says Iraq, Iran Trying To Acquire Armament Technology," Berliner Zeitung, 15 December 1994, p. 2, as cited in JPRS; Beichman, Arnold. "Iran's
Ongoing Arms-buying Binge," Washington Times, 4 June 1992, p. G3; U.S. Congress. Statement of The Director of Central Intelligence Before The Foreign Affairs Committee US House of Representatives, 25 February 1992, pp. 7-9; Blanche, Ed. "Gulf-Iran Missiles," Associated Press, 29 January 1991; "Reviving the Force of Islam," pp. 1299 -1300.
[20] Doug Richardson, "Iran is developing an IRBM, claims resistance group," Jane's Missiles and Rockets, 1 January, 2005.
[21] Robert Hewson, "Iranian turbojet advances to detailed design stage," Jane's Defence Weekly, 2 February, 2005.
[22] Bill Gertz, "Missiles sold to China and Iran," The Washington Times, 6 April, 2005.
[23] "Iran tests Shahab-3 motor," Jane's Missile and Rockets, 1 July, 2005.
[24] Nicolai Novichkov, "Tor-M-1s go to Iran by year-end," Jane's Missiles and Rockets, 13 October, 2006.
[25] "Iran unveils air-defence missile system," Jane's Missiles and Rockets, 1 June, 2007.
[26] "Russia completes Tor M-1 deliveries to Iran," Jane's Missiles and Rockets, March 1, 2007.
[27] Alon Ben-David, "Iran acquires ballistic missiles from DPRK, Jane's Defence Weekly, 4 January, 2006.
[28] Robin Hughes, "Iran's ballistic missile developments - long range ambitions," Jane's Defence Weekly, 13 September 2006.
[29] Ed Blanche, "Iran tests ballistic and anti-ship missiles," Jane's Missiles and Rockets, 1 June, 2006.
[30] Alon Ben-David, "West doubts Iran missile claims," Jane's Defence Weekly, 13 April, 2006.
[31] Alon Ben-David, "West doubts Iran missile claims," Jane's Defence Weekly, 13 April, 2006.
[32] "Shahab 3 shows no range increase," Jane's Missiles and Rockets, 1 July, 2006.
[33] Robin Hughes, "Iran's ballistic missile developments - long range ambitions," Jane's Defence Weekly, 13 September, 2006.
[34] "Iran's 'Great Prophet' military drill," Jane's Intelligence Digest, 17 November, 2006.
[35] Alon Ben-David, "Iran pushes space launch limits with research rocket test," Jane's Defence Weekly, 7 March, 2007.
[36] Alon Ben-David, Iran presents Ghadr - a 'new' ballistic missile," Jane's Defence Weekly, 10 October, 2007.
[37] Alon Ben-David, "Iran adds Ashura to missile line-up, Jane's Defence Weekly, 5 December, 2007.
[38] Geoffrey Jorden, "Smoke and mirrors - analyzing the Iranian missile test," Jane's Intelligence Review, 14 March, 2008.
[39] Joshua Mitnick and Bill Gertz, "Tehran's missile tests fail to impress U.S., Israel, Revolutionary Guard Corps flexes muscles," The Washington Times, 10 July, 2008.
[40] Cris Smyth, "Times - Picture: Iran 'fakes' missile launch after misfire," International Institute for Strategic Studies, 10 July 2008.
This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently
verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2010 by MIIS.
