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Updated August 2009
Introduction
The United States possesses a substantial nuclear weapons arsenal and associated delivery systems, and is one of the five nuclear weapon states recognized by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). While the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) suggested that the United States might develop and possibly test new types of nuclear weapons, the upcoming 2009 NPR may reverse this position. The United States destroyed its biological weapons in the early 1970s, and is in the process of destroying its stockpile of chemical weapons.[1]
Nuclear
The United States used nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, making it the only country ever to use nuclear weapons during a conflict. At its peak, in 1966, the American arsenal contained 31,700 nuclear warheads.[2] According to the counting rules in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), as of January 2009, the arsenal had an estimated 5,200 nuclear warheads and 2,700 operationally deployed warheads (2,200 strategic and 500 nonstrategic warheads).[3] The country has historically deployed nuclear weapons in six European NATO countries as part of its commitment to extended deterrence. In 2005 there were approximately 480 U.S. nuclear weapons in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.[4] However, the United States removed its nuclear weapons from Germany's Ramstein Air Base in July 2007, and from the United Kingdom's Lakenheath Air Base in June 2008.[5][6]
In addition to the NPT, the United States is a party to several treaties related to the reduction and control of nuclear weapons. Under the terms of the May 2002 U.S.-Russian Moscow Treaty (the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, or SORT), both countries are required to reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals to 1,700-2,200 operationally deployed warheads by 2012. Washington is also a member of export control organizations aimed at limiting the proliferation of sensitive nuclear technologies, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Zangger Committee (ZAC).
In October 1999, the U.S. Senate voted against giving its advice and consent to ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The George W. Bush administration said it had no plans to seek Senate reconsideration, but intended to maintain the unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing in place since 1992. In order to address the age-related deterioration of nuclear warheads, the Bush administration resumed small-scale warhead production at Los Alamos National Laboratory in 2007. Bush administration plans for a large-scale Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program were stalled by repeated Congressional denials of funding, and President Barack Obama made clear in his FY2010 budget proposal that his administration would not support the RRW program. [7]
President Obama's "Prague Speech" on 5 April 2009 presented a bold vision for his administration's approach to the role of nuclear weapons in the 21st century. Committing the United States to the long-term goal of zero nuclear weapons, Obama said "today, I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons."[8] Other highlights of the Prague Speech included Obama's commitment to "immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty," to "seek a new treaty that verifiably ends the production of fissile materials intended for use in state nuclear weapons," to "build a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation, including an international fuel bank, so that countries can access peaceful power without increasing the risks of proliferation," to "secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years," and to "negotiate a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with the Russians this year." The United States and Russia have begun negotiations on a treaty to replace START, and the new treaty will likely call for arsenal reductions beyond SORT levels. [9]
The United States is actively involved in peaceful applications of nuclear technology. It possesses 104 nuclear power reactors, including 69 Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR) and 35 Boiling Water Reactors (BWR), producing over 100,000 MWe of energy or approximately 20% of the country's electric power needs.[10] No new reactors have been ordered since 1978. However, increased natural gas prices, improved reactor designs, and a desire to lower climate change inducing emissions have spurred renewed U.S. interest in nuclear power. As of March 2007, energy companies had submitted 34 applications to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for licensing to operate new nuclear reactors.[11] In addition, as of March 2008, the NRC had received 9 combined license applications (COL) for the actual construction of new reactors.[12]
The United States has had a policy against reprocessing spent nuclear fuel since the 1970s, when the Carter Administration first imposed a moratorium, primarily in response to the proliferation concerns associated with reprocessing. The George W. Bush Administration revisited the reprocessing debate beginning with the February 2006 announcement of its Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), whose next generation technologies were intended to utilize reprocessing.[13] However, Congress significantly trimmed the program's proposed FY2009 budget, and the Obama administration has already cancelled key components of GNEP. Namely, the Energy Department announced in April 2009 that it is "no longer pursuing near-term commercial demonstration projects." [14]
Biological
In 1941, U.S. Secretary of War Henry Stimson commissioned a study by the National Academy of Sciences on the threat posed by biological weapons. The study concluded that the United States should move forward with an offensive and defensive biological weapons program, and President Franklin Roosevelt verbally approved the program in May 1942.[15] Beginning in 1943 and ending in 1969, the United States weaponized a variety of pathogens and toxins for use against humans and plants. Weaponized anti-human agents included Bacillus anthracis (anthrax), Francisella tularensis (tularemia), Coxiella burnetii (Q fever), Brucella suis (Brucellosis or Malta fever), Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus (VEE), Clostridium botulinum (Botulinum Toxin), and staphylococcus aureus (staphylococcal enterotoxin B or SEB).[16] Weaponized anti-plant agents included wheat rust, rye blast,[17] and other bacterial pathogens, toxins, and fungal plant pathogens designed to destroy food crops or defoliate trees.[18] In addition, military scientists conducted research on Rift valley fever, plague, Chikungunya,[19] cholera, dengue fever, human glanders, and shigellosis (dysentery).[20]
On 25 November 1969, President Nixon renounced biological weapons and unilaterally placed restrictions on further production.[21] Then on 10 April 1972 Nixon signed the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BTWC), followed by the deposit of ratification on 10 April 1975.[22] Between May 1971 and February 1973, the United States destroyed its entire BW stockpile (including over 40,000 liters of anti-personnel biological warfare agents and 5,000 kilograms of anti-agricultural agents) at the Pine Bluff Arsenal, Rocky Mountain Arsenal, and Fort Detrick.[23]
Chemical
In response to German chemical attacks during World War I, The United States established the Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) in 1918. During the war, the CWS manufactured, stockpiled, and used chemical weapons, primarily mustard and phosgene gases.[24] Other early agents included chlorine and chloropicrin. Chemical weapons (CW) development and production expanded rapidly during World War II, with production of new chemicals including cyanogen chloride, hydrogen cyanide, and lewisite. However, President Franklin Roosevelt declared a no-first-use policy and did not use CW during WWII.[25]
After WWII, the renamed Chemical Corps concentrated on research and development of weaponized sarin and V nerve agents (VX), with eventual weaponization of artillery, rockets, and other delivery systems.[26] In 1969, Public Law 19-121 restricted testing, transport, storage and disposal of CW.[27] Also in 1969, President Nixon signed an executive order halting further production of unitary chemical weapons. These two events, combined with several environmental incidents and growing international criticism over chemicals used in Vietnam (such as Agent Orange and tear gas), resulted in a substantial reduction of CW programs.[28] In 1975, the United States ratified the Geneva Protocol, with the reservation that the treaty not apply to defoliants and riot control agents such as those used in Vietnam and Laos.
The Reagan administration reexamined the CW issue in the 1980s and began production of binary sarin artillery shells in 1987. However, the use of CW in the Iraq-Iran war soured public opinion towards CW. Then in 1989, chemical companies, fearing a public relations disaster, refused to provide the first Bush administration with necessary CW related chemicals. On 1 June 1990, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev signed the Bilateral Destruction Agreement (BDA), halting all production of new U.S. and Soviet CW.[29] In April 1997 the United States ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and committed to destroying all chemical stockpiles by 2007.
As of 31 December 2007, Washington had destroyed 14,074.585 metric tons of chemical-warfare agents (or 51% of its declared stockpile). The United States requested and received an extension until April 2012, the final deadline set by the CWC.[30] However, according to the Department of Defense (DOD), destruction of the entire stockpile by December 2012 does not appear feasible. Furthermore, despite a congressional mandate to complete destruction by December 2017, laws restrict the transport of CW across state lines to already existing destruction facilities.[31] The Pentagon is requesting $1.2 billion in supplemental funding through fiscal year 2015 to speed up construction of destruction plants at the largest remaining CW arsenals in Pueblo, Colorado and Bluegrass, Kentucky.[32] Even with the supplemental funding, the DOD says it will need until 2021 to destroy the last remaining CW stockpiles.[33]
The United States also participates in CW nonproliferation through the Australia Group (AG), an export-control mechanism.
Missile
The United States produces highly sophisticated liquid- and solid-fueled ballistic missiles as well as cruise missiles. Washington deploys 450 Minuteman nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) at bases in Montana, North Dakota, and Wyoming.[34] The bomber force deploys approximately 500 nuclear weapons and consists of B-52 bombers that can deliver air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM), advanced cruise missiles (ACM), or gravity bombs. The force's B-2 bombers only carry gravity bombs.[35] The Navy's 14 operational Ohio-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) carry approximately 1,152 Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). The Navy also possesses approximately 100 nuclear-tipped Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles, but none are currently deployed.[36]
The United States is one of only three countries (including China and Russia), able to launch nuclear warheads on land-based ICBMs. As of 2005, Washington possessed 846 long-range missiles (LRBM), down from 1,640 in 1987. Following the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), it eliminated its entire stockpile of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM).[37] Pursuant to the restrictions of the INF, the United States does not possess ballistic or cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers.
The United States devotes considerable defense budgetary resources to antimissile weapons. Antimissile defense systems comprise three categories: short range, medium range, and long range systems. Most proposed systems are hit-to-kill interceptors and many are in the early stages of research and development. The most advanced short-range system is the PAC-3 patriot system.[38] Use of PAC-3 systems in the 2003 Iraq war produced mixed results including: successful interception of the nine "most threatening" ballistic missiles, failure to detect several low-flying Iraqi cruise missiles and ultralight aircraft, and friendly fire on coalition aircraft resulting in the deaths of three soldiers.[39] Medium-range systems under development include the Army's THAAD system and the Navy's Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense. The THAAD system produced disappointing results in testing, while the Aegis system saw success under highly scripted tests and real world results remain unclear. Despite strong technical doubts and scientific opposition, the United States deploys a long-range system called Ground Based Midcourse Defense (GMD). In 2004, the Air Force placed several GMD systems in silos at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. The system hit five out of ten targets in highly scripted and unrealistic testing.[40]
The United States is a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), whose goal is to restrict the proliferation of unmanned delivery systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. Washington is also a member of the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC), designed to supplement and bolster the MTCR.
Sources:
[1] Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, Second ed. (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), pp. 60-67.
[2] Natural Resources Defense Council, "Table of U.S. Nuclear Warheads: 1945-2002," Index of Nuclear Data, 25 November 2002, www.ndrc.org.
[3] Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "Nuclear Notebook: U.S. nuclear forces, 2009," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 65, no. 2, March/April 2009, pp. 59-60.
[4] Hans M. Kristensen, "U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A Review of Post-Cold War Policy, Force Levels, and War Planning," National Resources Defense Council, February 2005, p. 8, www.nrdc.org.
[5] Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2008," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 64, no. 1, March/April 2008, p. 53.
[6] Hans M. Kristensen, "U.S. Nuclear Weapons Withdrawn from the United Kingdom," FAS Strategic Security Blog, June 2008, www.fas.org.
[7] Scott Miller, "Obama Cuts RRW Program," Arms Control Today, April 2009, www.armscontrol.org/ act/ 2009_04/ RRW.
[8] The White House: Office of the Press Secretary, "Remarks by President Barack Obama," Hradcany Square: Prague, Czech Republic, 5 April 2009, www.whitehouse.gov.
[9] Robert Evans, "U.S., Russia focus on details of potential arms pact," Reuters (Geneva), 3 June 2009, www.reuters.com.
[10] Department of Energy, "U.S. Nuclear Reactors," and "U.S. Nuclear Generation of Electricty," Energy Information Administration, www.eia.doe.gov.
[11] Larry Parker and Mark Holt, "Nuclear Power: Outlook for New U.S. Reactors," CRS Report for Congress, 9 March 2007, pp. 1-4, www.fas.org.
[12] Department of Energy, "U.S. Nuclear Reactors," Energy Information Administration, www.eia.doe.gov.
[13] Edwin Lyman and Frank N von Hippel, "Reprocessing Revisited: The International Dimensions of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership," Arms Control Today 38, no. 3, 1 April 2008, pp. 6-14.
[14] Daniel Horner, "Part of GNEP Officially Cancelled," Arms Control Today, May 2009.
[15] Jeanne Guillemin, Biological Weapons (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), pp. 59-60.
[16] Eric Croddy, Chemical and Biological Warfare: A Comprehensive Survey for the Concerned Citizen (New York: Springer-Verlag, 2002), p. 31.
[17] Globalsecurity.org, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: Biological Weapons," www.globalsecurity.org.
[18] Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, Second ed. (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), p. 212.
[19] Jeanne Guillemin, Biological Weapons (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), p. 106.
[20] Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, Second ed. (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), p. 211.
[21] Jeanne Guillemin, Biological Weapons (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), p. 125.
[22] Jeanne Guillemin, Biological Weapons (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), p. 127.
[23] Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, Second ed. (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), pp. 60, 212.
[24] Jonathon B. Tucker, War of Nerves: Chemical Warfare from World War I to Al-Qaeda (New York: Anchor Books, 2007), p. 19.
[25] Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, Second ed. (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), p. 213.
[26] Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, Second ed. (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), p. 213.
[27] Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, Second ed. (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), p. 213.
[28] Jonathon B. Tucker, War of Nerves: Chemical Warfare from World War I to Al-Qaeda (New York: Anchor Books, 2007), pp. 223-224.
[29] Jonathon B. Tucker, War of Nerves: Chemical Warfare from World War I to Al-Qaeda (New York: Anchor Books, 2007), pp. 245-295.
[30] OPCW, "Report of the OPCW on the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction in 2007," www.opcw.org.
[31] Peter Eisler, "Chemical Weapons Disposal on Fast Track," USA Today, 6 May 2009, www.usatoday.com.
[32] Department of Defense, "Department of Defense (DoD) Chemical Demilitarization Program (CDP) Semi-Annual Report to Congress," June 2008, pp. 1-6, www.acq.osd.mil/cp; James R. Carroll, "Blue Grass Army Depot to miss 2017 weapons disposal deadline," Louisville Courier-Journal, 15 May 2009, www.courier-journal.com.
[33] "No Legal Option for Meeting Chemical Demilitarization Deadline, Report Says," Global Security Newswire, 2 June 2009, www.globalsecuritynewswire.org.
[34] Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "Nuclear Notebook: U.S. nuclear forces, 2009," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 65, no. 2, March/April 2009, pp. 61-62.
[35] Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "Nuclear Notebook: U.S. nuclear forces, 2009," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 65, no. 2, March/April 2009, pp. 61, 64.
[36] Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "Nuclear Notebook: U.S. nuclear forces, 2009," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 65, no. 2, March/April 2009, pp. 61-65.
[37] Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, Second ed. (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), pp. 85-87.
[38] Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, Second ed. (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), pp. 97.
[39] Dennis M. Gormley, "Missile Defense Myopia: Lessons from the Iraq War," Survival 45, no. 4, Winter 2003-2004, pp. 61-86.
[40] Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, Second ed. (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), pp. 97-101.
This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently
verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2010 by MIIS.
