1363_SPN

Preface

The

Foreign Relations of the United States

series presents the official

documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and
significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The
Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibil-
ity for the preparation of the

Foreign Relations

series. The staff of the

Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of
the General Editor of the

Foreign Relations

series, plans, researches,

compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank
B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific stan-
dards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March
26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the se-
ries through 1991.

Public Law 102–138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act,

which was signed by President George H.W. Bush on October 28, 1991,
established a new statutory charter for the preparation of the series.
Section 198 of P.L. 102–138 added a new Title IV to the Department of
State’s Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 4351, et seq.).

The statute requires that the

Foreign Relations

series be a thorough,

accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy de-
cisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes
of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehen-
sive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the
United States Government. The statute also confirms the editing prin-
ciples established by Secretary Kellogg: the

Foreign Relations

series is

guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records
should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the pub-
lished text that a deletion has been made; the published record should
omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and
nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in
policy. The statute also requires that the

Foreign Relations

series be pub-

lished not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are
convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and schol-
arly standards of selection and editing.

Structure and Scope of the

Foreign Relations

Series

This volume is part of a retrospective subseries of volumes of the

Foreign Relations

series that fills in gaps in the volumes of the Truman

and Eisenhower subseries. At the time the Truman and Eisenhower vol-
umes were prepared, the Office of the Historian did not have access to
documents related to intelligence. This is the second volume that
documents the institutional foundations of the relationship between

III

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foreign policy and intelligence. The first,

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950,

Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, was published in 1996.
This volume is a sequel, and it will be followed by a third volume with
the same focus, covering the years 1956–1960. After 1960, the

Foreign

Relations

volumes for the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon-Ford subseries

include a chapter on intelligence and foreign policy in their volumes
on the organization and management of foreign policy, thus negating
the need for separate retrospective volumes.

Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for

Foreign Relations,

1950–1955, Development of the Intelligence Community

This volume is organized along chronological lines in one large

chapter covering 1950–1955, and a second chapter that includes the key
National Security Council Intelligence Directives of the period. The vol-
ume documents the institutional growth of the intelligence community
during the first half of the 1950s. When Lt. General Walter Bedell Smith
took over as Director of Central Intelligence in October 1950, he in-
herited an agency that was widely believed to have been unable to es-
tablish itself as the central institution of the U.S. intelligence commu-
nity. Utilizing his great prestige, and a national security directive from
President Truman, Smith established the multiple directorate structure
within the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that has continued to this
day, brought the clandestine service into the CIA, and worked to ef-
fect greater inter-agency coordination through a strengthened process
to produce National Intelligence Estimates. The exponential growth of
the national security establishment and of the intelligence community
was due to the impact of two factors: NSC 68 (a clarion call for more
active containment of the Soviet Union) and the Korean War. The Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency was called upon to expand the clandestine ser-
vice, and the intelligence community was required to provide better
and more definitive intelligence on the Soviet bloc and China. When
Allen Dulles took over as Director of Central Intelligence in February
1953, these pressures continued. By 1955, the general consensus of two
commissions appointed by President Eisenhower to review the intelli-
gence effort was that the clandestine service had grown too rapidly
and was plagued by poor management. In general, the commission im-
plied that the clandestine service’s growth had come at the expense of
the agency’s intelligence analysts.

This volume presented the editors with documentary challenges.

The documents used to compile this volume were unique by

Foreign

Relations

standards. Rather than documenting the formulation of for-

eign policy decisions or important diplomatic negotiations, this vol-
ume is a record of high-level policy plans, discussions, administrative
decisions, and managerial actions that transformed the intelligence
community from its somewhat shaky establishment into a community

IV Preface

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that collected intelligence worldwide; provided extensive analysis of
that intelligence for policy makers; and carried out covert operations,
as approved by the United States Government, on a global scale. The
intelligence community under President Eisenhower in 1955 was a
much more significant player and a more robust bureaucracy than it
was under President Truman in the late 1940s. This volume documents
that growth and development.

In preparing this volume, the editors sought to limit their selec-

tion of documents to those dealing with national intelligence coordi-
nation, planning, and policies. The editors did not seek to document
the planning and implementation of specific intelligence operations, or
to document the impact of intelligence appraisals upon specific foreign
policy decisions or negotiations. Intelligence reports, estimates, and
analyses dealing with particular regions, countries, or issues have not
been included. The important intelligence operations of the Truman
and Eisenhower years, missing in the coverage of

Foreign Relations

for 1945–1960, are covered in other retrospective volumes. The first,
Guatemala, 1952–1954, was published in 2003. Others will follow.

The preparation of this volume raised special problems since many

of the intelligence documents for 1950–1955 have been destroyed, or
were widely scattered in multiple archival holdings. Documents were
hard to locate because of the shifting and rapid growth of various in-
telligence organizations. It became obvious that some important deci-
sions were probably reached without written records having been
made. Still, this volume presents an extensive collection of documents
that will go a long way to demonstrate the growth of the intelligence
community during the key period 1950–1955. That growth and devel-
opment was not without growing pains, as the documents reveal.

Editorial Methodology

The documents are presented chronologically according to Wash-

ington time. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the
date and time of the conversation, rather than the date a memorandum
was drafted. Documents chosen for printing are authoritative or signed
copies, unless otherwise noted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the

Foreign Re-

lations

series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guid-

ance from the General Editor. The documents are reproduced as ex-
actly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are
described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according
to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents
within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been sup-
plied by the editors for each document included in the volume.
Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in
the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently

Preface V

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corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are corrected
by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in
roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the source text are printed
in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the
original text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter
of each volume.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals

with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified af-
ter declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where pos-
sible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indi-
cating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire
documents withheld for declassification purposes have been accounted
for and are listed with headings, source notes, and number of pages not
declassified in their chronological place. All brackets that appear in the
original text are so identified in footnotes. With the exception of Presi-
dential recordings transcribed in the Office of the Historian by the edi-
tor(s) of the volume, all ellipses are in the original documents.

The first footnote to each document indicates the document’s

source, original classification, distribution, and drafting information.
This note also provides the background of important documents and
policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy ad-
visers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent

material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional
documentary sources, provide references to important related docu-
ments printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide sum-
maries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elu-
cidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and
other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supple-
ment or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than

to page numbers.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documenta-

tion, established under the

Foreign Relations

statute, reviews records,

advises, and makes recommendations concerning the

Foreign Relations

series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and
editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the prepa-
ration and declassification of the series. The Advisory Committee does
not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series,
but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and
reviews volumes, as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statu-
tory obligations.

VI Preface

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Declassification Review

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Ad-

ministration, conducted the declassification review for the Department
of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was
conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Or-
der 12958, as amended, on Classified National Security Information
and other applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all in-

formation, subject only to the current requirements of national secu-
rity, as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions
entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bu-
reaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S.
Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding spe-
cific documents of those governments. The declassification review of
this volume, which began in 2002 and was completed in 2006, resulted
in the decision to withhold 18 documents in full, excise a paragraph or
more in 28 documents, and make minor excisions of less than a para-
graph in 35 documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research

conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassifi-
cation review process described above, that notwithstanding the num-
ber of denied and excised documents, the record presented in this vol-
ume presented here provides an accurate and comprehensive account
the development of the intelligence community, 1950–1955.

Acknowledgments

The editors wish to acknowledge the assistance of officials at Na-

tional Archives and Records Administration for their assistance in pro-
viding access to documents at the Truman and Eisenhower Presiden-
tial Libraries. David Haight at the Eisenhower Library was particularly
helpful. The History Staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence
was extremely cooperative in assisting the editors in collecting relevant
documents from Central Intelligence Agency files. Michael Warner,
then Deputy Historian of the History Staff, was so instrumental in the
production of this volume that he is listed as a co-editor. Special thanks
to David Hatcher, Historian at the National Security Agency, and the
historian at the Defense Intelligence Agency, who provided advice and
key documents from their agencies.

The retrospective volumes on the organization and development

of the intelligence community during the Truman and Eisenhower
years was the brainchild of Neal Petersen, a long time editor of

Foreign

Relations

and an expert on intelligence history. Petersen retired from

the Office of the Historian before the first volume on the

Establishment

of the Intelligence Community

was published in 1996, but the idea and

Preface VII

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Sources

In keeping with the statutory requirement of the

Foreign Relations

series, the editors have complete access to all the retired records and
papers of the Department of State: the decimal central files; the special
decentralized files (“lot files”) at the bureau, office, and division lev-
els; and the files of the Executive Secretariat. Virtually all the Depart-
ment’s files have been permanently transferred to the National
Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland
(Archives II). All of these files, which the exception of the INR/IL his-
torical files, and the administrative lot file that was later destroyed, are
open for research at the National Archives.

The editors of the

Foreign Relations

series also have full access to

the papers of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, and other White
House foreign policy records. Presidential papers maintained and pre-
served at the Truman and Eisenhower libraries include significant in-
telligence documentation from the Department of State and other fed-
eral agencies including the National Security Council, the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.

The editors also have full access to the files of the Central Intelli-

gence Agency still in the possession of the Agency as well as to records
transferred from the Agency to the National Archives. The Central In-
telligence Agency files were crucial to the preparation of this volume
and they will be discussed below.

Since this volume focuses on the development of intelligence, and

not foreign policy and foreign relations, its sources are considerably
different from most other

Foreign Relations

volumes. The decimal cen-

tral files used for this volume are mainly intelligence-related, as re-
flected in the annotated source list below. The volume relies heavily
on the retired files of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) at
the Department of State. The most useful lot file was Lot 58 D 776,
covering INR’s work from 1945–1960. INR lot files subsequently have
been consolidated at the National Archives, but Lot 58 D 776 provides
core documentation for that consolidated file. The files of the Policy
Planning Staff (S/P) of the Department of State also proved very valu-
able, especially S/P Files, Lot 64 D 563 and S/P–NSC Files, Lot 62 D
1, both of which had key material on psychological warfare and the
Psychological Strategy Board. The lot files of the Executive Secretariat
(S/S) of the Department of State were also very useful, particularly
S/S–NSC, Lot 62 D 333, which contains the minutes and related pa-
pers of the Psychological Strategy Board, 1951–1953. Also of value are

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1363_chfm 9/28/07 9:27 AM Page XI

S/S–NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351, the basic master files of the Department’s
NSC records for 1947–1961 and S/S–NSC Files, Lot 66 D and S/S–NSC
Files, Lot 66 D 95, which both contain miscellaneous NSC records,
with the latter containing NSC records of actions and some National
Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs). Finally, the INR/IL
Historical Files have documentation on the preparation and work-
ing of NSC 10 series, the papers establishing and refining responsi-
bilities for covert operations. All lots mentioned above, with the ex-
ception of the INR/IL Historical Files, are available at the National
Archives.

The best Central Intelligence Agency files listed are those of the

Executive Registry, the Directorate of Operations, and the History Staff.
They are of equal importance to the Department of State lot files. The
History Staff files require special explanation. The History Staff collec-
tion, maintained by the History Staff in the Center for the Study of In-
telligence, contains documents selected over time by personnel of the
various components of the Agency as having significant historical value
and transferred to the physical custody of the History Staff to ensure
their continued availability as part of the historical record. Documents
in the historical collection tend to vary widely in nature and quality
and usually provide only a partial record, but they are nonetheless a
major resource and have been widely used in the preparation of this
volume.

The Central Intelligence Agency files from the Executive Registry,

the various directorates, and the Intelligence Community Management
Staff, have a more direct provenance. The Executive Registry files are
the official records of the Director of Central Intelligence and are there-
fore crucial. The files of the Directorate of Operation were equally valu-
able, while the files of the Directorate of Intelligence and Directorate
of Science and Technology, and the Community Management Staff were
important, but not to the standard of the Executive Registry, History
Staff files, or the Operations files.

The editors did not do research in the massive files of the Na-

tional Security Agency or the Defense Intelligence Agency, but instead
relied upon the historians at those agencies to make available key doc-
uments upon request or recommendation. At the National Archives,
research in Record Group 218, the Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
provided a few key documents. Record Group 263, the Central Intel-
ligence Agency Files at the National Archives also fell into that same
category. At the time the research for this volume was done, RG 263,
contained basically sources made available to Thomas Troy for use in
preparation of his book on the founding of the Agency, declassified
National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Es-
timates, and declassified article from the Agency in-house journal,

XII Sources

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Studies in Intelligence.

Since the research for this volume was under-

taken, the Central Intelligence Agency has transferred more records to
the National Archives and made others available on its website. Fi-
nally, Record Group 273, the records of the National Security Council
contains some key NSC policy papers, official minutes of NSC meet-
ings, and NSCIDs.

Research at the Truman and Eisenhower presidential libraries pro-

vided important documents, but certainly not to the magnitude or im-
portance as the records of the Department of State or Central Intelli-
gence Agency. At the Truman Library in the Papers of the President,
the President’s Secretary’s File was the most important, followed
closely by the Subject File with documents on organizing covert oper-
ation and copies of NSCIDs. At the Eisenhower Library the best files
were the Whitman File (records kept by Eisenhower’s personal assist-
ant Ann Whitman), the Staff Secretary Records, and the Records of the
President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.

Two published works are worthy of consideration as starting

points or research. The first is Michael Warner, editor,

The CIA Cold War

Records: The CIA under Harry Truman,

which reproduces in facsimile for-

mat 81 documents covering 1945–1953, some of which are also pro-
duced in this volume. The other book is Ludwell Monatgue,

General

Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence, October 1950–
February 1953,

originally a classified five volume CIA study of the same

name, but published in declassified form as a monograph by Pennsyl-
vania State University Press. Montague was both a participant and an
observer of the events of which he writes and supplemented his own
recollections by research in CIA records and by extensive interviews of
and correspondence with other key participants.

Unpublished Sources

Department of State

Central Files.

See National Archives and Records Administration below.

Lot Files.

For other lot files already transferred to the National Archives and Records

Administration at College Park, Maryland, Record Group 59, see National Archives and
Records Administration below.

A/MS Files: Lot 54 D 291

Consolidated administrative files of the Department of State for 1949–1960, as
maintained by the Management Staff of the Bureau of Administration (subsequently
destroyed and not transferred to the National Archives).

INR/IL Historical Files

Files of the Office of Intelligence Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

Sources XIII

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National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland

Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State

Decimal Central Files, 1950-1955

100.4/PSB: Psychological Strategy Board
101.2: National Security Council
101.21: Central Intelligence Agency
103.11: U.S. federal agencies of non-Cabinet rank
103.1102: personnel of U.S. federal agencies of non-Cabinet rank
114.3: unauthorized or improper publication
120.201: workloads of diplomatic and consular representation
511.00: U.S. psychological warfare
611.00: U.S. international relations
611.61: U.S. relations with the Soviet Union
700.5411: U.S. overflights
711.5: U.S. national defense
711.52: U.S. intelligence activities
711.5200: U.S. intelligence activities
711.5261: U.S. intelligence activities in the Soviet Union
794.0221: Japanese occupied territory

Lot Files

Administration Files: Lot 62 D 220

Top Secret records of the Bureau of Administration dealing with inter-agency
relations from 1948–1961

INR Files: Lot 58 D 528

Miscellaneous Top Secret files for the years 1949–1954 as retired by the Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, including master files of Intelligence Estimates prepared
by the Department of States Estimates Group

INR Files: Lot 58 D 776 (INR Lots 61 D 67 and 62 D 42 subsequently combined with this

lot file)
Subject files for 1945–1960, as maintained by the Office of the Special Assistant to
the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence, which includes information on
the birth of the intelligence organization in the Department of State and a history
of the national intelligence structure

INR Files: Lot 59 D 27

Miscellaneous files for the years 1948–1954, including master file of minutes of the
Intelligence Advisory Committee

INR Files, Lot 78 D 394

Files relating to National Intelligence Estimates and Special Intelligence Estimates

Policy Planning Staff Files: Lot 67 D 548

Subject files, country files, chronological files, documents, drafts and related
correspondence for 1957–1961

S/P Files: Lot 64 D 563

Master file of documents, drafts, records of meetings, memoranda, and related
correspondence for 1947–1953 of the Policy Planning Staff

XIV Sources

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S/S–NSC OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385

Master set of the administrative and country files of the Operations Coordinating
Board for the years 1953–1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat

S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1

Serial and subject master file of National Security Council documents and
correspondence for the years 1948–1961 maintained by the Policy Planning Staff

S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 333

Master file of minutes and papers of the Psychological Strategy Board for the years
1951–1953, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat

S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 430

Master file of the Operations Coordinating Board for the years 1953–1960, as
maintained by the Executive Secretariat

S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351

Serial master file of National Security Council documents and correspondence and
related Department of State memoranda for 1947–1961, as maintained by the
Executive Secretariat

S/S-NSC Files: Lot 66 D 148

Miscellaneous files concerning subjects considered by the National Security Council
during 1949–1962, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat

S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95

Administrative and miscellaneous National Security Council documentation,
including NSC Records of Action for 1947–1963, as maintained by the Executive
Secretariat

P Files: Lot 52 D 432

Files of Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Edward W. Barrett for 1951

P Files: Lot 55 D 339

Files of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, 1951–1952

S/S–RD Files

Files of restricted data materials maintained by the Executive Secretariat

Record Group 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Papers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Record Group 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency

Background documents from various sources made available to Thomas Troy in connec-

tion with the preparation of his book on the founding of the Central Intelligence Agency

Collection of NIE’s, SNIE’s and SE’s
Declassified articles from

Studies in Intelligence,

a CIA publication

Record Group 273, Records of the National Security Council

Official NSC meeting minutes file
Records of the NSC Representative for Internal Security
Record set of NSC policy papers

Sources XV

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1363_chfm 9/28/07 9:27 AM Page XV

Defense Intelligence Agency

Records made available by the Defense Intelligence Agency Historian

National Security Agency

Records held by or obtained through the Center for Cryptologic History, National

Security Agency

Records of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

Records of the meetings, reports and miscellaneous papers of the President’s Board of

Consultants for Foreign Intelligence Activities and, its successor, the President’s
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

Truman Library, Independence, Missouri

President’s Secretary’s Files

Subject File
Official File

Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas

Dulles Papers

Papers of John Foster Dulles, 1952–1959

Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File

Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of the United States, 1953–1961,
maintained by his personal secretary, Ann C. Whitman. The Whitman File includes:
the Name Series, the Dulles-Herter Series, Eisenhower Diaries, Ann Whitman (ACW)
Diaries, National Security Council Records, Miscellaneous Records, Cabinet Papers,
Legislative Meetings, International Meetings, the Administration Series, and the
International File

Eisenhower Records

Records of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of the United States, including the
daily appointment book of the President

Hoover Commission Report on Intelligence Activities

Project “Clean Up”

Records of Gordon Gray, Robert Cutler, Henry R. McPhee, and Andrew J.
Goodpaster, 1953–1961

Staff Secretary Records

Records of the office of the Staff Secretary, 1952–1961

Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Records

Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology Records

Published Sources

Benson, Robert L., and Michael Warner, eds.,

Venona: Soviet Espionage and the American

Response, 1939–1957.

Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1996.

Sources XVII

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Abbreviations and Terms

AD/ORE,

Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates

ADPC,

Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, CIA

ADSO,

Assistant Director for Special Operations (CIG and CIA)

AEC,

Atomic Energy Commission

AFSA,

Armed Forces Security Agency

AFSS,

Air Force Security Service

ARC,

Air Resupply and Communications

ARPA,

Advanced Research Projects Agency

ASA,

Army Security Agency

ATIC,

Air Technical Intelligence Center

BOB,

Bureau of the Budget

BW,

biological warfare

CA,

covert action; also circular airgram

CAS,

Cleared American Source

CAT,

Civil Air Transport

CE,

Division of Central European Affairs, Department of State; also Counter-Espionage

CENTO,

Central Treaty Organization

CERP,

Combined Economic Reporting Program

CG,

Commanding General

CI,

Counter-intelligence

CIA,

Central Intelligence Agency

CID,

Criminal Investigative Division; also Counter-intelligence Division

CIG,

Central Intelligence Group

CO,

Commanding Officer

COAPS,

Coordination, Operations and Policy/Planning Staff

COMINT,

Communications Intelligence

CP,

Communist party

CRITIC,

Critical Intelligence Communications

CSP,

Chief, Special Projects Division, Office of Policy Coordination

CW,

chemical warfare

DCD,

Domestic Contacts Division

DCI,

Director of Central Intelligence (CIG and CIA)

DCID,

Director of Central Intelligence Directive

DDCI,

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (CIG and CIA)

DDA,

Deputy Director for Administration

DDC,

Deputy Director for Coordination

DDI,

Deputy Director for Intelligence

DDO,

Deputy Director for Operations

DDP,

Deputy Director for Plans

DD/S&T,

Deputy Director for Science and Technology

DIRNSA,

Director, National Security Agency

DNI,

Director of Naval Intelligence

DOD,

Department of Defense

DPD,

Development Projects Division

E & E,

escape and evasion

ECA,

Economic Cooperation Administration

XIX

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ECM,

electronic counter-measures

ELINT,

electronic intelligence

ES/NSC,

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

EUCOM,

European Command

EUR,

Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

FBI,

Federal Bureau of Investigation

FBID,

Foreign Broadcast Information Division

FBIS,

Foreign Broadcast Information Service

FE,

Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State

FEA,

Foreign Economic Administration

FEC,

Free Europe Committee

FI,

Foreign Intelligence

FOA,

Foreign Operations Administration

FSO,

Foreign Service Officer

FSR,

Foreign Service Reserve

FTX,

field training exercise

FY,

fiscal year

G–2,

intelligence section of divisional or higher staff

G–5,

civil affairs section of divisional or higher staff

GAO,

General Accounting Office

GCHQ,

General Communications Headquarters (UK)

GMAIC,

Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee

GMIC,

Guided Missile Intelligence Committee

HICOG,

High Commissioner for Germany

HUMINT,

human intelligence

IAB,

Intelligence Advisory Board

IAC,

Intelligence Advisory Committee

IAD,

Acquisition and Distribution Division, Office of Research and Intelligence,

Department of State

IBD,

International Broadcasting Division

ICA,

International Cooperation Administration

ICBM,

intercontinental ballistic missile

ICIS,

Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

ICS,

Interdepartmental Coordinating Staff; also Intelligence Community Staff

IDP,

Initial deployment plan

IFIO,

International Foreign Information Organization

IFIS,

International Foreign Information Staff

IG,

Inspector General

IIC,

Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee

IS,

Intelligence Staff

ISA,

International Security Affairs, Department of Defense

INR,

Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

J–2,

JCS intelligence organization

JAEIC,

Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee

JANIS,

Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies

JCS,

Joint Chiefs of Staff

JIC,

Joint Intelligence Committee; also Joint Intelligence Center

JIS,

Joint Intelligence Staff

JISPD,

Joint Intelligence Studies Publication Board

XX Abbreviations and Terms

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JOT,

junior officer trainee

JRC,

Joint Reconnaissance Center

JRDB,

Joint Research and Development Board

JSPD,

Joint Subsidiary Plans Division

JTIS,

Joint Technical Intelligence Subcommittee

Legal Adviser, Department of State

MAAG,

Military Assistance Advisory Group

MI,

military intelligence

MID,

Military Intelligence Division, Department of the Army

MIS,

Military Intelligence Staff, War Department General Staff; also military intelligence

service

NATO,

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCFE,

National Committee for a Free Europe

NIA,

National Intelligence Authority

NIC,

National Indications Center of the IAC Watch Committee

NIE,

National Intelligence Estimate

NIS,

National Intelligence Survey; also National Intelligence Summary

NPIC,

National Photographic Interpretation Center

NSA,

National Security Agency

NSC,

National Security Council

NSCID,

National Security Council Intelligence Directive

NSG,

Navy Security Group

NSRB,

National Security Resources Board

NTPC,

National Technical Processing Center

OB,

order of battle

OCB,

Operations Coordination Board

OCD,

Office of Collection and Dissemination

OCI,

Office of Current Intelligence

ODA,

Office of Departmental Administration, Bureau of Administration, Department of

State

ODM,

Office of Defense Mobilization

OIR,

Office of Intelligence Research

OLI,

Office of Libraries and Intelligence Acquisition

ONE,

Office of National Estimates

ONI,

Office of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

ONR,

Office of Naval Research

OO,

Office of Operations

OPC,

Office of Policy Coordination

OPD,

Operations Division, War Department

ORE,

Office of Research and Evaluation; also Office of Reports and Estimates

OSO,

Office of Special Operations

OSS,

Office of Strategic Services

OWI,

Office of War Information

PACAF,

Pacific Air Forces

PACOM,

Pacific Command

PBCFIA,

President’s Board of Consultants for Foreign Intelligence Activities

PCG,

Planning Coordination Group

PFIAB,

President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

PHOTINT,

photographic intelligence

Abbreviations and Terms XXI

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PIC,

Photographic Interpretation Center

PM,

Directorate of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State; also paramilitary

PNG,

persona non grata

PNIO,

priority national intelligence objectives

POCC,

Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee

PP,

political and psychological

PSB,

Psychological Strategy Board

Secretary of State’s Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence

R&A,

research and analysis

R&D,

Research and development

RFA,

Radio Free Asia

RFE,

Radio Free Europe

RIAS,

Radio in the American Sector

ROB,

radar order of battle

ROKG,

Republic of Korea Government

RTG,

Reconnaissance Technical Group

S&T,

Science and Technology

SAC,

Strategic Air Command

SANACC,

State-Army-Navy-Air Coordinating Committee

SE,

Special Estimate

SEC,

Scientific Estimates Committee

SESP,

Special Electronic Airborne Search Operations

SHAPE,

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

SI,

special intelligence

SIS,

Special Intelligence Service

SNIE,

Special National Intelligence Estimate

SO or SOPAG,

Special Operations

SOVMAT,

Soviet material

SWNCC,

State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee

T/O,

table of organization

TAC,

Tactical Air Command

UNO,

United Nations Organization

USAFE,

U.S. Air Forces, Europe

USCIB,

U.S. Communications Intelligence Board

USEB,

U.S. Evaluation Board

USFA,

U.S. Forces in Austria

USIA,

U.S. Information Agency

USIB,

U.S. Intelligence Board

USIE,

U.S. Information and Education (Program)

USRO,

U.S. Mission to NATO and European Regional Organizations

USSR,

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

VOA,

Voice of America

ZI,

zone of interior

XXII Abbreviations and Terms

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Persons

Acheson, Dean,

Secretary of State from January 21, 1949 to January 20, 1953

Adams, Sherman,

White House Chief of Staff from January 20, 1953

Allen, George V.,

Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from March 31, 1948 to

November 28, 1949; Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and
African Affairs from January 24, 1955 to November 1957; Director of the United
States Information Agency from November 15, 1957 to 1960

Allen, Raymond B.,

Director of the Psychological Strategy Board from January to Au-

gust 1952

Amory, Robert, Jr.,

Deputy Director for Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency

from March 23, 1953 to 1962

Armstrong, W. Park, Jr.,

Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and

Intelligence from June 11, 1950; Chairman of the Communications Intelligence
Board

Baker, William,

Vice President, Bell Laboratories; Member of the President’s Science Ad-

visory Committee; Head of Baker Panel on Communications Intelligence

Balmer, Brigadier General Jesmond D.,

USA, member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the

Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence for Interagency Coordination

Barbour, Walworth,

Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs from July 25, 1951 to

May 1954; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from May 26,
1954 to November 20, 1955

Barrett, Edward W.,

Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from February 1, 1950

to February 20, 1952

Belmont, Alan H.,

Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Berding, Andrew H.,

Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from March 22, 1957

to 1961

Bishop, Max,

Consulate General at Dhahran from September 20, 1951 to January 6, 1954;

Operations Coordinator, Office of the Under Secretary of State from November 2,
1954 to December 3, 1955

Bissell, Richard,

Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence from February

1, 1954 to 1958; Deputy Director for Plans from 1958 to February 1962

Boggs, Marion,

Director of the National Security Council Secretariat until July 1959;

Deputy Executive Secretary, from July 1959

Bohlen, Charles,

Counselor, Department of State from March 13, 1951 to March 1953;

Ambassador to the Soviet Union from March 27, 1953 to March 1957; Ambassador
to the Philippines from March 13, 1957 to May 1959; Special Assistant to the Secre-
tary of State from May 9, 1959

Booster, Davis E.,

Staff Assistant to Secretary of State Dulles

Bowie, Robert,

Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State from May 18,

1953 to August 1955; Department of State Representative on the National Security
Planning Board from 1953 to 1957; Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning
from August 10, 1955 to August 28, 1957

Braden, Thomas,

Assistant to the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,

Office of Policy Coordination, International Organizations Division from 1951 to
1952; Chief, International Organizations Division, Central Intelligence Agency, from
1952 to 1954

Bradley, General Omar N.,

USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff from August 16, 1949

to August 15, 1953

XXIII

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Breitweiser, Major General Robert,

USAF, Director of Intelligence, Joint Staff from Feb-

ruary 1957

Brownell, George,

former military officer and lawyer; Head of Communications Intel-

ligence Committee from December 28, 1951

Bruce, David K.E.,

Ambassador to France from 1949 to 1952; Under Secretary of State

from February 7, 1952 to January 20, 1953; Observer to the Interim Committee of
the European Defense Community from February 19, 1953; Representative to the
European Coal and Steel Authority from 1954 to January 22, 1955; Ambassador to
Germany from March 14, 1957 to 1959

Brundage, Percival E.,

Deputy Director, Bureau of the Budget from 1954 to 1956; Direc-

tor, Bureau of the Budget from April 2, 1956 to March 17, 1958

Burke, Admiral Arleigh A.,

USN, Chief of Naval Operations from August 17, 1955 to

1961

Cabell, General Charles P.,

USAF, Director of Intelligence, Office of the Deputy Chief

of Staff from 1951 to 1953; Intelligence Advisory Committee, Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence from 1953 to 1962

Caccia, Sir Harold,

British Ambassador to the United States from 1956 to 1961

Canine, Lieutenant General Ralph J.,

USA, Director, Armed Forces Security Agency

from 1951; Director, National Security Agency from November 4, 1952 to 1956

Cassidy, Brigadier General John,

USA, Staff Director, President’s Board of Consultants

on Foreign Intelligence Activities from January 1956

Clark, General (Ret.) Mark,

USA, President of the Citadel from 1953 to 1955; Chairman

of the Hoover Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch for the In-
vestigation of the Central Intelligence Agency from 1954 to 1955

Conant, James, B.,

Ambassador to Germany from May 17, 1955 to February 19, 1957

Connolly, Admiral Richard L.,

USN, President, Long Island University; member, Pres-

ident’s Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities from January 13,
1956

Coyne, J. Patrick,

National Security Council Representative for Internal Security from

1947 to 1960; President’s Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Staff
Director from 1960

Cumming, Hugh,

Foreign Service Officer, Moscow, Department of State from June 12,

1950 to August 14, 1951; Personal Rank of Minister to Moscow, Department of State,
from August 14, 1951 to June 1952; Deputy Secretary General for Political Affairs,
NATO, from June 30, 1952 to September 1953; Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State from October 10, 1957

Cutler, Robert,

Administrative Assistant to the President until 1953; Special Assistant to

the President for National Security Affairs from March 23, 1953 to April 1955 and
from January 1957 to July 1958

Dulles, Allen W.,

Chairman, National Security Council Survey Committee until 1948;

Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency, 1951; Deputy Director
Plans, Central Intelligence Agency in 1951; Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
from 1951 to 1953; Director of Central Intelligence from 1953; member, Committee
on Information Activities Abroad from February 17, 1960 to January 12, 1961

Dulles, John Foster,

Secretary of State from January 21, 1953 to April 1959

Dodge, Joseph M.,

Director, Bureau of the Budget from 1953 to 1954; Chairman, Coun-

cil on Foreign Economic Policy from December 1954 to 1956

Doolittle, General James,

USAF; member, President’s Board of Consultants on Foreign

Intelligence Activities; Head of Doolittle Panel on Covert Activities from January 13,
1956

Eden, Anthony,

Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom from 1951 to 1955; Prime Min-

ister of the United Kingdom from 1955 to 1957

XXIV Persons

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Eisenhower, General Dwight D.,

USA, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe from

December 1950 to May 31, 1952; President of the United States from January 20,
1953

Eisenhower, Major John S.D.,

USA, Assistant Staff Secretary to the President from 1953

Elbrick, C. Burke,

General Deputy Assistant Secretary, Department of State, from May

26, 1954 to February 1957; Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from
February 11, 1957 to April 22, 1958; Ambassador to Portugal from October 29, 1958

Erskine, General (Ret.) Graves,

USMC, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for

Special Operations from June 1953 to October 31, 1961

Evans, Allan,

Director, Office of Intelligence and Research, Department of State until

September 15, 1957; Director, Office of Intelligence, Research, and Analysis from Feb-
ruary 22, 1959

Fechteler, Admiral William M.,

USN, Chief of Naval Operations from August 1951 to

August 1953

Foster, William C.,

Administrator, Economic Cooperation Administration from 1950 to

1951; member, Strategic Missile Evaluation Committee or “Teapot Committee”, from
June 16, 1953 to February 8, 1954; Deputy Secretary of Defense from September 24,
1951 to 1953

Frank, Joseph A.,

Office of Policy Coordination, Central Intelligence Agency from April

28, 1955

Furnas, Howard,

Office of Research and Intelligence, Department of State from No-

vember 2, 1950 to September 1952 and from August 20, 1954 to September 1957;
member Policy Planning Staff and Representative to the National Security Council
Planning Board from January 13, 1958

Gaither, Rowan,

Assistant Director of the Radiation Laboratory, MIT; member of the

Board of Trustees, the RAND Corporation, from May 14, 1948; Chairman of the Ford
Foundations from March 1951; Head of the Strategic Missile Evaluation Committee
or “Teapot Committee,” from June 16, 1953 to February 8, 1954; Head of Security
Resources Board of Office of Defense Mobilization which issued “Deterrence-
Survival in the Nuclear Age” from April 1957

Gardner, Trevor,

USAF, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Develop-

ment from 1954 to February 1956

Gates, Thomas S.,

Under Secretary of the Navy from October 2, 1953 to 1957; Secretary

of the Navy from 1957 to 1959; Deputy Secretary of Defense from June to Decem-
ber 1959; Secretary of Defense from December 2, 1959 to January 20, 1961

Gleason, S. Everett,

Historian, Council on Foreign Relations from 1946 to 1950; Deputy

Executive Secretary of the National Security Council from March 1953 to 1959; Cul-
tural Attaché of the United States to the United Kingdom from 1959 to 1961

Goodpaster, Major General Andrew,

USA, Staff Secretary to the President from Octo-

ber 10, 1954 to January 1961

Gray, Gordon,

Secretary of the Army from June 20, 1949 to April 12, 1950; Director of

the Psychological Strategy Board from 1951 to 1952; member, the President’s Com-
mittee on International Information Activities from January 20, 1953 to June 30, 1953;
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from July 1955 to
February 1957; Director of Defense Mobilization from March 1957 to July 1958; Spe-
cial Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from July 1958 to Janu-
ary 1961; member, Committee for Information Activities Abroad from February 17,
1960 to January 12, 1961

Guthe, Otto,

Special Assistant to the Director, Office of Libraries and Intelligence Ac-

quisition from January 23, 1948 to October 30, 1949; Assistant Director, Research and
Reports, Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Committee from 1953 to
1965; Chairman, Economic Intelligence Committee from 1953 to 1965

Persons XXV

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Hagerty, James,

Press Secretary to the President from January 1953 to 1961

Harlow, Bryce N.,

Administrative Assistant to the President from January 1953; Deputy

Assistant to the President from 1953 to 1961

Harriman, W. Averell,

Representative to Europe of the Economic Cooperation Admin-

istration from 1948 to 1950; Special Assistant to the President from 1950; Director of
Mutual Security from 1951 to 1953

Helms, Richard,

Office of Special Operations, Deputy Assistant Director for Special Op-

erations, Central Intelligence Agency from 1951 to 1952; Acting Chief of Operations,
Office of the Deputy Director for Plans from 1952 to 1953; Chief of Operations from
1953 to 1958; Deputy to the Deputy Director for Plans and Chief of Operations from
1958 to 1962

Henderson, Loy,

Ambassador to Iran from September 19, 1951 to January 1956; mem-

ber of the First and Second Suez Canal Conference, Suez Canal Committee in Lon-
don and Cairo from August to September 1956; Deputy Under Secretary of State for
Administration from January 26, 1955 to 1961

Herter, Christian,

Under Secretary of State and Chairman, Operations Coordinating

Board from February 1957 to April 1959; Secretary of State from April 1959 to Jan-
uary 1961

Hillenkoetter, Rear Admiral Roscoe,

USN, Director of Central Intelligence, Central In-

telligence Group and Central Intelligence Agency from May 1, 1947 to October 7,
1950

Hooker, Robert G., Jr.,

Policy Planning Staff, Department of State from January 23, 1950

to December 1951; Foreign Affairs Officer, Department of State, from November 13,
1953 to December 1954

Hoover, Herbert,

former President; Chairman of the Commission on Organization of the

Executive Branch of the Government from 1953

Hoover, Herbert, Jr.

Under Secretary of State and Chairman, Operations Coordinating

Board from October 1954 to February 1957

Hoover, J. Edgar,

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Houston, Lawrence,

Assistant General Counsel of the Office of Strategic Services; Gen-

eral Counsel to the Central Intelligence Group and to the Central Intelligence Agency
from 1946

Howe, Fisher,

Deputy Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence, Department of

State from March 1, 1950 to March 12, 1956; Director, Executive Secretariat, Depart-
ment of State, from March 12, 1956 to October 1958

Hughes, John C.,

member, the President’s Committee on International Information Ac-

tivities from January 20, 1953 to June 30, 1953

Hughes, Rowland R.,

Director, Bureau of the Budget from 1954 to 1956

Hulick, Charles E., Jr.,

Deputy Operations Coordinator, Office of the Under Secretary of

State from March 1, 1954 to August 12, 1956

Hull, General (Ret.) John E.,

USA, member, Strategic Missile Evaluation Committee or

“Teapot Committee” from June 16, 1953 to February 8, 1954; Chairman of the Pres-
ident’s Board of Consultants for Foreign Intelligence Activities from January 13, 1958

Humelsine, Carlisle H.,

Executive Secretary, Department of State from June 1947 to Jan-

uary 11, 1950; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Administration from January
1950; Assistant Secretary of State for Administration from July 29, 1950; Deputy Un-
der Secretary of State for Administration from August 11, 1950 to 1953

Irwin, John N. II,

member, the President’s Committee on International Information Ac-

tivities from January 20, 1953 to June 30, 1953; Deputy Assistant Secretary to the As-
sistant Secretary for Internal Security Affairs, Department of Defense from 1957 to
1961; Assistant Secretary of Defense for National Security Affairs from 1958 to 1961;
member, Committee on Information Activities Abroad from February 17, 1960 to
January 12, 1961

XXVI Persons

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Jackson, C.D.,

Special Assistant to the President from January 26, 1953 to March 1954;

President, Free Europe Committee in 1954; member, Committee on Information Ac-
tivities Abroad from February 17, 1960 to January 12, 1961

Jackson, William H.,

member, National Security Council Survey Committee in 1948;

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from October 7, 1950 to 1951; Chairman, the
President’s Committee on International Information Activities from January 20, 1953
to June 30, 1953; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State from September 1955 to
January 1956; Special Assistant to the President from January to September 1956;
Acting Special Assistant to the President from September 1956 to January 1957

Jessup, Phillip,

Ambassador at Large from March 2, 1949 to 1953

Johnson, Louis,

Secretary of Defense from March 28, 1949 to September 19, 1950

Johnson, Roy W.,

Director, Advanced Research Projects Agency, Department of Defense

from February 1958 to 1959

Joyce, Robert P.,

Office of Special Operations, Central Intelligence Group, Liaison to the

Department of State from 1946 to June 1947; Political Adviser on Trieste from July
1, 1947 to October 27, 1948; Senior Consultant Representing the Secretary of State,
Office of Policy Coordination from September 1948; Policy Planning Staff, Depart-
ment of State from December 23, 1948 to December 22, 1952; Special Assistant, Bu-
reau of Intelligence and Research from October 7, 1957 to April 19, 1959

Kennan, George F.,

Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State from March 7,

1948 to January 1, 1950; Counselor of the Department of State from August 4, 1949
to July 1951; Ambassador to the Soviet Union from March 14, 1952 to September
1952

Kent, Sherman,

Head of the Office of the National Estimates from November 1953 to

December 31, 1967; Chairman, Board of National Estimates, Central Intelligence
Agency, November 1953 to December 31, 1967

Khrushchev, Nikita,

Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union from Sep-

tember 7, 1953

Killian, James,

member, Scientific Advisory Committee, Office of Defense Mobilization,

from 1951 to 1957; Head Technical Capabilities Panel, Office of Defense Mobiliza-
tion in June 1955; Chairman, President’s Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelli-
gence Activities from January 13, 1956 to 1958; Special Assistant to the President for
Science and Technology from November 1957 to July 1959

Kirkpatrick, Lyman B.,

Deputy Assistant Director for Office of Operations, Central Intel-

ligence Agency until 1950; Executive Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence
from 1950 to 1951; Assistant Director for Special Operations from 1951 to 1952, Chief
of Operations, Deputy Directorate of Plans from 1952 to 1953; Special Assistant to the
Deputy Director for Plans in 1953; Inspector General from April 1953 to 1962

Kistiakowsky, George,

member, Strategic Missile Evaluation Committee or “Teapot

Committee” from June 16, 1953 to February 8, 1954; staff member, White House Of-
fice of Science and Technology from 1957 to 1959; Director and Special Assistant to
the President for Science and Technology from July 1959 to January 1961

Kohler, Foy,

Chief, International Broadcasting Division, Department of State until No-

vember 1, 1949; Director, Voice of America Broadcasting from 1949 to 1952; Assist-
ant Administrator, International Information Administration February 14 to
November 1952; Policy Planning Staff from November 9, 1952 to February 2, 1953

Kyes, Roger,

member, President’s Committee on International Information Activities

from January 20, 1953 to June 30, 1953; Deputy Secretary of Defense from February
2, 1953 to May 1, 1954

Land, Edwin,

Founder of Polaroid; Chairman, Technical Capabilities Panel, Office of De-

fense Mobilization from 1954; member, President’s Board of Consultants on Foreign
Intelligence Activities from 1962

Persons XXVII

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Larson, Arthur,

Director, Under Secretary for Labor until 1956; United States Informa-

tion Agency from 1956 to 1957; Special Assistant to the President for Speech Writ-
ing from 1957 to 1958

Lawrence, Harold,

Deputy Staff Director, President’s Board of Consultants for Foreign

Intelligence Activities from January 1956

Lay, James S., Jr.,

member, Central Intelligence Group from January 1946; Secretary, In-

telligence Advisory Board from January 1946 to September 1947; Office of Reports
and Estimates, Central Intelligence Group in 1947; Assistant to the Executive Secre-
tary, National Security Council from September 1947 to January 1950; Executive Sec-
retary, National Security Council from January 1950 to 1961

LeMay, Curtis,

USAF, Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command from 1949 to 1957;

Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force from 1957 to 1961

Lemnitzer, General Lyman,

USA, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army from April 8, 1957 to

September 1960; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff from September 1960 to 1962

Lloyd, Selwyn,

Minister of Defense of the United Kingdom from 1954 to 1955; Secretary

of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom from December 1955 to 1960

Lodge, Henry Cabot,

Senator (R–MA); Permanent Representative to the United Nations

from January 23, 1953 to 1960

Lovett, Robert A.,

Assistant Secretary of War for Air until December 1945; Under Sec-

retary of State from July, 1, 1947 to January 20, 1949; Deputy Secretary of Defense
from 1950 to 1951; Secretary of Defense from 1951 to 1953; member, Strategic Mis-
sile Evaluation Committee or “Teapot Committee” from June 16, 1953 to February
8, 1954; member, President’s Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
from January 13, 1956

MacArthur, Douglas II,

Counselor of the Department of State from March 30, 1953 to

July 20, 1956

MacMillan, Harold,

British Prime Minister from January 1957 to October 1963

Macy, Robert M.,

Chief, International Division, Bureau of the Budget from 1950

Magruder, Brigadier General (Ret.) John,

USA, United States Army, Senior Consultant

representing the Secretary of Defense, Office of Policy Coordination from Septem-
ber 1948 to 1953

Makins, Sir Roger,

British Ambassador to the United States from January 7, 1953 to

November 9, 1956

Marshall, Charles Burton,

member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, from

June 1, 1950 to 1953

Marshall, General George C.,

USA, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army until November 1945; Sec-

retary of State from January 21, 1947 to January 20, 1949; Secretary of Defense from
September 21, 1950 to 1951

Matthews, H. Freeman,

Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from July

5, 1950 to 1953

McCone, John,

Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission from 1958 to 1960; Director of

Central Intelligence from November 29, 1961

McElroy, Neil H.,

Secretary of Defense from August 7, 1957 to December 1959

Merchant, Livingstone,

Special Assistant to the Secretary of State from November 30,

1951 to March 24, 1952; Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from March
11, 1953 to May 7, 1956 and October 29, 1958 to August 12, 1959; Deputy Under Sec-
retary of State for Political Affairs from August to December 1959; member, Com-
mittee on Information Activities Abroad from February 17, 1960 to January 12, 1961;
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from June 24, 1960 to February 1, 1961

Meyer, Cord,

International Organizations Division, Central Intelligence Agency from

1951 to 1954; Director, International Organizations Division from 1954

Morgan, George,

Acting Director, Psychological Strategy Board from 1951 to 1952; Deputy

Executive Officer, Operations Coordinating Board from March 23, 1953 to 1954

XXVIII Persons

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Murphy, Robert,

Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from November

1953 to 1959; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from August to Decem-
ber 1959

Nash, Frank C.,

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

from 1951 to 1953; Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
from March 23, 1953 to 1954

Nitze, Paul H.,

Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, from January

1, 1950 to 1953; member, Strategic Missile Evaluation Committee or “Teapot Com-
mittee” from June 16, 1953 to February 8, 1954

Parrott, Thomas A.,

Office of Policy Coordination

Persons, Major General “Jerry” Wilton B.,

Deputy Assistant to the President from Jan-

uary 20, 1953 to October 7, 1958; Assistant to the President from October 7, 1958 to
1961

Peurifoy, John E.,

Assistant Secretary of State for Administration from March 17, 1947

to August 10, 1950

Quarles, Donald A.,

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Development from

October 1, 1953 to August 11, 1955; Secretary of the Air Force from August 15, 1955
to 1957; Deputy Secretary of Defense from April 30, 1957 to May 8, 1959

Radford, Admiral Arthur W.,

USN, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from August

1953 to August 1957

Reber, James Q.,

Assistant Director for Intelligence Coordination, Central Intelligence

Agency from 1950 to 1954

Robertson, Reuben,

Deputy Secretary of Defense from August 1, 1955 to April 8, 1957

Rockefeller, Nelson A.,

Special Assistant to the President and Chairman of the Planning

Coordination Group from 1954 to 1955

Rusk, Dean,

Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs from March 28, 1950 to

1951

Samford, Lieutenant General John,

USAF, Director of Intelligence for the United States

Air Force from 1952 to 1956; Director, National Security Agency from November
1956 to November 1960

Sargeant, Howland H.,

Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from

October 1, 1947 to 1950

Savage, Carlton,

member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State from October 16,

1949

Smith, Gerard C.,

Consultant to the Secretary of State on Atomic Energy Affairs from

April 12, 1954 to January 1, 1957; Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning
from October 18, 1957 to 1961

Smith, Walter Bedell,

Director of Central Intelligence from October 7, 1950 to February

20, 1953; Under Secretary of State from February 9, 1953 to 1954

Sprague, Mansfield,

General Counsel, Department of Defense from 1955 to 1957; As-

sistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from 1957 to 1958;
Head of the Committee on Information Activities Abroad from February 17, 1960 to
January 12, 1961

Staats, Elmer B.,

Executive Officer of Operations Coordinating Board, National Security

Council from 1953 to 1954

Stassen, Harold,

Director for Mutual Security from January to May 1953; Director for

Foreign Operations from August 1, 1953 to 1955; Special Assistant to the President
for Disarmament from 1955 to 1958

Stevens, Vice Admiral (Ret.) Leslie C.,

Joint Plans Subsidiary Division, Joint Chiefs of

Staff; Director, Psychological Strategy Board from September 1949

Persons XXIX

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Stewart, Gordon,

Chief, Foreign Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency from July 1949

Strauss, Lewis L.,

Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission from July 1953 to 1958

Streibert, Theodore C.,

Director of the United States Information Agency from 1953 to

1956

Stubbs, Gail L.,

Office of Policy Coordination, Central Intelligence Agency

Symington, W. Stuart,

Secretary of the Air Force from September 18, 1947 to April 24,

1950; Senator (D–MO)

Talbott, Harold E,

Secretary of the Air Force from February 4, 1953 to August 1955

Trudeau, Major General Arthur G.,

USA, Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2 from November

16, 1953 to August 8, 1955

Truman, Harry S,

President of the United States from April 12, 1945 to January 20, 1953

Truscott, Lieutenant General (Ret.) Lucian,

the first Deputy Director for Coordination,

Central Intelligence Agency from July 1, 1957 to July 1, 1960

Twining, General Nathan,

USAF, Vice Chief of Staff from June 30, 1953 to August 1957;

Chief of Staff from June 1953 to 1957; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from Au-
gust 15, 1957

Vandenberg, General Hoyt S.,

USAF, Director of Central Intelligence, Central Intelli-

gence Group from June 10, 1946 to May 1, 1947; Chief of Staff, United States Air
Force from April 30, 1948 to 1953

Webb, James E.,

Under Secretary of State from January 28, 1949 to 1952

Whearty, Raymond P.,

Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

Wilson, Charles, E.,

Secretary of Defense from 1953 to 1957

Wisner, Frank G.,

Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, Central Intelligence Agency

from September 1, 1948 to August 1, 1951; Deputy Director for Plans from August
23, 1951 to December 1, 1958

Yost, Charles W.,

Foreign Service Officer, Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs,

Department of State from December 30, 1949 to September 29, 1950; member, Pol-
icy Planning Staff from April 20, 1958

XXX Persons

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The Intelligence Community,
1950–1955

Organization of U.S. Intelligence

Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Johnson

Washington, January 19, 1950.

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force

SUBJECT

Support of Covert Operations of CIA

REFS

(a) Memorandum to the Director, CIA, on the above subject dtd 6 Oct ‘49

(b) Reply of Director, CIA, to the Secretary of Defense, 18 Oct ‘49

1. Pursuant to the last paragraph of the first reference you are au-

thorized to support the covert operations of the Central Intelligence Agency
in accordance with the terms of my memorandum of 6 October 1949.

2. The Joint Subsidiary Plans Division, Joint Staff, is the agency

within the Department of Defense responsible, among other duties, for
coordinating and facilitating operational support of approved covert
operations of the CIA with the Services.

3. The responsibilities in this field of Brigadier General John Ma-

gruder, USA (Retired), Policy Consultant for this office with the State
Department and the Central Intelligence Agency, remain as indicated
in my letter of 7 October 1949, to the Secretary of State, a copy of which
was provided you.

Louis Johnson

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 95–G00278R, Box 1,

Folder 5. Top Secret. Copies were sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director, Subsidiary
Plans Division; and the Director of Central Intelligence.

See

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment,

Document 312.

Ibid., Document 315.

Ibid., Document 313.

Printed from a copy that indicates Johnson signed the original.

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National Security Council Report

NSC 59/1

Washington, March 9, 1950.

THE FOREIGN INFORMATION PROGRAM AND

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE PLANNING

1. Foreign information programs in periods of peace and psycho-

logical warfare programs in periods of national emergency or war are
established instruments of national policy and must be continuously
directed toward the achievement of national aims. Foreign information
activities and related facilities of all departments and agencies of the
U. S. Government comprise the essential elements of a national foreign
information program in time of peace and the essential nucleus for psy-
chological warfare in periods of national emergency and the initial
stages of war.

2. To achieve continuity between peacetime and wartime plans

and programs and to provide for the strengthening and coordination
of all foreign information activities in time of peace and psychological
warfare activities in time of national emergency and the initial stages
of war:

The Secretary of State shall be responsible for:

(1) The formulation of policies and plans for a national foreign in-

formation program in time of peace. This program shall include all for-

eign information activities conducted by departments and agencies of

the U. S. Government.

(2) The formulation of national psychological warfare policy in

time of national emergency and the initial stages of war.

(3) The coordination of policies and plans for the national foreign

information program and for overt psychological warfare with the De-

partment of Defense, with other appropriate departments and agen-

cies of the U. S. Government, and with related planning under the

NSC–10 series.

2 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

320-672/B428-S/11008

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66 D 148, Psychological

Warfare. Secret. NSC Action No. 283 recorded that the Council approved NSC 59 as
amended by memorandum action of March 9. The report in its approved form (printed
here) was circulated as NSC 59/1 under cover of a March 9 note from Lay and submit-
ted to the President for consideration. NSC Action No. 283 is ibid., S/S–NSC Files: Lot
66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council. A memorandum from Lay
to the National Security Council, March 10, indicates that the President approved NSC
59/1 on March 10. (Ibid., S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, 1935–62, Box 115)

For the NSC 10 series, see

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelli-

gence Establishment, Documents 283 ff.

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All departments and agencies of the U.S. Government shall for-

mulate detailed plans in support of the overall plans, and shall insure
the most effective coordination and utilization of their appropriate ac-
tivities and facilities for the implementation of approved plans, poli-
cies, and programs.

3. There shall be established within the Department of State an or-

ganization to:

Initiate and develop interdepartmental plans, make recom-

mendations, and otherwise advise and assist the Secretary of State in
discharging his responsibilities for the national foreign information
program in time of peace.

b. Make plans for overt psychological warfare, including recom-

mendations for preparations for national emergency and the initial
stages of war. Such plans shall be continuously coordinated with joint
war plans through the planning agencies of the Department of Defense
and where such plans have a direct impact on war plans they shall be
subject to the concurrence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

4. Plans prepared by this organization for overt psychological

warfare in time of national emergency or the initial stages of war shall
provide for:

Coordination of overt psychological warfare with:

(1) Covert psychological warfare.

(2) Censorship.

(3) Domestic information.

The employment and expansion, insofar as is feasible, of the ac-

tivities and facilities which compose the national foreign information
program in time of peace, in order to assure rapid transition to opera-
tions in time of national emergency or war.

c. Control of the execution of approved plans and policies by:

(1) the Department of Defense in theaters of military operations;

(2) the Department of State in areas other than theaters of mili-

tary operations.

Transmittal of approved psychological warfare plans and poli-

cies to theater commanders through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5. The organization provided for in paragraph 3 above shall con-

sist of:

A Director appointed by the Secretary of State after consulta-

tion with other departments and agencies represented on the National
Security Council.

Policy consultants representing the Secretary of State, the Sec-

retary of Defense, and the Chairman of the National Security Resources
Board.

The Intelligence Community 3

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A consultant representing the Director of Central Intelligence for

matters relating to coordination with planning under the NSC–10 series.

A consultant representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff on NSC 59

and NSC 10/2 matters.

e. A staff composed of full-time personnel representing the De-

partment of State, the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelli-
gence Agency.

f. A liaison representative to the staff from the National Security

Resources Board and such liaison representation or staff membership
from other departments and agencies of the government as may be de-
termined by the Director after consultation with the consultants.

6. The Department of State shall provide necessary space, secre-

tarial staff, and such other administrative services as may be required
for this organization.

7. The NSC–4 and the NSC–43 series are hereby rescinded.

See Document 17.

The NSC 43 series, “Planning for Wartime Conduct of Overt Psychlogical War-

fare,” is in National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, National Security
Council Files. For text of NSC 4–A, December 9, 1947, see

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950,

Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 253. NSC 4, December 17, 1947,
is ibid., Document 252.

Letter From the Department of State Member of the Standing
Committee (Trueheart) to the Chief of the Coordination,
Operations, and Policy Staff of the Central Intelligence
Agency (Childs)

Washington, March 29, 1950.

Dear Mr. Childs:

Reference is made to your memorandum of March 6, 1950, for-

warding a draft interagency operating procedure for the proposed
Watch Committee.

As you are aware, we are in full accord with the Watch Commit-

tee idea. We believe, however, that the specific procedures outlined in

4 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–R01731R, Box 43,

Folder 7. Top Secret. A handwritten notation indicates a copy was sent to AD/ORE on
March 30.

Not found.

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the CIA proposal tend to obscure the method by which the Commit-
tee should operate and, indeed, the basic purpose for which the Com-
mittee needs to be established.

In considering procedures for the Watch Committee, it is impor-

tant to bear in mind that a committee is not needed merely to effect an
exchange of pertinent items of information. The unique feature of a
committee—and the reason a committee is needed in this field—is that
it provides a mechanism whereby all such items of information may
be juxtaposed, compared with each other, discussed, and jointly eval-
uated by the members. Similarly, the committee structure permits joint
consideration of the important question: What are the proper and sig-
nificant categories of information (indicators) having a bearing on So-
viet intentions to make war in the near future?

With this is mind we are submitting for your consideration a re-

draft of the agreement.

While there are a number of minor changes,

the most important adjustments we propose are designed to empha-
size this deliberative aspect of the Committee’s work. I should be glad
to discuss it with you in detail at your convenience.

I am sending copies of this letter to the other action addressees of

your memorandum.

Sincerely yours,

William C. Trueheart

The enclosure, entitled ”Draft of Proposed Interagency Operating Procedure,”

was not found.

Not further identified.

Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of
State (Kennan) to the Under Secretary of State (Webb)

Washington, March 30, 1950.

On June 18 [

], 1948, at its 13th meeting, the National Security

Council approved a directive (NSC 10/2)

establishing in the Central

The Intelligence Community 5

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 64 D 563, Chronological. Top

Secret.

For text of NSC 10/2, see

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelli-

gence Establishment, Document 292.

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Intelligence Agency an Office of Special Projects

to plan and conduct

covert operations, and in coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
plan and prepare for the conduct of such operations in war time. The
directive charged the Director of Central Intelligence with assuring

through designated representatives of the Secretary of State and of the Secre-
tary of Defense

that covert operations be planned and conducted in a

manner consistent with United States foreign and military policies and
with overt activities.

Pursuant to this Directive, I was designated by General Marshall

as his representative for the above purpose, and this designation was
officially made known to the Executive Secretary of the National Se-
curity Council by a letter signed August 13, 1948 by Mr. Lovett.

Since

that date, I have continued to bear this responsibility.

My present preoccupation with other duties and my pending de-

parture from the Department oblige me to recommend that I now be
relieved of this responsibility, and I do so recommend.

However, I do not think that any successor to me should be ap-

pointed in present circumstances; and I would urge that the National
Security Council be informed that the Department will not be able to
give further guidance on the exercise of this function by CIA until cer-
tain prerequisites are met which could alone assure the soundness of
the operation of these arrangements. These are:

(a) There would have to be a marked improvement in the facili-

ties for assuring the cooperation of security authorities of the Govern-
ment in general, and the Department of Justice in particular, in the ef-
forts of this Department and the Office of Special Projects to promote
psychological warfare purposes.

It was never to be expected that covert operations could be so con-

ducted as to produce appreciable political results unless those charged
with their conduct could command the cooperation and the confidence
of all agencies of the United States Government. In a memorandum of
conversation and understanding initialed on August 12, 1948 by Mr.
Souers, Admiral Hillenkoetter, Mr. Blum, Colonel Yeaton, Mr. Wisner
and myself,

designed to serve as the basic premises underlying the

conduct of this work, it was agreed that the activity was to be consid-

6 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

The Office of Special Projects was the name originally proposed for the Office of

Policy Coordination.

Not printed. (National Archives, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 64 D 563, Political and Psy-

chological Warfare)

The actual date of the meeting was August 6, 1948; the memorandum of conver-

sation is printed in

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Estab-

lishment, Document 298.

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ered “a major political operation” and that “the greatest flexibility and
freedom from the regulations and administrative standards governing
ordinary operations” would be required for its successful prosecution.

These requirements have not been adequately met. In particular,

the Government has proven itself unable to take the necessary and ap-
propriate action in matters concerning a number of the ex-communists
and others who are the heart and soul of the potential ideological re-
sistance to communism both here and abroad and whose movements
in and out of this country are important to this purpose. Any political
warfare efforts which purport to dispense with a free and flexible col-
laboration with these elements must be largely unrealistic. In addition
to this, present restrictions on the exercise of executive discretion in the
employment of persons by the United States Government place heavy
handicaps on the fulfillment of the purposes of political and psycho-
logical warfare. I do not deny that positive results can still be obtained,
in a fragmentary way and in limited areas of political warfare work
where the cooperation of other agencies of the Government is not re-
quired. But in general the framework for the accomplishment of this
work is so discouraging that prospects for success cannot be regarded
as balancing out, in present circumstances, the other risks and disad-
vantages of the Department’s participation in it.

(b) Some suitable arrangements would have to be devised to pro-

tect State Department personnel against personal damage to them-
selves arising out of their participation in this work.

Experience has indicated that the issuance of political guidance to

the Director of Central Intelligence in these matters is, in present cir-
cumstances, liable to distortion and exploitation in ways dangerous to
the reputations and positions of the persons concerned in this Depart-
ment. We have already had one instance in which the issuance of such
guidance in good faith, through the proper channels and with the full
authority of superior officers in this Department, has—without notifi-
cation to anyone in this Department—been reported by the CIA to the
FBI as possible evidence of political unreliability on the part of the State
Department official concerned. We have no protection against this hap-
pening again and no assurance that any one in this Department will
even be aware of it when it does happen. In these circumstances, I
would consider it unjust to permit any official of this Department to
have anything to do with this work without warning him that his par-
ticipation in it may very well be used, unbeknownst to him, for the
purpose of throwing suspicion on his character and his loyalty. And
since it is obviously not a tolerable state of affairs that men should be
asked to work in this atmosphere and in this jeopardy, I think it nec-
essary that this matter be clarified before the Department of State can
participate further in this work.

The Intelligence Community 7

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On point (a), above, I think it may still be possible to bring about

some improvement by direct discussion with the agencies concerned—
particularly with the Attorney General. If this proves not to be the case,
it seems to me that our only resort is the National Security Council.

On point (b), I think that this must in any event be taken up with

the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council.

You will appreciate that it is not without great concern and dis-

appointment that I make this recommendation. The idea of the estab-
lishment of an organization of this sort for covert operations in the po-
litical field was largely my own, as was the initiative which led to the
Department’s prominent part in launching this venture. It has been,
and is, my conviction that the effective conduct of political warfare on
the covert plane is indispensable to the prosecution of a successful pol-
icy toward the Soviet Union, designed to prevent a third world war
and to reduce Soviet power and influence to tolerable dimensions. Any-
thing which interferes, even temporarily, with the prosecution of this
work seems to me to diminish materially the chances for defeating com-
munist purposes on a world-wide scale.

I would also like to make it clear that the above recommendation

is not meant to be in any sense critical of the conduct of the work of
the Office of Special Projects by Mr. Wisner who, as far as I am able to
observe, has struggled loyally and valiantly to make a success of this
work under bitterly discouraging conditions and who has considerable
accomplishments to his credit in those areas where conditions have
permitted him to develop his official activity.

George F. Kennan

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Editorial Note

NSC 68, “United States Objectives and Programs for National Se-

curity,” April 14, 1950, is printed in

Foreign Relations,

1950, volume I,

pages 234–292. The National Security Council adopted NSC 68 on April
25, but President Truman did not approve it until September 30. The
paper envisioned, among other things, a dramatic increase in defense
spending, particularly in the form of covert action operations directed
against the Soviet Union and its satellites. For subsequent papers in
the NSC 68 series and related documentation, see the compilation on
national security policy, ibid., 1951, volume I.

8 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of
Defense Johnson

Washington, May 5, 1950.

SUBJECT

Special Electronic Airborne Search Operations (SESP)

1. For several years since the end of the war, the Navy and the Air

Force have been codirecting special electronic airborne search projects
in the furtherance of a program of obtaining the maximum amount of
intelligence concerning foreign electronic developments as a safeguard
to the national defense. These operations have been carried on with-
out a formal statement of policy but on the basis of an informal work-
ing agreement between the Navy and the Air Force. The information
derived from these activities is of the utmost importance from both an
operational and technical standpoint, and thus far has not been at-
tainable from any other source.

2. As you undoubtedly know, the recent incident in the Baltic,

in which a Navy patrol plane engaged in a flight connected with this
program was lost, resulted in a high-level decision, on 17 April 1950,
to discontinue further projects of this program for a period of thirty
days.

3. It is recognized that there is a risk of repetition of such incidents

upon resumption of these flights, but it is felt that there would be more
serious disadvantages accruing to the United States if the cessation of
these operations were to be extended over an excessively long period.

4. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff urge that the special elec-

tronic airborne search projects be resumed with the least practicable
delay and that action be initiated at the highest governmental level to
secure approval therefor. In this connection they have agreed upon the
policies stated below as a definitive basis of operation when these
flights are resumed:

The division of effort, geographically, will be that which most

nearly follows normal peacetime deployment of air units, and at pres-
ent is as follows:

The Intelligence Community 9

Source: National Security Agency, Center for Cryptologic History, Series V, L.1.2.

Top Secret. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates Johnson saw it.

A U.S. Navy B–24 Privateer aircraft with 10 crewmen abroad was shot down by

Soviet planes on April 8. The United States protested the Soviet action; see

Foreign Rela-

tions,

1950, vol. IV, pp. 1140–1149.

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(1) Europe:

(a) To the Navy—Mediterranean and Black Sea Areas.

(b) To the Air Force—Baltic, Gulf of Bothnia, Murmansk, and

Caucasus Areas.
(2) Far East—To the Air Force.

The above division of responsibility does not preclude performance of
Special Electronics Search Projects missions by either Service in any
area, as may be locally agreed, when operational, cover, and other con-
siderations so indicate. However, missions conducted by one Service
which penetrate the area of the other Service will be coordinated thor-
oughly through the Commander concerned.

b. Aircraft engaged in these operations over routes normally

flown by unarmed transport-type aircraft, i.e., the land masses of the
Allied Occupation Zones and the Berlin and Vienna corridors, will con-
tinue to operate with or without armament. Aircraft engaged in these
operations

over all other routes adjacent to the USSR or to USSR- or

satellite-controlled territory will be armed and instructed to shoot in
self-defense.

c. Pending the availability of armed ECM aircraft, and in order to

continue reconnaissance operations at the same tempo as was the case
prior to the Baltic incident, flights will be conducted on the same sched-
ules and routes as planned for ECM aircraft but with armed, and not
necessarily ECM equipped, B–29 or B–50 aircraft.

d. Flights by single aircraft will, to the maximum extent possible,

be scheduled so that the portion(s) of the flight near particularly sen-
sitive or heavily defended areas will be under cover of darkness or
weather.

Flights will not be made closer than twenty miles to the USSR

or USSR- or satellite-controlled territory.

Emergency single-group code transmissions meaning “I am be-

ing attacked by VF,” “I am being tracked by VF,” etc., are prescribed
for joint use.

Flights will not deviate from or alter planned flight courses for

other than reasons of safety.

(

Note:

Although it is recognized that this paper is concerned pri-

marily with SESP missions, it is considered that certain of the provi-

10 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

“Which?” is handwritten in the margin, presumably by Johnson. In reply Secre-

tary of the Navy Captain W.G. Lalor sent a memorandum to the Executive Secretary to
the Secretary of Defense on May 22 explaining that the phrase “with or without arma-
ment” meant either armed or unarmed aircraft. (National Security Agency, Center for
Cryptologic History, Series V, L.1.2.)

President Truman wrote at the end of this sentence: “Good sense, it seems to me.

HST.”

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sions contained herein are equally applicable to all aerial reconnais-
sance which may be conducted in sensitive areas adjacent to the USSR
or to USSR- or satellite-controlled areas.)

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Omar N. Bradley

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

President Truman wrote “Approved 5/19/50 Harry S Truman” below the signa-

ture block.

Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, May 5, 1950.

SUBJECT

OPC–Department of State Liaison

PARTICIPANTS

OPC–Mr. Wisner, P—Mr. Barrett, P—Mr. Sargeant, A—Mr. Humelsine,
S/S—Mr. Sheppard, S/P—Mr. Joyce, and P—Mr. [

name not declassified

]

The following points of agreement were reached at the meeting in

Mr. Humelsine’s office on May 5.

1. The focal point of responsibility in the Department of State for

providing coordinated propaganda policy guidance to OPC is the As-
sistant Secretary for Public Affairs.

2. There are two major segments to the problem of liaison so far

as public affairs programs are concerned:

(a) Policy guidance and (b) coordination of operations.

3. To make certain that operations do in fact proceed in accordance

with top-level decisions on propaganda policy, the following arrange-
ments should be undertaken:

(a) Designation by the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs of a

deputy who would work with an OPC designee on (1) policy guidance

The Intelligence Community 11

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Operations, Job 80–01795R,

Box 2, Folder 7. Top Secret. Drafted by [

name not declassified

]. A handwritten notation on

the memorandum reads “Mr. Wisner (Your designee?)”

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matters and, (2) coordination of operations. Once specific arrangements

for coordination of operations are approved, agreed-on working-level

relations can be started between OPC and P area units.

(b) Mr. Joyce will designate a person, to be associated with him,

to work with OPC on propaganda projects. Mr. Barrett will arrange for

this designee to work with his deputy for P–OPC liaison and with

B/POL. The Joyce designee will have full access to P area policy guid-

ance materials and meetings.

policy guidance and coordination of operations under the above

arrangements.

(d) Mr. Joyce, under these arrangements, will continue to have full

access to the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs and to the resources

of the Public Affairs area. Proposals for modification of these arrange-

ments or modification of major operational decisions will be the sub-

ject of prior discussion by P, Mr. Joyce and OPC.

Memorandum by the Assistant Director for Policy
Coordination of the Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner)

Washington, May 8, 1950.

SUBJECT

Data for Consideration in Connection with NSC Studies

1. The attached data have been prepared in response to a request

on 4 May from the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, for budg-
etary estimates by OPC for the period from 1 July 1950 to 30 June 1957
in connection with certain studies being conducted with regard to NSC
68.

These estimates are based upon the assumptions understood to be

applicable to NSC 68 and particularly the decision of the United States
Government to make a major effort in the field of covert operations.
The OPC charter is not elaborated here since it is assumed that those
reviewing this paper will be familiar with NSC 10/2

and related

documents.

2. The primary consideration is determination of the scale on

which it may be possible to carry out covert operations in support of

12 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 64 D 563, NSC 68. Top Secret.

The memorandum bears no indication of addressees.

An annex of budgetary estimates for FY 1951–1957 is attached but not printed.

The Policy Planning Staff request of May 4 has not been found.

See footnote 2, Document 2.

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United States foreign policy. In this connection it is apparent that two
factors impose ceilings on covert operations:

a. The establishment of an organization such as OPC is unprece-

dented in the peacetime history of the United States. Because of this a

significant body of knowledge, personnel reserves, techniques and

philosophy of operations are not readily available. The difficulty of

locating and inducing physically, intellectually and psychologically

qualified American personnel to abandon their present activities and

enlist in the cold war imposes a significant limitation on the capacity to

plan and conduct covert operations. So long as the nation is technically

at peace and manpower controls do not exist, recruitment of adequate

numbers of personnel with ability to direct and execute these activities

will be difficult and a fairly heavy attrition rate can be foreseen.

b. The second major limiting factor is the requirement that OPC

activities be conducted in such a covert manner that they cannot be

traced to the United States Government and in the event such activi-

ties are so traced, the Government shall be in a position plausibly to

disavow responsibility. Covert operations are increasingly difficult to

execute as they increase in size. Even such a relatively simple matter

as the clandestine disbursement of funds grows difficult as the amounts

involved increase to millions of dollars. These difficulties pyramid

when complex activities are undertaken, such as the creation of large

resistance organizations or the extensive employment of guerrilla units.

The problems attendant on security are not insurmountable in them-

selves, but there are definite [limits?] above which it is not safe to go

without willingness to face exposure which might entail hostile polit-

ical and psychological exploitation.

3. A further difficulty inherent in the conduct of clandestine op-

erations on behalf of this Government lies in the vast water area and
various national borders interposed between the United States and its
target areas. In contrast to the USSR operating from the center of the
Eurasian land mass with interior lines of communication and domi-
nating all areas between them and their primary targets in Eurasia,
United States is confronted with major logistical and security problems
that are not comparable. Even though logistical problems can be re-
solved the maintenance of adequate security in peacetime is a real lim-
iting factor in the conduct of covert operations in Eurasia.

4. Responsive to the decision of the United States Government to

make a major effort in the field of covert operations and to provide the
basis on which the increased responsibilities of OPC may be accom-
plished, it is assumed that adequate administrative and logistical sup-
port will be available; specifically, that:

a. Prompt and final decision is made on NSC 50,

thus providing

a firm basis for organization.

The Intelligence Community 13

For text of NSC 50, see

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence

Establishment, Document 384.

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b. Adequate space is available to accommodate the Washington

headquarters.

c. OPC (or the combined covert offices if OPC and OSO are con-

solidated under NSC 50) will have a high degree of administrative au-

tonomy and control.

d. The FBI will conduct such personnel and other investigations

as may be requested by OPC on a priority basis.

e. The Departments of Defense, State and other governmental

agencies will provide adequate logistical and administrative support

upon request of OPC.

f. In view of the dearth of personnel experienced in covert oper-

ations, military and foreign service personnel having appropriate qual-

ifications will be made available to OPC on a high priority basis.

g. Recognition will be given to the fact that those conducting

covert operations are in fact the front line troops in the cold war and

should be given maximum support with administrative flexibility.

5. Since it is considered that 1954 is the crucial year, the estimates

up to and including that time must necessarily include expenditures
for establishing, stockpiling and operating overseas supply bases, the
establishment and strengthening of effective organizations to direct and
execute covert operations in and against each target area, the estab-
lishment of an adequate, world-wide communications system, and the
conduct of extensive training with adequate facilities of all types, in-
cluding paramilitary.

6. A series of independent projections coincide in establishing a

figure of [

number not declassified

] as the maximum American field force

that OPC can install and maintain overseas in 1954. This force will be
disposed largely in Eurasia in considerable depth along the periphery
of the Soviet Union. Prior to 1954 the primary limitation will be the
size and inexperience of our overseas stations. However, by 1954 the
bulk of the [

number not declassified

] personnel will have attained a de-

gree of effectiveness which should have a significant effect on the
cold war. The number of American personnel does not indicate the to-
tal size of the forces involved in covert operations, which must nec-
essarily be conducted largely through apparati utilizing indigenous
personnel.

7. The attached data which present estimates of OPC financial re-

quirements by target areas as well as operational areas are considered
as realistic as is possible within the framework of considerations and
limitations outlined herein. Modifications of these estimates would be
required in response to more specific policy guidance with respect to
emphasis on certain programs or areas. For example, if covert economic
warfare operations on any considerable scale were subsidized by OPC
it would require sums greatly in excess of these estimates. Likewise,
the share of financial responsibility to be borne by OPC in connection
with certain types of joint operations undertaken with the Department
of Defense may affect the estimates.

14 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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8. As is indicated above, the two major factors limiting the scale of

covert operations are qualified and trained personnel willing and able
to undertake these activities in the areas involved and the requirement
that the activities be conducted in such a covert manner that they can-
not be traced to the United States Government. Manpower controls de-
signed to channel qualified personnel into the Government service on
behalf of the cold war would ameliorate the first limitation. Likewise, if
the international situation deteriorates further, the United States Gov-
ernment may be willing to authorize greater security risks in covert op-
erations in order to step up such activities. For example, covert support
of guerrilla or resistance forces on a large scale would be impossible to
accomplish with the degree of security required by current United States
policy. Should the Government’s policy require such support on an en-
larged scale with recognition of security factors involved, funds greatly
in excess of those indicated on the attachment would be required.

Frank G. Wisner

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant
for Intelligence (Armstrong) to the Under Secretary of State
(Webb)

Washington, May 9, 1950.

[Source: Department of State, A/MS Files: Lot 54 D 291, CIA

1949–52. Top Secret. 2 pages not declassified.]

10.

Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Webb) to Director
of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter

Washington, June 6, 1950.

[Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–54, 103.1102/

6–650. Top Secret. 2 pages not declassified.]

The Intelligence Community 15

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11.

Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter to
the Under Secretary of State (Webb)

Washington, June 12, 1950.

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Job

80–R01731R, Box 13, Folder 560. Secret. 2 pages not declassified.]

12.

Editorial Note

When North Korea invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950, the U.S.

intelligence organizations had few resources or personnel dedicated to
Korean matters. This situation changed quickly, with the Central In-
telligence Agency and the armed forces’ intelligence services devoting
massive efforts to support the Korean war effort. The CIA Office of Pol-
icy Coordination began an immediate build-up. Its operational con-
cepts were based on the Office of Strategic Services’ (OSS) World War
II experience and stressed stay-behind agents and guerrilla forces. For
the CIA’s intelligence analysis of the early phase of the Korean war, see
Woodrow J. Kuhns,

Assessing the Soviet Threat: The Early Cold War Years

(Washington: Central Intelligence Agency, 1997).

After the second capture of Seoul by Communist forces in 1951,

guerrilla forces, along with commando and reconnaissance raids, re-
ceived the bulk of CIA attention. Eventually some 3,000 guerrillas were
operating in the mountains of North Korea, and they briefly succeeded
in tying up some North Korean and Chinese troops. The CIA also pro-
vided order of battle and targeting intelligence, intelligence to enforce
the economic embargo against North Korea and China, and daily cur-
rent intelligence publications on the situation in Korea.

For a time, following the entry of Chinese troops in late Novem-

ber 1950, there was widespread concern in the United States that the
Korean invasion was the first phase of a Soviet-inspired World War III
that would soon engulf Europe as well as Asia. Planning began to si-
multaneously provide massive support for anti-Communist guerrillas
in China and paramilitary activity in Europe. Emergency war plans
were drawn up. In this crisis atmosphere, the Department of Defense
urged the CIA to begin to accelerate many other war-related programs:
evasion and escape planning, the build-up of supplies, training of para-

16 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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transmitter that was installed in Germany and went on the air as Ra-
dio Free Europe on July 4, 1950. A host of other organizations also
worked with OPC, with more or less independence, in the early cold
war years. These included the American Committee for Freedom for
the Peoples of the USSR, the Committee for a Free Asia, the Congress
for Cultural Freedom, and several youth and student organizations, in-
cluding the National Student Association. One of the earliest Agency
proprietary companies was Air America, which long provided CIA air-
lift capability in the Far East. CIA purchased Air America from Claire
Chennault and his partner on August 23, 1950. Air America provided
extensive support for CIA activities during the Korean war.

16.

Letter From the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (Hoover) to the President’s Special Consultant
(Souers)

Washington, July 7, 1950

My Dear Admiral:

For some months representatives of the FBI and of the Department

of Justice have been formulating a plan of action for an emergency sit-
uation wherein it would be necessary to apprehend and detain per-
sons who are potentially dangerous to the internal security of the coun-
try. I thought you would be interested in a brief outline of the plan.

Action to Be Taken By the Department of Justice

The plan envisions four types of emergency situations: (1) attack

upon the United States; (2) threatened invasion; (3) attack upon United
States troops in legally occupied territory; and (4) rebellion.

18 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: National Archives, RG 273, Files of the National Security Council Repre-

sentative for Internal Security 1947–69, Box 36, Problem 11. Personal and Confidential;
by Special Messenger. A handwritten notation reads: “Mr. Coyne has suggested that you
probably will choose to discuss this with Mr. Lay and Mr. Coyne.” This is followed by
an initial that appears to be an “S”. The initials JPC probably indicate that J. Patrick
Coyne, NSC Representative for Internal Security, read the letter. Souers sent a non-
committal reply on July 14. (Ibid.)

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The plan contains a prepared document which should be referred

to the President immediately upon the existence of one of the emer-
gency situations for the President’s signature. Briefly, this proclama-
tion recites the existence of the emergency situation and that in order
to immediately protect the country against treason, espionage and sab-
otage the Attorney General is instructed to apprehend all individuals
potentially dangerous to the internal security. In order to make effec-
tive these apprehensions, the proclamation suspends the Writ of
Habeas Corpus for apprehensions made pursuant to it.

The plan also contains a prepared joint resolution to be passed by

Congress and an Executive Order for the President which too will val-
idate the previous Presidential proclamation.

The next step in the plan is a prepared order from the Attorney

General to the Director of the FBI to apprehend dangerous individu-
als, conduct necessary searches and seize contraband as defined in the
plan. Together with the order to the Director of the FBI the Attorney
General will forward a master warrant attached to a list of names of
individuals which names have previously been furnished from time to
time to the Attorney General by the FBI as being individuals who are
potentially dangerous to the internal security.

It should be pointed out that the plan does not distinguish between

aliens and citizens and both are included in its purview. If for some rea-
son the full plan is not put into operation it has so been drawn that the
section applicable only to alien enemies may be put into effect.

Action to Be Taken By the FBI

For a long period of time the FBI has been accumulating the names,

identities and activities of individuals found to be potentially danger-
ous to the internal security through investigation. These names have
been compiled in an index which index has been kept up to date. The
names in this index are the ones that have been furnished to the De-
partment of Justice and will be attached to the master warrant referred
to above. This master warrant will, therefore, serve as legal authority
for the FBI to cause the apprehension and detention of the individuals
maintained in this index. The index now contains approximately twelve
thousand individuals, of which approximately ninety-seven per cent
are citizens of the United States. Immediately upon receipt of instruc-
tions and the master warrant from the Attorney General the various
FBI Field Divisions will be instructed by expeditious means to cause
the apprehension of the individuals within their various territories.
Each FBI Field Division maintains an index of the individuals within
its territory, which index is so arranged that it may be used for ready
apprehension purposes. Upon apprehension the individuals will be
delivered to the nearest jail for temporary detention and action by the
Attorney General.

The Intelligence Community 19

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Detention and Subsequent Procedures

The permanent detention of these individuals will take place in

regularly established Federal detention facilities. These facilities have
been confidentially surveyed and the facilities have been found to be
adequate in all areas except in the territory covered by the FBI’s New
York, Los Angeles and San Francisco Offices. In these three areas
arrangements have been perfected with the National Military Estab-
lishment for the temporary and permanent detention in Military facil-
ities of the individuals apprehended.

The plan calls for a statement of charges to be served on each de-

tainee and a hearing be afforded the individual within a specified pe-
riod. The Hearing Board will consist of three members to be appointed
by the Attorney General composed of one Judge of the United States
or State Court and two citizens. The hearing procedure will give the
detainee an opportunity to know why he is being detained and permit
him to introduce material in the nature of evidence in his own behalf.
The hearing procedure will not be bound by the rules of evidence. The
Hearing Board may make one of three recommendations, that is; that
the individual be detained, paroled or released. This action by the
Board is subject to review by the Attorney General and the Attorney
General’s decision on the matter will be final except for appeal to the
President.

The details of this plan as set forth in this communication have

also been furnished on this date to Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Sec-
retary, National Security Council.

With expressions of my highest esteem and best regards,
Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

17.

Editorial Note

On July 10, 1950, NSC 74, a report to the National Security Coun-

cil by Under Secretary of State James Webb on “A Plan for National
Psychological Warfare,” totalling 51 pages, was circulated to members
of the Council and Secretary of the Treasury John W. Snyder. The re-
port dealt largely with wartime contingency planning. It also recom-
mended that a national psychological warfare organization be estab-
lished. Pursuant to this recommendation and to NSC 59/1 (Document
2), the Department of State announced on August 17 the creation of a

20 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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National Psychological Strategy Board under the Secretary of State. For
text of the announcement, see Department of State

Bulletin,

August 28,

1950, page 335. The board was in fact the Director and Consultants pro-
posed in NSC 59/1, with representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
NSC 74 never received the formal approval of the Council, but was
used for reference in subsequent studies of this subject. A copy of NSC
74 is in the National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 51,
NSC 74.

18.

Director of Central Intelligence Directive 14/1

Washington, July 17, 1950.

ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERAGENCY DEFECTOR COMMITTEE

1. Pursuant to the provisions of NSCIDs 13 and 14,

a permanent

Interagency Defector Committee is hereby established, under the
Chairmanship of the Central Intelligence Agency, composed of one
representative each from the Central Intelligence Agency, the De-
partment of State, the Departments of the Army, Navy, and the Air
Force, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.

2. The various Intelligence Advisory Committee representatives,

acting for their chiefs, will exercise within the Committee all powers
of decision defined by and allocated to the various Intelligence Agen-
cies under the provisions of NSCIDs 13 and 14.

3. The Interagency Defector Committee will proceed immediately

to implement the Defector Program in accordance with NSCIDs 13
and 14.

R.H. Hillenkoetter

Director of Cenral Intelligence

The Intelligence Community 21

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff, Job 84–B00389R, HS/HC–600,

Box 4. Secret; Security Information.

Documents 252 and 253.

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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19.

Memorandum From the Chairman of the Communications
Intelligence Board (Armstrong) to the Executive Secretary of
the National Security Council (Lay)

Washington, July 19, 1950.

SUBJECT

Communications Intelligence Requirements and Mobilization

1. At its Fifty-third meeting, 14 July 1950, the United States Com-

munications Intelligence Board (USCIB) reviewed the status of the
United States communications intelligence effort in the face of the
world situation.

2. The members of the Board agreed unanimously that:

(a) the total communications intelligence requirements of the

United States at this time transcend the specific requirements spring-

ing solely out of the Korean problem;

(b) the present scale of communications intelligence effort falls far

short of meeting total requirements or even of enabling the United

States to exploit available communications information to its full

potential;

ments can be accomplished only slowly because of the time factor

involved in obtaining the indispensable security clearances of added

personnel and in constructing the complex physical apparatus

required;

(d) for the foregoing reasons, the expansion of the communica-

tions intelligence effort must be started now;

(e) partial mobilization in the communications intelligence field

should be undertaken on a selective basis immediately.

3. In view of the above, the United States Communications Intel-

ligence Board recommends to the National Security Council that as a
matter of urgency:

(a) the National Security Council recognize that expansion of the

United States communications intelligence effort is required and at the

earliest possible moment;

(b) the National Security Council recommend to the President that

the member departments and agencies of the United States Commu-

nications Intelligence Board be authorized to intensify without delay

the communications intelligence effort by proceeding with the selec-

22 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC Intelligence

Directives. Top Secret. Lay circulated the memorandum to the NSC the next day. (Ibid.)

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tive mobilization of reserves in this specialized field and with a gen-

eral expansion of other personnel and equipment.

For the United States

Communications Intelligence Board:

W. Park Armstrong, Jr.

The Intelligence Advisory Committee approved the recommendation, adding that

“intensification” should apply to the entire intelligence structure, not just communica-
tions intelligence. Hillenkoetter informed NSC Executive Secretary Lay of this action in
a memorandum of August 8, and Lay in turn informed the members of the NSC in a
memorandum the same day. Both memoranda are ibid. The President approved the
USCIB recommendation on July 27 in NSC Action No. 322. (Truman Library, President’s
Secretary File)

Printed from a copy that indicates Armstrong signed the original.

20.

Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter to
the Under Secretary of State (Webb)

Washington, July 26, 1950.

Dear Mr. Webb:

The State-Defense Staff Study of 1 May 1950, on “Production of

National Intelligence”, transmitted with your letter of 7 July

for my

comments, points up the conflicting theories which have prevailed
since the inception of CIA on the responsibility within our Government
for intelligence relating to the national security, i.e., a responsible sin-
gle Director versus a committee of co-equal directors of the several in-
telligence agencies.

The proposals set forth in the Staff Study would be so radical a

departure from the concept of the Central Intelligence Agency as en-
visaged by the Congress that there exists at present no legal authority
to adopt them.

The Intelligence Community 23

Source: National Archives, RG 59, INR Historical Files: Lot 58 D 776, National In-

telligence Staff Study. Secret. All ellipses in the original letter.

Not printed. (Ibid.) For the staff study, see

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence

of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 420. Apparently, however, the staff study
sent to Hillenkoetter mistakenly included pages from a “preliminary” or “early” ver-
sion; see Document 22.

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As an indication of this Congressional intent, I quote from the

statement of the Chairman of the Special Subcommittee of the House
Expenditures Committee Investigating Intelligence Activities of the
Government (at the time of the Bogota crisis) dated 16 April 1948:

“It may be necessary for Congress to enact additional legislation

to give the CIA the independent status it was generally presumed to

enjoy . . . . Our Central Intelligence Agency must be protected against

censorship or intimidation by any arm of the Executive Branch.”

This position has been repeatedly made clear to me in virtually

every committee session I have attended since assuming the Director-
ship. It is also a fact that in times of crisis the appropriate Congres-
sional Committees have always called on the Director of Central In-
telligence for an accounting and for briefing on the intelligence
situation. The Congress has always made it amply clear in these situ-
ations that it holds the Director and this Agency completely responsi-
ble in the field of foreign intelligence, and it presumes that this Agency
has the requisite powers and authorities to make that responsibility ef-
fective in the interests of our national security.

The effect of your Staff Study is to abrogate the statutory respon-

sibility for the production of national intelligence of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency and shift it as a collective responsibility to a commit-
tee. This is specified in your study as follows:

“Until the emergence of a national estimate or study from the IAC,

collective responsibility is inescapable under the Act of 1947 . . . The

full statutory responsibility of the D/CI for the production of national

intelligence becomes operative only when . . . final drafts of national

estimates or studies are recommended by the IAC to the D/CI.”

Not only does the National Security Act contemplate no such doc-

trine of collective responsibility, but, in NSC 50,

the National Security

Council specifically disavowed this doctrine in the following language:

“. . . we do not believe that the Director and the IAC should be

bound by the concept of collective responsibility because this would

inevitably reduce coordinated national intelligence to the lowest com-

mon denominator among the agencies concerned.”

Careful thought and study has been given to the existing NSCID 1

in its relation to the statutory responsibilities of this Agency. The pres-

ent directives and their implementation have not been satisfactory.
There has been prepared for submission to the National Security Coun-

24 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

For text of NSC 50, see

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence

Establishment, Document 384.

Ibid., Document 432.

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cil a basic NSCID which is attached herewith for your information.

This draft clearly establishes the minimum authorities necessary to en-
able this Agency to fulfill its statutory responsibilities and likewise es-
tablishes the responsibilities of the departmental agencies in support
of national intelligence. Separate specific comments on your Staff Study
are also attached.

It is noted that you propose to submit your Staff Study with its

proposed NSC Directive direct to the NSC. It is therefore requested that
our comments and the inclosure accompany your submission.

As a matter of parallel interest the CIA has been instructed by the

NSC to consider through normal NSCID procedure the following
quoted comments of the Secretary of Defense, and to submit recom-
mendations in connection therewith:

“I do not find the IAC comments on RECOMMENDATION 8 to

be convincing. Existing directives fall far short of coming to grips with

urgent and recognizable problems of coordination of intelligence in

Washington and overseas. Furthermore, I do not concede that the

‘rather elaborate committee structure’ is either inevitable or desirable.

On the contrary, it is my belief that the intricate committee structure is

the consequence of compromises created by inter-bureau rivalries

rather than the results of objective study of intelligence organization.

Dependable conclusions from . . . intelligence, as from every other

subject matter of national intelligence, should result from evaluation

and synthesis within the framework of the Central Agency of all avail-

able material from every Federal source. Final responsibility for coor-

dinating the collection of this material as well as its processing should

rest squarely in the same agency. With that responsibility should go

corresponding authority, which now is ambiguous and obscured in the

present interlocking committee structure.”

In view of our instructions from the NSC in connection with this

statement, it would in any case be incumbent on this Agency to sub-
mit our proposed revision of the NSCID through normal channels as
it reflects our considered opinion of what is needed as a proper foun-
dation for the national intelligence mission.

Sincerely,

R. H. Hillenkoetter

Rear Admiral, USN

The Intelligence Community 25

Not found.

A 7-page paper, July 25, signed by Hillenkoetter, is attached but not printed.

Printed from a copy that indicates Hillenkoetter signed the original.

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21.

Memorandum From the Chief of Staff of the Army (Collins)
to Secretary of Defense Johnson

Washington, July 28, 1950.

SUBJECT

Expanded Requirements of the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) in View
of Current World Situation

1. By a memorandum dated 22 June 1950

the Joint Chiefs of Staff

recommended to you that funds be made available to permit com-
mencing immediate recruiting of additional civilian personnel by the
Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA), in order to increase that
Agency’s output of communications intelligence. The Director, AFSA,
was thereafter authorized by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comp-
troller) to commence recruiting, with ultimate ceiling to be determined
later.

2. In the light of the current world situation, as it has developed

since 22 June, the necessity for a large increase in output of communi-
cations intelligence has taken an added degree of urgency. In addition,
the same developments have generated an additional need for greatly
expedited production of cryptographic material required by the armed
forces, and for stepped-up prosecution of already approved research
and development projects in both the communications intelligence and
communication security fields.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, after careful study of the needs in-

volved, recommend as a matter of urgency that the current direct re-
sources of AFSA be increased as follows (these increases include the
additional personnel recommended in the above mentioned memo-
randum of 22 June 1950):

Personal Services (Civilian)

Additional

Increased

positions

FY 1951 funds

Communications

intelligence

1253

$5,210,800

Communication

security

389

$ 893,740

Totals . . . .

1642

$6,104,540

26 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: National Archives, RG 218, CCS 334 NSA (7–24–48) Sec. 4 (Formerly NSA).

Top Secret. Copies were sent to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, Assistant to the Chief
of Naval Operations, Director, P&O Air, and Director of the Joint Staff.

Not found.

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Note

—The increased funds include, in addition to salaries of new per-

sonnel, allowance for overtime to provide for a 6-day work-week for
all civilian personnel.

Other Objects

Increased

FY 1951 funds

Communications intelligence

$2,914,200

Communication security

$2,176,760

Total . . . .

$5,090,960

Note

—The increased funds for objects other than personal services are

chiefly to provide supplies and equipment entailed in increased and ex-
pedited effort represented by the recommended increase in personnel.

4. The foregoing amounts include $2,998,000 for research and de-

velopment, which amount has already been requested of the Chair-
man, Research and Development Board.

5. In addition to the increases in funds and in civilian personnel

recommended above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved increases,
amounting to 244 officers and 464 enlisted men, in the military per-
sonnel assigned to AFSA. A program for intercept facilities expansion
to be provided for AFSA by the Services is now under consideration
by the Armed Forces Security Agency Council. The expanded com-
munications requirements related to this program will be determined
as soon as practicable.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

J. Lawton Collins

The Intelligence Community 27

Printed from a copy that indicates Collins signed the original.

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22.

Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant
for Intelligence and Research (Armstrong) to the Under
Secretary of State (Webb)

Washington, August 10, 1950.

SUBJECT

State–Defense Staff Study on “Production of National Intelligence”

I regret to report the discovery that the staff study enclosed with

your letter of July 7 to Admiral Hillenkoetter on this subject

was in

fact a preliminary version containing three pages which were later
amended. While the final version of the paper is not fundamentally
different, the fact is that only the early version contained the reference
to “collective responsibility”—to which Hillenkoetter took strong ex-
ception and on which he pinned much of his argument.

This error, for which I am fully responsible, appears to have come

about through the circumstance that the paper was amended in the in-
terval between the time it was first presented to you (May 2) and the
time when you considered it for the second time and forwarded it to
Hillenkoetter (July 7). The amended pages were not substituted in the
copies in your office, one of which apparently was transmitted to Hil-
lenkoetter.

While we feel sure that the CIA reaction to either version of the

paper would have been substantially the same, we must of course set
the record straight by transmitting the final version of the paper on
which there was State-Defense agreement. At the same time, there is
the chance, however faint, that if Hillenkoetter has any inclination to
modify his original and extreme position, forwarding of the later ver-
sion will provide him with a convenient excuse for doing so.

In this connection, General Magruder and Admiral Souers yester-

day discussed the CIA reaction to our proposals. According to Ma-
gruder, it is Souers’s view that Hillenkoetter’s position is wrong, that
an effort should be made to make him see the constructive features of
our proposals, and that the later version of the paper may provide him
with a convenient “out.” To this end, Souers has suggested that he

28 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: National Archives, RG 59, INR Historical Files: Lot 58 D 776, National In-

telligence Staff Study. Secret. Drafted by Trueheart. Sent through the Executive Secretariat.

Dated May 1, 1950; printed in

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the In-

telligence Establishment, Document 420.

Regarding Webb’s July 7 letter, see footnote 2, Document 20. The enclosed “pre-

liminary” or “early” version of the State–Defense staff study has not been found.

See Document 20.

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himself call Hillenkoetter and urge him to set up a meeting where
Magruder could go over the paper with Hillenkoetter and his princi-
pal assistants.

Before that meeting, however, it will be important that we get to

Hillenkoetter the correct final version of the paper. The simplest and
best way of accomplishing this would be for you to telephone Admi-
ral Hillenkoetter, inform him of the mistake and tell him that you are
sending over the correct version of the paper. At the same time, you
should mention that you understand that General Magruder will be
discussing the subject of national intelligence with him.

Recommendation:

That you telephone Admiral Hillenkoetter along the above lines.
That you sign the attached letter after making the telephone call

which will transmit the corrected paper.

W. Park Armstrong, Jr.

The attached letter and “corrected paper” have not been found, but the list of at-

tachments at the end of the letter identifies the corrected paper as the May 1, 1950, text
(see footnote 2 above).

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

23.

Memorandum for the Record

Washington, August 29, 1950.

Set forth below is a brief statement of some of the more pressing

problems presently facing the Central Intelligence Agency. These are
the subject of extensive studies within the Agency and are volumi-
nously documented in Agency files.

The Intelligence Community 29

Source: National Archives, RG 263, History Staff/History Collection: History Re-

search Project 82–2/00286, Box 4, HS/HC 500, National Intelligence Directives. Secret.
Not signed but prepared by CIA General Counsel Lawrence Houston. According to Lud-
well Montague,

General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence, October

1950–February 1953,

p. 60, Smith had asked Houston for a review of the problems fac-

ing CIA and Houston responded on this date. A signed copy of Houston’s August 29
covering memorandum to Smith and another copy of the memorandum for the record
are printed in Michael Warner, ed.,

The CIA Under Harry Truman,

pp. 341–347.

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Appended hereto are certain documents which most clearly illus-

trate the issues involved and which indicate measures which would be
basic steps in the solution thereof. These documents are identified in
a list of tabs at the end of this paper.

1. Coordination of Activities.

Difficulties in coordinating the intelligence activities of the Gov-

ernment, and of performing other functions imposed upon CIA by law,
result from existing National Security Council directives which impose
upon CIA the board of directors mechanism of the Intelligence Advi-
sory Committee (IAC) in the following manner:

a. They require that recommendations and advice of the Director

of Central Intelligence (DCI) to the National Security Council (NSC)
must contain the concurrence or non-concurrence of the IAC;

b. They enable the IAC to assert the position that they are not

merely advisory to the DCI, but are actually a board of directors, of
which the DCI is but the executive secretary, i.e. one among equals;

c. Therefore the recommendations which go forward to the NSC

are not CIA recommendations as contemplated by the law, but actu-
ally are watered-down compromises, replete with loop-holes, in an at-
tempt to secure complete IAC support.

2. Intelligence Support for Production of Estimates.

Difficulties are encountered by CIA in producing adequate intel-

ligence estimates, due to the refusal of the IAC agencies to honor CIA
requests for necessary intelligence information, departmental intelli-
gence, or collection action:

a. Information has been withheld from CIA by IAC agencies on

the basis that it is “operational” rather than “intelligence information”
and therefore not available to CIA; that it is “eyes only” information
or on a highly limited dissemination basis; or that it is handled under
special security provisions which by-pass CIA;

b. CIA is not empowered to enforce its collection requests on IAC

agencies, or establish priorities;

c. There is a failure of spontaneous dissemination of certain ma-

terial to CIA;

d. IAC agencies continue to cite the so-called “Third Agency Rule”

as a basis for refusing to give intelligence to CIA.

3. Production and Dissemination of Estimates.

The furnishing of adequate national intelligence estimates to the

President, the NSC, and other appropriate recipients is hampered by

30 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

None of the tabs are attached.

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the lack of complete material, (as set forth in paragraph 3, above), and
by present procedures which require concurrence or substantial dis-
sent to each estimate from the IAC agencies, but make no provision for
setting time limits thereon:

a. Departmental agencies of the IAC cannot concur in intelligence

estimates which conflict with agency substantive policy; nor can they
free themselves from departmental bias or budgetary interests;

b. Coordination of CIA estimates often takes months, with the re-

sult a compromise position;

c. Departmental dissents to CIA estimates are frequently unsub-

stantial, quibbling or reflective of departmental policy.

4. Special Problems.

a. The IAC agencies resist the grant of authority to CIA to issue

directives affecting the intelligence field in general and their activities
or priorities in particular on the ground that it would violate the con-
cept of command channels;

b. The status of CIA in relation to the President and the NSC must

be redefined and clarified;

c. The relationships between CIA on the one hand, and the De-

partment of Justice—particularly the FBI, on the other, especially in
connection with the defector problem, must be improved and clarified.

d. Difficulties imposed by NSC directives in the field of uncon-

ventional warfare must be eliminated, particularly the policy control
over CIA granted to the Departments of State and Defense. The sepa-
ration of clandestine operations into two offices within CIA creates se-
rious problems of efficiency, efficacy and, above all, security;

e. There is a failure of coordination of overt intelligence collection

in the field, due in part to competition among the departments in the
field, but also to lack of positive planning and action by CIA. This re-
sults in unnecessary duplication and overlaps, and the initial with-
holding of choice material. It is becoming necessary for CIA to take a
strong position in the field of overt collection abroad.

5. Nuclear Energy and Other Special Intelligence Subjects.

Each has its own but related problems.

6. Relationship Between JCS and CIA in the Event of War.

This is an unresolved problem which has been the subject of con-

siderable discussion, one aspect of which is covered by Tabs F and G
attached. It may of course require urgent consideration at any time.

7. Conclusion.

Solution of the above problems lies in a grant of adequate authority

to the DCI and CIA, and use of that authority to achieve the necessary

The Intelligence Community 31

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coordination by direction rather than placing reliance in a spirit of co-
operation and good will.

INDEX OF TABS

Tab A

— CIA proposed revision of NSCID #1. This directive is be-

lieved by CIA to be necessary to give the Director the au-
thority needed for exercise of his responsibilities. It has
been forwarded to State for discussion, but no further ac-
tion has been taken on it.

Tab B

— Proposed “Memorandum to the National Security Coun-

cil,” which elaborates paragraphs 1–3 set forth in the
memorandum above. This was prepared several months
ago as an introduction to CIA’s proposed revision to
NSCID #1, included herewith under Tab A.

Tab C

— National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID)

#1, under which CIA presently operates.

Tab D

— Memorandum entitled “Legal Responsibilities of the Cen-

tral Intelligence Agency”, which emphasizes particularly
Congressional intent in regard to the national intelligence
mission.

Tab E

— Current State/Defense proposals for reorganization of in-

telligence production within CIA. A compromise version
of this paper is still under discussion.

Tab E/1 — Compromise now urged by State/Defense thru Gen.

Magruder.

Tab F

— Joint Intelligence Committee report on war time status

and responsibilities of CIA and its field agencies (JIC
455/1, 12 July 1950). This indicates an intention on the
part of the JIC to have JCS take over control of all covert
activities in the event of war.

Tab G

— Memorandum for Brig. Gen. John Magruder, dated 16 Au-

gust 1950, setting forth CIA’s position on its war time re-
lations to the Joint Chiefs. This memorandum was origi-
nally drafted for dispatch to the Secretary of Defense and
was actually dispatched to General Magruder.

32 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Docu-

ment 432.

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24.

Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant
for Intelligence and Research (Armstrong) to the Under
Secretary of State (Webb)

Washington, September 14, 1950.

SUBJECT

Review of Relations with CIA

The purpose of this review is twofold:
1. To give you a general roundup of the state of our relations with

the CIA at this juncture, as a new Director is coming in;

2. To ascertain which, if any, issues should be discussed with Ad-

miral Hillenkoetter as a result of your letter,

written just prior to your

departure for Europe, in which you suggested getting together with
him to take up any problems which exist in relation to one particular
phase of the Department’s relations with CIA, namely, secret intelli-
gence [

1 line not declassified

Any review such as this naturally focuses on areas of difficulty;

these, however, must be kept in the perspective of our total relations
which in a great number of areas are on the whole satisfactory. In this
connection it should be pointed out that the Department’s relations
with CIA on the following important matters are of the best:

Defectors

—each case invariably presents a knotty problem, but

in the course of the last six months they have been smoothly and
cooperatively dealt with by the Department, CIA, and the Military
Services.

Foreign Broadcast Monitoring

—an important “service of common

concern” in which CIA produces for the Department and other agen-
cies a vast quantity of voice monitoring reports.

Scientific Intelligence

—A “service of common concern” and also

a coordinating mechanism in which CIA’s performance has been good.
This office also works very closely with U/A, Mr. Arneson.

The Intelligence Community 33

Source: Department of State, A/MS Files: Lot 54 D 291, CIA 1948–1952. Top Secret.

The memorandum was under cover of a September 19 memorandum from C.E. Johnson
of the Management Staff of the Bureau of Administration to Humelsine, which indicates
that a September 20 meeting was scheduled among Webb, Humelsine, Armstrong, and
Howe to review relations with the CIA and Johnson’s recommendations for changes in the
proposed memorandum to Webb. Johnson recommended adding a statement on the in-
adequacy of CIA’s intelligence collection and production. He further wanted to delete the
reference to showing the memorandum to Smith, preferring this be conveyed to Webb
orally. He also believed Smith should be invited to the Department for the meeting and
briefed on the Department of State role in and capabilities for intelligence.

Not found.

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Contacts Branch

—again a “service of common concern” in which

CIA exploits the foreign intelligence available in the US through con-
tacts with foreign nationality groups and individuals and US business
firms with representatives abroad.

I should point out also that whereas the problems which I shall

discuss below are focused primarily in OSO (secret intelligence) and
ORE (research intelligence) it should not be construed that trouble ex-
ists with these offices on all points. Rather, there is a wide area of co-
operative effort and useful collaboration and liaison with only a few,
if significant, areas of disagreement on policy or method.

By way of general comment I would like to indicate that there are

two factors in CIA attitude and method which we find difficult to deal
with and which are often a source of misunderstanding:

a. CIA is reluctant to give us full information—especially volun-

tarily, but even after request. This applies to some intelligence infor-

mation and also to activities in which they participate. In this it is our

view that they carry security too far, or use security as an excuse for

withholding information.

Similarly, we find CIA reluctant to come to us directly with their

problems, to identify issues and seek solutions directly. We get com-

plaints, but we find an unhealthy lack of direct approach to us by sen-

ior officers seeking constructive solutions to problems large and small

which inevitably arise.

The following outline summarizes the points of difficulty, present

and potential, in our relations with CIA.

I. Coordination of Intelligence Activities.

The Department has long felt that CIA has been deficient in ful-

filling its responsibilities for leadership and direction in the coordina-
tion of intelligence throughout the Government. This responsibility
within CIA is fulfilled essentially by two mechanisms:

a. The Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) composed of the

Chiefs of each of the intelligence services, advisory to the Director.

b. A staff office (COAPS) composed of officers contributed by the

various agencies and headed by a State Department officer, responsi-

ble to the Director and charged with formulating any procedures for

the coordination of intelligence activities.

The Department is confident that change for the better can be an-

ticipated not only by virtue of the new Director who will assume the
chairmanship of the IAC and should fulfill the leadership expected of
the Director of CIA in coordination matters, but also through the ap-
pointment of James Q. Reber as the State Department officer in charge
of COAPS, who will also be Executive Secretary of the IAC.

I believe that no useful purpose would be served by discussion of

this matter with the outgoing Director.

34 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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II. Intelligence Collection Programs.

This problem, which has very wide implications and is pointed

up by the Korean incident, is discussed in a separate, accompanying
memorandum.

No useful purpose would be served by a discussion of the matter

at this time with the Director.

III. Research Intelligence and “National Intelligence.”

The difficulties which have arisen between the Department and

CIA in this area stem from divergence of views as to the nature of “na-
tional intelligence” and the method of producing it on the one hand,
and, on the other, a conflict of ideas on the location of responsibility in
the Department and CIA for the production of research intelligence in
the political and economic fields. The latter of these two problems is
perennial and may in some measure be clarified with a solution to the
problem of national intelligence. In any event, the steps necessary to
bring this problem to a solution will only come in time and should be
improved with the arrival of the new Director.

Some advance has been made in the problem of “national intelli-

gence” which was sharpened by your exchange of letters with Admi-
ral Hillenkoetter on the joint State-Defense proposal. General Magruder
has made a preliminary exploration with Admiral Hillenkoetter and
believes that an area of agreement may be possible.

Pending the outcome of these negotiations and the installation of

the new Director on whose decision any final revision will depend, I
believe no useful purpose would be served in raising this matter with
Admiral Hillenkoetter.

IV. Organization for Secret Intelligence (OSO) and Secret

Operations (OPC).

You will remember that some months ago general agreement was

reached between the Department of Defense, CIA/OSO, CIA/OPC,
and ourselves on a reorganization which would combine OSO and OPC
and would take the form of an NSC directive (proposed NSC 10/3).

Further action on this document, however, was delayed pending a so-
lution to the problem of personnel involved in the reorganization and
now must await the new Director for action and implementation.

No useful purpose, therefore, would be served by discussions on

this matter with Admiral Hillenkoetter. However, you should know

The Intelligence Community 35

Dated September 14; attached but not printed.

Further information on the proposed merger is in

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950,

Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 419. The draft NSC 10/3 is
printed as an attachment to that document.

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that although there is no disagreement as between the Departments of
State and Defense and CIA on this question, the Defense Department is
currently considering a revision of authorities for wartime with respect
both to OSO and OPC activities, and this may present some difficulties.

[

Heading and 10 paragraphs (49 lines) not declassified

]

VI. CIA Budget.

Each year the CIA submits an over-all budget figure to the NSC

prior to submission to the Bureau of the Budget. It appears that over
the course of the last few years no agency—neither the NSC nor the
Budget Bureau nor the Office of the President, nor, for that matter, Con-
gressional committees—examines the CIA budget with any thorough-
ness to warrant assumption of the responsibility for approval.

At best it is a very difficult matter to determine what degree of re-

view should be made of the CIA budget to bring about a balance be-
tween the security factors which are obviously involved on the one
hand, and the minimum requirements for assumption of responsibil-
ity by the Secretaries of State and Defense in the NSC, on the other.

Last year at your suggestion General Magruder and Halaby for De-

fense, and Sheppard and Howe for the State Department, were given
an informal presentation of the budget programs for some of the offices
of CIA. This was an initial step on the part of the NSC to form a basis
for judgment for approval of the budget. Since that time an effort has
been made by the Departments of State and Defense to arrive at a for-
mula for an annual review of the budget. Consideration was given, for
instance, to the possibility of appointing each year a special ad hoc high
level group under the NSC for this specific purpose. More acceptable
seems the possibility that the Director submit to the IAC on a secure
basis for its comment the budget programs of the several CIA offices so
that the NSC would at least have the benefit of the IAC advice.

This problem has advanced no further and almost surely should

await the installation of the new Director and a new look at the prob-
lem with him. (As yet no discussions on this subject have been held
with CIA itself.) In the meantime, no purpose would seem to be served
in a discussion of the problem with Admiral Hillenkoetter.

General Conclusion.

1. The Department’s relations with CIA are, with some exceptions,

satisfactory.

2. The areas of difficultly are by no means impossible of solution

and most, if not all, should be soluble with the new Director.

3. Although you asked to have a meeting with Admiral Hil-

lenkoetter on your return, we know of no problems between the agen-
cies which are of a kind that can be solved by such a discussion.

36 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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Recommendations:

1. That you take the opportunity to ask Admiral Hillenkoetter if he

has any matters he wants to discuss, but you do not press for a meeting.

2. That you consider showing this memorandum to General Smith

on a personal and informal basis soon after he takes office.

W. Park Armstrong, Jr.

A handwritten comment in the margin just below this paragraph reads, “Is this

adequate?”

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

25.

Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 4/2

Washington, September 28, 1950.

PRIORITY LIST OF CRITICAL NATIONAL

INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES

In accordance with DCI 4/1,

paragraph 3, the following list of

critical national intelligence objectives, with respect to the USSR, is es-
tablished; so the highest priority shall be given to the collection of in-
formation and to the production of intelligence concerning Soviet ca-
pabilities and intentions for:

1. taking direct military action against the Continental United States;
2. taking direct military action, employing USSR Armed Forces,

against vital U.S. possessions, areas peripheral to the Soviet Union, and
Western Europe;

3. interfering with U.S. strategic air attack;
4. interfering with U.S. movement of men and material by water

transport;

5. production and stockpiling, including location of installations

and facilities, of atomic and related weapons, other critical weapons
and equipment, and critical transportation equipment;

The Intelligence Community 37

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Operations, Job 78–04513R,

Folder 35, Box 2. Secret.

Not printed. (Ibid., History Staff, Job 84–B00389R, Box 4)

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6. creating situations anywhere in the world dangerous to U.S. na-

tional security, short of commitment of Soviet Armed Forces, includ-
ing foreign directed sabotage and espionage objectives;

7. interfering with U.S. political, psychological, and economic

courses of action for the achievement of critical U.S. aims and objectives.

R. H. Hillenkoetter

Rear Admiral, USN

Director of Central Intelligence

26.

Memorandum From [

name not declassified

] of the Office

of Policy Coordination of the Central Intelligence
Agency to Thomas A. Parrott of the Office of Policy
Coordination

Washington, October 10, 1950.

SUBJECT

Quarterly PW Guidance Report

1. Psychological warfare policy guidance for OPC activities was

received from two principal sources during the past quarter. Much of
this guidance came from the OPC Consultants, while some was re-
ceived from the National Psychological Strategy Board (formerly the
Interdepartmental Foreign Information Organization, on which OPC
functioned in consultant status).

2. From the OPC Consultants, the following guidance was given

OPC in matters of Psychological Warfare:

a. At the meeting of 9 August 1950, Mr. Joyce (State) agreed with

the opinion that OPC should no longer engage in [

less than 1 line not

declassified

] motion pictures. He stated that this should be treated as an

overt matter and that such matters would be handled elsewhere.

b. On the same date, it was agreed that any possible use of

propaganda balloons [

less than 1 line not declassified

] should not be

publicized.

38 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Operations, Job 80–01795R,

Box 3. Top Secret.

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c. On 23 August 1950, the consultants agreed that there was no

objection on policy grounds to OPC proposals for the use of balloons
from time to time [

less than 1 line not declassified

d. At the meeting of 13 September 1950, Admiral Stevens (JSPD)

cautioned against any attempt to use Navy vessels as cover for [

less

than 1 line not declassified

] psychological warfare operations. He stated

that the Navy could furnish technical advice as to the feasibility of
water-borne operations but that no warships would be made available
for this purpose.

e. On 20 September 1950 the consultants stated that in planning

and executing covert psychological warfare operations OPC should
consider decisions of the National Psychological Strategy Board as con-
stituting governing policy.

f. Again on 20 September, Mr. Hulick (OPC) referred to a recent

decision of the National Psychological Strategy Board to the effect that
balloons other than those of the toy variety would not be used for overt
or covert propaganda against Iron Curtain countries without prior spe-
cific permission from the Board. Such a medium will be reserved for a
particularly important message. It was stated that this policy is by no
means irrevocable and that proposals for OPC action in this field would
be considered on their merits.

3. Guidance received from the National Psychological Strategy

Board:

a. On 14 July 1950, Mr. Barrett (State) announced the formation of

an ad hoc coordinating group composed of State, Army, Navy, Air Force,
and JSPD members, chaired by Mr. Jos. Phillips, State. This group was
to coordinate information policy guidance in connection with the Ko-
rean situation. OPC made arrangements to have a member present at
the ad hoc meetings, and overt guidance discussed therein was turned
later into general materials for OPC Area Divisions. Guidance received
at meetings for this inter-service group was indirect and irregular, and
only used when appropriate to OPC methods and channels.

b. At the same meeting of 14 July, Mr. Wisner (OPC) referred to a

decision, approved by the Department of State, to permit the National
Committee for Free Europe to use certain material attributing respon-
sibility of the Korean situation to the Soviets.

c. On Tuesday, 15 August 1950, the Board discussed attempts to

defeat the admission of Communist China to the Security Council. The
Board felt that [

less than 1 line not declassified

] propaganda identifying

Communist China participation in the Korean situation might be ex-
tremely effective in certain limited areas. Mr. Phillips (State) referred
to a suggestion that we might give circulation to reports or rumors
that the Soviets did not actually want to seat the Chinese Commu-
nists in the UN. Mr. Barrett (State) saw no objection to this on policy

The Intelligence Community 39

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grounds and undertook to review the policy question of limited covert
use.

d. On 21 August 1950, Mr. Barrett (State) reported the recom-

mendations of his department on identification of Chinese Communist
participation in the Korean war. Such action was approved. (See entry
above.)

e. At a special meeting of 13 September 1950, it was decided by

the Board that the use of balloons as a propaganda carrying medium
against the Iron Curtain countries would not at that time achieve any
important advantage; the potential value of balloons was decided to
have been sufficiently established to justify the further development
and stockpiling of balloons for use in an emergency or in time of war.
OPC was given the responsibility of doing so.

f. The [

less than 1 line not declassified

] was discussed on 18 Sep-

tember 1950, and Gen. Magruder (Defense) expressed the need for
handout materials explaining [

less than 1 line not declassified

] to the

public.

g. At the meeting of 25 September 1950, Mr. [

name not declassified

]

(OPC) was asked to comment on the progress of the balloon project,
and in doing so Mr. [

name not declassified

] requested authorization to

coordinate with ONR on research, which was agreed to. A uniform re-
ply to private inquiries re government use of balloons was agreed to:
“The matter is under continuous study by agencies of the government,
but disclosure of results at this time would not be in the public inter-
est.” The Board decided that utilization of large balloons would only
be desirable on extraordinary basis to seek to reach large numbers be-
hind the Curtain with important messages. The right of decision to use
them was held by the NPSB. The Board further indicated at this time
that any use of balloons for propaganda purposes, whether large or
small (toy variety) would be a matter falling under its jurisdiction, and
that such uses should be for Board decision. In view of the present sit-
uation, OPC was admonished to procure balloons for these purposes
simultaneously with the fostering of training of personnel, additional
research and experimentation. [

⁄

lines not declassified

]

[

name not declassified

]

40 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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27.

Memorandum From Theodore Babbitt, Ludwell Montague,
and Forrest Van Slyck of the Office of Research and
Evaluation of the Central Intelligence Agency to the Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence (Jackson)

Washington, October 10, 1950.

SUBJECT

Plan for a CIA Office of Estimates

1. Pursuant to your oral instructions given on 7 October we sub-

mit, in Enclosure A, an outline plan for a CIA Office of Estimates.

2. The end in view cannot be accomplished by reorganization

within CIA alone. Successful implementation of this plan will require
complementary action to ensure adequate research support by the de-
partmental agencies and a cooperative attitude in the process of final
coordination of estimates. The plan should not be put into effect until
these requirements have been reasonably met.

3. Details of the structure and strength of the Office of Estimates

will depend to a considerable extent on the composition and capabil-
ities of the proposed Office of Research, as well as upon the degree of
research support which can be reasonably expected from the depart-
mental agencies, especially OIR. Consequently the elaboration of En-
closure A should be deferred until these matters are sufficiently clari-
fied to afford a sound basis for further planning.

4. Some concrete problems which will arise in the course of reor-

ganization with CIA and related negotiations with the IAC agencies
are set forth in Enclosure B.

The Intelligence Community 41

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff, Job 84–T00286R, Box 4, Folder

2. No classification marking. The memorandum is unsigned.

Not found.

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Enclosure A

ROUGH PLAN FOR AN OFFICE OF ESTIMATES

This plan is based on the concepts held in 1945–46 and more re-

cently set forth in the Dulles Report,

NSC 50,

and the “Webb Pro-

posals”.

One point must be made absolutely clear however, in order

to avoid the patent defects of a joint committee system. It must be un-
derstood by all concerned that the Director at his level and the
Assistant Director at his, having heard all the pertinent evidence and
argument, have a power of decision with respect to the form and con-
tent of the estimate, other interested parties retaining the right to record
divergent views when these relate to substantial issues and serve to in-
crease the reader’s comprehension of the problem, and then only.

The plan also presupposes:
a. The establishment of a Research Office in CIA to provide intel-

ligence research reports in fields of common concern (e.g., scientific,
economic, geographic).

b. Action to make sure of the availability of research support from

the departmental agencies adequate to meet the requirements of the
Estimates Office as to both timeliness and content. This condition can-
not be met at present.

c. The recruitment of requisite senior personnel as rapidly as pos-

sible. The contemplated Office cannot be adequately manned with per-
sonnel now in CIA.

d. Thorough indoctrination of the IAC agencies in the new, cooper-

ative concept, and a new start in relations with them. Initiation of the
plan in the atmosphere which now exists would very probably be taken
by them as an opportunity to impose on the partly imaginary CIA with
which they have long contended. This plan will not work except on a ba-
sis of mutual confidence and cooperation in the national interest.

Organization and Functions

Office of the Assistant Director

Assistant Director and Deputy Assistant Director
Coordination and Liaison Staff
Administrative Staff

42 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Confidential.

See

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment,

Document 358.

Ibid., Document 384.

Ibid., Documents 378, 380, and 404.

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Coordination and Liaison Staff

(For supporting argumentation see the

Annex to this Enclosure.)

A. Composition.

1. One full-time representative each designated by the IAC rep-

resentatives of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force respectively.

2. A similar representative of the CIA research office (or part-time

representation of each of its major components?).

3. CIA Staff Assistant, NSC Staff.
4. A similar CIA representative with OSD and JIG.
5. Executive Secretariat.

B. Functions.

1. In general, to represent the interest of their respective agencies

in the Estimates Office, and the interest of the Estimates Office in their
respective agencies.

2. Specifically, to assist the Assistant Director in:

a. Developing the estimates production program.

b. Formulating the terms of reference for particular estimates.

c. Formulating requests for research support and obtaining

prompt and effective compliance therewith.

d. Reviewing the estimates produced prior to their submission to

the Director and the IAC.

e. Securing IAC concurrence, or at least the formulation of dissent

in the light of joint consideration.

Administrative Staff

Personnel, fiscal, and administrative services.
Receipt and dissemination services.
Reproduction services.

Current Intelligence Division

Production of the Daily Summary.
Editing and publishing of other periodical reviews.
Custody of sensitive material.
Maintenance of situation room.
Maintenance of off-hours watch.

The Intelligence Community 43

Not printed.

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Five Regional Divisions: American, North Atlantic, East European,

Southern, and Far Eastern.

A. Composition

1. Senior analysts well qualified by aptitude and experience for

critical appraisal of current information and research data, for the per-
ception of emergent trends, and for interpretation of the significance
of current or anticipated developments. While every sort of expertise—
political, economic, military, and area—should be represented, the em-
phasis should be on appreciation of the effect of all factors in combi-
nation.

2. Integral research support for these senior analysts, to assist

them by keeping track of current developments, organizing research
data from various sources, doing leg work, and drafting under their
direction.

B. Functions

1. Surveillance of the developing situation, consultative guidance

of the Current Intelligence Division, and the initiation of research proj-
ects and of estimates as required.

2. Production of estimates falling within Divisional competence.
3. Provision of appropriate expert participation in task groups

formed to produce estimates of broader scope.

Functional Division

Provision of expertise (e.g., scientific, economic, geographic) as re-

quired on a functional rather than regional basis.

General Division

A very few analysts of broad competence rather than particular

specialization, to concern themselves with the interrelationship of
developments falling within the cognizance of two or more divisions
and to provide leadership for task groups set up to deal with such
problems.

44 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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28.

Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Webb) to
the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council
(Lay)

Washington, October 17, 1950.

SUBJECT

Second Progress Report on NSC 59/1 “The Foreign Information Program and
Psychological Warfare Planning”

NSC 59/1 was approved as Government policy on March 10, 1950.

It is requested that this Progress Report as of September 30, 1950, be
circulated to the members of the Council for their information.

With the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, the Secretary of State took

immediate steps to meet the urgent requirements of the situation. These
steps included:

(1) the issuance of public policy guidance for all U. S. Government

information media on Korea;

(2) the establishment within the Department of State of an ad hoc

interdepartmental group to facilitate rapid coordination, especially be-

tween the Department of State and the Department of Defense, of psy-

chological warfare policy matters in connection with the Korea situation;

(3) the establishment of communications with Toyko, with the De-

partment of the Army as executive agent, and transmission to CINCFE

of numerous suggestions for increasing the effectiveness of our psy-

chological warfare effort in Korea;

(4) the assignment to the psychological warfare section estab-

lished by General MacArthur in G–2 of Department of State informa-

tion specialists normally attached to the information staff of Ambas-

sador Muccio

in Korea.

In order to meet the requirements of further situations in which

joint political and military action is required in the psychological war-
fare field, the Secretary of State took action to strengthen the existing
organization under NSC 59/1.

With the concurrence of the Interdepartmental Foreign Informa-

tion Organization, the Department of State on August 16, announced
the establishment of a national psychological strategy board to carry

The Intelligence Community 45

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66 D 148, Psychological

Warfare. Secret. This memorandum was circulated by Lay on October 17 as a National
Security Council Progress Report. (Ibid.)

For text of NSC 59/1, see Document 2; the text of the first progress report on NSC

59/1, June 21, is in the National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66 D 148, Psycho-
logical Warfare.

Ambassador to Korea John J. Muccio.

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out the functions assigned to the present Organization as established
under NSC 59/1.

Instead of serving simply as policy consultants, the

representatives of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
the Director of Central Intelligence are meeting regularly each week as
members of the Board with the Assistant Secretary of State for Public
Affairs as Chairman. Liaison representatives from the National Secu-
rity Resources Board and the Economic Cooperation Administration
are also meeting with the Board. A liaison representative from the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency will be available to attend Board meetings as
required for intelligence matters. In addition to the responsibilities laid
down in NSC 59/1, the Secretary of State is looking to the Board for
concrete advice on both policy and operating problems in current sit-
uations where joint political and military action is required in the psy-
chological warfare field.

The Board has taken action on a report forwarded by the Interde-

partmental Foreign Information Staff (IFIS) on August 16, recom-
mending adequate research and development on balloons for possible
use as an alternative means of reaching the Soviet Union in the event
of war or in the absence of diplomatic relations. The Central Intelli-
gence Agency has been requested to arrange for the development
and stocking of suitable types of balloons for possible use in emergency
or war.

Other IFIS reports considered by the Organization include one on

training of personnel for psychological warfare and foreign information.

The report prepared by the Organization on a Plan for Psycho-

logical Warfare was transmitted to the Executive Secretary, National
Security Council on July 7, 1950.

This report has been distributed for

consideration by the NSC and is now under study by the interested
Departments and Agencies.

James E. Webb

46 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Reference is to the National Psychological Strategy Board; see Document 17. With

the establishment of the Psychological Strategy Board on April 4, 1951 (see Document
60), the National Psychological Strategy Board was redesignated the Psychological Op-
erations Coordinating Committee.

See Document 17.

Printed from a copy that indicates Webb signed the original.

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29.

Minutes of a Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Committee

IAC–M–1

Washington, October 20, 1950.

PARTICIPANTS

Director of Central Intelligence Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith, Presiding

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State
Major General R. J. Canine, acting for Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, Department

of the Army

Rear Admiral Felix L. Johnson, Director of Naval Intelligence
Major General Charles P. Cabell, Director of Intelligence, Headquarters,

United States Air Force

Dr. Walter F. Colby, Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy Commission
Brigadier General Vernon E. Megee, Deputy Director for Intelligence,

The Joint Staff

Mr. Meffert W. Kuhrtz, acting for Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau

of Investigation

ALSO PRESENT

Mr. William H. Jackson, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Fisher Howe, Department of State
Colonel Hamilton Howze, Department of the Army
Captain John M. Ocker, USN, Department of the Navy
Brigadier General E. Moore, Department of the Air Force
Dr. Malcolm C. Henderson, Atomic Energy Commission
Captain R. G. McCool, USN, The Joint Staff

1. The agenda of the meeting was “Policies and Procedures of the

Intelligence Advisory Committee.”

CIA Developments

2. In opening the meeting, General Smith gave a brief résumé of

some of the problems affecting the Central Intelligence Agency which
were deemed of interest to the members of the Intelligence Advisory
Committee. He referred specifically to certain drafts of proposed NSC
directives, which were under discussion at the time General Smith took
over the duties of Director of Central Intelligence between representa-
tives of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State and
the Department of Defense. In general, the drafts under discussion were
designed to implement NSC 50.

By agreement of the Director of

The Intelligence Community 47

Source: National Archives, RG 59, INR Files: Lot 59 D 27, IAC Minutes 11/9/1950–

12/20/1951, Box 71. Secret. No drafting information appears on the minutes. The meet-
ing was held in the Director’s Conference Room at the Central Intelligence Agency.

For text of NSC 50, see

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence

Establishment, Document 384.

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Central Intelligence, the Department of State and Department of De-
fense, further consideration of these drafts was terminated on the ba-
sis of General Smith’s assurance that NSC 50 constituted a sufficient
directive at the present time. General Smith stated that NSC 50, giving
effect in substance to the recommendations of the so-called Dulles Com-
mittee Report, had not yet been carried out by the Central Intelligence
Agency but that it was his intention promptly to carry out this direc-
tive except in one respect.

3. The exception related to the merger of the Office of Special Op-

erations, the Office of Policy Coordination, and the Contact Branch of
the Office of Operations. This merger was considered neither practical
nor advisable at this time. General Smith said he believed the coordi-
nation of these offices, as recommended by the Dulles Report and in-
corporated in the directive from the National Security Council, could
be achieved by more effective cooperation without actual merger. Gen-
eral Smith’s position in regard to this aspect of NSC 50 had been made
clear to the National Security Council at its meeting on 12 October 1950
and had been approved by the Council.

4. General Smith also stated that he had encountered another

problem in the Central Intelligence Agency which arose out of confu-
sion as to the position of the Office of Policy Coordination in relation
to the Central Intelligence Agency and to OPC’s guidance from the
Department of State and the Department of Defense. General Smith
said that he construed NSC 10/2,

though somewhat ambiguous, as

giving clear responsibility and authority to the Director of Central In-
telligence for the activities of the Office of Policy Coordination. He
said that guidance from the Department of State and the Department
of Defense was essential for the success of these operations and that,
as a matter of procedure, he was willing that such guidance be given
by representatives of the Department of State and the Department of
Defense directly to Mr. Wisner. However, Mr. Wisner would act un-
der the authority and subject to the control of the Director of Central
Intelligence, who, under NSC 10/2, was responsible for Mr. Wisner’s
operations.

Meetings of the IAC

5. In referring directly to the work of the Intelligence Advisory

Committee in the future, General Smith expressed his opinion that this
Committee should meet more often and for longer periods although,

48 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

The NSC meeting of October 12 is mentioned in Montague,

Walter Bedell Smith as

Director of Central Intelligence,

p. 66. Smith became DCI on October 7, 1950.

See

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment,

Document 292.

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as chairman, he would make every effort to keep the meetings as brief
as possible. He stated that the Intelligence Advisory Committee must
be geared for rapid cooperative work.

National Intelligence Estimates

6. In opening the subject of national intelligence estimates, Gen-

eral Smith read from a memorandum written by Mr. William H. Jack-
son, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, as follows:

The Responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency for National

Intelligence Estimates.

One of the principal duties assigned to the Central Intelligence

Agency “for the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of
the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of
national security” is “to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to
the national security, and provide for its appropriate dissemination.”
The Central Intelligence Agency is thus given the responsibility of see-
ing to it that the United States has adequate central machinery for the
examination and interpretation of intelligence so that the national se-
curity will not be jeopardized by failure to coordinate the best intelli-
gence opinion in the country, based on all available information.

Although the Act

provides that “the departments and other agen-

cies of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate,
and disseminate departmental intelligence,” the statute does not limit
the duties of the Central Intelligence Agency to correlate and evaluate
intelligence, except by the standard of “national security.”

The purport of the National Security Act can be understood and

justified in the light of the history and general objectives of the Act.
Behind the concept of a Central Intelligence Agency lay the necessity
not only for the coordination of diversified intelligence activities, and
for the performance by the central agency itself of certain services of
common usefulness, but also for the coordination of intelligence opin-
ion in the form of reports or estimates affecting generally the national
security as a whole.

The Act apparently gives the Central Intelligence Agency the in-

dependent right of producing national intelligence. As a practical mat-
ter, such estimates can be written only with the collaboration of experts
in many fields of intelligence and with the cooperation of several de-
partments and agencies of the Government. A national intelligence re-
port or estimate as assembled and produced by the Central Intelligence

The Intelligence Community 49

The full text of Jackson’s memorandum has not been found.

Reference is to the National Security Act of 1947 (P.L. 80–253), enacted July 26,

1947; 61 Stat. 495–510.

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Agency should reflect the coordination of the best intelligence opinion,
based on all available information. It should deal with topics of wide
scope relevant to the determination of basic policy, such as the assess-
ment of a country’s war potential, its preparedness for war, its strate-
gic capabilities and intentions, its vulnerability to various forms of di-
rect attack or indirect pressures. An intelligence estimate of such scope
would go beyond the competence of any single Department or Agency
of the Government. A major objective, then, in establishing the Central
Intelligence Agency was to provide the administrative machinery for
the coordination of intelligence opinion, for its assembly and review,
objectively and impartially, and for its expression in the form of esti-
mates of national scope and importance.

The concept of national intelligence estimates underlying the

statute is that of an authoritative interpretation and appraisal that will
serve as a firm guide to policy-makers and planners. A national intel-
ligence estimate should reflect the coordination of the best intelligence
opinion, with notation of and reasons for dissent in the instances when
there is not unanimity. It should be based on all available information
and be prepared with full knowledge of our own plans and in the light
of our own policy requirements. The estimate should be compiled and
assembled centrally by an agency whose objectivity and disinterested-
ness are not open to question. Its ultimate approval should rest upon
the collective judgment of the highest officials in the various intelli-
gence agencies. Finally, it should command recognition and respect
throughout the Government as the best available and presumably the
most authoritative intelligence estimate.

Although the task is made more difficult by a lack of general ac-

ceptance of the concept of national intelligence estimates in the Gov-
ernment, it is, nevertheless, the clear duty and responsibility of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency under the statute to assemble and produce
such coordinated and authoritative estimates.

7. There followed a discussion of the above excerpt from the mem-

orandum and there was general assent at the meeting to its statement
of the responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency for national in-
telligence estimates. General Smith stated that, in order to discharge
this responsibility, he proposed at the earliest possible time to set up
in the Central Intelligence Agency an Office of National Estimates. This
division, in his opinion, would become the heart of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency and of the national intelligence machinery. Services of
common concern, now performed in the present Office of Reports and
Estimates but not including the production of political intelligence,
would be placed in a separate office or division which might properly
be called the Office of Research and Reports. The latter would confine
its activities to the production of reports as a service of common con-
cern in fields assigned specifically by directives of the National Secu-

50 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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rity Council. It was pointed out by Mr. Jackson that the fact that the
Office of Reports and Estimates has in the past produced both national
estimates and miscellaneous reports in various fields, which could not
possibly be construed as national estimates, had blurred and confused
both the product and function of the Office of Reports and Estimates.
There has been insufficient differentiation between the form and the
coordination procedure in connection with the two products and in
their methods of production.

8. General Smith said that, as to the matter of form, in the future

intelligence estimates produced by the Central Intelligence Agency on
the basis of intelligence contributions from the various intelligence
agencies and concurred in or dissented from by the respective agen-
cies would be published under a cover showing plainly that the esti-
mate was a collective effort the result of which would be labeled as a
national intelligence estimate.

Action

9. After discussion the following procedural steps were agreed

upon in the production of national estimates:

a. The Intelligence Advisory Committee will adopt an intelligence

plan, or more specifically, a list of required national estimates in an or-

der of priority.

b. In the case of a particular estimate, a frame of reference and the

assumptions on which the estimate is based will be discussed and ap-

proved by the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

c. Work on the estimate will be referred in the first instance to the

Office of Reports and Estimates, or to the Office of National Estimates

when it is established in the Central Intelligence Agency, and the sev-

eral intelligence agencies will be consulted and a time-table fixed for

contributions to the national estimate within the fields of their respec-

tive interests.

d. On the basis of these contributions, the Central Intelligence

Agency will produce a first draft of the proposed national estimate.

e. This draft will be sent back to the agencies for comment and

modification and for further discussion if required. On the basis of such

comments and discussion, the Central Intelligence Agency will pro-

duce a second draft of the estimate.

f. This second, or later drafts if required, will be submitted to the

Intelligence Advisory Committee for final discussion, resolution of dif-

ferences and approval.

g. If differences cannot be resolved and approval obtained, the es-

timate will be published with notation of substantial dissent and rea-

sons therefor.

It was made clear by General Smith that this procedure would not

and could not be followed in the case of so-called “crisis estimates.” In
the event of need arising for a quick or crisis estimate, a procedure sim-
ilar to that used in the recent instance when the President called for a
series of estimates prior to his departure for the meeting with General

The Intelligence Community 51

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MacArthur would be followed.

That is, a special meeting of the In-

telligence Advisory Committee will be called and representatives of the
various intelligence agencies assigned at once to the production of a
draft of the required estimate for immediate submission to the Intelli-
gence Advisory Committee for discussion, revision and approval.

Agenda for the Next IAC Meeting

Action:

10. It was determined that at the next meeting of the Intelligence

Advisory Committee there would be discussion of national estimates
priorities and the frame of references and assumptions to form the ba-
sis of an intelligence estimate of the situation in Indo-China. It was also
agreed that at a future date General Smith will produce a paper for
submission to the Intelligence Advisory Committee indicating how the
Central Intelligence Agency will function in the theater of operation in
time of war. The next meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Committee
was scheduled for Wednesday, 25 October, 3:00 P.M.

The resultant Korean “estimates” are reprinted in Michael Warner, ed.,

The CIA

Under Harry Truman,

pp. 349–372.

30.

Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant
for Intelligence and Research (Armstrong) to Secretary of
State Acheson

Washington, October 23, 1950.

SUBJECT

NSC Consideration of CIA Budget

Annually the CIA has submitted for NSC approval a budget for

which it proposes to seek appropriation. This “budget” usually has
been stated simply as a total figure and, until last year, approved with-
out extensive consideration by the NSC or its staff.

52 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 50 Series.

Top Secret. This memorandum received the concurrence of Humelsine, Jessup, and
Matthews. Document 24 provides background on this issue.

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For the 1950–51 year representatives of State and Defense did re-

view in a cursory fashion the budget programs of several of the CIA
offices prior to NSC approval of the figure “for submission to the Bu-
reau of the Budget.” Subsequently, State and Defense gave some
thought to the difficult problem of how, without compromising the se-
curity of the Agency, to fulfill its responsibility by a more satisfactory
review of the CIA budget.

With the recent change in leadership in CIA, however, it no longer

seems appropriate to suggest that a detailed NSC examination of the
budget should take place; rather, there should be an indication that the
NSC and the Departments of State and Defense have confidence in the
new Director. It is quite likely that General Smith will volunteer to dis-
cuss some of his plans and programs with the Council.

Recommendations:

1. That the NSC approve the budget figure as submitted.
2. That, if appropriate and without indicating any lack of confi-

dence, you might suggest in the course of the discussions that it would
be helpful if General Smith, during the course of the year, would con-
sider the problem of how the NSC can best fulfill its responsibilities
with respect to the CIA budget and recommend procedures which
would permit the fulfillment of those responsibilities without com-
promising the security of his Agency.

31.

Memorandum for the Record by the Assistant Director
for Policy Coordination of the Central Intelligence
Agency (Wisner)

Washington, November 2, 1950.

SUBJECT

Relationship with ECA; conversations between top-ranking ECA and CIA
officials on 2 November 1950

1. This memorandum will record the highlights of a conference

which took place on Thursday 2 November between General Smith,

The Intelligence Community 53

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Operations, Job 80–01795R,

Box 3. Top Secret. Drafted on November 7.

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Mr. Jackson and the undersigned for CIA, and Messrs. Foster and
Bissell for ECA. At the outset of the meeting, I was requested by Gen-
eral Smith to summarize the history of the relationship which I pro-
ceeded to do by giving a brief but general chronological account of the
origin and development of our dealings with ECA, together with three
or four illustrations of the activities in which we have been jointly en-
gaged. At the conclusion of this résumé I emphasized our concern on
the score of security breaches and operational and other improprieties
as regards the use of counterpart funds. After giving a number of il-
lustrations of these unhappy developments and after referring to sev-
eral of the points made by Mr. Harriman in his most recent conversa-
tions with me, I stated that it seemed to me that there had been two
chief types of insecurity and that there were two methods which should
be employed in order to clear up as much of the difficulty as possible.

2. The two types of action which had given us concern and which

promise to create much more serious problems for all who are involved
unless they can be brought to an end are (a) loosetalk, i.e., the tendency
on the part of certain ECA labor and public relations people to talk about
matters which were none of their concern and with unauthorized peo-
ple; and (b) clumsy and dangerously insecure attempts on the part of
ECA labor and public relations officials [

less than 1 line not declassified

]. I

acknowledged that we might not have been entirely without fault our-
selves and I said that we had taken a number of steps to tighten up
within our own organization, but I said that it seemed that action was
in order on the part of Messrs. Foster and Bissell to clear up the diffi-
culties within ECA. It was agreed by Messrs. Foster and Bissell that these
actions should be taken and that as a first step fresh directives should
be prepared to all ECA personnel concerned, [

1 line not declassified

]. It

was further agreed that I should endeavor to work this out with Mr. Bis-
sell at an early meeting (meeting set for two P.M., 10 Nov 50)

[

2 lines

not declassified

3. [

1 paragraph (29 lines) not declassified

]

4. Mr. Foster then referred to a number of other projects which are

pending before him at the present time. He said that he had not ap-
proved these projects because he had not received enough information
about them to enable him to exercise his judgment. [

3 lines not declas-

sified

] He requested that further information be supplied to him on

these and the other projects before him and I agreed to furnish this in-
formation either to himself or in his absence to Mr. Bissell. (It seems to
me that either Mr. Foster has forgotten what we have told him or that

54 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

A handwritten note in the left margin reads, “Staff I to prepare draft.” Staff I was

part of OPC.

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we have not done a proper job of providing details—with a third pos-
sibility that Mr. Tappin may not have passed on to Mr. Foster the in-
formation which we have provided to him about the projects under
consideration.)

5. I inquired as to whether Mr. Bissell would be authorized to act

on matters of common concern, including the approval of projects in
the absence of Mr. Foster, who will be out of the country for about 5
weeks on a round-the-world tour. Mr. Foster acknowledged that Mr.
Bissell would have full authority in his absence. (Accordingly, we
should endeavor to clear these matters with Mr. Bissell at a very early
meeting and I should like to be reminded of this and provided with
the papers and a reasonable oral briefing. I consider this to be the re-
sponsibility of Colonel Taylor as to the pending projects.)

6. There were some very favorable comments made about the

progress of our [

less than 1 line not declassified

] operations and all agreed

that there was not only success here but immeasurable success in terms
of evident results. The situation as regards [

less than 1 line not declassi-

fied

] operations was acknowledged to be by no means as clear. When

called upon for an explanation of this, I said that the principal problem
arose from the fact that the leadership of the [

less than 1 line not declassi-

fied

] has been weak and vacillating and that it has not been possible to

press them as far as the [

less than 1 line not declassified

] have gone. I fur-

ther said that our approach had been more along the lines of building
up the younger and more vigorous elements [

less than 1 line not declassi-

fied

] and providing them with encouragement, guidance and funds for

specific projects. General Smith commented that we should continue
along this line especially that of building up vigorous younger ele-
ments—but that we should take our own independent soundings on the
[

less than 1 line not declassified

] situation at a very early date with a view

to reappraising the possibilities and reevaluating our efforts to date. It
might be that we have been too soft about the old leadership and that
we should undertake more stringent measures to move aside this lead-
ership in order to make way for the other and better elements. Mr Bis-
sell raised a question about the [

less than 1 line not declassified

] and Gen-

eral Smith replied that he did not think that they offered too promising
a medium but that they should be looked at again.

F.G.W.

The Intelligence Community 55

A handwritten notation in the left margin reads “SAA.” This referred the issue

to Wisner’s Special Assistant for Action Colonel Robert Taylor.

A handwritten notation in the left margin reads, “SAA.” A handwritten notation

in the right margin reads [

text not declassified

Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

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32.

Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Marshall to
Director of Central Intelligence Smith

Washington, November 27, 1950.

SUBJECT

Present Status of United States Intelligence

In the overall planning for our national security, an adequate and

timely intelligence capability is felt to be a first priority consideration.
In order to prevent strategic and tactical surprise we would wish to
have:

(a) A 7- to 10-day warning of the imminence of hostilities, during

which period our defense systems could be alerted and forces deployed

or positioned as required.

(b) Provide additional warnings at least 12 to 48 hours prior to the

initiation of hostilities which will indicate the location of bases on

which atomic attacks are mounted and which will report the approxi-

mate time of launching of these attacks.

The foregoing provisions are obviously beyond our capabilities

and possibly for a long time to come. However, they do provide a clear-
cut target toward which your agency and the Department of Defense
should point their intelligence efforts.

Satisfaction of these requirements necessitates detailed, compre-

hensive and continuing knowledge of the disposition, organization and
state of readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces and the supporting econ-
omy. The current basis of estimates concerning the Soviet armed forces
seems dangerously inadequate.

Because of the extraordinary security program of the Soviet Union

virtually no intelligence contribution to these requirements is available
through normal channels available to Service intelligence agencies.

In view of the basic requirement to prevent strategic and tactical

surprise, our limited capability to meet this requirement and the po-
tential for improvement of this capability through operations by the
Central Intelligence Agency within the USSR and the satellites, partic-
ularly in the covert and defector fields, the Department of Defense is
prepared to place support of CIA operations in these fields in Priority
One.

56 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Operations, Job 80–01795R,

Box 3. Top Secret.

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In view of the foregoing, a statement of your foreseeable quanti-

tative and qualitative requirements in as much detail as possible is re-
quested in order to enable the Department of Defense to arrange for
this support.

With special reference to the matter of military equipment it is fur-

ther requested that your requirements in this field be forwarded as
soon as possible and separately from the more general requirements in
support of the broader intelligence programs.

G. C. Marshall

Printed from a copy that indicates Marshall signed the original.

33.

Memorandum From the Assistant Director for Policy
Coordination of the Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner) to
Staff and Division Chiefs

Washington, November 29, 1950.

SUBJECT

Policy Governing the Conduct of OPC Operations Within the United States

The following policy is announced to guide all concerned in judg-

ing the appropriateness of engaging in a given activity within the
United States or its outlying possessions. This policy will not be con-
strued as an alteration of existing procedures for obtaining approval
to undertake a specific project or operation.

1. Basic Authority.

a. The following sources and limitations of authority are applica-

ble to the subject of this paper:

(1) Sec. 102(d), National Security Act of 1947:
“. . . Provided, that the agency [CIA]

shall have no police, sub-

poena, law-enforcement powers, or internal security functions. . . .”

The Intelligence Community 57

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Operations Job 80–01795R,

Box 3. Top Secret. Drafted in I/PR on November 21 and 24. All ellipses in the original.

Brackets in the original.

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(2) Excerpt from Memorandum of Agreement between ADPC and

FBI:

“. . . The Office of Policy Coordination recognizes the primary

responsibility of the FBI in the field of United States domestic
security. . . .”

(3) NSC 10/2:
OPC was created by NSC 10/2 (under the authority of Sec.

102(d)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947) to supplement the overt
foreign activities of the U.S. Government and to conduct covert oper-
ations in support of or to accomplish U.S. foreign policy objectives.
The term covert operations is defined as embracing all activities (ex-
clusive of operations to secure intelligence and of cover and decep-
tion for military operations) against hostile foreign states or groups or
in support of friendly foreign states or groups, which are conducted
so that any U.S. Government responsibility for them is not evident
and that if uncovered the responsibility therefor can be denied. For-
eign policy objectives are interpreted to be those objectives which are
established by the President (usually acting through the Secretary of
State) in pursuance of applicable laws, and enunciated and interpreted
through various regulations and pronouncements. OPC’s source for
determination of what is U.S. foreign policy at a given time is the De-
partment of State.

2. Interpretation.

a. General.

It is clear that by both law and charter OPC is precluded from en-

gaging in operations concerned with the domestic affairs of the United
States. OPC is authorized to conduct operations only against or in sup-
port of foreign states or elements thereof. Police, law-enforcement, and
internal security functions are responsibilities of other U.S. Govern-
ment agencies; OPC is bound by the presumption that these agencies
are performing their functions faithfully and effectively.

What may not be clear is whether OPC is authorized to engage in

operations within the United States against or in support of a foreign
state or group and in so doing support U.S. foreign policy objectives.
In many instances it might appear more practicable to carry out a given
operation in the United States than elsewhere. OPC is not expressly
authorized or forbidden by NSC 10/2 to conduct such operations.
However, it appears to have been the intent of the NSC that covert op-

58 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Not found.

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erations were only to be executed abroad (cf., purpose of establishing
OPC: “to supplement the overt

foreign activities

of the U.S. Govern-

ment” (underscoring supplied)). Moreover and more important, it
would be very difficult if not impossible to undertake covert opera-
tions in the United States in such a manner that “any U.S. Govern-
ment responsibility for them is not evident and that if uncovered
the U.S. Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for
them.” The U.S. Government has certain responsibilities under inter-
national law for acts committed within its jurisdiction which might
well make impossible disavowal of responsibility for a covert act
committed by OPC in the United States. For these reasons it is con-
sidered that only in the most exceptional circumstances will it be de-
sirable to propose operations which are to be executed within the
United States.

b. Auxiliary Activities.

It is also evident, however, that OPC does have occasion to carry

on certain activities within the United States. [

⁄

lines not declassified

]

The fact that these activities take place within the United States is, how-
ever, purely incidental to the main purpose of the OPC operation. The
essential element is that they are part of operations to be executed
abroad against hostile foreign states. Such activities have no other re-
lation to the domestic affairs of the United States than that they phys-
ically take place, for reasons of necessity, convenience, security, etc.,
within the United States. The determinant as to the propriety, from the
standpoint of OPC’s charter, of an OPC undertaking within the United
States is therefore the

objective

of the operation. The ultimate objective

of any proposed undertaking must clearly be to produce an effect upon
a foreign state or group. This effect may even be the ultimate recep-
tion abroad of an idea which has been produced and disseminated
within the United States. It is not appropriate to undertake any activ-
ity which has the objective or primary effect of influencing the foreign
or domestic policies of the United States, or of influencing the internal
security of the United States; or which has as its target a domestic group
in the United States.

c. Preliminary Activities.

There are certain other kinds of activity which OPC must carry on

within the United States which are incidental but necessary to the ex-
ecution of its substantive tasks. Some of these are self-evident and will
not be dealt with here (e.g., personnel recruitment, domestic liaison,
matériel procurement). Others are not so clearly defined and delineated
and consequently provide opportunity for misunderstanding. Among
these are:

[

1 paragraph (20 lines) not declassified

]

The Intelligence Community 59

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(2)

External Research

—Preliminary to launching some operations

it may be necessary to perform certain research or to acquire informa-
tion which is necessary for realistic planning. Since OPC is not a re-
search organization, it is often obliged to turn to external sources. The
employment of private individuals and organizations outside the Gov-
ernment is sometimes required. In this activity OPC will finance only
that research which (a) deals with matériel the need for which is es-
sential to OPC operations, and (b) can not be obtained from established
U.S. governmental research organizations. Here again, however, such
contacts with U.S. groups, and their utilization, is solely for the
support of OPC operations abroad.

(3)

Training

—Providing specialized training is an inherent pre-

requisite to the undertaking of many substantive activities. It is neces-
sary to give indoctrination training to staff personnel. It is necessary
to train staff agents and indigenous agents in doctrine and techniques
of secret operations. It may be desirable to train individuals or groups
of indigenous agents for execution of a particular clandestine opera-
tion. When it is more convenient and more practicable to do so, such
training will be administered in the United States.

There are other types of training which involve personnel not un-

der the permanent or complete control of OPC but which enable OPC
indirectly to execute operations abroad. The training of a selected group
of members of a foreign internal security service in anti-sabotage tech-
niques might enable OPC effectively to discharge a requirement for
protection of vital materials or installations in the country represented.
[

4 lines not declassified

] It is appropriate for OPC to provide these types

of training within the United States if (1) the

objective

of such training

is within the charter of OPC, and (2) the training can, for reasons of
convenience, security, control, or availability of facilities, most effec-
tively be provided within the United States. OPC can of course pro-
vide this training through its own or through other available facilities
where it is more desirable to do so.

(4)

Technological Research and Development

—In order that profi-

ciency in execution of operations and capabilities for new operations
may be constantly expanded, it is desirable to conduct research into
and to sponsor the development of new devices, weapons, and equip-
ment, including psychological warfare aids. It is necessary and appro-
priate to carry on this activity within the United States. In so doing,
however, OPC will insofar as practicable conduct research and devel-
opment through other Government agencies, OPC will not initiate re-
search or development directly through private organizations in the
United States, except where OPC has principal interest in the article to
be developed, and where it is demonstrably impracticable to work
through an established Government agency.

60 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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3. Chief, Staff III will promulgate this policy through appropriate

regulations.

Frank G. Wisner

A handwritten note in the margin next to paragraph 3 reads: “Done! see OPC Reg

50-15 dated 30 Nov 50. [

initials not declassified

] 30 Nov.” [

text not declassified

]

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

34.

Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of
State and the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, December 4, 1950.

I. Purpose

This agreement is entered into between the Department of State

(hereinafter referred to as the Department) and the Central Intelligence
Agency (hereinafter referred to as CIA), to make administrative pro-
visions for budget and finance procedures pertaining to the support of
overt assignments of personnel of the Department (including Foreign
Service personnel) to CIA Washington and field activities in the conti-
nental United States. This agreement also provides a basis for such
other budget and finance arrangements as may be mutually agreed
upon. This agreement does not cover those personnel details of a tem-
porary nature [

less than 1 line not declassified

], or regular interservice as-

signments as provided for in the Foreign Service Act, or other nonre-
imbursable assignments mutually agreed upon. This agreement will
cover all assignments of Departmental personnel now or hereafter
made to all CIA Washington and domestic field office activities unless
for security reasons appropriate officials determine that reimbursement
should be made under the terms of the “covert” arrangements. Ap-
pendices may be added or amendments made to this agreement to
cover other budget and finance arrangements of an overt nature as mu-
tually agreed upon in writing by appropriate officials of the Depart-
ment and CIA.

The Intelligence Community 61

Source: National Archives, RG 59, INR Historical Files: Lot 58 D 776, State–CIA

Relationship 1949–56, Box 2. Secret.

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II. Salaries

Advances will be made to the Department at the beginning of

each quarter. Such payments will be based upon the salary compen-
sation paid by the Department since other direct costs will be borne
by CIA. Quarterly estimates will be based on known and anticipated
needs for each quarter by grades, positions, and types of officials as-
signed. Adjustments will be made for over or under-payments for the
preceding quarter. Fourth quarter adjustments should not normally be
necessary.

III. Travel Arrangements

Any required temporary duty travel in the United States will be

covered by appropriate CIA authorizations and all expenses will be
paid to the officials concerned by CIA. Travel from overseas posts to
the continental United States prior to detail to CIA and, in the event of
assignment for overseas duty, the travel, salary, and other expenses in-
cident thereto will be handled under the terms of costs arrangements
consummated for such purposes.

IV. Liaison

Liaison between the Department of State and the Central Intelli-

gence Agency pertinent to this agreement shall be controlled at points
designated by each agency for policy clearance, administrative coor-
dination and implementation, and budgetary planning and reim-
bursement as follows:

a. The Policy Clearance Liaison Official shall be responsible for se-

curing or ensuring operation and policy clearance, and establishing se-

curity standards for each activity requiring administrative support, and

for advising the appropriate Administrative Liaison official thereon.

b. The Administrative Liaison Official of each Agency shall be re-

sponsible for intra-agency administrative coordination, implementa-

tion and maintenance of established security provisions.

c. The Budgetary and Finance Liaison Official shall be responsi-

ble for the establishment of cost factors, the transfer of funds between

62 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

In a November 2 letter to DCI Smith, Humelsine reaffirmed the Department’s li-

aison officers and agreed to establish an administrative control officer in the Office of
the Special Assistant, Intelligence and Research, “to coordinate Departmental adminis-
trative support to CIA on all covert and overt matters except those pertaining to OPC.”
(National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–54, 103.11/11–150) Deputy Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence Jackson’s letter to Humelsine, November 28, acceded to the Department
liaison arrangements, named the CIA liaison officials, and enclosed copies of the covert
and overt agreements for signature. (Ibid., 103.11/11–2850) The Department accepted the
CIA’s designated liaisons and signed each agreement. (Letter from Humelsine to Jack-
son, December 5; ibid., 103.11/12–550) The text of the December agreements has not been
found.

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Agencies, and the accomplishment of the necessary budgetary plan-

ning and allotment adjustments.

d. Additional liaison points at appropriate working levels may be

established at the discretion and under the control of the Administra-

tive Liaison Official.

e. Each Agency will determine if one or more officers will be des-

ignated to represent it in the discharge of the liaison responsibilities

listed in a, b, and c above.

W. H. Jackson

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

C. H. Humelsine

Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

Department of State

Printed from a copy that indicates the memorandum was signed by Jackson on

November 28, and Humelsine on December 4.

35.

Minutes of a Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory
Committee

IAC–M–10

Washington, December 7, 1950.

Director of Central Intelligence

Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith

Presiding

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State
Major General A. R. Bolling, Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, Department

of the Army

Rear Admiral Felix L. Johnson, Director of Naval Intelligence
Brigadier General Ernest B. Moore, acting for Director of Intelligence,

Headquarters, United States Air Force

Dr. Walter F. Colby, Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy Commission
Captain R. G. McCool, USN, acting for Deputy Director for Intelligence,

The Joint Staff

The Intelligence Community 63

Source: National Archives, RG 59, INR Historical Files: Lot 58 D 776, Office of Li-

braries and Intelligence Acquisition, 1950–51, Box 18. Top Secret. No drafting informa-
tion appears on the minutes. The meeting was held in the DCI’s Conference Room.

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Mr. Victor P. Keay, acting for Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of

Investigation

ALSO PRESENT

Mr. William H. Jackson, Central Intelligence Agency
Dr. William L. Langer, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. [

name not declassified

], Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. Ludwell Montague, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Allan Evans, Department of State
Mr. William C. Trueheart, Department of State
Colonel Hamilton H. Howze, Department of the Army
Dr. Samuel McKee, Jr., Department of the Army
Mr. Roy S. Tod, Department of the Army
Captain John M. Ocker, USN, Department of the Navy
Colonel Edward H. Porter, Department of the Air Force
Lieut. Colonel J. C. Marchant, Department of the Air Force
Mr. C. D. DeLoach, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Acting Secretary Mr. James Q. Reber, Central Intelligence Agency

[Omitted here is discussion of minutes of previous meetings, a

comparative study of U.S.–USSR military and industrial strength,
China, NSRB request for an estimate, and intelligence requirements re
Spitzbergen.]

Watch Committee Terms of Reference (IAC–D–6)

Action:

Agreed that there should be a single Watch Committee

in the Government properly operated with the full participation of the
IAC members. This Committee should be the Watch Committee cur-
rently located in the Pentagon and headed by General Weckerling. Gen-
eral Smith stated that the Watch Committee headed by the CIA should
be abolished and that the terms of reference before the members would,
therefore, not need to be acted upon. He requested General Bolling to
have distributed to the member agencies the terms of reference under
which the present Watch Committee in the Pentagon is operating and
arrange for such modification as may be necessary to provide the U.S.
Government the service required. General Smith stated that it was his
responsibility to see that there is an arrangement in the Government
for carrying out the functions of a Watch Committee, that he did not
consider it necessary for the CIA to head it, that this Committee should
serve the entire Government and should accordingly be fully sup-
ported. He said that he was prepared to provide such financial or other
support as was necessary for this Committee to fulfill his needs under
the statute. It was understood that teletype facilities already exist which

64 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Not found.

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would ensure communication necessary to meet the needs of the DCI
and the IAC members.

[Omitted here is discussion of the German Defector Exploitation

Center and crisis estimates on Germany, Iran, and Indochina.]

36.

Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Smith to
Secretary of Defense Marshall

Washington, December 26, 1950.

SUBJECT

Support Required by the Central Intelligence Agency from the Department
of Defense

REFERENCE

Your Memorandum dated 27 November 1950, Subject: Present Status of
United States Intelligence

1. This Agency will make a maximum effort and will coordinate

the collective efforts of all intelligence agencies toward attainment of
the objectives set forth in reference memorandum. Defense plans can-
not be based, however, on the assumption that timely warning of So-
viet attack can be assured.

2. The following is a general statement of the support needed by

the Central Intelligence Agency from the Department of Defense:

a. Assignment to CIA of one or two officers each from the Army,

Navy, and Air Force, well qualified to assist in preparing national in-
telligence estimates.

b. [

1 paragraph (7 lines) not declassified

]

c. [

1 paragraph (7 lines) not declassified

]

d. [

1 paragraph

(

2 lines) not declassified

]

e. [

1 paragraph (8 lines) not declassified

]

f. Clarification of the relationship between representatives of CIA

and the theater commanders in theaters of operations to insure that
details of operations, covert personnel, and other highly sensitive ma-
terial are known to a minimum number of individuals.

The Intelligence Community 65

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Operations, Job 80–01795R,

Box 3. Top Secret.

Document 32.

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g. Arrangements by which CIA will be kept fully informed of

those operational decisions and plans of the JCS which have a direct
or indirect bearing on the functions of CIA. For the present, we believe
that this would require providing this Agency, for carefully restricted
use, copies of JCS, JIC and other papers bearing upon the duties and
responsibilities of CIA.

h. Establishment of a permanent liaison between the JCS and ap-

propriate elements of CIA, including a method for furnishing advice
and guidance on essential elements of information which are consid-
ered of paramount importance for intelligence collection efforts.

3. The above are general statements of the requirements for the

Central Intelligence Agency and indicate the major principles on which
it is necessary to establish agreement between CIA and the JCS on the
methods of support of this Agency.

Walter B. Smith

Printed from a copy that indicates Smith signed the original.

37.

Memorandum by J. L. Barnard of the Bureau of European
Affairs

Washington, January 4, 1951.

PRODUCTION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

General Bedell Smith’s direction of CIA has resulted in a signifi-

cant change in that organization’s production of finished intelligence.
CIA is now in the business of producing what are called National In-
telligence Estimates along the lines laid down in NSC 50. These papers
are interdepartmental in character, designed to focus all available in-

66 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: National Archives, RG 59, INR Files: Lot 58 D 528, NIE Correspondence

VI, 1950–54. Confidential. The memorandum was prepared to provide information to
EUR on the production of National Intelligence Estimates. It was attached to a memo-
randum entitled “Background Paper for Mr. Armstrong’s Statement at UM on National
Intelligence Estimates.” After that meeting, held on January 5, Special Assistant for In-
telligence, W. Park Armstrong, Jr., circulated a list of completed and projected National
Intelligence Estimates to 20 senior officials in 20 different offices and bureaus of the De-
partment of State. (Ibid., Central Files 1950–54, 103.11/1–851)

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telligence on a problem of importance to the national security. In the
preparation of these Estimates, CIA is now relying on the State Depart-
ment, rather than its own staff, for political and economic intelligence,
the Department of the Army for military, etc., etc. A reorganization within
CIA is in process with the emphasis on quality rather than quantity of
personnel. CIA’s Office of Reports and Evaluation (ORE) is being elim-
inated so far as political intelligence is concerned, and a small top level
Office of National Estimates has been created to integrate the depart-
mental drafts for the approval of the Intelligence Advisory Committee
(IAC). (The IAC advises the Director of Central Intelligence and is made
up of the chiefs of intelligence of State, Army, Navy, Air, AEC, FBI, and
a representative from the Joint Staff in the Department of Defense.) Upon
approval by the IAC, the paper becomes a National Intelligence Estimate
and is sent by the Director of Central Intelligence to the President, ap-
propriate officers of Cabinet level, and the NSC.

What all this means to EUR is simply this: heretofore reports writ-

ten by CIA’s former evaluation office (ORE) were sent to the R area of
the Department for comment and concurrence or dissent. In this pro-
cedure, the Bureau’s role was gauged to the relatively minor impor-
tance of these papers. The R area checked with the Bureau to insure
that the Department was speaking with one voice, but the papers sel-
dom dealt with major issues.

With the new CIA product, however, it is obvious that Bureau par-

ticipation will be more important than it has been in the past. These
National Intelligence Estimates, as can be seen by the auspices under
which they are prepared and their eventual destination, carry consid-
erable weight. What the new CIA Office of National Estimates wants
and should have from State is the pooled intelligence of the Bureau
and R. This approach does not mean that the Bureau will have to do
any original drafting—such drafts will be prepared by the R area—but
it does mean that the Bureau will share the responsibility for making
State’s contribution.

In practice, the preparation of a National Intelligence Estimate

breaks down into the following steps: (1) the R area (OIR) prepares a
first draft of the political and/or economic section of the paper under
interdepartmental agreements as provided for in NSC 50; (2) these sec-
tions are then taken by the Office of National Estimates (CIA) and
worked into a draft of the whole paper; (3) this CIA draft is sent to the
contributing Departments for comment; (4) after consideration by the
Departments, it is further discussed in CIA by an interdepartmental
working group; (5) a final draft is then issued by CIA for approval by
the IAC.

Although the Bureau may, on occasion, be consulted at stage (1),

it will generally not enter the picture until stage (3) when the CIA draft

The Intelligence Community 67

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of the whole paper is sent to the Departments for comment and sug-
gestion. Stage (3) should be the beginning and the end of Bureau par-
ticipation, unless the draft is radically changed in the course of its fu-
ture development either in the working group discussion or the IAC
(see below). The Bureau will receive its copy for comment through the
Intelligence Adviser. Bureau comment may be made either in writing
to the Intelligence Adviser, or directly to the OIR personnel involved
(in which case the Intelligence Adviser should be informed). In the
event that the Bureau or OIR feel that further discussion is needed in
order to develop a unified Departmental position, they will notify the
Intelligence Adviser who will then arrange a meeting for a reconcilia-
tion of views. If there is a fundamental divergence of interpretation be-
tween the Bureau and R, this fact and the opposing arguments will be
presented to the Special Assistant for Intelligence who will follow the
accepted principles of action and review by referring the matter to
higher authority for a decision as to the Departmental position.

In this connection it should be noted that the Special Assistant

speaks for the Department in the IAC. This role has its complications.
The IAC, although formerly concerned almost exclusively with juris-
dictional matters, has now been transformed under General Smith’s
chairmanship into a substantive group, which means that there is con-
siderable give and take around the table before a final version of an
Estimate is approved. Should the Special Assistant feel that in his judg-
ment the final version is so changed by this give and take as to run
counter to the Departmental position, he can either ask time for fur-
ther consideration (in which case the Bureau will be apprised) or, if
time does not permit, he can publish the Departmental position as a
dissent in an appendix to the National Estimate.

Throughout this whole process, it must be recognized that once a

National Estimate draft is underway, the timing on deadlines for con-
tributions or comments is out of the hands of R. The Special Assistant
will attempt to have these deadlines made realistic, but the ultimate
decision as to their urgency rests with the IAC itself. Therefore, in or-
der to incorporate the Bureau’s views in this new and influential se-
ries of intelligence appraisals, it is essential that every effort be made
within EUR to meet the due dates specified.

It is hoped that the procedure cited above will not place too great

an additional burden on Bureau personnel, while, at the same time, it
will ensure that the Bureau’s role as a contributor of intelligence is be-
ing effectively played.

68 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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38.

Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence
Smith to the Executive Secretary of the National
Security Council (Lay)

Washington, January 8, 1951.

SUBJECT

Draft of NSC Directive on Covert Operations and Clandestine Activities

1. On 14 December 1950, at my request, the National Security

Council suspended paragraph 4 of NSC 10/2.

2. I am submitting herewith the draft of a directive for issuance

by the National Security Council which clearly defines the responsi-
bilities for covert operations and clandestine activities in peace or in
war.

This draft was prepared by representatives of this agency in con-

sultation with Rear Admiral Leslie Stevens from the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Brigadier General John Magruder from the Office of the Secre-
tary of Defense, and Mr. Robert Joyce from the Department of State.

3. It is my recommendation that this Directive be sent by the Na-

tional Security Council to the Departments of State and Defense and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment.

4. A related subject which needs clarification is the distinction

between covert operations such as may be planned and executed by
this agency, and guerrilla warfare conducted by regular forces. I have
directed that a paper on this subject be prepared for submission to
the NSC.

Walter B. Smith

The Intelligence Community 69

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff Job 83–00036R, Box 1. Secret.

The date is taken from an attached document summary.

NSC Action No. 400, approved December 14, 1950, suspended the provisions of

paragraph 4 of NSC 10/2, at the request of the Director of Central Intelligence, until the
issuance of a further directive. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files:
Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

The attachment printed below is a draft of NSC 10/3; see footnote 2, Document 42.

Printed from a copy that indicates Smith signed the original.

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Attachment

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVE

COVERT OPERATIONS AND CLANDESTINE

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. Under the authority of Section 102(d) (5) of the National Secu-

rity Act of 1947 the National Security Council hereby directs that:

2. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for the

planning, preparation and execution of covert operations and clan-
destine intelligence activities in peace or in war and for insuring that
such operations are planned and conducted in a manner consistent
with and in support of U.S. foreign and military policies and with overt
activities.

3. The following relationships shall prevail in wartime or in peace-

time in areas where U.S. military forces are engaged in combat:

a. The DCI shall coordinate covert operations and clandestine in-

telligence activities with the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and the appropriate non-military U.S. government departments
and agencies, and insure that plans for such activities are accepted by
JCS as being consistent with and complementary to approved plans for
wartime or emergency military operations.

b. Covert operations and clandestine intelligence activities in a

theater of military command shall come within the responsibility of
the theater commander and the DCI shall designate a senior represent-
ative to be on the General Staff of each theater commander concerned
with such operations and activities, responsible to the theater com-
mander through the Chief of Staff, to assist in the planning, direction
and command of such operations and activities. Policy direction and
control of the execution of such operations and activities in the theater
shall be through the JCS via the theater commander.

c. Theater commanders shall be advised of such covert operations

and clandestine intelligence activities as are based in their respective
areas but with objectives that transcend or do not directly affect the re-
sponsibilities of the respective theater commanders.

d. The DCI shall coordinate with the Secretary of State in order to

insure that plans and activities are consistent with the political strat-
egy and political operations and objectives of the United States.

e. In areas other than theaters of military operations, the senior

representative of the DCI shall keep the respective senior political rep-

70 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Secret.

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resentatives, in the countries concerned, generally advised of covert
operations and clandestine intelligence activities affecting the area of
their responsibility or based thereon, and shall obtain political guid-
ance from such representatives with respect thereto.

f. For reasons of security and adequate liaison, the DCI shall main-

tain independent communications with his representatives overseas,
including lateral communications between theaters. Arrangements for
such communications shall be coordinated with those of the military.

g. The Departments of State and Defense and the JCS shall pro-

vide continuous guidance and support of the DCI in planning covert
operations and clandestine intelligence activities and insure that such
operations and activities receive the necessary and appropriate
support.

4. As used herein clandestine intelligence includes espionage and

counterespionage; covert operations include guerrilla warfare (as de-
fined in NSC______), sabotage, covert demolitions, covert countersab-
otage, covert removal of personnel including escape and evasion evac-
uation and exfiltration, covert propaganda, covert political warfare and
covert economic warfare. Such operations do not include armed con-
flict by organized military forces or cover and deception for military
purposes.

5. The foregoing rescinds paragraph 4 of NSC 10/2 and all other

provisions of NSC 10/2 and NSCID–5

which may be inconsistent with

the provisions of this directive.

For text of NSCID No. 5, December 12, 1947, see

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950,

Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 423.

39.

Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Deputy
Special Assistant for Intelligence and Research (Howe)
to the Special Assistant for Intelligence and Research
(Armstrong)

Washington, January 9, 1951.

[Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 103.11/1–951. Se-

cret; R Distribution Only. 1 page not declassified.]

The Intelligence Community 71

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40.

Report by the Chairman of the Armed Forces Security
Agency Council (Stone) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

J.C.S. 2010/25

Washington, January 11, 1951.

SUCCESSION OF DIRECTORS, ARMED

FORCES SECURITY AGENCY

Reference: J.C.S. 2010

The Problem

1. In light of the directive in the Appendix to J.C.S. 2010,

to rec-

ommend a procedure by which the successors to the office of Director,
Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA), will be appointed.

Facts Bearing on the Problem and Discussion

2. Paragraph 2b of the Appendix to J.C.S. 2010 provides that a Flag

or General Officer of the Army, Navy, or Air Force be appointed by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff as Director, Armed Forces Security Agency, subject
to the approval of the Secretary of Defense. It further provides that the
Director’s normal tour of duty shall be two years, and that the direc-
torship be rotated among the Services. No procedure has yet been es-
tablished whereby successors to the Director, AFSA, will be appointed.

3. The first Director, AFSA, was nominated to the Joint Chiefs of

Staff by an ad hoc committee (appointed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff)
composed of two members from each of the three Services; his ap-
pointment was made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the approval of
the Secretary of Defense.

4. The first Director (Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone, U.S. Navy) took

office on 15 July 1949; his tour of duty will be completed on 15 July
1951.

5. A proposed procedure to determine the succession of Directors,

Armed Forces Security Agency, has been concurred in by the Armed
Forces Security Agency Council (Enclosure).

72 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: National Archives, RG 218, CCS 334 NSA (7–24–48) Sec. 4 (formerly 334

AFSA). Top Secret; Limited Distribution. A covering note from W.G. Lalor and L.K. Ladue
of the Joint Secretariat indicates that on January 19 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the
recommendations and the conclusion in JCS 2010/25 and issued the directive in the
enclosure.

Not found.

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Conclusion

6. It is concluded that a requirement exists for a definite proce-

dure to be established whereby the succession of Directors, Armed
Forces Security Agency, will be determined.

Recommedations

7. It is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

a. Approve the above conclusion.

Issue the directive in the Enclosure to the Chairman, Armed

Forces Security Agency Council.

Enclosure

DIRECTIVE FOR THE CHAIRMAN, ARMED FORCES

SECURITY AGENCY COUNCIL

SUBJECT

Procedures for Nominating and Appointing the Director, Armed Forces

Security Agency

1. An ad hoc committee of the Armed Forces Security Agency

Council (AFSAC), composed of two Flag or General Officer members
of each Service, shall convene on or about 1 February 1951 for the pur-
pose of nominating the second Director, Armed Forces Security Agency
(AFSA). The Army and the Air Force will indicate not later than 1 Feb-
ruary their General Officer candidate or candidates for the Office of
Director, who are considered to be suitably qualified, and available if
appointed. (The first and present Director is a Navy Flag Officer.)

2. This committee shall nominate one officer from among those

indicated as candidates by the Army and Air Force, and will report this
nomination to AFSAC for forwarding to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for ap-
propriate action, not later than 1 March 1951.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, upon approving the nomination, and

subject to the approval of the Secretary of Defense, will appoint that
General Officer to assume the duties of Director, AFSA, on or about 15
July 1951, for two years.

4. The third Director, AFSA, shall be a General Officer of the Serv-

ice not previously represented in this position.

5. Biennially thereafter, the succeeding Director of AFSA will

be from the appropriate Service, as determined by the rotation thus
established.

The Intelligence Community 73

Top Secret.

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41.

Airgram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic
Missions and Consulates

Washington, January 15, 1951, 2:15 p.m.

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEYS (NIS)

Reference is made to the Department’s unnumbered circular in-

struction dated November 5, 1948 entitled “National Intelligence Stud-
ies”.

In the above instruction the general outline of the program for

production of NIS was announced, and a brief description given, both
of the purpose of NIS, and the responsibilities of the Department in its
production. Since the issuance of this instruction, a number of chap-
ters and sections of NIS relating to various countries have been com-
pleted. Copies of these portions have regularly been forwarded to the
principal post in the area concerned under cover of Form DS–4.

The present international situation has emphasized and greatly in-

creased our requirements of both current and basic intelligence. The
present greater emphasis on current information is obviously in order,
but it must not obscure and completely supplant the collection and re-
porting of needed basic information. Planning and the establishment
of policy relative to national security require basic intelligence, too.
Therefore, where at all possible, increased attention should be devoted
to providing the basic information needed for the preparation of the
NIS and to filling in and bringing up-to-date chapters and sections
which have already been completed.

In preparing portions of NIS, every effort is made by the produc-

ing agency to utilize all pertinent information available in Washington.
It has been and will continue to be necessary, however, to request ad-
ditional data and information from Foreign Service posts. In some cases
it will be expedient to forward to the post concerned preliminary drafts
of sections for revision or correction and return to the Department.

It is, of course, very important that portions of NIS which have

been produced be revised and kept up-to-date. In the preparation of
occasional and voluntary reports, Foreign Service personnel are urged
to consult available NIS material, and wherever possible, endeavor to

74 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–54, 103.11/1–1551. Secret; R

Distribution Only. Drafted on January 5 by OLI/IAD: Theodore M. Nordbeck. Cleared
by R/NIS: John B. Appleton, EUR: John L. Barnard, FE: Cyrus Peake, NEA: Edwin M.
Wright, ARA: Hobart A. Spalding, GER: John R. Kennedy. The airgram was sent to 66
Embassies and Legations and 10 Consulates.

Not printed. (Ibid., 101.61/11–548)

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augment the information contained therein. Each NIS section and sub-
section concludes with a paragraph entitled “Comments on Principal
Sources”, which contains a brief survey of the information gaps and
weaknesses in the preceding section. These comments are a valuable
guide to the basic information which is currently not available in Wash-
ington and which should, if possible, be acquired and reported.

The Department, and the other agencies cooperating in the NIS

program, welcome and request comments and suggestions from the
field concerning NIS. It is requested that completed sections and sub-
sections forwarded to posts be brought to the attention of all appro-
priate personnel at the post.

Acheson

42.

Note From the Executive Secretary of the National Security
Council (Lay) to the National Security Council

NSC 10/4

Washington, January 16, 1951.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF CIA (OPC) WITH RESPECT TO

GUERRILLA WARFARE

References: NSC 10/2 and NSC 10/3

Upon the recommendation of the Acting Director of Central In-

telligence, his enclosed memorandum and its attached draft Directive
on the subject are circulated herewith for consideration by the National
Security Council.

As recommended in paragraph 3 of the enclosed memorandum,

the Departments of State and Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are
being requested to transmit to this office their respective comments for
Council consideration in connection with the enclosed draft Directive.

The Intelligence Community 75

Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s Secretary’s Files,

Subject File. Top Secret.

For text of NSC 10/2, see

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelli-

gence Establishment, Document 292. DCI Smith’s interpretation of NSC 10/2 as con-
veyed by Wisner to the Departments of State and Defense and JCS is printed in

The CIA

Under Harry Truman,

p. 347. A draft of NSC 10/3 is in

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emer-

gence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 419. Other versions are attachments
to Documents 38 and 43.

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It is requested that special security precautions be taken in the handling

of this matter.

James S. Lay, Jr.

Enclosure

Memorandum From Acting Director of Central Intelligence
Jackson to the Executive Secretary of the National Security
Council (Lay)

Washington, January 15, 1951.

SUBJECT

Draft of NSC Directive on Responsibilities of CIA (OPC) with Respect to

Guerrilla Warfare

1. Under date of January 8, 1951, the Director of Central Intelligence

transmitted to the Executive Secretary, National Security Council, a draft
NSC directive on covert operations and clandestine activities.

In para-

graph 4 of the memorandum of transmittal, which accompanied this
draft, he stated that a paper dealing with a related subject requiring NSC
clarification would shortly be submitted to the NSC.

2. Submitted herewith is the draft of a directive for issuance by

the NSC which defines and delimits the responsibilities of CIA (OPC)
with respect to guerrilla warfare. This draft was prepared in collabo-
ration with representatives of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. It is recommended that this draft be sent by the NSC to the De-

partments of State and Defense and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for con-
sideration and comment.

William H. Jackson

76 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Top Secret.

Document 38.

Printed from a copy that indicates Jackson signed the original.

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Enclosure

Washington, January 11, 1951.

DRAFT NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVE

RESPONSIBILITIES OF CIA (OPC) WITH RESPECT TO

GUERRILLA WARFARE

The Problem

1. To determine the appropriate responsibilities of CIA (OPC) in

the field of guerrilla warfare.

Definitions

2. For the purpose of this study the several types of military or

paramilitary forces which may be involved in armed conflict are de-
fined as follows:

National Military Forces.

Organized and uniformed military

elements which are organically components of a national military

establishment.

Guerrilla Forces.

Organized bodies of politically motivated and

predominantly indigenous irregulars, in or out of uniform, not organ-

ically a part of national military forces, trained and equipped for armed

conflict of specialized character and for limited objectives.

Underground Resistance Forces.

Politically motivated and pre-

dominantly indigenous individuals and groups organized and trained

clandestinely for covert subversive operations against the state and,

when opportunity offers, for semi-covert physical operations, includ-

ing armed conflict. In the latter stages, underground resistance move-

ments tend to become identical with guerrilla organizations.

Discussion

3. This study deals with the respective roles of the U.S. Military

Forces and CIA (OPC) in the exploitation of friendly guerrilla forces in
order to determine the responsibilities of CIA (OPC) in this field.

General Responsibilities of CIA (OPC) in Guerrilla Warfare

a. This organization is the national agency responsible under spec-

ified conditions for the “planning, preparation and execution” of the
various types of covert operations enumerated in NSC 10/2. Some of
these operations do not involve armed conflict and will not be dis-
cussed in this study. Some of the physical types of covert operations
might indirectly involve armed conflict but it is primarily in the field

The Intelligence Community 77

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of guerrilla warfare that responsibilities of CIA (OPC) and the national
military forces overlap.

b. The responsibility of CIA (OPC) with respect to guerrilla oper-

ations differs in peace and war. In peacetime, OPC formulates doctrine
and technique for utilization and employment of guerrilla warfare,
plans guerrilla warfare operations to be implemented in case of war in
response to and consistent with the requirements of the military au-
thorities, and within the limits of feasibility, makes the physical prepa-
rations necessary for such implementation. It foments, supports and
conducts only such peacetime guerrilla operations as may be author-
ized by the State Department with the approval of the Department of
Defense. In wartime, OPC implements plans previously prepared, and
continues the planning and execution of guerrilla warfare operations
within the framework of organization and command specified in
NSC______.

Characteristics and Capabilities of CIA (OPC) in Support of Guerrilla

Warfare

4. a. The covert operations of CIA (OPC) “do not include armed

conflict by organized military forces.” Therefore CIA (OPC) has no re-
sponsibility for the organization, training or operations of such units
as “Commandos,” “Rangers,” etc., which are in all respects organic
components of national military forces. This does not, however, pre-
vent mutual arrangements between the national military forces and
CIA (OPC) for employing the same facilities, when appropriate, for the
training of individuals or groups in subjects of common interest.

b. A distinguishing characteristic of guerrilla operations by CIA

(OPC) is the employment of relatively limited numbers of American
CIA (OPC) personnel. This consists of individual operatives and lead-
ers rather than large bodies of men. Such personnel, however, must
have specialized qualifications, including linguistic and political back-
ground, imagination, resourcefulness and initiative. They must have
access to clandestine intelligence sources. They will be concerned with
such intricate matters as establishing initial contacts with appropriate
leaders of underground or guerrilla forces in enemy territory, gaining
their confidence and developing their capabilities by furnishing com-
munications, weapons, equipment and training, and by exercising such
controls over their organization and operations as will insure that their
activities support U.S. political and military objectives.

c. These operations will generally be strategic rather than tactical

in nature. Initially and usually they will be deep in enemy territory
and will require special intelligence, communications and covert trans-

78 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

NSC 10/3, as approved. [Footnote in the original.]

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portation facilities. In the initial phases, the fomentation, development
and exploitation of indigenous underground and guerrilla forces
should be exclusively a responsibility of CIA (OPC). Without wasteful
duplication, the national military forces could not be expected to have
the assembled talent and flexibility of organization for such operations.

d. Most resistance activities and movements in their earlier stages

are covert in character, and have their origins in the successful estab-
lishment and operation of underground organizations. As they begin
to develop strength, these movements have a tendency to come out
into the open and under proper circumstances, including support by
the local population, favorable terrain, and assistance from the outside,
develop into organized resistance movements on a major scale. As-
suming the successful development of large-scale and relatively well
organized resistance movements behind enemy lines resulting from
successful covert operations or originating spontaneously, the control
and exploitation as well as the support and provisioning of such re-
sistance movements should become the responsibility of the theater
commanders whose interests are most directly affected or benefited.

e. However, such guerrilla movements never entirely lose their

covert characteristics in that they maintain contacts with underground
operatives located in cities and in or near centers of enemy control; and
moreover, in that they depend for their survival upon extreme mobility
and secrecy as to their location and movements as of any given time. Fi-
nally, they remain highly political in their nature and inspiration, and for
this as well as other reasons already mentioned, cannot be used against
all types of objectives and targets. It follows that even though control and
direction of large organized resistance movements should pass to the sen-
ior military commanders, there remains the necessity for close coopera-
tion by and assistance from those experienced in covert operations.

Responsibility of the National Military Forces in Unconventional Combat

Methods

5. a. As previously stated, guerrilla forces are not to be confused

with organizations such as “Commandos” and “Rangers”. These lat-
ter are organized by and are organically a part of the national military
forces. The combat operations of these types of units will often require
methods similar to those employed by guerrillas. The training of such
organizations will, in some respects, be analogous to that of guerrillas.
Their operations can best be described as employment of “unconven-
tional combat methods” by orthodox forces—unconventional only in
the sense that they have been little exploited in the American Military
Forces and are more flexible and adaptable to circumstances than those
of conventional combat units.

b. Independent Commando-type units can accomplish close-in or

distant raids for a variety of purposes. They may include airborne or

The Intelligence Community 79

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landing operations. Ranger-type units, organic to the division, consist
of specially equipped personnel trained in hand-to-hand combat,
furtive movement and individual resourcefulness in all situations. They
are adept at infiltration and disruptive tactics behind enemy lines. The
activity of these units is limited to the zone of combat of the parent di-
vision and is employed to assist the division in carrying out its spe-
cific missions. These units may at times employ local indigenous in-
habitants. While they employ tactics similar to guerrillas, neither
Commando nor Ranger operations are deemed to be guerrilla opera-
tions, and CIA (OPC) has no responsibility respecting them.

Responsibility of the National Military Forces in Guerrilla Warfare

6. a. The national military forces rarely, if ever, will be in posi-

tion to assume responsibility for the covert techniques required in fo-
menting guerrilla movements, establishing initial contacts with exist-
ing ones, and in the early development of the movements into
appreciable military assets. This is the mission of CIA (OPC) and that
agency should be afforded all feasible logistical support by the mili-
tary forces.

b. In wartime, a guerrilla movement having successfully been

built up to a certain magnitude, may require military direction and lo-
gistical support from an appropriate military commander similar to
that furnished regularly constituted forces under his command. Such
direction and support will exceed the resources of CIA (OPC). At this
time, control, exploitation and supply of the movement should be as-
sumed by or assigned to the appropriate military commander. Never-
theless, for reasons stated in paragraph 4–e, CIA (OPC) personnel
should either serve as, or continue to be a part of, the operating link
between that commander and the guerrilla forces.

In some cases a decision by the theater commander becomes nec-

essary as to whether or not command of the guerrillas should pass. In

a few cases, attended by profound political implications, consultation

in the matter of command will be advisable between the theater com-

mander and higher authority.

Conclusions

7. a. Guerrilla warfare is defined as the operations of organized

bodies of politically motivated and predominantly indigenous irregu-
lars, in or out of uniform, not organically a part of national military
forces, trained and equipped for armed conflict of specialized charac-
ter and for limited objectives.

b. CIA (OPC) is the agency of this Government which in peace-

time has the sole responsibility under specified conditions for the plan-
ning, preparation and conduct of guerrilla operations. In wartime CIA
(OPC) is responsible for continued planning and conduct of guerrilla

80 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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warfare, subject to the provisions of NSC______,

and in collaboration

with the national military forces as follows:

CIA (OPC) is responsible for the development of existing guerrilla

movements and the fomentation of new ones; and for the control and

support of guerrilla operations until their magnitude requires that such

control and support be passed to an appropriate military commander.

Such elements of CIA (OPC) as may be required should either serve

as, or continue to be a part of, the operating link between that com-

mander and the guerrilla forces.

Recommendations

8. That the National Security Council accept the Discussion as

guiding principles and approve the Conclusions.

NSC 10/4, as approved. [Footnote in the original. NSC 10/4 was withdrawn at

the request of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence following approval of NSC
10/5 on October 23 (see Document 90).]

43.

Memorandum From Robert P. Joyce of the Policy Planning
Staff to the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)

Washington, January 16, 1951.

SUBJECT

NSC 10/3

I think you will find the attached file

to be self-explanatory and

I believe that you will desire to review it before the Under Secretary
considers signing the attached draft memorandum addressed to Mr.
James S. Lay, Jr. The following considerations with respect to NSC 10/3
have been suggested to me within the Department:

1. The document as presently worded does not sufficiently as-

sert Department of State responsibility, authority and control over the
activities set forth in 10/3. Specifically paragraph 3a would seem to

The Intelligence Community 81

Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files: NSC 10 Series, 1951. Top Secret.

Joyce apparently clipped this memorandum to a file folder holding several doc-

uments on this topic. The folder has not been found.

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place complete control of covert operations and clandestine intelligence
activities within the JCS. Similarly the last sentence in paragraph 3b
reenforces JCS control. (In active military theatres)

2. Paragraph 3d then produces [

reduces

?] the “coordinating” role

of the Secretary of State vis-à-vis the Director of Central Intelligence in
Washington. It has been suggested that this coordinating role is insuf-
ficiently explicit and does not extend down to the theatre command-
ers through the JCS.

It has been suggested to me that the Department should ask for a

great deal more in that the roles between the Department and the Mil-
itary Establishment have now reached a point where the Department
of State is in a position to obtain a great deal more than this document
provides for. It was therefore suggested that the two alterations marked
on page 2 and page 3 of the draft 10/3 might now be included in the
Department’s comment requested by Mr. Lay.

I have the following comments to make:
1. General Smith and Allen W. Dulles feel that it is necessary at

this time to obtain for CIA what is set forth in 10/3. They both feel that
they have gone as far as possible in asserting CIA’s role vis-à-vis the
JCS in Washington and as related to theatre commanders. As long as
the present JCS position remains in its present state, nothing further
can be accomplished in increasing the responsibility and authority of
the CIA particularly in military theatres. As you know, General Smith
and Allen Dulles are presently in Tokyo in an endeavor to accomplish
something with General MacArthur and General Willoughby which
will make it possible for CIA to play some role in the intelligence field
in General MacArthur’s theatre. (Has his theatre ever been defined
geographically?)

2. The Director of Central Intelligence feels that if he tries to get

more than 10/3 calls for, he might end up by getting much less. In
other words, General Smith is prepared to settle for 10/3 as presently
drafted on the theory that this gives him enough to work out CIA’s
problems in the command structure given present thinking within the
JCS and the personalities of theatre commanders in time of war. Gen-
eral Smith does not feel that it would be wise at this time, in his en-
deavor to obtain the necessary degree of authority and control over
secret operations and clandestine activities, to engage in a jurisdictional
battle with the JCS which would raise basic issues, generate heat and

82 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

The parenthetical phrase was added by hand. References to paragraphs 3a and

3d under points 1 and 2 of this memorandum apparently refer to the earlier draft at-
tached to Document 38.

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conflict and probably result in jeopardizing what CIA now has and can
get in the present circumstances.

3. My own feeling is that the Department of State can probably

not go beyond the present language of draft NSC 10/3 in asserting
civilian responsibility and authority. General Magruder and Admiral
Stevens agree that this is a fact. General Magruder is an outstanding
exponent of the theory that war is too serious a business for the gen-
erals, is an extension of politics, etc., etc. He advises against the De-
partment’s trying to assert itself further than is now outlined in the
present draft and believes that if it did so the JCS would react violently,
and immediate conflict would develop and there would be little or no
hope of getting even what is set forth in the present language of 10/3.

I think it will be most useful if Messrs. Matthews and Webb could

have your comments on the foregoing.

Robert P. Joyce

Attachment

DRAFT NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVE

COVERT OPERATIONS AND CLANDESTINE

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1. Under the authority of Section 102(d)(5) of the National Secu-

rity Act of 1947, the National Security Council hereby directs that:

2. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for the

3. The DCI shall coordinate with the Secretary of State in order to

insure that plans and activities are consistent with the political strat-
egy and political operations and objectives of the United States.

4. In areas other than theaters of military operations, the senior

representative of the DCI shall keep the respective senior political rep-
resentatives, in the countries concerned, generally advised of covert

The Intelligence Community 83

A handwritten postscript by Joyce reads, “. . . Another consideration: If this Dept.

causes difficulties with the JCS which hold up indefinitely W.B. Smith’s new charter, he and
C.I.A., I think, will not appreciate this Dept’s role therein. RPJ.” Ellipsis in the original.

Top Secret.

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operations and clandestine intelligence activities affecting the area of
their responsibility or based thereon, and shall obtain political guid-
ance from such representatives with respect thereto.

5. The following relationships shall prevail in wartime or in peace-

time in areas where U.S. military forces are engaged in combat:

The DCI shall coordinate covert operations and clandestine in-

telligence activities with the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs

of Staff and the appropriate non-military U.S. Government depart-

ments and agencies, and insure that plans for such activities are ac-

cepted by JCS as being consistent with and complementary to approved

plans for wartime or emergency military operations.

b. Covert operations and clandestine intelligence activities in a

theater of military command shall come within the responsibility of

the theater commander and the DCI shall designate a senior represent-

ative to be on the General Staff of each theater commander concerned

with such operations and activities, responsible to the theater com-

mander through the Chief of Staff, to assist in the planning, direction

and command of such operations and activities. Policy direction and

control of the execution of such operations and activities in the theater

shall be through the JCS via the theater commander.

c. Theater commanders shall be advised of such covert operations

and clandestine intelligence activities as are based in their respective

areas but with objectives that transcend or do not directly affect the re-

sponsibilities of the respective theater commanders.

d. For reasons of security and adequate liaison, the DCI shall

maintain independent communications with his representatives over-

seas, including lateral communications between theaters. Arrange-

ments for such communications shall be coordinated with those of the

military.

6. The Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Na-

tional Security Resources Board, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall pro-
vide continuous guidance and support of the DCI in planning covert
operations and clandestine intelligence activities and insure that such
operations and activities receive the necessary and appropriate support.

7. As used herein clandestine intelligence includes espionage and

counterespionage; covert operations include guerilla warfare (as de-
fined in NSC______), sabotage, covert demolitions, covert countersab-
otage, covert removal of personnel including escape and evasion evac-
uation and exfiltration, covert propaganda, covert political warfare and
covert economic warfare. Such operations do not include armed
conflict by organized military forces or cover and deception for mili-
tary purposes.

8. The foregoing rescinds paragraph 4 of NSC 10/2 and all other

provisions of NSC 10/2 and NSCID No. 5 which may be inconsistent
with the provisions of this directive.

84 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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44.

Memorandum From Acting Director of Central Intelligence
Jackson to the Executive Secretary of the National Security
Council (Lay)

NSC 66/1

Washington, January 18, 1951.

SUBJECT

Intelligence Support for the Voice of America with regard to Soviet Jamming

1. Reference is made to my memorandum of 7 September 1950 on

the above subject,

forwarding the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee

on Voice of America Jamming, and noting that Recommendation 3 of
the Report regarding establishment of an additional monitoring facil-
ity would be referred to the United States Communications Intelligence
Board.

2. The Chairman of USCIB has now forwarded to me the attached

report

which recommends, in brief, that an additional monitoring fa-

cility be established under the operational direction of AFSA and de-
lineates the requirements in terms of facilities, personnel and equip-
ment for the establishment of such a facility. This USCIB report and its
recommendations have the unanimous approval of the IAC.

3. In the light of the USCIB report and further consideration of the

problem, the IAC now submits, for the consideration of the Council in
connection with NSC 66, the following final recommendations which
incorporate the recommendations of the USCIB report and the recom-
mendations of the earlier IAC report, appropriately revised:

That a readjustment of priorities among existing intelligence

tasks or a reallocation of the use of existing intelligence facilities should
not be undertaken.

That there should be established an additional monitoring ac-

tivity to obtain and provide information on current Soviet jamming ac-
tivities which will assist the VOA in its program and assist other U. S.
Government communications services in combatting present and fu-
ture Soviet radio interference, and that this additional monitoring ac-
tivity be established, coordinated and operated as follows:

The Intelligence Community 85

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 21, 1935–62, no label,

Box 115. Secret.

Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary subject: “Support for the Voice of Amer-

ica in the Fields of Intelligence and of Research and Development,” dated September 11,
1950. [Footnote in the original. This memorandum has not been found.]

Not found.

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(1) The initial program for this activity should be undertaken

along the lines suggested in Enclosure 2 of the USCIB Report of 28 No-

vember 1950.

(2) This activity should monitor and locate Russian jamming sig-

nals and other interfering transmitters and should convey promptly

and continuously to the VOA and other interested U. S. communica-

tions services such resulting information as will assist them to improve

their reception.

(3) This activity should not interfere with existing monitoring pro-

grams, particularly from the standpoint of equipment and personnel.

(4) This activity will be coordinated by CIA with existing non-

AFSA monitoring activities.

(5) In view of the COMINT aspects of this program, USCIB should

be assigned the function of general coordination of this activity. In the

performance of this function USCIB should be governed by the provi-

sions of NSCID No. 9.

(6) This activity should be placed under the operational direction

of AFSA, and appropriate provision should be made for Service pro-

curement of the necessary equipment and personnel.

c. That the CIA assume over-all responsibility to:

(1) Coordinate the collection of information concerning Russian

jamming from all sources.

(2) Serve as the collection point for this information and assure

that such of this information as will assist the VOA and other govern-

ment communications services to improve their reception on a daily

basis is passed promptly and continuously to these services. The CIA,

with the assistance of the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department

of State, should determine and establish such security arrangements

and channels of dissemination as may be required to pass this infor-

mation to the VOA; these arrangements and channels to be determined

in the light of materials made available.

(3) Undertake, in conjunction with the other intelligence agencies,

a coordinated program for the collation, evaluation and dissemination

of such information as will be useful in the long-range analysis of Russ-

ian radio interference and in the development of counter-measures.

W. H. Jackson

86 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Attached hereto. [Footnote in the original. Enclosure 2, IAC–D–11, is not attached.]

For text of NSCID No. 9, March 10, 1950, see

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emer-

gence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 435.

The President approved the recommendations on February 28. (Memorandum

from Lay to the National Security Council, February 28; National Archives, RG 59,
S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 21, 1935–62, no label, Box 115)

Printed from a copy that indicates Jackson signed the original.

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45.

Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the
Department of State (McWilliams) to the Deputy Under
Secretary of State for Administration (Humelsine)

Washington, January 19, 1951.

I am attaching herewith a copy of a draft directive on the national

psychological effort which was left with Mr. Webb by Mr. Souers today.

Mr. Webb informs me that Mr. Souers made a very strong plea that

we accept this arrangement, and it had been Souers’ desire to go di-
rect to the Secretary with this proposal.

Mr. Webb has asked me to put the paper into the proper hands for

staff study and presentation of recommendations to the Secretary. He
considers this a matter of urgency since Souers intends to go to the
President about this in a short time.

Mr. Webb specifically asked that you and Mr. Barrett collaborate

on the staff paper for the Secretary. I am forwarding this to you for ac-
tion with the request that you prepare a paper in coordination with Mr.
Barrett and such other offices as you might think necessary.

W.J. McWilliams

Attachment

Washington, January 18, 1951.

DRAFT DIRECTIVE ON THE NATIONAL

PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT

There is hereby established under the National Security Council a

Psychological Strategy Board responsible at the national level for psy-
chological policy formulation within the framework of approved na-
tional policies, and for coordination and evaluation of the national psy-
chological effort, including authority to issue policy guidance to all
departments and agencies of the Government executing major portions
of the psychological effort abroad:

The Board shall be composed of:
a. a full-time chairman, who shall be designated by the President

on the recommendation of the National Security Council, and who shall

The Intelligence Community 87

Source: National Archives, RG 59, P Files: Lot 52 D 432. Secret.

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Secret.

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be the head thereof and shall, subject to review by the National Secu-
rity Council at the request of any Council member, have the power of
decision upon matters falling within the jurisdiction of the Board;

b. one representative each of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of

Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence;

c. one representative each of the heads of such other departments

and agencies of the Government as may from time to time be deter-
mined by the Board.

In the event of an objection by any member of the National Secu-

rity Council to a decision of the Board or its Chairman, an effort shall
be made by the Council member and the Board, or its Chairman, to re-
solve the divergency prior to any consideration by the National Secu-
rity Council.

The Chairman of the Board, subject to the direction of the National

Security Council, shall be authorized to employ such consultants as
may be necessary and to organize a staff composed of individuals em-
ployed for this purpose and of individuals detailed from the partici-
pating departments and agencies.

The Board and its staff shall perform no psychological operations.

46.

Letter From the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
(Jackson) to the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant for
Intelligence and Research (Armstrong)

Washington, February 1, 1951.

Dear Mr. Armstrong:

As you know, General Smith has written to the Secretary of State

to indicate in broad terms how he envisions the allocation of certain
intelligence responsibilities, in line with National Security Council
Directives, as between the Department of State and the Central Intel-
ligence Agency. This letter was based on the principles agreed to in
our recent discussions on the responsibilities of the Department and

88 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: National Archives, RG 59, INR Historical Files: Lot 58 D 776, State–CIA

Relationship 1949–56. Confidential.

Dated February 1. (Ibid.)

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Central Intelligence Agency with reference to certain functions for-
merly performed in Central Intelligence Agency by the Office of
Reports and Estimates. To assist you in planning to meet the addi-
tional burden which will fall on the Department, I am outlining my
understanding of the agreements upon which General Smith’s letter
is based.

The Department has responsibility for intelligence research in the

political, cultural and sociological fields. The research work hitherto
performed in these fields by our former Office of Reports and Esti-
mates is discontinued and the Department will be responsible for meet-
ing the requests from all departments and agencies previously handled
by the Office of Reports and Estimates. This will include initiation of
requirements for intelligence collection and evaluation of raw infor-
mation reports in these fields. The Department will undoubtedly have
further demands on its resources arising from its increasing participa-
tion in the preparation of National Intelligence Estimates.

As a guide towards estimating the increased burden on the De-

partment, I might point out that Central Intelligence Agency is dis-
continuing, among other activities, the following:

1. Political research to meet the requests of the National Security

Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other departments and agencies;

2. Intelligence research for psychological warfare;

3. Intelligence research on international organizations, particularly

United Nations;

4. Intelligence research on world Communism;

5. Intelligence research in the political, cultural and sociological

fields for the internal needs of Central Intelligence Agency.

The Central Intelligence Agency wishes to assist the Department in

meeting these new responsibilities, as is indicated in General Smith’s let-
ter. To fulfill this obligation, Central Intelligence Agency is prepared to:

1. Provide, for the remainder of fiscal 1951, funds for additional

personnel up to the amount of $200,000. We have both estimated that

the number of additional personnel which the Department may need

is approximately 150.

2. Cooperate in the detail or transfer to the Department of any

available personnel formerly engaged in the Office of Research and Es-

timates. The Department is free to discuss such detail or transfer di-

rectly with the personnel involved.

I understand that working negotiations are under way on these

points. Copies of this letter have been distributed to the appropriate

The Intelligence Community 89

This assistance was presumably to tide the Department over until the positions

were properly authorized and budgeted.

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officers in this organization for policy guidance. I hope you and I may
meet for further discussions if the need arises in the course of these
negotiations.

Sincerely,

William H. Jackson

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

47.

Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Webb) to
the Executive Secretary of the Department of State
(McWilliams)

Washington, February 2, 1951.

Admiral Souers has spoken to the Secretary regarding the discus-

sions Admiral Souers and I have been having about the proposed Cab-
inet Committee on psychological warfare, to be headed by a full-time
chairman and report to the NSC.

Admiral Souers made the point to the Secretary that there were a

number of programs going in this field which we were not aware of
and which he did not think could be coordinated without some pro-
cedure such as he has suggested. He said his main objective was to get
all these things out on the table so they could be looked at and put to-
gether as a program.

The Secretary desires Mr. Humelsine or Mr. Barrett, or the proper

person, to prepare for him a short paper on the programs that are be-
ing discussed with Admiral Souers. He wants to know particularly
what programs are going which are not subject to our coordination
now. What is the subject matter of these programs, both overt and
covert?

After the Secretary has studied this matter, he is inclined to agree

to a meeting that would include himself, Admiral Souers, Fred Law-
ton, Bedell Smith and Bob Lovett to thrash the matter out.

90 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: National Archives, RG 59, P Files: Lot 52 D 432. Top Secret. Copies were

sent to Barrett for action and to Humelsine.

See Document 45.

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48.

Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 5, 1951.

PARTICIPANTS

CIA—Messrs. Reber, Smith, Webb, [

name not declassified

]

State—Messrs. Barnes S/S, Manfull S/S–R, Trueheart R

SUBJECT

CIA Daily Summary

In opening the meeting, Mr. Reber stated in substance that: 1) Af-

ter consultations with the President, CIA had decided to continue to
publish its Daily Summary but to recast the publication in the form of
a true “Intelligence Summary” rather than a mere summary of
telegrams; and 2) CIA desired to obtain from the Department an ad-
ditional copy of all S/S telegrams for a new Office of Current Intelli-
gence, which will be established to publish the new Daily.

Mr. Barnes

stated that while the Department had always desired

to keep the CIA Director and the analysts in the Office of National Es-
timates fully informed of current developments of a sensitive nature,
we had always had certain reservations regarding the Daily Summary,
particularly with respect to its distribution. He pointed out that the
CIA Daily Summary had never been an “Intelligence Summary” as
such and that we have been concerned at times in the past regarding
the use of sensitive and operational S/S telegrams in that publication,
particularly after the distribution of the Summary had been extended
to include persons not normally receiving S/S–R telegrams.

Mr. Reber expressed the view that the distribution of the Summary

was an incidental question; that it was necessary in the first instance
to determine the intelligence need to be met by the new Summary; and
that it was necessary in any event for the new Office of Current Intel-
ligence to receive all pertinent information, including S/S telegrams,
in order to do an adequate job.

At this point there was a long and inconclusive discussion of

whether it was necessary for the editors of the new Daily to have ac-
cess to all sensitive and operational materials in order for them to se-
lect intelligently the significant items for reporting and whether it was
feasible to publish a true “Intelligence Summary” on a daily basis. In

The Intelligence Community 91

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–54, 114.3/2–551. Secret.

Drafted by Melvin L. Manfull.

Robert G. Barnes, Chief of the Policy Reports Staff, Executive Secretariat.

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this connection, there was a divergence of opinion among the CIA peo-
ple themselves as to whether they could publish on a periodic basis
the type of “Intelligence Summary” they apparently had in mind.

Mr. Barnes explained the various channels through which CIA re-

ceived Department telegrams and expressed doubt that the Office of
National Estimates and Office of Current Intelligence in CIA required
equal treatment with respect to S/S telegrams. He stressed in this con-
nection overall responsibilities of S/S concerning the distribution of
sensitive material to other agencies and the relationship of the CIA
Daily Summary to this problem.

It was finally agreed that: 1) CIA would develop and present to

the Department more concrete proposals with respect to the type of
publication they had in mind, the distribution it should receive, etc, in
justification of their request; and 2) in the interim, Mr. Smith was au-
thorized to make available to the editor of the new Summary copies of
“information only” S/S telegrams on a trial basis in order for CIA to
determine its possible future need for this type of material in connec-
tion with the new Summary.

49.

Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for
Public Affairs (Barrett) to Secretary of State Acheson

Washington, February 13, 1951.

SUBJECT

Meeting with Admiral Souers

Regarding your meeting with Admiral Souers:
When the parties concerned were unable to resolve their differ-

ences over who should supervise psychological strategy now and in
event of war, the question was referred to the NSC.

The President then

directed Admiral Souers, with the assistance of the Bureau of the
Budget, to study the subject and make recommendations.

The Admiral came up with what he considered a compromise plan.

This was a plan for a board as proposed by the Defense Department,

92 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–54, 511.00/2–1351. Secret.

Sent through the Executive Secretariat.

See Documents 45 and 47.

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consisting of one representative each from State, Defense, Joint Chiefs
and CIA, plus an “independent” chairman. However, the Admiral pro-
posed that the chairman should report to the National Security Coun-
cil—not to the President as recommended by Defense.

We have objected strenuously to this plan, and accordingly, we un-

derstand it hasn’t been presented to the President.

Subsequent discussion with Admiral Souers developed the fact

that he had in mind a board whose field would be far broader than
that discussed in any of the NSC 74 papers.

The original papers all

specified that the board would give broad direction to overt informa-
tion and psychological warfare matters and just “coordinate with”
covert psychological operations. The Admiral, it developed, was think-
ing in terms of a board that would plan general strategy for virtually
all unconventional warfare measures. These would include overt psy-
chological strategy, covert psychological strategy (whispering cam-
paigns, etc.), covert operations of the old OSS variety, and perhaps cer-
tain economic warfare measures (like pre-emptive buying).

Admiral Souers has implied in private conversations that he be-

lieves the planning for perfectly overt psychological operations should
continue under the coordination of the Secretary of State, as is now the
case with our Psychological Strategy Board, which presently operates
under the authority given the Secretary in NSC 59

and which would

be strengthened under State’s version of NSC 74. He seems, however,
inclined to advocate the creation under NSC of a superboard to coor-
dinate overt psychological planning with planning in all the other un-
conventional warfare fields mentioned above.

The following is a listing of U.S. foreign propaganda programs in

being or planned and the state of coordination with each:

In addition to the Department’s USIE program, programs are now

being carried on or are planned by CIA, ECA, Army, Air Forces, NATO
and SHAPE.

The Department, ECA, Army, NATO and SHAPE are now engaged

in overt information activity abroad.

Coordination of overt operations by the Department is undertaken

through the National Psychological Strategy Board (members: State, as
Chairman, Defense, JCS, CIA, ECA and NSRB) which has been set up
under NSC 59, and through direct liaison in the U.S. and abroad be-
tween the Department and the agencies concerned. The independent
charters held by ECA and the Army occasion a lack of coordination

The Intelligence Community 93

See Document 17.

For the text of NSC 59/1, see Document 2.

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and/or duplication in some operations such as the Armed Forces Ra-
dio Service and the activity of some ECA country units.

Covert propaganda operations are centered in CIA although the

ECA and Army, in some instances, appear to be involved in activity of
this nature (to the apparent annoyance of CIA).

CIA covert propaganda operations are coordinated with the De-

partment through an agreement for direct liaison between P and CIA’s
Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), through the role of Mr. Joyce (S/P)
as CIA consultant, and through CIA participation in the National Psy-
chological Strategy Board. I consider that coordination in this field is
satisfactory, but do not know and do not need to know the substance
of all of CIA’s programs. ECA and Army covert or semi-covert opera-
tions are not coordinated with State or CIA in all cases. NATO and
SHAPE information operations are in the formative stage, and we are
working out the problems of coordination. No major problems here
have been uncovered so far.

Psychological warfare in areas of military operations is under the

control of the theatre commander, as in Korea.

There is a substantial lack of coordination in relation to psycho-

logical operations in Korea. This is a problem not only for the Depart-
ment but for the JCS, the Department of the Army and CIA.

Research in psychological warfare is being undertaken by State,

Army, Air Forces, and CIA.

There is a definite lack of coordination in the field of psychologi-

cal warfare research, particularly within the defense establishment.

50.

Memorandum for the Record by the Director of Central
Intelligence’s Executive Assistant (Kirkpatrick)

Washington, February 14, 1951.

SUBJECT

Meeting on Integration of O/SO and O/PC

94 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Operations, Job 78–05091A,

Box 1. Secret.

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PRESENT

Mr. Dulles, [

name not declassified

], W.C. Wyman, Mr. Wisner

Col. Johnston, [

name not declassified

], Mr. Angleton, Mr. Helms, and

Mr. Kirkpatrick

1. It was proposed by Mr. Dulles that a basic step toward inte-

gration might be the adjustment of the geographical divisions in the
two offices so that they correspond to each other. Mr. Wisner said that
this might prove difficult in certain instances and cited Italy as an ex-
ample. He said that O/PC in Italy falls naturally into the Western
Hemisphere bloc, whereas in O/SO it is in the Mediterranean-Balkan
area. It was pointed out that [

less than 1 line not declassified

]. It was con-

cluded that this matter would be studied and that there probably would
be adjustments necessary on both sides.

2. There was discussion of making the staffs in both offices cor-

respond to each other. It was pointed out that Mr. O’Gara has plans
for the administrative staffs of both offices which will make them iden-
tical. It was decided that a committee composed of Col. Johnston, Mr.
Helms, and Mr. O’Gara should study this problem and come up with
recommendations.

3. There was discussion of the level on which O/SO and O/PC

operations should be coordinated. O/PC feels that there should be spe-
cialists at a certain level. It was suggested that this level might be the
area region which would be the bottom of the merger. It was suggested
that each area division be combined with the deputy for each activity.
The pattern by area may vary. It was pointed out that the “confiden-
tial” activities of O/PC as distinguished from the “secret” operations
might be separated. The general operations of the two offices break
down into political-economic, paramilitary, and intelligence. It was also
suggested that perhaps area divisions might have a deputy for each of
these activities rather than a deputy for O/SO and one for O/PC.

4. O/PC raised the question of the responsibility for dealing di-

rectly with resistance groups. It was pointed out that it was the O/PC
function to run resistance groups although it is recognized that it is the
O/SO function to get intelligence from these groups. A task force com-
posed of Mr. Angleton, Mr. [

name not declassified

], and Mr. Rositzke was

named to reach an agreement on this subject and to present any points
of controversy to the Assistant Directors for referral, if necessary, to the
Deputy Director.

5. There was talk of the fact that three offices, OO [Office of Op-

erations],

O/SO and O/PC were all in contact with the [

less than 1 line

not declassified

]. It was agreed that this was a very sensitive subject and

The Intelligence Community 95

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that there should be a unified approach. A task force composed of Mr.
Thompson, Mr. Houck, Mr. Hunter, and Mr. Ashcraft was named to
determine a policy on dealing with labor.

6. A similar problem of three offices all dealing with the [

less than 1

line not declassified

] was raised. A task force composed of Mr. Horton, Mr.

Ashcraft and Mr. Lloyd was named to determine an agency policy for
dealing with the [

less than 1 line not declassified

7. The question of training was brought up and Mr. Kirkpatrick

was asked to prepare for Mr. Dulles a statement on training.

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

51.

Memorandum of Agreement Between the Central
Intelligence Agency and the Department of State

Washington, February 19, 1951.

RE SS CABLES

Because of certain changes in CIA organization the Department of

State and CIA have considered it useful to re-examine arrangements
whereby the Department has been making available to CIA certain spe-
cial cables through the Office of the Secretary of State. The following
understandings have been reached as a result of the re-examination:

a. The Department of State will make every effort to supply directly

to CIA, through direct distribution or through the IAD liaison channel,
all intelligence reports of interest to CIA. In addition the Department will
continue to supply to the Central Intelligence Agency, through the chan-
nel indicated in paragraph f. below, two copies of operational and policy
telegrams of interest and concern to CIA which may be considered so
sensitive as to not be placed within the normal liaison channel.

b. The external distribution of the Daily Intelligence Bulletin,

which will replace the CIA Daily Summary,

is:

96 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: National Archives, RG 59, INR Historical Files: Lot 58 D 776, State–CIA

Relationships, 1949–56. Confidential.

See Document 48.

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The President

Secretary of State

Secretary of Defense

c. Inclusion of materials from the special State Department distri-

bution in the Daily Intelligence Bulletin will be based on importance
in terms of intelligence rather than operations or policy developments.
The agencies will rely upon close contact between the Office of Cur-
rent Intelligence and SS to develop understandings regarding inclusion
of sensitive materials.

d. Because of State Department’s legitimate concern with regard

to the extent of third agency use of State Department sensitive cables,
any extension of the proposed distribution (see paragraph b. above)
will be done only after consultation with the State Department.

e. The responsibility for receipt and internal CIA distribution of

telegrams under consideration shall be the Office of Current Intelligence
with the understanding that distribution will be limited to: the Office of
the Director, the Office of National Estimates, and to Daily Intelligence
Bulletin editors as necessary for their background information.

f. As of the beginning of business Tuesday, February 20th, the Of-

fice of Current Intelligence will assume the responsibility for receipt and
dissemination, a function discharged at present by the Office of Na-
tional Estimates. Specifically the officer in charge and his address is:

[

3 lines not declassified

]

g. In the Department of State this special liaison will be handled

by the Policy Reports Staff of the Executive Secretariat.

For the Director of Central Intelligence:

James Q. Reber

Acting Assistant Director,

Intelligence Coordination

The Intelligence Community 97

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. Below the signature is typed:

“Endorsed: Agreed: Robert G. Barnes, February 19, 1951” with an indication that Barnes
signed the original.

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52.

Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Administration (Scott) to the Under Secretary of State
(Webb)

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

NSC–74 Background

This is in response to your request for a full statement of the

inter-departmental arrangements and planning leading up to NSC–74

and the assignment of the psychological problem to Admiral Souers.

1. NSC–10/2

NSC–10/2 (attached as Tab A),

approved in June 1948 fixed re-

sponsibility for covert operations and directed the responsible officer
to assure coordination of such activities with U.S. foreign and military
policies and overt activities. This decision has remained in effect and
has not been at issue in the planning of organization for overt psy-
chological operations until Admiral Souers’ assignment.

2. NSC–4 and NSC–43

NSC–4

(attached as Tab B), which was approved by the NSC in

December, 1947, made provision for the coordination of foreign infor-
mation measures. NSC–43

(attached as Tab C), which was approved

by the NSC in March, 1949, made certain provisions on planning for
wartime conduct of

overt

psychological warfare. In December, 1949, the

provisions of these two papers were consolidated with minor changes
and approved as NSC–59.

3. NSC–59

NSC–59 (attached as Tab D), approved in March, 1950, charges the

Secretary of State with responsibilities for:

98 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: National Archives, RG 59, P Files: Lot 55 D 339. Top Secret. Although this

memorandum is attached to one from Barrett to Webb, March 14, the content of Scott’s
memorandum indicates that it was probably drafted about February 20.

See Document 17.

An attached list of Tabs A–M is not printed. None of the tabs are attached to the

memorandum. For NSC 10/2, see

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intel-

ligence Establishment, Document 292.

Ibid., Document 252.

See ibid., Documents 392 and 401.

See Document 2.

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(1) Formulation of policies and plans for peacetime information

program, including all foreign information activity conducted by de-

partments and agencies of the U.S. Government.

(2) Formulation of National Psychological Warfare policy in time

of national emergency and the initial stages of war.

(3) Coordination of policies and plans for the information program

and for overt psychological warfare with the Department of Defense,

with other appropriate departments and with related planning under

the NSC–10 series.

There was directed to be established within the Department of

State an organization to consist of: “(a) A Director appointed by Sec-
retary of State after consultation with other departments and agencies
represented on the National Security Council. (b) Policy consultants
representing the Secretary of the State, the Secretary of Defense, and
the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board. (c) A consult-
ant representing the Director of Central Intelligence for matters relat-
ing to coordination with planning under the NSC–10 series. (d) A con-
sultant representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff on NSC–59 and NSC–10/2
matters. (e) A staff composed of full-time personnel representing the
Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Central In-
telligence Agency. (f) A liaison representative to the staff from the Na-
tional Security Resources Board and such liaison representation or staff
membership from other departments and agencies of the government
as may be determined by the Director after consultation with the
consultants.”

This organization was directed to:

“(a) Initiate and develop interdepartmental plans, make recom-

mendations, and otherwise advise and assist the Secretary of State in

discharging his responsibilities for the national foreign information

program in time of peace.

(b) Make plans for overt psychological warfare, including recom-

mendations for the preparations for national emergency and the initial

stages of war. Such plans shall be continuously coordinated with joint

war plans through the planning agencies of the Department of Defense

and where such plans have a direct impact on war plans they shall be

subject to the concurrence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”

4. Psychological Strategy Board

On August 17, 1950, the Department of State issued a press release

(attached as Tab E) announcing the establishment of a national psy-
chological strategy board under the Secretary of State.

This Strategy

Board was in fact nothing more than the “Director” and the “Consul-
tants” under NSC–59, including the JCS representative. This step was

The Intelligence Community 99

Printed in Department of State

Bulletin,

August 28, 1950, p. 335.

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taken in recognition of the necessity for conducting psychological
measures in connection with the hostilities in Korea and the increas-
ingly critical world-wide situation. The activities of the “organization”
were in fact intensified, as the Board has met more frequently since the
announcement and has dealt with more problems of a psychological
character requiring joint political and military action.

5. NSC–74

In July, 1950 the Under Secretary of State transmitted to the NSC

a report prepared by the Organization established pursuant to NSC–59.
This report was issued for clearance as NSC–74 (attached as Tab F).

This paper has been prepared principally during the period prior

to Korea and was based on the tacit assumption that any war would
be general and would break out without warning. It provided an
“initial stage” of psychological warfare organization to be invoked
on D–day, or earlier at the discretion of the President, and a plan for
the “subsequent stages” to be established as rapidly thereafter as
possible.

The plan for the initial stages of war recognized the responsibility

of the Secretary of State to “formulate national psychological warfare
policy and issue psychological warfare policy directives to appropri-
ate departments and agencies of the U.S. Government” and to “coor-
dinate policies and plans for overt psychological warfare with the De-
partment of Defense” and other agencies. The plan also directed the
Secretary of State to make “detailed plans and preparations to employ
psychological warfare to the maximum in consonance with this plan.”
It was recognized that overt psychological warfare would be executed
in theaters of military operations by theater commanders and in other
areas by the Department of State.

For the “initial stages” the Interdepartmental Foreign Information

Organization was to be “augmented” and established as an Interim
Psychological Warfare Board to act as the “Executive Agent” of the Sec-
retary of State in the execution of his planning and coordinating re-
sponsibility for psychological warfare. The Board was to be composed
of a Chairman representing the Secretary of State, a Vice-Chairman rep-
resenting the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and one representative each from
State, Defense, and ECA.

The plan for the “subsequent stages” provided a National Psy-

chological Warfare Board “composed of a Chairman, appointed by the
President and directly responsible to him; a member designated by and
representing the Department of State; a member chosen from the Joint
Chiefs of Staff organization, designated by and representing the De-
partment of Defense; and a member designated by and representing
the Central Intelligence Agency.”

100 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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On September 13, 1950, Secretary Johnson submitted to the Exec-

utive Secretary of NSC his comments on NSC–74

(attached as Tab G).

He proposed the immediate implementation of the plan for the “ini-
tial stages”, but he considered it inadequate even for the situation at
that time and thought that “we should move to create immediately an
independent psychological planning board in the Executive Office of
the President.” The chairman would have been directly responsible to
the President and the board members would have been full-time ap-
pointees not representing the Departments.

Also on September 14, the Under Secretary of State advised the

NSC that the Department of State approved NSC–74 except for the sub-
sequent stages plan, which he believed required further study.

(See

Tab H.) He also stated that he had “taken steps to strengthen the
Inter-departmental Foreign Information Organization established un-
der NSC–59/1, so that it may meet the requirements of situations where
joint military and political action is necessary in the field of psycho-
logical warfare”, referring to the establishment of the psychological
strategy board.

After further study within the Department, a draft NSC–74/1 (at-

tached as Tab I) was developed.

In an effort to meet the requirements

of the present situation, this paper provided for the establishment of a
National Psychological Strategy Board (or National Psychological War-
fare Board in time of war) “as the coordinating agent for the Secretary
of State” with respect to his responsibility to “recommend broad poli-
cies and plans for the national psychological effort designed to achieve
a maximum support of U.S. national objectives” and to “review the
plans and programs of agencies executing psychological measures for
conformity with national policy.” The chairman was to be designated
by the Secretary of State, the vice-chairman by JCS and additional mem-
bers by State, Defense, and CIA. This paper spoke of the “National Psy-
chological Effort” in order to avoid the controversy about whether
“psychological warfare” is conducted in time of peace, and to make
adequate provision for the present situation. It was the position of the
Department of State that organization in time of war should be sub-
jected to further study.

Following discussion of the new State Department draft by the NSC

senior staff, it was determined that agreement between the Departments
could not be secured. A memorandum of disagreement was prepared

The Intelligence Community 101

Not found.

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(attached as Tab J) and submitted for NSC consideration, together with
an additional memorandum from the JCS

(attached as Tab K). The sen-

ior staff memorandum stated the essential issue as follows:

“Should responsibility at the national level for psychological pol-

icy formulation, within the framework of approved national policies,

and for the coordination and evaluation of the national psychological

effort, including authority to issue policy guidance to all Departments

and agencies of the Government executing portions of the psycholog-

ical effort (1) be assigned to the Secretary of State, or, (2) be assigned

to an official independent of any Department and responsible to the

President.”

After NSC consideration on January 4, the President referred these

memoranda “to Mr. Souers and the Bureau of the Budget for further
study and recommendation to the President.”

On January 18, Mr. Souers presented to you the proposal for a

Board “under the NSC” with a chairman to be appointed by the Pres-
ident

(attached as Tab L).

Last week there was a meeting at the Bureau of the Budget for dis-

cussion of this problem which was attended by Admiral Souers;
Messrs. Lawton and Staats of the Bureau; Messrs. Barrett, Matthews,
Joyce, and Scott. A revised draft of the Souers directive was circulated
and discussed, but no copies were given out. An analysis of this re-
vised draft is attached as Tab M.

W. K. Scott

102 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Neither found.

Not further identified.

See attachment to Document 45.

Memorandum from Scott to Webb, February 16. (National Archives, RG 59,

P Files: Lot 55 D 339)

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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53.

Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Smith to
President Truman

Washington, February 28, 1951.

Your copy of the initial issue of the daily Current Intelligence Bul-

letin, which is based upon information from all sources, is enclosed.

The former summary, which was based solely upon cables from diplo-
matic representatives, has been discontinued.

It is hoped that the broad representative current intelligence

presented in the new Bulletin, with immediate comments of analysts,
will be of more comprehensive value to you. It should be emphasized
that the comments do not necessarily represent the mature appre-
ciation of the Central Intelligence Agency and have not been coor-
dinated with the other agencies represented on the Intelligence
Advisory Committee. They are actually the first impressions of CIA
on “spot” information, and are subject to later revision. The next and
following copies will contain selected items received directly from CIA
sources.

Walter B. Smith

The Intelligence Community 103

Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s Secretary’s Files.

Top Secret.

Not found. A description of the enclosure at the end of the memorandum iden-

tifies it as the Current Intelligence Bulletin of February 28, 1951. A copy is in Central In-
telligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Job 97–T00975A, Box 1.

The former summary, called the Daily Summary, was based on collateral sources,

primarily news media and Department of State telegrams from U.S. Embassies abroad.
It was designed for the use of the President and the National Security Council. The Cur-
rent Intelligence Bulletin drew on all-source material, including COMINT-derived in-
formation. Distribution outside of CIA was to the President, the Secretary of State, and
the Secretary of Defense. See also Documents 48 and 51.

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54.

Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Smith to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Bradley)

Washington, March 2, 1951.

Dear General Bradley:

Herewith as discussed during our conference last Monday (see An-

nex 1)

are estimates of the support which is or which may be needed

by CIA from the Department of Defense in order to carry out projects
which have already been approved or which it is possible may be ap-
proved within the near future in accordance with our estimate of pres-
ent trends of policy. Our estimated requirements are listed under three
categories as follow: those already requested under approved projects;
those required for the support of approved projects, requests for which
will be made within the next thirty days; those required for the sup-
port of projects which are still tentative or which are still in the dis-
cussion state.

These latter are largely guesswork but the guesswork is educated

to the extent that it is based on past experience and on our estimate of
future possibilities.

For cross reference, in Annex 2,

we have indicated the require-

ments for covert operations by project, listing those which fall within
the above three categories.

As I mentioned during Monday’s conference, the responsibilities

which are being placed upon us under our Charter and under NSC di-
rectives, particularly in the field of planning and execution of guerrilla
warfare activities, go beyond our current capabilities and indeed em-
brace operations of such magnitude that they threaten to absorb the
resources of this Agency to a point which might be detrimental to its
other responsibilities.

In order to bring these activities into proper focus a statement will

be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff within the next 60 days,

giv-

ing CIA estimate of support required from the Department of Defense

104 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

320-672/B428-S/11008

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01731R, Box 10.

Top Secret.

Attached but not printed.

Not found.

Smith sent a follow-up letter to Bradley on May 4 stating that NSC consideration

of his request for a determination of the appropriate scope and pace of CIA operations
was pending. He was therefore withholding providing his overall requirements for De-
partment of Defense support until the NSC had made its decision. (Central Intelligence
Agency, Executive Registry, Job 95–G00278R, Box 1, Folder 9)

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in order to meet our dual responsibilities in the field of operations and
accordingly to enable it to:

(1) complete the organization of a professional clandestine intel-

ligence service, adequate to meet all peacetime requirements plus an

estimate of expansion to meet conditions of general war;

(2) conduct effective covert operations on a global basis under con-

tinued conditions of cold war and including guerrilla activities on the

mainland of Asia and in Eastern Europe.

The above would require, in my opinion, detailed planning, guid-

ance, and control, participated in by the three Armed services, the De-
partment of State, and probably the Office of Defense Mobilization, as
well as the Central Intelligence Agency. This Agency will be glad to
participate in discussions directed toward the formation of a staff or
syndicate competent to give such guidance and control.

Faithfully,

Walter B. Smith

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

55.

Letter From President Truman to Director of Central
Intelligence Smith

U.S. Naval Station, Key West, March 8, 1951.

Dear Bedell:

I have been reading the Intelligence Bulletin

and I am highly im-

pressed with it.

I believe you have hit the jackpot with this one.
Sincerely,

Harry S. Truman

The Intelligence Community 105

320-672/B428-S/11008

Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s Secretary’s Files.

No classification marking. President Truman was on vacation at the Little White House
in Key West, Florida. A handwritten notation on the letter reads, “air mailed from Key
West.”

See Document 53.

Printed from a copy that indicates Truman signed the original.

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56.

Letter From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(Bradley) to Director of Central Intelligence Smith

Washington, March 9, 1951.

Dear General Smith:

I have read your letter (TS #43690) of 2 March 1951

with interest,

and note that you are preparing a statement for submittal to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff giving your estimate of the support required from the
Department of Defense in order to meet your responsibilities in the
field of operations.

The assets which may be generated by requirements for operations

in the cold war can be expected to be of proportionate value in case
overt global war should intervene, and for some time all of us have
been acquiring a considerable body of experience in learning the me-
chanics of dealing with the complex elements that are involved.

It seems to me that much of the support which is visualized in the

enclosures to your letter can be provided by arrangements which have
already been set in motion and are well advanced. This leads me to
hope that we will not have too much difficulty in handling the situa-
tion within the current framework, but it is, of course, a proper sub-
ject for further exploration and discussion with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Financing appears to be a matter between you and the Congress,

but you may be assured that I shall support your efforts to obtain funds
for any conception of your plans and operations which has been ac-
cepted by Defense.

Sincerely,

Omar N. Bradley

106 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 95–G00278R, Box 1,

Folder 9. Top Secret.

Document 54.

Printed from a copy that indicates Bradley signed the original.

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57.

Memorandum to the Executive Secretary of the National
Security Council (Lay)

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Third Progress Report on NSC 59/1, “The Foreign Information Program and
Psychological Warfare Planning”

1. NSC 59/1 was approved as Government policy on March 10,

1950. It is requested that this Progress Report as of March 6, 1951, be
circulated to the members of the Council for their information.

2. In addition to steps taken to strengthen the existing organiza-

tion under NSC 59/1 as reported in the second progress report,

fur-

ther measures have been taken in this direction. Twenty-one weekly or
semi-weekly meetings of the National Psychological Strategy Board
have been held since the last progress report. The new procedures for
expediting the conduct of Board meetings were approved in Decem-
ber 1950, and the appointment of a full-time Executive Secretary to the
Board is pending.

3. New arrangements were made for closer interdepartmental co-

ordination of information policy guidances.

4. A survey team composed of Colonel W.J. Bohnaker, Joint Sub-

sidiary Plans Division of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Lt. Col. Frederick R.
Young, Psychological Warfare Division, Department of the Army, and
Mr. W. Bradley Connors, Department of State, was sent to Tokyo and
Korea in October. Findings of the survey group were reviewed by the
Interdepartmental Foreign Information Organization at its meeting of
November 13, 1950, and on 18 January 1951 the Director, Mr. Barrett,
transmitted to executing agencies the following statement on psycho-
logical warfare activities in Korea:

“The Interdepartmental Foreign Information Organization, having

reviewed psychological warfare activities in Korea on the basis of infor-
mation now available, which is admittedly incomplete, and noting that
psychological warfare activities in the Department of the Army have been
elevated to the status of a Special Staff Division, concludes that:

“1. The importance of psychological warfare as an instrument of

national policy should be emphasized to all executing agencies in the

field;

The Intelligence Community 107

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–54, 711.5200/3–751. Secret.

Drafted by Oechsner.

For text of NSC 59/1, see Document 2.

Document 28.

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“2. Executing agencies should give psychological warfare the pri-

ority commensurate with its importance.

“3. The fullest use should be made of all known techniques and

facilities now available for psychological warfare.

“4. To assure the most effective coordination of psychological war-

fare measures at the national level, it is desirable that agencies execut-

ing psychological warfare programs in the field provide full reports on

current plans and operations.”

Periodic reviews of psychological warfare activities in Korea have

been made subsequently by the Board with the purpose of imple-
menting the above conclusions. It is the view of the Department of
State, however, that proper status and importance have not yet been
given psychological warfare in Korea.

5. A Plan for National Psychological Warfare for General War, pre-

pared by the Interdepartmental Foreign Information Staff under the
terms of NSC 59/1, has been forwarded to the Director and is under
consideration by the Board.

6. The staff has also notified the Director of completion of a study

on “Detailed Functions of a National Psychological Warfare Organiza-
tion,” pending a decision on the location of the organization under NSC
74/3.

7. Plans for the following areas have been developed interde-

partmentally or by the Department of State and have been accepted by
the Board for implementation or are under present consideration:

Korea

China

Indo-China

Russia

Germany

8. “Project Troy”.

A report developed by the Department of State

after consultation with the National Psychological Strategy Board, has
been submitted; its implementation is now under consideration. The
report covers only the first stages of the study described below, and

108 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Regarding NSC 74, see Document 17. NSC 74 and NSC 74/1 are in National

Archives, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 74. NSC 74/3 was not found.

Project Troy, initiated in October 1950, was a research study undertaken by a group

of scientists and social scientists assembled by the Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy. The “Project Troy Report to the Secretary of State” was submitted on February 1,
1951. It proposed technical means to get around Soviet jamming of VOA and ideas for
political and psychological warfare. A copy is in National Archives, RG 59, INR Histor-
ical Files: Lot 58 D 776, Project Troy, Perforating the Iron Curtain. Documentation on the
report and consideration of it within the Department of State is ibid., Central Files
1950–54, 511.00, 611.00, 711.5, and ibid., S/P Files: Lot 64 D 563. See also Document 59.

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will be available to other departments shortly. Under this project, the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology assembled 30 of the nation’s top
scientists and other experts to explore all means—conventional and un-
conventional—for penetrating the Iron Curtain. The report endorses
the large scale expansion of radio facilities, already initiated, and calls
for even further expansion along lines which should facilitate further
piercing the curtain by means which will not interfere with other
telecommunications channels (military).

9. “Project Vagabond”. Under this project, a study has been made

of the use of seaborne portable radio transmitters to be mounted for
stationary operations at negotiated bases in our overt information ac-
tivities, but also to be available for covert operations and for military
psychological warfare in the event of war.

10. “Project Brain Wave”. The Department of State is developing

and has reported to the Board a project designed to stimulate display
of indigenous anti-Communist sentiment in the countries of Western
Europe.

11. “Project Nobel”. The Board has approved a project for the

issuance of a pro-Western statement by all surviving holders of the
Nobel peace prize.

12. The Board has continued to study the use of balloons as prop-

aganda carriers. CIA has been assigned the project of a continuing study
in this field and has also been instructed to stockpile one thousand large-
sized propaganda balloons of the best type presently available.

13. The Board has at various meetings studied the question of de-

fectors and their possible use in the information and psychological war-
fare programs.

14. The subject of the relationship between SHAPE, NATO, State

and Defense, with respect to both the current information program
and psychological warfare planning, is under active study by staff and
Board.

58.

Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Smith to
President Truman

Washington, March 20, 1951.

[Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s

Secretary’s Files. Top Secret. 1 page not declassified.]

The Intelligence Community 109

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59.

Memorandum From Robert J. Hooker of the Policy Planning
Staff to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze)

Washington, March 26, 1951.

SUBJECT

Troy Report

The Troy Report almost uniformly reflects a very high order of

technical competence, political sophistication, and common sense. It
deserves the most serious consideration. It lays down principles and
techniques for the conduct of political warfare which, with few excep-
tions, seem worthy of adoption. On the non-technical side its value is
not so much its originality—few of the ideas will seem original to any-
one who has sat around the S/P table—as its cogency. Development of
Staff views as to what recommendations should be adopted, and how
we can secure their adoption, would seem to be in order.

Following are its highlights. I am intruding my own comments

only with respect to recommendations which seem to be questionable.

Volume I—Foreword

Explains that although the initial study was directed primarily to-

ward the technical problems confronting VOA because of Soviet jam-
ming, it was agreed that other methods of piercing the Iron Curtain
should be examined, “and that the nature of any technical facility was
inevitably tied to the target and to the content of the material to be con-
veyed and finally to the effect which was ultimately desired.” (p. viii)
Thus the study has emerged with the concept of “political warfare”.
“The newness of our idea, if any, lies in the understanding of the strate-
gic power of the several elements when combined as a well rounded
and coordinated whole. . . . the idea that the United States must de-
velop a coordinated political warfare effort is the most important idea
in the report.” (p. ix)

110 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 64 D 563, Political and Psycho-

logical Warfare 1951–1953, Box 11A. Top Secret. Drafted by Hooker. All ellipses in the
original.

See numbered paragraph 8 of Document 57 and footnote 5 thereto.

Another evaluation of the Troy report is in a memorandum from Armstrong to

Barrett, March 26, which complimented the report for “its appreciation of the nature of
political warfare and in its proposals as to the techniques that could be employed in dis-
seminating our propaganda and otherwise carrying on political warfare activities.” In
his memorandum Armstrong also offered a critique of the “over-all substantive ap-
proach” of the Troy report. (National Archives, RG 59, INR Files: Lot 58 D 776, Box 14)

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Part I—Political Warfare

Chapter I—Political Warfare

Urges the “unification of political warfare”, which “should be or-

ganized like any form of warfare, with specialized weapons, strategy,
tactics, logistics, and training”. (p. 3)

Part II—Communication Into Shielded Areas

Deals with means of communication for piercing the Iron Curtain,

mentioning, besides radio and balloons, and other existing ways, the
use of direct mail to send professional journals and industrial and com-
mercial publications and questions “Impulsive emotional blockades of
this kind of communication, such as the recent ban on shipments of

The Iron Age

”. It also mentions sending of objects, typical of American

life, drugs, flash lights, fountain pens, small radio receivers, etc.

Chapter II—Radio

“Really important advances can be made along two complemen-

tary lines: a) by developing a broadcasting system which combines
standard elements in a special way to achieve the effect of enormous
power and, b) by developing a tiny, cheap, self-contained, durable re-
ceiver that could eventually be distributed in large numbers over the
world.” (p. 11) It notes that a hundred, perhaps a thousand, Soviet
jamming transmitters are in use, which “appear to be

centrally controlled,

although the individual transmitters are widely distributed”. (p. 13)
“The evidence suggests that the operation is growing in scale and is a
direct and major threat to high-frequency radio communication

within

and

Europe generally”. (p. 14)

Recommends use of “the coherent transmitter” technique whereby

a ten unit cluster, radiating one megawatt each, costing about 1.5 mil-
lion dollars apiece, would have the same power as a single one hun-
dred megawatt unit, “and if well-located could reach most of Eastern
Europe at night. . . . (a) it cannot easily be jammed over a large area;
(b) it can be heard with a receiver as insensitive as a simple crystal set”.
(p. 21)

Recommends also “a concerted effort to develop crystal and tran-

sistor receivers for mass production”. (p. 22)

Points out “The Russian jamming operation seems to us to have

clear and serious implications extending beyond the immediate prob-
lems of the Voice of America. . . . Already there have been instances of
deliberate, effective jamming of intercontinental point-to-point trans-
missions, both United States and British. . . . If our high-frequency
transmissions were jammed (they could be jammed tomorrow) and the
Atlantic cables cut by submarine action, air mail would be our only
means of communication with Europe. . . . the problem must be faced,

The Intelligence Community 111

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as a matter of national security, now. . . . A wideband transatlantic com-
munication facility, reliable and secure against jamming, can and must
be provided. The appropriate agency should at once sponsor a thor-
ough engineering study of the several possible methods. The national
telecommunications policy must be reexamined. . . . The challenge of
the electro-magnetic war is serious and we are not organized to meet
it.” (pp. 24–27)

Chapter III—Balloons

“An area of a million square miles could be saturated with a bil-

lion propaganda sheets in a single balloon operation costing a few mil-
lion dollars. . . . If the area of dispersal in such an operation were re-
stricted to 30,000 square miles, which may be practicable, there would
be a leaflet laid down, on the average, for each area of 30 by 30 feet.
. . . The dispersion of balloons in flight and the dispersion of leaflets in
falling from altitude both lend themselves to saturation operations.
. . . Production specifications should be established now and produc-
tive capacity should be located. . . . The operational testing and pro-
duction program should be undertaken now. It may cost about one mil-
lion dollars. . . . In order to coordinate balloon use with other political
warfare operations, organizational planning for the final operations
should start now. . . . A stockpile sufficient for an actual operation
should be created now, and the questions of size and type of stock
should be reviewed periodically as the program develops”. (pp. 29–35)

Part III—Notes on Target Areas

Introduction

Observes that VOA “programs should deal insofar as possible with

subjects that are matters of real

emotional concern

to the members of the

audience. . . . There is a real danger . . . that heavy emphasis on news
will lead to a neglect of longer range types of programs dealing with
the local concerns of people behind the curtain”. (p. 40)

Chapter IV—Russia

Notes that appeals to reason or efforts to modify ideological views

have small chance of success. Suggests efforts should be directed to-
ward undermining Soviet rulers’ confidence in themselves and each
other: noting possibility of producing deterioration in administrative
structure “by overloading the system with material introduced from
outside”; disturbing confidence of the leaders by increasing defection;
stimulating mutual distrust by artificial means, bogus letters, etc.; pro-
moting distrust of dependability of military and political organizations
among the satellites. Comments that although the “full and fair” for-
mula is officially abandoned, it remains in the habits of psychological
warfare operators. Recommends “We should avoid the position, ex-

112 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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press or implied, that communism is bad, or any implication of con-
tempt for communism . . . rather . . . that Stalinism has betrayed cer-
tain ideals of Marxism which have actually had a peaceful evolution
in the West. . . . Discord in the United States is not only tolerable but
actually necessary. Variation and divergence . . . are . . . an evidence of
strength, not weakness. . . . There should be no direct or indirect dis-
paraging of Soviet culture.” (pp. 44–45)

Our principal targets should be the intelligentsia, skilled workers,

bureaucrats, personnel of the mechanized armed forces, rural areas.
Major themes should be “The Soviet peoples have proven themselves
capable, patriotic, hard-working . . . having with their sweat and blood
built up a large scale industry and modern agriculture, are now being
denied the fruits of their labor by a harsh and grasping regime. . . . the
USSR and the United States . . . have . . . common interests and com-
mon attitudes. . . . Americans grant that the teachings of Marx, Engels,
and Lenin have great historical importance. Yet the Stalinist system has
not evolved . . . as Marx and Engels would have wished”. (p. 46) The
handling of the material “should be persistent, simple and consistent
. . . based on genuine sophistication in Stalinist thinking . . . truly per-
sonal . . . occasionally seek the opportunity for drama . . . should get
on the band-wagon at the earliest possible moment for programs which
are certain to be widely popular among the Russian people, even if
they also have official Russian support.” (pp. 46–47)

Chapter V—Europe

Proposes “a program based on the concept of European unity. . . .

one must look to European tradition itself. . . . Nor will mere verbal ar-
gument suffice if in our other acts we appear to encourage the contin-
uance of inequities or special privilege long associated with the man-
agerial elites of European society.” (pp. 51–55)

Recommends exploiting the opportunities offered by Yugoslavia.
Recommends considering seriously the inclusion of satellite and

possibly Russian units in the all-European Army and, with suitable ac-
knowledgment of the difficulty of the problem, emphasizes the im-
portance and the genuine possibility of organizing a European Army
with national units as small as companies. (Comment: The inclusion
of satellite and Russian units under their own flags or so organized as
to appear to the world as national units would seem questionable prior
to an outbreak of hostilities. But they should be so organized that they
can readily be converted into national units. The Report’s unwilling-
ness to accept the assumption that national units in the European Army
must be of division size seems warranted, provided the problem is ap-
proached with suitable realism and flexibility.) The economic program
should be designed to reduce the inequalities between social classes,

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reduce the feeling of isolation from sources of raw materials and mar-
kets for manufactures, eliminate barriers between the nations of Eu-
rope and encourage increase in productivity.

Recommends emergency aid and all possible support to Yugoslavia.

Chapter VI—China and Southeast Asia

“We cannot appeal to them to align themselves with us against

Russia, save in terms of the fact that we, rather than Russia, can aid
them in their struggles for development. . . . There is needed now a
special Presidential Commission on Aid to Asia”. (p. 66) Political war-
fare operations “should operate at the local level and specially trained
technical personnel should participate at the local level. . . . projects
must fit local needs, local customs, and local requirements”.

Chapter VII—The Defector

Makes the highly questionable recommendation that an experi-

mental Russian government-in-exile should be set up, “a small but re-
sponsible state with its own territory and a more or less free hand to
develop social and political institutions which could fit the needs of
present day Russians. . . . the creation of Russian troop units to serve
in the all European Army . . . almost immediately”. (p. 71)

The remaining recommendations are closely similar to the policy

decisions already taken and now pending with respect to defectors, ex-
cept for a recommendation, the necessity for which seems question-
able, “that the defector program be set up under a single individual
with authority to draw on necessary resources and personnel wher-
ever located within the government”. (p. 72)

Part IV—Some General Conclusions

Chapter VIII—General Conclusions

“In the absence of plans the conduct of political warfare tends

to become a series of defensive responses to enemy action. . . . The
success of our political warfare depends finally, upon the public
support of national policies. . . . What is needed, what is indeed in-
dispensable, is a planned research effort to insure first, that scarce
resources of personnel, wherever located, are assigned tasks of the
highest priority and second, that pieces of the research mosaic not
lying clearly within the responsibility of existing agencies are sup-
plied to complete the whole picture. . . . there must be some

single

authority

concerned with political warfare exclusively, with the ca-

pacity to design a comprehensive program and the power to obtain
execution of this program through the effective action of all the agen-
cies and departments that are now engaged in waging political war-
fare.” (pp. 79–81)

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Volume II

Annex 1—Political Warfare

Points out that “the rise of technology has so changed the play of

economic and social forces that the questions that now divide nations
. . . go too deep to yield easily to negotiation . . . international relations
must therefore increasingly be conducted through channels that reach
the mass of people directly”. (pp. 1–2)

Observes that U.S. Civil War was the first since the religious wars

of the 17th Century to be fought consciously over an idea, and was
fought not by professional armies but by masses of men representative
of the whole society, with spectacular losses on both sides, won less by
superior tactical skill than by overwhelming weight, and ended in un-
conditional surrender. “Technological advance has now put in our
hands logistical weapons of such power that we find ourselves liter-
ally unable to use them for limited objectives. War has become for us
not only all-out but all-or-none. . . . Even though such a weapon might
win a war, it probably would not do so in a way that will lead to a sat-
isfactory peace. Atomic war thus falls outside the Clausewitz defini-
tion. Its possession gives us time to develop a united world, but its use
will not continue that policy.” (p. 3)

Thus, we must seek other ways of reaching our international ob-

jectives. “Fear of all-out war has so far kept us from aggressive steps
to halt the Russian advance. This is just the wrong attitude. A carefully
planned series of forward steps that erode the Russian power provides
the best way of avoiding, not provoking, the last great battle of the
West . . . we must remember clearly that all international actions—wars
included—are directed at the minds and emotions of men. . . . This in-
terconnected simultaneous use of all instruments of international ac-
tion to obtain a single objective is what we call, in this Report, politi-
cal warfare. . . . a political war consisting of well-planned attacks on a
series of limited objectives will make an all-out shooting war impossi-
ble for Russia and unnecessary for us.” (pp. 3–4)

Annex 2—Briefing Travelers

Points out desirability of briefing travelers and U.S. soldiers abroad

to make a good impression and answer intelligently the types of ques-
tions they will be asked.

Annex 3—The Mails

Points out value of use of the mails for “some sort of access to the

U.S.S.R. and easy access to some of the satellites. . . . this channel should
be used for what it is worth. . . . suited to a long-range background
program. . . . can provide an equal-status contact—a professional
talking to an already-sympathetic professional. . . . of non-government

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origin. . . . Lists of appropriate printed material, commercial or non-
commercial should . . . be selected from

that now distributed in the United

States.

. . . (1) of a high standard (2) non-political.” (pp. 1–2)

Annex 4—Distribution of Objects

Seems far-fetched, with the all-important exception of crystal ra-

dios capable of receiving new and future VOA programs.

Annex 5—Overload and Delay

An “attack . . . should be directed at those weaknesses which could

not be corrected without seriously reducing the power held by those
few at the top. We might, for instance, take actions which would result
in a serious overloading of the top levels by a crippling increase in the
number of problems referred upward for a decision. How far could the
Soviet system go in increasing the decision-making powers at the lower
ranks before it fell below the critical level of centralized control for
maintaining a dictatorship? We should explore all the ‘input’ points
available to us, and we should deliberately embark on a program for
increasing them, particularly at the lower levels. . . . deliberately ex-
periment in this area . . . investigate the nature of departures from rou-
tine which make any local action improbable. . . . We might create many
difficulties for the system by making as many of the situations it must
meet highly conditional.” (pp. 3–4)

Annex 6—Albania

Discusses possible defection of Albania in terms which add noth-

ing to our understanding of this problem and its potentialities.

Annex 7—Two Doctors

Skip it.

Annex 8—Political Warfare—United States vs. Russia

“. . . propaganda against the U.S.S.R. will be a squandering of money

and of personnel and may actually be harmful unless there is a certain
minimum coordination of words and acts. . . . unless its policy makers
know in advance of significant military, economic, and political moves
which are to be undertaken by all Government agencies . . . our pro-
grams of attack must be derived from the properties of the target, not
from the properties of the weapons we happen to have.” (pp. 2–3)

As objectives for VOA discusses friendship, creating doubt, re-

sistance, and social groupings by classes, sex and age, the peasantry,
nationality groups, party affiliation, and military-civil.

It recommends strongly against “the non-Party people being set

off against the Party members. This has long been a shaky proposition,
because it neglected the structure of the Party and the diversity of its
actual roles in Soviet society. . . . A very high proportion of displaced

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persons . . . maintain that a large number of the Party people are blame-
less, were forced into their membership, and do their best not to harm
people. . . . To stress the theme of Party as against non-Party people
might serve to push them deeper into the Party rather than away from
it.” The crucial differentiation is between “we” and “they”, “between
the ordinary, poor driven people both within and without the Party,
and those in power or associated and/or identified with it”. (p. 12)

“The suggested approach does not slight, minimize, or debunk So-

viet accomplishments. A series error is often made in assuming that
because so many Soviet citizens seem to have so strong a rejection of
the Soviet regime, they equally reject all of its works and institutions.
Nothing could be further from the truth. Work with defectors indicates
that even among the most disaffected there tends to be strong personal,
even emotional, identification with many of the features of society de-
veloped under Soviet rule. . . .

“By the same token, we should be exceedingly cautious in attack-

ing the Soviet system not to permit the impression that this means for
us the sweeping away of all the basic institutions of contemporary So-
viet society and their replacement by institutions imported from the
West. Our central appeal is the promise of an end to the oppressive,
compulsive totalitarian aspects of the Soviet regime. . . .

“. . . There are two closely related themes which meet the require-

ments indicated. The first stresses that the Soviet regime is impersonal,
harsh, capricious, with little or no respect for the human dignity or for
the basic rights to justice and fair play of a hardworking, decent, long-
suffering people. The second stresses that the Soviet people have made
great sacrifices and endured extraordinary hardship and suffering to
build up in the Soviet Union a great and powerful industry and a prom-
ising agricultural establishment, but they are being denied the fruits of
their labor and the just reward for their suffering—which itself need
never have been so great or so long-lasting—by a regime which is ex-
ploiting the ordinary people, peasant, worker, and intelligent [

sic

]

alike, for purposes of its own having nothing to do with the welfare of
the people.” (pp. 15–16)

Volume III

Annex 9—Personnel for Southeast Asia and Other Backward Areas

Proposes “the recruiting of a group of American youth willing and

able to spend two to four years of their lives in intimate personal con-
tact with the village people of Asia. Their primary task would be the
demonstration of suitably modified western techniques of public health

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and agriculture. . . . The training program would have, of course, to be
elaborated with care and modified on the basis of future experience
. . . whether the scheme proposed here can actually meet the need in
practice can only be found out by trying. The importance of the prob-
lem certainly justifies a pilot project to test the possibilities.” (pp. 1–3)

Annex 10—Population Problems

Notes futility of economic aid when “no ingenuity of Marxist di-

alectic, and no Point IV can reason away or buy off the rules of biology.”
In the not-very-long run the various proposed measures of assistance
“will increase in even greater proportion the number of mouths”.

Suggests efforts to build up in such areas of the Far East “some-

what different attitudes toward individual life than now exists. Specif-
ically, this change can be described in terms of encouraging mothers
to recognize the value of having a limited number of healthy, energetic
and well-nourished children rather than a succession of sick, feeble and
starving ones. . . . Demonstration that medicine and public health pro-
vide a more certain means of survival may well reduce the exagger-
ated drive towards numbers”. (pp. 1–2)

Annex 11—Research in Support of Political Warfare

“. . . it is particularly crucial that research be instituted which will

guide the central coordinating body charged with fashioning the over-
all national political welfare [

warfare

?] strategy. . . . [it]

must be of such

a kind that it provides partial predictions concerning the psychologi-
cal repercussions at home and abroad of economic, military, diplomatic,
and informational policies.”

Recommends study of the political control systems utilized for in-

fluencing the decisions of groups holding or seeking power, analysis
of the social structure of key target areas, and of basic attitudes of tar-
get populations, investigation of major channels of communication
within a country and existing attitudes towards materials carried in
these channels, continuing studies of domestic vulnerability to politi-
cal warfare, and research on the changing of attitudes.

Also recommends research in support of the defector program, on

the use of radio, the creation of the image of America, methods of dis-
rupting Russian administrative systems, vulnerabilities of Russian
satellite armed forces, revolutionary role of Russian intellectuals, the
concept of “United Europe”, the problem of inventing things for South-
east Asian requirements, the effectiveness of the exchange of persons,
and political warfare administration.

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Annex 12—Defectors

“The lesson of history is clear that exiles or defectors have played

a key role in revolutionary or counterrevolutionary movements. To the
extent that they have been supported and aided by foreign governments
. . . such support has usually paid good dividends in terms of national
interests to the foreign government . . . [

⁄

lines not declassified

]. If so,

however, the consequences of such techniques for our general defection
program must be carefully evaluated before any such decision is made.
. . . [

6 lines not declassified

] . . . The intelligentsia and the middle occupa-

tional elite are more strongly represented in the defector group than in
the total Russian population. A third (at least) of the defectors had Party
and/or Komsomol membership—this is

much

higher than a random

sample. This fact militates strongly against the contention that defectors
overwhelmingly represent the rejects of Soviet society or people who
were

never

able to adjust to the Soviet regime.” (pp. 5–19)

Annex 13—Forward Planning

Deals with the possible impact on our society of the developing

situation and its “threat to some of the historic qualities that we have
heretofore assumed to be an inherent part of our way of life”, diver-
sity, mobility, curiosity, and affection or sympathy. “We earnestly rec-
ommend a research program that will pool the energies and wisdom
of historians, anthropologists, economists and psychologists to analyze
the possible effects of a prolonged preparedness upon this society and
provide us with a basis for dealing intelligently with the life that lies
immediately before us.” (pp. 2–4)

[Comment: This might well be a desirable project for the Ford

Foundation to undertake.]

Annex 14—Public Opinion

“A special problem of public support might arise if Russia were

to appear to relax or stabilize her aggressive pressure. . . . Other prob-
lems of public support may well arise if the government adopts a pol-
icy of aggressive political warfare.” (p. 1)

Discusses, among the type of problems which can be anticipated:

How does public opinion influence foreign policy? How can policy be
best presented to earn support? How can public understanding and
support be increased? and America’s image of itself.

Annex 15—Stalin

“Since Stalin’s death offers the best opportunity for exploiting the

fear and self-interest of the Soviet elite with the aim of weakening the

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regime to the point where it can no longer threaten our world objec-
tives, and since the death of the dictator can occur at any time, it is of
the utmost importance to initiate planning for this eventuality without
delay. . . . it is proposed that a special section be set up within the Po-
litical Warfare Executive to concentrate exclusively on this task. . . . to
collect the views of the most competent students of Soviet Government
and society and those of recent refugees from the U.S.S.R. as to what is
likely to take place when Stalin dies. From these views, several hypotheses
should be developed. . . . For each one of these hypotheses the general
outline of a political warfare campaign would be developed. Failure to
have a strategy worked out might permit consolidation of power under
a new dictator, and we might have to wait another quarter of a century
(if we survive that long) for another opportunity.”

Annex 16—Biography of Team

Annex 17—Consultants

Annex 18—Project Troy Briefing

Volume IV

The annexes contained in Volume IV, 19 through 26 inclusive, all

deal with the various technical problems of breaking through the So-
viet jamming of VOA.

60.

Editorial Note

In a directive of April 4, 1951, to the Secretary of State, the Secre-

tary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence, President Tru-
man established the Psychological Strategy Board. His goal was to pro-
mote “more effective planning, coordination and conduct, within the
framework of approved national policies, of psychological operations.”
The Board, consisting of the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Sec-
retary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence, was to re-
port to the National Security Council. For text of the directive of April
4, see

Foreign Relations,

1951, volume I, pages 58–60. See also ibid., pages

902–965. President Truman appointed Gordon Gray as the first Direc-
tor of the Psychological Strategy Board.

The White House released an abbreviated version of the President’s

directive on June 20. See

Public Papers: Truman, 1951,

pages 341–342.

The Department of State initially opposed the creation of the Board

and later maintained that a Department member should chair the

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Board, arguing that it was “impossible . . . to entrust the formulation
and execution of policies and programs of political warfare to an agency
not subject or subordinate to the Department of State.” (Memorandum
from Under Secretary of State Webb to the Director, Bureau of the Bud-
get, March 15; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–54, 100.4
PSB/4–451) Ellipsis in the original.

Master files of minutes and papers of the PSB for the years of its

existence are ibid., S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 333. Additional material
on the establishment of the PSB and its operations is ibid., P Files: Lot
55 D 339, Barrett Files and ibid., Central Files 1950–54, 100.4/PSB,
511.00, and 711.5200.

61.

Paper Prepared in the Office of Policy Coordination of the
Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, April 4, 1951.

CIA/OPC STRATEGIC WAR PLAN

IN SUPPORT OF

THE JOINT OUTLINE EMERGENCY WAR PLAN

I. General

1. Purpose

This plan provides for conversion of peacetime covert operations

to wartime needs in support of military war plans based on forces avail-
able. This plan is limited to such operations and excludes considera-
tion of the manifold CIA/OPC responsibilities for covert operations in
peace, in cold war and in overt war not in direct support of military
war plans.

2. Definitions

a. For the purposes of this paper, “D (The) Day” refers to the day

on which actual, active combat operations of conventional warfare start
in a general war.

b. “Peace” as used herein refers to all situations short of overt gen-

eral war.

The Intelligence Community 121

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for Operations,

Job 79–01228A, Box 6. Top Secret. Printed from a copy that indicates that the last three
pages were revised on November 1.

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3. Assumptions

At any time after 1 January 1951, war may be forced upon the

United States and her Allies by acts of aggression on the part of the
USSR and/or her satellites.

a. (1)

Basic Assumption

(JCS). This plan may be effective at any

moment, but full implementation of the plan is predicated on actual
hostilities not starting before 30 June 1952.

Special Assumptions

(JCS).

(1) M–Day and D–Day may be the same.
(2) The USSR will have the following Allies:

Poland

Bulgaria

Eastern Germany

Communist China

Czechoslovakia

Outer Mongolia

Hungary

Albania (probably)

Rumania

The political alignment of Korea will depend on the outcome of

the UN actions there.

(3) The Western bloc will consist of the following:

(a) Allied with the United States at the outbreak of war:

United Kingdom

Italy

France

Portugal

Benelux

Australia

Denmark

New Zealand

Norway

South Africa

Iceland

Ceylon

Canada

(b) Bound to Allies by treaty commitments (subject to provisions

of the UN Charter):

1 UK and Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq

2 US and Philippines

3 US and Latin American countries (in varying degrees of

cooperation)

are unlikely to fight, especially outside of their own territory.

(d) The Allies will have base facilities at least in Japan.

(e) The status of the governments of Western Germany and Aus-

tria is dependent upon plans under NATO.

(f) Greece is entirely sympathetic and will help as far as possible.

(g) Sympathetic to the Western bloc but probably not belligerents

at the outset:

India

Pakistan

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(4) Neutral Countries

(a) Probable neutral countries unless attacked:

Switzerland

Afghanistan

Iran

Sweden

Burma

Yugoslavia

Spain

Thailand

Finland

Indonesia

Ireland

Israel

(5) Western European countries under NATO will have improved

economically and militarily but, except for the UK, will be unable to
resist effectively, being overrun and occupied.

(6) Atomic weapons will be used by both sides.
(7) Biological warfare

may

be used by either side.

(8) War may start with little or no warning. At best, it will be pre-

ceded by a period of political negotiations and tension which will give
the Allies a few months warning. The Allies may decide to start the
main attack.

(9) Part of the oil of the Middle East will become vital to the Al-

lied effort at some stage of the war.

(10) It is expected that the Soviets will employ subversive activi-

ties and unconventional warfare on a global scale and to an extent un-
paralleled in history.

Added Assumptions

(CIA). For the Armed Forces to capitalize on

CIA effort, they should on a top priority basis:

(1)

General

(a) Provide material, logistical, and administrative (communica-

tion) support from the Army.

(b) Ear-mark, effective for use on “D–Day” (or earlier if the immi-

nence of Soviet invasion is unmistakable), the necessary Air Support

from the Air Force to include coordinated and simultaneous attack by

both Air and Unconventional Forces and the execution of night opera-

tions for the purpose of infiltrating personnel and sabotage stores.

officer and enlisted personnel who are trained in Clandestine Warfare

under CIA auspices.

(2)

For Covert Operations in Europe

(a) Authorize a limited relaxation of security measures and activ-

ities in Europe under Army and/or Air Force cover and the allocation

to CIA of a safe Military training area in Germany for processing, bil-

leting, and administering limited number of CIA recruited Austrian

and German indigenes now available for training.

(b) Authorize the utilization by CIA of selected personnel from

U.S. controlled indigenous labor battalions in Germany as a source

for recruiting personnel to be trained and employed in Clandestine

Operations.

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the screening and selection of indigenous personnel to be recruited by
the Army under the Lodge Bill, so that an adequate percentage of the
personnel screened and accepted can be made available to CIA.

(d) In conjunction with CIA, set up without delay in the European

Theater a planning team to effectuate the above. This team to consist
of one each member from the Army, Air Forces, and CIA.

II. Mission

4. Strategic Concept Peace and War

Peace.

To conduct covert operations in support of U. S. foreign

policy objectives and to plan and prepare for support of military war
plans.

War.

In time of war to conduct covert operations in military the-

aters in support of military war plans as well as covert operations in
support of U.S. foreign policy directives. In areas outside of military
theaters, to conduct covert operations in support of over-all politico-
military war plans to reduce the Soviet war potential.

5. Basic Missions

Peace.

In general CIA/OPC’s present basic activities are specif-

ically prescribed in NSC 10/2 as follows:

(1) Propaganda
(2) Economic warfare
(3) Preventive direct action, including:

(a) Sabotage

(b) Anti-sabotage

(d) Evacuation.

(4) Subversion against hostile states, including:

(a) Assistance to underground resistance movements

(b) Assistance to guerrillas

(d) Support of anti-Communist elements in threatened countries.

(5) Planning and preparation, in conjunction with the JCS, for the

conduct of covert operations in wartime.

CIA/OPC has intensified and amplified certain of these cold war

activities in response to NSC 68, NSC 58/2, NSC 59, NSC 103/1, NSC
104 and other significant NSC documents.

124 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Regarding NSC 68 and NSC 59, see Documents 5 and 2, respectively. For NSC

58/2, see

Foreign Relations,

1949, vol. V, pp. 42–54. For NSC 103/1, see ibid., 1950, vol. V,

pp. 463–466. For NSC 104, see ibid., 1951, vol. I, pp. 1023–1034.

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War.

In time of war, or when the President directs, all plans for

covert operations shall be coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff
with a view to the accomplishment of the following mission:

THE UTILIZATION OF COVERT OPERATIONS TO THE

FULLEST PRACTICABLE EXTENT TO ASSIST IN ACCOMPLISHING
THE MILITARY DEFEAT OF THE U.S.S.R. AND HER SATELLITES.
HIGHEST PRIORITY AMONG COVERT OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT
OF MILITARY WAR PLANS WILL BE GIVEN TO THE RETARDA-
TION OF THE SOVIET ADVANCE IN WESTERN EUROPE.

6. Specific Undertakings

a. Support by covert means the following military undertakings:
(1) Essential defensive tasks

(a) Protection of the Western Hemisphere outside of the conti-

nental U.S.

(b) Defense of the U.K.

(2) Strategic air offensive

(a) The strategic air offensive will be directed against:

1 Soviet atomic air offensive

2 Support elements of Soviet offensive

3 Soviet industrial potential with emphasis on POL and trans-

portation facilities

(3) Operations in Western Eurasia

(a) Operations in Western Europe will include defensive operations;

if the situation renders it imperative, withdrawal until assumption of of-

fensive operations and reoccupation of lost territory. The defensive op-

erations by unconventional warfare forces in support of military war

plans will include, on highest priority, the retardation of the Soviet ad-

vance and attacks on Soviet forces and lines of communications at the

outset

of hostilities. Maximum pressure will be maintained during the

time that the Allied forces are engaged in the Western European defense.

(4) Control of essential lines of communication as follows:

(a) Western Hemisphere to U.K.

(b) Western Hemisphere to Gibraltar

(d) West coast of U.S. to Japan, Okinawa, Philippines Anzam area,

and Alaska

(e) U.K. to Gibraltar and Central and South Atlantic

(f) Gibraltar to Suez

b. Unconventional warfare against Soviet submarine and mining

potential.

c. Increase of psychological warfare upon the outbreak of general

overt war.

The Intelligence Community 125

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d. Increase of unconventional warfare upon the outbreak of gen-

eral overt war.

7. Phasing of Tasks—General

Present to “D Day”

(1) Preparation of CIA war plan and coordination of this plan

with that of the military theaters. Procurement and training of covert
personnel, stockpiling of supplies, and matériel to be used in support
of war plans. Conduct of approved covert operations.

(2) The activation and effectuation of such covert operations in

support of war plans (e.g., evacuation, sabotage, or counter-sabotage)
as may be ordered by competent authority.

(3) Preparation for the transition from peacetime execution of

covert operations to the wartime execution under the command of the
American Theater Commander. This will include activation of a spe-
cial CIA staff at the American Theater Commander’s headquarters.

First Phase (D to D

3 Months)

The implementation of covert operations in support of theater war

plans to cover withdrawals and in support of an air offensive. During
this phase and beginning at the outset of hostilities, highest priority
will be given to retardation of the Soviet advance, attacks on Soviet
forces, and interruption of Soviet LOC’s.

Second Phase (D

3 Months to D

12 Months)

Continuation of basic strategy of first phase to include the em-

phasis on the retardation of the Soviet advance.

Third Phase (D

12 Months to D

24 Months)

The implementation of covert operations in support of theater war

plans aimed at stabilizing the Soviet offensive. Upon stabilization of
the Soviet offensive, such covert operations will be directed toward en-
hancing the Allied position and toward initiating an Allied offensive
either in this phase or phase IV.

Fourth Phase (D

24 Months to End of War)

Continuation of basic strategy of second and third phase with in-

creasing emphasis on covert operations in support of an Allied offen-
sive and in support of the establishment of military government. Op-
erations to nullify “scorched earth” tactics on the part of the retreating
enemy will be mounted at this time.

III. TASKS FOR CIA/OPC DIVISIONS IN SUPPORT OF

MILITARY WAR OPERATIONS

8. General

Each geographical division will plan, develop facilities for, and ex-

ecute upon direction, covert operations in the countries within its area,

126 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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in coordination with and in support of the programs of other United
States Government agencies, as follows:

Eastern Europe:

Assist U.S. armed forces to

(1) Retard from the

outset

of hostilities, the Soviet advance, attack

the Soviet forces, destroy their lines of communication, and exert the
maximum pressure on them during the period that the Allied forces
are engaged in the defense of Western Europe. This is of highest
priority.

(2) Incite discontent amongst Soviet peoples with the Kremlin-

controlled government and keep alive and strengthen their hope for
eventual liberation therefrom.

(3) Develop the resistance potential of opposition elements within

the USSR and countries under its domination.

(4) Induce, by every stratagem and means possible, the defection

of satellite states and their separation from the USSR.

(5) After the Western Allies are prepared to capitalize thereon, in-

stigate revolts in selected countries in the area with a view to depos-
ing the communist regimes and replacing them with governments
which are friendly to the cause and subscribe to the principles set forth
in the U.N. Charter.

(6) Inhibit the growth of Soviet political and military capabilities

for further offensive action against the non-communist world.

(7) In countries in the area not under control of the USSR,

strengthen the will and ability of the peoples and the governments to
resist efforts at communist subversion.

(8) Assist the military theater commanders, in the event of hostil-

ities, in conducting such operations against the Soviet Union and its
satellites as will destroy the effectiveness of their combined military
forces, and the effectiveness of supporting communist parties, result-
ing in their replacement by governments sympathetic to the free world.

(9) Provide support to other competently authorized operations

and activities directed from or toward the area.

(10) Priority in CIA preparations for wartime operations insofar as

Western Europe is concerned will be in areas

east

of the Rhine–Alps line.

Western Europe

(1) Assist U.S. Armed Forces to retard, where and when applica-

ble, the Soviet advance, attack the Soviet forces, destroy their lines of
communication, and exert the maximum pressure on them during the

The Intelligence Community 127

Balkans, Greece, Czechoslovakia, Baltic States, Poland, Hungary, Germany, Aus-

tria, Switzerland, USSR. [Footnote in the original.]

Scandinavian Countries, Benelux, United Kingdom, France, Iberia, Italy, Trieste.

[Footnote in the original.]

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period that the Allied forces are engaged in the defense of Western Eu-
rope. This is of highest priority.

(2) Disaffect local Communist parties from the Cominform and

the CPSU(B).

(3) Dissipate the support and strength of the Communist party in

each country.

(4) Strengthen the will and ability of the peoples in the area to re-

sist both the internal and external forces of Communism.

(5) Prepare the peoples of the area, in case of attack by external

Communist forces, to engage in resistance activities and the Western
powers to communicate with, assist, and direct this resistance.

(6) Provide support to other competently authorized operations

and activities directed from or toward the area.

(7) Every possible precaution must be taken to insure that the pat-

tern of recruiting, organizing, and coordinating activities in North At-
lantic Treaty Organization areas does not indicate that the United States
lacks confidence that the line of the Rhine–Alps can be held. Such pre-
cautions may require the use of cover plans to conceal the true pur-
pose of preparations in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization areas.

Near East and Africa

(1) Acquaint the peoples in critical parts of the area with the im-

perialist and subversive aims of the USSR and local communist move-
ments.

(2) Strengthen the will and ability of the peoples in the area to re-

sist the internal and external encroachments of communist forces.

(3) Enroll the peoples and governments in the area on the side of

the West in the East-West conflict.

(4) Ensure the availability to the Western world, and the denial to

the USSR and satellites, of the strategically important resources of the
area.

(5) Alleviate the conflicts and differences between or among coun-

tries within the area with a view to establishing harmonious relations
between the various states in the area.

(6) Prepare the peoples of those areas likely to be overrun by hos-

tile forces in case of war to carry on resistance activities, and the West-
ern allies to communicate with, assist, and direct this resistance.

(7) Provide support to other competently authorized operations

and activities directed from or towards the area.

128 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

All of Africa, Israel, Arab States, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordania, Saudi Arabia,

Yemen, Turkey, Iran, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Ceylon, Tibet. [Footnote in the
original.]

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Far East

(1) Frustrate by all possible means the efforts of the USSR to es-

tablish a regime in China subservient to the interests of the USSR; and
to consolidate its control over the territories and peoples of China.

(2) Foster the emergence of and develop a Chinese political lead-

ership which can command popular support of the Chinese people and
not be subject to domination by the USSR.

(3) Dissipate the support and strength of local Communist parties

in those countries where such parties are actively functioning.

(4) In countries in the area not under the control of the USSR or

the Communist Party of China, acquaint the peoples and governments
with Communist aims and strengthen their will and ability to resist ef-
forts at Communist subversion.

(5) In countries in the area likely to be overrun by Communist

forces, prepare the peoples thereof to engage in resistance activities and
the Western Allies to communicate with, assist, and direct this resistance.

(6) Develop the resistance potential of opposition elements in East-

ern USSR.

(7) Provide support to other competently authorized operations

or activities directed from or toward the area.

Western Hemisphere

(1) Dissipate the support and strength of the local Communist

party in those countries where one is actively functioning.

(2) Strengthen the will and ability of the peoples in the area to re-

sist both the internal and external forces of communism.

(3) Ensure the availability to the United States and its Allies, and

the denial to the USSR and satellites, of those strategically important
resources designated by compotent authority.

(4) Provide support to other competently authorized operations

and activities directed from or toward the area.

Psychological Staff Division

(1) To provide the over-all direction, technical guidance, and

means (as required) to Area Divisions for exploitation of economic, po-
litical, propaganda, and scientific situations.

(2) To plan and develop facilities for covert economic, political,

propaganda, and scientific operations, and execute those operations re-
quiring centralized control and which transcend military theaters of
operations and are not within the operational capabilities of the Area
Divisions, to:

The Intelligence Community 129

Siam, Malaya, Indonesia, Philippines, Burma, China, Japan, Okinawa, Korea, New

Zealand, Australia, Pacific Islands. [Footnote in the original.]

South and Central Americas. [Footnote in the original.]

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(a) Weaken the position of the Soviet Bloc and strengthen the po-

sition of the U.S. and Allies.

(b) Combat the activities of Communist-controlled international

organizations.

organizations to resist Communist effort at subversion, and encourage
these organizations in anti-Communist activities.

(d) Encourage the subjects of the USSR and its Satellites to desert

Communist jurisdiction, renounce allegiance to their rulers, and seek
haven in non-Communist jurisdiction; provide interim sanctuary and
support to such disaffected peoples and other refugees from USSR and
Satellite jurisdiction; and prepare for their employment in the task of
liberating their respective homelands.

(e) Accomplish such other missions as may be assigned from time

to time in the pursuit of opportunities or support of other projects.

9. Operational Forces

a. Tab “A”

outlines the CIA/OPC operational forces available on

a phased basis.

b. Tab “B” outlines the Air Force support requirements.
c. Tab “C” outlines the Naval support requirements.

IV. Administrative and Logistical Matters

Requirements for logistical support, bases, and personnel and ma-

teriel in the ZI for period from 1 July 1952 to 1 July 1954 will follow.

V. Command, Communications, and Liaison Matters

11. The command and communications channel of CIA will be from

the Headquarters in Washington to its principal headquarters in the field.
In active theaters of war where American forces are engaged, covert op-
erations will be conducted under the direct command of the American
Theater Commander and orders therefore will be transmitted through
the Joint Chiefs of Staff unless otherwise directed by the President.

12. For reasons of security and adequate liaison, the DCI shall

maintain independent communications with designated representa-
tives overseas, including lateral communications between theaters.
Arrangements for such communications shall be coordinated with
those of the military.

13. Command and Liaison Procedures for War Planning of Covert

Operations in Theaters (see Annex 1).

130 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

None of the tabs are printed.

Not printed. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for Op-

erations, Job 79–01228A, Box 6)

Not printed.

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62.

Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff
(Nitze) to the Under Secretary of State (Webb)

Washington, April 9, 1951.

Mr. McWilliams asked me to set down briefly my ideas concern-

ing the functions of the new Psychological Strategy Board.

In partic-

ular I want to state my exceptions to Mr. Barrett’s memorandum to you
of March 29, 1951, on the subject: Plans for Psychological Strategy
Board.

That memorandum speaks of the board’s jurisdiction as including

“the development of proposals in the field of military, political and eco-
nomic action geared for psychological effect and to the development
of campaigns directed toward important psychological objectives and
embracing action in these fields as well as the fields of purely psy-
chological activity”. It envisages the board as operating as a central au-
thority on political warfare—”as recommended by the Troy group”.

The Troy group, you will recall, was originally given warrant to

study the problem of defeating Russian jamming of the Voice of Amer-
ica. The group widened its own jurisdiction to include the content of
the programs to be protected against jamming. The group interpreted
this widened jurisdiction to include the substance of “political war-
fare”. The group interpreted “political warfare” to include the Marshall
Plan, Point IV, ECA operations in the Far East, and the like. The group
referred to political warfare as “inter-connected simultaneous use of all
instruments of international action”. The group envisaged political
warfare as the range of activities which, if successful, “will make an
all-out shooting war impossible for Russia and unnecessary for us”.

The group then called for an “aggressive” political warfare program

instead of the current efforts, which the group labeled “defensive”.

The group discovered a need that “the many elements of our na-

tional power, political, economic, military,” be “wielded as an inte-
grated effort”. In the group’s phrasing, “We therefore urge the unifi-
cation of political warfare”.

The group thus called for “some single authority”. This was

to have “capacity to design a comprehensive program and power to

The Intelligence Community 131

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 64 D 563, Chronological. Top Se-

cret. Drafted by Marshall.

See Document 60.

The memorandum by Barrett has not been found. An unsigned March 26 draft

prepared by Leon Crutcher of the Management Staff is in National Archives, RG 59,
P Files: Lot 55 D 339.

See footnote 5, Document 57 and Document 58.

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obtain execution of this program”. The authority was to be “concerned
with political warfare exclusively”, but the phrase, as we have seen,
was interpreted to embrace all aspects of foreign policy.

The Troy group went vastly beyond its original terms of reference

and explored a field for which it had no special competence and about
which it had little information. In effect it proposed a new board to
take over the jurisdiction of all the agencies operating in the foreign
field, of the NSC, and in part of the President himself.

I think I have stated sufficiently my misgivings about the Troy re-

port as a frame of reference for the new board. I have the same mis-
givings about the reference in Mr. Barrett’s memorandum to “the de-
velopment of proposals in the field of military, political and economic
action geared for psychological effect and to the development of cam-
paigns directed toward important psychological objectives and em-
bracing action in these fields as well as fields of purely psychological
activity”.

In my view, if the board were to follow out the implications of the

Troy report and the language cited from Mr. Barrett’s memorandum,
the result would be a harmful duplication and conflict of authority with
established agencies and a missing of the potentially very valuable ob-
jective set up for the board in the establishing directive.

The board obviously is not intended as a new agency to determine

or formulate the ends of our foreign policy. Its primary jurisdiction has
to do with means of our policy—those means devoted directly to af-
fecting the state of mind within the adversary’s camp. I employ the
word “directly” advisedly. I am aware that all of our policy—ends and
means—relates in some way to the state of mind in the adversary’s
camp. Certain of the means for carrying out that policy act indirectly
on his state of mind as a collateral effect. I do not believe these means
fall within the board’s primary jurisdiction. Other means are designed
for direct effect on that state of mind. These clearly do fall within the
board’s primary jurisdiction.

I believe the board should bring about a sharpening of effort in re-

gard to our behind-the-iron-curtain information program, our defector
program, our covert activities within the adversary’s fold, and the like.
It should seek to ensure that no opportunity for such activities goes
unexploited and that the activities are consistent among the various
agencies carrying them out. When this part of our effort might be
helped by a clarification of policy or broadening the effort to interpret
that policy on some other front, the board should be alert to the op-
portunity to call the matter to the attention of the agency or agencies
concerned. If the board should undertake to formulate programs
“geared for psychological effect” in the field of military, political and
economic action and “embracing action in these fields as well as fields

132 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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of purely psychological activity”, there would be no stopping place
short of assuming jurisdiction over the whole range of our foreign pol-
icy—ends and means.

Paul H. Nitze

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

63.

Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National
Security Council (Lay) to the National Security Council

Washington, April 9, 1951.

SUBJECT

NSC 10/3 and NSC 10/4

REFERENCES

A. NSC 10/2

B. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “NSC 10/3” and subject:

“NSC 10/3 and NSC 10/4”, dated February 6 and March 30, 1951,
respectively

The enclosed memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence

on the subject reports is submitted herewith for consideration by the
National Security Council of the proposal contained in paragraph 1
thereof.

Accordingly, it is requested that each Council member indicate his

action with respect to the proposal contained in the first paragraph of

The Intelligence Community 133

Source: Truman Library, Harry S. Truman Papers, President’s Secretary’s Files,

Subject File. Top Secret.

For a draft of NSC 10/3, see the attachment to Document 43. For NSC 10/4, Jan-

uary 16, see Document 42. NSC 10/4 was withdrawn on December 13, after the approval
of NSC 10/5; see Document 90.

For text, see

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Estab-

lishment, Document 292. This text cites the 1951 revised language of paragraph 4 that
includes the added final phase “unless otherwise directed by the President.” See foot-
note 6 below.

Lay’s February 6 memorandum to the National Security Council transmitted the

CIA’s draft directive on NSC 10/3 along with a memorandum from Under Secretary
Webb outlining the views of the Department of State. Lay’s memorandum also indicated
that the National Security Resources Board concurred in the proposed directive. (Na-
tional Archives, RG 273, Policy Papers, NSC 10/3, Box 3) Lay’s March 30 memorandum
has not been found (see footnote 6 below).

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the enclosure by completing and returning the attached memorandum
form.

Furthermore, if the proposal in paragraph 1 of the enclosure is ap-

proved,

it is requested that all copies of NSC 10/3 and of the refer-

ence memorandum of March 30 be returned to this office in accordance
with the recommendation contained in paragraph 2 of the enclosure.

With respect to NSC 10/4, it is suggested that further Council con-

sideration of that report be deferred until additional recommendations
regarding it are submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence at a
later date, as indicated in the last paragraph of the enclosure.

It is requested that special security precautions be taken in the handling

of this material and that access be limited to individuals requiring the infor-
mation contained herein in order to carry out their official duties.

James S. Lay, Jr.

Enclosure

Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Smith to
the National Security Council

Washington, April 9, 1951.

SUBJECT

NSC 10/3 and NSC 10/4

1. As a result of a conference held on 5 April 1951 by the Deputy

Secretary of Defense Lovett, Under Secretary of State Webb, General
Bradley, and the undersigned,

it was agreed that the differences among

134 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Not found.

Truman approved the proposal for a new paragraph 4 of NSC 10/2 in an April

16 memorandum to Lay. In a handwritten note he added: “It is a proper suggestion. I
approve it.” (Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s Secretary’s Files,
Subject File) Lay informed the Council by memorandum of April 16 that the statutory
members of the Council had approved the new paragraph 4. This settled the controversy
between CIA and the JCS (see Document 42) and draft NSC 10/3 was withdrawn. The
President’s copy of Lay’s April 16 memorandum bears a handwritten notation dated
May 25, 1951, by Rose A. Conway, Administrative Assistant in the President’s office, in-
dicating that copies of NSC 10/3 and Lay’s memorandum of March 30 had been returned
to Lay for destruction.

Top Secret.

The conference is described in Montague,

General Walter Bedell Smith as Director

of Central Intelligence,

p. 207.

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the interested agencies with regard to the proposed changes in NSC
10/2 could best be composed by substituting for paragraph 4 thereof
the following:

“4. In time of war, or when the President directs, all plans for

covert operations shall be coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In

active theaters of war where American forces are engaged, covert op-

erations will be conducted under the direct command of the American

Theater Commander and orders therefor will be transmitted through

the Joint Chiefs of Staff unless otherwise directed by the President.”

2. Accordingly, it is recommended that NSC 10/3, and the com-

menting paper thereon by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 27 March
1951,

be withdrawn.

3. If this recommendation is accepted by the National Security

Council, the basic directive for covert operations by the Office of Pol-
icy Coordination of the Central Intelligence Agency (NSC 10/2) will
remain in effect with paragraph 4 thereof changed as indicated in para-
graph 1, above. This document leaves something to be desired but it
is workable. Discussions relative to the details of authority and re-
sponsibility, which appear inevitably to follow any significant change,
can thus be minimized. Those which cannot be avoided when two
or more agencies of Government are cooperating in pursuit of a com-
mon objective can be continued indefinitely on the staff level without
militating against the effectiveness of important operations now in
progress.

4. Further recommendations regarding final action on NSC 10/4

(Responsibilities of CIA with Respect to Guerrilla Warfare) will be sub-
mitted at a later date when it is determined to what extent, if any, these
responsibilities can be transferred or decentralized to other agencies of
the Government.

Walter B. Smith

The Intelligence Community 135

Not found.

Printed from a copy that indicates Smith signed the original.

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64.

Letter From Secretary of Defense Marshall to Director of
Central Intelligence Smith

Washington, April 13, 1951.

Dear General Smith:

Reference is made to your memorandum of 26 December 1950,

transmitting a general statement of the support needed by the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) from the Department of Defense.

The military agencies accept the commitment for furnishing one

or two officers each to CIA to aid in the preparation of national intel-
ligence estimates.

Your request for special consideration in obtaining military per-

sonnel for use in clandestine intelligence and covert operations entails
budgetary, personnel and training implications which must be consid-
ered by the three Services in their manpower plans. If you will furnish
the Department of Defense with more detailed breakdown with respect
to the numbers of enlisted and officer personnel desired from each of
the Services, the qualifications desired in such personnel, and the rate
at which you desire they be supplied, I will be glad to consider the
matter further.

With respect to the use of certain facilities at Army, Navy and Air

Force installations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will welcome discussion of
the details of such requirements and be receptive to any reasonable de-
mands which will further the national security.

[

1 paragraph (12 lines) not declassified

]

The assignment of CIA representatives to the military staffs in the-

aters of operations will be dependent upon the relationship between
those representatives and the theater commanders. This is now under
consideration in NSC 10/3 proposed by CIA.

With reference to your request that you be kept fully informed of

operational decisions and plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I am in-
formed that the policy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this matter has
been transmitted to you in JICM–1205 of 25 September 1950.

Permanent liaison between elements of the Central Intelligence

Agency and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including a method of furnishing

136 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 95–G00278R, Box 1,

Folder 9. Top Secret.

Document 36.

For the draft text of NSC 10/3, see the attachment to Document 43.

Not found.

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advice and guidance on essential elements of information, appears to
be established through frequent working-level contacts with the Serv-
ice intelligence agencies and the representative of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff on the Intelligence Advisory Committee. Should any deficiencies
exist under this arrangement, I would appreciate having them brought
to my attention.

As the remaining proposals made in your memorandum will be

directly affected by the decisions reached with respect to revision of
NSC 10/2 and NSCID 5,

it is believed advisable to defer a definite re-

ply until final action on the proposed revisions has been taken.

Faithfully yours,

G. C. Marshall

See Document 255 for the revision of NSCID No. 5.

Printed from a copy that indicates Marshall signed the original.

65.

Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Smith to
the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Intelligence
Conference (Hoover)

Washington, April 17, 1951.

SUBJECT

Need for Specific Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Information

Your memorandum of 28 February 1951,

outlining the need for

specific intelligence and counter-intelligence information on the part
of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, was handed to us on
22 March 1951 by Major General Bolling. This Agency realizes that the
type of information which you describe is becoming more and more
necessary and vital to the internal security of the United States, ap-
preciates your action in specifying the types of information desired by
your Committee and welcomes the opportunity to comment on the
problem you have presented.

The Intelligence Community 137

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01731R, Box 29.

Secret.

Not found.

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In our overseas operations our ability to achieve satisfactory re-

sults in the fields of interest to the IIC depends in some areas upon ob-
taining the cooperation of local intelligence and security organizations.
These local organizations have, in varying degrees, useful information
on the specific targets listed in your memorandum. We could secure
more information from these local agencies if we were able, within the
limits prescribed by the primary requirements of our own security, to
work out an exchange of information and to furnish them on a basis
of reciprocity some information on these subjects developed within the
United States.

Furthermore, we could more effectively address the work of this

Agency to the targets set out in your memorandum if there were a
closer coordination of the intelligence on Soviet controlled espionage
activities abroad and the intelligence on such activities in this country.

To this end, the CIA would be glad to consider with the IIC agen-

cies the desirability of designating a CIA liaison representative to at-
tend meetings of the IIC or to serve as a member of a working group
of the IIC in order to facilitate the exchange of information which will
be mutually helpful.

Walter B. Smith

Printed from a copy that indicates Smith signed the original.

66.

Letter From the Chairman of the Interdepartmental
Intelligence Conference (Hoover) to Director of Central
Intelligence Smith

Washington, May 2, 1951.

Dear General Smith:

Your memorandum of April 17, 1951,

concerning the IIC need

for specific intelligence and counterintelligence information, has
been received and considered by the Interdepartmental Intelligence
Conference.

138 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01731R, Box 29.

Confidential; Via Liaison. The letter is on FBI stationery.

Document 65.

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67.

Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for
Public Affairs (Barrett) to the Under Secretary of State
(Webb)

Washington, May 14, 1951.

SUBJECT

Plans for New PSB

On Tuesday, May 8, a meeting was called by General Smith in CIA

to discuss plans for the new PSB. This meeting was attended by Mr.
Dulles, Admiral Stevens, General Magruder, Mr. Wisner and myself.
Minutes of the meeting are being prepared by CIA and a copy will be
sent to your office in case you would like to look at them.

No firm recommendations were made as to the substantive prob-

lems which the Board should attack. General Smith expressed the opin-
ion, however, that the PSB should have as one of its functions taking
high policy from NSC and other sources and translating this into psy-
chological warfare objectives. Admiral Stevens felt that the Board
should concern itself largely with use of psychological warfare in the
cold war and General Smith believes it might constitute a “general
staff” for the cold war.

At the end of the meeting General Smith requested that each

agency concerned designate two men to draft recommendations for the
consideration of the Board members. This working group is to address
itself to the following questions:

1. What kind of a staff will the Board need?

2. How should this staff proceed?

3. What mechanisms are presently available which could be used

for the conduct of the Board’s business.

4. What should be the initial program of the Board?

Allen Dulles and I registered mild objections to the above. We felt

that the Board should consume as little time as possible on formal con-
sideration of mechanisms, organizational problems, etc.—and certainly
should not get involved in a lot of formal papers on this subject. Both
of us expressed the belief that we would like to see the Board get go-
ing immediately on certain substantive problems—like our over-all
strategy with regard to Iran, or overloading the Soviet administrative

140 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–54, 100.4–PSB/5–1451.

Secret. Sent through S/S, and initialed by Webb.

The minutes have not been found.

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system. The General seemed to agree in part, but, I gather, felt that
some minimum organizational planning would be necessary.

I have asked Mr. Phillips Davison, Executive Secretary of the Psy-

chological Operations Coordinating Board, to represent the Depart-
ment on this working group. He would be accompanied by Mr.
Crutcher from Mr. Humelsine’s office when organizational problems
are being considered, and by Mr. Phillips from this office when policy
matters are under discussion.

The first meeting of this working group has been called for next

Wednesday.

E.W.B.

68.

Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National
Security Council (Lay) to the Director of the Policy Planning
Staff (Nitze), the Department of Defense Representative on
the National Security Council Senior Staff (Nash), the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Representative on the National Security
Council Senior Staff (Wooldridge), and the Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence (Jackson)

Washington, May 14, 1951.

SUBJECT

Scope and Pace of Covert Operations

At the direction of the President you have been designated as a

special group of the Senior NSC Staff to consider the attached memo-
randum on the subject from the Director of Central Intelligence, and
to prepare for the Council’s consideration appropriate recommenda-
tions with respect thereto.

In performing this function it is anticipated that you will work in

close collaboration with your respective principals in order to reflect
their views during the staff work, and with the designated represent-
atives of your respective departments and agencies under NSC 10/2

The Intelligence Community 141

Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s Secretary’s Files,

Subject File. Top Secret; Eyes Only.

Regarding NSC 10/2, see footnote 2, Document 42.

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in order to realize the advantages of their knowledge and experience
in this field.

After allowing time for your study of the attached memorandum,

a meeting will be scheduled within the next week or so.

It is requested that extraordinary security precautions be taken in the

handling of this project and that knowledge of and access to the attached mem-
orandum and subsequent documents be restricted to the minimum required
for adequate staff work. Copies of or extracts from this and subsequent docu-
ments should not be made without permission of this office.

James S. Lay, Jr.

Attachment

Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence
(Smith) to the National Security Council

Washington, May 8, 1951.

SUBJECT

Scope and Pace of Covert Operations

The Problem

1. To obtain more specific guidance from the National Security

Council in order to define the projected scope and pace of covert op-
erations in aid of current overt cold-war and of military preparations
to meet overt global war, and to insure timely and effective support
for such operations.

Pertinent Facts

2. The following facts highlight the need for this guidance and

support:

a. To meet its responsibilities for covert operations, the Central In-

telligence Agency has already had to increase its personnel and ex-
penditures to an extent believed to exceed the scope contemplated by
the National Security Council when it authorized covert operations in
the summer of 1948.

b. Even more considerable increases will be required in the near

future if this agency is to discharge the missions already specifically

142 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Top Secret; Eyes Only.

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proposed to it by the Departments of State and Defense and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff or undertaken on the initiative of CIA with the approval
of such Departments. Still greater increases would be required to ac-
complish the missions which are apparently envisioned under the NSC
68 series (and of which segments are found in various other NSC pa-
pers; e.g., NSC 58/2, NSC 59, NSC 103/1, and NSC 104).

These in-

creases are beyond CIA’s present administrative support capabilities.

c. High level policy decisions are required not only on the issue of

these increases in themselves, but on the direction and nature of covert
operations. For example, to what extent will the United States support
counter-revolution in the slave states? A Joint Chiefs of Staff memoran-
dum to the Director of Central Intelligence, 28 March 1951,

raises a re-

lated issue: The view of the JCS that CIA give maximum emphasis to
preparations for the retardation of Soviet advances in Europe beginning
on D Day. In view of CIA’s presently limited facilities this request raises
the issue of the priorities as between covert-cold-war activities and covert
activities to support the military in the event of a general war.

Discussion

3. Pursuant to the provisions of NSC 10/2, CIA has been actively

engaged for over two years in the planning and conduct of covert op-
erations in the general fields of activity specifically provided for
therein, viz:

a. propaganda

b. economic warfare

c. preventive direct action, including—

(1) sabotage

(2) anti-sabotage

(3) demolition

(4) evacuation

d. subversion against hostile states, including—

(1) assistance to underground resistance movements

(2) assistance to guerrillas

(3) assistance to refugee liberation groups

(4) support of anti-Communist elements in threatened countries

e. Planning and preparation, in conjunction with the JCS, for the

conduct of covert operations in wartime.

The Intelligence Community 143

Regarding the NSC 68 series, see Document 5. For NSC 58/2, “U.S. Policy To-

ward the Soviet Satellite States in Eastern Europe,” December 8, 1949, see

Foreign Rela-

tions,

1949, vol. V, pp. 42–54. Regarding NSC 59, NSC 103/1, and NSC 104, see footnote

2, Document 61.

Not found.

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4. Subsequent to NSC 10/2, the NSC 68 series called for an in-

tensification of covert operations in the fields of economic, political
and psychological warfare with the purpose of rolling back the perime-
ter of Soviet power and the ultimate frustration of the Kremlin design.
As a result, the covert activities of CIA have been stepped up con-
siderably, even though the policies established by NSC 68 have
never been spelled out in terms of a specific covert program directive
to CIA.

5. Specifically, the currently stepped-up covert projects of CIA (see

more detailed listing at Tab “A”) are being prosecuted in five areas of
the world as follows [

1 line not declassified

Western Europe [

dollar amount not declassified

]

Emphasis on: psychological and labor operations especially [

less

than 1 line not declassified

], organization of stay-behind and resistance

groups in all Western Europe [

less than 1 line not declassified

], political

action [

less than 1 line not declassified

] and a pilot economic warfare op-

eration [

less than 1 line not declassified

Eastern Europe [

dollar amount not declassified

]

Emphasis on: psychological warfare [

less than 1 line not declassified

];

extensive special political operations [

less than 1 line not declassified

]; or-

ganization of resistance groups in Eastern Europe and the Baltic; and
expansion of the [

less than 1 line not declassified

] underground.

Near East [

dollar amount not declassified

]

Emphasis on: preliminary exploratory activities [

less than 1 line not

declassified

]; denial of [

less than 1 line not declassified

] oil fields; psycho-

logical and labor operations throughout the Near East.

Far East [

dollar amount not declassified

]

Emphasis on: guerrilla warfare and escape and evasion in [

less than

1 line not declassified

]; stay-behind preparations [

less than 1 line not declas-

sified

]; psychological and labor activities throughout the Far East; preclu-

sive buying; [

2 lines not declassified

Latin America [

dollar amount not declassified

]

Emphasis on: preliminary exploratory activities, propaganda, and

the establishment of a mechanism for these and other activities on an
expanded scale.

Special Projects [

dollar amount not declassified

]

Emphasis on: National Committee for Free Europe and its agency,

Radio Free Europe; training foreign agents in the United States; sup-

144 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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port of international anti-Communist labor and youth organizations;
and the development of outlets for propaganda against foreign targets.

Research and Development [

dollar amount not declassified

]

Overhead [

dollar amount not declassified

]

6. [

1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified

]

7. [

7 paragraphs (26 lines) not declassified

]

8. The above missions, current and proposed, representing a very

considerable number of covert cold-war projects, constitute in them-
selves a rather extensive preparation to conduct covert operations in
support of the military effort in the event of the outbreak of a general
war. Nevertheless, they do not comprise the comprehensive cold-war
program clearly contemplated by NSC 68. In the absence of a specific
detailed plan for conducting a comprehensive cold-war program, it is
not possible to make an accurate estimate of manpower, matériel, and
money required. Nor, in the absence of detailed overt war plans is it
possible to make an accurate estimate of the requirements of full-scale
covert operational support of an all-out military effort. Nevertheless,
it is possible, on the basis of the requirements of the programs already
under way or in the planning stage, to make an informed guess of the
general order of magnitude of a covert apparatus capable of support-
ing either an effort to prevent overt war or an all-out military effort in
the event of such war. [

⁄

line not declassified

] (These estimates exclude

additional requirements for military personnel and for funds to stock-
pile and resupply certain standard military items for guerrillas and re-
sistance groups. For further detail see Tab “B”.)

9. Thus, the Central Intelligence Agency is faced with the fact that

its covert operations are outstripping its present administrative capa-
bilities. Even an apparatus of the magnitude required to discharge the
relatively limited cold war and military support programs, outlined by
paragraphs 5 and 7 above, calls for an administrative organization of
considerably greater strength than now present in CIA to solve effec-
tively the complex planning and logistical problems involved. Specif-
ically, there would be required a staff comparable to that of a Major
Command, procurement and production machinery for those items not
properly assignable to the Department of Defense, and additional fa-
cilities for: training, security clearances, communications, headquarters
office space, and other requisite administrative and logistical services.
Without such augmentation the growing magnitude of covert opera-
tions will tend to divert an ever increasing share of the time and at-
tention of CIA key personnel from the basic intelligence mission of the
Agency, with the attendant risk that such mission will not be ade-
quately accomplished.

The Intelligence Community 145

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10. Although the cumulation of missions already undertaken by

CIA, to say nothing of those now proposed to CIA, may transcend the
original intentions of NSC 10/2, the NSC 68 series leaves little doubt
that it is our national policy to conduct covert operations on a very
large scale. It is the view of CIA that all of these things can and should
be done. But before launching CIA into such large activities, a number
of high level policy decisions and certain vital assurances are required
from the National Security Council. The following paragraphs deal
with the qualitative nature of the required guidance.

11. It appears that the Office of Policy Coordination was originally

created to be primarily an agency to execute covert support to cold war
activities (with planning and preparation for covert support in the
event of hot war as an additional responsibility). However, the in-
creasing scope and pace of hot war preparation is tending to over-
shadow this original purpose. The cold war program (though essen-
tially political in conception) is heavily weighted with military
considerations; equally, the hot war preparations (though essentially
military in conception) are heavily weighted with political considera-
tions. Because CIA’s present responsibilities cover both current cold
war covert operations and certain covert aspects of preparations for
hot war, it has perhaps been more immediately aware than other in-
terested agencies of the need for delineation of policies and priorities
as between these programs and of the need for more definitive ma-
chinery to give both programs politico-military guidance on a contin-
uing basis. The machinery established under NSC 10/2, i.e., the des-
ignated representatives of the Departments of State and Defense, has
consisted of individuals of the most exceptional qualifications, who
have been of the greatest assistance in developing projects. The efforts
of these representatives have been augmented by those of an equally
well qualified and helpful representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
However, this machinery was not designed to develop strategic guid-
ance of the order required by the far-reaching policy determination of
NSC 68 and other post-NSC 10/2 policy papers.

12. An illustration of the need for such strategic guidance is the

problem raised by the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as expressed in
its memorandum of 28 March 1951, that the Central Intelligence Agency
should give top priority to preparations for the retardation of a Soviet
military advance across Europe. The responsibilities of the Director of
Central Intelligence under NSC 10/2 are such that he cannot accept
this view as controlling without assurance that this military policy will
also be consistent with the foreign policy of the United States. Only a
National Security Council decision can give this assurance in a matter
of such moment. Such a decision will require a determination of rela-
tive priorities and of the extent to which the United States is willing to
support and follow up on counter-revolution in the slave states. Polit-

146 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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ical and matériel support on a national scale is required to back up and
capitalize on any counter-revolution which may be engendered. Only
the National Security Council can insure such support.

13. It is true that the covert apparatus needed for the cold war is

similar to that needed to support the military effort in a hot war. How-
ever, there are numerous important differences in detail and in timing.
For example, it is clearly desirable from the standpoint of either cold
war or hot war to develop the potential of resistance groups in East-
ern Europe. How much of this potential to develop, when to release it,
and how much to hold in reserve are problems which can be and are
argued differently by the military and by the political experts. Again
CIA must seek politico-military guidance at the NSC level to determine
where and how to build and utilize its covert assets.

14. Another area requiring such guidance pertains to the question

of concealing U.S. participation in covert activities which cannot re-
main completely covert. The training of indigenous personnel for re-
sistance and guerrilla activity, the mounting of guerrilla operations, all
become more difficult to cover as the size of the effort increases and
the time for field operations approaches. [

3 lines not declassified

] Some-

where in the process it becomes pointless to attempt to deceive the en-
emy on U.S. participation, just as it would have been naive for the
U.S.S.R. to expect the U.S. to believe it had no part in supporting and
directing the Greek Communist guerrilla operations. Only continuing
guidance from the National Security Council level can insure sound
decisions in this field.

15. Finally, it is urged that these matters call for immediate reso-

lution by the National Security Council. It requires approximately
eighteen months to build the base from which all-out covert operations
can be launched. The building of the U.S. covert base and apparatus is
not proceeding at the required pace and cannot until the specific de-
termination and guidance discussed above have been issued by the
National Security Council.

Conclusions and Recommendations

16. The above discussion leads to the following conclusions which

are stated in the form of recommendations to the National Security
Council:

a. That in view of the magnitude issue as well as the guidance

needed to give proper direction to stepped up covert operations, the
National Security Council initiate a comprehensive review of the covert
operations situation.

b. That this review contain a restatement or redetermination as

appropriate of the several responsibilities and authorities involved in
U.S. covert operations.

The Intelligence Community 147

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c. That if the above review results in a reaffirmation of the deci-

sion to place covert operational responsibility within the Central In-
telligence Agency—the Central Intelligence Agency should be pro-
vided necessary support from other agencies of the government to
insure the successful discharge of this responsibility including the fol-
lowing specific assurances:

(1) Adequate provisions for joint planning with the Armed Forces

for covert activities and operations in support of wartime military

operations, spelling out a clear delineation of authorities, duties and

responsibilities.

(2) Specific guidance for dealing with the military in fields where

the same covert apparatus is being developed to engage in high pri-

ority cold war missions as well as to be available to the military in the

event of overt war.

(3) More specific provision for insuring that the foreign policy and

political considerations which are involved in covert operations are

brought to bear on determinations of politico-military significance.

(4) Specific provisions to insure that the type and quantities of per-

sonnel, administrative and logistical support required of other gov-

ernmental departments and agencies for the prosecution of the covert

effort will be forthcoming as necessary.

d. That where guidance for covert operations is of concern to more

than one Department, this guidance be coordinated and issued to the
Central Intelligence Agency (and to other participating agencies) by the
new Psychological Strategy Board.

Walter B. Smith

Tab A

[

2 pages not declassified

]

Tab B

[

1 page not declassified

]

148 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Printed from a copy that indicates Smith signed the original.

Top Secret; Eyes Only.

Eyes Only.

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69.

Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Public Affairs (Sargeant) to the Under Secretary of State
(Webb)

Washington, May 24, 1951.

Program Planning for Psychological Warfare

The National Security Council has directed that in any actual the-

ater of war the Department of Defense will be responsible for psycho-
logical activities. However, as it is agreed that the State Department’s
program of International Information and Educational Exchange will
be called on to assist the military the following steps have been taken:

1. An emergency plan has been prepared which covers the nec-

essary general directives for providing propaganda activities in the
country attacked and in adjacent countries, not only for the United
States forces which might be involved but for the government under
attack. While this plan is general, it was drawn with two special coun-
tries in view—Iran and Yugoslavia.

2. A stockpile of necessary basic supplies, including paper, ink,

mimeograph, and necessary sound equipment is being prepared.

3. A basic stockpile of propaganda output in the form of research

materials on various subjects that will probably need to be covered in
an emergency as well as some semi-prepared press releases, pamphlets,
leaflets and other similar forms of propaganda is being prepared.

Further, an informal meeting has been held with the British to pro-

vide for the beginning of active policy and operations liaison.

In a situation short of actual warfare the State Department is re-

sponsible for overt propaganda activities. Through the National Psy-
chological Strategy Board we are in constant liaison with other agen-
cies in the field. As an acknowledged agency of the United States
Government we do not engage in activities which will seriously em-
barrass the government.

However, recognizing the seriousness of the international situa-

tion we began to prepare almost two years ago for a vigorous Psy-
chological Offensive. The Offensive has the dual purpose of (1)
strengthening the alliance of free nations, and (2) weakening the
Soviet Union and its satellites. We distinguish between the short

The Intelligence Community 149

Source: National Archives, RG 59, P Files: Lot 52 D 432, Office of Assistant Sec-

retary Edward Barrett, 1950–51, Box 5. Restricted. The unsigned original appears to be
a draft. There is no indication whether it was sent to Webb. It bears the handwritten
note, “Hand-carried to Wilber’s office this PM.”

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term objective in psychological warfare of persuading the enemy to
make a false move and the longer term objective in our psychologi-
cal offensive of both encouraging our friends and discouraging our
enemies.

In preparation for our special program we prepared a plan known

as the Campaign of Truth, which contains the following devices to con-
centrate our efforts on our specialized objectives:

1. A system of country priorities in which we analyzed propa-

ganda strategy on a global basis.

2. Country papers which aimed our efforts more precisely by

stating:

a. Those propaganda themes or objectives which in each country

would best contribute to our overall objectives.

b. Target group priorities in which we chose those social classes

in each country which it was most expedient for us to reach; and

c. Media priorities by which we determined what devices are most

effective in each country for reaching our target groups.

3. Special Propaganda Plans—Special plans spelling out in great

detail the psychological vulnerability of the peoples and the appeals
useful in reaching them, have been prepared for Russia, China, Indo-
China and the Eastern European satellites and South Asia. Others are
in process.

4. Guidances—There are four types of guidances used to assure

that our operators use the most effective messages:

a. The country paper or basic guidance for each area.

b. The overnight guidance which covers day to day events.

c. The weekly guidance which takes care of events of continuing

concern; and

d. Special guidances which cover either special propaganda prob-

lems or special events which lend themselves to propaganda exploita-

tion.

Among the State Department activities which might be pointed to

as vigorous implementation of the propaganda responsibility of the
State Department, I include the following:

(1) Radio—We have two radio stations—RIAS in Berlin and Red-

White-Red in Vienna beaming a strong signal and a hard-hitting mes-
sage into the Eastern European areas constantly. The Radio Division is
now constructing studios in Munich in addition to increasing the
strength of its transmitters and from there will beam still a third pro-
gram into Russia and Eastern Europe soon. The next step calls for a
fourth program to be beamed out of Salonika to the Near East. The
Ring Plan which calls for encircling Russia and her satellites with the
most powerful radio transmitters ever built, and Project Vagabond, in
which radio transmitters are mounted on ships, are examples of the

150 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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new planning of IBD.

A further effort to get our message into the cru-

cial areas, has already resulted in contracting for radio receivers to be
distributed in Korea, Indo-China, Greece, Iran and Turkey. The 1952
budget provides for further increase of this program. Further, IBD has
begun to broadcast in many minority languages of China and Russia,
as for example, Ukrainian, Georgian, Lithuanian, Amoy, Mandarin,
Cantonese and Swatow dialect, as well as Urdu and Hindi to South
Asia, and is actively working toward programs in Central Asian di-
alects in the very near future.

(2) Press—The major changes under the Campaign of Truth in the

press program are that regional and local production in not only stand-
ard languages but important dialects is being stressed and that a great
deal of material which is either tied to the local interests of the people
or is anti-Soviet in character is being produced under the imprint of
private groups. This is one way in which we have been able to aid or-
ganizations interested in furthering the same objectives we have.

(3) Motion Pictures—The new developments in the motion pic-

ture program are ever-increasing emphasis on production in the field,
particularly in priority countries and the speeding up of the produc-
tion of a newsreel so that it can become a fast medium for propaganda
messages.

(4) Exchange of Persons—Priority emphasis worldwide has been

given to labor leaders and journalists, as labor is a most important tar-
get group for us in almost every priority country and opinion leaders
are also a first priority group. The trend has been away from academic
exchanges toward political exchanges.

(5) Libraries and Institutes—In addition to more careful selection

of types of books and languages in the translation program the whole
concept of the library has been sharpened into that of an Information
Center which specializes in books, magazines and exhibits which con-
tribute directly to our basic purposes of strengthening ourselves and
weakening the enemy.

In policy formulation USIE plays an active role in the Department.

Mr. Barrett participates in Mr. Webb’s meetings. Representatives of the
Policy Staff are members of working groups on special problems, as for
example, the CFM meetings in Paris, the Forced Labor issue, the NATO
information program for which we have the responsibility in the United
States Government. A special Policy Implementation Staff makes news
for us to exploit. We help to determine the content of various intelli-
gence reports sent out to the missions, and we receive propaganda
guidance reports from our missions at regular intervals, some daily.

The Intelligence Community 151

International Broadcasting Division.

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Although the planning for our program began quite some time

ago it should be noted that little could be done to really effect signifi-
cant improvement until last October when additional funds were
granted by the Congress. The Campaign of Truth is dependent on hav-
ing adequate resources.

70.

Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant
for Intelligence and Research (Armstrong) to the Director of
the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze)

Washington, May 26, 1951.

SUBJECT

Scope and Pace of Covert Operations

General Smith’s memorandum of May 8 to the NSC on the above

subject

raises a number of not clearly separable problems and issues.

In an admittedly arbitrary delineation, the following discussion and
recommendations for a Departmental position in the Senior Staff are
offered, with an indication, where possible, of the views expressed by
General Magruder and Admiral Stevens.

1. Increased Scope of OPC Operations

The great increase in number and size of projects which OPC has

been called on to perform and can anticipate since the approval of NSC
10/2,

and particularly since the Korean war, requires, in General

Smith’s view, a reaffirmation by the NSC of its directive to CIA con-
tained in 10/2. He as much as says that the character of the mission
for OPC has changed by the change in size and he believes this should
be recognized by NSC.

152 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–54, 611.61/5–2651. Top Se-

cret. This memorandum is virtually identical to a draft by Robert P. Joyce of the Policy
Planning Staff to Nitze, May 26; ibid., INR Files: Lot 58 D 776, OPC. The difference in
attribution has not been explained. Memoranda from Joyce to Nitze of May 18 and May
(misdated March) 25, and an unsigned memorandum to Armstrong of May 17 on the
same subject, are ibid.

See the attachment to Document 68.

See Annex 1 and Annex 2 below.

See footnote 2, Document 42.

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There seems to be no disagreement in the Department or with Gen-

eral Magruder, Admiral Stevens, or CIA itself that there is no alterna-
tive but to pursue vigorously the covert operations and to re-affirm the
10/2 in the light of the changes noted by General Smith.

2. Cold War Operations vs. Preparation for Hot War

General Smith points out the gradual but pronounced shift of em-

phasis in OPC projects from those in support of cold war activities to
those involved in the planning and preparation for covert support in
the event of war. This presents to OPC a competing claim upon per-
sonnel and facilities and General Smith requires further guidance.

The Department would join with General Magruder and Admiral

Stevens in believing that we have no course but to pursue both objec-
tives simultaneously. However, the Department would feel that, in the
light of the continuing and understandable pressure from the Military
for activities in support of a hot war, it is necessary to re-affirm that a
fundamental mission of OPC is to promote national policy which has
been most recently set forth in the NSC–68 series,

and that therefore

primary

emphasis must be upon the cold war psychological objectives.

This would include the underlying principle that every effort, includ-
ing psychological, should be made to prevent the coming of a Third
World War, while not overlooking the possibility that such a war will
break out and we will need to be fully prepared for it.

3. Guidance Mechanism; Support

General Smith directly and indirectly inquires whether OPC

should look to the Psychological Strategy Board for guidance and co-
ordination. At the same time he points out that OPC will not be able
to fulfill its mission unless it gets more support in terms of personnel
and assistance in military and political plans and policies.

The Department would agree with General Magruder and partic-

ularly with Admiral Stevens that the PSB was established for just this
purpose and it should be utilized to the fullest possible extent. The PSB
can and should be called upon for giving or obtaining from the NSC
decision where decision is needed, for giving continual guidance, for
coordinating the various agencies and for marshalling from the agen-
cies the support required by OPC.

4. Decision and Guidance on Specific Projects

General Smith asks for guidance on a number of specific projects

some of which will be in conflict in terms of either the objectives or

The Intelligence Community 153

See Document 5.

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claims upon personnel or facilities in short supply. Notably General
Smith has pointed out that with respect to the problem of support of
counter-revolution in the slave states—how much support should be
given, when to release it, how much reserve to maintain—presents a
conflict in terms of the objectives of the cold war on the one hand, and
of preparation for hot war on the other.

Although General Magruder does not address this point, Admiral

Stevens points out, and the Department of State would warmly en-
dorse his position, that such problems cannot be answered without fur-
ther plans and proposals by the CIA and impliedly what the issues are
as between the conflicting objectives. This and every other project on
which CIA needs specific guidance or decision must be presented in
terms of the specific problem to the PSB for coordination, and where
necessary presentation to the NSC and the President.

5. Cover Problems

General Smith’s memorandum points out that under the rigid

specifications of 10/2, all OPC operations must be carried out in such
a way as to remain covert and not disclose the interest of the US Gov-
ernment; that this tends to limit the effectiveness of OPC, particularly
in para-military type operations which, on the one hand cannot dis-
guise US Government interest and on the other can be more effectively
carried out under quasi-military aegis.

Admiral Stevens suggests and General Magruder would appar-

ently concur that this problem too should be presented in terms of in-
dividual projects and specific recommendations thereto to the PSB for
resolution. There is no apparent inclination to disagree with General
Smith on this.

[

1 paragraph (12 lines) not declassified

]

6. Organization

General Smith’s memorandum does not directly address this ques-

tion but implicit in his approach as well as in the memoranda of Gen-
eral Magruder and Admiral Stevens is the problem of organization for
covert activities. The Department would join with Magruder and
Stevens in feeling that within OPC and CIA organizational changes,
particularly in any distinction between wholly covert type operations
and para-military operations, should be handled by CIA itself and
should not be of concern to the other agencies except where they may
impinge upon the responsibilities of the other agencies or upon the in-
telligence effort of the Government. On the other hand, with respect to
the organizational location of covert operations in the Government as
a whole, the Department would agree with Magruder and Stevens that
there is no alternative to the present allocation of this responsibility, al-
most in toto, to CIA–OPC.

154 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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Proposed Action

Only Admiral Stevens has suggested what specific action should

be taken on General Smith’s memorandum. Even General Smith’s rec-
ommendations call for “guidance”, without any indication as to the na-
ture or form of such guidance.

The Department would concur in Admiral Stevens’s specific sug-

gestion that the Senior Staff recommend that the NSC approve a state-
ment of policy with respect to General Smith’s memorandum. In brief,
Admiral Stevens recommends that this statement of policy contain the
following points:

a. CIA should increase the scope and pace of its cold-war activi-

ties without jeopardizing its planning and preparation for covert, hot-

war activities.

b. There should be no change in the present Governmental or-

ganization for covert activities, but that the newly created Psycholog-

ical Strategy Board should be fully utilized.

c. (1) Present mechanisms for coordination on planning for hot

war are available with elements of the Military Establishment.

(2) The PSB should give the necessary guidance on any conflicts

which arise in pursuing the objectives for the cold and the hot war.

(3) The PSB can and should ensure that political and military con-

siderations are applied to covert activities.

(4) All agencies should give fullest possible support to the covert

activities and this support should be insured and coordinated through

PSB.

d. PSB should be specifically directed (by the NSC and the Pres-

ident) to provide or obtain the guidance required by CIA.

Annex 1

Memorandum From Brigadier General John Magruder to the
Department of Defense Representative on the Senior Staff of
the National Security Council (Nash)

Washington, May 23, 1951.

SUBJECT

Scope and Pace of Covert Operations (memo to NSC from Director, Central
Intelligence dated 8 May 1951)

1. The Director, Central Intelligence is faced by problems created

by the cold war in which our enemy has the initiative and by the fact

The Intelligence Community 155

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Top Secret; Eyes Only. General Magruder was the Department of Defense con-

sultant to the Office of Policy Coordination.

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that our Government as a whole has not adapted itself to the flexibil-
ity of action demanded in the circumstances. The Departments of State
and Defense in the face of swift and uninhibited manuevers by the
Kremlin are still bound by formal traditions of political action and con-
ventional war planning as if peace and war were absolute conditions.
CIA alone has been conceived and patterned to exercise relative freedom
of action in a world situation which is more akin to war than peace.

2. Nationally we are not mobilized to face the kind of challenge

forced upon us by the Kremlin. That challenge obviously cannot be
met by the CIA alone, or by the totality of our so-called psychological
resources. The Soviets have enlarged the cold war by the coordinated
employment actively or potentially of all their resources, orthodox as
well as unorthodox.

3. The issues raised by the DCI are not administrative or juris-

dictional. They can be understood only in light of the inflexibility of
our governmental organization and concepts in facing urgent and un-
usual requirements. While the orthodox departments think and plan
too largely in terms of a D–Day that no man can predict, we deprive
ourselves of full resources in fighting a cold war which might be de-
cisive. While our psychological and covert agencies remain a “thin red
line of heroes”, there is no authoritative agency geared to ensure them
mutual and continuous support from orthodox national forces.

4. The National Security Council cannot serve as this agency. Nor

can it solve the problems of CIA by any broad statements of principle
or detailed delineation of functions. The Council can, however, urge
expedition in the activation of the required agency and ensure its un-
questioned authority to solve the major issues raised by the DCI, as
well as other varied problems yet to be created by the cold war

5. I refer to the Psychological Strategy Board. When activated this

organization, within the terms of the Presidential Directive of 4 April
1951,

can resolve most of the difficulties facing the DCI through its

authority to:

(a) Consider on the national level major covert projects coordi-

nated with all other psychological operations.

(b) Give authoritative decision with respect to the necessity and

propriety of CIA undertaking major projects requiring resources bal-

anced as between cold war demands and future war plans.

covert operations at all times are contributory to the attainment of na-

tional objectives.

(d) Promulgate programs which will include provisions for such

supplementary support as may be required from other departments

and agencies, including manpower, money and general logistics.

156 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

See Document 60.

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6. In view of the foregoing considerations, the following com-

ments are pertinent to the

Conclusions and Recommendations

in para-

graph 16 of the basic paper, by sub-paragraphs as numbered therein:

Sub-paragraph a and b.

It is useless to belabor the question as to

whether or not CIA should continue to be the agency primarily re-
sponsible for conducting “covert” operations. This matter has long
been debated with the same conclusion. The answer should be affirm-
ative for two reasons: one, there is no other agency of government
which can as logically be assigned the responsibility; two, the cold
war is on, and the ground lost by any major reorganization at this
time would be hazardous. The reasonable concern of the DCI re-
garding guidance he requires in the stepped-up covert operations
can be dispelled by the coordination and guidance forthcoming from
the Psychological Strategy Board which should be expected to make
logical distribution of responsibilities in the conduct of cold war
operations.

If this statement of the scope and authority of the Psychological

Strategy Board should be in question, the National Security Council
should recommend in unequivocal terms to the President an inter-
pretation of his Directive which would establish the validity of the
concept.

Sub-paragraph c(1).

Provisions for joint planning with the armed

forces for covert operations in war time exist in the established pro-
cedures for the preparation of covert annexes to joint war plans
through the mechanism of the Joint Subsidiary Plans Division of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington and the Commander’s Staff in the-
aters of operations. Unusual adjustments should be provided in PSB
programs.

Sub-paragraph c(2).

Guidance in the allocation of available resources

of CIA for covert operations as between cold war missions and prepa-
rations for overt war should be made in the programs promulgated by
the PSB.

Sub-paragraph c(3).

The PSB should have the authority and re-

sponsibility for determining the relative weight to be ascribed to po-
litical and military considerations involved in covert operations, and
be the arbiter as to whether the operations should or should not be un-
dertaken by CIA.

Sub-paragraph c(4).

The administrative and logistical provisions of

projects or programs promulgated to operational agencies, including
CIA, by the PSB should provide authoritatively for the necessary sup-
plementary support, if required, in types and quantities of personnel,
and other administrative and logistical assistance.

Sub-paragraph d.

The guidance herein requested is a normal re-

sponsibility of the PSB as prescribed in the President’s Directive.

The Intelligence Community 157

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7. It is probably true that the major departments have looked to

CIA for accomplishments wholly beyond its capabilities, particularly
in available manpower. Furthermore, the same departments, when re-
quested by CIA for assistance in supporting its overload, have been
loathe to depart from administrative rigidity and war mobilization ob-
jectives in order to aid CIA. The recruitment of types of Americans with
talents required by the varied operations of CIA is rendered almost im-
possible by favorable employment conditions in civil life and the ab-
sorption of such types into the armed forces. It is literally impossible
for CIA to expand operations unduly unless the armed forces make
available manpower in keeping with the tasks imposed. Decision must
be made as to whether the manpower demands for war mobilization
or cold war operations are to have precedence in a rational division of
scarce categories of personnel. If it be assumed that the cold war can
be won, then it is rational to divert manpower for psychological oper-
ations at a relatively minor charge against orthodox mobilization plans
and routine administrative conveniences.

8. Reconsideration should be given to the provision of NSC 10/2

which requires that covert operations be “so planned and executed that
any U.S. Government responsibility for them is not evident to unau-
thorized persons and that if uncovered the U.S. Government can plau-
sibly disclaim any responsibility for them.” It is obvious that the in-
ternational atmosphere and conditions requiring this highly restrictive
security provision no longer exist. Publicly announced national policy
asserts the determination of the Government to fight Soviet aggression
wherever it appears and implicitly by any means necessary. If for no
other reason, the magnitude and variety of cold war effort renders the
security formula invalid except for

genuinely covert operations.

Certainly

it is not a secret to the enemy that the U.S. Government supports un-
conventional warfare. We should not accept the handicaps of unduly
rigid security measures respecting para-military types of operations be-
yond those required to obscure our strategy and tactics. The accept-
ance of this reasoning is important in that it facilitates all adminis-
trative and logistical steps in combining overt and covert national re-
sources in pursuing the cold war.

A clear differentiation can be made between two categories of

“covert” operations to the first of which the security formula in NSC
10/2 should remain applicable, and to the second of which the formula
should be modified. These two categories are:

(a) Covert operations of a political, economic and psychological

character, which by their nature remain truly covert and which are em-

ployed abroad to influence developments favorable to the United

States, and

(b) Operations which, while initially covert, are by their nature

designed to create psychical manifestations which cease to be covert,

158 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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such as, sabotage, support of underground and guerilla movements

and para-military activities.

John Magruder

Annex 2

Memorandum From the Chief of the Joint Subsidiary Plans
Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Stevens) to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Representative on the Senior Staff of the National
Security Council (Wooldridge)

SPDM–208–51

Washington, May 17, 1951.

SUBJECT

Scope and Pace of Covert Operations

1. The action to be taken by the National Security Council on the

Central Intelligence Agency memorandum of 8 May 1951, “Scope and
Pace of Covert Operations,” hinges on the acceptance or rejection of
two propositions which are implied but not discussed in that memo-
randum. They are:

a. Although global overt war may occur at any time, the possi-

bility that the cold war will continue is sufficiently great to warrant a

strong effort in the planning and conduct of the cold war as well as of

a hot war.

b. There is a possibility that by the planned use of all our capa-

bilities, including covert ones, we can win the cold war, thereby avert-

ing global hot war.

2. Acceptance of these two propositions means that we play it both

ways, for either war or a continuation of the uneasy “peace,” without
putting all our eggs in either basket. Although there may be differences
of opinion as regards the degree of probability of both of the two above
propositions, there seems to be general agreement as to their validity
as stated, and consequently as to the desirability of our playing it both
ways. This is the only course which seems consistent with our intelli-
gence and the national thinking behind the great bulk of National Se-
curity Council papers in recent years.

3. As a result of past experiences, we are better organized to deal

with overt war than with the unprecedented situation of a protracted

The Intelligence Community 159

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Top Secret; Eyes Only. Two copies were sent to Magruder. Admiral Stevens was

the Joint Chiefs of Staff consultant to OPC.

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all out cold war. The President’s directive of April 4, 1951, establishing
the new Psychological Strategy Board but requiring maximum use of
existing agencies, seems to go far towards providing the necessary
mechanism. PSB can be expected to function not only as a coordinat-
ing agency for guidance, but, when it is unable to reach decisions and
provide guidance itself in the light of approved policy, to formulate
and recommend in the premises to the National Security Council and
the President.

4. A decision to play it for both hot war and a continuation of the

cold war gives a definite answer to the basic question raised by the
CIA memorandum. CIA should increase the scope and pace of its ca-
pabilities and action directed towards the winning of the cold war, but
should not jeopardize its effectiveness for hot war, including planning
and preparations therefor by so doing. When detailed and specific con-
flicts in priorities arise, they can and should be settled through the Psy-
chological Strategy Board. CIA is also required to insure that its intel-
ligence activities will not suffer by such an increase in scope and pace,
and its internal arrangements should take this into consideration.

5. The extent to which the United States will support and follow

up on counter-revolution in the slave states, how much of that po-
tential to develop, when to release it, and how much to hold in re-
serve, cannot be answered without the development of more concrete
plans and proposals to this end. Such plans and proposals are entirely
suitable for presentation by CIA to the PSB, which, after study, criti-
cism and coordination, should obtain final decision from the President
via the National Security Council. The potential forces for counter-
revolution may, with sufficient time and skill in their development, be
capable of eventually providing a final solution for the cold war, or, in
case hot war intervenes, of raising covert operations from a series of
minor conspiracies to the stature of a weapon on a par with land, sea
and air forces.

6. [

1 paragraph (9 lines) not declassified

]

7. Consistent with the foregoing, it is suggested that the follow-

ing action be proposed to the National Security Council on the specific
recommendations of the CIA memorandum:

a. As a result of a comprehensive review of the covert operations

situation, the CIA should increase the scope and pace of its capabili-

ties and action directed towards the winning of the cold war, but should

not by so doing jeopardize its effectiveness for hot war.

b. Covert operational responsibility should remain as now di-

rected. Although all organizational problems are not completely solved,

there is no reason to believe that they cannot be solved within the ex-

isting framework. Moreover, the urgencies of the situation will not per-

mit major structural alterations, which would in themselves create new

problems. Such clarifications of present broad responsibilities as may

be essential should be handled through the PSB.

160 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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c. (1) Directives are in existence which appear to make basic ad-

equate provisions for joint planning with the Armed Forces for covert

activities and operations in support of wartime military operations. The

mechanism of the PSB should be employed for any clarifications which

may be necessary.

(2) Specific guidance for dealing with the military in fields where

the same covert apparatus is being developed for both cold and hot

war purposes should be obtained from the PSB.

(3) The PSB should insure that the foreign policy and political con-

siderations which are involved in covert operations are brought to bear

on determinations of politico-military significance. To accomplish this,

the PSB has recourse up to the NSC and the President, and down to

operating agencies either directly or through the consultant mecha-

nisms that are established by NSC 10/2 and NSC 59/1.

(4) Within the limits of security, all government agencies should

be directed to provide appropriate personnel, administrative, and lo-

gistic support for the covert effort. The detailed nature of this support

should be coordinated through the PSB.

d. The Psychological Strategy Board should be directed to provide

or obtain guidance as necessary to the covert effort.

L. C. Stevens

Rear Admiral, USN

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

71.

Memorandum of a Meeting of the Senior Staff of the
National Security Council

Washington, May 28, 1951.

SUBJECT

General Smith’s memorandum to the NSC of May 8 on the

“Scope and Pace of

Covert Operations”

The Intelligence Community 161

Source: National Archives, RG 59, INR Historical Files: Lot 58 D 776, OPC. Top

Secret. Printed from an unsigned carbon copy. The first page bears the initials “PA”, in-
dicating that this copy was intended for W. Park Armstrong, Jr. The drafting officer and
those present at the meeting have not been identified.

Attachment to Document 68.

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Action

It was agreed that CIA–OPC would prepare a written and oral

presentation of two projects

—Guerrillas in China, and Resistance in

Eastern Europe—by which the Senior Staff could become more famil-
iar with the details and therefore the problems involved in such proj-
ects, including such issues as:

a. Personnel and logistic support in short supply and possibly in

conflict with other projects;

b. Possible conflicts on objectives of the project, particularly as be-

tween the cold war and preparation for hot war;

c. Alternative methods such as covert, semi-covert, and para-

military;

d. Potentialities, including an analysis of the political and military

risks involved in the fulfillment of the project.

Discussion

The discussion touched on the following points:
1.

Personnel.

OPC is experiencing serious difficulty in obtaining

the necessary personnel to carry out its operations, and notably head-
quarters personnel, most of whom would come from the Military Es-
tablishment—either regular officers or special call-up of reserves. One
estimate of their needs called for 50 officers per year, of special quali-
fications in various areas and military specialties.

Supplies and Stock Piling.

There was no disagreement in the re-

sponsibility of CIA to budget for its own supplies, but to procure them
through the facilities of the Military.

Funds.

CIA pointed out that to date funds were not a limitation

upon their effectiveness in carrying out planned projects, but rather the
limitations were in personnel and logistics.

Priorities.

It was pointed out that there were three types of proj-

ects, the allocation of resources to which represented the basic priority
difficulty, namely: (a) political and psychological targets, purely for the
cold war; (b) guerrilla operations which could be activated now or in
the event of hot war; and (c) development of resistance in preparation
for hot war. In this connection it was pointed out that any cold-war ac-
tivity would be helpful toward the preparation for hot war, but at the
same time preoccupation with (b) and (c) above could not help but hurt
the effective prosecution of (a).

162 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Frank G. Wisner forwarded these studies to the NSC senior staff under cover of

a memorandum dated June 8. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Direc-
tor for Operations, Job 79–01228A, Box 6)

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Potentialities and Risks.

Considerable concern was felt that the

fulfillment of many of the projects under way might materially increase
the risk of general war. Obviously the more successful we are in reach-
ing our cold-war objectives of containment through strengthening of
free-world forces, the more we are risking a general war. On the other
hand the OPC projects may inherently be more provocative than the
general factors of success because they are designed positively to
weaken the potential enemy, and in some cases to cause clashes.

Psychological Strategy Board.

It was generally felt that the PSB,

when it becomes operative, will be in a position to coordinate the di-
rection given to OPC projects. Two important matters in this connec-
tion were pointed out:

a. The PSB charter may have to be expanded if it is to be effective

in insuring

the support

as distinct from guidance for OPC from the var-

ious agencies.

b. Initiative in presenting the issues involved in projects must rest

heavily upon CIA, which should identify the various issues and con-

flicting priorities—whether of matériel or objectives—for presentation

to the PSB and, where appropriate, the NSC.

Scope and Organization.

There was no disagreement that CIA

must continue to increase the scope of its activities to fulfill the en-
larged mission given to it. It was apparent that with possibly minor
exceptions CIA should continue to have full responsibility for all of this
type of work.

In this connection it was pointed out that General Smith’s memo-

randum was indicative of the growth and success of the OPC opera-
tions because it raised such problems as conflicting priorities and the
effects of successful operations which heretofore have not been neces-
sary to raise since all of the effort was going into a build-up. At the
same time the memorandum indicated the need for CIA to put forward
full analysis of the issues involved in projects in which some decision
is necessary and the need for the development of such a facility as PSB
for the resolution of such problems. These problems could not any
longer be decided on a blanket and over-all basis but would require
the specific analysis of the issues in individual projects.

The Intelligence Community 163

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72.

Terms of Reference for the Economic Intelligence
Committee

IAC D–22/1 (Revised)

Washington, May 29, 1951.

1. The Director of Central Intelligence with the concurrence of the

members of the IAC has established an Economic Intelligence Com-
mittee, on which shall sit designated representatives of those agencies
charged with primary responsibility for foreign national security in-
telligence, i.e., the Departments of the Army, Navy, Air Force, State, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Any other
agency whose interest or competence may be relevant to the particu-
lar problem under examination may be invited also to sit with the Eco-
nomic Intelligence Committee.

2. The representative from the Central Intelligence Agency shall

serve as Chairman of the Economic Intelligence Committee, and he
shall supply the secretariat.

3. The Economic Intelligence Committee shall:

a. Arrange concerted economic intelligence support, on selected

major issues, for studies of interagency interest requested by the In-

telligence Advisory Committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, etc.

b. Arrange for the mobilization of the data and analysis available,

relevant to appropriate operating problems of any member agency re-

questing assistance, or of any other agency dealing with economic se-

curity problems, which may request assistance.

c. Examine continuing programs of fundamental economic re-

search relating to the national security throughout the United States

Government and recommend to the IAC for appropriate action allo-

cation of responsibility for specific fields of inquiry where such allo-

cation appears appropriate.

d. Review and report to the IAC from time to time, on the perti-

nence, extent, and quality of the data and analyses available, bearing

on the issues analyzed.

e. Recommend to the IAC for appropriate action priorities and al-

location of responsibilities for the collection and analysis to fill specific

gaps in the economic intelligence needed for national security.

f. Maintain a continuing review of the foreign economic intelli-

gence activities of the United States Government as they relate to the

national security.

g. Make such special reviews of economic intelligence distribu-

tion and processing procedures as may appear useful, and make rec-

164 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 85–500362R, Box 3,

Folder 10. Secret. The document was forwarded, presumably to members of the Intelli-
gence Advisory Committee (there is no list of addressees), under cover of a memoran-
dum from James Q. Reber, Secretary, Intelligence Advisory Committee. (Ibid.)

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ommendations for improvement to the Intelligence Advisory Com-

mittee, which shall have responsibility for instituting such action as it

may judge appropriate.

h. Prepare coordinated reports which present the best available

foreign economic intelligence.

4. In carrying out its responsibilities, the Economic Intelligence

Committee may set up such subcommittees and working parties as
may be judged necessary.

5. When any member agency is unable to accept a recommenda-

tion of the Committee, the matter may be referred to the Intelligence
Advisory Committee. All agencies directly concerned shall be asked to
sit with the Intelligence Advisory Committee for the consideration of
such questions.

73.

Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence (Jackson) to the Executive Secretary of the
National Security Council (Lay)

Washington, May 31, 1951.

SUBJECT

Appraisal of Foreign Economic Intelligence Requirements, Facilities and

Arrangements Related to the National Security

1. In accordance with the instructions of the National Security

Council in NSC Action 282,

the Central Intelligence Agency has con-

ducted a study of foreign economic intelligence requirements relating
to the national security and of the facilities and arrangements currently
employed for meeting those requirements.

2. As the study has progressed, both the requirements and the fa-

cilities and arrangements have been changing in response to changes

The Intelligence Community 165

Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s Secretary’s Files.

Secret. Jackson’s report was circulated to NSC members under cover of a June 1 mem-
orandum from Lay.

NSC Action No. 282, February 7, 1950, requested a study of economic intelligence

and existing facilities and arrangements, and a plan for satisfying national needs for such
intelligence through coordinated inter-agency effort. (National Archives, RG 273, NSC
Records of Action, Box 1)

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in the international situation and in the organization of various agen-
cies of the Government.

3. It is believed that the facilities and arrangements now in effect

or contemplated by the various agencies will go far toward providing
the basis for the adequate coverage of economic intelligence relating
to the national security whose lack prompted NSC Action 282. The Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency itself is engaged in strengthening its work in
economic intelligence production as a service of common concern. The
Office of Research and Reports has been established to coordinate the
economic intelligence activities of other agencies and to produce such
economic intelligence as it not otherwise allocated.

4. For reasons explained in Tab A,

it is believed that it is neither

practicable nor desirable to recommend at this time a formal allocation
by the National Security Council of responsibility for economic intel-
ligence production among the various agencies.

5. What is immediately needed is machinery to insure regular pro-

cedures whereby (1) the full economic knowledge and technical talent
available in the Government can be brought to bear on specific issues
involving the national security, and (2) important gaps in the collective
economic knowledge of the Government can be identified on a con-
tinuing basis and responsibility for filling them be allocated as they are
disclosed.

6. To meet this need, the Director of Central Intelligence proposes

to establish an Economic Intelligence Committee. This proposal and
the terms of reference of the Committee

described in Tab A (tabbed in

red) have the concurrence of the members of the Intelligence Advisory
Committee. To clarify the role of the Central Intelligence Agency in the
coordination and production of economic intelligence, it is recom-
mended that the National Security Council issue the attached proposed
NSCID (Tab B

—also tabbed in red). This proposed NSCID has also re-

ceived the concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Committee. It
would be desirable to invite the Economic Cooperation Administration
and the Department of Commerce to sit with the National Security
Council when this document is being considered. Upon the approval
of the proposed NSCID, the Director of Central Intelligence will es-
tablish the Economic Intelligence Committee.

166 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Memorandum to the Intelligence Advisory Committee from the Director of Cen-

tral Intelligence entitled “Proposed Economic Intelligence Committee,” undated, not
printed.

Document 72.

Not printed. The draft NSCID is identical to NSCID No. 15, June 13, corrected on

June 22, Document 254.

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7. It is further recommended that the National Security Council

call to the attention of the relevant agencies of the Government the
urgency of a collaborative effort to exploit the intelligence resources of
the Government for security purposes. A draft of a proposed commu-
nication from the National Security Council asking that high priority
be given to requests for cooperation from the Economic Intelligence
Committee is attached (Tab C).

8. The Director of Central Intelligence will keep under continuing

review the arrangements of the United States Government for the pro-
duction of economic intelligence and will make further recommenda-
tions concerning specific allocations of responsibility should this ap-
pear desirable at any time in the future.

William H. Jackson

Not printed.

Printed from a copy that indicates Jackson signed the original.

74.

Department of State Press Release

No. 532

Washington, June 20, 1951.

In answer to questions as to the relationship between the Psycho-

logical Strategy Board, announced today by the President,

and the In-

terdepartmental Committee which has been working in this field un-
der the chairmanship of Mr. Edward W. Barrett, Assistant Secretary of
State for Public Affairs, the following statement was issued by Under
Secretary of State James E. Webb:

“By agreement with my two colleagues on the Psychological Strat-

egy Board, I can state it is now planned that the Interdepartmental
Committee which has been serving under the chairmanship of the As-
sistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs will continue in existence
with responsibility for coordinating the execution of United States for-
eign information programs under the name ‘Psychological Operations

The Intelligence Community 167

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 59/1, Box

55. No classification marking.

The President approved the Psychological Strategy Board on April 4; see Docu-

ment 60. This press release made the President’s directive available to the public.

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Coordinating Committee.’ This Committee, which has been serving in
this field for the past year, includes representatives from the Depart-
ment of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Economic Cooperation Administration, and the Depart-
ment of State.

“Other activities in the Department of State will continue as

presently organized under the broad guidance of the new Psycholog-
ical Strategy Board announced by the President.”

Under Secretary of State Webb wrote Director of Central Intelligence Smith on

May 2 informing him that this change was taking place, and asking that a CIA officer
be made available to serve with the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee.
Smith replied in the affirmative in an undated letter. (Both in Central Intelligence Agency,
History Staff, Job 83–00036R, Box 5)

75.

Memorandum From Robert P. Joyce of the Policy Planning
Staff to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze)

Washington, June 21, 1951.

SUBJECT

The Director of Central Intelligence on the Scope and Pace of CIA Activities
with Particular Reference to Para-Military Operations and Preparations
for Operations

General Walter B. Smith met this morning with the ad hoc com-

mittee of the Senior Staff of the NSC to set forth verbally his ideas on
the above-mentioned subject. The representatives of the Departments
of State, Defense and the JCS who act as consultants to OPC of CIA
were also present.

General Smith started by querying whether it was desirable for

CIA to operate as a sort of “covert War Department” for the conduct
of large-scale guerrilla operations. He added that para-military, large-
scale guerrilla operations might go on for a period of years in this pres-

168 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, NSC 10 Series, 1951. Top Se-

cret. Drafted by Joyce.

The consultants to the Office of Policy Coordination were Joyce (for the Depart-

ment of State), Brigadier General John Magruder (for the Department of Defense) and
Rear Admiral Leslie C. Stevens (for the Joint Chiefs of Staff).

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ent era of the tepid war. He commented that no commander should
accept responsibility for important missions unless he is assured of re-
ceiving proper support. He went on to speak of CIA’s present support
of guerrilla warfare on the China Mainland. He stated that it was pos-
sible that these operations might develop into a very large military ef-
fort involving perhaps two or three hundred thousand men who would
have to be equipped and supplied. If this situation did in fact develop
it would naturally involve a large production program for specialized
light weapons and would mean in addition, a large-scale training,
shipping and air-supply and re-supply program which would amount
to a military operation. In other words an “operation of war” on a
grand scale.

General Smith doubted that the CIA was the proper agency to un-

dertake such a program. He stated that our Military Establishment
would undoubtedly feel uncomfortable with such an operation left to
a civilian agency. He added that although the Secretary of Defense and
the top echelon of the three services might agree with such an opera-
tion to be undertaken by the CIA, nevertheless the working levels in
the armed services would not be prepared to go along and the end re-
sult would be that necessary logistic and other support would not be
forthcoming in a degree which would permit the CIA successfully to
fulfill its responsibilities. General Smith cited several instances whereby
support for CIA in terms of personnel had been agreed to by the Sec-
retary of Defense but that long delays and whittling down by the lower
echelons of the three services had resulted in his obtaining only a min-
imum of support. For example, the Secretary of Defense had agreed
that CIA should receive from 400 to 500 officers but that after a period
of four months only 40 officers had been supplied to the CIA. He em-
phasized that the delays in the staff echelons and the reluctance to make
available qualified personnel had made it virtually impossible for the
Director of Central Intelligence to meet the requirements which had
been laid upon him by the JCS itself. General Smith then spoke of the
responsibility and authority vested in a theatre commander to accom-
plish certain missions and added that he did not see how the Director
of Central Intelligence or his representatives could ever obtain in peace-
time like authority to accomplish missions of great magnitude which
had been laid upon the CIA. He then stated that it might be possible
for high ranking and highly competent generals loaned to CIA to ob-
tain such authority but there were very few of these and they were
most difficult to obtain from the Military Establishment. In other words,
available talent in this category was limited.

General Smith went on to say that he, acting on his own respon-

sibility, could do and did do certain things in the field of special op-
erations. As an illustration he mentioned activities designed to impede
the supply of aviation gasoline to the Chinese communists which was

The Intelligence Community 169

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presently entering the Portuguese port of Macao. He said that an op-
eration of this kind would only require a few men and his organiza-
tion could handle it. On the other hand, however, a large para-military
support program for anti-communist guerrillas in China is entirely an-
other thing and perhaps beyond the capabilities of the CIA given pres-
ent dispositions and attitudes within the working levels of the Military
Establishment.

General Smith went on to say that the major mission of the CIA

is intelligence and that the operations tail are now starting to wag the
intelligence dog and that CIA was already spread very thin. He added
that the obtaining of necessary funds was not presently a problem as
the honeymoon with Congress was still going on. He added, however,
that these honeymoons never lasted forever and that sooner or later he
would probably have to justify to the Congress programs and large
projects involving the expenditure of several hundred million dollars.

General Smith stated that as the Director of Central Intelligence it

would afford him great relief if he could wrap up in one package this
whole problem of guerrilla warfare and present it to the military as a
military and not a CIA responsibility. He felt that he must do this for
the reasons which he had already set forth and unless there should be
enthusiastic, timely and real support from the Military Establishment
which was not presently forthcoming and which he did not anticipate.
He went on to point out that the military were apparently placing great
hopes in the so-called retardation project. He feared that these D–Day
hopes of what could be done were unrealistic and therefore danger-
ous. He spoke of the large preparations which would be required and
stated that it had been his experience that by the time an adequate force
could be equipped and trained it would undoubtedly be penetrated.
He mentioned the difficulties faced by the French resistance due to en-
emy penetration and stated that in the present case the dangers of
communist-penetration were much greater and that whole groups
which had been painfully prepared might be gobbled up almost in-
stantly when and if D–Day came. He emphasized that there was a high
degree of wishful thinking and unreality within the Military Estab-
lishment as to what could be accomplished by special operations in
wartime and that this was a dangerous situation to be allowed to de-
velop further. He stated that the conventional army officer did not un-
derstand the enormous difficulties involved due to an understandable
lack of knowledge of just what guerrilla warfare behind the enemy
lines involved. He added that there should be a careful auditing of the
requirements the military were placing upon the CIA in this field with
a view to there being a complete understanding as to the probable ca-
pabilities of the CIA. This would avoid misunderstandings as well as
erroneous military planning based on false assumptions.

170 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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General Smith stated that, as a minimum, there should be joint

CIA-military participation in planning and operations in order that the
military should bear its responsibility for large-scale guerrilla opera-
tions. This would assure that the necessary support from the military
for the CIA would be forthcoming. He stated that there might be set
up within the JCS a joint staff where CIA and military officers could
plan para-military operations. General Smith suggested that CIA spe-
cialized personnel might assume responsibility for first contacts with
underground leaders and guerrilla commanders. The CIA might even
assume the responsibility for providing modest supplies to guerrilla
movements in order to see how their capabilities develop. If such guer-
rilla capabilities develop in a large way and turn into important mili-
tary operations, then the CIA responsibility should cease and the mil-
itary should take over and be charged with the responsibilities for
supply, re-supply and other logistic support.

Admiral Stevens stated that there was already in progress joint

planning as between the CIA and the representatives of the JCS and
that he considered that this situation was working out well. He added
that naturally there was a time lag in getting projects approved due to
the fact that the JCS had a continually clogged agenda. He added that,
in his opinion, the military generally speaking were trained and held
responsible for formal military operations and that they were incapable
of waging cold war. General Magruder agreed that there was insuffi-
cient flexibility in the formal Military Establishment or in the formal
military mind successfully to carry on delicate covert operations where
a great deal of flexibility and sophistication in political matters was
called for.

It was generally agreed that a great deal of educational work was

necessary before the military could realize the nature and potentiali-
ties of covert operations. It was suggested that perhaps the best way
for the CIA to obtain the requisite support from the Military Estab-
lishment would be for General Marshall to issue orders to the effect
that the CIA operation was a national effort of the greatest importance
and that the heads of the military services should see to it down the
line that it received what it needed to have in an expeditious manner
as a matter closely related to the national security. There was discus-
sion as to whether it might or might not be desirable for the President
to issue the necessary instructions in order that CIA should receive un-
stinted and generous support.

Robert P. Joyce

The Intelligence Community 171

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76.

Memorandum From the Acting Executive Secretary of the
National Security Council (Gleason) to the National Security
Council

Washington, June 27, 1951.

SUBJECT

Scope and Pace of Covert Operations

REFERENCES

A. Memo for Special Committee of Senior NSC Staff from Executive Secretary,

same subject, dated May 14, 1951

B. NSC 10 Series

At the direction of the President, a Special Committee of the Senior

NSC Staff has been studying the scope and pace of covert operations as
outlined in the enclosed memorandum from the Director of Central In-
telligence.

In this connection, the Special Committee has had the bene-

fit of further elucidation of the problem by officials of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency responsible for covert operations. The Director of Central
Intelligence has expressed to the Special Committee his serious concern
that covert operations of the scope and magnitude described in the en-
closure are beyond the capabilities of CIA without greatly increased and
accelerated support from the Departments of State and Defense.

On the basis of its study and consideration of the subject, the Spe-

cial Committee of the Senior NSC Staff recommends that the National
Security Council take the following actions:

1. Approve in principle as a national responsibility the immedi-

ate expansion of the covert organization established in NSC 10/2, and
the intensification of covert operations designed in general order of
emphasis to:

a. Place the maximum strain on the Soviet structure of power, in-

cluding the relationships between the USSR, its satellites, and Com-

munist China; and when and where appropriate in the light of U.S.

and Soviet capabilities and the risk of war, contribute to the retraction

and reduction of Soviet power and influence to limits which no longer

constitute a threat to U.S. security.

172 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s Secretary’s Files,

Subject File. Top Secret; Eyes Only. A copy was sent to the Director of Central Intelligence.
A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates that it was the President’s copy.

Document 68.

See Document 42 and footnote 2 thereto.

Not attached; presumably it was a copy of Smith’s May 8 memorandum attached

to Document 68.

See Document 75.

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b. Strengthen the orientation toward the United States of the peo-

ples and nations of the free world, and increase their capacity and will

to resist Soviet domination.

c. Develop underground resistance and facilitate covert and guer-

rilla operations in strategic areas to the maximum practicable extent

consistent with 1-a above, and ensure availability of these forces in the

event of war.

2. Reaffirm the responsibility and authority of the Director of Cen-

tral Intelligence for the conduct of covert operations in accordance with
NSC 10/2 and subject to the general policy guidance prescribed therein,
and further subject to the approval of the Psychological Strategy Board
which shall be responsible for:

a. Determining the desirability and feasibility of programs and of

individual major projects for covert operations formulated by or pro-

posed to the Director of Central Intelligence.

b. Establishing the scope, pace, and timing of covert operations

and the allocation of priorities among these operations.

c. Ensuring the provision of adequate personnel, funds, and lo-

gistical and other support to the Director of Central Intelligence by the

Departments of State and Defense for carrying out any approved pro-

gram of covert operations.

3. Request the Secretary of Defense to provide adequate means

whereby the Director of Central Intelligence may be assured of the con-
tinuing advice and collaboration of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the for-
mulation of plans for paramilitary operations during the period of the
cold war.

4. In view of the necessity for immediate decision prior to the com-

ing into operation of the Psychological Strategy Board, authorize the
conduct of expanded guerrilla activities in China, as outlined in the at-
tached memorandum and pursuant to the appropriate provisions of
NSC 48/56.

It is requested that you indicate your action with respect to the

above recommendations by completing and returning,

as a matter of pri-

ority,

the attached memorandum form.

It is requested that special security precautions be taken in the handling

of this material and that access be limited to individuals requiring the infor-
mation contained herein in order to carry out their official duties.

S. Everett Gleason

The Intelligence Community 173

For NSC 48/5, “U.S. Objectives, Policies and Courses of Action in Asia,” May 17,

see

Foreign Relations,

1951, vol. VI, pp. 33–63.

The attached memorandum form, not printed, bears no indication of approval or

disapproval by President Truman or the National Security Council.

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77.

Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Smith to
Secretary of Defense Marshall

Washington, July 2, 1951.

Dear General Marshall:

I have carefully studied the proposed revision of NSCID–5 as pre-

pared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff

and have compared it with the orig-

inal directive which it is designed to replace.

The proposal of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff appears to disregard the intent of Congress as expressed
in the National Security Act of 1947 and as revealed in the record of
Congressional hearings prior to the passage of the Act. During these
hearings it was made clear that the purpose of Congress in enacting
the law was to centralize control of clandestine activities abroad. The
term, “services of common concern,” as finally written into the law was
used, among other subjects, to cover clandestine espionage operations.

The proposed revision seems also (see paragraph 1, sub-paragraph

a of the draft) to disregard the fact that the responsibility of the Director
of Central Intelligence is to the National Security Council and the Presi-
dent—a status which was reaffirmed recently in the President’s hand-
written comments on the Joint Chiefs of Staff document proposing revi-
sion of NSC 10/2, which also pertains to this Agency.

The special

operations of this Agency are designed to support in every possible way
the requirements of the Departments and Services which operate under
the statutory members of the National Security Council but the channel
of responsibility to the National Security Council remains clear.

From the practical point of view, it is unwise to have a number of

different authorities conducting clandestine operations. When I assumed
my present duties, I found that a number of Government Departments
were operating their own “spy nets” abroad. One or two of these were
voluntarily transferred to CIA control in accordance with the intent of
law. Others remain in existence, and we cross trails from time to time;
sometimes with ludicrous and occasionally with rather tragic results. On
the whole, however, this multiplicity of control of a very sensitive type
of operation is a thoroughly bad business. I believe it can be corrected in
time by establishing a broader base of confidence and cooperation in CIA

174 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff Job 83–01034R, Box 4, Folder 6.

Top Secret.

The JCS revision was not found.

For NSCID No. 5, December 12, 1947, see

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, The Emer-

gence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 423.

Not found.

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operations and by improving those operations to the point where they
meet the needs of the agencies CIA is designed to serve.

NSCID–5 as presently in effect, after stating in paragraph 1 that

the Director of Central Intelligence shall conduct all organized Federal
espionage operations outside the United States and its possessions for
the collection of foreign intelligence information required to meet the
needs of all Departments and Agencies concerned in connection with
the national security, makes exception “for certain agreed activities by
other Departments and Agencies.” I am prepared at any time to dis-
cuss any such activities proposed by other Departments and Agencies
and to endeavor to reach an agreement with respect to them. Further-
more, I am obligated under paragraph 4 of NSCID–5 to coordinate such
agreed activities of “casual agents” with the organized covert activities.

I wish to make it clear that this Agency is entirely willing to place

its personnel under the American theater commander in any theater of
active military operations where American troops are engaged and is
equally willing, and indeed anxious, to coordinate its activities with
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If it is necessary to formalize this attitude, a
brief statement like that embodied in the recently approved revision of
paragraph 4, NSC 10/2,

should be sufficient. Accordingly, I do not be-

lieve that the proposed revision merits consideration by the National
Security Council. The present directive seems quite adequate.

Faithfully,

Bedell Smith

See footnote 2, Document 38.

Printed from a copy that indicates Smith signed the original.

78.

Minutes of a Meeting of the Psychological Strategy Board

PSB M–1

Washington, July 2, 1951.

PRESENT

Lieut. General W. Bedell Smith, Director of Central Intelligence
Mr. Robert Lovett, Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Intelligence Community 175

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 333, PSB Minutes.

Secret. This was the first meeting of the PSB. It was held in the DCI’s conference room.

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Mr. Edward Barrett, for the Under Secretary of State
Mr. Gordon Gray, Director, Psychological Strategy Board
Mr. Allen Dulles, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. James Q. Reber, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. [

name not declassified

], Central Intelligence Agency

Functions of the Board and Staff

1. Initial discussion was based on the agenda proposed in the

memorandum of 1 June 1951 from Mr. Dulles to the Director of
Central Intelligence.

In view of Mr. Gray’s appointment, discussion of

the proposed interim procedure (Tab A of that memorandum) was not
necessary. The proposed functions and organization of the Staff (Tab
B) was passed over as it was considered a non-controversial paper. The
basic difference of view brought out in General Magruder’s and Mr.
Sargeant’s papers was discussed briefly but no decision or recom-
mendation was made. It was agreed that Mr. Gray should have an op-
portunity to discuss the matter with various interested people before
forming an opinion.

2. General Smith stated his view that the principal factor missing

in our psychological set-up at the present time is a “master plan” sim-
ilar to the plan of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the last war when it
was decided to concentrate first on Germany and then turn on Japan.
He pointed out that everything else would logically flow from such a
plan and that economic programs, covert missions, and VOA policies
should be related to it.

3. General Smith felt that the PSB and its Staff should work on the

preparation of this master plan and act as a high-level project review
board to allocate missions to the various agencies and to survey the ef-
fectiveness of operations in progress.

Funds, Space, and Personnel

4. The Board agreed that Mr. Gray and his Staff should be physi-

cally located on “neutral ground” apart from any one of the partici-
pating agencies.

5. It was understood that Mr. Peel of CIA would assist Mr. Gray

in working out with Mr. Finan of the Bureau of the Budget

and rep-

resentatives of State and Defense the necessary arrangements regard-
ing funds and office space for the Board and Staff. General Smith agreed
to try to make certain slots available for the immediate hiring of some
high-level consultants to be assigned to the PSB.

176 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

A copy is in the Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–R01731R,

Box 33, Folder 1089.

William F. Finan, Assistant Director for Administrative Management, Bureau of

the Budget.

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Relations With Other Groups

6. The relation of the Board to the NSC was discussed briefly, and

it was understood that the Board would occupy a position somewhat
similar to that of the Senior Staff, reporting directly to the NSC. Coor-
dination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be effected through their
representative with the Board, Admiral Stevens.

7. The supporting role of the O/PC Consultants and Mr. Barrett’s

Psychological Operations Coordinating Board was mentioned and the
possibility was raised of combining these two groups while preserv-
ing separate overt and covert staffs. It was agreed, however, that no
change should be made at the present time inasmuch as both groups
were operating satisfactorily.

Scope of “Psychological Operations”

8. The point was made that the scope of the Board’s responsibil-

ity is very broad and covers every kind of activity in support of U.S.
policies except overt shooting and overt economic warfare.

79.

Memorandum From the Chairman of the Interdepartmental
Committee on Internal Security (Whearty) to the National
Security Council Representative on Internal Security
(Coyne)

NSC 68/17

Washington, July 23, 1951.

SUBJECT

ICIS Section of Internal Security Annex for Report on Status and Timing of
Current U.S. Programs for National Security

In accordance with the memorandum for the Senior NSC Staff by

the NSC Executive Secretary, dated July 16, 1951,

attached hereto is

the ICIS Section of the Internal Security Annex for the report on this
subject. It is noted that the Executive Secretary indicated that the
initial drafts of the annexes should be available to the drafting team

The Intelligence Community 177

Source: National Archives, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council Rep-

resentative on Internal Security, 1947–69, NSC 68 (Internal Security), Box 46. Top Secret.

Not found.

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not later than July 23, 1951. As you know, this report is to be prepared
pursuant to the President’s directive to the NSC with respect to the re-
view of the NSC 68 programs.

Raymond P. Whearty

Attachment

1. Utilizing the personnel and facilities of all Federal agencies con-

cerned, the ICIS is developing a program designed to bring about the
highest practicable state of internal security. The program includes the
following major elements:

a. Protection of critical governmental, industrial, port and other

installations and facilities.

b. Measures designed to afford preventive security against uncon-

ventional attack, including atomic, chemical, biological and radiological.

c. To establish more effective controls to prevent the entry into the

United States of persons who are actually or potentially dangerous to
the national security and the exit of those whose departure would con-
stitute a security threat.

d. To strengthen the controls over the importation and exporta-

tion of materials, the entry or exit of which would endanger the na-
tional security.

e. Procedures designed to protect classified government information.
f. Procedures for federal advice to state and local authorities and

private business in voluntarily restricting the dissemination within the
United States of unclassified technological information, the release of
which might endanger the national security.

g. Assurance that responsible federal agencies have made ade-

quate plans and preparations for the administration of various inter-
nal security programs, the implementation of which is contingent upon
a state of war or war-related emergency.

h. Coordinating the provisions of emergency legislation and reg-

ulations pertaining to internal security matters.

2. A summary of the progress made to date under items a. to h.

above follows:

a. (1) A study, in two parts, covering industrial security, was sub-

mitted to the NSC which approved its recommendations. As a conse-
quence thereof, an Industry Evaluation Board and a Facilities Protec-

178 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Secret.

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tion Board have been established; the former under the Secretary of
Commerce and the latter, while administered by the Department of
Commerce, responsible to the ICIS. The functions of these boards are
to evaluate industrial plant and related resources; to assign to the ap-
propriate departments and agencies of government the responsibility
for preparation and supervision of security programs; to establish over-
all protection policies; to insure the preparation of detailed plans by
each agency in its area of responsibility; and to review and monitor the
implementation of such plans.

(2) A plan for the protection of government buildings, prepared

by the General Services Administration, is currently awaiting final ICIS
approval.

(3) A study on port security submitted to the Treasury Depart-

ment has resulted in the preparation of a detailed plan for augment-
ing Coast Guard activities in this respect. The plan has been approved
and is currently being implemented.

b. Several studies have been prepared and approved covering pos-

sible preventive measures against unconventional attack. Some thirty-
five (35) studies by various departments and agencies have been sub-
mitted to ICIS covering the vulnerability of their respective areas of
responsibility. A study proposing that an overall intelligence evalua-
tion be prepared by CIA, utilizing the IAC agencies, has been submit-
ted to, and is under consideration by, the NSC. Such an evaluation is
essential upon which to predicate the degree of implementation not
only of protective measures against unconventional attack but also
should prove invaluable in the consideration of defense measures
against all forms of covert and overt attack.

c. (1) Comprehensive reports covering entry and exit safeguards

have been prepared and approved by ICIS. Their provisions and rec-
ommendations for strengthening controls have been referred to and are
being implemented by the responsible agencies such as the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service (Justice), Visa and Passport Divisions
(State), Customs (Treasury).

(2) The “Wartime Regulations Covering Entry and Exit” have been

completely revised and redrafted, and are currently being circulated
by State Department to all interested departments and agencies for
concurrence.

d. (1) A detailed study covering the means of clandestine intro-

duction of unconventional attack media and other materials. Predicated
upon its conclusions, recommendations have been made to the Bureau
of Customs and other agencies for the augmentation of already exist-
ing machinery for detection and prevention of entry.

(2) The authority to control the export of strategic materials is

vested in the Secretary of Commerce. The determination of what

The Intelligence Community 179

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materials are strategic or which for reasons of economics, etc., should
not, in the interest of national security, be exported is not within the
purview of ICIS.

(3) The control of export of unclassified, published technological

information to the Soviet bloc has, at the request of the Secretary of
Commerce, been actively studied and interim recommendations made.
No final solution to this extremely complex problem has been devised.
Special emphasis is currently being placed on finding a solution.

e. (1) Regulations establishing “Minimum Standards for the Han-

dling and Transmission of Classified Government Information” have
been submitted to, and approved by, the NSC and the President, con-
tingent upon the resolution of the provisions of a single paragraph
thereof by the Department of Justice and the Department of Defense.

(2) Regulations establishing “Minimum Standards for Security

Clearance for Access to Classified Government Information” have been
submitted to and approved by the NSC and the President who has di-
rected their publication concurrently with, or immediately following,
the publication of the regulations referred to in (1) above.

(3) Regulations prescribing security procedures to determine the

eligibility of foreign visitors to have access to classified U.S. Govern-
ment information have been submitted to the NSC and are currently
under consideration by it.

f. A study was prepared by the ICIS which has led to the estab-

lishment of an agency in the Department of Commerce to provide ad-
vice and guidance in this field to state and local authorities and to pri-
vate business. Appropriate liaison has been established in all
departments and agencies concerned whereby recommendations are
made as to the guidance to be given regarding the specific matters com-
ing under their respective jurisdictions. Appropriate publicity has been
given this project, and it is now functioning.

g. This is a general problem which is receiving continuing con-

sideration. In applying the principle it is usually determined that spe-
cific measures fall under one of the categories listed in a. through f.
above and progress thereunder has been discussed previously.

h. This also is a general problem of a continuing and varied na-

ture. In addition to generating such regulations, for example, as shown
in e. above, the ICIS reviews proposed regulations and legislation orig-
inating in various departments and agencies with a view to evaluat-
ing and recommending the resolution of differences pertaining to the
interests and requirements of other agencies. Since the various de-
partments and agencies of the executive branch have become more and
more cognizant of the coordinative function of ICIS, the effectiveness
of its efforts in this area of interest has improved.

180 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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3. There has been almost unqualified cooperation by the various

departments and agencies in support of ICIS activities. However, many
of the programs and projects advocated by the ICIS for implementa-
tion by these agencies have met with the obstacle of lack of funds. For
example, the Department of Commerce has found it difficult to pro-
vide for the essential staff and administrative cost of the Industry Eval-
uation Board and the Facilities Protection Board. Agencies such as the
Federal Communications Commission are finding it difficult to un-
dertake even the planning for physical security of the communications
industry. Once such plans are completed the cost of supervision and
enforcement of protective measures will be an additional obstacle. As
a further example, plans for removing subversives from critical plants
and facilities must provide, not only for security checks of employees
which is of itself an expensive procedure, but also for the equally im-
portant protection of the rights of individuals through hearings and
appeals procedures. The latter will doubtless entail the establishment
of regional appeals boards across the country, probably under the ju-
risdiction of the Department of Labor. That Department consequently
must be provided the funds for their establishment and functioning.
Plans are not yet crystalized to the degree that specific costs can be es-
timated but it is anticipated that impediments and difficulties of this
nature will be encountered.

4. The program, as outlined, is considered adequate. Additional

specific problems under the broad outline are constantly arising and
are being incorporated thereunder for active consideration. The entire
program is an immediate one, and the corrective actions determined
to be necessary are being implemented on an urgent basis as soon as
the requirement is established. Those measures which are earmarked
for implementation only in the event of general hostilities nevertheless
are envisaged as being equally urgent for determination as those which
are required to be implemented currently.

5. Inasmuch as all of its functions are considered to be current and

immediate, the target date for readiness is

now

and not in the future.

The ICIS will continue to impart a sense of urgency to all of its delib-
erations and will endeavor to instill the same in the agencies charged
with the responsibility of carrying out agreed upon internal security
measures.

The Intelligence Community 181

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80.

Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of
Defense Marshall

Washington, July 27, 1951.

SUBJECT

A Project to Provide a More Adequate Basis for Planning for the Security of the
United States

1. In response to your memorandum dated 8 June 1951,

the Joint

Chiefs of Staff have considered the report of the Interdepartmental
Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) on the above subject.

They have

considered also a memorandum, dated 13 July 1951, by the Director of
Central Intelligence

which was forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

by your memorandum of 19 July 1951.

2. The ICIS report considers Soviet capabilities, Soviet intentions,

and U.S. plans for the internal security of the United States. It suggests
the need for further coordination and integration of such matters. The
draft directive proposed in the report, addressed to the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence as Chairman, Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC),
is intended to remedy these inadequacies by establishing a project to
develop a comprehensive appraisal of Soviet capabilities to injure the
continental United States. The draft directive contemplates further that
key Defense Department personnel be assigned to the project full time
for an estimated period of six months and examination by the IAC of
certain aspects of United States military war plans.

3. In the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the project proposed

in the ICIS report involves four distinct steps as follows:

a. An estimate of the capability of the USSR to launch a military

attack on the continental United States.

Comment:

This estimate should be prepared under the direction of

the Director of Central Intelligence as Chairman of the IAC.

b. An estimate of the capability of the USSR to conduct sabotage

and otherwise disrupt internal U.S. activities.

182 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Job 80–R01440R,

Box 3, Folder 10. Top Secret. The memorandum was sent to the members of the National
Security Council at the request of the Secretary of Defense on July 30.

Not found.

Apparent reference to Document 79. A memorandum from DAH (not identified)

to DCI Smith, July 23, which summarizes a June 1 draft of the ICIS report is attached
but not printed.

See the attachment below.

Not found.

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Comment:

This estimate also should be prepared under the direc-

tion of the Director of Central Intelligence as Chairman of the IAC.

c. An evaluation of our military capability to counter potential en-

emy capabilities as estimated in subparagraph 3 a above, and an esti-

mate and report of the probable damage to the United States resulting

from such attack.

Comment:

This is a responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

d. An evaluation of ways and means available to counter poten-

tial enemy capabilities as estimated in subparagraph 3 b above, and an

estimate and report of the probable damage to the United States re-

sulting from such enemy actions.

Comment:

This should be accomplished under the direction of the

ICIS.

4. Procedures now in effect, whereby members of the IAC provide

information and advice to the Director of Central Intelligence, assure
assistance in the preparation of estimates 3 a and 3 b above by those
qualified in such matters. Accordingly, such intelligence as is required
for the project is available through normal channels without the as-
signment of additional Department of Defense personnel on a full-time
basis to CIA. In addition, the ICIS is so organized that portions of the
project allocated to that agency will not entail assignment of additional
full-time personnel.

5. In view of the above, it is believed that the enclosed draft di-

rectives provide a more satisfactory means of accomplishing the pur-
poses of the project than the one proposed in the ICIS report. It is rec-
ommended, therefore, that the enclosed directives be issued by the
National Security Council in lieu of the directive proposed by the ICIS.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Omar N. Bradley

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Intelligence Community 183

A handwritten notation at the end of this paragraph reads: “Interdepartmental

Int. Conf.” Regarding the subsequent assignment of this estimate to the Interdepart-
mental Intelligence Conference, see footnote 4, Document 86.

Printed from a copy that indicates Bradley signed the original.

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Top Secret.

184 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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Enclosure “A”

PROPOSED NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVE

APPRAISAL OF SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE

COURSES OF ACTION FOR A SURPRISE ATTACK UPON THE

CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES DURING 1951–52

1. Pursuant to authorization by the President, the Director of Cen-

tral Intelligence, as Chairman of the Intelligence Advisory Committee
(IAC), is hereby directed to develop, with the assistance and guidance of
IAC agencies and the advice of other appropriate Government depart-
ments and agencies, comprehensive intelligence estimates concerning:

a. The capabilities of the USSR to launch military attacks against

the continental United States, and

b. The capabilities of the USSR to injure or damage persons, prop-

erty or morale within the United States by subversion and sabotage.

2. For the purpose of implementing this directive, the departments

and agencies of the executive branch of the Government shall make
available to the Director of Central Intelligence such intelligence in-
formation and advice as appropriate to the solution of the problem.

3. It is desired that these estimates be completed as soon as prac-

ticable and, upon completion, a report be forwarded to the National
Security Council.

Enclosure “B”

PROPOSED NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVE

MEASURES FOR THE INTERNAL SECURITY OF THE

UNITED STATES

1. Pursuant to authorization by the President, the Interdepart-

mental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) is hereby directed to
evaluate, with military advice and guidance from the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, ways and means available other than those within the purview
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to counter potential enemy capabilities to
conduct sabotage and otherwise disrupt internal U.S. activities.

2. The Director of Central Intelligence, as Chairman of the Intelli-

gence Advisory Committee (IAC), has been directed to furnish ICIS a
comprehensive intelligence estimate of Soviet capabilities to injure or

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The Intelligence Community 185

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damage persons, property, or morale, within the United States by sub-
version and sabotage. ICIS, within its normal functions, will devise
measures to counter such Soviet capabilities.

3. It is desired that this evaluation be completed as soon as prac-

ticable after receipt of the intelligence estimate (paragraph 2 above) and
that a report be forwarded to the National Security Council.

Attachment

Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Smith to
the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council
(Lay)

Washington, July 13, 1951.

SUBJECT

A Project to Provide a More Adequate Basis for Planning for the Security of the
United States

REFERENCE

Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence from the Executive
Secretary, National Security Council, same subject, 5 June 1951

1. There is no doubt of the great need for, and value of, the pro-

posed project. The conclusions and recommendations of the Interde-
partmental Committee on Internal Security are concurred in.

2. It should be noted, however, that the appraisal envisaged is of

much broader scope than the usual National Intelligence Estimate. It
involves the integration of intelligence on the USSR with various types
of information on the United States. It is therefore essential that, as pro-
vided in Paragraph 2 of the proposed NSC Directive, all Government
departments and agencies “shall make available to the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence such information in their possession as is necessary to
the solution of the problem . . .” as well as “the full-time services, on
a temporary loan basis, . . . of those individuals who are best qualified
by experience and knowledge to assist in the project.”

Walter B. Smith

Secret. All ellipses in the original.

Not printed. Other memoranda are attached that relate to NSC discussion of the is-

sue in June, including a memorandum from Lay to the National Security Council, June 5,
which encloses a June 1 memorandum from Whearty to Coyne that transmits the June 1
draft ICIS report and a proposed National Security Council directive. The latter two are not
attached, however, and none of these attachments is printed.

Printed from a copy that indicates Smith signed the original.

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81.

Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff
(Nitze) to the Under Secretary of State (Webb)

Washington, August 3, 1951.

Before leaving on my vacation I want to set down my views in re-

lation to developments concerning the Psychological Strategy Board.

1. The Presidential Directive of April 4, 1951,

is somewhat un-

clear in setting forth the scope of the Board’s jurisdiction in that it

a. Refers to psychological objectives, strategy and operations with-

out precisely delimiting the meaning of “psychological.”

b. Covers by reference NSC 59/1

and 10/2

in the jurisdiction of

the Board without saying specifically whether the inclusion is defini-

tive or illustrative.

c. Vests the Board with power to “formulate policy” in respect to

psychological activities without defining the relationship between such

policy and the national foreign policy.

2. In the efforts to get the Psychological Board operating two gen-

eral approaches to the question of the Board’s purpose and jurisdiction
have developed—

a. The first is generally advocated for by members of CIA active

in the initial phases of the Board’s work. It is that the Board has pri-

mary authority with regard to all matters of the conduct of foreign pol-

icy short of formal hostilities.

b. The second represents the viewpoint of the Department of State

and has support from the military. It is that the Psychological Strategy

Board should exercise—

(1) Primary authority in ensuring among all agencies concerned

maximum effectiveness and unity of objective and effort in regard to

activities set forth in NSC 59/1 and 10/2.

(2) Secondary authority to see that full account of psychological

factors—that is, aspects having impact on the mind, will, and morale

of foreign peoples—is taken in the planning and execution of other ac-

tivities bearing on the field of foreign relations, including the planning

of the national objectives themselves.

3. These two points of view have been made apparent in all crit-

ical stages of the efforts to establish the understandings and the orga-
nizational arrangements to get the Board’s work under way. To clear

186 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 64 D 563, Psychological Warfare.

Secret. Drafted by Charles Burton Marshall, member of the Policy Planning Staff.

See Document 60.

For NSC 59/1, see Document 2.

Regarding NSC 10/2, see footnote 2, Document 42.

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the matter up, the Director of the Board

sought to bring about an

agreed definition of psychological operations as concerned in the
Board’s jurisdiction. This effort produced two drafts which typify the
conflicting approaches:

a. The first representing the radically broad concept of the Board’s

scope is:

“Psychological operations,” as used in the President’s directive, is

a cover name to describe those activities of the United States in peace

and in war through which all elements of national power are system-

atically brought to bear on other nations for the attainment of U.S. for-

eign policy objectives.

b. The second, representing the more restricted view, is:

Psychological operations are interpreted within the terms of the

Presidential Directive of 4 April 1951 to consist of activities designed

to influence the attitudes, actions and capabilities of foreign peoples,

so as to further U.S. national objectives.

The role of PSB is:

a. To formulate basic plans for the systematic employment of those

psychological operations encompassed by NSC 59/1 and NSC 10/2, to

coordinate their execution, and to evaluate their effect.

b. To ensure in the formulation and application of national polit-

ical, economic and military policies, that the symbolic and psycholog-

ical aspects thereof are adequately exploited.

In face of the prospect that the two definitions were irreconcilable,

the Director decided to lay aside the effort to remedy the issue by def-
inition and to concentrate instead on particular problems and the cre-
ation of a staff.

4. It is necessary and desirable, however, to clear up in the be-

ginning the difference as to the Board’s purpose and jurisdiction and
to resolve the issue by adopting the narrower concept. This is based
on the following considerations:

a. It would be counter to the interests of the Board and to the Gov-

ernment in general to have friction develop between the Board and

other agencies concerned over conflicting assumptions about author-

ity. The principle that good fences make good neighbors is just as im-

portant in Government as it is anywhere else.

b. Clarity of view as to purpose and function is desirable not only

to avoid jurisdictional conflicts at the top level but also to develop har-

monious collaboration in day-to-day relationships at all levels.

c. Clarification is necessary in order to clear the way for going

ahead with planning the Board’s work. In laying out the work it is nec-

essary to know not only what the Board’s and its Staff’s problems will

be but also to what relationship to the problems the Board and its Staff

will have. Under the radically broad definition, any problem might be

expounded by inference to cover the sum total of national policy. To

The Intelligence Community 187

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Gordon Gray.

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make particular problems manageable, it is necessary to relate them to

some restriction in basic concept. It would prove vexatious to every-

one concerned if the Board and its Staff were to commence their labors

without some clear view as to goal and limits.

d. It is well to confine the Board to a commitment which it can

fulfill and which will make it most useful to the Government rather

than attempting to fulfill a vast responsibility all too likely to result in

duplication, conflict, and frustration running counter to the Board’s

usefulness.

5. In the discussions of the organizational problem the Director

and some of his immediate assistants have repeatedly stressed that a
premium will be placed on staffing the organization with individuals
from outside the Government service. This may be desirable in avoid-
ing the draining away of talents needed in other agencies and in widen-
ing the sum of capabilities available to the Government. At the same
time, the idea can be pushed too far. A unit composed preponderantly
of individuals unfamiliar with the labyrinthine ways of the Govern-
ment would all too likely find itself unable to make headway. It would
find itself frustrated in trying to get its own work done. Others would
find it getting in the way. It is better therefore that a balance be struck
between new resources of imagination and old wisdom in the ways of
the Government.

6. The following are recommended:

a. That the Under Secretary seek, at the next meeting of the Board,

to bring about an agreement as to the underlying concept of the Board’s

direction and limits in harmony with the principles stated in the more

restrictive view of the Board’s role.

b. As a matter of less urgency, that the Under Secretary give a

caveat against the attitude which discounts the usefulness of individ-

uals already in the Government and seeks a preponderance of indi-

viduals from outside the Government in staffing the Board.

Paul H. Nitze

188 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

The Psychological Strategy Board adopted a statement on September 25 that

favored the more restrictive view of its role. It is printed in

Foreign Relations,

1951, vol.

I, pp. 178–180.

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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82.

Minutes of a Meeting of the Psychological Strategy Board

PSB M–2

Washington, August 13, 1951, 2:30–4:30 p.m.

PRESENT

Members

Lt. General W. Bedell Smith, Director of Central Intelligence, Acting Chairman
Mr. James E. Webb, Under Secretary of State
Mr. Robert Lovett, Deputy Secretary of Defense

Others

Mr. Gordon Gray, Director, Psychological Strategy Board
Col. Armand Hopkins, JCS Representative
Major General John Magruder, Department of Defense
Mr. Frank Wisner, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Charles E. Johnson, Acting Executive Secretary, Psychological Strategy Board
Mr. Robert G. Efteland, Secretary

Progress Report by the Director (PSB D–1)

1. In addition to his statement in

Progress Report by the Director

(PSB D–1),

Mr. Gray commented that efforts are being made to recruit

individuals for permanent appointment to the staff of the Psychologi-
cal Strategy Board (PSB). He noted that Task Panel “A” (PSB D–1/1)

was the outgrowth of a meeting at the White House in which Assist-
ant Secretaries of State Rusk and Barrett had participated.

Procedure for Conduct of Board Business

2. The Board agreed that it would meet only when there are im-

portant problems to discuss. The Acting Chairman and the Director
will schedule meetings on a rotation basis at any one of the three Agen-
cies at the convenience of the Board. The members are free to bring
their alternates as they deem desirable.

3. In the matter of briefing, Mr. Gray suggested that his staff brief

the members’ alternates a few days before meetings of the Board. The
alternates would then brief the members in advance of Board meet-
ings. General Smith and Mr. Lovett favored this procedure. Mr. Lovett
urged that papers be held to a minimum for security reasons. Mr. Webb
stated that he had not decided how to handle the briefing problem.

The Intelligence Community 189

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 333, PSB Minutes. Top

Secret. Drafted on August 14. The meeting was held in the Director’s Office, Psycho-
logical Strategy Board Building.

A copy is in the Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Job 80–R01731R,

Box 32, Folder 1060.

A copy is ibid.

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4. To prevent problems being placed before the Board for decision

until the members have had a chance to study them, it was the con-
sensus that the Director should determine whether a problem is within
the competence of the Board and whether it is necessary for the PSB
staff to present its views to the PSB.

List of Problems of Interest to the Board (PSB D–2)

5. Mr. Gray, in presenting his views on

List of Problems for the Di-

rector and Staff in Order to Work Priority

(PSB D–2), called the Board’s

attention to paragraph 4 in which he states his concern that the Board
should not assume too many problems without careful consideration.
He said this document is an effort to translate NSC papers into action.
It is necessary to convert NSC policies into specific objectives and for-
mulate plans which will achieve these objectives. As the problems listed
in Sections II–A, II–B and II–C on page 2 are solved, the remaining
problems will become clearer. The staff intends to give top priority to
the substantive problems I through II–C which fall generally into a cat-
egory of psychological strategy planning not previously initiated. Sec-
tion II–D will then be considered. Section II–E will be considered con-
currently inasmuch as these problems are largely concerned with
relationships. Mr. Gray explained that it is not necessary to reconcile
differing definitions as to what psychological operations mean because
the same work is necessary under either concept. Consequently, it was
decided to list the problems facing the PSB to provide the Board with
specific terms of reference which would enable it to get on with its
work. Therefore, the list of problems (PSB D–2) illustrates the area of
interest of the PSB and the Staff. At the same time it provides for Mr.
Gray the basis for planning a functioning staff organization.

6. General Smith said that the list of problems appears to be mon-

umental. He asked Mr. Gray how he expected to accomplish these proj-
ects and still attack current problems. Mr. Gray replied that the Staff
intends to use ad hoc groups whenever necessary on new problems.
General Smith said that in his opinion the PSB staff would require many
reinforcements to accomplish the work outlined in PSB D–2. He be-
lieved that completion of the problems listed would require two years
of effort by the PSB staff and that there was not that much time avail-
able. He said that the problems listed in Sections I–A (4), I–A (5), and
I–A (7) are enough to keep the PSB staff busy for quite some time. In
addition, as he looked over the list of problems, it appeared that many
others were going to require work by the staff in the very near future.
He noted, as an example, that the problem in Section II–K had not yet

190 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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been assigned a work priority. However, it is a problem which must
be met right now.

7. Mr. Webb said that the Kremlin has a special group which de-

votes all of its efforts to maximizing the strength of the USSR and to
fractionating and weakening that of the United States. He hoped that
the members would conceive the function of the PSB as drawing to-
gether U.S. efforts in the same way as the Kremlin group does for Rus-
sia. Moreover, he believed the Board should discuss further many of
the problems listed in PSB D–2 before the Staff completes its work and
reaches a final position on the problems. He said surveys take time and
that we should not overlook each Board member’s ignorance of the
work of other agencies. He looked upon the PSB as a central place for
the members to meet, discuss problems and make policy. The PSB
should be a central place where guidance would be available. It would
give Mr. Webb the feeling that here is a group of knowledgable Gov-
ernment Officials who can meet our major problems in the psycho-
logical area.

8. Mr. Lovett said that this list is an encyclopedic approach and

gives the Board something to shoot at. He suggested that the Board ap-
prove the document (PSB D–2) as an identification of problems which
call for discrimination as to which should be undertaken first. He sug-
gested that the Board undertake as a matter of urgency the problems
listed in Section I–A (4), I–A (5) and I–A (7). This will enable the Board
to find out what is being done by Government agencies, what general
directives they are following and what they plan to do. Mr. Webb
agreed with Mr. Lovett and said that if these three problems were
worked out, the PSB would then know what the agencies in the U.S.
Government are working on. It could bring together whatever addi-
tional resources are necessary to achieve our goals and could make the
necessary plans for any gaps which might be found to exist. General
Smith agreed with: a) the above, b) that the staff of the Board should
undertake the necessary work in connection with these three points;
and c) that the Board should consider at a later date the other prob-
lems listed in the document. Mr. Gray said that the list will naturally
be subject to constant revision. He suggested that the staff, in addition
to the study of Sections I–A (4), I–A (5) and I–A (7), be allowed to take
up any urgent matter which the Board might direct.

Section II–D of PSB D–2

9. The Board discussed at length the problem stated in this sec-

tion of the paper. It was the consensus of the Board that the Russians
are planning some disruptive action to embarrass us. Possibly they will
reaffirm their disarmament suggestions and intensify their peace drive.
It will have the same old sugar coating and will attempt to show that
the United States is preventing disarmament in the world. The Shvernik

The Intelligence Community 191

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letter possibly gives a guide to the Russian attitude. No doubt the Rus-
sians will say to small countries “if you don’t go along with us and ac-
cept our position, you must bear the consequences.” The Board agreed
that the United States must take action to meet these Russian maneu-
vers both abroad and in the United States.

Section II–E of PSB D–2

10. Mr. Gray said that he planned to have a Special Assistant han-

dle the relationships of PSB with congressmen and representatives of
private agencies who are interested generally in psychological devel-
opments. He does not anticipate any problems in this connection. The
main thing will be to keep others from doing things we don’t want
them to do rather than the need to encourage cooperation by outsiders.
Mr. Webb asked Mr. Gray if he intended to use other executive agen-
cies of the Government to talk to representatives of private groups. Mr.
Gray said that he would use Government agencies but that it would
be necessary to have someone available in PSB to talk with them so
that they feel they are being given consideration. General Smith be-
lieved it would be desirable for Mr. Gray to have such an officer to deal
with interested private agencies. Mr. Lovett said that the Department
of Defense would handle most inquiries itself but that it would push
off general inquiries to the PSB. It was the consensus of the Board that
the procedure outlined by Mr. Lovett should be followed.

Organization, Functions, and Budget (PSB D–3)

11. The Board’s consideration was limited to page 5 of PSB docu-

ment D–3. In explaining this estimate, Mr. Gray said that he expects that
the staff will be increased somewhat to meet the problems the PSB must
handle. However, he believed that any increase would be reasonable
and in no case would the staff be increased to anywhere near double
the size called for in the document. The Board agreed that the neces-
sary funds would be provided from appropriate Agency budgets.

Other Business

12. Mr. Gray discussed two papers as examples of problems which

contain psychological implications. He asked that the members cau-
tion their Agencies to make available to the PSB copies of paper of im-
portance to the work of the Board and its Staff. The members agreed
that they would instruct their agencies to cooperate in this matter.

13. General Smith discussed the question of preventing uncon-

trolled activity in the psychological field now that the PSB has been or-
ganized. He said that there is a need to develop an over-all psycholog-

192 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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ical strategy plan. Other Agencies and the Army, which is concerned
only with the tactical military phase of operations, would then be able
to carry out assigned missions. General Magruder stated that he would
discuss the Army’s role with Mr. Lovett (who had left the meeting) and
that the Department of Defense would handle the matter internally. He
said that the Services would deal with the Board through the JSPD which
was established for this purpose. General Magruder said that two pa-
pers are being prepared concerning the Army’s interpretation of its func-
tion and that copies will be submitted to the PSB. It was the consensus
that an over-all psychological strategy plan should be developed so that
all activity in the Government is in consonance with it.

83.

Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of
Defense Marshall

Washington, August 15, 1951.

SUBJECT

Scope and Pace of Covert Operations

1. In accordance with the request contained in your memorandum

dated 29 June 1951,

the Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied the recom-

mendations of the Special Committee of the Senior National Security
Council Staff regarding the “Scope and Pace of Covert Operations”,
forwarded by a memorandum from the Executive Secretary of the Na-
tional Security Council (NSC), dated 27 June 1951.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have prepared a Study, a copy of which

is attached hereto.

The Conclusions to this Study are quoted below for

ready reference:

“a. In the light of the world situation, the United States should,

within its capabilities, bring to bear upon the USSR appropriate cold-
war resources and weapons during peacetime with the objective of

The Intelligence Community 193

Source: Truman Library, President’s Secretary’s Files, Subject File. Top Secret; Eyes

Only. Lay circulated the memorandum to the National Security Council on August 22.
(Ibid.)

Not found.

Document 76.

Not printed.

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weakening the power and will of the Kremlin to wage either cold or
hot war;

“b. It is possible that the present cold war may continue over a

period of many years. However, the implementation of a well-planned
United States program of covert operations (as defined in NSC 10/2)

against the Kremlin conceivably might shorten the period of the strug-
gle, might also be decisive in winning the cold war, and thus might
prevent the eventuation of overt war. These possibilities appear suffi-
cient to justify the United States in undertaking a covert effort of great
magnitude;

“c. In order to assure a well-planned United States program of

covert operations against the Kremlin during peacetime:

“(1) The Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) should develop the

strategic concept and national program, based upon national objectives,

consistent with current military planning and within available eco-

nomic means;

“(2) After approval by the National Security Council (NSC) of the

concept and program, necessary operational plans, including costing

and other appropriate estimates, should be prepared by the appropri-

ate agencies under the direction of the PSB and subject to its review

and approval;

“(3) In the event of any conflict of interests among the agencies

directly concerned, the NSC should be the final arbiter in each case;

and

“(4) All elements of the national program of covert operations

should be reviewed by the NSC at least quarterly;

“d. Responsibility for the conduct of covert operations in wartime

must be as directed in NSC 10/2. In this connection, it is axiomatic that
all wartime operations in any military theater or area (specifically in-
cluding covert) shall be under the direction of the military commander
of the theater or area. On the other hand, responsibility for the conduct
of covert operations in peacetime should rest in the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence (DCI);

“e. On the long-range basis, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

should procure and maintain its own personnel;

“f. On both long-range and short-range bases, the Department of

Defense should support CIA peacetime covert operations by:

“(1) Providing for approved projects, appropriate equipment and

services as practicable which either cannot or should not be obtained

elsewhere; and

194 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

NSC 10/2 is in

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Estab-

lishment, Document 292.

320-672/B428-S/11008

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“(2) Assisting in training, as practicable, and in providing neces-

sary training facilities (such as not to interfere with research and de-

velopment installations and installations required to be maintained in

a combat-ready status) particularly when cover is an inherent require-

ment for the training;

“g. Department of Defense support of CIA peacetime covert oper-

ations at an increased scope and pace will call for some expansion of the
mobilization base and mobilization requirements. This expansion
should, in general, be related to the increase in CIA covert operations;

“h. In view of the present restricted capability of CIA, such peace-

time projects as can be justified by reason of their immediate urgency
and of the national importance of the results reasonably to be expected
therefrom, should be supported by the Department of Defense. On the
short-term basis, this support in terms of military personnel will in-
clude a limited number of specially qualified active duty officers and
men and certain retired and/or reserve officers not on active duty. Some
of these reserve officers may, on the short-term basis, be called to ac-
tive duty for assignment to CIA for a specific project. This must be sub-
ject, however, to an overriding priority for the Services whenever a
Service specialty qualification is involved. In addition, assistance by
the Department of Defense to CIA probably will be necessary with re-
spect to the duty status and process of procurement of certain poten-
tial inductees and personnel with reserve commissions:

“i. The following procedures and restrictions must apply to the

assignment of military personnel to CIA:

“(1) Arrangements for assignment of active duty officers and

men will be made with the Services through the Joint Chiefs of Staff

organization;

“(2) The need for personnel must be justified in each instance.

Numbers will be limited to the minimum for performance of specific

tasks in approved projects and programs;

“(3) As far as practicable, all details or assignments will be on a

voluntary basis and under no circumstances will an individual be as-

signed to CIA against his will. All details will be temporary in nature

and subject to Services practices of rotation;

“(4) No individuals in the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC)

or in other officer candidate groups will be made available to CIA;

and

“(5) CIA must make every effort to assure to the military person-

nel assigned to it an equality of opportunity for advancement (in pay

and allowances or rank, etc.) commensurate with that of their con-

temporaries serving on active duty with their parent Service; and,

where applicable and feasible, to obtain for individuals concerned a re-

muneration consistent with that paid to personnel obtained from other

sources and performing comparable duties;

“j. In order for the Department of Defense to support a CIA accel-

erated program the requirements for personnel, supply, and services

The Intelligence Community 195

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should, except in extreme emergency, be forecast sufficiently in
advance to enable the Services to include such requirements in their
mobilization base and requirements. Personnel provided to CIA by the
Services should be on a reimbursable basis so that they will not be
charged against the authorized strength of the Services; and

“k. All matters concerning the support to be rendered CIA by the

Department of Defense will be subject to the overriding reservation
that such support either for a single project or for the total of all proj-
ects will not jeopardize seriously the capabilities of the Department of
Defense to carry out its responsibilities. If the conflicting needs of the
Department of Defense and the projects for covert operations impinge
upon the question of the security of the United States, the question
should be decided on a level no lower than the President.”

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the recommendations

in the memorandum, subject as above, dated 27 June 1951, from the
Executive Secretary of the NSC, be approved, subject to:

a. Acceptance by the NSC of the military considerations, together

with the reservations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as set forth in para-
graph 2 above, and

b. The revision of paragraphs 1 and 2 of the recommendations to

read as indicated below (with appropriate renumbering of the suc-
ceeding paragraphs):

“1. Direct the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) to submit at the

earliest practicable date a strategic concept for a national program of
covert operations directed against the Kremlin under cold war condi-
tions designed in general order of emphasis to:

“a. Place the maximum strain on the Soviet structure of

power, including the relationships between the USSR, its satel-

lites, and Communist China; and when and where appropri-

ate in the light of U.S. and Soviet capabilities and the risk of war,

contribute to the retraction and reduction of Soviet power and

influence to limits which no longer constitute a threat to U.S.

security.

“b. Strengthen the orientation toward the United States of the

peoples and nations of the free world, and increase their capacity
and will to resist Soviet domination.

“c. Develop underground resistance and provide assistance

to underground resistance movements and guerrillas in strategic
areas to the maximum practicable extent consistent with 1–a above,
and to provide the base upon which the military may expand these
forces on a military basis in time of war within activated theatres
of operations.

“2. As an interim measure, and subject to future NSC action on

the report to be submitted by the PSB as directed in paragraph 1 above,

approve in principle as a national responsibility the immediate ex-

pansion of the covert organization established in NSC 10/2, and the

196 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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intensification of covert operations designed to accomplish the objec-

tives set forth in the three preceding subparagraphs, in accordance with

approved plans and projects.”

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Omar N. Bradley

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Printed from a copy that indicates Bradley signed the original.

84.

Memorandum for President Truman of Discussion at the
100th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, August 22, 1951.

[Omitted here is discussion of agenda items 1: The Situation in the

Far East, 2: The Kaesong Negotiations, 3: Probable Soviet Actions at
the San Francisco Conference on the Japanese Peace Treaty, 4: The Sit-
uation in Iran, and 5: Relations between India and Pakistan.]

6. NSC 26/2

(Progress Report, dated July 26, 1951, by the

Department of State on NSC 26/2)

In response to The President’s request for comments on this

Progress Report, General Smith outlined briefly the activities of repre-
sentatives of CIA in the areas in question. [

2 lines not declassified

]. In

conclusion, General Smith stated to the Council the need which he felt
for clearer authorization from the Secretary of State or from the Coun-
cil in order to permit CIA to carry out its responsibilities under this
policy.

Mr. Lay pointed out that all that was necessary was a formaliza-

tion by the Secretary of State of CIA’s responsibility to carry out poli-
cies set forth in NSC 26/2.

The Intelligence Community 197

Source: Truman Library, Memo for the President, Meeting Discussions, 1951. Top

Secret. Drafted on August 23, but no drafter is indicated.

NSC 26/2 is in National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, Box 51.

The July 26 progress report has not been found, but for the fourth progress report, April
7, 1952, see Document 105.

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The National Security Council:
Discussed the reference Progress Report and noted that the Secre-

tary of State would issue a directive to the Director of Central Intelli-
gence formalizing the responsibilities of the Central Intelligence
Agency in implementing the policies set forth in NSC 26/2.

[Omitted here is discussion of agenda items 7: Security of Strate-

gically Important Industrial Operations in Foreign Countries, 8: The
Position of the United States With Respect to the Philippines, and 9:
NSC Status of Projects.]

85.

Memorandum for the Record by the Deputy Director for
Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner)

Washington, August 27, 1951.

SUBJECT

Consideration of the JCS memorandum concerning the “Magnitude Paper” by
ad hoc committee of NSC Senior Staff

This memorandum will record the highlights of a meeting of the

ad hoc committee of the NSC Senior Staff which was held in Mr. Lay’s
office on 27 August to consider the JCS memorandum to the Secretary
of Defense

commenting upon and proposing certain revisions of the

NSC Staff paper on this subject.

The following individuals were pres-

ent at the meeting: Mr. Lay and Mr. Gleason (NSC); Messrs. Bohlen
and Joyce (State); Mr. Nash and General Magruder (Defense); Admiral
Wooldridge (JCS); Mr. Gray (PSB); and Messrs. Jackson and Wisner
(CIA).

In the outset of the meeting it became evident that the majority if

not all of those present considered the JCS memorandum to be con-
fusing and obscure. Numerous questions were addressed to Admiral
Wooldridge in the effort to obtain clarifications of various points in the
JCS paper. For example, Mr. Lay stated and others agreed that they
could not understand the intent of the changes made by the JCS paper

198 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Deputy Director for Operations, Job

79–01228A, Box 6. Top Secret. Drafted on August 29. The original was sent to Jackson;
copies were sent to Dulles (DD/CI) and Johnston (AD/PC). All ellipses in the original.

Document 83.

Document 76.

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320-672/B428-S/11008

in paragraph 1c of the NSC Staff paper. These changes propose the
deletion of the words “facilitate covert and guerrilla operations” and
the substitution of “provide assistance to underground resistance
movements and guerrillas”; and the deletion of the words “insure avail-
ability of these forces in the event of war” and the substitution of “to
provide

the base

upon which the military may expand these forces on

a military basis in time of war within activated theaters of operation”.
It was concluded that the original language should remain unchanged
in the absence of any clear reason for changing it. However it was
agreed to add the following language to the end of the original para-
graph 1c:

“. . . insure availability of these forces in the event of war

for util-

ization in accordance with principles established by the National Security

Council, including wherever practicable provision of a base upon which the

military may expand these forces on a military basis in time of war within ac-

tive theaters of operation.

” (underscored language added)

Mr. Nash proceeded to analyze the JCS memorandum and made

the point that the paper in its entire latter portions dealt with matters
which were not suitable for inclusion in an NSC paper but which
should be the subject matter of internal Defense Department determi-
nation and disposition. Mr. Nash recommended that the attention of
the meeting be focused on the forepart of the paper to the exclusion of
the very detailed administrative provisions of the latter paragraphs. It
was agreed that Mr. Nash’s recommendation was sound and that the
latter paragraphs of the paper should be the subject of consideration
and decision within the Department of Defense and the military serv-
ices. Presumably there would be an opportunity for CIA to participate
in the deliberations leading to the development of the Defense De-
partment position and papers covering the administrative provisions.

Admiral Wooldridge urged on behalf of the JCS that two changes

be made in the paper in order to take into account and adequately re-
flect the points of chief concern to the JCS. He proposed the addition
of a new paragraph 2 in the paper to read as follows:

“Direct the Psychological Strategy Board to assure that its strate-

gic concept for a national psychological program includes provision

for covert operations designed to achieve the objectives stated in para-

graph 1 above.”

It was agreed to adopt this paragraph in order to make manifest

within the paper the responsibility of the Psychological Strategy Board
for insuring that the specified objectives should be provided for in the
strategic plan which it is required to develop under the directive which

The Intelligence Community 199

Printed here as italics.

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sets up the PSB. It was understood that nothing in the new paragraph
would require the submission to and approval by the PSB of existing
programs and activities of the CIA in order for these to proceed or ob-
tain the necessary support of the Defense establishment.

Admiral Wooldridge’s other point was that paragraph 2c should

be changed to provide that the PSB would coordinate the provision of
personnel, funds and other support to the CIA by the Departments of
State and Defense, rather than

insure

the provision of such support.

Admiral Wooldridge contended that the PSB as such had no authority
to “insure” the provision of support by the other departments. Mr. Jack-
son while acknowledging the technical accuracy of Admiral
Wooldridge’s point nevertheless maintained that the assurance of sup-
port for the CIA was essential from the point of view of the Director
of CIA, and that whatever words might be added it should be very
clear that the CIA should not be called upon to execute programs with-
out the assurance that the necessary support would be forthcoming.
Mr. Jackson’s position was fully supported by all present at the meet-
ing and it was agreed to adopt the following language to give expres-
sion to the technical point raised by Admiral Wooldridge:

“Coordinating action to insure the provision of adequate person-

nel . . .”—continues as original.

There being no other points offered or suggested by Admiral

Wooldridge or any others at the meeting, it was agreed that the above
indicated changes would be all that were necessary. Mr. Nash indicated
that he would recommend to the Secretary of Defense that the latter
send forward to Mr. Lay a statement to the effect that the NSC Senior
Staff paper is approved by the Department of Defense subject only to
the three indicated changes in language.

Frank G. Wisner

200 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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Printed from a copy that indicates Wisner signed the original.

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86.

Record of Action No. 543 of the National Security Council

Washington, August 30, 1951.

A Project To Provide a More Adequate Basis for Planning for the Security

of the United States

(Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary,

same subject, dated June 5

and August 7, 1951;

NSC Action

No. 519

)

Approved the draft directive on the subject prepared by the Direc-

tor of Central Intelligence pursuant to NSC Action No. 519 and attached
to the reference memorandum of August 7 on the subject, in lieu of the
draft directive proposed by the Interdepartmental Committee on Inter-
nal Security in the enclosure to the reference memorandum of June 5. The
Acting Attorney General approved with the following comment:

“Since the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference deals only

with the internal security aspects of the Nation’s security, it is pre-
sumably understood that the IIC should prepare the estimate provided
for in paragraph 1 (b) of the draft directive only in so far as it pertains
to the internal aspects of the capability of the USSR to conduct sabo-
tage and otherwise disrupt internal U. S. activities. The foreign aspects
of Russia’s ability to commit sabotage, of course, are not within the
purview of the IIC, and would appear properly a matter of study by
the CIA and the subject of a separate report.”

Note:

The Acting Attorney General participated in the above ac-

tion with the Council, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of
Defense Mobilization. The approved directive and comment by the Act-
ing Attorney General subsequently circulated for Council information
and transmitted to the appropriate agencies for implementation.

The Intelligence Community 201

320-672/B428-S/11008

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence,

Job 80–R01440R, Box 3, Folder 10. Top Secret.

See footnote 9, Document 80.

Not found.

NSC Action No. 519, approved August 1, noted NSC discussion of the report by

the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (Document 79) and the views of
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence, and agreed to the four points
in the third paragraph of the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum (see Document 80), sub-
ject to the assignment of paragraph 3–b to the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference
and the integration and coordination of the resulting reports by representatives of the
appropriate departments and agencies by the Director of Central Intelligence into a sin-
gle report for the National Security Council; and noted that the Director of Central In-
telligence would prepare a directive derived from the NSC guidelines. (National
Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Actions by the
National Security Council)

1363_A15-A20.qxd 9/28/07 9:29 AM Page 201

87.

Report on the Office of Special Operations of the Central
Intelligence Agency by the Deputy Assistant Director of
Special Operations (Kirkpatrick)

Washington, August 31, 1951.

I. Introduction

History of the Organization.

The Office of Special Operations is a di-

rect carry-over from the Office of Strategic Services. When that organ-
ization was disbanded at the end of the war, the Secret Intelligence
Branch and the X–2 Branch (Counterespionage) were retained as the
Strategic Services Unit under the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
War. When the President created the Central Intelligence Group in Jan-
uary 1946, the Strategic Services Unit was transferred to that organi-
zation and became the Office of Special Operations.

Principal assets brought forward from OSS days included some

experienced personnel; the nucleus of organizations operating princi-
pally in Germany and China; the counterespionage files of OSS; and
established liaisons with certain foreign intelligence services. While the
organization in China has been largely destroyed by the Communists,
the organization in Germany has been developed and expanded. In-
herited after the conclusion of World War II was the responsibility for
coverage of Latin America, previously held by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.

Today the Office of Special Operations is organized into seven for-

eign divisions operating 131 fixed field stations, three principal staffs
and six subordinate staffs. [

3 lines not declassified

]

II. Findings—General

1. There is a high degree of professional competence among the

Division and Staff Chiefs in OSO, although it is apparent that this pro-

202 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Operations, Job 80–B01795R,

Box 6. Top Secret. In an August 31 covering memorandum to Deputy Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence Jackson, Kirkpatrick wrote in part: “The attached report on the Office
of Special Operations is based upon my participation in certain parts of your survey of
OSO during July and August 1951, plus independent conversations which I have held
with Staff, Division and Branch Chiefs, reports which I have had prepared, and research
into various OSO files.” He also noted certain discrepancies in personnel figures which
were attributable, he said, to personnel in transit from headquarters to the field and vice
versa. The body of the report includes sections on the Staffs, the Foreign Divisions, Mis-
cellaneous, and Recommendations, followed by charts showing OSO Organization,
Staffing, Field Stations, Distribution of CIA/OSO Intelligence Material, Reports Dis-
seminated by OSO, and Estimated Personnel Strength of the British Secret Services.

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fessional competence has not always been utilized to its fullest extent
in the development of an espionage service directed at the principal
targets of intelligence.

2. No particular emphasis is being placed by OSO on espionage

against the USSR.

3. There is an extreme shortage of personnel in all classes, rang-

ing from the Branch Chief level to the clerical level. Further, it is obvi-
ous that a considerable amount of valuable OSO effort is lost as a re-
sult of a shortage of clerical personnel to handle the paper work.

4. Considerable OSO effort is being dissipated from the major mis-

sion of establishing a long-term clandestine espionage organization.
Particular examples of the dissipation of effort is the emphasis on sup-
porting the 8th Army in Korea with an intelligence detachment. Actu-
ally OSO does not have the trained personnel to do this job at the pres-
ent time, and the net gains for CIA will be minor in contrast with the
gains by use of the same personnel on long-term espionage operations.

5. There is not sufficient emphasis in OSO on counterespionage

operations.

6. OSO rules and regulations should be reviewed, to allow greater

initiative and judgment by responsible branch, division, staff, and sta-
tion chiefs.

7. The tremendous support-load that OSO performs for other of-

fices of CIA and other agencies of the Government, should be lessened.

8. There is too great concentration on collection of short-range,

tactical information, and not sufficient attention to collection of high-
level political and strategic information.

9. The policy of shifting personnel between areas, and of a two-

year tour of duty overseas, should be reviewed.

10. [

3 lines not declassified

]

11. There has been insufficient liaison between OSO headquarters

and the field.

12. There is no standard system for checking on the activity of

field stations. In one instance, the only report received from a field rep-
resentative was a request for supplies—no intelligence has yet been re-
ceived from this station.

The Intelligence Community 203

In June 1951, CIA formalized the Redcap program to monitor Soviet officials

abroad and encourage them to defect. See Robert L. Benson and Michael Warner,
eds.,

Venona: Soviet Espionage and the American Response, 1939–1957

, p. xxxii. This required

considerable liaison with foreign intelligence services. Attempts were also made to in-
filtrate agents into the Soviet Union, but, given stringent Soviet controls, these attempts,
codenamed Redsox, enjoyed very limited success. This was recognized by 1954 and a
program using legal travelers for short term observation of the Soviet Union was set up
under the codename Redskin.

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13. There is no standard divisional organization.
14. The delay between collection of information and its dissemi-

nation to consumer intelligence agencies is in the nature of two to three
months except for cabled reports. Two major bottlenecks are responsi-
ble for this: official pouches are extremely slow; and reports control has
been allowed to take three to six weeks as an average to produce re-
ports (this is after the reports are prepared for publication by the for-
eign divisions).

15. [

2 lines not declassified

]

[Omitted here is the body of the report.]

88.

Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Director of Special
Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency (Kirkpatrick)
to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Jackson)

Washington, September 25, 1951.

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job

95–G600278R, Box 1, Folder 7. Secret. 3 pages not declassified.]

89.

Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National
Security Council (Lay) to the National Security Council

Washington, October 9, 1951.

SUBJECT

Scope and Pace of Covert Operations

REFERENCE

Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated 27 June
1951,

and references therein

204 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s Secretary’s File,

Subject File. Top Secret; Eyes Only. A copy was sent to the Director of Central Intelligence.
Ellipsis in the original.

Document 76.

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The Under Secretary of State and the Acting Chairman of the Na-

tional Security Resources Board have approved the recommendations
contained in the reference memorandum. The Director of Central In-
telligence has concurred therein.

The Acting Secretary of Defense, however, on October 8, 1951 ap-

proved the recommendations contained in the reference memorandum,
subject to the following changes:

1. Change paragraph 1–e to read as follows:
“Develop underground resistance and facilitate covert and guer-

rilla operations in strategic areas to the maximum practicable extent
consistent with 1–a above, and ensure availability of these forces in the
event of war for utilization in accordance with principles established
by the National Security Council, including wherever practicable pro-
vision of a base upon which the military may expand these forces on
a military basis in time of war within active theaters of operations.”

2. Insert a new paragraph 2 to read as follows, renumbering the

ensuing paragraphs accordingly:

“Direct the Psychological Strategy Board to assure that its strate-

gic concept for a national psychological program includes provision
for covert operations designed to achieve the objectives stated in para-
graph 1 above.”

3. Change the original paragraph 2–c (now paragraph 3–c) to read

as follows:

“Coordinating action to ensure the provision of adequate person-

nel. . . .”—continues as in original.

Accordingly, it is requested that you indicate your action with re-

spect to the above changes by completing and returning,

as a matter of

priority,

the attached memorandum form.

It is requested that special security precautions be taken in the handling

of this material and that access be limited to individuals requiring the infor-
mation contained herein in order to carry out their official duties.

James S. Lay, Jr.

The Intelligence Community 205

See Document 85.

The attached memorandum form, not printed, indicates that President Truman

gave his approval on October 23; see Document 90.

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90.

Note From the Executive Secretary of the National Security
Council (Lay) to the National Security Council

NSC 10/5

Washington, October 23, 1951.

SCOPE AND PACE OF COVERT OPERATIONS

REFERENCES

A. Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated June 27,

1951

B. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated August 22,

1951

C. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated October 9,

1951

As of October 23, 1951, the statutory members of the National Se-

curity Council approved the recommendations contained in Reference
A as amended by the changes contained in Reference C. The Director
of Central Intelligence had concurred therein.

Accordingly, the report as amended and approved is enclosed

herewith for information and appropriate implementation by all de-
partments and agencies concerned, as indicated therein.

It is requested that special security precautions be taken in the handling

of this report and that access be limited strictly to individuals requiring the
information contained therein to carry out their official duties.

It is further requested that all copies of the reference memoranda

be withdrawn and returned to this office upon receipt of this report.

James S. Lay, Jr.

206 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s Secretary’s Files,

Subject File. Top Secret. NSC 10/4 (Document 42) was withdrawn on December 13, af-
ter the approval of NSC 10/5. (Memorandum from Lay to the National Security Coun-
cil, December 13; Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s Secretary File,
Subject File)

Document 76.

The August 22 memorandum transmitted the JCS views (Document 83) to the

National Security Council.

Document 89.

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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Enclosure

ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON

SCOPE AND PACE OF COVERT OPERATIONS

1. The National Security Council approves in principle as a na-

tional responsibility the immediate expansion of the covert organiza-
tion established in NSC 10/2, and the intensification of covert opera-
tions designed in general order of emphasis to:

a. Place the maximum strain on the Soviet structure of power, in-

cluding the relationships between the USSR, its satellites, and Com-
munist China; and when and where appropriate in the light of U.S.
and Soviet capabilities and the risk of war, contribute to the retraction
and reduction of Soviet power and influence to limits which no longer
constitute a threat to U.S. security.

b. Strengthen the orientation toward the United States of the peo-

ples and nations of the free world, and increase their capacity and will
to resist Soviet domination.

c. Develop underground resistance and facilitate covert and guer-

2. The National Security Council directs the Psychological Strat-

egy Board to assure that its strategic concept for a national psycho-
logical program includes provision for covert operations designed to
achieve the objectives stated in paragraph 1 above.

3. The National Security Council reaffirms the responsibility and

authority of the Director of Central Intelligence for the conduct of
covert operations in accordance with NSC 10/2 and subject to the gen-
eral policy guidance prescribed therein, and further subject to the ap-
proval of the Psychological Strategy Board which shall be responsible
for:

a. Determining the desirability and feasibility of programs and of

individual major projects for covert operations formulated by or pro-
posed to the Director of Central Intelligence.

b. Establishing the scope, pace, and timing of covert operations

and the allocation of priorities among these operations.

The Intelligence Community 207

Top Secret. Also printed in Michael Warner, ed.,

The CIA Under Harry Truman,

pp. 437–439.

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c. Coordinating action to ensure the provision of adequate per-

sonnel, funds, and logistical and other support to the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence by the Departments of State and Defense for carrying
out any approved program of covert operations.

4. The National Security Council requests the Secretary of Defense

to provide adequate means whereby the Director of Central Intelligence
may be assured of the continuing advice and collaboration of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in the formulation of plans for paramilitary operations
during the period of the cold war.

5. In view of the necessity for immediate decision prior to the com-

ing into operation of the Psychological Strategy Board, the National Se-
curity Council authorizes the conduct of expanded guerrilla activities
in China, as outlined in the memorandum from the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence enclosed with the reference memorandum of June 27,
1951 (Reference A), and pursuant to the appropriate provisions of NSC
48/5.

NSC 48/5, “U.S. Objectives, Policies and Courses of Action in Asia,” is printed

Foreign Relations,

1951, vol. VI, pp. 33–63.

91.

Fact Sheet

Washington, November 8, 1951.

Name

: IAC Watch Committee

Established

: Established in its present form by IAC decision of 7 De-

cember 1950.

It was preceded by the Joint Intelligence Indications

Committee (JIIC), which consisted of full members from the military
services and members of other IAC agencies participating informally.

Chairman

: Brig. General John Weckerling, Chief, Intelligence Div.,

G–2.

208 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Administration Files: Lot 62 D 220, Top Secret

Records on Inter-Agency Relations, 1948–61, Committee Status Book, Box 1. Top Secret.
The date is handwritten at the bottom of the page.

See Document 35.

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Membership

CIA

JCS

State (Mose Harvey, DRS;

Air Force

Alternates: Boris Klosson &

Army

Howard Wiedemann, DRS)

Navy

AEC
FBI

Terms of Reference

: Terms of reference, as authorized by the IAC, are

given in G–2 memorandum (G2–IWW–319.26) dated 20 December
1950.

The Committee’s mission is to collect, evaluate, analyze and re-

port indications of Soviet-Communist intentions of hostile action and
it is responsible for issuing a weekly report on Indications of Soviet-
Communist Intention of Hostile Action.

Secretariat

: G–2 provides the secretariat which a) regularly collects

from all IAC agencies material bearing on the determination of Soviet-
Communist intentions, and b) drafts, reproduces and distributes the
weekly report.

Activity

: The Committee meets regularly once a week (Wednesdays

from 10 a.m. to about 1 p.m.) and has crash sessions when required.

Background

: See memorandum referred to in point 5 above.

Effectiveness

: The IAC Watch Committee is performing an extremely

important function and, in effect, may be regarded as the intelligence
body charged with the responsibility of alerting the US Government
of Soviet-Communist intentions to initiate war. The Department’s par-
ticipation has priority over most other intelligence functions performed
by DRS and to a large extent the work of DRS is geared to the inten-
tions problems with which the Committee is concerned.

The Intelligence Community 209

Not found.

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92.

Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Webb) to
the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council
(Lay)

Washington, November 8, 1951.

SUBJECT

Third Progress Report on NSC 59/1, “The Foreign Information Program and
Psychological Warfare Planning”

1. NSC 59/1 was approved as governmental policy on March 10,

1950. It is requested that this Progress Report, as of October 17, 1951,
be circulated to the members of the Council for their information.

2. The activities described in this report were undertaken in im-

plementation of NSC 59/1.

3. The Interdepartmental Foreign Information Organization was

redesignated the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee

following the issuance of the Presidential Directive of April 4, 1951, es-
tablishing a Psychological Strategy Board.

It will therefore be referred

to hereafter in this report as the “Committee.” Formal announcement
of the redesignation is being withheld pending decision on certain or-
ganizational details.

4. In addition to the Chairman, representatives of the following

agencies regularly attend the weekly meetings: Department of Defense,
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Executive Office of the President, Department of
State, Economic Cooperation Administration, and Central Intelligence
Agency. The Army, Navy and Air Force chiefs of psychological war-
fare attend when matters of interest to their respective services are be-
fore the Committee.

5. On the Committee’s recommendation, a survey team was sent

to Tokyo and Korea in October 1950 to study psychological warfare ac-
tivities there. The findings of this group were reviewed by the Com-
mittee at its meeting November 13, 1950. The Committee has subse-
quently made periodic reviews of psychological warfare activities in
Korea in order to help implement the recommendations of the survey
team.

210 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, 1935–62, Box 115,

no label. Secret; Security Information.

See Document 74.

See Document 60.

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6. A National Psychological Warfare Plan for General War

was

prepared by the Interdepartmental Foreign Information Staff (now the
Secretariat of the Committee) under the provisions of NSC 59/1. This
Plan was approved by the Committee and forwarded to the National
Security Council. The National Security Council has since received
comments on the Plan from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which were re-
ferred to the Psychological Strategy Board. The Department of State
has also submitted a version of the Plan to the Psychological Strategy
Board.

7. Psychological warfare plans for Russia, Korea and Indochina

have been developed and approved. Plans for Germany, the Middle
East and the Satellite areas are being prepared in the Department of
State. A China plan is also being prepared on the basis of comments
from the field on the Interim Plan for China, approved by the Com-
mittee in March, 1951.

Project Troy

Under this project, thirty of the nation’s top scientists and other

experts were assembled by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
under contract to the Department of State to explore all conventional
and unconventional means of penetrating the Iron Curtain. Particular
attention was given to the possibilities of utilizing in psychological war-
fare the new developments in the electro-magnetic field. The report
submitted by the group calls for a substantial expansion of our radio
facilities, which has already been undertaken. A vest-pocket radio is
being developed along the lines recommended by the group, making
use of the “transistor,” a remarkable device which increases battery-
life several hundred times and makes it possible to build a radio set of
this size.

Funds to complete the project, although requested, have not been

appropriated by Congress.

Propaganda Balloons

There has been continued study of the possibility of using balloons

to carry our propaganda to the people of Russia and her satellites. Fol-
lowing Committee approval, the appropriate government agency, in
cooperation with private organizations including the Crusade for Free-
dom in New York, launched an experimental propaganda balloon proj-
ect from Western Germany with Czechoslovakia as a target. This proj-
ect was begun the week of August 12, 1951. Balloons were subsequently

The Intelligence Community 211

The plan, which was discussed at an October 25 meeting of the PSB, is in the Na-

tional Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 333, PSB D–8, Box 1.

See Document 59.

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launched to Poland. Details of the project have since appeared in the
press. The effectiveness of the project is currently being evaluated.

10.

Defectors

At the Committee’s request, the Department of State prepared a

detailed history of United States handling of Russian and Satellite de-
fectors during and since World War II. This study was turned over to
the Policy Advisory Staff of the Department of State for its use in treat-
ing information aspects of the defector question.

11.

Exploitation of Economic Themes

The Committee has recommended that a full-time consultant be

employed to study the problem of coordinating government output on
economic matters and exploiting economic themes more fully.

Working with the Economic Cooperation Administration the Psy-

chological Operations Coordinating Committee actively promoted sev-
eral economic themes in psychological operations. One of the most im-
portant of these is the ECA Production-Productivity drive in Western
Europe. This is a concerted effort to increase Western Europe’s gross
production by $100 billion yearly. The project has become front-page
news in most of Europe’s newspapers. By agreement between the De-
partment of State and ECA the Production-Productivity drive is now
a major U.S. project.

12.

Prisoners-of-war

A study on propaganda exploitation of Chinese and North Korean

Prisoners-of-war was approved by the Committee on August 13 and
recommended as guidance to the Far East Command.

13.

Contingency of Soviet Leaders’ Death

A contingency plan against the possible death of certain Soviet

leaders has been prepared by an inter-agency working group at the re-
quest of the Committee and is in process of final coordination.

14.

Current projects

Some of the more important current activities of the Committee or

the Secretariat are as follows:

a) With the approval of the Psychological Strategy Board an in-

terdepartmental working group has been established to study the
broad range of psychological problems growing out of the presence of
U.S. military units overseas.

b) A military working group charged with developing key themes

for use in propaganda directed to Soviet and Satellite troops has made
an interim report to the Committee.

c) On recommendation of the Committee an expanded program

of on-the-job training has been undertaken in the State Department for
military officers in psychological warfare. The military services have
expressed their desire to continue participation in this program.

212 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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d) The Committee is considering a Navy Department study en-

compassing plans to exploit the psychological potential in Soviet sub-
marine operations.

e) The Committee is engaged in making plans for the implemen-

tation of two Korean contingency plans which were prepared by the
Psychological Strategy Board.

f) The Secretariat is developing stand-by psychological operations

plans for implementation immediately following the outbreak of a pos-
sible general war. When completed and approved by the Committee,
these plans will be forwarded to the Psychological Strategy Board for
consideration.

James E. Webb

Printed from a copy that indicates Webb signed the original.

93.

Memorandum From the Assistant Director for Special
Operations (Wyman) and the Assistant Director for Policy
Coordination of the Central Intelligence Agency (Johnston)
to Director of Central Intelligence Smith

Washington, November 14, 1951.

SUBJECT

Draft Report on Special Operations

1. From early October until the present date, OPC/OSO and mem-

bers of the Joint Subsidiary Plans Division have engaged in the con-
sideration of three successive drafts of a JCS paper, subject as above.

2. This paper is of utmost significance to CIA’s responsibilities for

war planning in both Europe and for any extension of NATO to the
Middle East. It established three principles:

a. That overall guidance for clandestine activities at SHAPE or any

NATO countries to be established, will be channeled through the Stand-
ing Group, Washington, D.C.

The Intelligence Community 213

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01731R, Box 8,

Folder 333. Top Secret; Security Information.

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b. That, while in time of war Commanders within NATO will ex-

ercise operational control of U.S. clandestine resources in direct sup-
port of military operations to the extent necessary to ensure coordina-
tion, the command of such resources will be retained in both peace and
war by the U.S.

c. It reaffirms the NSC directive that clandestine operations con-

ducted in active Theaters of War where American Forces are engaged
will come under the American Theater Commander or such other U.S.
Commanders as may be designated by the JCS. (The problems of U.S.
command responsibilities in Europe are currently under discussion.
The outcome of these discussions will determine whether CIA will be
responsive to a single U.S. Commander or some other U.S. military
mechanism.)

3. The subject paper recommends in paragraph 3.h, page 5, En-

closure “A,”

the establishment of an “ad hoc” committee under the

Standing Group to advise it on clandestine matters. It will be noted that
the proposed DCI memorandum reserves the right later to ask for es-
tablishment of a permanent committee if such is considered necessary.

4. Similarly, the subject paper, in paragraph 21., suggests direct co-

ordination between OSO and JCS, through the JSPD. In the proposed
DCI memorandum to the Chief, JSPD, concurrence is made with the
principle advanced, but resolution of what office is to handle the di-
rect coordination is left to the JCS as an internal matter.

5. In the main, the Report of the JSPD to the JCS guards our re-

spective OPC and OSO interests and those of CIA as a whole;

and

agreeable to the request contained in paragraph 2. of TS 62654 (Tab
“A”),

it is recommended that the accompanying memorandum from

DCI to the Chief of the Joint Subsidiary Plans Division, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, be signed and dispatched.

W. G. Wyman

Kilbourne Johnston

214 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

According to the list of enclosures at the end of the memorandum, Enclosure “A”

was a memorandum from the DCI to the Chief, JSPD. It has not been found.

The enclosed draft report, identified as Enclosure “B,” has not been found.

Tab “A” was a memorandum from JSPD to the DCI, dated October 26, not found.

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94.

Memorandum for the Files

Washington, November 23, 1951.

SUBJECT

Meeting at Mr. Barrett’s Home on Tuesday Evening, November 20, 1951 to
discuss USIE and OPC Relationships

Those Present were as follows:

For CIA

For State

Mr. Dulles

Mr. Barrett

Mr. Wisner

Mr. Kohler

Mr. Lloyd

Mr. Joyce

Mr. Braden

Mr. Barbour
Mr. Devine

Conclusions:

It was agreed that:
(1) The proposed RFE Baltic broadcasts would not go on the air

as scheduled and that a joint RFE–VOA effort would be made to take
care of the displaced personnel. Kohler to confer with NCFE officials
re details.

(2) That the next Crusade for Freedom would not be of the high-

pressure and spectacular nature of this year’s but would be something
in the nature of a magazine and directmail approach with all copy care-
fully cleared.

(3) That Radio Free Asia would undergo no further expansion un-

til the future course of the Committee for Free Asia had been settled
in a manner satisfactory to both CIA and State.

Discussion:

At the opening of the meeting an agenda was distributed in which

was included brief statements proposing what the proper spheres
of operation of RFE and VOA should be. These proposals were as
follows:

The Intelligence Community 215

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff, Job 83–00036R, Box 7. Top

Secret.

Officers not otherwise identified are: For CIA, Lloyd was Deputy Chief, Psycho-

logical Staff Division and Braden was Chief, International Organizations Branch, Psy-
chological Division, Office of Policy Coordination. For State, John E. Devine was in the
Press Office.

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1. Sphere of Activity for RFE and, by extension, RFA

To provide radio facilities so that the potentially most effective

émigré groups can speak from nearby points to their captive fellow-
countrymen. By implication this would preclude acknowledged spon-
sorship by American, British or any group other than the speaking émi-
grés. It also implies that the broadcasts would be in the standard
broadcast band.

2. Sphere of Activity for VOA

To deliver a radio message, by both medium and short wave, in

the name of the United States Government and the American people.

These proposals were not agreed to in the meeting.
Following the first reading of these proposals, Mr. Dulles pointed

out that the RFE Czech program does not now credit émigré groups but
rather puts forward effective individuals many of whom are anonymous.

Mr. Wisner advanced the suggestion that perhaps RFE activities

should only be continued if they are supplementary and noncompeti-
tive with VOA.

Mr. Kohler generalized this thought in a proposal that RFE should

carry on covert or supplementary activities which will aid the official
United States Government radio. Mr. Wisner did not think the term
“Covert” could be logically applied in the case of RFE.

Mr. Joyce commented that at the present time the émigré com-

mittees connected with NCFE are so divided that RFE cannot ordinar-
ily get authority to attribute items to any one of the émigré groups. He
did add that the committees are serving one of their original purposes
in that they are keeping émigré group pressure from officials in the
State Department.

Mr. Lloyd, in response to a question, said that there is now very

little recording of program material by émigré groups in New York.
That was previously the basic arrangement but now the bulk of the
material is originating overseas.

Mr. Barrett referred to the four questions which were posed by Mr.

Barnard at the previous meeting and said that we ought to examine all
RFE activities in the light of the following questions:

1. Is the activity one that is serving a useful enough purpose to

justify the funds involved?

2. Can it be done better by this organization than by Government

directly or by other existing organizations?

3. Is it jeopardizing the existence and success of other important

activities?

4. How can it best be financed?

Mr. Barrett went on to say that according to best available estimates

the USSR is now spending about two billion dollars a year on propa-

216 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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ganda and directly related activities. Hence, there is considerable justifi-
cation for multiple activities—provided they don’t adversely affect one
another. He also said that some of the need for non-Governmental groups
to participate in a “no holds barred” campaign has disappeared with the
toughening attitude of the United States Government vis-à-vis USSR, but
that we should study carefully the extent to which such more-extreme-
than-government activities are still justified.

Mr. Barbour stated that the limit on what the United States Govern-

ment may say is probably getting less and less but there will always be
some such area which can better be handled by a non-Governmental
organization.

Mr. Kohler stated that he does not see in practical terms what this

non-Governmental area is. He mentioned that VOA is now using very
strong anti-Stalin material and the principal yardstick is whether an
item is effective propaganda or not. He pointed out that this same cri-
terion would apply to the operations of a non-Governmental organi-
zation. Mr. Kohler added that he thinks that the RFE programming is
probably a little more conservative than VOA because RFE is not so
near policy and has to tread carefully on a number of issues. Mr. Braden
asked whether in the Far East, Radio Free Asia can say things that the
United States Government cannot say. Mr. Kohler said that he was not
aware that it could. He added that if a third force group appeared which
had something to say that we wanted said and could not say ourselves
it would then be time to give them radio facilities.

Mr. Barbour stated that he feels that RFE could as a general rule

take a more strident line than VOA.

Mr. Barrett raised the question as to whether the Czech operation

was actually ideal and suggested that we ought to get more informa-
tion on it.

Mr. Wisner reported that the French are now taking active steps to

form a national committee. He also said that the British were making
some moves in that direction but had not gotten far. Mr. Barrett said that
instead of a national committee for France, Britain, U.S., and so on, there
ought to be a committee for Free Europe which would really be interna-
tional in character. Mr. Dulles said that an international committee would
be very difficult to organize and even more difficult to operate. What
would be better in his opinion would be three national committees with
a permanently sitting coordinating group, probably in Paris.

Mr. Barrett said that he felt we might somehow profit by the de-

vices worked out by American political parties—organizations such as
“New Dealers for Willkie”, “Young Democrats for Dewey” and so on.

Mr. Kohler raised the question of what we are really after in East-

ern Europe. He said that he didn’t think we needed propaganda in
Eastern Europe because the Russians are doing our work for us.

The Intelligence Community 217

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Mr. Joyce did not agree with this and referred to the NSC basic

documents in which we are directed to increase tension in Eastern Eu-
rope and try to release the USSR’s hold over its satellites and roll back
the Soviet borders to the 1939 line.

Mr. Barrett said that he felt it was most important for us to get

news and ideas to the people in Eastern Europe. Mr. Kohler added that
two radio voices—VOA and RFE—are worse than one when they are
not clearly distinguishable by the audience. Mr. Wisner said if we
needed more volume to Eastern Europe we should step up the Voice
of America.

Mr. Barrett recalled the fact that Mr. Kohler feels that there is noth-

ing that needs to be said to the Baltic that cannot be said quite ade-
quately by the Voice of America. Mr. Dulles raised the question of how
the Baltic plans of RFE could be called off if it is decided not to put the
programs on the air. Mr. Kohler said that in his talks with John Hughes

and Adolph Berle

he had the definite impression that the personnel

which had so far been lined up for the Baltic program could be taken
care of in other ways. He said it would be better to have a headache
for a couple of weeks than to live the problem for a couple of years.
Mr. Dulles pointed out that a responsible group of American citizens
had participated in the planning for this and other RFE activities and
that they and their proposals could not just be casually dismissed. Mr.
Wisner said he felt that a perfectly logical explanation could be ad-
vanced, that political conditions have changed and that the State De-
partment is now able to carry on the Baltic job; therefore, RFE’s re-
sources could be applied to other directions. Mr. Barrett recalled that
the request from the State Department for the Baltic broadcast by RFE
had come at a time when State did not have the financial resources to
undertake such programs. Mr. Kohler said that the Baltic program need
had first come to his attention in the winter of 1949–50. Mr. Dulles
reminded the group that in May, 1951 the Department of State had
approved RFE broadcasts in the Baltic languages. Mr. Joyce said that
this same approval had come as recently as August 8 of this year from
the Department. It was generally agreed that in spite of these com-
mitments conditions had changed and it was important now that RFE
broadcasts did not go on in the Baltic languages. Mr. Kohler then said
that he would get together in New York with RFE representatives to
help them take the head off RFE in connection with any cancellation

218 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Hughes was a prominent businessman, Ambassador to the Atlantic Council, and

member of the NCFE.

Berle was a prominent lawyer, former Assistant Secretary of State, and a mem-

ber of the NCFE.

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of the Baltic language broadcast plans. He said that he would do this
within a week.

Mr. Wisner asked if the present policy of the Department would

allow subversive broadcasts to this area. Mr. Kohler said there was no
necessity for subversive broadcasts since we had not recognized the
Soviet rule in these areas and were working with what we felt were
the legal governments.

Mr. Dulles said that close liaison between IBD and RFE in New

York was needed and he was told that arrangements had already been
made for regular meetings between Mr. Kretzmann

and Mr. [

name not

declassified

] of RFE.

Mr. Lloyd said that RFE has just about completed work on three

stations in Lisbon which are powered with 50 kilowatts each. These
have been intended for relaying purposes only, with the programs orig-
inating in Munich being sent to Portugal and then played back by short
wave to Hungary, Romania, and so on. Mr. Barrett made the sugges-
tion that perhaps more radio operations could be justified simply on
the basis of tying up Russian facilities and making some progress in
the electronic war.

Mr. Dulles raised the question of what should be done about the

Crusade for Freedom next year. Mr. Barrett said that he felt that the
present type of campaign was harming the total United States effort
and making people ask the question whether the Voice of America is
really needed. He did not say that to his surprise no serious questions
came up in the last Congress concerning the apparent duplication be-
tween Radio Free Europe and VOA. Mr. Barrett suggested that instead
of the present type of Crusade for Freedom, a low-pressure program
should be conducted. He said that something along the line of the tu-
berculosis seal campaign in magazines, with coupons, and so on, ought
to be tried out. Mr. Lloyd then said that Abbott Washburn

was only

getting into high speed on the Crusade and that in the next few years
he hoped to be able to work the Crusade for Freedom up to a point
where 15 or 20 million dollars could be raised. Mr. Dulles suggested
that Mr. Washburn be brought down to Washington at an early date
and given the idea of the low-pressure campaign. Mr. Barrett raised
the question of explaining the rest of the RFE budget if the mail order
approach raises only about $750,000. He felt than an anonymous donor
could take care of that problem but Mr. Dulles did not agree on this
point. Mr. Dulles raised the question of whether the Crusade for Free-
dom has value in making the public more aware of the international

The Intelligence Community 219

Roger Kretzmann of IBD.

Executive vice chairman of the Crusade for Freedom.

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political situation. It was said that this question could not really be an-
swered. Mr. Barrett felt that it probably made the public more aware
in certain respects but on the whole created more problems than it
solved.

Mr. Barrett raised the question about Radio Free Asia and Mr.

Braden replied that RFA is staying right where it is until they are given
further orders. Mr. Barrett said that in regard to the radio audience in
China it was his understanding that there is a small and decreasing au-
dience as the result of Communist repressive measures. He felt that it
was better for OPC to put its RFA money into local, non-U.S.-labeled
operations in the Far East. He said that we did not need another Amer-
ican voice in the area. Mr. Dulles then suggested that RFA be kept go-
ing on its present basis along with CFA for the next few weeks until
the new head of the organization is selected. He should then be brought
in for a discussion of this whole problem. In closing, Mr. Barrett sug-
gested that the four questions posed by Mr. Barnard be applied to all
NCFE and CFA projects. He suggested that CIA appoint one person
and that State appoint another to work as a team to do this job. Mr.
Dulles said that he would prefer to see a record of this meeting and
have a chance to discuss it with his colleagues before appointing such
a person.

95.

Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Director for
Special Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency
(Kirkpatrick) to Director of Central Intelligence Smith

Washington, November 30, 1951.

SUBJECT:

Request from G–2 for Discussion of Agreed Activities under NSCID #5

1. Reference is made to our memorandum to you dated 17 No-

vember 1951

concerning the above subject. On 23 November 1951,

prior to the receipt of the attached memo and proposed agreement from
General Bolling to you, Mr. Roy Tod of G–2 informally coordinated

220 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff, Job 83–01034R, Box 4. Top

Secret.

Document 255.

Not found.

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with OSO the draft of the proposed agreement entitled “Establishment
of ‘Agreed Activities’ by the Department of the Army Under the Pro-
visions of NSCID #5.”

2. The draft has been successfully revised by OSO, and in the opin-

ion of this Office represents a sound statement of the problem. Com-
plete coordination with the CIA of the espionage and counterespionage
activities being conducted by the Services has never taken place and
would be of great benefit and assistance in reducing duplication, elim-
inating the undue dissipation of intelligence assets, and providing an
orderly controlled maximum utilization of the entire U.S. intelligence
potential.

3. It is recommended that the proposals in the attached agreement

be concurred in and implemented and that the same proposals be ex-
tended to include the Navy and the Air Force.

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick

Attachment

Draft Department of the Army Paper

Washington, November 23, 1951.

SUBJECT

Establishment of “Agreed Activities” by the Department of the Army Under the
Provisions of NSCID #5

1. NSCID #5 authorizes and directs that the DCI shall conduct all

organized

Federal espionage operations outside the United States and

its possessions for the collection of foreign intelligence information re-
quired to meet the needs of all Departments and Agencies concerned,
in connection with the national security,

except for certain agreed activi-

ties by other Departments and Agencies.

(The same policy applies to

counter-espionage activities.) This directive further provides that the
use of casual agents in a covert capacity by any IAC agency shall be
coordinated by the DCI with the organized covert activities.

The Intelligence Community 221

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Top Secret.

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2. For varying reasons, largely beyond the control of the intelli-

gence agencies, the entire provisions of NSCID #5 have never been ef-
fectively implemented nor has the U.S. attained the position where it
can now accomplish espionage operations on the scale required to meet
completely the continually expanding needs of all the Departments and
Agencies concerned. Since the original issuance of NSCID #5 in Janu-
ary 1947 there has been a steady expansion in the scope and volume
of the intelligence information required by the military services and
other agencies. Because this has been paralleled by an expansion in the
security measures of the USSR and its satellites, the U.S. Government
has been faced with an ever increasing dependence upon espionage
and related clandestine activities as the primary means for obtaining
the information required.

3. Through necessity and with the tacit approval of CIA, the Army

intelligence elements within the overseas command areas have been
conducting espionage operations, to varying degrees, since the end of
World War II. Under a strictly legal interpretation of NSCID #5 in the
absence of any official arrangements for “agreed activities” by the De-
partment of the Army, the Army is not empowered to conduct organ-
ized espionage operations and CIA remains responsible for the con-
duct of espionage operations to meet both the tactical requirements of
the overseas commanders and to meet the long range strategic re-
quirements originating at the Washington level. However, the Army
possesses, by virtue of its trained complements in overseas areas and
its present and past “unagreed activities”, espionage assets which
should be utilized to the fullest extent in order to meet the ever in-
creasing need for that intelligence information which, under present
conditions, is procureable only through clandestine operations. In or-
der to regularize these necessary and desirable espionage activities be-
ing conducted by the Army, they should be “legalized” by agreement
between the DCI and the Department of the Army as provided in
NSCID #5. Such agreement would permit the Army, in large measure,
to conduct espionage operations to meet those tactical information re-
quirements which are in direct support of an overseas commander’s
mission and would place CIA in a better position to concentrate on
long range strategic requirements which usually necessitate deeper and
more permanent operations.

4. Various ad hoc arrangements have been made between the Army

and CIA in an attempt to solve the problem of conducting espionage
operations on a closely coordinated basis as envisaged by NSCID #5.
During the period 1949–50, G–2, in collaboration with CIA, prepared
and issued to the intelligence chiefs of FECOM, USFA, and EUCOM,
policy letters calling for joint planning and coordination of operations
between CIA and these overseas commands. However, these policies
have not been implemented to a productive and satisfactory extent.

222 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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5. There are established responsibilities for the implementation of

National Security Council Intelligence Directives. First, NSCID #1

pro-

vides that “the respective intelligence chiefs shall be responsible for in-
suring that NSC orders or directives, when applicable, are implemented
within their intelligence organizations”. In this connection, the revised
NSCID #5 (dated 28 Aug 51)

was sent by the NSC to the Director of

Central Intelligence

and the IAC agencies

for appropriate action; Second,

JCS 202/70 charges the JIC with responsibility for preparation of joint
guidance to unified commands (under further provision of JCS
1259/27)

on national policy pertaining to intelligence activities. The

unified commands have not been notified officially of the recent revi-
sion of NSCID #5 nor have the service intelligence chiefs on the IAC
taken formal action to implement the “agreed activities” portion of this
directive, and officially establish the current and continuing espionage
operations of the military services as “agreed activities” under the pro-
visions of NSCID #5.

6. It is deemed essential that action be taken to remedy these de-

ficiencies with the least possible delay so that espionage operations be-
ing conducted by the Army shall be officially recognized by the DCI
as “agreed activities” under the provisions of NSCID #5 and fully co-
ordinated by him within the framework of an overall program to in-
sure the most effective use of all espionage capabilities currently or po-
tentially available to the U.S. Government.

7. The current situation may be sumarized as follows:
a. The United States government is not now in a position to meet

the full extent of its present needs for clandestine collection of intelli-
gence information. Fulfillment of these needs can only be met through
centrally coordinated utilization of

all

espionage capabilities currently

or potentially available to the U.S. Government.

b. Army intelligence elements within the overseas command areas

are conducting espionage operations without their “accreditation” as
“agreed activities” under the provisions of NSCID #5.

c. The overseas commands have information requirements, based

upon their assigned missions, which can only be met through espi-
onage operations.

d. [

1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified

]

The Intelligence Community 223

320-672/B428-S/11008

For NSCID No. 1, see

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence

Establishment

Document 432.

Not found, but see Document 77.

Neither JCS paper has been found.

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e. As additional areas of the world become critical or sensitive, in

terms of their involvement with the struggle between the USSR and
the Western Powers, there will be a further increase in the scope and
variety of information targets requiring espionage activity on the part
of the U.S. Government.

f. It has now become mandatory that

all

U.S. espionage capabili-

ties be put to use and that they be conducted in such a manner that
each capability will be so applied as to best meet the overall interests
of the U.S. Government.

8. It is believed that action should be taken to accomplish the

following:

a. Development of a basic agreement between the DCI and the

Department of the Army that will establish the conditions, including
type of espionage operations, and the extent to which Army intelli-
gence elements within the overseas command areas may conduct, as
“agreed activities” under the provisions of NSCID #5, espionage op-
erations in direct support of the overseas commander’s mission or for
such purposes as the DCI and the A.C. of S, G–2 may mutually agree
to be in the overall interests of the U.S. Government.

b. Development of specific agreements to meet the particular re-

quirements and conditions existing within each overseas command
area, with particular reference to the areas in or from which the Army
intelligence elements may conduct espionage operations as “agreed
activities.”

c. Development of a mechanism for centralized coordination and

control of U.S. espionage operations both at the Washington level and
in the field, that will:

(1) Promote the most effective use of all espionage capabilities cur-

rently or potentially available to the U.S. Government;

(2) Avoid duplication of effort, unwitting multiple use of the same

sources, false confirmation, and the dissipation of those intelligence as-

set which are available.

e. Preparation of the necessary directives to implement the action,

outlined in sub-paragraphs a. through d. above, within the Army
elements of the overseas commands and appropriate CIA stations
overseas.

9. It is recommended that G–2 discuss this proposal informally

with the DCI and suggest to him that appropriate representatives of
G–2 and CIA/SO be appointed to develop the action outlined in para-
graph 8 above. This proposal has been informally coordinated with the
OSO/CIA and it is understood that the DCI has been informed.

224 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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96.

Notes of a Meeting

Washington, December 5, 1951.

SUBJECT

Psychological Strategy Board

PRESENT

S/P—

PSB—Admiral Stevens

Mr. Nitze

PSB—Mr. Philbin

Mr. Ferguson (part)

C—Mr. Bohlen (part)

Mr. Savage

P—Mr. Phillips

Mr. Koch

P—Mr. Schwinn

Mr. Marshall

R—Mr. Trezise

Miss Fosdick

S—Mr. Compton

Mr. Tufts
Mr. Stelle
Mr. Villard
Mr. Watts

Admiral Stevens opened the meeting by saying he was chairman

of a small group in PSB charged with “formulating a national strate-
gic concept for psychological action” as called for in the directive es-
tablishing the PSB and as envisioned in NSC 59/1 and NSC 10/2 which
include both covert and overt propaganda activities.

Mr. Nitze said he thought the covert and overt activities should

be kept separate.

Admiral Stevens said that people were worried today because they

felt that our foreign policy was “gone at piecemeal—on a hand to
mouth basis” with no over-all strategic concept. A strategic concept, he
said was a “point of view—a tentative plan of action, always under re-
view but not rigid” and he thought that such a concept or plan should
be put down on paper, difficult as it might be to do.

A discussion ensued about the difficulties of getting “everything

down” in NSC papers and the danger of parts being lifted out of con-
text to fit particular situations.

Admiral Stevens said that, at present, NSC papers are the only ap-

proved guides to national policy and cited the NSC paper on the
U.S.S.R. in which the policy of reducing the threat of Soviet power and

The Intelligence Community 225

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 64 D 563, Political and Psycho-

logical Warfare. Top Secret. Drafted by Phillip H. Watts, Executive Secretary of the Pol-
icy Planning Staff.

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influence is set forth. How far, he asked, do you have to reduce the
power and influence to have meaning. The fomenting of revolution
within the U.S.S.R. is to be treated separately because the U.S. is not
prepared for such an undertaking and would have no assurance of suc-
cess, but in order to form an over-all concept it has to be considered.

Admiral Stevens referred to the PSB paper dated 15 November,

entitled

National Psychological Strategy,

which had been sent to the De-

partment informally the previous week. He said it was only a work-
ing draft intended to evince reactions from State and CIA. What he’d
like, would be to have Bohlen, Nitze, Joyce and Wisner get together
and see if they couldn’t come up with a “central strategic concept.”

Mr. Nitze suggested that perhaps it would be better to start at the

narrowest part of the problem, i.e. how to reduce the threat of Soviet
power and influence.

Admiral Stevens said that the PSB draft was an attempt to outline

the steps necessary to create a central strategic concept and that NSC
10/5

was a “holding operation” which he defined as “placing the max-

imum strain on the Soviet structure of power.”

Mr. Nitze pointed out that “maximum strain” were meaningless

words—that we should get down to the concrete.

Admiral Stevens returned to the PSB draft and said that what State

had been asked for was (a) its point of view about creating revolutions
in the satellites, (b) what political actions would be undertaken for the
holding operation set forth in NSC 10/5, and (c) what could be ac-
complished by other actions including propaganda controlled by State.

Mr. Nitze again urged that we take a concrete problem such as the

retraction and reduction of Soviet power and influence. This is

one

pol-

icy objective of the U.S. Government but

not

the sum total of U.S.

policy—there are a whole hierarchy of objectives. It would be fine if
Soviet power would retract but as you get down to accomplishing this
you get into many complex problems. Stimulating a revolution in the
U.S.S.R. is not now a current practical objective.

Admiral Stevens said a statement to this effect should be put out

and approved by the NSC. OPC needs this kind of a statement as part
of a central concept.

Mr. Bohlen said there is no single policy but a multiplicity of poli-

cies like the multiplicity of dots which make the whole image on a
radarscope. He said he wasn’t clear how a central concept would be
helpful—we should look at specific areas—Albania, for example. There

226 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

A copy is in National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–54, 100.4–PSB/5–1551.

Document 90.

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are many serious complications which flow from creating a revolution
in any satellite country.

Mr. Nitze said he felt that we should develop our capabilities in

the covert field as far as possible. We should move up in successive
first approximations on an area by area, technique by technique basis.

Admiral Stevens agreed with the area by area approach and said

that OPC must then come in with what it is capable of doing. He said
he realized that a central concept wouldn’t solve all our problems but
that we ought to try to put one down on paper.

Mr. Bohlen suggested that it might be possible to take specific ar-

eas such as East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, etc., and assuming
that we had certain covert action capabilities, take a look at what the
political implications of such actions would be. At the same time we
might select certain areas and assuming the existence of favorable po-
litical factors have OPC determine what their covert capabilities were.
Then the two determinations might be married.

Mr. Nitze said he worried about theoretical situations. Where there

existed a clear problem with concrete possibilities of accomplishing
something, this approach might be OK, but taking a series of hypo-
thetical situations and trying to see through all the branching implica-
tions and reactions would be a negative exercise.

Admiral Stevens said that some of the fringe areas around the

U.S.S.R. are vulnerable and we should look carefully to see what can
be done. He said OPC was capable of carrying out several simultane-
ous operations if it seemed desirable to do so.

Mr. Bohlen said that Wisner needs to know the general direction

in which we want to proceed so that he can lay out his plans and have
his agents prepared. Therefore, we should take a look at individual
areas.

Admiral Stevens said it still gets back to a central strategic con-

cept. Put down on paper that we don’t want to create a revolution in
the U.S.S.R. as well as some of the “lesser things” we do want to do.
It will just be an approximation to be used as guidelines for PSB and
OPC.

Mr. Nitze again emphasized the difficulty of setting forth general

principles until you get down to specific problems. There is always the
danger that people will think that by having broad principles lots of
specific problems will be solved.

Admiral Stevens said he still thought that we’d make the biggest

advance if State would undertake to respond to the request in the PSB
paper.

Mr. Nitze said he thought that joint work with OPC and PSB was

called for so that everyone would be clear on the dimensions of the

The Intelligence Community 227

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problem and just what was to be accomplished. He suggested that we
address ourselves to the specific question of the retraction and reduc-
tion of Soviet power and influence. He said he could envisage a paper
broken down somewhat as follows:

a. Reduction and retraction of Soviet power to acceptable pro-

portions over a 10-year period.

b. Any thought of revolution in the U.S.S.R. must come at the end

of the 10-year period.

c. Reduction of Soviet power in the Satellites in the near term.

d. The development of techniques to accomplish a, b, and c.

This is a first approximation and should be kept under continu-

ing review.

Admiral Stevens said he would like to have a “good” State De-

partment man sit with his committee to coordinate the responses to the
PSB paper.

Mr. Nitze replied that taking responses and putting them together

wouldn’t work—what was needed was joint work by State, OPC, and
PSB.

There followed an inconclusive discussion of the term “psycho-

logical strategy”, during which Mr. Nitze pointed out the dangers in-
volved in trying to marry propaganda and covert operations. They
should be kept separate and made concrete and definable.

Admiral Stevens returned to the PSB paper and asked if State could

put anything on paper which would be helpful—could it, for instance,
redraft the three requests made of it?

Mr. Nitze said he considered the framework of the paper wrong.

It appeared that the retraction and reduction of Soviet power and in-
fluence was the “be all” and “end all” of our policy. If this phase of
our policy could be taken as a specific problem and so addressed, he
thought we could come up with something useful. He ended the meet-
ing by saying that we would get together with someone from OPC and
PSB and try to map out a course of action.

228 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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97.

Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Smith to
the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council
(Lay)

Washington, December 10, 1951.

SUBJECT

Proposed Survey of Communications Intelligence Activities

1. In view of the duties and responsibilities imposed upon the Di-

rector of Central Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Agency by Sec-
tion 102(d) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the DCI
herewith advises the National Security Council that he is gravely con-
cerned as to the security and effectiveness with which the Communica-
tions Intelligence activities of the Government are being conducted.

2. It is believed that existing means of control over, and coordina-

tion of, the collection and processing of Communications Intelligence
have proved ineffective to assess and reconcile the Communications In-
telligence requirements of the various interested Departments and Agen-
cies and, as well, the national intelligence requirements in this field.

3. It is further believed that the system of divided authorities and

multiple responsibilities which prevails with respect to Communica-
tions Intelligence will, if uncorrected, preclude the development of the
consistent, firmly administered security program which is required in
order to preserve this invaluable intelligence source. In recent years
a number of losses have occurred which it is difficult to attribute to
coincidence.

4. Because of the unique value of Communications Intelligence, this

matter directly affects the national security. Any corrective measures to
be taken should be based upon a thorough investigation of the facts and
should give due regard to the needs of the National Security Establish-
ment and those of the various Departments and Agencies concerned.

5. Accordingly, it is recommended that the Secretary of State and

the Secretary of Defense, assisted by the Director of Central Intelligence,
be asked to have the Communications Intelligence activities of the
Government surveyed, with the view of recommending any corrective
measures that may be required to insure the most secure and effective
conduct of such activities.

Walter B. Smith

The Intelligence Community 229

Source: National Security Agency, Center for Cryptologic History, Series XVI, C–3

(CIA Reports). Top Secret. “Approved Dec 13 ‘51 /s/ Harry S Truman” is handwritten
in the bottom left corner of the memorandum.

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98.

Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Smith to
Secretary of Defense Lovett

Washington, December 11, 1951.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In anticipation of the probability of a military cease-fire in Korea,

as well as the possibility of a breakdown in negotiations, it becomes
important to review our assets in China proper and the effect thereon
of either development. A year ago the Chinese Nationalist Government
claimed the existence of 1,500,000 guerrillas on the Mainland of China,
and although we believe that this figure was exaggerated, we know
that during the past year the effective action of the Chinese Commu-
nist forces has greatly reduced the number of guerrillas. The current
CIA estimate is approximately 165,000. A military cease-fire on the Ko-
rean peninsula will probably restore freedom of movement to a major
portion of Chinese forces now confronting us, and it is to be assumed
that the Chinese Communist Government will then take action to in-
tensify the anti-guerrilla campaign.

Another asset is the Chinese Nationalist Forces on Taiwan. Their

army now consists of about 450,000 ground troops in fair state of small
unit training but with inadequate equipment and in a poor state of
combat effectiveness. Their small Navy and Air Force have both dete-
riorated militarily as a result of lack of equipment and training facili-
ties. These forces will within four years begin to undergo a rapid de-
terioration through age alone. They, like the guerrillas on the Mainland,
represent a waning asset which will have to be strengthened, built up,
and used within the immediate foreseeable future if we are to get any
benefit from them.

The military and economic programs for the support of Taiwan,

such as they are, have attained only limited success. This is due in part
at least to Nationalist refusal to effect political reform and particularly
to the failure of the Nationalist Government to eliminate corruption
among its officials. Our support to guerrillas has so far failed to pro-
duce the results which had been initially anticipated, due primarily to
Nationalist reluctance to commit their guerrilla assets to action and sec-
ondarily to the difficulty of Chinese Nationalist regular officers of sen-
ior grade to adapt themselves to the conditions and requirements of
guerrilla warfare.

230 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for Operations,

Job 79–01228A, Box 11. Top Secret.

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Recent studies based on personal observation on the spot by sev-

eral qualified officers serving with this Agency indicate the following:

(a) The Chinese Nationalist forces are not as ineffective potentially

as the pessimistic reports made a year ago, by our Service Attachés
then on Taiwan, would indicate. Neither are they as effective as the op-
timistic reports of Americans now employed directly or indirectly by
the Chinese Nationalist Government would indicate. My belief is that
they can be made effective and that if U.N. policy permitted, and if the
Nationalist Government would cooperate effectively, Chinese Nation-
alist divisions could be rotated to Korea and might serve very cred-
itably. It is the opinion of General Wyman

and other qualified ob-

servers that the presence of a Nationalist division in Korea in contact
with former Nationalist troops now serving the Communist Govern-
ment would have a marked psychological effect.

(b) The existing scattered and relatively ineffective guerrilla forces

on the Mainland, if well led, armed, and given a political rallying point,
could be made a potent weapon and might contain much stronger Chi-
nese Communist forces.

in strength as the result of training, improved morale, and improved
equipment, would, particularly if its combat training should include re-
peated and aggressive raids and temporary thrusts onto the Mainland,
immobilize for coastal defense a considerable portion of the better troops
of the Chinese Communist Army and a large quantity of its military trans-
port. The Nationalist troops on certain offshore islands are doing this at
the present time on a small scale and the threat could be intensified.

In my opinion if we are to obtain the full effect of the possibilities

enumerated above, two things are required. The first is a change in our
own policy with respect to employment of Chinese Nationalist forces
and a more aggressive approach to the use of guerrillas. Second: po-
litical reform of the Chinese Nationalist Government is essential. So far
U.S. efforts to encourage such reform have been almost without suc-
cess as the controlling clique of the KMT has been unwilling to loosen
its stranglehold on the Government. It is probable that this intran-
sigeance stems from the belief that maintenance of the status quo gives
this clique an exclusive claim to reinheritance of the Mainland as a by-
product of U.S. victory in World War III.

Attached are two studies

bearing on the basic subject which I sug-

gest be given military staff consideration. One of these represents the

The Intelligence Community 231

Major General Willard G. Wyman, a so-called China hand, serving as Comman-

der of US Forces, Southeastern Europe at this time.

Not printed.

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views of the Estimates Division of this Agency

which, although not

an IAC coordinated paper, reflects the most recent estimates of the mil-
itary intelligence agencies. As will be noted, this paper does not con-
cern itself with the beneficial effects which would result from an im-
provement of the political situation on Taiwan. The other study which
represents the views of the operating divisions of CIA points up the
difficulties resulting from the present unsatisfactory political situation
and concentrates upon the importance of a housecleaning in Taiwan
and a clarification of U.S. policy if significant results are to be achieved.

These are my personal views, based on conversations with all those

in this Agency who are giving consideration to the exploitation of our
assets in the Far East. I recommend, however, that the Joint Chiefs of
Staff consider this general subject and the attached papers as a matter
of urgency for the purpose of amplifying and firming up our present
program and, if indicated by mature consideration, producing recom-
mendations which will crystallize our governmental policy toward the
strengthening of Taiwan as an anti-Communist base militarily, eco-
nomically, politically, and psychologically. It seems to me that the self-
interest of the United States demands this.

Personnel of CIA are prepared to participate and assist in this study

and in the planning which should follow. For this purpose I have
arranged to secure the services of General Frank Merrill

who, as you

know, is experienced in commando-type operations in the Far East and
he would head the CIA contribution to any planning syndicate which
you may desire to establish.

Sincerely,

Walter B. Smith

232 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Estimates Division is the Office of National Estimates.

Major General Merrill (Ret.) was a veteran of both the China and Burma

Theaters.

Printed from a copy that indicates Smith signed the original.

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99.

Editorial Note

On December 13, 1951, President Truman directed the Secretary of

State and the Secretary of Defense, assisted by the Director of Central
Intelligence, to appoint a committee to examine United States Gov-
ernment Communications Intelligence (COMINT) efforts and to rec-
ommend measures to improve their conduct and security. (Truman Li-
brary, President’s Secretary’s File) The committee was headed by
prominent New York attorney George A. Brownell and included
Charles E. Bohlen, representing the Department of State, General John
Magruder, representing the Department of Defense, and William H.
Jackson, representing the Central Intelligence Agency. The committee
submitted a five-part report on June 13, 1952. Part I was a history of
U.S. COMINT efforts, Part II dealt with the role of COMINT, Part III
laid out the then-current organization of the COMINT community, Part
IV detailed the actual conduct of COMINT activities, and Part V con-
sisted of the report’s conclusions and recommendations.

The major findings of the report were that the four existing

COMINT organizations (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Armed Forces Se-
curity Agency (AFSA), which was controlled by the JCS) were con-
ducting duplicative operations in many areas and that the U.S. Com-
munications Intelligence Board (USCIB) lacked adequate authority to
correct the situation. The report recommended that AFSA be given
greatly expanded authority over the service organizations, that the
AFSA director report directly to the Secretary of Defense, and that
USCIB be replaced by a new, strengthened COMINT Board chaired by
the DCI.

In October 1952, the President and the NSC adopted most of the

Brownell Committee’s recommendations and issued a revised version
of NSCID No. 9 on October 24, 1952 (Document 257). In place of AFSA,
the National Security Agency was created. NSA had the same resources
as AFSA, but a different charter. The JCS was removed from the chain
of command. The Secretary of Defense was made executive agent for
the government as a whole for COMINT, subordinate to a special com-
mittee of the NSC consisting of himself and the Secretary of State, ad-
vised by the Director of Central Intelligence.

The Brownell Committee report is in National Archives, RG 457,

SRH–123, Brownell Committee Report; a declassified version is avail-
able in George A. Brownell,

The Origins and Development of the National

Security Agency

(Laguna Hills, CA: Aegean Park Press, 1981).

The Intelligence Community 233

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100. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 17, 1952.

SUBJECT

Meeting to Discuss the Crusade for Freedom held in Mr. Barrett’s Office on
January 17, 1952

PARTICIPANTS

CIA—Mr. Allen Dulles, Mr. Frank Wisner, Mr. Tom Braden and Mr. Gates Lloyd

NCFE—Mr. C. D. Jackson and Mr. Abbott Washburn

State—Mr. Edward W. Barrett, Mr. Howland H. Sargeant, Mr. Foy Kohler, Mr.

Robert P. Joyce and Mr. John Devine

Agreement:

As the result of the discussion it was agreed that the Crusade for

Freedom would be continued in 1952 but in a considerably lower key
in comparison with the 1951 Crusade. The precise nature of the Cru-
sade is to be worked out cooperatively by NCFE, CIA and the De-
partment of State.

Discussion:

Mr. Jackson said that he and his colleagues realize that they can-

not repeat the 1951 type Crusade. He raised the question of whether
there should be a Crusade at all and answered it by saying that he felt
that some sort of Crusade had to continue. He said that the major ques-
tion was what sort of Crusade could be organized and still not pre-
sent serious problems for the Department of State. Mr. Jackson said
that the most troublesome aspect of the 1951 Crusade was its length of
three months. He said that a shorter Crusade pitched at a lower level
would solve many of the problems that had occurred in the past year.
He said that one good idea that had been developed by local commit-
tees was to have a one-day civic organization doorbell ringing cam-
paign. Some buildup of publicity would be necessary for a national
doorbell ringing campaign but it would be nothing to compare with
the extended Crusade of this year. Mr. Jackson said that the direct mail
approach had been tried this year with some success and could be ex-
panded. He added that he felt the short campaign would have the ad-
ditional advantage of removing the possibility of the public’s making
invidious comparisons between RFE and VOA. He said that with the

234 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, no folder title,

Box 48. Top Secret; Security Information. Drafted by John Devine of the Bureau of Pub-
lic Affairs on January 21.

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short campaign there would not be time for the public to reflect on
such issues.

Mr. Barrett reminded the group that NCFE had started as an or-

ganization to look after and make use of the various Eastern European
refugee groups. He recalled that giving these groups a radio voice was
something of a later development. He also recalled that the Crusade
was established primarily as a cover for the governmental support of
the enterprise. Mr. Barrett raised the question of whether or not the
Crusade had grown to such proportions that it was now a case of the
tail wagging the dog. He also raised the question of whether the two
or three million dollars that might be raised in the Crusade might be
endangering the $85,000,000 involved in the appropriations for the
USIE operations. He thought it was important to get back to the idea
of just enough of a Crusade to give the minimum necessary cover to
NCFE. Mr. Barrett suggested direct mail solicitation of funds, maga-
zine advertisements and coupons, and corporation solicitations. He
also said that he thought the device of large anonymous gifts might be
looked into further.

Mr. Jackson said that after the 1951 campaign it became clear to

him that the Crusade had actually done an important selling job on the
American public in the matter of psychological warfare and the im-
portance of such an effort to our nation. He felt that this was a most
important aspect of the Crusade and one that had been usually over-
looked. Mr. Jackson said also that an efficient field organization had
been built up for the Crusade and it was one which could respond to
almost any kind of stimuli we wanted to apply.

Mr. Kohler suggested that the Crusade’s national organization

might be used to communicate to the public other messages which
would be useful in connection with the United States’ psychological
warfare effort.

Mr. Sargeant said that if the Crusade’s national organization were

really going to continue to be a force in the situation, it would be nec-
essary to keep it busy the year around with useful projects such as film
shows, publicizing the visits of foreign labor leaders, and participating
in other activities relating to the international propaganda situation.

Mr. Barrett said that it was important to secure international

sponsorship for the RFE broadcasts as had been done for the balloon
operations.

Mr. Jackson said that the international nature of the balloon message

did not add anything to its effectiveness. He said that current attempts
to set up committees in France and England along the lines of NCFE were
not succeeding and he doubted seriously whether that was a fruitful
line of further endeavor. Mr. Jackson said that he felt the development
should be toward the Munich-type of operation to Czechoslovakia where

The Intelligence Community 235

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the program has acquired such a predominantly local coloration
that the American connection is almost completely submerged. Mr.
Dulles agreed that an international committee was not a workable
arrangement.

Mr. Washburn said that two million dollars gross had been raised

in the Crusade this year when there was a stated goal. He thought that
the next Crusade need not have a specific goal and that such a change
would help keep things in a low key.

Mr. Kohler commented that in the 1951 Crusade, the impression

was given that the combined efforts of RFE and RFA were covering the
world as far as radio propaganda needs were concerned.

Mr. Sargeant said that he felt a Crusade national organization

could serve a useful purpose in developing popular interest in psy-
chological warfare and could at the same time assign tasks to local
groups which would actually assist in the psychological warfare effort.
He mentioned writing of letters and essay contests.

Mr. Dulles said that he hoped that the group could agree on the

Crusade’s going ahead this year on a program that will be worked out
in close coordination with VOA.

Mr. Jackson said that he hoped a four point decision could be

reached:

1. That the Crusade should go ahead this year.

2. That it should take place in September at the earliest and not

last more than two weeks.

3. That the Crusade national organization should proceed in the

meantime with the jobs of general education on psychological warfare

matters, and an explanation of VOA–RFE relationships.

4. That NCFE should collaborate with the Department of State on

what should be said to local groups.

Mr. Jackson’s suggestions were discussed but there was no gen-

eral agreement.

Mr. Barrett felt that agreement at this time should be limited to

saying that the Crusade organization should not be disbanded, that
there should be a Crusade in 1952 of a considerably lower pitched na-
ture, and that the precise character of the 1952 Crusade should be
worked out in close consultation between NCFE, CIA and State. This
was agreed to by all present.

236 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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101. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans of the

Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner) to the Chief of Staff of
the Air Force (Vandenberg)

Washington, January 22, 1952.

SUBJECT

Civil Air Transport’s Application for Commercial Rights in Okinawa

REFERENCE

a. GHQ Far East Command Letter AG 095 (22 November 1951) GD/D, dated

November 22, 1951, Subject: Civil Air Transport’s Application for Commer-
cial Rights in Okinawa

1. It is understood that reference a. has been forwarded by the De-

partment of the Army to the Department of the Air Force for action.
The Psychological Warfare Division of the latter Department has in-
formally requested this Agency to make a statement of its interest in
the matter.

2. Civil Air Transport (CAT, Incorporated) is a Chinese flag airline

wholly owned by the United States Government and controlled by this
Agency. As a commercial airline, Civil Air Transport performs a wide
variety of covert services for the Agency throughout the Far East [

lines not declassified

]. It is the single most valuable asset of the CIA in

the Far East, without which the Agency would find it impossible ei-
ther to discharge its operational tasks or to plan the greatly increased
activities envisaged under NSC 68

and 10/5.

3. [

1 paragraph (15 lines) not declassified

]

4. Apart from the U.S. Government’s interest outlined above, there

appears to be ample justification for approving Civil Air Transport’s ap-
plication on strictly commercial grounds. Firstly, whereas under the
terms of the Sino-U.S. bilateral agreement a United States carrier is per-
mitted to serve Formosa, the Chinese Government’s designated instru-
ment, Civil Air Transport, by virtue of its aircraft limitations, has been
unable to avail itself of rights to serve points in the U.S. territories
specified in the route annex of the agreement. Notwithstanding the pre-
cise terms of the agreement, it would seem in order, as a matter of

The Intelligence Community 237

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 95–G00278R, Box 1,

Folder 15. Top Secret. Security Information. Drafted in the Far East Division of OPC on
January 11. Sent to Vandenberg through the Joint Subsidiary Plans Division of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.

Not found.

See

Foreign Relations,

1950, vol. I, pp. 234–292.

Document 90.

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comity, to grant the designated airline of China traffic rights to serve
an alternate point under United States control which is within the air-
line’s capabilities to serve. Secondly, the routes flown by Civil Air Trans-
port naturally include Okinawa and it is hardly justifiable that Oki-
nawa, a point in the immediate trading area of Formosa, should be
denied the service of the international airline of China. Thirdly, Civil
Air Transport is the only airline in the area which has the capacity and
the willingness to render low cost cargo and passenger service com-
mensurate with the economy of the area; this factor is expected to at-
tract substantial traffic of U.S. contractors and others on Okinawa em-
ploying indigenous personnel. It is not calculated, however, that any
appreciable inroad will be made on the business of other competitive
airlines inasmuch as the type of traffic which could be carried by Civil
Air Transport would not, in any event, be moved by other commercial
air carriers. Lastly, it would constitute an economic hardship to the air-
line in serving its routes from Korea to Thailand to have no traffic rights
at Okinawa inasmuch as it would still be necessary to make technical
stops at Okinawa for the purpose of fueling.

5. With reference to the final paragraph of reference a. it should

be noted that the Civil Aeronautics Board does not have jurisdiction
over civil air operations at Okinawa except where carriers of the United
States are involved. This Agency does not desire that the United States
Government’s interests in Civil Air Transport be disclosed to the Board
at this time; conversely, it is believed that coordination with the Board,
without disclosure of United States Government interest might lead to
unnecessary delays and possible obstructions by representations of in-
terested United States carriers. It is requested, therefore, that the mat-
ter not be coordinated with Civil Aeronautics Board as suggested. The
subject has, however, been discussed with Mr. Alexis Johnson, Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, who
has stated that the Department will interpose no objection to approval
of Civil Air Transport’s application.

6. The Agency considers it a matter of great importance and

urgency that the subject application be approved. Failure to obtain
such approval will result in the most serious setbacks to the Agency’s
operations.

Frank G. Wisner

238 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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102. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, February 15, 1952.

SUBJECT

Meeting with USAF Representatives Regarding USAF Photo Reconnaissance
Requirements

1. [

name not declassified

] and 1st Lt. C. W. Matt

attended a meeting

with representatives of USAF to discuss and explore the requirement for
a pre-D-Day reconnaissance of the USSR. Air Force representatives in-
cluded officers from Requirements, Plans, Operations, Intelligence, De-
velopment and the AF State Department representative. Brig. Gen. Gar-
land was the senior officer present.

2. In opening the discussions, the Chairman stated that it was nec-

essary to develop a firm requirement in order to sell State Department
in the need for relaxing the diplomatic side enough to permit viola-
tions of sovereignty. It will be necessary to impress on State the degree
to which our offensive will rely on pre-D-Day reconnaissance in order
to carry out our post-D-Day strikes. Secondly, Air Force must point out
the large vacuum existing in intelligence regarding the USSR. The
Chairman stated that SAC had been asked to participate in develop-
ing a requirement. SAC, however, declined, stating that in their view
the requirement should be based on the need for intelligence. SAC did
not want to raise the implication that their offensive would be delayed
by waiting for reconnaissance!!!

3. The representative from Development outlined what was on

hand or would be available in the future. He stated that it was neces-
sary to obtain guidance on which item or items to push. In other words,
where will they put their money? He discussed balloons, drones, a re-
con version of the Snark

and piloted aircraft. The recon Snark should

be available in 1954 and will have speed of Mach .95 and altitude of
52,000. Drones can now be controlled up to 50 miles and this can prob-
ably be raised to 200 miles. Gopher balloons will be available in the
fall of 1952.

4. Requirements representative stated that recon was needed on

(1) new industrial complexes and air facilities for which there is no

The Intelligence Community 239

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff, Job 83–00036R, Box 11. Secret;

Security Information. Drafted by [

name not declassified

], Air Maritime Division, Office of

Policy Coordination, Central Intelligence Agency.

Both of CIA’s Air Maritime Division.

Snark was a proposed Air Force strategic cruise missile.

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intelligence or for which we need new intelligence, (2) area from Urals
to FE on which there is no photo coverage and (3) general recon to un-
cover new targets developed since WW II. It was also pointed out that
warning requirement was also of prime importance.

5. Air Force State representative reported that State had formerly

taken a dim view of violations such as photo recon would involve.
However, he believed that now that international affairs had gotten to
present condition, State might not take as serious objections as before.
They might agree that the planes, etc., might get shot down the indi-
cent would not start a war. [

sic

] He stated balloons might cause mis-

givings in State because of their lack of directional control and possi-
ble aimless wanderings. Representative seemed to think State might
go along with Snark, drones, etc., if requirement strongly presented.

6. CIA representative was asked how CIA might contribute. It was

pointed out that only a very limited capability existed at present. A
CIA capability might be developed but will require a large amount of
support from Air Force. At best, and for some time in the future, CIA
capability will be largely peripheral.

7. It was decided that Intelligence Section of USAF would develop

the draft requirement from the intelligence viewpoint. Other sections
would assist as required. Presumably, CIA will be specifically asked
for any future information if Air Force so desires.

[

name not declassified

]

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

103. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Director for Special

Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency (Helms) to the
Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency
(Wisner)

Washington, February 16, 1952.

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Operations,

Job 75–05091R, Box 1, Folder 37. Secret; Security Information. 3 pages
not declassified.]

240 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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104. Memorandum From the Director of the Psychological

Strategy Board (Allen) to Board Members

Washington, February 20, 1952.

SUBJECT

Procedure for Handling 10/5 Matters in PSB

I recommend that the following arrangements and procedures be

formally approved by the Psychological Strategy Board in order that
it may most effectively discharge its responsibilities under paragraph
3 of NSC 10/5:

1. A special panel will be created by PSB, the membership of which

will consist of the same representatives of the Secretary of State and of
the Secretary of Defense who now advise the Central Intelligence
Agency’s Office of Policy Coordination pursuant to NSC 10/2, and
the representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who acts in a similar ca-
pacity.

The membership will also include a representative of the Cen-

tral Intelligence Agency and two representatives of the Psychological
Strategy Board, designated by the Director, Psychological Strategy
Board, one of whom shall act as Chairman of the panel.

2. This panel shall consider all programs and individual major

projects within the scope of NSC 10/5 which are submitted to the panel
for review by the Director of Central Intelligence.

3. In the light of national policy and preliminary and tentative es-

timates of available resources, the panel will review the desirability of
the programs and major projects which have been referred to it and
reach agreement or disagreement as to recommendations for approval,
modification, or disapproval.

The Intelligence Community 241

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 333. Top Secret; Se-

curity Information. Forwarded to Under Secretary of State Webb under cover of a letter
from Allen of the same date. The letter was returned to Allen with a note dated Febru-
ary 25. A handwritten notation on the letter indicates that it was approved by Webb.
(Ibid.)

Document 90. In a letter of March 14 Allen informed H. Freeman Matthews,

Deputy Under Secretary of State, that he had received written approval from each mem-
ber of the Board. Allen further stated that C. Tracy Barnes, his deputy, was being desig-
nated chairman of the special panel to be established under the approved procedure.
(National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 56 D 459, Secretary’s Letters, Defense 1952)

For text of NSC 10/2, see

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelli-

gence Establishment, Document 292. The representatives were Robert P. Joyce (State),
Brigadier General John Magruder (Defense), and Rear Admiral Leslie C. Stevens (JCS).

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4. All of the following projects or programs will be referred by the

panel to the Director of PSB for submission to the PSB:

(a) Any program or “major” project on which the panel as a whole

cannot reach unanimous agreement;

(b) Any program or “major” project which in the opinion of any

member of the panel raises a question of policy, desirability or feasi-
bility of sufficient importance to warrant formal consideration by the
PSB.

5. Any program or “major” project on which the panel as a whole

has reached unanimous agreement and which has not been referred to
the Director of PSB for submission to the PSB under the provisions of
paragraph 4 (b) above shall be handled as follows:

(a) The representative of the Director of Central Intelligence on

the panel shall present the program or project to the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence for his approval if not already formally recommended
by him. If he approves, the Director of Central Intelligence shall sign
and file with the Director of PSB a written statement approving such
project or program and agreeing that the Central Intelligence Agency
will provide such support as such project or program requires from the
Central Intelligence Agency as evidenced by the requirements ap-
proved by the panel.

(b) The representative of the Secretary of State on the panel shall

present the program or project to the Under Secretary of State for his
approval. If he approves, the Under Secretary of State shall sign and
file with the Director of PSB a written statement approving such proj-
ect or program from the standpoint of national policy and agreeing that
the Department of State will provide such support as such project or
program requires from the Department of State as evidenced by the re-
quirements approved by the panel.

shall present the program or project to the Deputy Secretary of Defense
for his approval. If he approves, the Deputy Secretary of Defense shall
sign and file with the Director of PSB a written statement approving
such project or program from the standpoint of national policy and
agreeing that the Department of Defense will provide such support as
such project or program requires from the Department of Defense as
evidenced by the requirements approved by the panel.

6. Any program or project which has received the approval of the

Director of Central Intelligence, the Under Secretary of State and the
Deputy Secretary of Defense, under the provisions of paragraph 5,
above, shall be deemed to have received the approval of the Psycho-
logical Strategy Board in accordance with the requirements of NSC
10/5.

242 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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7. In the event that the Director of Central Intelligence, the Under

Secretary of State or the Deputy Secretary of Defense shall report that
his Department or Agency, respectively, is unwilling or unable to pro-
vide the approval and agreement set forth in paragraphs 5 (a), 5 (b),
or 5 (c) above, the project or program in question shall be referred by
the panel to the Director of the Psychological Strategy Board for sub-
mission to the Psychological Strategy Board for its further action.

8. In the event that the Director of Central Intelligence, the Under

Secretary of State, or the Deputy Secretary of Defense recommend any
amendment, modification, or other changes to the program or project,
the program or project, together with such recommendations, will be
referred back to the panel for further action, under procedures identi-
cal to those applicable to the original submission of programs and proj-
ects to the panel.

RBA

105. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Bruce) to

the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council
(Lay)

Washington, April 7, 1952.

SUBJECT

Fourth Progress Report on NSC 26 Series, “Removal and Demolition of Oil
Facilities, Equipment and Supplies in the Middle East”

NSC 26/2,

NSC 26/4 and NSC 26/5

were approved as govern-

mental policy on January 10, 1949, August 18, 1950 and May 3, 1951, re-
spectively. It is requested that this fourth progress report as of March 10,
1952 be circulated to the members of the Council for their information.

Important Developments:

1. July 9, 1951, the Secretary of Defense stated that due to

worsening world conditions and increased global requirements, “the
earmarking of a military contingent for the specific use in connection

The Intelligence Community 243

Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s Secretary’s File,

Subject File. Top Secret; Special Handling.

Not printed. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, Box 51)

Neither printed. (Ibid., RG 273, Policy Papers of the NSC: NSC 26, Box 9)

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with NSC 26/2 should not be done in advance”.

He added that the

JCS were of the opinion that although “under certain circumstances a
force such as the Battalion of Marines now in the Mediterranean might
be available for this mission”, “the sending of a force to Saudi Arabia
must be decided at the time (of the emergency) in view of the overall
situation confronting us”.

2. [

4 paragraphs (39 lines) not declassified

]

3. On August 14, 1951 it was recommended by State [

less than 1

line not declassified

] field representatives in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia in

consultation with local US military officials that the company notify
the Saudi Arabian Government in a most general way of denial and
evacuation plans.

On August 21, 1951 it was decided by the Depart-

ments of State and Defense in consultation [

less than 1 line not declassi-

fied

] that not only denial plans, but also broader national policies in the

area, would be jeopardized by such disclosure to SAG officials at that
time and that no indication should be given that the Western powers
might abandon the area.

4. On August 22, 1951 the National Security Council discussed the

third progress report and noted that the Secretary of State would issue
a directive [

3 lines not declassified

5. On September 10, 1951 the Bahrein Petroleum Company in-

formed the Department of State of its acceptance of the denial policy
provided: (a) concurrence of the local government were obtained be-
fore the program could be put into effect, and (b) company claims for
reimbursement would be “treated upon the same footing as claims of
other companies elsewhere who cooperate in like measures”.

6. [

3 paragraphs (11 lines) not declassified

]

7. [

16 lines not declassified

] Similar problems in Saudi Arabia have

been presented to the US military for resolution. No problems have
arisen that require action on the NSC level.”

8. January 16–February 3, 1952, a mission of State–Defense–CIA–

US oil company representatives visited Middle East oil areas of United
States denial responsibility, i.e. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrein, Qatar,
to review NSC 26 progress, plans, policies and problems. Conclusions
and recommendations, which are now under State–Defense–CIA study,
will be presented in the next progress report.

244 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Not printed. (Ibid.)

Not found.

See Document 84.

Not found.

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Action Now Contemplated

Further action required to implement NSC 26 includes further de-

velopment of Aramco-type denial plans to Kuwait, Kuwait Neutral
Zone, Bahrein and Qatar; [

less than 1 line not declassified

]; continual ex-

amination of the situation re protective forces; and inter-Departmental
consideration of problems observed during the January field mission,
i.e. implementation of the denial plans in the event of local opposition,
status of company personnel engaged in denial operations, degree of
denial throughout Middle East oil areas, clearer definition of the na-
tional interest in preserving oil reservoirs, notification of local author-
ities regarding denial plans, delegation of field responsibility for NSC
26, security of denial plans, coordination of denial plans with produc-
tion plans, rehabilitation plans, personnel protection, evacuation, and
counter-sabotage plans.

Policy Evaluation

Policy evaluation will be withheld pending a resolution of the

problems mentioned in the above paragraph, following which recom-
mendations will be made as to whether new Council action, including
the revision of NSC 26, is desirable.

David Bruce

Printed from a copy that indicates Bruce signed the original.

106. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans of the

Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner) to Director of Central
Intelligence Smith and the Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence (Dulles)

Washington, April 10, 1952.

SUBJECT

United States Policies on Support for Anti-Communist Chinese Forces

The Intelligence Community 245

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for Operations,

Job 79–01228A, Box 11. Top Secret; Security Information; Eyes Only.

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1. This memorandum is prepared for the information and use of

the Director and the Deputy Director only. It summarizes the discus-
sion which took place at the JCS Conference Room at 11:00 a.m.
Wednesday, 9 April 1952. The State Department was represented by
Messrs. Bohlen, Nitze, Allison and Ferguson. The JCS was represented
by General Bradley, Admiral Fechteler, General Twining, General Hull
and General Cabell. The Department of Defense was represented by
Mr. Nash, and Mr. Lay was present for the NSC staff. Messrs. Dulles
and Wisner represented CIA.

2. The stated subject matter of the meeting was the JCS paper to

the NSC on Formosa,

although General Bradley pointed out that the

subject matter was much broader and stemmed from the Director’s De-
cember letter to the Secretary of Defense.

The composition of the meet-

ing had been determined at the NSC meeting of the preceding week,
at the conclusion of which it had been decided that there would be a
direct discussion of the policy questions raised by the JCS paper as be-
tween State, Defense, JCS and CIA, as a preliminary to a possible NSC
staff study of the matter. CIA had been included because of the mat-
ter having been originally raised by the Director’s letter and also be-
cause of the importance of the policy review to large and significant
CIA operations in the area concerned.

3. Mr. Bohlen began for State by giving a brief résumé of our pres-

ent policy with respect to Formosa and the Chinese Nationalists, which
is largely spelled out in NSC 48/5.

Following this, Mr. Bohlen said that

he would like to take up the points in the JCS paper of 22 March 1952,
one by one, in order to clarify certain doubts which the State Depart-
ment had as to the significance and underlying meaning of these points.
It was not clear to the Department whether the paper refers to what the
policy should be on the assumption of a truce in Korea, or whether it
proposed modifications of the existing policy either at the present time
or on the basis of some other assumption. He asked whether subpara-
graph (c) meant that the JCS were proposing the lifting of restrictions
now in order to allow the Chinese Nationalists to attack the mainland.

4. Admiral Fechteler replied that the meaning of this paragraph

is that we should not close the door to movements westward from For-
mosa. It did not mean that the ban against westward movements
should be lifted immediately, but only if conditions should warrant this
in the light of developing circumstances.

5. Mr. Nitze replied that this was a very helpful clarification and

one quite satisfactory to State. The Department had been concerned

246 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Dated March 22; see

Foreign Relations,

1952–1954, vol. XIV, Part 1, pp. 20–21.

Document 98.

For NSC 48/5, see

Foreign Relations,

1951, vol. VI, pp. 33–63.

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lest this mean a recommendation for an overt policy change at the pres-
ent time—since such a policy change would be interpreted world-wide
as a full engagement of U.S. power and prestige in the destruction of
the Chinese Communist regime on the mainland.

6. Admiral Fechteler asked what the situation would be if the Chi-

nese Nationalists should attempt to launch raids against the mainland
from Formosa now. What would we do; would we try to stop this; and
if so, by what means would we seek to stop it—by diplomatic or by
military means? Messrs. Allison and Nitze replied that they regarded
this as an academic question at the present time, since the Nationalists
are not in a position to launch significant landings against the main-
land without our help.

7. General Bradley asked Mr. Dulles whether CIA operations have

suffered or are suffering from the existing policy, which prohibits move-
ments east or west, and if so, what changes we consider necessary in
order to remove the interferences.

8. [

11 lines not declassified

] (At a later point in the discussion, Mr.

Dulles raised the question as to whether the present policy means that
the Nationalists are prevented from reinforcing the offshore islands
from Formosa. It was the unanimous response that the present policy
does not prohibit the reinforcement or re-supply of the offshore islands
from Formosa, since the policy is restrictive only against attacks upon
the China mainland. It was further stated that what happens as be-
tween the offshore islands and the mainland is not affected by the pres-
ent policy and that it need not be a concern of this Government.)

9. Mr. Nitze stated with respect to subparagraph (c) that State

could accept the explanation and interpretation given by Admiral
Fechteler provided its meaning were clearly spelled out as requiring a
re-examination of all of the circumstances which might be applicable
at the appropriate moment in connection with a determination of
whether the circumstances might warrant a lifting of the ban on move-
ment westward.

10. General Hull stated that he considered the question somewhat

more fundamental and not so easy to dismiss. The existence of the
westward ban implies that we have a substantially negative policy on
the use of present and potential resources on Formosa. The question
is, “Do we build up or don’t we?” If there is to be a build-up, there
must be at the very least a philosophy understood and accepted at the
top levels of this Government that we are building toward a positive
or affirmative exploitation of the Formosa potential. Lacking this phi-
losophy, Formosa will simply fail to receive the priorities and hence
won’t get the stuff. The other competitive demands for our military aid
will eat up all of the matériel, and Formosa will get nothing.

11. Mr. Nitze thought the present language of NSC 48/5 is both

broad enough and sufficiently flexible to permit a build-up not only

The Intelligence Community 247

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for defensive purposes but also for possible offensive purposes. He
quoted portions of the language of this paper in support of his point.

12. Mr. Bohlen said he was inclined to agree with General Hull’s

position that the language could be amended slightly to give it a more
positive ring, provided that it was clearly understood that we would
not tell the Chinese Nationalists that we were changing the policy and
undertaking the support of a build-up for offensive purposes. He ex-
plained that the Chinese Nationalists would surely exploit any such
statement or information on a world-wide basis with grave embar-
rassment to our over-all position and at a time when it is still difficult
to foresee what future developments will bring.

13. Mr. Dulles said that he was troubled about the fact that this is

the only spot in the world where we are using our own forces to protect
the Communists. Mr. Bohlen replied that this was perhaps theoretically
so, but he said that we would no doubt move to restrain any others over
whom we have influence if we thought they were likely to launch overt
aggressive attacks against the USSR or the satellites. He said, moreover,
the “protection of the Communists” is at this time illusory since there is
nothing at the moment to protect the Chinese Communists

from.

14. General Hull in reply to a question from Mr. Allison stated that

the JCS did not deem it within the realm of possibility to build up the
Chinese Nationalists to the point where they could successfully under-
take an invasion of the Chinese mainland without extensive military as-
sistance from us. He said, “If they go back, we have got to put them back.”

15. Reverting to an earlier point in the conversation, Mr. Allison said

that it might clarify the situation somewhat if we would state now that
if there should be an overt Communist attack against Southeast Asia, we
would employ the Chinese Nationalist potential against Hainan or such
other places as might be most effectively attacked by these forces.

16. General Hull said this would be helpful. General Bradley said

that this last point tended to confuse him somewhat. He was trying to
sort out in his mind the difference between the paper now under con-
sideration and discussions of another paper relating to what actions
we would take in the event of an attack by the Chinese Communists
against Southeast Asia. He reminded the meeting that the present dis-
cussion grew out of and had been touched off by General Smith’s let-
ter, which had taken the line that if we are going to do anything about
Formosa, time is of the essence.

17. Mr. Dulles stated that this was as he understood it to be. Gen-

eral Smith’s letter had clearly pointed up the aspect of wasting assets
and the disintegration of the situation on Formosa from both a mili-
tary and political standpoint. There are disquieting reports about the
political and military situation on Formosa—reports of sagging morale
and other things which open up alarming possibilities as to what may

248 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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happen if we do not firm up our policy for that area and take appro-
priate action under the new policy.

18. General Bradley said that this obviously raises the entire ques-

tion of the validity of our support to Formosa. Why should we be
spending several hundreds of millions of dollars and pouring in mili-
tary supplies and equipment if we are not willing to take the additional
steps necessary to insure against a collapse. We are faced with several
distasteful conclusions:

a. As matters now stand, we are allowing a useful potential to

waste away and are merely throwing good money after bad.

b. It would appear that our present methods cannot be expected

to unseat the Communist regime, and that the adoption of the addi-

tional military measures to accomplish this result at this time would

risk our involvement in a general war, at least against China, and pos-

sibly Russia as well.

c. If we withhold or withdraw our aid now, Formosa will collapse

in short order.

With respect to this latter point, General Bradley said that the JCS

has repeatedly taken the position that the loss of Formosa would be highly
damaging to our over-all strategic position, but that this was not suffi-
ciently critical to warrant our putting in U.S. forces to hold Formosa.

19. Mr. Nash stated that the decision of the NSC had, as he un-

derstood it, been to review the entire situation and not just one or two
isolated features of it. He proposed that a working group comprised
of State, Defense, JCS, CIA and NSC representatives should immedi-
ately address itself to the broader task.

20. Mr. Bohlen agreed that this was the problem. He said there

should be an immediate study of everything that can be done to so-
lidify and stabilize the situation on Formosa.

21. General Bradley also agreed and added that he would like to

adopt Mr. Bohlen’s proposal of a slight modification of the pertinent
language of NSC 48/5. He also said that he thought subparagraphs (d)
and (e) of the JCS paper of 22 March represent existing policy and there-
fore raise no new questions.

22. Mr. Bohlen remarked that General Chase

had said when he

was here that the average age of the Chinese Nationalist forces on For-
mosa was some four years younger than the average age of the Divi-
sion which he had led in the invasion of the Philippines. (Mr. Dulles
requested the undersigned to check this point.)

23. Messrs. Nash and Lay reaffirmed Mr. Nash’s earlier recom-

mendation that a five-ply working group needs to study the problem in
the broad context of General Smith’s letter to the Secretary of Defense.

The Intelligence Community 249

Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Formosa.

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24. Just at the conclusion of the discussion, Mr. Dulles stated that

CIA would be very glad to continue its participation in this examina-
tion of the problem, not only because of what we might be able to con-
tribute from the intelligence standpoint but also because of the large
operational stake which we have in the outcome of the deliberation.
He reminded General Bradley that CIA had no wish to continue the
conduct of such large-scale operations and that General Smith had
pointed this out repeatedly and had offered to divest himself of this
responsibility if only the JCS or someone else would pick it up. These
remarks prompted a ripple of polite laughter around the table, and
General Bradley stated (with a smile and a bow towards Mr. Dulles)
that he saw no reason to revise the present situation or alter the re-
sponsibilities as they now stand.

Frank G. Wisner

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

107. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Smith to

the National Security Council

Washington, April 23, 1952.

SUBJECT

Report by the Director of Central Intelligence

In July 1949, the National Security Council directed that certain

changes be made in the organization of the Central Intelligence Agency.
The instructions contained in this Directive—NSC 50

—have been car-

ried out in all substantial respects.

There is attached, marked Tab A, a chart of the organization of the

Central Intelligence Agency as of October 1950 and an organization
chart as of 31 December 1951. A comparison of these charts will indi-
cate the general scope of this reorganization.

250 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 50 Series. Top

Secret. The memorandum was circulated by NSC Executive Secretary Lay on April 28 as
a National Security Council Progress Report on the implementation of NSC 50, “The Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency and National Organization for Intelligence,” July 1, 1949. (Ibid.)

See

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment,

Document 384.

320-672/B428-S/11008

1363_A15-A20.qxd 9/28/07 9:29 AM Page 250

Specifically, there has been established an Office of National Esti-

mates to produce intelligence estimates of national concern, both in
acute situations and on a long-term basis. In its operations this Office
utilizes the resources of the total United States intelligence community.
The members of the Council are acquainted with the production of the
Office of National Estimates, but, for ready reference, there is attached,
marked Tab B, a list of the National Intelligence Estimates which were
prepared in 1951.

To provide the National Security Council and appropriate offices

of the Government with all-source intelligence on a current basis, there
was also established during 1951 an Office of Current Intelligence.
Council members are acquainted with the publications of this Office.

An Office of Research and Reports has been set up to provide co-

ordinated intelligence, primarily on economic matters, as a service of
common concern to interested Government agencies. Although accu-
rate appraisal of an enemy’s economic potential is a most important
factor in estimating his military capabilities, this crucially-important
task had previously been scattered among twenty-four separate agen-
cies of the Government.

An Interdepartmental Economic Intelligence Committee has also

been established, and the Agency’s Assistant Director for Research and
Reports is its Chairman. His Office is the clearing house for study and
analysis of the economy of the Soviet Orbit and for exploring and fill-
ing the gaps that had developed in the previously unrelated system of
collection and evaluation.

In cooperation with the Department of Defense, there has been es-

tablished the Interdepartmental Watch Committee. Its function is to
provide constant and periodic review of indications of possible enemy
action. The Central Intelligence Agency also maintains a twenty-four
hour watch on behalf of the Agency.

Continuity of high caliber personnel, possessing specialized training

and experience, is essential for the conduct of the Agency’s activities. Ac-
cordingly, plans for a career service within the Central Intelligence
Agency are being worked out and the first groups of prospective jun-
ior career officers are in training.

After sufficient career personnel have been recruited and trained

in this service, it will be possible eventually to select senior officials of
the Central Intelligence Agency from among their number. This de-
velopment will take time. Meanwhile, one of the Agency’s continuing

The Intelligence Community 251

Not printed.

See Documents 72 and 73.

See Document 91.

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problems will be the difficulty of securing adequately qualified per-
sonnel, particularly for senior positions.

Four NSC papers approved during the period under review re-

quired the special services of the Central Intelligence Agency:

1. [

1 paragraph (9 lines) not declassified

]

2. NSC 86/1

confirmed the operational responsibility abroad of the

Central Intelligence Agency with respect to handling defectors. To meet
this responsibility, improved machinery has been provided by the
Agency for interrogating and caring for the high level defectors, [

2 lines

not declassified

]. Nevertheless, both the number and quality of defectors

have been disappointing. Studies are being made of inducement pro-
grams to improve this situation, and appropriate recommendations will
be made in due course to the Interagency Defector Committee. It should
be noted in this connection that the care and rehabilitation of escapees
and refugees, as distinguished from high level defectors, are not, and
should not be, a Central Intelligence Agency responsibility. [

2 lines not

declassified

]

3. The third NSC paper—NSC 66/1

—directed the Central Intelli-

gence Agency to provide intelligence support for the Voice of America
with respect to Soviet jamming. This is being done, but the establish-
ment of an additional monitoring facility to locate Soviet jamming sta-
tions, requested by NSC 66/1 of the Armed Forces Security Agency has
not been performed, due to technical difficulties. The National Security
Council subsequently authorized the Central Intelligence Agency and
the Department of State to implement this aspect of NSC 66/1 as a pi-
lot operation, pending further consideration of the plan on technical
grounds within the Department of Defense structure. This is being done.

4. The remaining paper—NSC 10/5

—redefines the Central Intel-

ligence Agency’s responsibilities in a field which was probably not en-
visaged at the time the National Security Act of 1947, under which the
Agency was established, was framed. This is the field of cold war covert
activities, including guerrilla warfare. We have accepted these respon-
sibilities as agents for the major Departments concerned and for projects
which are approved by the Psychological Strategy Board. The Depart-
ments of State and Defense are charged with providing the Central In-
telligence Agency with the necessary support to accomplish these mis-
sions. The presently projected scope of these activities has, during the

252 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

NSC 86/1, “U.S. Policy on Soviet and Satellite Defectors,” approved by Truman on

April 19, 1951, is in National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 86 Series.

For NSC 66/1, “Intelligence Support for the Voice of America With Regard to So-

viet Jamming,” see Document 46.

Document 90.

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past three years, produced a three-fold increase in the clandestine oper-
ations of this Agency and will require next year a budget three times
larger than that required for our intelligence activities. These cold war
projects are worldwide in scope (with the effort intensified in the Far
East) and they include psychological warfare as well as paramilitary op-
erations; denial programs with respect to strategic materials; stockpiling
on a limited scale in strategic areas to assist the military in the event of
war; the organization and planning of sabotage teams to support resist-
ance operations; and the planning and organization of escape and eva-
sion networks and stay-behind movements for use in the event of war.

Given the necessary support, it will be possible for the Central In-

telligence Agency to fulfill these requirements; but since they have re-
sulted in such a large expansion in the Agency’s budget and person-
nel strength, it should be noted that:

1. They are not functions essential to the performance by Central

Intelligence Agency of its intelligence responsibilities.

2. They were placed in this Agency because there was no other

Department or Agency of the Government which could undertake
them at that time.

3. They will inevitably militate against the performance by Cen-

tral Intelligence Agency of its primary intelligence functions and are a
continuing and increasing risk to its security. Regrettably, (from my
personal viewpoint) it seems impracticable, for reasons of coordination
and security, to divorce these from other covert operations.

There remain a number of unsolved problems—major and minor.

The following examples will indicate their nature and range:

Interrelationship Between Intelligence and Operational Planning.

is not necessary for an intelligence officer to know very much about
plans, either civilian or military, but if his product is to be timely he
must have adequate advance information at least of the general nature
and objectives of any plans toward which he can make an intelligence
contribution, as well as of such national or international policies and
agreements as precede them. The liaison arrangements of CIA and the
Department of State on such matters are reasonably satisfactory, al-
though there remains room for betterment. Such arrangements with
the Armed Services are still somewhat less than satisfactory, although
some improvement is being made.

Security.

The utmost diligence has been exercised to insure the

security of the Central Intelligence Agency, and I am now convinced
that it is at least as secure as any activity of the Government. My re-
maining concern in this regard is largely based on the fact that the
Agency is scattered among twenty-eight buildings in the Washington
area. Every effort will be made to obtain funds for the construction of
a reasonably secure building.

The Intelligence Community 253

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Communications Intelligence.

Responsibility for this activity is

presently divided. It is of particular concern since it affects a highly
important source of raw intelligence. The President has directed that a
survey be made by the Secretaries of State and Defense, assisted by the
Director of Central Intelligence, to determine what, if any, organiza-
tional changes might improve the security and productivity of this serv-
ice. This survey is now in progress under the supervision of an inde-
pendent committee, appointed for the purpose.

Scientific and Technical Intelligence.

The least progress in coordi-

nating intelligence activities has been made in certain fields of scien-
tific and technical intelligence. An interagency committee is presently
studying this problem, with the view of recommending the proper
steps for the improvement of this situation.

The Council is generally acquainted with the Central Intelligence

Agency’s secret operations designed to produce raw intelligence. Al-
though we are making every effort to develop these latter sources, our
experience so far has been in general disappointing. They are costly by
comparison with other intelligence operations and they present in most
cases a gambler’s chance of obtaining really significant critical strate-
gic information, although they consistently produce a significant quan-
tity of useable information. We must and shall devote our best effort
to their improvement and to the exploitation of every reasonable chance
for penetration. On a few rare occasions there have been really brilliant
accomplishments.

In conclusion, it should be pointed out that, in view of the efficiency

of the Soviet security organization, it is not believed that the present
United States intelligence system, or any instrumentality which the
United States is presently capable of providing, including the available
intelligence assets of other friendly states, can produce strategic intelli-
gence on the Soviet with the degree of accuracy and timeliness which the
National Security Council would like to have and which I would like to
provide. Moreover, despite the utmost vigilance, despite watch commit-
tees, and all of the other mechanics for the prompt evaluation and trans-
mission of intelligence, there is no real assurance that, in the event of sud-
den undeclared hostilities, certain advance warning can be provided.

As far as our intelligence production is concerned, the Central In-

telligence Agency is basically an assembly plant for information pro-
duced by collaborating organizations of the Government, and its final
product is necessarily dependent upon the quality of the contributions
of these collaborating organizations.

Walter B. Smith

254 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

320-672/B428-S/11008

See Documents 97 and 99.

Printed from a copy that indicates Smith signed the original.

1363_A15-A20.qxd 9/28/07 9:29 AM Page 254

320-672/B428-S/1

1008

PERSONNEL

STAFF

PROCUREMENT

REQUIREMENTS

STAFF

COORDINATON,

OPERATIONS &

POLICY STAFF

LEGAL

STAFF

ADVISORY

STAFF

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
(

Organization as of 1 October 1950

)

INTELLIGENCE

ADVISORY

COMMITTEE

DIRECTOR

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

EXECUTIVE

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

DEPUTY EXECUTIVE

BUDGET

STAFF

MANAGEMENT

STAFF

MEDICAL

STAFF

INSPECTION

& SECURITY

STAFF

ADMINISTRATIVE

STAFF

SPECIAL

SUPPORT

STAFF

OFFICE OF

REPORTS &

ESTIMATES

OFFICE OF

SCIENTIFIC

INTELLIGENCE

OFFICE OF

COLLECTION &

DISSEMINATION

OFFICE OF

POLICY

COORDINATION

OFFICE OF

OPERATIONS

OFFICE OF

SPECIAL

OPERATIONS

The Intelligence Community

255

ab A

1363_A15-A20.qxd 9/28/07 9:29 AM Page 255

320-672/B428-S/1

1008

DIRECTOR OF

TRAINING

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
(

Organization as of 31 December 1951

)

INTELLIGENCE

ADVISORY

COMMITTEE

DIRECTOR

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

TECHNICAL

SERVICES

STAFF

OFFICE OF

SPECIAL

OPERATIONS

OFFICE OF

POLICY

COORDINATION

OFFICE OF

OPERATIONS

OFFICE OF

COMMUNICATIONS

GENERAL

COUNSEL

ASSISTANT

DEPUTY

(GENERAL)

ASSISTANT

DEPUTY

(SPECIAL)

ASSISTANT

DEPUTY

(INSPECTION

& SECURITY)

ASSISTANT

DIRECTOR

(PERSONNEL)

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

(PLANS)

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

(ADMINISTRATION)

AUDITOR

ADVISOR

FOR

MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF

COLLECTION &

DISSEMINATION

OFFICE OF

RESEARCH

& REPORTS

OFFICE OF

NATIONAL

ESTIMATES

OFFICE OF

CURRENT

INTELLIGENCE

OFFICE OF

INTELLIGENCE

COORDINATION

OFFICE OF

SCIENTIFIC

INTELLIGENCE

256

For
eign Relations, 1950–1955

1363_A15-A20.qxd 9/28/07 9:29 AM Page 256

108. Briefing Paper Prepared by the Chairman of the 10/5 Panel

(Barnes)

Washington, May 7, 1952.

BRIEFING TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

ON SOME 10/5 PROBLEMS

A. The Purpose of the Briefing

The word “briefing” on the agenda is somewhat misleading. I

should be extremely reluctant to “brief” the Board on 10/5,

as each of

you already has considerable familiarity with the subject, quite aside
from the fact that General Smith is the undisputed expert. What I am
really doing is asking for a “briefing in reverse”; or, in other words,
seeking the Board’s help and guidance on behalf of the 10/5 Panel so
that it can function as the Board’s screening agent, as completely and
intelligently as possible. Study of the famous “Packet” has shown us
as members of the Panel that there are some issues which should be
submitted for Board consideration.

B. Summary of the Steps Leading Up to the Briefing

To provide the proper framework for the issues which we wish to

raise, I believe it will be of advantage to review briefly the background
of NSC 10/5.

NSC 10/2, approved by the President in June 1948,

directed the

undertaking of covert operations by OPC (then called the Office of Spe-
cial Projects) on behalf of the U.S. Government. The DCI was given the
ultimate responsibility and was instructed to ensure, through repre-
sentatives of State and Defense, that such covert operations were con-
sistent with U.S. policy. The 10/2 Representatives, consisting of Gen-
eral Magruder, General Balmer, and Mr. Joyce, have been meeting with
the Chief of OPC each week to give such policy guidance. In addition,
there is day-to-day liaison by CIA, not only with State and Defense,
but also with other appropriate departments and agencies.

The Intelligence Community 257

320-672/B428-S/11008

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 64 D 563, Political and Psycho-

logical Warfare. Top Secret; Eyes Only. The distribution of the paper is indicated in the
Annex. Not printed here is a brief table of contents. The May 8 minutes of the 12th meet-
ing of the Psychological Strategy Board indicate that this paper was discussed at that
time. (Ibid., S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 333, PSB Minutes) All ellipses in the original.

Document 90.

Printed in

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establish-

ment, Document 292.

1363_A15-A20.qxd 9/28/07 9:29 AM Page 257

The normal growth of CIA operations under 10/2, the approval

and implementation of the NSC 68 Series,

and additional requirements

placed on CIA by State, Defense, and the JCS (such as support for pro-
grams in Korea and China; the retardation program; resistance pro-
grams; stockpiling; and oil-denial programs), indicated to DCI that the
covert program was fast expanding beyond the horizons seen at the
time of its creation. Accordingly, CIA sought additional guidance from
NSC in the “Scope and Pace” or “Magnitude” Paper of May 8, 1951,

in which were set forth two fundamental issues, clarification of which
was considered essential to orderly growth. These were—

1. High policy approval of increases in personnel and expendi-

tures required by requested programs, but going beyond limits thought

to have been intended by NSC in June 1948, plus approval of sub-

stantial additional increases, if all the programs being thrust upon OPC

were even to be attempted;

2. High policy decisions as to the direction and nature of covert

operations.

[

2 paragraphs (12 lines) not declassified

]

With respect to the direction and nature of the covert program OPC

was faced with major decisions. CIA interpreted the NSC 68 Series as
establishing the desirability of large scale covert operations but felt that
these policies had not been translated into a directive sufficiently spe-
cific for the operational guidance of OPC.

Here is a sampling of the kind of decisions then troubling CIA:

1. Should OPC emphasize covert activities in support of cold war

or in support of preparation for hot war? For example, should OPC

properly give top priority to a European retardation plan as requested

by the JCS?

2. How should OPC resolve the differing military and political con-

cepts relating to the build-up, maintenance and use of resistance groups?

3. Should activities, such as paramilitary, be changed from covert

to overt? If so, when and how?

These basic problems prompted CIA to ask for guidance in four

areas: (1) the scope and pace of covert operations for cold war and
preparation for hot war; (2) redetermination of responsibilities for
covert operations; (3) assurance of logistical support; and (4) coordi-
nated guidance from PSB.

The NSC responded to the “Magnitude” Paper in NSC 10/5, ap-

proved by the President on October 23, 1951. This stated that the NSC
“approves in principle as a national responsibility the immediate ex-
pansion of the covert organization established in NSC 10/2”, thereby

258 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

See Document 5.

Attachment to Document 68.

320-672/B428-S/11008

1363_A15-A20.qxd 9/28/07 9:29 AM Page 258

answering at least in part the primary CIA worry as to OPC’s increase
in size. This answer, however, merely emphasizes the rest of 10/5,
which is devoted to the question of objectives and how to develop a
covert program.

Obviously, the best size for OPC can never be determined with en-

gineering accuracy. But equally obviously, the size of OPC should be
responsive, in a general way, to various considerations, among which,
in our opinion, are three important ones that will be discussed in greater
detail in a moment. These considerations are:

1. What are the correct interpretations of national objectives?

2. What is the national program for achieving them?

3. How large can the OPC program become without disclosing the

hand of the U.S.?

As to objectives the NSC called for an intensification of covert oper-

ations designed to: (1) place maximum strain on the Soviet structure of
power; (2) contribute towards retraction of Soviet power and influence;
(3) orient the free world towards the U.S., and (4) develop resistance and
guerrilla operations.

With regard to program, 10/5 in effect says to CIA, “We recognize

your need for guidance; we will not spell it out for you ourselves; we
will, however, provide you with a mechanism which should resolve
your dilemmas.”

The mechanism was PSB, then a young and only just fluttering

fledgling. PSB was directed to include in its strategic concept provision
for covert operations to achieve the objectives just mentioned. More-
over, PSB was given the responsibility for: (1) determining de-
sirability and feasibility of covert programs and major projects, and
(2) establishing the scope, pace, and timing of covert operations.

In furtherance of these responsibilities, the Board on February 27,

1952 approved the creation of a panel that includes the 10/2 Repre-
sentatives already described, plus two PSB members, Barnes and Put-
nam. At the same time, an administrative procedure was adopted for
reviewing programs and projects.

On March 20, 1952, CIA submitted to PSB the “Packet”, which con-

sists of the CIA/OPC Strategic Plan, a Budget Analysis for FY 1953,
Programs and Major Projects over $50,000, and their Support Require-
ments—a total documentation of about 300 pages, including descrip-
tions of some 100-odd projects.

The Intelligence Community 259

320-672/B428-S/11008

See Document 104.

The “Packet” has not been found, but several documents dealing with Department

of State consideration of it are in National Archives, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 64 D 563, Po-
litical and Psychological Warfare. The CIA/OPC Strategic War Plan is Document 61.

1363_A15-A20.qxd 9/28/07 9:29 AM Page 259

The 10/5 Panel has now studied the “Packet”, in the light of 10/2,

the “Magnitude” Paper, 10/5 and other NSC papers. This study has con-
vinced us that many of the “Magnitude”-type issues still demand clari-
fication and that serious Board consideration is essential. Whatever time
may be required for this consideration, however, the Board in our opin-
ion need not delay its approval of much, perhaps all, of the “Packet”.

C. Approval of the “Packet”

Without prejudice to any strategy which PSB may later evolve, via

the Stevens Group or by other means; without prejudice to further
analysis of the “Packet” (such as the information which has been re-
quested by the JCS representative in order to provide more readily com-
parable figures on supporting personnel and materiel being supplied
by Defense); and without prejudice to questions which any of the Board
may wish to ask; it is our belief that in general the “Packet” should be
endorsed.

Despite the rapid growth of OPC, the total FY 1953 program still

only calls for about one per cent of the federal budget and, at most,
only [

number not declassified

] men.

Unquestionably, the establishment of facilities and the training of

personnel are the top priority needs of OPC today.

OPC can reasonably continue this build-up without losing operat-

ing flexibility. In the meantime, the individual training plus the consol-
idation of organization will be assets to OPC whatever jobs are assigned
to it in the future. Consequently, although no decision is today requested
of the Board, the 10/5 Panel does plan soon to submit the “Packet”, or
as much of it as is appropriate, to the Board for its approval.

Obviously, any Board approval of an OPC Packet must be subject

to continuous review, as national policy evolves.

But, in particular, the approval which the 10/5 Panel will soon rec-

ommend to the Board must be subsequently reviewed by both the Panel
and the Board in the light of future clarifications of national policy and
objectives.

D. Certain Unresolved Issues

Our study of the “Packet” has made us realize that soon the Board

is to be presented with some difficult but unavoidable issues.

To eliminate any possible ambiguity—the Board will not be ex-

pected to

make

policy, but if the 10/5 Panel is to operate, it needs some

interpretations

of policy.

For example, before the Board, or the Panel acting for it, can pass

on the “desirability” of a project as required by 10/5, it seems to us
that the Board must provide answers to quite a number of basic ques-
tions, of which I will give two rather closely related examples:

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1. Does U.S. policy, as properly interpreted, contemplate supply-

ing overt physical support to revolutionary factions that might emerge

in the wake of Stalin’s death, if the situation offered a reasonable chance

of changing a regime to suit U.S. interests without precipitating gen-

eral war?

It seems to us that if U.S. policy excludes this possibility, then OPC

would prepare for quite a different program than it would if U.S. pol-
icy either included the possibility of such overt physical support or
merely reserved to the nation the freedom to make the decision at a
later date.

2. Does U.S. policy, as properly interpreted, include or exclude ef-

forts under any circumstances to overthrow or subvert the govern-

ments of the satellites or the U.S.S.R.?

If U.S. policy excludes such efforts, then any OPC projects directed

primarily or largely to those ends should be eliminated or should be
retained only on the ground that preparations for such efforts may give
the U.S. some freedom of decision.

If, on the other hand, the answer is “yes”, or merely “maybe”, then,

in order to have freedom of decision at the proper moment, it would
seem important for the Board to know now, and for the 10/5 Panel to
find out for the Board, how much military support and what type of
military support will be available. For example, do we plan to go in
on foot? If not, are airborne divisions available or on order? If on or-
der, is the lead time synchronized with the estimated date of need?

In stating these examples, no inference is intended that the Board

is responsible for resolving the questions. However, in order that the
Board may discharge its obligation with respect to the OPC program,
it must, in our judgment, be fully acquainted with the answers from
whatever source derived. The 10/5 Panel, in turn, must seek such an-
swers when attempting to perform its delegated functions.

The following passages from a lead article in the April 26, 1952,

issue of the London

Economist

express a similar dilemma in the public

mind:

“The discreet silence of western diplomacy about its hopes and

purposes in Eastern Europe becomes more and more conspicuous. . . .

“From the viewpoint of the Kremlin this silence of embarrassment

must look like the silence of conspiracy. From London and Paris, from

the land and sea stations of the Voice of America, from Radio Free Eu-

rope in Munich, and from such guerilla bases as Madrid and Belgrade

and so-called ‘black’ stations, there comes hour after hour a stream of

criticism and exhortation directed at the Soviet Union and its satellites.

The effort is comparable only to that of the Cominform itself. To Moscow

monitoring services and to the Russians who read analyses of western

output, it must all look systematic and sinister. To experienced Com-

munists, who themselves plan ahead and think in terms of political

The Intelligence Community 261

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warfare, it must seem incredible that all this activity is not harnessed

to a plan for war and civil war among the western marches of the So-

viet Union.

To encourage resistance by words and to have no intention of

supporting it later by arms does not, the Russian would argue, make sense.

”

(emphasis supplied)

“. . . the general atmosphere of conspiracy is heightened by the ac-

tual and alleged activities of the Central Intelligence Agency behind
the Iron curtain.”

“There can, indeed, be little doubt that there is in Eastern Europe

a widespread belief that time will bring what the rulers call a war of
aggression and what the ruled call liberation.”

“. . . This is obviously an unsatisfactory state of affairs, which

might become dangerous. It may mean that American and British poli-
cies are out of step and that there are two policies in Washington. It
may mean that planning has moved from containment pure and sim-
ple to containment plus all such interference with the Russian sphere
of influence as can be safely got away with. . . . In a decision to pass in
Europe from containment to political, economic and social counter-
attack there is nothing whatever to be ashamed of. . . . What is wrong
is that policy in such a matter should be formed piecemeal under the
pressure of special requirements without any formulation of how far
it is to go and what its ultimate objectives are to be. . . .”

“. . . The policy of ‘containment plus’ is just beginning to hurt the

East; but unless it is formulated and explained, public opinion will not
support it and accept its consequences.”

E. Responsibilities of the 10/5 Panel

To assist in reaching a sensible working relationship between the

Board and the 10/5 Panel, I am including in this final section some spe-
cific requests for guidance.

1. We should like the Board to confirm in principle the conclusion

that OPC cannot create a useful apparatus unless it be authorized to
develop an over-all program, in dollars and personnel, covering a pe-
riod of, let us say, two or three years.

The 10/5 Panel feels that OPC, like the Army, must be allowed to

tailor its apparatus to an order of magnitude. It cannot today deter-
mine precisely what operation will be needed tomorrow any more than
the Army can prophesy what particular campaign it will be directed
to fight. The 10/5 procedure is presently focused on approval of par-
ticular programs and projects. If the 10/5 Panel should formalize and
perpetuate this type of approval, to the exclusion of more general ap-
proval, it would tend to stultify OPC’s healthy development, especially
if this procedure were in any way construed as requiring OPC to de-
lay the creation and training of a useful apparatus until the Board had
approved particular programs and projects.

Such approval, of course, will not affect in any way the Board’s

existing responsibility to review all particular programs and projects
submitted under the 10/5 procedure.

262 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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It will, however, ensure OPC the flexibility essential for the de-

velopment of quality as well as of quantity, and it will permit the 10/5
Panel to prepare an over-all program for Board consideration.

Moreover, such approval in our opinion would be in keeping with

the NSC decision in 10/5 already mentioned; namely, to approve “in
principle as a national responsibility the immediate expansion of the
covert organization established in NSC 10/2. . .” This was an approval
of an increase in order of magnitude.

2. With respect to the Panel’s job of screening particular programs

and projects for the Board, the following are some suggested conclu-
sions which are submitted for ratification by the Board. As you will
see, they are efforts to hang flesh on the 10/5 skeleton.

a. The 10/5 Panel should

not

be called upon to act like a general

manager of the program. This is properly the function of CIA/OPC.

For example, one project calls for [

less than 1 line not declassified

We believe that the PSB should

not

be responsible for approving such

matters as (1) the exact type or amount of stores cached, (2) the loca-
tion of the caches, or (3) safeguards to prevent physical deterioration
or loss of secrecy. Anything recommended by the Case Officer and ap-
proved by CIA and the 10/2 [

10/5

?] mechanism will be considered rea-

sonable, in the absence of actual evidence to the contrary.

The PSB

should

be responsible for determining that:

(1) The procurement and caching of stores for retardation is

reasonable;

(2) [

less than 1 line not declassified

] is a reasonable country in which

to prepare for retardation; and that

(3) The scale of the effort is reasonable.

b. Other recommendations are:

(1) That the 10/2 Representatives continue to provide the detailed,

day-to-day guidance to CIA, while the 10/5 Panel provides the more
general guidance, including the strategic concepts to be developed by
the PSB. Details should be worked out between the 10/2 Representa-
tives and the 10/5 Panel.

(2) That when a program appears to contribute towards the

achievement of a national objective, but also appears either to be in-
consistent with current national policy, or to be in an area where na-
tional policy is not clearly defined, the 10/5 Panel should bring the
program to the attention of the Board.

For example, CIA has two major programs for China: (a) support

of Nationalist Government-controlled guerillas and resistance groups
on the mainland [

less than 1 line not declassified

], and (b) support of “any

and all” anti-Nationalist anti-communist resistance groups on the
mainland [

less than 1 line not declassified

]. Each program contributes to-

wards the national objective of reducing communist power in China.

The Intelligence Community 263

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The programs, however, raise a basic question: Is U.S. Policy: (a)

to strengthen the Nationalist Government as a rallying point for all
anti-communist activities in China, (b) to encourage the development
of a “Third Force” to assume control of all anti-communist activities in
China at the expense of the Nationalists, or (c) to support at least for
the time being both the Nationalist Government and to develop a
“Third Force”.

(3) That the 10/5 Panel may become concerned with the possible

desirability of conducting a 10/5 program overtly rather than covertly.

For example, the “Magnitude” paper points out that after guerilla

forces have reached a certain size, attempts to maintain cover are ridicu-
lous. Therefore, an increase in guerilla or resistance forces would require
a further judgment as to the desirability of making the operation overt.

c. The 10/5 Panel should be authorized to ask questions designed

to uncover hidden assumptions and implications in connection with

any matter germane to the responsibilities delegated to it by the Board.

Annex

Distribution is as follows:

Copy No.

General Walter Bedell Smith

Director of Central Intelligence Agency

William C. Foster

Deputy Secretary of Defense

David K. Bruce

Under Secretary of State

Raymond B. Allen, Director

Psychological Strategy Board

Frank G. Wisner, Deputy Director/Plans

Central Intelligence Agency

[

name not declassified

]

Central Intelligence Agency

Colonel Kilbourne Johnston

Assistant Director, Central Intelligence Agency

Robert P. Joyce, Policy Planning Staff

Department of State

Brigadier General Jesmond D. Balmer

Chief, Joint Subsidiary Plans Division

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Brigadier General John Magruder

Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

for International Security Affairs–Psychological Policy

264 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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C. Tracy Barnes, Deputy Director

Psychological Strategy Board

Palmer Putnam, Special Assistant to the Director

Psychological Strategy Board

Philip H. Watts, Policy Planning Staff

Department of State

109. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Bruce)

to the Executive Secretary of the National Security
Council (Lay)

Washington, May 7, 1952.

SUBJECT

Fourth Progress Report on NSC 59/1, “The Foreign Information Program and
Psychological Warfare Planning”

1. NSC 59/1

was approved as governmental policy on March 10,

1950. It is requested that this progress report, as of April 15, 1952, of
activities undertaken in implementation of NSC 59/1, be circulated to
the members of the Council for their information.

2. The organization referred to in NSC 59/1 has been designated

The Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee (POC). It will
be referred to in this report as “the Committee.”

3. This report describes only those foreign information operations

and plans which, being interdepartmental in nature, were coordinated
through the Committee.

4. Consequent to a reorganization of foreign information activi-

ties within the Department of State, the Chairmanship of the Commit-
tee has been assumed by the Administrator, International Information
Administration. The following are regularly represented at the weekly
meetings of the Committee: Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the Mutual Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, Assistant
Secretary for Public Affairs, Department of State, and the Army, Navy

The Intelligence Community 265

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Miscellaneous Lot Files: Lot 62 D 385, NSC 59,

Box 56. Top Secret; Security Information. Forwarded to NSC members under cover of a
memorandum from Lay, May 7. (Ibid.)

Document 2.

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and Air Force chiefs of psychological warfare and the Psychological
Strategy Board staff.

Troop Acceptability Program

An operational plan for handling psychological problems grow-

ing out of the presence of United States military personnel in Europe,
has been approved by the Committee. The interdepartmental working
group which prepared this plan is now preparing another for dealing
with psychological problems connected with the presence of United
States military personnel in other areas of the world.

Soviet-Dominated Military Personnel

A plan for conducting overt psychological operations vis-à-vis the

armed forces of the Soviet-dominated world was prepared by an in-
terdepartmental working group by direction of the Committee. The
Committee also approved and referred to appropriate operating divi-
sions a number of interdepartmentally-developed propaganda themes
to be used in output directed towards military personnel of the USSR
and its captive countries.

General Assembly

On the Committee’s recommendation qualified information spe-

cialists were obtained from the Department of Defense and another
agency to support the public information staff of the United States Del-
egation to the United Nations General Assembly in Paris in Novem-
ber, 1951. These officers provided valuable assistance to the Delegation
in the conduct of its information operations.

NATO Anniversary

The Committee provided advice and support in the preparation

of interdepartmental plans for a broad program of information activ-
ity of the U.S. and other NATO member countries to commemorate the
third anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in April,
1952. The Committee and its staff participated in arrangements for the
issuance of a special postage stamp commemorating the anniversary.

Television in Propaganda

An interdepartmental working group established by the Commit-

tee has laid the groundwork for interdepartmental cooperation in the
further development of television as a propaganda medium.

10.

Operations Newsletter

A “Psychological Operations Newsletter” is issued monthly by the

Staff. The purpose of the newsletter is to keep appropriate officers of
POC member agencies, both in Washington and in field establishments,
informed of current activities in this field.

266 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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11.

Training Program

In accordance with the Committee’s recommendation, an ex-

panded program of on-the-job training is being conducted in the State
Department for military officers assigned to psychological warfare or-
ganizations. Fourteen officers have completed the six-months course,
or are now following the course.

12.

Project Nobel

The Committee has approved and referred to the International In-

formation Administration in the Department of State, for implementa-
tion, a project designed to associate the living recipients of the Nobel
peace prize with the ideals of the Free World.

13.

Current Activities

Some of the more significant current activities of the Committee

or its staff, in conjunction with the appropriate operating agencies, are
as follows:

a. Considering overt psychological warfare operations plans for

handling Communist charges that UN Forces are using bacteriological
warfare in Korea.

b. Coordination, at the request of the Psychological Strategy

Board, of overt psychological warfare operations plans to exploit the
success or failure of the Korean truce negotiations.

c. Coordinating interdepartmental propaganda activity with re-

spect to the Soviet note of March 10 dealing with a German peace treaty.

d. Review of a proposed statement on Communist sabotage of

peace negotiations in Korea, which could be issued by General Ridg-
way in event of failure of the negotiations.

e. Interdepartmental planning for overt psychological warfare op-

erations following possible outbreak of general war. Known as the “X-
Day Project,” the plans will be forwarded to the Psychological Strat-
egy Board when completed and approved by the Committee.

f. Establishment of liaison arrangements between the Committee

and the Information Liaison Group, a U.S. interdepartmental commit-
tee established in Paris to consider information and propaganda prob-
lems in the European area.

g. Development of overt psychological operations plans to help

maintain continued Yugoslav independence from Soviet domination.

David Bruce

The Intelligence Community 267

Printed from a copy that indicates Bruce signed the original.

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110. Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant

for Intelligence and Research (Armstrong) to Secretary of
State Acheson

Washington, May 9, 1952.

SUBJECT

Progress Report on NSC 50:

The Central Intelligence Agency and National

Organization for Intelligence

The subject report represents General Smith’s account of his stew-

ardship of the Central Intelligence Agency since he assumed office in
October 1950; I believe that you will want to read it in full.

It sets forth

the considerable accomplishments of CIA during this period, the major
problems which remain to be solved and a caveat as to what may be rea-
sonably expected of the U.S. intelligence system, given the efficiency of
the Soviet security organization. I would recommend that you compli-
ment General Smith on the report and on the progress it records, which
in a very large measure is attributable to his personal leadership.

There are three points to which your attention should be drawn

and which may be discussed in connection with the review of this
Progress Report:

Covert Operations.

You will observe that General Smith lays con-

siderable stress on the greatly increased scope of this phase of CIA’s
responsibilities (page 3, paragraph 4), pointing out that in the coming
year the [

2 lines not declassified

]. While it would be undesirable to take

exception to the preview given by General Smith of increased activi-
ties in this field, it would be well to indicate, in connection with this
paragraph of the Progress Report, that the Department, for its part, is
constantly seeking to evaluate the effects of covert CIA operations in
terms of overall U.S. objectives and in the light of changing interna-
tional conditions.

Departmental Information.

General Smith states on page 4 that

arrangements whereby CIA obtains information on the Department’s
planning and policy “are reasonably satisfactory, although there re-
mains room for betterment.” (Similar arrangements with the military
services are described as “somewhat less than satisfactory.”) You

268 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 50 Series.

Top Secret. Concurred in by G, S/P, and C. Transmitted through the Under Secretary
and the Executive Secretariat.

For NSC 50, see

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Es-

tablishment, Document 384.

Document 107.

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should know that since the issuance of NSC 50 on July 1, 1949, the De-
partment has made intensive efforts to make available to CIA all in-
formation believed to be of concern to it. The Secretariat furnishes to
CIA by rapid means a most comprehensive selection of the Depart-
ment’s telegrams, including telegrams of a policy nature. Similar non-
telegraphic materials are furnished through one of my divisions. In ad-
dition, a representative of CIA/OPC has access in Mr. Joyce’s office to
the complete file of messages comparable to your daily “log”, save only
those items deleted by Mr. Joyce. Finally, arrangements have been made
whereby certain highly sensitive materials identified as of interest to
intelligence, such as the record of your recent conversations with the
British Ambassador regarding Indochina, are made available by my of-
fice to the Director of Central Intelligence for highly-limited CIA in-
ternal distribution. In view of the nature of the planning and policy-
making process, and the high degree of security required, it is very
doubtful that intelligence will ever be fully satisfied with the state of
its information in this regard.

On the other hand, you should be aware that the flow of infor-

mation described above is by no means reciprocated by CIA. Planning
and operational data are made available only as CIA determines that
the Department’s interests are affected. Some information of direct con-
cern to the Department is not made available and access to CIA
telegrams, which would provide a check on the adequacy of CIA’s prac-
tices in this regard, is not permitted.

Current Intelligence.

The Department has some reservations on

the discussion in the report of “current intelligence”, to which General
Smith makes brief reference on page 1. The Dulles–Jackson Correa re-
port of January 1949,

on which NSC 50 is based, took exception to the

various current intelligence summaries (daily, weekly, and monthly)
which were then being published by CIA. The Committee questioned
the need for such publications, pointing out that they consisted almost
entirely of summaries of departmental telegrams (90 percent State), in-
cluding both operational and intelligence material. The result, accord-
ing to the Committee, was “a fragmentary publication which deals with
operations as well as intelligence, without necessarily being based on
the most significant materials in either category.” The Committee con-
cluded that (a) “in a summary of this type, circulated to the President
and the highest officials of the Government, there is an inherent dan-
ger that it will be misleading to its consumers”; and (b) it duplicates
at considerable expense of manpower and money, summaries circu-
lated by the Department and other agencies.

The Intelligence Community 269

For a summary of the Dulles Report, see

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence

of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 358.

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The production of these summaries has been improved and it is

our understanding that the President finds them of great value which,
in itself, is reason for a continued effort in their production. The De-
partment, however, still finds many of the same objections that existed
in 1949 and itself finds the summaries of little value. In particular, we
are concerned that the summaries frequently are the vehicle whereby
foreign policy problems, with CIA comment, are brought to the atten-
tion of high officials of other agencies and the President, during the
period when policy recommendations are being formulated and before
the Department is prepared to suggest courses of action. We believe
that with due regard for timeliness the provision of certain current in-
telligence to the President and to the operating agencies of the Gov-
ernment could and should be based on the same principles of contri-
bution and coordination among the agencies as is now effected with
respect to National Intelligence Estimates.

Recommendations:

1. That you warmly commend General Smith on this report and

on the leadership he has brought to the Intelligence community.

2. That you state, with reference to CIA covert operations, that the

Department, for its part, is constantly seeking to evaluate the effects of
covert CIA operations in terms of over-all U.S. objectives and in the
light of changing international conditions.

3. That, if the question is raised regarding the furnishing to CIA

of information from the Department, you invite General Smith to sug-
gest ways in which the existing liaison could be improved, bearing in
mind that (a) his principal problem appears to be with the Pentagon
and (b) the flow of information from CIA likewise leaves something to
be desired.

4. That, if the question is raised regarding current intelligence, you

indicate that, while you recognize such publications are necessary and
appropriate for the President, you believe they would serve a more
useful purpose if the principles of contribution and coordination which
apply to National Intelligence were applied insofar as possible to cur-
rent intelligence.

W. Park Armstrong, Jr.

270 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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111.

Memorandum From Robert P. Joyce of the Policy Planning
Staff to the Under Secretary of State (Bruce)

Washington, May 22, 1952.

SUBJECT

Magnitude of CIA Operations

It occurred to me that you might be interested in some sort of re-

capitulation of the points brought out in the meeting in your office yes-
terday afternoon in connection with today’s meeting of the PSB. There
are one or two new elements in the situation that came out of the reg-
ular Wednesday meeting of the 10/2 Consultants yesterday afternoon.
(I did not attend this meeting myself but my representative, William A.
McFadden, reported to me this morning.) The two new elements are:

1. Assistant Director of CIA for OPC, Colonel Johnston, stated that

if the PSB tomorrow (today) generally bought the CIA “Packet”,

OPC

would consider that it had finally obtained a charter which would per-
mit it to expand in a large way and start creating on a world-wide ba-
sis an impressive covert apparatus necessary to accomplish the re-
quirements laid upon OPC of CIA. Colonel Johnston indicated that
favorable action today by the PSB would have CIA budgetary signifi-
cance as well. The implication of this is that the CIA could move
forward to obtain the vast amount specified in the “Packet”.

2. General Balmer of the Joint Strategic Plans Division advised at

the meeting yesterday that the JCS had finally approved the OPC “war
plan”

and would communicate such approval with its comments

within about one week.

In connection with paragraph one above, there is quoted an ex-

cerpt from a memorandum presented to the Senior Staff of the NSC on
June 8, 1951 by Frank G. Wisner:

“Unless the decision is made now to provide the resources and

apparatus capable of undertaking covert operations of this magnitude,

the United States will not be in a position to conduct such covert

activities as national policy may require. Therefore, failure to reach a

decision at this time is in effect a decision

not

to proceed with the

The Intelligence Community 271

Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files: NSC 10 Series, 1952. Top Se-

cret; Security Information. Drafted by Joyce. Copy 1 of 6. A handwritten note on mem-
orandum reads “Copies 3, 4 and 5, sent to, seen by & returned by, Nitze, Sargeant and
Armstrong—destroyed on 9.11.53.” All elipses in the original.

See footnote 7, Document 107.

Document 61.

Not found.

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build-up required to implement current national policy as expressed

in NSC 68 and other applicable NSC directives”.

I think you might desire to keep in mind the following consider-

ations at the PSB meeting this afternoon:

a. Paragraph 5 of NSC 10/2 of June 18, 1948

states: “As used in

this directive ‘covert operations’ are understood to be all activities (ex-
cept as noted herein) which are conducted or sponsored by this Gov-
ernment against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of
friendly states or groups but which are so planned and executed that
the United States Government responsibility for them is not evident to
unauthorized persons and if uncovered the United States Government
can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them. . . .” The question
might reasonably be asked General Smith if present plans to create a
very large “covert apparatus” can possibly meet the requirements of
the foregoing provisions of NSC 10/2. Will not large CIA bases on a
world-wide scale soon be recognized for what they are? Will it not be
impossible under these circumstances for this Government plausibly
to disclaim any responsibility?

b. Although NSC 10/2 authorizes OPC “in coordination with the

JCS to plan and prepare for the conduct of such operations in wartime”,
will not in fact the establishment of large bases for training guerrilla
warriors and for staging air drops behind the lines in case of war, etc.,
have important political repercussions in peacetime?

c. If the CIA proceeds to establish such large and necessarily at

least semi-overt bases throughout the world, all in the line of prepa-
rations for a hot war, will not the impression be created in the Krem-
lin that this Government is busily preparing to attack the Soviet Union?
Will not the Russians point to these large and populous bases as evi-
dence to support their thesis that the United States intends to unleash
a global war against the motherland of the workers? Will not our al-
lies in the West react unfavorably and themselves be fearful that the
United States is in fact preparing perhaps not to bring about a war but
at least engaging in provocative action which might inspire reaction
from the East leading to increasing danger of war?

d. Does General Smith himself think that he can create a huge

“covert apparatus” on a world-wide basis which has any chance what-
ever of maintaining its covert nature?

e. How effective does General Smith consider the retardation plan

would be in case of a hot war? Does problematical assistance to the
military effort in case of a hot war over-balance the moral and psy-
chological factors referred to in the previous paragraphs?

272 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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For NSC 10/2, see

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Es-

tablishment, Document 292.

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f. By generally approving of the “Packet” does the Department of

State endorse in a blanket fashion JCS and CIA plans for preparing for
a hot war?

g. Is it a fact, as we understood General Smith to believe a year

ago, that CIA planning for a hot war de-emphasizes and limits the ef-
fectiveness of CIA as an intelligence agency and an agency designed
to operate covertly in the field of political warfare for the ultimate ob-
jective of achieving cold war objectives thus lessening the chances of
and perhaps preventing the outbreak of all-out warfare?

I believe that these questions trouble us here in the State Depart-

ment. You may care to recommend that some of these considerations
should be studied by the 10/5 Panel before it recommends to the PSB
that the CIA “Packet” should at this time be generally approved.

Robert P. Joyce

112. Letter From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant for

Intelligence and Research (Armstrong) to Director of Central
Intelligence Smith

Washington, June 3, 1952.

Dear General Smith:

As you know, National Security Council Intelligence Directive No.

places upon the Department of State primary responsibility for the

collection abroad, by overt means, of information in the basic sciences.
The Department, under this directive, has additional secondary re-
sponsibilities for collection in other scientific and technical fields.

On a limited scale, the Department has, during the past two years,

endeavored to meet these responsibilities. The experience gained dur-
ing this period of time has confirmed the importance of several factors
in the collection of scientific information:

a. Except in the case of the USSR and its satellites (including China),

the traditional and normal channels of intercommunication between US
and foreign scientists are capable of furnishing a large portion of the

The Intelligence Community 273

Source: National Archives, RG 59, INR Files: Lot 58 D 776, Atomic Energy. Secret;

Security Information. Drafted by Theodore M. Nordbeck on May 29.

For NSCID No. 10, see

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence

Establishment, Document 429.

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information required for intelligence purposes. The normal channels com-
prise interchange of published works and scientific periodicals, recipro-
cal visits and attendance at international meetings and conferences.

b. In the case of the USSR and satellites, the limited information

available through normal channels can be effectively supplemented
only by carefully planned covert activities.

c. In the case of non-Soviet areas, the information which is needed

to supplement that received through the normal and traditional chan-
nels mentioned above principally relates either to a specific field of sci-
entific effort and to research which has not yet reached the publication
stage, or to an overall evaluation of scientific potential in one or more
broad fields.

d. The types of information mentioned in (c) above can be ac-

quired most efficiently and economically through overt means, pro-
vided the following factors are kept in mind:

1. The use of relatively young or scientifically unknown individ-

uals will, in most cases, not only be ineffective, but may tend to dry

up even the normal channels of intercommunication. Profitable con-

tact with foreign scientists can usually be expected only where there is

a reasonable quid pro quo, that is, when the US scientist is a qualified

leader in a given field, and when the basis of the contact is a legitimate

exchange of scientific ideas and experiences. Relatively unknown in-

dividuals who only ask questions quickly arouse resentment and re-

luctance, since it is obvious that their principal purpose is to extract in-

formation, giving nothing in return.

2. Every effort must be made to keep the collection of basic scien-

tific information removed from the taint of intelligence. Infraction of

this principle may not only hinder the overt operation, but may jeop-

ardize contacts and sources essential to the success of covert operations.

3. The degree to which a US scientist can be successful in collect-

ing information on a specific or general scientific field depends upon

his own ability and competence in that field rather than upon any de-

tailed briefing by intelligence.

The Department is keenly aware of the importance of carrying out

its responsibilities under NSCID–10, and desires to expand its current
activities in this respect. The following steps should be taken in this
direction, some of which can be accomplished within the Department’s
present resources; others will require additional support.

a. The Department can collect the bulk of basic scientific material

available in published form which CIA requires.

b. The existing scientific attachés can undertake to collect specific

additional information which CIA may require within their individual
fields of competence.

c. With appropriate financial assistance, known and competent

specialists can be selected and sent overseas for limited periods of two
to three months to cover specific fields of science on a strictly overt ba-

274 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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sis. These consultants would function in the same manner as normal
science attachés, and would make their reports to the office of the Sci-
ence Advisor, Department of State. They would have no direct con-
nection with CIA in any way.

d. The office of the Science Advisor, with additional staffing as-

sistance, could undertake a more extensive program of debriefing sci-
entists and engineers who have visited foreign areas under private
sponsorship. The use of this office, which while it has no apparent con-
nection with intelligence, is directly and openly concerned with sci-
ence, will in many cases be more fruitful than debriefing by the intel-
ligence agencies themselves.

e. With adequate financial assistance the Department can increase

the competence and scope of coverage of US representation to inter-
national scientific conferences and congresses abroad. It is believed that
such meetings are extremely profitable occasions for the interchange
of scientific information and ideas, particularly in acquiring prepubli-
cation knowledge of work in progress.

In accordance with paragraphs 1,d and 1,f of NSCID–10, the above

views and suggestions are submitted to the Central Intelligence Agency
for consideration, both as to their validity, and as a basis for further dis-
cussion as to the degree of support to the overt scientific collection ac-
tivities of the Department which might be appropriate and justifiable.

Sincerely yours,

W. Park Armstrong, Jr.

Printed from a copy that indicates Armstrong signed the original.

113. Memorandum by the Director of Naval Intelligence

(Johnson)

ONI Instruction 003820.36A

Washington, June 3, 1952.

SUBJECT

Exploitation of maritime sources for intelligence purposes

The Intelligence Community 275

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 95–G00278R, Box 1,

Folder 17. Secret; Security Information. The memorandum was sent to “Distribution List
F28 (less DIC–17ND),” which has not been identified.

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Purpose.

This instruction outlines an agreement between the Of-

fice of Naval Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Agency con-
cerning the exploitation of maritime sources for intelligence purposes.

Cancellation.

ONI Instruction 003820.36

is cancelled and su-

perseded by this instruction.

Background.

The National Security Council places the responsi-

bility for the collection of foreign intelligence from domestic sources
with the Central Intelligence Agency. Because of the extensive naval
interest in maritime matters, and the capabilities of the DIOs in ex-
ploiting this field, a mutually satisfactory agreement has been reached
by ONI and CIA.

Procedure.

Counter-Intelligence and Security.

The exploitation of maritime

Sources, including but not limited to, masters, officers, crews, opera-
tors, owners and agents for counter-intelligence and security purposes,
is the responsibility of the District Intelligence Officers without prior
clearance or coordination with CIA.

Foreign Intelligence, Owners, Operators and Agents.

Exploitation

of owners, operators and agents for the purposes of foreign intelligence
is the primary responsibility of CIA. If deemed advisable however, and
subject to prior coordination with the CIA field office, these sources
may be exploited for foreign intelligence purposes by the DIOs. Such
interviews will be arranged, and at his option participated in, by the
cognizant field representative of CIA. Primary responsibility of the CIA
in this field does not restrict or affect in any way the responsibility of
the DIOs under paragraph 4a of this instruction.

Foreign Intelligence, Masters, Officers and Crews.

The exploitation

of masters, officers and crews of merchant vessels for foreign intelli-
gence purposes is the responsibility of the DIOs. Direct access by CIA
to such sources, in exceptional cases, is not precluded by this agree-
ment; however such special interviews will be arranged by the DIOs.

d. Dissemination.

(1)

Foreign Positive Intelligence.

Foreign positive intelligence ob-

tained by DIOs from maritime sources, either afloat or ashore, shall be

made available to the CIA field office for ultimate appropriate dis-

semination by CIA in Washington. The DIOs shall simultaneously sub-

mit reports of such intelligence to ONI for dissemination within the

Naval establishment. Every effort will be made to secure duplicate

copies of enclosures, in order that the CIA field office and the DIO may

276 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Known as the “Salt Water Agreement.”

Not found.

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each forward a copy to Washington. In the event that only a single copy

of enclosures is available, and reproduction is impracticable, they shall

be forwarded to CIA.

(2)

Counter-Intelligence.

All counter intelligence and information

secured under the SOMM plan

will be forwarded to ONI for analysis

and dissemination. No lateral distribution of such reports will be made

to CIA field offices by the DIOs.

Sources.

(1)

Counter-Intelligence.

The names of counter-intelligence inform-

ants shall not be disclosed to CIA.

(2)

Foreign Intelligence Sources.

The names of sources furnishing

foreign intelligence exclusively, whether connected with the maritime

field or not, will be furnished to CIA field offices.

(3)

Overlapping Sources.

It is considered probable that some mar-

itime sources, as listed in paragraph 4c of this instruction, will also be

classified by the DIOs as counter-intelligence informants or SOMM

plan participants. The release of names of such sources to the CIA field

office is subject to the discretion of the DIO. Sufficient source descrip-

tion will be furnished the CIA field office to obviate false confirmation,

but extreme care is urged in such disclosure that sensitive sources sup-

plying both types of information are not jeopardized.

Requirements.

IAC requirements for foreign intelligence from

sources in paragraph 4c of this instruction will be coordinated by CIA,
as necessary. General Navy requirements covering the exploitation of
these sources are presently in the hands of the DIOs, and further spe-
cific requirements will be furnished from time to time by ONI. DIOs
will make every effort to alert the pertinent CIA field office to the ar-
rival of ships from high priority areas, or of unusual foreign intelli-
gence potential. In such cases a CIA representative may furnish inter-
agency requirements or participate in the interview if necessary.

DIO–CIA Field Office Relationship.

It is manifestly impossible to

exactly delimit all rights, responsibilities or privileges under an inter-
agency agreement, such as this one, developed within the framework
of NSCID No. 7.

It is possible, however, to fashion such an agreement

into an effective instrument for the complete intelligence exploitation
of the maritime field. The catalyst required is an amicable working re-
lationship between the DIOs and the CIA field offices, which can only
be based upon a sympathetic understanding of each other’s problems
and a desire to cooperate in a common effort. District Intelligence
Officers are directed to make every effort consistent with existing

The Intelligence Community 277

Not further identified.

See

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment,

Document 427.

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directives to formulate such a working relationship at the earliest mo-
ment, and resolve such local problems as arise in connection with this
agreement.

R. F. Stout

Printed from a copy that bears the typed signature of Deputy Director of Naval

Intelligence Stout who signed for Johnson.

114. Editorial Note

NSC 114/3, “United States Programs for National Security,” June

5, 1952, included Summary Statement No. 7—Foreign Intelligence and
Related Activities, prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency. For text
of Summary Statement No. 7, see

Foreign Relations,

1952–1954, volume

II, Part 1, pages 50–53.

115. Minutes of a Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory

Committee

IAC–M–73

Washington, June 5, 1952.

Director of Central Intelligence

General Walter Bedell Smith

Presiding*

Deputy Director (Intelligence)

Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. Loftus E. Becker

Presiding*

278 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Community Management Staff, Job

82–00400R, Box 1. Secret; Security Information. The meeting was held in the DCI’s con-
ference room.

Asterisks refer to footnote in the original minutes reading, “For part of the

meeting.”

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MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State
Brigadier General John Weckerling, acting for Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2,

Department of the Army

Rear Admiral Felix L. Johnson, Director of Naval Intelligence, Department

of the Navy

Colonel Edward H. Porter, acting for Director of Intelligence, Headquarters,

United States Air Force

*Dr. Malcolm C. Henderson, acting for Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy

Commission

Brigadier General Richard C. Partridge, Deputy Director for Intelligence,

The Joint Staff

Mr. Victor P. Keay, acting for Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of

Investigation

ALSO PRESENT

Dr. Sherman Kent, Central Intelligence Agency
*Mr. Robert Amory, Jr., Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Ralph Clark, Central Intelligence Agency
*Mr. R. J. Sontag, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Paul Borel, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Ludwell L. Montague, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Edgar Hoover, Central Intelligence Agency
*Mr. William P. Bundy, Central Intelligence Agency
*Mr. Chester Cooper, Central Intelligence Agency
*Mr. Harold Ford, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Richard Drain, Central Intelligence Agency
*Mr. [

name not declassified

], Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. William C. Trueheart, Department of State
Mr. R. M. Scammon, Department of State
Mr. Mose L. Harvey, Department of State
Mr. Joseph A. Yeager, Department of State
Colonel O. B. Sykes, Department of the Army
Lieut. Colonel H. N. Maples, Department of the Army
Captain Ray Malpass, USN, Department of the Navy
Colonel Charles F. Gillis, Department of the Air Force
Colonel S. M. Lansing, The Joint Staff
Colonel John D. Tolman, The Joint Staff

James Q. Reber

Secretary

Approval of Minutes

Action:

The minutes of the last meeting, 29 May 1952,

(IAC–M–72) were approved.

The Intelligence Community 279

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

IAC minutes are in Central Intelligence Agency, Community Management Staff

Job 82–00400R, Box 1.

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RDB Request for Intelligence Estimate of Soviet Scientific and

Technological Capabilities (IAC–D–51)

Action:

Agreed that the RDB request would be met by the JIC

if this proved to be within the latter’s capability. In this event it was
understood that the JIC would arrange for the RDB promptly to with-
draw their request on the DCI.

Discussion:

It was pointed out that the JIC had a study now in

progress (JIC 603/1)

which was along the lines of the RDB request. It

was thought probable that with some adaptation this study would sat-
isfy the RDB request and also serve as a scientific and technological con-
tribution for NIE–65.

General Smith stated that a component of the De-

fense Department, such as RDB, should, where possible, get its
intelligence support from the military intelligence agencies. The DCI sat-
isfies the intelligence requirements of the NSC and, although willing to
satisfy a need of such organizations as RDB, if practicable, will be glad
to have such needs satisfied elsewhere. In response to a question Gen-
eral Smith agreed that CIA components would be willing to give infor-
mal assistance to the military analysts, to the extent that was practica-
ble in the light of their other duties, but made it clear that CIA does not
participate in JIC estimates and assumes no responsibility therefor. If it
should develop that the JIC could not without outside contributions meet
the RDB need and the RDB request is not withdrawn, then the DCI stated
he would expect to try to satisfy the request on a community basis.

[Omitted here is discussion of other subjects.]

280 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Not found.

NIE 65, “Soviet Bloc Capabilities Through 1957,” approved June 16, 1953. (Na-

tional Archives, RG 263, Central Intelligence Agency Files)

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116. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National

Security Council (Lay) to the National Security Council

Washington, June 12, 1952.

SUBJECT

Organized and Coordinated Program of Covert Preclusive Buying

REFERENCES

A. Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated

February 11, 1952

B. NSC 104/2, pars. 11 and 12

C. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject, “Assignment of

Responsibilities for Economic Defense,” dated November 7, 1951
and January 25, 1952

Pursuant to Reference A, the Senior NSC Staff requested the Eco-

nomic Defense Advisory Committee (formerly the Mutual Trade Security
Advisory Committee) to prepare a study of the desirability and feasibil-
ity of the initiation of a preclusive buying program. The enclosed report

was prepared by the Economic Defense Advisory Committee in response
to this request; was submitted through the Department of State; and was
discussed by the Senior NSC Staff which concurred in it with amend-
ments incorporated therein. The Senior NSC Staff considered that the rec-
ommendations in paragraph 10 of the enclosure are in accordance with
existing policy contained in NSC 104/2, and that action by the National
Security Council on these recommendations is, therefore, not required.

In the light of the above, the Secretary of State, pursuant to Ref-

erence C, is directing the implementation of the recommendations con-
tained in the enclosure through the Economic Defense Advisory Com-
mittee. The enclosed report is accordingly circulated herewith for the
information of the National Security Council to indicate the action
which is being taken on the basis of the memorandum of the Chair-
man, National Security Resources Board, in Reference A.

James S. Lay, Jr.

The Intelligence Community 281

Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s Secretary’s Files.

Secret; Security Information. Copies were sent to the Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary
of Commerce, Acting Director of Defense Mobilization, and the Director of the Bureau
of the Budget.

Not printed. (Ibid.)

For NSC 104/2, see

Foreign Relations,

1951, vol. I, pp. 1059–1064.

The November 7, 1951, memorandum circulated to the National Security Coun-

cil a November 6 memorandum on the subject from President Truman, which is printed
ibid., p. 1214. The January 25 memorandum is in National Archives, RG 59, Central Files
1950–54, 460.509/1–2552.

Not printed.

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117. Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 4/2 (Revised)

Washington, June 12, 1952.

PRIORITY LIST OF CRITICAL NATIONAL

INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES

In accordance with DCI 4/1,

paragraph 3, the following list in or-

der of priority of critical national intelligence objectives, with respect
to the USSR and its Satellites (including Communist China) is estab-
lished; so the highest priority shall be given to the collection of infor-
mation and to the production of intelligence concerning Soviet and
Satellite capabilities and intentions for:

1. taking direct military action against the Continental United

States;

2. taking direct military action, employing USSR and Satellite

Armed Forces, against vital U.S. possessions, areas peripheral to the
Soviet Orbit, and Western Europe;

3. interfering with U.S. strategic air attack;
4. interfering with U.S. movement of men and material by water

transport;

5. production and stockpiling, including location of installations

and facilities, of atomic and related weapons, other critical weapons
and equipment, and critical transportation equipment;

6. creating situations anywhere in the world dangerous to U.S. na-

tional security, short of commitment of Soviet and Satellite Armed
Forces, including foreign directed sabotage and espionage objectives;

7. interfering with U.S. political, psychological, and economic

courses of action for the achievement of critical U.S. aims and objectives.

Walter B. Smith

Director of Central Intelligence

282 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Operations, Job 78–04513R,

Box 1. Secret; Security Information.

Not printed. (Ibid., History Staff Job 84–T00389R, HS/HC–600, Box 4)

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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118. Letter From the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Kennan) to

the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)

Moscow, June 18, 1952.

Dear Doc:

I propose in this letter to speak about matters of such delicacy that

I want you to know before you get into it that it is a letter of which I
am keeping no copy, and one which you will probably wish to destroy
as soon as you have read it.

Since my arrival in Moscow I have become increasingly aware of

a situation which not only gives me great concern but which seems to
involve a very important question of principle concerning the attitude
of our Government as a whole toward this mission and the functions
which it is supposed to perform. I am prepared to go ahead and de-
cide these questions on my own formal responsibility here, but in do-
ing so I wish to make sure that the situation is clearly understood in
Washington and that my decision here is in accord with the view of
authoritative circles in our Government. It is for this reason that I am
mentioning the matter to you.

I find upon arrival here and upon closer acquaintance with the ac-

tivities of the staff that during the past two or three years this mis-
sion—and by that I mean its personnel, premises and extraterritorial
status—has been intensively and somewhat recklessly exploited by the
military intelligence-gathering agencies of the Government for their
particular purposes. Their representatives here have, I am afraid, been
encouraged by their home offices to utilize intensively such facilities
as they enjoy here by virtue of their diplomatic status, for the purpose
of assembling every possible shred of information on military subjects.
I do not find that their instructions have called upon them to take ad-
equate account of the effects their actions might have on the straight
political and diplomatic potential of the mission, or on those very priv-
ileges and facilities from which they were profiting. So far as I can an-
alyze the point of view which lies behind these activities, it is one which
has not considered the diplomatic potential of this mission as a factor
to be seriously taken into account, and which assumes the very exis-
tence of the mission as a short term provisorium, to be ruthlessly and
intensively exploited while it lasts.

The Intelligence Community 283

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–54, 120.32161/6–1852. Top

Secret.

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I would like to be able to list for you a number of the factual in-

cidents which lead me to make these observations. Actually, I cannot
bring myself to put them on paper for obvious reasons. I can only say
the following about them:

1. Many of them are quite shocking and surprising, almost in-

credible to anyone who has had any extensive familiarity with the
diplomatic profession.

2. In several instances little or no effort has been made to avoid

detection by the Soviet authorities. In certain instances actions have
been performed here under the very lenses of Soviet photographers
appointed for the purpose of photographing them, and those actions
were ones which the Soviet Government had specifically warned us
were contrary to local law.

3. Many of these actions seem to me to have been of a childish

and “Boy Scout” nature, which, in addition to serving as proof to the
Soviet Government of systematic misuse of our diplomatic status, must
have brought smiles to the faces of higher Soviet authorities and can-
not have contributed to Soviet respect for the mission.

4. Many of the targets are ones which I think could easily have

been reached by other and less dangerous methods.

5. In general, these activities have been the result not of sponta-

neous initiative on the part of the men out here, but of pressures put
upon them by their own superiors in Washington.

These activities have had and are having three effects which I think

it is important for our Government to note:

1. They are self-defeating in that they lead to a steady and grad-

ual curtailment of the very facilities which they exploit.

I have no doubt whatsoever that the curtailment of travel for this

mission represents a reaction of the Soviet authorities to the extensive ex-
ploitation of travel facilities by this and other missions for purposes which
cannot be viewed by them as legitimate. The same is true of the drastic
and total isolation of the diplomatic corps here, including even neutral
missions, from contact with the Soviet people. These things have proba-
bly had a good deal to do with the extraordinary pressures put on the
servant and custodial staffs of diplomatic missions. If they are continued,
we must expect a steady increase in the severity of these restrictions to a
point where life will become practically impossible for foreigners in this
city unless they wish to sit like prisoners within their buildings and be
served by imported servants. The upshot of this is that activities of this
nature must be predicated upon a lack of concern for maintenance of
those very facilities whose existence they assume and exploit.

2. These activities have a deleterious effect on the actual diplo-

matic potential of the mission, i.e., of its value as a political reporting

284 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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unit and a channel of communication with the Soviet Government, and
have already probably reduced its possibilities significantly in these
fields.

What has been said above about the exhaustion of these channels

for intelligence purposes has its application in even greater degree to
the normal purposes that these facilities were supposed to serve. With
the increasing isolation of the diplomatic corps, the curtailment of
travel facilities, and the constant increase in Soviet vigilance vis-à-vis
foreigners, you have the ruin of those last vestigial positions which
made possible, even in a minor way, something resembling normal life
and travel in this country. Not only that, but one cannot help feeling
that the attitude of members of the Soviet Government and officials of
the Foreign Office toward individual diplomatic officers of our mission
must be affected by what they know of the uses to which the mission
is daily being put. This applies particularly to the ambassador here, for
the Soviet authorities can only conclude either that he is aware of and
responsible for this employment of his mission, or that he is not aware
of it or is powerless to stop it. In the first case, they must regard him
as the major offender. In either of the latter cases they must regard him
as a secondary figure-head who is only being put up for formal and
protocol purposes like their own ambassadors abroad. I hardly need
emphasize to you how serious a factor this is. In the end, the great po-
litical judgments about the nature of Soviet power, its psychology and
its intentions, are of vastly greater importance to our Government than
detailed tidbits of tactical information about the Soviet armed forces,
much of which can be obtained in other places of (if really well-trained
people are used) by other and more desirable methods. Yet we are se-
riously handicapped, in our ability to arrive at these major judgments,
by the retaliatory actions brought upon us by these peripheral activi-
ties of the mission. Furthermore, the maintenance of the mission as a
channel of communication with the Soviet Government is something
which may be rarely of practical importance but when the moment
does come that it is of any value at all, then its importance can be enor-
mous. In the burdening and reduction of the ambassadorial position
by the tolerance of these activities our Government is really taking a
heavy responsibility in the face of the uncertainties of the future.

3. The continuance of this type of activity actually places in jeop-

ardy, in my opinion, the physical security of the members of the mis-
sion and their families.

Thus far the Soviet authorities have been very correct in this re-

spect, and no American official or employee has, in recent years, suf-
fered (to my knowledge) any physical damage or open unpleasantness.
However, we know very well that the Soviet authorities are assembling
a careful, and, I fear, impressive record of all of our activities. The Grow

The Intelligence Community 285

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diary is only a small part, I am sure, of what they have in their pocket.
We also know that in the more remote past there have been instances
when unwise Americans met with physical violence, judicial sum-
monses and other forms of unpleasantness. We must remember that our
American employees here—and by this I mean all those persons not on
the diplomatic list—are by Soviet usage completely devoid of diplo-
matic immunity for any violations of Soviet law. We have not seen fit
to challenge seriously this position of the Soviet authorities. That means
that these people are all extremely vulnerable and can in most instances
very easily be framed and made subject to court action at any time.

Finally, you have the several possibilities that out of the present

delicate international situation there might arise either a rupture of re-
lations between our countries or an actual state of war. In either of these
events, I think it entirely possible, if not likely, that individual mem-
bers of our staff, and perhaps the whole staff might suffer seriously by
virtue of these activities that have been conducted in the past. Our Gov-
ernment must therefore realize that if it wishes such activities to be
continued at this post, it cannot hold the ambassador and other offi-
cers of the mission responsible for the maximum safety of members of
the staff in the face of possible consequences that may ensue.

I am aware that this is hardly a matter on which direct written in-

structions can be issued to this mission, and not even one about which
there can be official correspondence. I do not wish to place the Gov-
ernment in the position of having to give me any written instructions
of an undesirable nature. I am therefore writing this letter to tell you,
first of all, that I propose to issue orders to all members of this mission
that they are expected to comply strictly with Soviet laws and regula-
tions so far as they are known, and also they are to avoid every form
of public behavior which might be expected to give the impression to
local citizens and officials that they are engaged in improper activities.
This applies particularly to the use of cameras, radio receiving sets, and
other electrical and auditory devices, and to the visiting or inspection
of installations or areas of a known military significance. I have already
discussed these matters with the service attachés, who have taken my
observations in good part. But one of them points out that this will
mean important modifications in his policies and activities, and that
these modifications are not apt to be agreeable to his home office.

Secondly, I would like to ask that you call to the attention of the

heads of the various intelligence-gathering agencies the fact that this
is my intention, and that you ascertain whether any of them is in dis-
agreement with this position and considers that it is, on balance, detri-
mental to United States interests.

Thirdly, in case there is this feeling on the part of any of the re-

sponsible heads of the agencies involved, I would earnestly request

286 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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that you have this matter taken to a high interdepartmental agency for
thorough discussion and settlement.

Fourth, if my proposed position here meets with the full under-

standing and approval of the Government—so that I need not feel that
any subsequent reproach will rest upon me or this mission for its con-
duct in this matter—then I will expect no reply of any sort to this com-
munication, and I will understand that silence means consent.

Fifth, if, on the other hand, it is the considered view of the ap-

propriate higher authorities of our Government that the practices I have
in mind are of an importance such as to override the disadvantages to
which I have pointed, and if, therefore, it is the desire of the Govern-
ment that I not alter any of the existing practices, then I would appre-
ciate it if you could find means simply to inform me that my letter of
this date has been duly considered but that the Government sees no
grounds for alteration of existing practices. In such case, however, I
want it clearly understood, both by the Secretary and the President,
that I cannot properly be held responsible for such deterioration as may
ensue in the value of this mission both as an observation post and as
a channel of communication with the Soviet Government, or for any
other unhappy consequences.

I am sorry to have to write this letter, but if you will put yourself

in my place you will see that I have no choice but to do so. I cannot
allow to proceed a progressive deterioration in the actual diplomatic
potential of a mission entrusted to my care, on a vague assumption
that this is what the Government wants. On the other hand, I cannot,
without at least apprising the Government of what I am doing and giv-
ing it an opportunity to overrule me, take administrative measures here
which might later conceivably lead to my being charged with having
deprived the United States Government of valuable information, and
prejudiced the military interests of the country.

Very sincerely yours,

George F. Kennan

The Intelligence Community 287

On July 7, Fisher Howe, Deputy Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for In-

telligence and Research, sent a note to Matthews and followed up with a letter on July
15 informing him that the Services were asking for copies of Kennan's letter. Howe sug-
gested that the Department obtain Kennan's agreement to show it to them. (Ibid.) In a
July 22 memorandum, Howe stated that Matthews agreed, Kennan was queried and
agreed, and that he and Walworth Barbour discussed it with senior representatives of
the Services. All said they had no serious objection to Kennan's proposals. (Ibid.) Ac-
cording to a handwritten note by Howe on the July 22 memorandum, Matthews sent a
letter to Kennan to this effect, but Matthews' letter has not been found.

Printed from a copy that indicates Kennan signed the original.

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119. Memorandum From President Truman to the Chairman of

the Psychological Strategy Board (Smith)

Washington, June 21, 1952.

SUBJECT

Organization of Psychological Strategy Board

I have been giving consideration to the organization of the Psy-

chological Strategy Board and particularly to the question of whether
the directive of April 4, 1951,

establishing it should be amended. In

addition to the recommendations of the Board’s first Director and the
recommendations of the Board included in your useful and construc-
tive memorandum of May 16,

I have had the report of a study un-

dertaken at my direction by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget.

It is my view that, as you recommend, no change in the directive

of April 4, 1951, or in the organization of the Board should be made at
this time. The Board’s decision to rotate the chairmanship, with the Di-
rector taking his turn as presiding officer is consistent with the intent
of the directive of April 4, 1951.

Adjustments in the relationships of the Director with the National

Security Council and of the Board with the Joint Chiefs of Staff rec-
ommended in your memorandum similarly can be made within the
framework of the existing directive and are consistent with it. I shall
speak with the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council
relative to the former. Appropriate representation of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff with the Board can be arranged by the Secretary of Defense.

I believe that it would be helpful to me if the Board could suggest

occasions when I might become more directly informed of its work,
particularly of its evaluation of the national psychological effort,
through a meeting with the Board, the Director and the Executive Sec-
retary of the National Security Council.

I am transmitting the report of the Director of the Bureau of the

Budget on the organization of the Psychological Strategy Board for
study and appropriate action by the Board.

The report emphasizes the

The Intelligence Community 289

Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Confidential File. Top Secret,

Security Information. A June 13 memorandum from Bureau of the Budget Director F. J.
Lawton to President Truman indicates that the proposed memorandum to Smith had
been discussed with Souers, Lay, and Smith, and that all were in agreement with it. (Ibid.)

See Document 60.

Not printed. (Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Confidential File)

Attached but not printed is the April 21 report entitled “The Psychological Strat-

egy Board: Selected Aspects of Its Concept, Organization and Operations.”

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primary usefulness of the Board as an instrument for more effective
planning through the organized utilization of the resources of the par-
ticipating agencies. The report further stresses the need for increased
emphasis upon the Board’s responsibilities for forward planning and
in the evaluation of the total national psychological effort. I particu-
larly commend these sections of the report to the attention of the Board.

Harry S. Truman

Printed from a copy that indicates Truman signed the original.

120. Memorandum From the Assistant Director of National

Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency (Kent) to the
Deputy Director of Intelligence of the Central Intelligence
Agency (Becker)

Washington, July 1, 1952.

SUBJECT

The Problem of Scientific and Technical Intelligence

1. Herewith some thoughts on the problem of scientific and tech-

nical intelligence which are pretty close to convictions with me.

2. Without in any way trying to derogate the importance and the

extraordinary difficulty of your administrative problems, let me repeat
that had O/NE not had the assistance of O/SI in drafting the text of
SIE–5,

that estimate would have been a quite different and far, far less

useful document. In fact, it is my belief that without O/SI’s interpre-
tation of the evidence and with no corrective for service interpretation
of the evidence, C/NE could have done nothing but accept the serv-
ice interpretation which in the light of what I learned from O/SI would
have been an over-reassuring one.

290 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

320-672/B428-S/11008

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff Job 84–00022R, Box 3, Folder

12. Secret.

Reference is presumably to NIE–5, “The Scale and Nature of the Soviet Air Defense

Effort, 1952–54,” December 3, 1951. (Ibid., National Intelligence Council, Job 79–S01011A,
Box 2, Folder 1)

1363_A21-A24.qxd 9/28/07 9:31 AM Page 290

3. Obviously this is for your private eye and just as obviously if I

give it any further circulation it will be to Washington Platt on an “Eyes
Only” basis.

Sherman Kent

Attachment

Some Thoughts on the Problem of Scientific and

Technical Intelligence

1. In any country’s security system there are elements upon which

the country in question places great store. These are truly its secrets of
security.

2. Generally speaking these secrets of security if they are not in

themselves scientific and technical at least rest on scientific and tech-
nological developments. Ask yourself: Knowledge of what twenty US
secrets of security would I be most concerned to keep from the USSR?
How many of the twenty really lie outside the scientific/technical area?

3. The importance which a country attaches to any of these ele-

ments in its security system is an index of that country’s desire to keep
them secret from all outsiders. Thus the more important they are the
more difficult they become as intelligence targets.

4. The security measures in operation in the USSR have been pe-

culiarly successful in the scientific/technical areas. It would be my
guess that in no part of our knowledge of Soviet secrets of security is
the ratio of fixed points to voids so large. In the matter of the gadgets
around which Soviet air defense capabilities are built, the paucity of
fixed points is dramatic in the extreme.

5. In the last analysis the mission of intelligence is to draw the

meaningful and objective generalization from the data.

a. If the data, or fixed points, are numerous and the voids between

them small, then meaningful, objective, and probably correct general-

izations can be drawn.

b. If the data, or fixed points, are few and the voids between them

large, meaningful generalizations can still be drawn. But who is to say

that they are objective and/or probably correct? Who is to say they are

anything but pure fiction?

The Intelligence Community 291

320-672/B428-S/11008

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Secret.

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6. In case 5b above, the generalizer, minimally confined and di-

rected by fixed points, may be engulfed by forces wholly extraneous
to the problem at hand. It is here that he may be consciously or un-
consciously taken over by his hopes, his wishes, and his fears, or by
those of his friends or the institution he works for. (I refer you to the
men who have designed maps of the heavens and who have general-
ized the muscular Orion and his club, belt, and lion skin from a dozen
or so stars.) What he comes up with is something far different from
and usually far more or less than the meager suggestions of the fixed
points. The added something is not from the data; it is from him.

7. As long as the national intelligence community can fix only rel-

atively few points in key scientific and technical developments of the
USSR and as long as the voids between these points are very large, gen-
eralizations by any single individual or single intelligence institution
may be dangerously skewed by individual wish or institution policy.

8. Ask yourself: “What would I wish if my future were interwoven

with that of one of the armed services?” You would wish to be a part
of the best damn outfit of its sort in existence—an outfit that could de-
liver enough lethal power to destroy any enemy in a single attack and
do it without losing a man.

9. Ask yourself the next question: What do I do to get my wish?”

If you are in intelligence you may do two things.

a. To assure yourself that your service will get the funds to make

it the best damn outfit of its sort in existence you will not play down

the enemy. You will build him up, especially in gross terms of his of-

fensive capability.

b. To assure yourself that once you’ve got the best damn outfit in

the world, it will carry out its mission you begin to take away from the

enemy. You will take away notably in the area of his defensive capa-

bilities. You are not quite so certain to do this as to build up his offen-

sive capabilities, because of the perils involved. You know that if you

significantly undervalue his defensive capabilities and plans are drawn

upon your evaluation your service may be cruelly hurt in the clash.

You finally fix the point of his defensive capabilities at the place where

the curve of your wish intersects the curve of your fear. The fixed points

are so few that you can easily draw your curves to accommodate them.

10. When you have done these two things you have done little

more than describe the ideal enemy; the enemy big enough to warrant
the perfection of your outfit, but an enemy who is nevertheless a push-
over in a showdown.

11. You can do this in the field of scientific and technical intelli-

gence on the USSR, and no one can say you may [

nay?

] so long as the

ratio of fixed points to voids remains what it is.

12. The above is a long way of spelling out my doubts as to the

virtues of assigning to given departmental intelligence organizations a

292 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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“primary” responsibility in any of the specific areas of scientific and
technical intelligence. All along I have feared the generalizations, say,
that ONI may make of the fixed points and voids re Soviet underwa-
ter warfare techniques, that G–2 may make re Soviet tank design, that
A–2 may make re Soviet GCI and A–2 radar and AAA. I have however
been somewhat comforted by realizing that if any single service comes
up with a wishful generalization, this generalization may be opposed
to the wish of another service; that the other service will possess all the
data of the first and that it will be capable of drawing its own variant
or opposing generalization.

13. If a service is duly invested with “primary” responsibility and

if at the same time it possesses sources of information which it may or
may not share with other services and if it chooses not to share, the
chances of another service developing a variant or opposing general-
ization have shrunk considerably and may have shrunk to approxi-
mate zero.

14. We are in a position today where we cannot anticipate either

(a) a dramatic decrease in the ratio of voids to fixed points in the area
of scientific and technical developments in the USSR or (b) a dramatic
change in human nature. As long as we do not take out insurance
against the acceptance of a generalization that must perforce partake
heavily of the wish, we are asking for trouble. If I were carrying the
statutory responsibilities of the DCI the minimum insurance I would
take out would be as follows:

a. Keep O/SI in business pretty much as it is today—even en-

deavor to strengthen some of its divisions. The ones I would strengthen

would be those dealing with the most important subject matter irre-

spective of whether another agency had been awarded “primary” re-

sponsibility in this subject matter.

b. Set up a machinery to insure that no one scientific/technical in-

telligence outfit withheld information which it may have developed

and which it found useful in drawing its own generalizations.

The Intelligence Community 293

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121. Memorandum From the Director of the Armed Forces

Security Agency (Canine) to Secretary of Defense Lovett

Washington, July 8, 1952.

SUBJECT

Brownell Committee Report

REFERENCE

Your Memorandum of 23 June 1952

1. After a careful study of the report of the Brownell Committee,

I have concluded that it presents a fair and essentially accurate picture
of the history and development of COMINT and of its present func-
tioning. I have followed closely the work of the Committee through-
out their investigation and have been greatly impressed with their ob-
jective approach to and deep penetration of the extremely complicated
problem which confronted them. It is my opinion that they have
reached eminently sound conclusions.

2. In those portions of the report containing historical and other

background information, there are a few errors in fact, and also certain
statements which may convey erroneous impressions. While these ap-
pear to have had no significant effect on the Committee’s obviously
thorough understanding of the essentials involved, and their whole
background, it is desirable that certain of these errors be set straight
for the record; this is done in inclosure 1.

3. In my opinion the organization of COMINT activities proposed

by the Brownell Committee is both workable and practical at all three
levels, subject to the comment given below. It would constitute an ex-
tension on a joint basis of the vertical principle of organization which,
as the Committee points out, now exists in each of the three Armed
Services separately. I regard as particularly important the degree of au-
thority which the Committee proposes to vest in the Director of AFSA,
an authority which, for the first time since the creation of the Agency,
will be commensurate with his responsibilities.

4. It is noted that the Committee apparently intends that the re-

sponsibilities of the Director of AFSA be extended in the Communica-
tion Security field to embrace the production and protection of the

294 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: National Security Agency, Center for Cryptologic History, Series V, F.7.12.

Top Secret; Security Information.

See Document 99.

Not found.

Not printed.

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codes and ciphers of the entire U.S. Government, rather than merely
the Department of Defense as is now the case. I consider such an ex-
tension of jurisdiction in the Communication Security field to be de-
sirable. However, the Committee has not seen fit to elaborate upon this
proposal and, in fact, has included in its report very little comment on
the problems involved. Moreover, the proposed directive contains no
specific provisions as to organization above, within, or below AFSA for
the purpose of conducting communication security activities on a na-
tional basis. In this connection it is desirable to invite to your attention
two facts:

a. There is in existence an Executive Order dated 3 July 1945,

which created a National Cryptographic Security Board charged with

responsibility for the efficient coordination and supervision of all cryp-

tographic systems and related procedures of the Federal departments

and agencies. This Board was established as a body apart from the then

existing Communication Intelligence Board for the reason that differ-

ent interests were involved.

b. The United States Communication Intelligence Board (USCIB)

has considered at some length the advisability of extending its re-

sponsibilities to include communication security matters but has thus

far failed to reach agreement.

In view of the foregoing facts, I believe that further study is required
to determine the best national structure for communication security ac-
tivities. Accordingly, the comments and proposed changes set forth
herein have to do with COMINT activities only. I will have a separate
study made of the communication security problem with a view to-
ward preparing a separate directive. It is believed advisable to treat the
two categories separately, and this can be done without detriment to
either. An attempt to combine the two in a single directive would prob-
ably introduce complications which could result in delaying imple-
mentation of the Committee’s clear-cut recommendations on COMINT.

5. With respect to the latter recommendations, the following com-

ment is submitted in response to paragraphs 3 and 4 of your memo-
randum:

Recommendations as to Changes in Organization Above AFSA

(1) Retention in USCIB of the principle of decision and action on

certain matters by unanimous agreement would serve to perpetuate

one of the chief difficulties which according to the Committee now

hamper USCIB, since the matters where this would apply are essen-

tially those to which the Board has confined its attention in the past.

This would particularly affect the protection of COMINT sources. The

net result would be to preserve for each Department and Agency

The Intelligence Community 295

Not found.

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virtual autonomy in the application of COMINT security measures, de-

spite the fact that the maintenance of such security is vital to all. It is

true that the right of appeal to higher authority is provided for in the

proposed Board procedures. Nevertheless, this would place the bur-

den of such appeal on the majority, where it would be reluctantly ex-

ercised, whereas in matters involving the common interest the burden

of obtaining exception should rest on the minority. Extension of the

majority-rule principle to all of the Board’s decisions and actions would

not only accomplish the latter but would also simplify the Board’s pro-

cedures. Certainly it would appear desirable to extend this rule at least

to security matters.

(2) Paragraph d. (5) of the proposed Presidential Memorandum

provides for certain special consideration in matters of appeal which

involve the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense as Executive

Agent. These responsibilities pertain to those matters which fall within

the jurisdiction of the Director of AFSA. The propriety of according this

consideration to appeals made by the representative of the Secretary

of Defense is appreciated; nevertheless, since the Director of AFSA is

also directly under the Secretary and is the individual immediately re-

sponsible, it would appear a less complicated arrangement to have the

Director rather than the representative of the Secretary of Defense,

given this special consideration in appeals. Accordingly, it is suggested

that consideration be given to the advisability of this change.

(3) Experience has demonstrated that the special nature of

COMINT activities requires that they be treated in all respects as be-

ing outside the framework of other or general intelligence activities. If

this is not done the protection of COMINT sources is seriously jeop-

ardized. In recognition of this fact, the current charter of USCIB (see

paragraphs 6 and 8 of National Security Council Intelligence Directive

#9)

contains certain provisions which I strongly urge be carried over

into the new directive.

Recommendations as to Organization within AFSA

(1) The introductory statement to this section of the Committee’s

conclusions and recommendations appears to imply that there are se-
rious weaknesses in the present organizational structure of AFSA. I
agree in general with what are apparently intended to be supporting
comments of the Committee, but it strikes me that these comments are
not, in fact, criticisms of structure but are remarks pertaining to per-
sonnel policies applicable to AFSA. They actually deal with incum-
bency of the Directorship and other key positions, the alleged high rate
of turnover of personnel, and various other personnel problems. I as-
sume therefore, that the Committee found no basic faults in the AFSA
structure as such.

(2) With regard to the recommendation that the Director should

have a civilian chief technical assistant who would have under him all
research and development in the cryptanalytic field, it is to be noted
that the Chief of the Office of Research and Development, one of the

296 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

320-672/B428-S/11008

See

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment,

Document 435.

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three principal subdivisions of AFSA, has been a civilian since January
1952. As a result of recommendations of the Special Cryptologic Ad-
visory Group (SCAG) a plan for improving the organization of these
activities is now in the process of development with the assistance of
SCAG members.

(3) It is noted that paragraph 2. a. of the Committee’s proposed

Presidential Memorandum

excludes

from the meaning of COMINT and

the mission of AFSA the evaluation and dissemination of information

obtained from intercepted communications, and its synthesis with in-

formation from other sources. It is noted further that paragraph 2. c.

(2) of the same memorandum states that the responsibility assigned to

the Director of AFSA

does not contravene

the responsibilities of the de-

partments and agencies in respect to these same functions. Whereas

the former statement is positively preclusive, the latter appears to af-

ford the Director some freedom of action provided he does not inter-

fere with the legitimate work of other agencies. Some latitude in this

is essential for technical purposes, especially in the field of traffic analy-

sis. It is, therefore, recommended that the former statement be omitted

and the latter be retained, with a slight modification, as a separate and

final provision of the proposed memorandum.

Recommendations as to Changes in Organization Below the AFSA

Level (In the Service COMINT Organizations)

(1) While the meaning of “COMINT activities” as used in Public

Law 513 is probably clear from the context of that Law it may be well

to define more specifically the scope of the term for the purposes of

the proposed directive. When read out of context, the definition of

Communication Intelligence contained in the Law could be interpreted

to include postal censorship and the monitoring and processing of for-

eign press and propaganda broadcasts. It is believed advisable to make

it clear that such activities are not to be included under the provisions

of the new directive.

6. Attached hereto as inclosure 2

is a suggested redraft of the pro-

posed Presidential Memorandum for the Secretary of State and the Sec-
retary of Defense. In addition to certain substantive changes which are
recommended on the basis of the foregoing comment, there is some re-
arrangement of the section which deals with the directive to USCIB.
This rearrangement is considered advisable because of the recom-
mended change in Board procedure. I consider that the proposed ex-
ecutive memorandum contains no information of classification higher
than Secret, and have reclassified the proposed revision of Exhibit K
accordingly.

Ralph J. Canine

Major General, US Army

The Intelligence Community 297

Not printed.

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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122. Memorandum of Conversation

Pasadena, California, July 17, 1952.

PARTICIPANTS

Cal Tech

President L. A. DuBridge
Dean E. C. Watson
Professor C. C. Lauritsen
Professor R. F. Bacher
Professor J. L. Greenstein (Part time)

PSB

Palmer Putnam

CIA

Willis A. Gibbons
[

name not declassified

]

SUBJECT

Discussion of the Feasibility and Utility of a Satellite Vehicle for Reconnaissance
Purposes

Background.

At the request of Mr. Palmer Putnam (PSB), and of

Admiral Luis deFlorez (OTS/CIA), I called Dean E. C. Watson, Cali-
fornia Institute of Technology (Cal Tech) on 10 July 1952 and asked if
he could arrange for himself, President DuBridge and Professors Lau-
ritsen, Bacher and Millikan to meet with us in Pasadena on Thursday,
July 17th for the purpose of discussing this subject. Dean Watson said
that he would be delighted to arrange the discussion. Upon arrival we
found that Professor Millikan had been called out of town and could
not meet with us. Dean Watson said that Professor J. L. Greenstein, an
astrophysicist, had conducted some discussion with the Rand Corpo-
ration people regarding the vehicle and suggested that Greenstein’s
knowledge would be helpful if we were agreeable to inviting him into
the discussion. We thereupon asked Professor Greenstein to consult
with us.

2. Putnam had brought with him several copies of a paper which

he had prepared outlining current capabilities of the Soviets and indi-
cating that by 1957 the Soviets will possess the capability of a satura-
tion attack with atomic weapons against the United States and against
which the United States can have no effective defense. Putnam held

298 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff, Job 83–00036R, Box 11. Secret;

Security Information. Drafted on July 25 by [

name not declassified

], Special Assistant for

Research, Office of Policy Coordination, Central Intelligence Agency.

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that some drastic policies are required and that we need to increase
our intelligence take regarding the Soviet Union. He suggested that the
utilization of a satellite vehicle for reconnaissance purposes might be
one means of increasing our intelligence concerning the Soviet Union
and of physical structures and the characteristics relating thereto.

3. We made reference to the Rand Corporation report “Utility of

a Satellite Vehicle for Reconnaissance,” R–217. The scientists present
from Cal Tech had read the report.

4. The report contemplated and discussed the feasibility of build-

ing and launching a so-called satellite vehicle which would orbit
around the earth at an altitude of some 350 miles above the earth trav-
elling at a speed of five miles per second, thus completing from 14 to
18 complete orbits every 24 hours earth time. The satellite would be
powered by an isotope of cerium (Ce–144), a beta emitter, which would
heat mercury into a vapor which in turn would drive an engine which
would drive generators for production of power. The power would be
utilized, once the satellite was on orbit, for operating the navigational
controls and a television camera and transmitter which would be in-
corporated in the satellite. The orbit of the vehicle would be predeter-
mined with respect to the earth’s latitude and longitude thereby per-
mitting intensive coverage from the standpoint of photography of
certain portions of the earth. The Rand study contemplated that five
television receiving stations would be erected on the earth to receive
the television signals and transmissions from the vehicle. The vehicle
would not be man-carrying.

5. It was the general consensus of the Cal Tech scientists:
a. That it was probably feasible to build such a vehicle;
b. That there would be unforeseen difficulties, which probably

could be surmounted, in “marrying” the different technical systems to
be contained within the satellite;

c. That the problem of insuring sufficient reliability of electronic

equipment installed in the satellite when such equipment could not be
got at or serviced would be great;

d. Serious question was raised as to the value of pictures taken

from an altitude of 350 miles.

(1) Resolution of presently available television camera equipment

was recognized to be of not much significance for objects of less than
200

200

in size. Question was therefore raised as to the net addi-

tion to be made by such photographs to our intelligence knowledge
concerning Soviet territory.

(2) Question was raised as to whether the gross information

thus obtainable would be worth the cost and the time interval which
necessarily must take place before such a vehicle could be developed
and successfully operated.

The Intelligence Community 299

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e. Factors relating to the pitch, roll and yaw characteristics of the

vehicle were discussed. It was considered that very slight pitches and
rolls might seriously interfere with picture collection and might make
difficult the identification of areas of which pictures were taken;

f. Inasmuch as almost no facts are available concerning tempera-

tures at altitudes above 100 miles from the earth’s surface, it was con-
sidered that heating and cooling aspects of the satellite vehicle would
be subject to considerable speculation and experimentation;

g. Normal atmospheric turbulence was considered to be a factor

which might interfere with picture taking;

h. It was considered that four or five such satellites might have to

be built and launched before one could be launched that would stay
on orbit and operate as we required.

6. Professor Lauritsen appeared to be the least impressed by the

possibility of use of a satellite vehicle for such reconnaissance purposes.
He asserted that in his opinion it would require from eight to ten years
to develop and construct such a vehicle for launching. He considered
also that the same or better reconnaissance information could be secured
by the employment of from six to twelve jet aircraft flying at an altitude
of 50,000 feet over the Soviet Union. He further asserted that such air-
craft in one day could secure the photographic information of better res-
olution and quality than could the satellite vehicle camera. Lauritsen as-
serted that this could be done immediately with presently available
equipment and that such aircraft could not be picked up by radar.

7. At the conclusion of our discussion I posed substantially the

following question to the scientists present: “If you were at present the
Director of Central Intelligence what would be your attitude and ac-
tion regarding the satellite vehicle for reconnaissance purposes?” Pres-
ident DuBridge and Dean Watson responded substantially as follows:

a. They would continue to consider the possibility of utilization

of such a satellite vehicle and in so doing they would

(1) consult with the scientists at the Rand Corporation who have

studied the matter intensively and have prepared the reports;

b. They would insure that additional and continuing feasibility

studies regarding the development and construction of such a vehicle
were pursued;

c. They would seriously investigate the nature and quality of

pictures (information) that could be secured from operation of such a
vehicle;

d. They would consider whether the additional intelligence in-

formation that theoretically could be secured from such a vehicle would
be worth the possible cost and the time lag necessary to create and pro-
duce it;

300 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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124. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Bruce) to

the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)

Washington, July 31, 1952.

SUBJECT

Fifth Progress Report on NSC 59/1, “The Foreign Information Program and
Psychological Warfare Planning”

1. NSC 59/1 was approved as governmental policy on March 10,

1950. It is requested that this progress report covering the period April
15–July 31, 1952, of activities untaken in implementation of NSC 59/1
be circulated to the members of the Council for their information. In
accordance with the provisions of the third paragraph of the President’s
directive of April 4, 1951,

a copy of this report is being referred to the

Psychological Strategy Board for use in its evaluation of the national
psychological effort.

2. The organization referred to in NSC 59/1 has been designated

The Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee (POC).

It will

be referred to in this report as “the Committee.”

3. This report describes only those foreign information operations

and plans which, being interdepartmental in nature, were coordinated
through the Committee.

4. Under the Chairmanship of the Administrator, the International

Information Administration, the following are regularly represented at
the weekly meetings of the Committee: Secretary of Defense, the Defense
Department Office of Information, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Mutual Se-
curity Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, Assistant Secretary for Pub-
lic Affairs, Department of State, the Army, Navy and Air Force chiefs of
psychological warfare and the Psychological Strategy Board staff. In ac-
cordance with the terms of the President’s directive of April 4, 1951, which
among other things authorized the Secretary of State to effect readjust-
ments in the organization established under NSC 59/1, the POC secre-
tariat was transformed into a full time interdepartmental planning staff.

5. During the period covered by this report the Committee con-

centrated its attention on psychological problems connected with the

302 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, no label, Box 115.

Top Secret; Security Information. Lay circulated the report to NSC members under cover
of a July 31 memorandum. (Ibid.)

For NSC 59/1, see Document 2.

See Document 60.

See Document 74.

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Korean situation, particularly with respect to the prisoner of war issue,
both as regards the physical control of prisoners of the United Nations
Command and also as regards the prisoner issue in the truce negotia-
tions. The recommendations of the Committee were designed to con-
tribute to the ability of the UN Command to gain and maintain the
psychological initiative in Korea. However, our psychological efforts
in Korea were directed toward the achievement of the principal UN
aim in Korea—the conclusion of an armistice.

6. Ascertaining that the United Nations Command was in a posi-

tion of serious disadvantage in handling the problems described above,
the Committee took prompt action resulting in the following:

a. An on-the-scene survey of psychological warfare support

arrangements in Japan and Korea by a team comprised of the Adminis-
trator, the International Information Administration, Dept. of State; the
Chief of Psychological Warfare, Department of the Army; and the Pol-
icy Advisor, International Broadcasting Service, Department of State.

b. The establishment in Washington on June 12 of a watch com-

mittee, with representation from the Departments of Defense and State
and the Central Intelligence Agency, whose purpose is to supply a daily
summary of news, editorials and public comments originating in the
U.S. and foreign countries, both Communist and non-Communist, con-
cerning the Korean situation, and to provide suggestions, information
and advice on psychological matters for fast transmission to Tokyo, Pu-
san and Panmunjom.

c. The establishment of a corresponding unit within FECOM com-

prised of military, psychological warfare and public information ex-
perts whose function is to inform FECOM of current world wide pub-
lic reaction to developments in Korea, and to provide, in quantity,
material and suggestions which may be useful in advancing the UNC
propaganda position relative to Korea.

d. The preparation of an action plan to provide for such activities

as the following:

1. Exploitation of signed-in-blood petitions of UNC-held prison-

ers resisting repatriation;

2. Stockpiling, for possible later use, recorded and press inter-

views with prisoners of war, and motion pictures of the prisoner-

screening process;

3. Exploitation of UNC information and education work among

prisoners of war;

4. Exploitation of rehabilitation work in South Korea.

Bacteriological Warfare Charges

The Committee gave considerable attention to Communist charges

concerning bacteriological warfare in Korea. The Committee audited
the activities of a working group comprised of representatives of the

The Intelligence Community 303

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Departments of Defense and State and the Central Intelligence Agency,
under State leadership for the purpose of developing psychological
plans for: (1) countering the Communist charges, and (2) developing
when possible new measures which would be designed to seize and
maintain the propaganda initiative. The group is effectively coordinat-
ing the efforts of the agencies concerned with handling the problem.

Troop Acceptance in Japan

The Committee provided interdepartmental coordination of a plan

for developing an attitude of acceptance and an active sense of re-
sponsibility on the part of the Japanese Government and people with
regard to the mission of the United States armed forces stationed in
and about Japan as a consequence of the United States–Japan Security
Treaty.

X-Day Planning

The Committee has continued to monitor the planning of its

X-Day Working Group, which is preparing complete contingency plans
for overt psychological operations during the initial stages of general
hostilities. When completed and approved by the Committee the plans
will be forwarded to the Psychological Strategy Board.

10.

Yugoslav Plan

The Committee noted and referred to the staff of the Psychologi-

cal Strategy Board for further development a working paper on main-
tenance of Yugoslav independence from Soviet domination.

11.

Review of POC Business

The committee has undertaken an extensive review of unfinished

POC business and is currently completing action on such business. The
committee also is reviewing past POC recommendations and is moni-
toring the implementation of approved projects.

12.

POC Recommendation Regarding Communist Military Buildup in

Korea

The POC recommended that there be a full public exposition of the

facts on the nature and extent of the Communist military buildup in
Korea during the course of the truce negotiations. As a result of POC’s
recommendation appropriate statements were issued by the UN Com-
mand, by the British and by other governments having forces in Korea.

David Bruce

304 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Printed from a copy that indicates Bruce signed the original.

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125. Report by the Psychological Strategy Board

PSB D–30

Washington, August 1, 1952.

STATUS REPORT ON THE NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT

AND FIRST PROGRESS REPORT OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL

STRATEGY BOARD

[Omitted here are a list of references and a brief summary of the

report.]

I. Status of the National Psychological Effort

The Board presents below a statement on the status of national

psychological programs as of 30 June 1952. In submitting this state-
ment the Board desires to emphasize the following general conclusions:

1. To be fully effective, psychological planning at the strategic level

should ideally be based on an agreed overall strategic concept for our
national psychological programs. While efforts to date underline the
difficulties of formulating such a concept, some progress has been made
in achieving agreement on certain broad criteria to be utilized in es-
tablishing relative priorities within existing capabilities. Further
progress toward the development and implementation of an agreed
strategic concept for our psychological effort can take place only in con-
junction with a corresponding development of capabilities and re-
sources and an accompanying adjustment of basic national policy.

2. The United States is not making significant progress in the psy-

chological field toward its objective of reduction and retraction of So-
viet power as laid down in NSC 20/4.

In considering the total cold

war position of the United States as contrasted with that position a year
ago, it is evident that in certain areas, such as Western Europe, our po-
sition has been strengthened by the good progress recorded under
NATO. However, there has been some deterioration of strength in cer-
tain other areas, notably in the Near East. But this should not neces-
sarily be attributed to superior effectiveness of Soviet propaganda.

3. A major handicap in psychological operations outside of the

Iron Curtain derives from growing resentment in parts of Asia and
throughout much of Europe to a “made in America” label on part of
our psychological output. Of even graver significance is the increasing

The Intelligence Community 305

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 333, PSB Files, PSB

D–30. Top Secret; Security Information. The report contains Annexes A–E. None is printed
except for Annexes D and E, which are enclosures 1 and 2 to Document 127.

See

Foreign Relations,

1948, vol. I, Part 2, pp. 662–669.

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reaction against the military character of some of our political and eco-
nomic activity. Programs designed to have a deterrent effect on the So-
viet Union are distorted and exploited by communist or anti-American
propaganda and thus are occasioning resistance, neutralism, and charges
of agressiveness to the detriment of our psychological effort.

The statement which follows is based on an analysis of current re-

ports of the Department of State and the Department of Defense, of a
report by field staff representatives of the Mutual Security Agency, and
of a report by the Central Intelligence Agency, concerning their activ-
ities related to the national psychological effort during the fiscal year
ending 30 June 1952.

This statement is not presented as a full evaluation of the national

psychological program during the period in question, the Board hav-
ing decided that such an evaluation is not possible at this time. How-
ever, the reports on which it is based throw significant light on some
aspects of the existing “cold war” situation. There emerges from them
a picture of some substantial progress, mixed with many problems and
obstacles which hinder a more complete achievement of our psycho-
logical objectives.

A. Outside the Iron Curtain

The general psychological situation in the non-Soviet world is not

bright, but progress has been made in some areas.

Western Europe

the picture is spotty. On the one hand, progress

is reported in containing Soviet communism and in the development
of unity and readiness to build indigenous military strength in the area.
On the other hand there are disturbing reports of the growth of neu-
tralism and anti-Americanism in France and Britain, if not in Western
Europe as a whole.

In the Middle East,

irresponsible nationalism is the current major

threat to free world interests. United States capabilities for effective
psychological action have declined though some slow progress is re-
ported in certain sections of the Moslem world.

In Africa,

intensive communist efforts to gain control over the col-

ored races are having some success. A modest start has been made at
laying the groundwork for future activities aimed at checking them.

In Latin America,

there has been a recent increase in our capabili-

ties for effective psychological action, and some indication of substan-
tial progress in combatting anti-American feeling in certain countries.

306 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

For the text of the report of the Department of State to the NSC, and summaries

of the other three reports mentioned, see Annexes A, B, and C, and specially classified
Annex D. [Footnote in the original. Regarding these annexes, see footnote 1 above.]

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In South and Southeast Asia,

anti-colonialism and associated racial

resentments have been far more important elements in the psycholog-
ical developments in the military struggle against rebel forces in the
area. On the other hand, communist electoral gains in India have forced
the Nehru Government to modify perceptibly its former position of
neutrality in the East-West conflict.

In Formosa and Japan,

some gains are reported as a result of United

States psychological activities.

In addition to the above comments on specific areas, the follow-

ing general observations on the non-Soviet world, drawn from the de-
partmental reports, may be warranted.

1. A steady operational trend toward the use of indigenous groups

for propaganda purposes reflects a recognition that in many areas overt
propaganda bearing the United States label is meeting with increasing
indifference or resistance. Further development of non-attributed psy-
chological methods, together with a de-emphasis of overt channels, ap-
pears to be logical in this situation.

2. In underdeveloped countries some progress has been made in

developing psychological approaches which appeal to local aspirations
and emphasize local participation and initiative. Such approaches are
particularly relevant in these areas, where the memory or actuality of
domination by the white man is a far greater psychological reality than
the Soviet menace.

3. The overriding abhorrence of another possible war in some ar-

eas, particularly Western Europe, constitutes an important psycholog-
ical liability for the United States. This attitude tends to inhibit actions
which may seem to involve any increased risk of war, and manifests
itself in neutralism, anti-Americanism, and extreme sensitivity to oc-
casional warlike statements by leading Americans. The spread of this
attitude makes possible the continued effective use of “peace” as a lead-
ing theme in Soviet psychological aggression.

4. Certain national policies of the United States are psychologi-

cally damaging in various areas of the non-Soviet world. In the Moslem
world this is true of United States policy toward Israel; in areas under
European domination it is true of United States identification with its
NATO allies which makes it difficult for the United States to avoid the
psychological effects of the colonial policies of those allies; in Britain
and elsewhere it is true of United States policy toward China.

The same may be said of certain primarily domestic matters. For

instance, efforts to counteract communist exploitation of the race
relations problem in the United States have not been fully successful.
Likewise, the restrictive immigration policy of the United States, most
recently embodied in the McCarran Act, has damaging psychological
repercussions abroad. Finally, United States tariff laws severely hurt the

The Intelligence Community 307

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ability of foreign countries to export to this country and thus are seen
abroad as running directly counter to United States policy of building
up economic stability in the free world by expanding international trade.

B. Behind the Iron Curtain

The Soviet grip in the Communist-dominated areas of Europe and

of the Far East appeared to be even firmer at the end of the fiscal year
1952 than at the beginning. There was no evidence of progress toward
achievement of the basic objectives set forth in NSC 20/4, namely, the
reduction and retraction of Soviet communist power. Moreover, short-
term possibilities of any improvement in this respect appeared so slight
as to be negligible. In this area of the world our national psychologi-
cal effort, both overt and covert, must continue for some time to em-
phasize long-term objectives and the discovery of means to build up
resources and capabilities.

Among the many problems incident to this buildup, one in par-

ticular may be mentioned. Our capabilities for effective action against
the communist regime in China are limited in part by the absence of a
stable and more universal rallying point outside China to which over-
seas Chinese could look for political and psychological leadership, and
by the related need for a thorough-going reform of Nationalist Chinese
military and political institutions.

In the overt information field behind the Iron Curtain, the Voice

of America and Radio Free Europe clearly emerge from the reports as
the only significant remaining programs which effectively reach the
people of either or both the USSR and the Satellites. The reports are
equally clear, however, as to the need for making the Voice still more
powerful. Meanwhile there are ominous indications that we may be
falling behind in the electromagnetic war.

Some good use has been made of defectors and escapees from be-

hind the Iron Curtain during the year, both on the programs of the
Voice and America and in non-attributable activities of other agencies.
Results point to the desirability of a still more highly organized effort
in this direction.

C. Related Activities

Certain related activities of a highly restricted nature are not cov-

ered in the body of this report. For an evaluative summary of these ac-
tivities, reference is made to the specially classified Annex D.

D. Organizational Progress

An improvement is noted in the effectiveness of policy guidance

during the period covered by this report. In part, the improvement has
resulted from closer cooperation of the departments and agencies in-
volved. Quicker and more effective action both in Washington and in

308 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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the field, and a consequent improvement in the coordination of our
psychological effort, has resulted from a number of forward steps in
organization. The reports make it clear, however, that much still re-
mains to be done.

II. Progress in Formulating and Promulgating Over-All National

Psychological Objectives, Policies and Programs

During its first year of operation the Psychological Strategy Board

has taken a number of steps to carry out its responsibility “for the
formulation and promulgation, as guidance to the departments and
agencies responsible for psychological operations, of over-all national
psychological objectives, policies and programs, and for the coordi-
nation and evaluation of the national psychological effort.” The ma-
jor effort has been in the planning field. The chief steps taken are as
follows:

A. Plans completed and in effect:

(1) Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of Commu-

nist Power in France—designed to encourage and support French
Government efforts to reduce communist power in their country to a
point where it will no longer threaten United States national objec-
tives in the area. Under this Plan and the parallel Plan for Italy (see
below), the initiative for the most important actions lies with the in-
digenous governments. Supporting actions by the United States are
under the control of the Ambassador. Progress in France has been con-
siderable during the past two months and prospects for the future ap-
pear good.

(2) Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of Commu-

nist Power in Italy—parallel to the above plan for France. Although
progress in Italy is less substantial than in France, the Italian Govern-
ment is actively considering further effective action in this field.

(3) Psychological Operations Plan for Soviet Orbit Escapees (Phase

“A”)—designed to provide care and resettlement for current escapees
and facilitate their use by CIA and the Armed Forces. Reception, sup-
plemental care, and resettlement operations have already begun on a
small scale and will be considerably expanded within the limits of the
4.3 million dollars made available to the Department of State for this
activity by the Director for Mutual Security.

The Intelligence Community 309

For a more detailed report on planning activities, see specially classified Annex

E. [Footnote in the original.]

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B. Plans and guidances completed but not yet being executed:

(1) Plans for immediate execution: None
(2) Stand-by plans:

General war:

i. A plan for the conduct of psychological operations in the

event of general war has been submitted by the Board to the Na-

tional Security Council and was under study by them as of 30 June

1952.

ii. A national overt propaganda policy guidance for general

war has been approved by the Board and serves as guidance for

current operational planning on this subject in the Government.

Korean Armistice Negotiations:

Two psychological operations

plans have been promulgated. One is partly operational at present and

provides for further actions in the event that an armistice is achieved.

The other plan provides for the contingency that armistice negotiations

are conclusively broken off and full hostilities are resumed.

C. Plans and projects authorized and in process of development

involve

most of the critical areas in the world struggle.

A plan for national psychological strategy with respect to

Germany,

nearly completed, is to deal with the integration of the Federal Republic
into Western Europe, the reduction of Soviet capabilities in Western
Germany, the problem of German unification, and the role of a unified
Germany in the unification of Europe.

Psychological strategy plans to advance national objectives in the

Middle East, Southeast Asia,

and

Japan

are in earlier stages of prepara-

tion. With respect to the

Soviet Union

a psychological operations plan

for exploiting Stalin’s passing from power has been drafted and is re-
ceiving further staff study.

Other plans and papers in preparation, not confined to any geo-

graphic area, include:

(1) an over-all strategic concept for the national psychological effort;
(2) a plan for stimulating and utilizing defection from the Soviet

Orbit beyond the existing flow of escapees (this plan will supplement
the “Phase A” plan mentioned in A. (3) above);

(3) an inventory of “cold war” instrumentalities, some of them

novel, with a view to harassment and retaliation against the USSR and
the Soviet Orbit;

(4) an analysis of communist “germ warfare” and other “hate Amer-

ica” propaganda and the psychological problems arising therefrom; and

310 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

This plan was approved by the President on 25 July 1952. [Footnote in the orig-

inal. See Document 123.]

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(5) a plan designed both to gain greater acceptance in the free

world for United States economic security objectives vis-à-vis the So-
viet Orbit, and to capitalize on and obstruct Soviet economic exploita-
tion of captive Europe and Communist China.

126. Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 3/4

Washington, August 14, 1952.

PRODUCTION OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

Pursuant to the provisions of NSCID No. 3,

and for the purpose

of strengthening the over-all governmental intelligence structure for
the production of scientific and technical intelligence, the following
policies and operating procedures are hereby established:

1. Policies

In discharging allocated responsibilities and effecting integration

of intelligence, the interested departments and agencies will apply the
following basic principles:

a. No complete separation of areas of interest is possible or nec-

essarily desirable in scientific and technical intelligence activities.

b. Full and free interchange of all intelligence information and fin-

ished intelligence between all agencies concerned is essential.

c. No one agency is considered to be the final authority in any

field; conclusions may be questioned by other IAC agencies and dis-
sents recorded.

d. Any agency may make such studies as it believes necessary to

supplement intelligence obtained from other agencies in order to ful-
fill its agency functions, but such studies should not normally be dis-
seminated outside the producing agency without advance consultation
with the agency having primary responsibility for the subject-matter
involved.

The Intelligence Community 311

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff, Job 84–00022R, Box 3. Secret;

Security Information. The Ad Hoc Committee to Survey Existing Arrangements Relat-
ing to the Production of Scientific and Technical Intelligence produced a lengthy inter-
agency report that formed the basis for DCID 3/4. The report is ibid. Annexes A and B
are attached but not printed.

For NSCID No. 3, see

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence

Establishment, Document 426.

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e. An agency charged with primary responsibility in a particular

field will develop special competence in that field and will normally
carry out all or most of the research in that field.

f. Each intelligence agency will endeavor to coordinate the intel-

ligence activities of its Technical Services and its other facilities having
intelligence production capabilities with the work of the IAC intelli-
gence agencies and to make available to those agencies the intelligence
produced by such Services and facilities.

2. Procedures:

Delineation of Dominant Interests.

The general field of scientific

and technical intelligence production is subdivided into three basic ma-
jor areas, and allocation of primary production responsibilities therein
is made as follows:

(1) Intelligence on all weapons, weapons systems, military equip-

ment and techniques, plus intelligence on pertinent research and de-
velopment leading to new military material and techniques—primary
production responsibility of the departments of the Department of De-
fense, as exemplified in Annex A.

(2) Intelligence on fundamental research in the basic sciences, on

scientific resources, and on medicine (other than military medicine)
plus intelligence on pertinent applied research and development—
primary production responsibility of Central Intelligence Agency, as
exemplified in Annex B.

(3) Intelligence on Atomic Energy—production responsibility of

all interested agencies.

b. It is recognized that despite the above-mentioned specific allo-

cations of primary production responsibilities to the Military Services
and CIA, the Military Services will also require intelligence indicating
trends from fundamental research in basic sciencies, which they nor-
mally will obtain from CIA. Conversely, CIA will also require intelli-
gence on applied research relating to weapons, weapons systems, mil-
itary equipment and techniques, and the technical characteristics of
existing equipment, which it normally will obtain from the Military
Services. Accordingly, there continue to exist areas of common or over-
lapping interest which require continuing inter-agency liaison and such
working-level conferences as may be appropriate.

Coordinating Mechanisms

(1) The Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee is hereby re-

constituted as a permanent interdepartmental committee with the same
structure and functions as before.

(2) Subject to the foregoing, there is hereby established the Scien-

tific Estimates Committee, a permanent interdepartmental committee,
to integrate scientific and technical intelligence, as and when required

312 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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for the production of national intelligence, to stimulate and guide
inter-agency liaison and such working-level conferences as may be ap-
propriate, and to coordinate the production of Chapter VII of the NIS.

(3) The Scientific Estimates Committee shall be composed of des-

ignated representatives as members from CIA, the Joint Staff, the De-
partments of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Atomic Energy Com-
mission, and such other ad hoc representatives as may be determined
necessary by the regular committee members. In order to maintain con-
tinuity and stability, each department and agency mentioned above
will designate a regular member and, if desired, an alternate by trans-
mitting names and titles to the Director of Central Intelligence. This ac-
tion will not preclude the designation of such additional persons as
may be technically and otherwise qualified to discuss or report on a
particular subject under consideration by the Committee. The Chair-
man will be elected annually. The Committee will establish its meth-
ods of procedure. The Central Intelligence Agency shall provide an ex-
ecutive secretary and secretariat as required.

(4) It is recommended that the SEC concentrate on the integration

of intelligence opinion (other than that for which the JAEIC is respon-
sible) as and when required for the purposes of national intelligence,
and only incidentally assist in the coordination of production of other
intelligence in scientific and technical fields. The principal occasion for
activity on the part of the committee will arise when contributions are
required for national intelligence purposes. The Committee’s activities
will be directed to synthesizing departmental intelligence, and while
so doing to bring to light any inconsistencies resulting from the pro-
duction activities of the respective departments and agencies, each op-
erating within its assigned sphere of responsibility, and to resolve con-
flicting conclusions, or have appropriate dissenting views registered
for the benefit of the national intelligence production organization.

(5) The SEC can best assist in the coordination of production of

intelligence in scientific and technical fields by stimulating and guid-
ing inter-agency liaison and working-level conferences.

3. Director of Central Intelligence Directive 3/3

is herewith

rescinded.

Walter B. Smith

Director of Central Intelligence

The Intelligence Community 313

Not printed. (Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff, Job 84–T00389R, Box 4)

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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127. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National

Security Council (Lay) to the National Security Council

Washington, August 19, 1952.

SUBJECT

Status of United States Programs for National Security as of June 30, 1952

REFERENCES

A. NSC 135

B. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary same subject, dated August 19,

1952

The following sensitive portions of two of the status reports at-

tached to the reference memorandum of August 19 on the subject,

are

transmitted herewith for the information of the statutory members of
the National Security Council as part of NSC 135:

Annex D to No. 6, The National Psychological Program, entitled

“Summary of a Report from the Central Intelligence Agency”.

Annex E to No. 6, The National Psychological Program, entitled

“Planning Activities of the Psychological Strategy Board Through June

30, 1952”.

Paragraph IX, 5 of No. 7, The Foreign Intelligence Program.

It is requested that special security precautions be observed in handling

the enclosures and that access thereto be limited to a need-to-know basis.

James S. Lay, Jr.

314 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 64 D 563, NSC 135. Top Se-

cret; Security Information; Eyes Only.

Regarding NSC 135, “Status of U.S. Programs for National Security as of June 30,

1952,” see

Foreign Relations,

1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, pp. 56–57.

Not printed. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 135

Series)

The PSB status report, PSB D–30, is printed as Document 125.

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Enclosure 1

Annex D to No. 6, “The National Psychological Program” of
NSC 135

Washington, August 1, 1952.

SUMMARY OF A REPORT FROM THE CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

There has been some progress in achieving the national objectives

set forth in NSC 10/2 and 10/5.

This progress, however, has been slow

and in most areas severely restricted, partly by the limited nature of
available resources and capabilities, but even more by time limitations.
It takes a long time to develop the apparatus and the trained person-
nel for covert activities and the development of concepts and doctrine
of the kind discussed in this report. The United States has been en-
gaged in covert activities for too brief a period, and therefore present
developments fall far short of ultimate potential.

Europe

In France and Italy, CIA reports that Soviet power and influence

apparently are being contained. Increased and more effective covert
psychological operations in Western Europe may account for the in-
creasingly violent and indiscriminate nature of the Soviet and indige-
nous Communist propaganda barrage against the anti-Communist or-
ganizations in that area.

[

2 paragraphs (22 lines) not declassified

]

In Eastern Europe, Soviet power and influence have not been re-

duced to any measurable extent. However, U.S. capabilities for future
covert operations have increased, [

less than 1 line not declassified

]. Re-

cent covert operations have revealed that the Communist authorities
do not have complete control of the situation in these countries, and
that the area can be successfully penetrated. Thanks to much valuable
experience gained in the techniques of covert psychological warfare
and political action in Eastern Europe, CIA now possesses capabilities
for influencing large segments of labor, youth, refugees, persecutees,
women, religious groups, and political parties.

The Intelligence Community 315

Top Secret; Eyes Only. This is Annex D to PSB D–30 (Document 125).

For NSC 10/2, see

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Es-

tablishment, Document 292. For NSC 10/5, see Document 90.

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In the satellite countries of Southeastern Europe, CIA capabilities

for psychological operations have increased considerably, though So-
viet power and influence have not been reduced in the area.

The power and influence of the Kremlin within the USSR has not

been affected by U.S. covert activities, and short-term possibilities in
this direction are so slight as to be insignificant. CIA’s effort in this area
is now being focused on progressively developing capabilities for long-
term exploitation.

Pointing out that present policy provides for U.S. support of anti-

regime resistance of the Great Russians, CIA sees a definite need for
resolving the policy question of the extent to which it will be permit-
ted to support clandestinely and exploit operationally

any

group or in-

dividual actively interested in the destruction of the Bolshevik regime.

Middle East

A decline in U.S. capabilities throughout most of the Middle East is

noted, though this is felt to be only temporary. To some extent, the de-
crease in U.S. covert capabilities in the Middle East is attributed to the
policy conflict arising out of U.S. support for the maintenance of France’s
position in North Africa, which has psychological repercussions through-
out the African, Arab, and Asian worlds. Similarly, an impediment to U.S.
capabilities in the area is found in the disparity of our attitudes toward
Israel and the Arab States despite a stated policy of impartiality.

In the particularly important field of the Moslem world, some

progress has been achieved along the following lines:

1. In utilizing nationalist forces for our own purposes, by en-

deavoring to direct them away from their more destructive tendencies
and into channels which will be relatively compatible with U.S. inter-
ests; namely, to endeavor to turn the force of nationalism against the
Communists, to direct it against political corruption, to focus it upon
demands for social reform and economic progress;

2. In stimulating an increased awareness among the religious hi-

erarchy of the threat of international Communism;

3. In increasing the degree of understanding of the status of

Moslems living inside the Soviet orbit; and

4. In laying the groundwork for further expanded activities along

similar lines. Progress will continue to be slow in this field because of
the most delicate and dangerous aspect of Near Eastern affairs from
the point of view of foreign intervention.

Far East

Support of the Chinese Nationalist Government on Formosa is de-

scribed as the most significant program now being undertaken by CIA
in the Far East, where the Agency is also actively supporting the mil-

316 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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itary authorities in Korea and laying the groundwork for penetration
of Manchuria and North China.

While, on balance, the U.S. has achieved some psychological gains

in the overt field (Treaty of Peace with Japan, Pacific Military Alliances,
etc.), Soviet power has not been measurably reduced in the Far East-
ern areas under its dominance, and progress toward our objectives in
the field of covert activities has been negligible, [

less than 1 line not de-

classified

]. There, CIA’s activities directed toward discrediting Soviet

Russia, Communist China, the [

less than 1 line not declassified

], and

Communism in general, are having some success.

Korea

CIA regards coordinating machinery between civilian and military

authorities in the field of psychological warfare as inadequate in cer-
tain respects. A coordinating mechanism (CCRAK) was set up, for ex-
ample, but failed to include the operations of USIE services in Korea.
Close cooperation with the military exists in the field on intelligence
and tactical psychological warfare measures. However, a completely
effective coordination of two major strategic plans with respect to Ko-
rea has not been realized with respect to coordination of command and
logistical support, but steps are being taken to remedy this situation.
These are expected to result in some modifications of CIA’s responsi-
bilities to ensure that CIA does not commit itself to actions which are
beyond its present or anticipated capabilities.

Latin America

Despite evidence that the Soviet Union is now placing greater em-

phasis on its covert mechanisms in Latin America, U.S. covert capa-
bilities there have substantially increased during the past year through
the expansion of personnel and facilities. Such expansion, it is planned,
may increasingly turn toward the formation or support of indigenous,
nationalistic, free-enterprise groups or political parties. Some substan-
tial results in combating pro-Communist and anti-American influences
have been achieved through covert means [

less than 1 line not declassi-

fied

]. It is to be noted that Latin America is an area unique for the United

States, because of the overt Good Neighbor and non-intervention poli-
cies of long standing, and the powerful reasons necessitating those
overt policies. The security of covert operations and the further devel-
opment of policy and management systems which protect such secu-
rity both in Washington and in the field are of peculiar importance for
this area. Therefore, CIA capabilities have been developed to be oper-
ative only under special conditions.

Africa

In Africa a beginning has been made in laying the groundwork

for future activities to check Communist efforts to get control over the

The Intelligence Community 317

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colored races; but this work has so far been purely preparatory and no
progress toward actual achievement in that field is recorded.

General

In general, CIA emphasizes the importance of setting up increased

capabilities, particularly in the form of thoroughly-trained American
and indigenous personnel and long-term cover mechanisms. An ap-
parent need exists for establishing at all possible points radio broad-
cast facilities capable of reaching the USSR.

CIA’s capabilities need to be reinforced for building up an appa-

ratus capable of long-term exploitation against the Chinese Commu-
nist regime. For the shorter terms CIA has had only very limited suc-
cess in the penetration either of Communist China or the USSR itself.

CIA points up the vital importance of VOA as constituting at pres-

ent the only effective means the U.S. possesses for conducting psy-
chological operations within the confines of the USSR. Covert pene-
tration has been carried out primarily for the purpose of procuring
intelligence, and because of the rigid controls impeding the movement
of agents inside that country, no psychological warfare under present
conditions can be undertaken in the USSR by any other medium ex-
cept radio.

Through its covert channels CIA has discovered that VOA broad-

casts have been audible in the USSR throughout 1950 and 1951. Al-
though Soviet jamming has considerably reduced the audibility of these
broadcasts, nevertheless information [

⁄

lines not declassified

] indicates

that considerable segments of the Soviet peoples continue to listen to
VOA broadcasts despite technical difficulties and personal risk. Some
of these refugees have criticised the VOA broadcasts for not being suf-
ficiently forceful and for devoting a considerable portion of the pro-
grams to irrelevant matters not bearing directly on the current East-
West struggle. Furthermore, ethnic groups such as the Ukrainians have
complained that the broadcasts are not sufficiently representative of
the desires and aspirations of the minority groups within the USSR.
But when all this is said, the fact remains that information obtained by
CIA indicates that the VOA broadcasts do play an important role in re-
minding the peoples of the Soviet Union that there is an alternative
way of life, and in providing them with hope of ultimate liberation.

[

1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified

]

In Western Europe especially, there was marked progress in CIA’s

efforts to work through various anti-Communist groups—both urban
and rural. At the same time, there have as yet been no very tangible
results from attempts to penetrate indigenous Communist parties. On
the other hand, efforts to combat Communist influence in the labor
unions, [

1 line not declassified

] have met with considerable success, [

less

318 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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than 1 line not declassified

], and the view is expressed that capabilities

in this direction should be increased.

Enclosure 2

Annex E to No. 6, “The National Psychological Program” of
NSC 135

Washington, August 1, 1952.

PLANNING ACTIVITIES OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL

STRATEGY BOARD THROUGH JUNE 30, 1952

1. Plans Completed and Being Executed

A. Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of Communist Power

in France. (PSB D–14/c).

This plan and the corresponding one for Italy (Paragraph 1B) were

developed by the same PSB planning panel and actions under both plans
are being coordinated by the same group. Both plans resulted from ex-
tensive inquiry during the summer and fall of 1951, as a result of which
the Board concluded that the French and Italian Communist apparati,
the two most powerful in Western Europe, constituted a serious threat
to American foreign policy and to NATO plans for defense of Western
Europe. In consequence, the Board prescribed specific courses of action
for reduction of Communist power in both France and Italy.

Upon approval of both plans on February 21, 1952, a Washington

interdepartmental coordinating committee was established under the
chairmanship of a member of the PSB staff, and comparable panels
were established in Paris and Rome. These groups are in communica-
tion with each other with respect to implementation of the plans.

Analysis of the Communist position in both France and Italy re-

sulted in the conclusion that in both countries the primary sources of
Communist power was in their organized control over trade unions.
Therefore, the main emphasis in both plans is devoted to reduction of
Communist power over trade unions and the encouragement of the
free trade union movement. The most important actions that can be
taken in both countries are for the government to give positive sup-
port to the democratic unions in their struggle against Communist

The Intelligence Community 319

Top Secret; Security Information; Eyes Only. This is Annex E to PSB D–30 (Doc-

ument 125).

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domination of organized labor, to stop subsidizing and to stop dealing
with the Communist unions, and to work towards a more equitable
share of the national income for labor.

With regard to the French plan, progress toward achieving the ma-

jor objectives appears hopeful under the present Pinay Government.
Unlike its predecessors, the Pinay Government has demonstrated far
more courage and affirmative leadership, and on its own initiative, has
been moving vigorously against the Communists within the last two
months. However, this is no guarantee of stability. The government has
given us assurances that it will continue this campaign and that it in-
tends to take specific action to reduce Communist power in the trade
union field. While making known to the government our continuing
interest in this problem, we have withheld more affirmative participa-
tion and are watching the French initiative with hope in its promise
for the future.

B. Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of Communist Power

in Italy. (PSB D–15/b).

As stated in connection with the similar plan for reduction of

Communist power in France reported in the previous paragraph, this
plan was approved by the Board on February 21, 1952. Development
of the plan, which was in conjunction with the development of the
French plan, is reported on in the previous paragraph.

With regard to progress concerning the achievement of the objec-

tives of the Italian plan, since September 1951 we have made high level
representations expressing our concern over the continued strength of
Communist power in Italy. The DeGasperi Government has repeatedly
assured us that it intends to take vigorous measures to reduce the
strength and influence of the Communist movement. Up to the May
1952 elections, the government had done very little along these lines
and, particularly, had not moved against the main sources of Com-
munist power in the trade union field.

The local elections throughout Italy in 1951 and 1952 indicated no

diminution and perhaps a slight increase of electoral support for the
Communist-left socialist bloc. Since the 1948 national elections, when
this bloc polled 31.4%, it has for the first time made substantial inroads
into the agricultural South. In contrast to this, the electoral support for
the four democratic center parties was substantially reduced compared
to 1948 due to a sharp fall off in support for the Christian-Democrat
Party, while the extreme right received a sharp increase in support.

Since the May elections we have received renewed and more pos-

itive assurances that the government means to move against the Com-
munists and there have been indications of formal action. The gov-
ernment will put its main reliance on new legislation. The situation

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now appears more promising and hopeful than it has been for a long
time, but we are awaiting positive results. Since the Communists ap-
pear to be avoiding the provocation of the Italian Government, we are
hopeful that the latter will take positive action on its own initiative.

C. Psychological Operations Plan for Soviet Orbit Escapees—Phase “A”

(PSB D–18a).

This plan, approved by PSB December 20, 1951, includes programs

to care for and resettle current escapees, and envisages maximum pos-
sible utilization of escapees [

less than 1 line not declassified

] under Pub-

lic Law 51 (Lodge Amendment), which permits recruitment of escapees
into the U.S. Armed Forces. (For discussion of Phase “B” see paragraph
3A below.)

On April 7, pursuant to approval by the President, $4.3 million

dollars were made available by the Director of Mutual Security to
the Department of State, which had been given responsibility for the
program.

The time since funds were made available has been used to build

the organization and staff for the continuing administration of the pro-
gram; and to identify and care for the most urgent immediate needs of
escapees.

Organization.

Small staffs are being established and activities have

begun in each of the countries which border the iron curtain. A regional
office in HICOG and a policy and coordination unit in the Department
of State have been established.

Resettlement and Supplemental Care.

A general contract was signed

on June 16, 1952, with the Provisional Committee for the Movement of
Migrants from Europe (PICMME, an international body organized in
November, 1951) for the overseas transport of up to 14,000 escapees
during one year at an estimated rate of $100 per capita. The number
thus far moved under the program is negligible, but it is anticipated
that a scheduled flow may be attained in August.

Projects have been authorized to care for urgent immediate needs

of escapees resident in Greece, Germany, Austria, Turkey and Italy,
needs such as food, clothing, shoes, repair and decontamination of bar-
racks, and medical treatment. In every country of operation the im-
mediate needs of the escapees are being met.

Propaganda Utilization.

No general propaganda utilization of the

plans and activities of the escapee program is now contemplated by
State Department. Newsworthy projects and assistance to key indi-
viduals will be used in media reaching iron curtain areas when ap-
propriate. When the program has greater accomplishments to point to,
the State Department plans more general treatment. Similar policies
govern domestic information activity.

The Intelligence Community 321

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Funds.

Of the initial authorization of $4,300,000, an estimated

$1,500,000 was obligated during the fiscal year 1952. An additional
$1,460,500 is being requested to cover an increase in the estimated num-
ber of escapees already requiring assistance.

Accomplishment of Other Purposes.

As requested under this phase

of the plan, the Department of Defense has somewhat liberalized the
conditions under which escapees may be recruited under the authori-
zation of the Lodge Amendment. Of 5194 applications, 3916 have been
rejected, 295 have been accepted (262 on active duty), and 982 are be-
ing processed.

[

1 paragraph (2 lines) not declassified

]

D. Public Statements with Respect to Certain Weapons. (PSB D–17d)

In February 1952, following a series of conflicting statements by

public officials as to atomic and related developments, the PSB ap-
proved and forwarded to the Executive Secretary, NSC, recommenda-
tions for a guidance to appropriate agencies on public statements with
respect to certain weapons. On May 9, 1952, a memorandum on this
subject was issued by the President, setting forth the criteria recom-
mended by the PSB and directing compliance therewith.

At present

the PSB staff is reviewing the action which has been taken by the agen-
cies and the effect of the application of the criteria.

2. Plans Completed But Not Yet Being Executed—

Stand-By Plans

A. Psychological Operations Plan Incident to Korean Cease-Fire

Negotiations (PSB D–7c).

This plan was approved by the Psychological Strategy Board on

October 25, 1951. It is designed to establish special psychological ob-
jectives to be implemented toward our allies as well as our adversaries,
with respect to the Korean conflict. Some of the desired courses of ac-
tion are at present in effect, but the majority of the recommended ac-
tions are directly related to the progress made in connection with the
cease-fire. The operational planning is substantially complete. An alert
network has been established among the affected agencies so that the
appropriate action can be put into effect without delay as developments
make this necessary.

322 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

NSC Action No. 622; NSC 126; and memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, sub-

ject, “Public Statements with Respect to Certain American Weapons”, dated March 28,
1952. [Footnote in the original. For NSC 126, see

Foreign Relations,

1952–1954, vol. II, Part

2, pp. 869–872.]

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B. Emergency Plan for Breakoff of Korean Armistice Negotiations

(PSB J–19d).

This plan was approved by the Psychological Strategy Board on

September 18, 1951. It endeavors to establish for governmental de-
partments and agencies engaged in psychological operations courses
of action for application in preparation for, and in the event of, a break-
down in the Korean armistice negotiations. The operational planning
is substantially complete. The receipt of certain assurances from the Far
Eastern Command with respect to logistical support is necessary in or-
der that the affected agencies can establish the appropriate contingent
plan without delay, should developments make this necessary.

C. Plan for Conducting Psychological Operations During General

Hostilities (PSB D–8b).

This plan was approved by the Board on February 21, 1952 and

submitted to the National Security Council as NSC 127. (As amended
and approved by the NSC and approved by the President, this was cir-
culated as NSC 127/1.)

This plan was designed in order that the proper

agencies would be able to conduct psychological operations in pur-
suance of prescribed national objectives during general hostilities. This
plan shall be executed upon Presidential proclamation in the event of
war or at such time as the President may direct.

D. National Overt Propaganda Policy Guidance for General War

(PSB D–11/b).

This plan was approved by the Board on November 15, 1951. It

sets forth the objectives which will govern the national overt propa-
ganda effort in a general war forced upon the United States by the
USSR or any of its satellites. The objectives and tasks which should be
followed by the United States with respect to the world as a whole, the
USSR and its satellites, our allies and friends, and neutral nations are
set forth. This guidance has been distributed to the various depart-
ments and agencies for their use. The Psychological Operations Coor-
dinating Committee (POC) has established an X-Day Committee which
is concerned with the inter-departmental coordination of policies and
operations in the event of war. This guidance is being used in the im-
plementation of their planning.

The Intelligence Community 323

See Document 123.

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3. Plans Authorized and in Process of Development

A. Psychological Operations Plan for Soviet Orbit Escapees—Phase “B”

(PSB D–18a/1).

This project is concerned with the stimulation of defection and

examination of the psychological and subsidiary military advantages
which would result from the proper utilization of these escapees.
Phase “A”, concerned with the care, resettlement, and possible uti-
lization of current escapees, is reported on in Paragraph 1C of this
paper.

B. Inventory of Instrumentalities for Countering Soviet Orbit Blackmail

Tactics (PSB D–19/1).

The Board has had prepared an “Inventory of Cold War Weapons”,

consisting of a list of certain agencies and instrumentalities (some of
which are of a novel character). The Board has further directed study
toward the feasibility of harassment and retaliation against the Soviets
by use of appropriate instrumentalities.

C. Psychological Operations Plan Prescribing Specific Courses of Action

with Respect to Germany (PSB D–21a).

This plan is designed to prescribe certain courses of action with

respect to: (a) the integration of Western Germany into Western Eu-
rope, (b) the reduction of Soviet capabilities in Eastern Germany, (c)
the achievement of German unity, and (d) the role of a unified Ger-
many in the unification of Europe.

D. Psychological Strategy Planning for the Middle East (PSB D–22).

This plan is to devise by means of coordinated psychological op-

erations a national psychological plan, taking into account both long-
range and short-range considerations, in order to overcome or prevent
instability within this area which would threaten Western interests. It
seeks to prevent the extension of Soviet influence and at the same time
to strengthen Western influence and to establish within the commu-
nity of nations a new relationship with the states of the area that rec-
ognizes their desire to achieve status and respects their sovereign
equality.

E. Psychological Strategy Planning for Southeast Asia (PSB D–23).

This plan is designed to assist by means of coordinated psycho-

logical operations in preventing the free countries of Southeast
Asia from passing into the Communist orbit and in developing in
these countries the will and ability to resist Communism from
within and without, and to contribute to the strengthening of the free
world.

324 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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F. Psychological Operations Plan for the Exploitation of Stalin’s Passing

from Power (PSB D–24).

This plan is designed to study the actions the United States should

take to develop the maximum psychological results at the time of
Stalin’s death.

G. Preliminary Analysis of the Communist B.W. Propaganda Campaign

(PSB D–25).

This study concerns itself with the psychological problems which

the current “Hate America” Communist propaganda campaign have
presented.

H. Statement of U.S. Aims in the Cold War (“Princeton Statement”—PSB

D–26).

This paper was designed to devise the maximum psychological ef-

fect which could be achieved by a statement of high U.S. or foreign of-
ficials relative to the liberation of peoples now under Soviet Commu-
nist control.

I. Psychological Strategy Plan for the Pro-U.S. Orientation of Japan

(PSB D–27).

This plan is designed to develop a psychological strategy for co-

ordinated psychological operations to strengthen Japan and other non-
communist powers in Asia. It would promote Japan’s economic and
military capacity to contribute to collective security, assure Japan’s con-
tinuing commitment to close association and joint action with the U.S.
and would assist in restoring Japan to a position of strength in a co-
operative endeavor to secure the non-communist nations of Asia from
Communist subversion or attack.

J. Psychological Strategy for Economic Security Vis-à-vis the Soviet Orbit

(PSB D–28).

This plan is designed to prepare national psychological strategy

and specific courses of action with respect to the psychological aspects
of U.S. economic security programs concerned with the Soviet orbit by
increasing the degree of acceptance in the Free World of U.S. economic
security objectives vis-à-vis the Soviet orbit. It also seeks to weaken So-
viet control over the orbit countries by capitalizing on and obstructing
Soviet economic exploitation of captive Europe and China through psy-
chological operations.

The Intelligence Community 325

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Enclosure 3

Paragraph IX, 5 (page 8) of No. 7, “The Foreign Intelligence
Program” of NSC 135

Washington, August 15, 1952.

5. ESPIONAGE AND COUNTERESPIONAGE

U.S. espionage and counterespionage activities outside the Conti-

nental limits of the U.S., with certain exceptions, are conducted by CIA.
Through these activities, including the operation of secret agents,
[

⁄

lines not declassified

] CIA has collected significant amounts of valu-

able intelligence from areas outside the USSR and the Soviet Orbit. A
number of high quality, secret sources have been developed in selected
areas, capable of producing important clandestine intelligence, often
with strategic implications.

Although substantial progress has been made, CIA has not yet

achieved a satisfactory collection of intelligence on and from the USSR
and the satellites. The tremendously effective State Security apparatus
of the USSR and the Soviet Orbit make this primary target extremely
difficult to attack. Intensive efforts have been expended in an attempt
to develop within the USSR and the satellite countries a secure clan-
destine intelligence apparatus capable of supporting and providing
communications for agent operations. The collection of intelligence
from these areas is increasing.

The reduction of available overt intelligence sources by Soviet and

satellite security precautions imposes upon CIA a responsibility for the
collection of intelligence through espionage and counterespionage to a
degree unparalleled in the past. In view of this and since available es-
pionage and counterespionage facilities are not sufficient to fulfill pres-
ent intelligence requirements, a mechanism for assigning over-all pri-
orities to intelligence requirements levied on CIA by the various U.S.
intelligence agencies has been established through the Interagency Pri-
orities Committee, a subcommittee of the Intelligence Advisory Com-
mittee. In general terms, the topmost priority within this framework is
being afforded to Soviet and satellite intentions and capabilities.

Substantial progress has been made in organizing stay-behind

agents in areas likely to be overrun in the event of further hostilities.
In the face of known Soviet occupation and control techniques, the

326 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Top Secret; Security Information; Eyes Only. For a summary of Report No. 7 of

NSC 135, see Document 128.

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durability of such stay-behind nets and their ability to function for an
appreciable period of time after the outbreak of hostilities have not
been firmly established. The effective establishment of stay-behind and
other war planning operations is conditioned upon over-all war plan-
ning by Defense agencies which is on a continuing basis.

Counterespionage operations abroad gradually have been built up

and concentrated against the Soviet and satellite intelligence services.
They are becoming increasingly effective.

128. Report From the National Security Council to President

Truman

Washington, September 2, 1952.

SUBJECT

Brief on No. 7, “The Foreign Intelligence Program,” NSC 135

The basic handicap of the program is, of course, the paucity of in-

telligence of all types, covert and overt, on the Soviet Orbit. Never-
theless, atomic estimates, though still uncertain, are more reliable than
a year ago. A number of “finds” in Soviet electronics and telecommu-
nications have been made. Intelligence on air defense and on basic sci-
entific research is improved. New economic sources and techniques
promise better intelligence on Soviet military production. Use of for-
eign radio broadcasts was good. Target research progressed. The NIS
program (world-wide encyclopedic data) is 45% complete on the 24
highest-priority areas, and 22% complete as a whole. NATO intelligence
requirements are being met.

Despite the fact that espionage within the Orbit has failed to pro-

duce significant results, outside the Orbit it is generally good. A num-
ber of stay-behind nets have been established.

Improvement is needed in coordination between intelligence and

policy and between intelligence and operational planning, although the

The Intelligence Community 327

Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s Secretary’s Files.

Top Secret; Security Information. This is a summary prepared by the NSC Reporting Unit
of a 12-page report (Report No. 7 of NSC 135, “Status of United States Programs for Na-
tional Security”) prepared by CIA with the concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Com-
mittee. The full report is ibid. It omits paragraph 5, which is printed as Enclosure 3 to
Document 127.

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national estimates are now effectively drawing upon governmental re-
sources. Political, social, and cultural intelligence research-in-depth is
needed for areas outside the Orbit. Enemy long-range plans and in-
tentions, especially in Korea, are not known. Knowledge of the Soviet
guided missile program is poor. Collection by the Service attachés is
inadequate. Further exploitation of aerial reconnaissance is indicated.
Knowledge of Soviet work in the field of radio jamming and in bio-
logical and chemical warfare is inadequate. Psychological and eco-
nomic warfare have created unparalleled demands for intelligence.

There is no guarantee that intelligence will be able to furnish ad-

equate warning of attack prior to actual detection of hostile formations.
Certain last-minute defensive and offensive preparations may, how-
ever, be detected; opportunities for such detection vary from fair (in
Germany and Korea) to extremely poor (in Transcaucasia and South-
east Asia).

129. Memorandum From Robert P. Joyce of the Policy Planning

Staff to the Under Secretary of State (Bruce)

Washington, October 15, 1952.

SUBJECT

PSB and General Smith’s Proposal

I refer to the memorandum

handed you by the Director of Cen-

tral Intelligence at the PSB meeting last Thursday, October 9, which
outlines General Smith’s recommendation that (in his own words):
“The responsibility for guiding policy, for approving projects, and for
assessing the results of all covert cold war operations be placed upon
the Psychological Strategy Board; and b) the present representatives of
the Departments of State, Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff now charged
with giving policy guidance to the operating divisions of this Agency
(or personnel of equal stature and experience) be grouped as a cold
war general staff with the Director of the PSB staff as Chief thereof,
and be given additional responsibility of considering proposed proj-

328 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: National Archives, RG 59, P Files: Lot 55 D 339, New Proposals for PSB.

Top Secret.

Printed below as Attachment 1.

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ects, of recommending these projects for approval or disapproval by
the Board, of periodic evaluation of the conduct of these projects, and
of recommending periodically whether they are to be continued or dis-
continued.” General Smith goes on to say that “The PSB, as presently
constituted, has not so far accomplished all of the results which I my-
self had hoped for.” He believes that the concepts and suggestions he
makes in these informal memoranda would make the PSB “a really
meaningful body as it would in fact become the device through which
all of our major cold war activities are considered and approved.”

A meeting was held in Mr. Frank G. Wisner’s office on October 10

at which were present in addition to Mr. Wisner, Admiral Kirk, Gen-
eral Magruder, Mr. Tracy Barnes, and myself, at your direction. As you
know, Mr. Barnes took over a week ago as Assistant Director of the
CIA for OPC. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss General
Smith’s memorandum and it was thoroughly understood that the meet-
ing was exploratory and that no commitments were expected or would
be made until the important suggestions and recommendations in Gen-
eral Smith’s memorandum were thoroughly understood. Admiral Kirk
stated that he had had long conversations with General Smith about
the latter’s thinking relating to the PSB role in clandestine political war-
fare. He remarked that he was in general agreement with General
Smith. Both General Magruder and Mr. Wisner had also discussed the
matter with General Smith and they had clear ideas as to what the lat-
ter was driving at. It was generally agreed that the kernel of General
Smith’s thought was contained in the sentence starting at the bottom
of page 1 of his memorandum which states: “Moreover, under the ex-
isting mechanism for providing policy guidance and program ap-
proval, the Agency has continued in the position of having to assume
too much responsibility and authority for its own good.” He goes on
to say that “the rapidly increasing cost of covert operations, coupled
with the missing elements of objective review and substantive audit,
leave it open to departmental and Congressional criticism.”

During the meeting I took occasion to clarify certain points in Gen-

eral Smith’s memorandum which did not appear to me entirely clear:

1) In speaking of “all of our major cold war activities,” did Gen-

eral Smith confine his recommendations only to political warfare by

clandestine means or was he thinking in terms of overt propaganda as

well? The answer was that he was thinking only of covert activity.

2) In outlining his concept of the duties of the “advisers and staff

officers of the three principals,” it was not clear as to whether these

persons would be PSB officials or officials of their respective depart-

ments and agencies, i.e., State, Defense, CIA and perhaps the JCS.

The answer was that these persons who would backstop the Board

members would be representatives of their respective departments

and agencies where they would have their offices and perform their

functions.

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3) When General Smith spoke of his objection to the formal ref-

erence of cold war projects to the routine machinery of the major de-

partments and the inevitable delays and breaches of security that this

process involves, did he mean to shut off the sometimes necessary and

fruitful direct working relationships between senior CIA officials and

senior State Department officials on the working level? The answer to

this question was no, but it was believed that General Smith desired a

rigidly controlled, lateral working relationship held to more senior and

responsible officials who were in a better position to give the neces-

sary advice and clearances.

General Magruder stated that he was very much in favor of Gen-

eral Smith’s basic concept. He commented that the atmosphere within
the Defense establishment relating to clandestine and unconventional
activities had changed very greatly over the past two years. These ac-
tivities at their outset were not clearly understood or appreciated by
the Military who took an understandably negative view of mysteries
and “unconventionality” which cut across established orthodox chan-
nels and straightforward military concepts. These attitudes within the
Defense establishment had been greatly ameliorated and now the atti-
tudes of top people within the Services and within the JCS vis-à-vis
covert operations reflected much more awareness of the necessity for
political warfare and all types of covert activities. He went on to say
that, although it was still difficult for any group including a represent-
ative of the Secretary of Defense to commit the three Services to logis-
tical support, nevertheless these difficulties could now be met much
more easily within the Defense establishment. General Magruder
commented that, in his opinion, expeditious clearances for covert ac-
tivities and Department of Defense “no objection” or “yes, please do
the most you can” were now possible as long as the activities did not
impinge upon the basic constitutional and legislative powers and au-
thority of the Military establishment.

I think that we should examine very closely General Smith’s con-

cept of the assistant, staff officer, or deputy to support each PSB mem-
ber. He envisages “highly qualified officers . . . upon whom the prin-
cipals could rely completely as their technical advisers and

whom their

respective Departments would accept in that status.

It would be essential

that these selected officers would have the competence to speak au-
thoritatively and definitively on the various matters to be considered
. . .” General Smith qualifies this rather startling allocation of author-
ity by stating that: “The selected staff officers would have to be held
responsible by the principals for the necessary amount of coordinating
and checking in their departments.”

I do not believe that this is a workable concept. No State Depart-

ment official would have the necessary qualifications to fulfill such re-
sponsible functions as I believe are envisaged under General Smith’s
concept of a “Board of Directors for all covert cold war activities.” I do

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not think that the Secretary or Under Secretary would consider giving
off-the-cuff clearances for highly sensitive political operations without
first consulting the most competent persons in the Department of State.
Certainly, no staff officer or assistant could or should be clothed with
any such power or responsibility as this would cut across basic con-
cepts of departmental handling of policy decisions. If, in any such
group as envisaged by General Smith, I or my successor should pre-
sume to provide policy clearance in highly sensitive fields of intimate
interest to, let us say, EUR, and in which, let us say, NEA has a pro-
found interest, I should certainly be assassinated instanter by the As-
sistant Secretaries of these two Bureaus, and quite rightly so. It is my
opinion that the present mechanism for providing policy guidance to
OPC of CIA works pretty well. It is perhaps administratively some-
what unorthodox, but the activity itself is “unconventional” and is not
easily fitted into conventional and institutionally correct procedures.

I inquired of Frank Wisner if he thought that General Smith con-

sidered that the Department of State was not providing adequate pol-
icy guidance under the present mechanism or whether there were long
delays in obtaining clearances due to some of the factors set forth in
General Smith’s memorandum. Mr. Wisner replied that he did not think
that this was in the General’s mind, but rather General Smith’s basic
thought was that “no objection” on the part of the Department of State
was not sufficient. He rather desired a mechanism which would more
closely commit the Department to responsibility for sensitive and ex-
ceedingly costly activities directly in the field of foreign policy by other
means, i.e., political warfare. I may add that whenever the CIA required
a policy decision on an important matter where time was of the essence,
such decision has been forthcoming sometimes within a matter of
hours. The Deputy Under Secretary is constantly available for these
high level decisions which have always been made in the past with-
out their being referred to the lower levels and fought over by rela-
tively junior officials. In other words, it is my view that General Smith’s
memorandum in this respect refers primarily to the delays, lack of suf-
ficient logistic support, and security breaches which have been expe-
rienced for understandable reasons within the Department of Defense
and the JCS.

With regard to the General’s insistence upon this Department as-

suming more responsibility for these activities, we must, of course, look
closely into the degree of authority and control which must be con-
comitant with such responsibility. As you know, it was the concept of
General Marshall, Mr. Forrestal, Mr. Lovett and Mr. Kennan, when OPC
was set up in the spring of 1948, that political warfare activities of covert
means (excluding para-military operations and planning therefor in
case of overt hostilities) was of primary interest to the Department of
State. The idea was explored of placing such activity directly within

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this Department, but I believe it was finally decided that the operation
should be one step removed from this Department, and it was for this
reason that it was placed, faute de mieux, within the framework of the
CIA. We are still the Department primarily interested in political war-
fare by covert means. If this is so, we should accept General Smith’s
basic thesis and accept more responsibility but at the same time exer-
cise closer control over operations. I inquired whether General Smith
had in mind a “theater commander” concept which would mean that
the Department would say “go ahead” and then his organization would
take over and all implementation would be considered operational and
within his exclusive responsibility. Mr. Wisner replied that this was not
in General Smith’s mind as evidenced by the part of the latter’s mem-
orandum where he refers to “periodic evaluation of the conduct of these
projects and of recommending periodically whether they are to be con-
tinued or discontinued.” This concept would mean a much greater de-
gree of State Department control than is presently exercised. When he
took over the CIA, General Smith told the Chief of Foreign Service Per-
sonnel Durbrow that he could use perhaps fifty qualified Foreign Serv-
ice Officers in a delicate operation where political know-how and area
expertise is essential. We have never been able to meet this request,
and presently there are only three or four qualified Foreign Service Of-
ficers serving in OPC of CIA.

As you are well aware, a green light for an operation or a “no ob-

jection” is entirely inadequate. My office has endeavored, through the
weekly 10/2 representatives forum and by personal contacts with sen-
ior operational personnel of the OPC to keep abreast of political war-
fare operations. This has been difficult and sometimes these operations
inevitably get off the beam. It is axiomatic that delicate political oper-
ations are about as good as the operators. Perhaps this adds up to the
conclusion that if this Department accepts more responsibility, it will
mean that senior officers of this Department must themselves devote
increasing personal attention to monitoring CIA political warfare
activities.

I think that recent events in the Soviet Union fully justify General

Smith’s observation that “it is inevitable that cold war operations will
continue over a long period of time.” If our conflict with Stalinism,
Russian Imperialism, International Communism, or whatever name we
give it may more and more assume the pattern of what we call “cold
war” over an indefinite period, it seems to me that political warfare by
clandestine means will increasingly assume major significance. The
NSC in 10/5

affirmed this conclusion and called for increased scope

332 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Document 90.

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and magnitude in covert operations. General Smith speaks of the happy
combination of personality and experience, the continuity of which is
not insured. I would place more stress than he apparently does on his
phrase “the continuity of which is not insured.” An institutional
arrangement made at this particular juncture and based to some de-
gree on personalities might be dangerous. It might work very well up
until January 20, 1953. With regard to the State Department end of Gen-
eral Smith’s concept, I should like to see, if possible, the focal point
within the Department providing policy guidance and control for po-
litical warfare activities placed upon as high a “professional level” as
possible.

I attach hereto a memorandum addressed to me on October 10 by

Mr. Krentz as well as a memorandum I have just received from Mr.
Tracy Barnes. I think that both of these memoranda will assist in our
study of the problem presented by General Smith’s memoranda.

Robert P. Joyce

Attachment 1

Draft Memorandum by Director of Central Intelligence
Smith

Washington, October 8, 1952.

In the field of unconventional and psychological operations the

Central Intelligence Agency is an executive and operating agency
charged with carrying out projects in support of national policies. These
projects include political and paramilitary operations, the general de-
sirability of which have been determined by the senior departments of
the Executive Branch of the Government. As an operating agent for
these departments, CIA requires more than policy guidance. The ac-
tual projects which it proposes to undertake in furthering national pol-
icy should be carefully scrutinized before final approval, and the net
value of the operations themselves should be periodically assessed by
some authority outside the Agency but representative both of it and of

The Intelligence Community 333

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Secret; Security Information. For text of the October 30 version of this paper en-

dorsed by the Psychological Strategy Board, see Document 135.

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the interested executive departments. The mounting cost of these op-
erations makes such prior assessment and continuous audit a matter
of great urgency.

Ever since I assumed my present responsibilities I have been try-

ing to arrive at the best method of establishing within the Agency an
objective method of project review and analysis, but without really sat-
isfactory results. Moreover, under the existing mechanism for provid-
ing policy guidance and program approval, the Agency has continued
in the position of having to assume too much responsibility and au-
thority for its own good. Thus, the rapidly increasing cost of covert op-
erations, coupled with the missing elements of objective review and
substantive audit, leave it open to departmental and Congressional crit-
icism. The simple fact is that in the field of cold war, vision and imag-
ination are essential, but these two essential qualities must be held un-
der wraps. Otherwise, the number of ways they will conjure up to
spend money is really surprising, and the selective judgment of a de-
tached, objective authority must be applied.

It is inevitable that cold war operations will continue over a long

period of time. The involve activities which do not lend themselves to
precise evaluation and it is impossible to judge in absolute terms the
successes or failures of particular programs. Unlike military operations
which require the continuous and increasing application of force to-
ward an abrupt and conclusive ending, those in which we engage usu-
ally require a fluctuating effort with no clear termination in prospect.
For this reason, it is all the more important that they should not be un-
dertaken unless all concerned are satisfied as to their desirability.

The ideal situation would be for all cold war projects to be con-

sidered in detail and passed upon by a committee consisting of the Un-
der Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence (the present PSB). However, it is not
possible for these fully occupied individuals to devote the amount of
time necessary for such direct analysis, and they would need compe-
tent and fully trusted advisors from their respective staffs in order to
be adequately informed. I believe, however, that the three officials men-
tioned, sitting as the Psychological Strategy Board, can

if adequately sup-

ported

perform these functions without too much additional burden,

and they are already doing a good deal of it in an informal way at their
weekly luncheon meetings. This, however, is the result of a happy com-
bination of personalities and experience, the continuity of which is not
insured. It can be insured only if there is a genuine acceptance of cer-
tain essential principles. The first of these is full recognition by the three
Board members of the true significance of their role which would be
actually to approve, guide, and assess the value of covert cold war op-
erations, as well as to give the policy guidance under which these op-
erations are planned and executed. In this capacity, they would be in

334 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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effect a board of directors for all covert cold war activities. Second and
somewhat more difficult of attainment would be the provision of a few
highly qualified officers within the P.S.B. staff upon whom the princi-
pals could rely completely as their technical advisors, and whom their
respective departments would accept in that status. It would be es-
sential that these selected officers have competence to speak authori-
tatively and definitively on the various matters to be considered, both
in their capacity as advisors and staff officers of the three principals
and as representatives of the departments from which they are sec-
onded. Time would be lost and insecurity would result from formal
reference of cold war projects to the routine machinery of the major
departments, since this would have the inevitable result of allowing
these matters to get down into the depths of departmental staffs and
to be fought over and widely discussed by a large number of relatively
junior officials. Hence, the selected staff officers would have to be held
responsible by the principals for the necessary amount of coordinating
and checking within their departments.

The three presently designated representatives of the Departments

of State and Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are all top quality in-
dividuals. We could not hope to get and would not want to have bet-
ter people. It seems to me that the only difficulty is that they are not
set up in the proper framework at the present time. They or others of
equivalent caliber could serve as the principal advisors and assistants
of the two Under Secretaries. I recommend, therefore, that: (a) the re-
sponsibility for guiding policy, for approving projects, and for assess-
ing the results of all covert cold war operations be placed upon the
Psychological Strategy Board; and (b) the present representatives of the
Departments of State, Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff now
charged with giving policy guidance to the operating divisions of this
Agency (or personnel of equal stature and experience) be grouped as
a cold war general staff with the Director of the PSB staff as chief
thereof, and be given the additional responsibility of considering pro-
posed projects, of recommending these projects for approval or disap-
proval by the Board, of periodic evaluation of the conduct of these proj-
ects, and of recommending periodically whether they are to be
continued or discontinued.

The PSB, as presently constituted, has not so far accomplished all

of the results which I myself had hoped for. The concept outlined above
would, to a certain extent, change its present character and would make
it a really meaningful body as it would in fact become the device through
which all of our major cold war activities are considered and approved.
The present staff of the PSB would undergo a corresponding change with
respect to its composition, functions and responsibilities.

These are general recommendations. If they are favorably consid-

ered, they will require detailed analysis and staff action.

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Attachment 2

Memorandum From Kenneth C. Krentz of the Policy
Planning Staff to Robert P. Joyce

Washington, October 10, 1952.

General Smith’s draft memorandum of October 8

presents a log-

ical and convincing case for the appointment of deputies to the PSB
members who would be responsible, each under the aegis of his own
department, for formulating policy guidance and evaluation for all
covert political and psychological operations. There is little doubt that
such a set-up would enable CIA to function more effectively and re-
sponsibly in this field and I can see certain advantages from the De-
partment of State’s point of view in that decisions be by a departmen-
tal group rather than solely by State with tacit or other concurrence by
Defense. However, I can foresee several serious dangers from our point
of view unless this project were to be extremely carefully worked out
in terms of our own organization.

First, it seems to me that our present small office, functioning for

and under the direct control of Mr. Matthews is, while not perfect, a
very effective means of pulling together day-to-day operations on the
covert side with all the responsible political officers of the Department.
We know what is going on and can work very closely with the Assist-
ant Secretaries and their Deputies and are in a position constantly to
guide the thinking of working-level people in CIA/opc.

Covert political warfare is so alien to the normal concepts of Amer-

ican government in the past, is so labyrinthine and delicate, that it
seems to me maturity of judgment and experience plus the career of-
ficer’s intuitive sense of political factors are essential factors in dealing
with the problem on the day-to-day working levels of the bureaus. Ex-
perience, I believe, will demonstrate that the deputies proposed would
in a very short time tend to become involved exclusively in high-level
decisions and relationships which would isolate them from the inti-
mate contact with the diverse parts of the Department and CIA, which
we now maintain.

To set up a new mechanism within the Department to perform our

function seems to me dangerous to our ends. I think particularly the

336 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Secret; Security Information.

See Attachment 1 above.

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“Secretariat” approach would tend to place these functions in a rou-
tine and perhaps an unimaginative context in which I do not believe
they can be fitted. I am quite aware that our present set-up is viewed
with horror by organizational and managerial eyes. Nevertheless, I be-
lieve the nature of the problem requires an unorthodox approach. In
other words, if we appoint the deputies to sit in the PSB, I believe they
should be supported by practically the same set-up which we now have
under Mr. Matthews.

We must also consider that the Deputy Under Secretary for Sub-

stantive Affairs is likely always to be a high-calibre substantive officer.
Under the vicissitudes of our system this would not necessarily be true
for future Under Secretaries.

General Smith says, “It would be essential that these selected of-

ficers (the deputies) have competence to speak authoritatively and de-
finitively on the various matters to be considered, both in their capac-
ity as advisors and staff officers of the three principals and as
representatives of the departments from which they are seconded (

sic

Time would be lost and insecurity would result from formal reference
of cold war projects to the routine machinery of the major departments,
since this would have the inevitable result of allowing these matters to
get down into the depths of departmental staffs and to be fought over
and widely discussed by a large number of relatively junior officials.
Hence, the selected staff officers would have to be held responsible by
the principals for the necessary amount of coordinating and checking
within their departments.”

In the last analysis this becomes a question of individuals. If we

were to set this proposal up tomorrow the individuals would be your-
self and General Magruder. This would work beautifully because both
of you have several years of intimate experience, knowledge of pitfalls,
extensive cooperating contacts—built up over several years also through
selected individuals—and the requisite qualities of mind for the job. Here
also we would run into the violent objection of managers that you can-
not rely upon individuals. Any comparably competent officers must be
able to take over at any time. I think this is the exception that proves the
rule. With the departure of yourself shortly and the possible departure
of General Magruder at any time, I have a strong feeling that we might
be getting into a very undesirable position. Furthermore, I do not think
General Smith’s generalization as to Departmental staffs can be applied
to the Department of State as it could to CIA or to the Pentagon. Our
substantive staffs are relatively small and highly coordinated in the tra-
ditional pattern of Foreign Office operation.

This matter of our own internal set-up should have the most care-

ful consideration before we agree to modifications. This is something
which is going to take a large amount of thought and foresight, but my

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first reaction is that to be successful we should have to maintain some-
thing within our own building very similar to what we have now.

I am thoroughly in accord with General Smith’s stresses on the

need for constant evaluation of covert programs and auditing even as
to detail. Carefully worked out, the mechanism he proposes might be
the best means of achieving this.

Kenneth C. Krentz

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

130. Memorandum From Robert P. Joyce of the Policy Planning

Staff to the Director of the Bureau of German Affairs
(Riddleberger)

Washington, October 10, 1952.

SUBJECT

Liaison Relationships between OPC of CIA and the Department of State

As you are aware, under NSC Directives the Department of State

has certain responsibilities for providing political guidance to the or-
ganization within the CIA which engages in certain activities which
might be generally referred to as within the field of political warfare.
Primary responsibility for providing this counsel, advice, guidance and
control is vested in Mr. H. Freeman Matthews, and I have responsibil-
ity as his subordinate for the day to day operation of this function. In
the performance of these duties, members of this office and I on occa-
sion consult with you when important policy matters are under con-
sideration. The ordinary relationship is, however, with the various
Deputy Assistant Secretaries and the office Directors and their

338 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–54, 103.11/10–1052. Top Se-

cret; Security Information. Copies were sent to EUR–Perkins, FE–Allison, NEA–Byroade,
and ARA–Miller. Riddleberger’s handwritten note on the first page reads: “Discussed
with Joyce. No answer required. JWR, 10/16/52.”

On August 1, OPC merged with the CIA’s Office of Special Operations to form

the Directorate of Plans, under Deputy Director for Plans Frank G. Wisner. The acronym
OPC was not used in CIA after that date.

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Deputies. On occasion, when a particular situation in a particular coun-
try demands and is receiving close attention by the CIA, officers in
charge are brought in.

My colleagues (Kenneth C. Krentz, Lampton Berry, William

McFadden) and I arrange personal meetings where the appropriate of-
ficial of the CIA is able to consult directly with the appropriate official
of the Department of State. I have found it desirable to attend these
meetings or to see to it that one of my colleagues is present. On occa-
sion, when the CIA is engaging in important operations in a particu-
lar country in a rapidly developing situation, my office has authorized
a continuing and sometimes daily direct relationship between the CIA
official concerned and the appropriate officer of the Department. In all
these contacts, however, my office is kept advised as to the nature of
the business and the decisions, if any, which were taken. This liaison
control has proved to be necessary in order that I may be in a position
to be continuously aware of the political advice being supplied to OPC
of CIA and in order that matters of importance may be brought to the
attention of Mr. Matthews for final decision.

OPC of CIA has expanded very rapidly indeed during the past

four years. From a small group of about [

number not declassified

] per-

sons in 1948, I believe the organization now has on its rolls some [

num-

ber not declassified

] persons. The activities of this section of CIA have

expanded enormously in scope and magnitude on a world wide basis.
This situation has meant (up until recently, for reasons which need not
be gone into here) that requests for political guidance and consequently
the need for increasing direct contact between CIA officials and offi-
cers of the Department of State has greatly increased. The job of chan-
nelizing and controlling these contacts has been difficult but, in my
opinion, necessary both in the interests of security and efficiency in
seeing to it that OPC obtains the most carefully considered advice from
the most competent and responsible officers in the Department.

A great number of officers of OPC of CIA are on terms of personal

friendship with many political officers of this Department, and there
has been a continuing tendency for informal contacts between such
persons on both sides of the house. It is very difficult, and sometimes
undesirable, to endeavor to control too stringently these relationships
which are occasionally fruitful. On the other hand, these personal re-
lationships sometimes work against important security considerations,
and on occasion the CIA man talks operations with his Department of
State friend who may talk policy. There have been occasions when con-
tacts of this nature result in the CIA man considering that he has ob-
tained a policy view or even on occasion a green light from his De-
partmental contact. In addition to these informal contacts, there is a
constant disposition on the part of some CIA officials to deal directly

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with his “opposite number” in the Department of State at times with-
out clearance within the CIA or with my office. I believe it will be un-
derstood that although certain “opposite number” contacts are on oc-
casion desirable, they should nevertheless be controlled. There have
been instances in the past when CIA officials have considered and re-
ported that they have received policy decisions or “no objection” re-
sponses from certain Departmental officers following direct and unco-
ordinated contacts.

This situation has been discussed on many occasions with Mr.

Frank Wisner, who has had his own difficulties within the CIA in con-
trolling and channeling relationships between OPC and the Depart-
ment of State. Recently Ambassador Lewis Clark, who is presently with
the CIA, has been placed in control of liaison between OPC of CIA and
this Department. He is preparing an inventory of all contacts between
OPC officials and political officers of this Department. He is discover-
ing that there have developed relationships such as described in the
preceding paragraph and that these contacts sometimes caused confu-
sion and duplication. Mr. Clark is tightening up this liaison relation-
ship within OPC, and his office will be the clearing house for all meet-
ings between OPC officers and the political officers of the Department
of State. He has requested, and I have agreed, that a renewed endeavor
be made within this Department to insure that all meetings involving
policy guidance shall be arranged for or passed upon by my office.

The purpose of this memorandum is to request that you bring this

matter to the attention of your Deputy and your office Directors. It
might be suggested to them that they should have no further direct
dealings with CIA officials on policy matters without clearance with
my office. Only in exceptional cases, should contact be below the
Deputy office director level. Exceptions should be cleared by my office
and the office director concerned. I am sure that you will understand
that there is no desire on my part to interpose myself or to choke off
useful and desirable contacts between officials of the CIA and appro-
priate political officers of the Department. I believe that you will agree
that this degree of control is necessary in order to 1) prevent misun-
derstandings of the Department’s position from developing within the
CIA; 2) insure that political advice and guidance proffered by one De-
partmental official is coordinated with other areas of the Department;
3) maintain a necessary degree of security with regard to the opera-
tions of the CIA and the relationship between OPC and the Depart-
ment of State under NSC Directives, and 4) insure that all substantive
and important policy guidance decisions are placed before Deputy Un-
der Secretary Matthews.

RPJ

340 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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320-672/B428-S/11008

131. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Smith to

the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council
(Lay)

Washington, October 14, 1952.

SUBJECT

A Project to Provide a More Adequate Basis for Planning for the Security of the
United States (NSC Action No. 543)

1. On August 30, 1951, by NSC Action No. 543, the National Se-

curity Council directed that the Director of Central Intelligence pre-
pare, in collaboration with the Interdepartmental Committee on In-
ternal Security (ICIS), the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference
(IIC), and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), a summary evaluation of the
net capability of the USSR to injure the Continental United States.
The NSC directive required that this summary evaluation be pre-
pared upon completion of basic studies by the Intelligence Advisory
Committee (IAC) under the direction of its Chairman, the Director
of Central Intelligence; by the IIC; by the JCS with collaboration, as
required, of the Federal Civil Defense Administration, (FCDA); and
by the ICIS with collaboration, as required, of the FCDA, as indicated
Tab A.

2. The IAC study was published on October 23, 1951 as Special

Estimate 14, “Soviet Capabilities for a Military Attack on the United
States before July 1952.”

The IIC study dated October 10, 1951,

and the ICIS study of May 15, 1952 are enclosed herewith as Tab B.

Because of the sensitive nature of the JCS study, it was not distributed
outside the JCS organization. Members of the working group which
drafted the summary evaluation were briefed orally on its contents.

3. The attached summary evaluation represents a step forward in

planning for the security of the United States and is transmitted as
an example of the caliber of work currently to be expected. In the

The Intelligence Community 341

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence

Job 80–R1440R, Box 3, Folder 10. Top Secret; Security Information. Smith’s memoran-
dum is attached to an October 21 covering memorandum from Acting Executive Secre-
tary Gleason to the NSC, which indicates that the NSC would “at an early meeting” con-
sider the recommendations contained in paragraph 5 of Smith’s memorandum. See
Document 137.

Document 86.

Not printed. A copy is in National Archives, RG 263, Central Intelligence Agency

Files.

Not enclosed but available upon request to the Executive Secretary. [Footnote in

the original.]

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following important respects, however, it falls far short of supplying
the estimates essential to security planning:

a. An evaluation of the USSR’s capability to injure the United

States should contain a plain statement of the estimated percentage of
reduction in US capabilities likely to result from Soviet attack; specif-
ically, percentage reduction in the fields of: US military strength in be-
ing, atomic counterattack capability, industrial production, and ability
to produce new weapons of critical importance.

b. To provide guidance in current planning for US security, evalu-

ations on this subject should be projected into the future and contain an
estimate of prospective developments in USSR’s offensive capabilities.

c. A more adequate and realistic evaluation would cover the prob-

able Soviet capabilities to injure US facilities and strengths in all parts
of the world, and not merely the capability of USSR to injure the Con-
tinental United States. Such an evaluation should include some esti-
mate of Soviet intentions in the light of net capabilities.

4. Three primary reasons why the attached paper does not meet

these requirements are:

a. We lack knowledge of Soviet plans and intentions and our

knowledge of Soviet capabilities cannot be considered complete.

b. The basic underlying studies required to produce the statement

mentioned in paragraph 3-a do not exist.

c. There is at present no machinery to plan, guide, coordinate and

produce an appraisal or estimate based on the integration of national
intelligence with military, political and economic operational data deal-
ing with our own capabilities.

5. It is believed that an appraisal of the type referred to in para-

graph 4-c would serve to provide a more adequate basis for planning
for the security of the United States. To this end it is recommended that
the National Security Council:

a. Note the attached summary evaluation as an initial effort in re-

sponse to the NSC directive issued by NSC Action No. 543, and as an
example of the kind of work currently to be expected on this type of
problem.

b. As an interim measure instruct the Director of Central Intelli-

gence to prepare, in collaboration with officials of other governmental
bodies as required,

terms of reference for a more adequate evaluation

of the USSR’s capability to injure the United States.

c. Concurrently, instruct the Director of Central Intelligence to ex-

amine, in collaboration with officials of other governmental bodies as

342 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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From this point, a line is drawn to the bottom of the page where the words “in-

cluding IIC & ICIS” were added by hand.

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needed,

the adequacy of present machinery, and the character of any

new machinery that may be required in order to plan, guide, coordinate,
and produce for the National Security Council, upon request, evalua-
tions in the nature of “Commander’s Estimates,” of the USSR’s capabil-
ities and intentions vis-à-vis the United States, based upon the integra-
tion of military, political, and economic operational data dealing with
United States’ capabilities and intentions, and national intelligence.

Walter B. Smith

Enclosure

Washington, October 6, 1952.

NET CAPABILITY OF THE USSR TO INJURE THE

CONTINENTAL US

Problem

1. To prepare a summary evaluation of the net capability of the

USSR, as of mid-1952, to injure the continental United States.

Scope

2. This evaluation considers the injury which could be inflicted on

the continental United States by USSR military action and Soviet-
inspired sabotage in connection with the initial attack and in connec-
tion with attacks immediately following. The US has substantial
strengths in being outside the continental United States, and no esti-
mate is expressed herein as to the effect of a Soviet attack on such
strengths or the likelihood that the Soviet will allocate parts of its strik-
ing power to such an attack.

Conclusions

3. The Soviet Union, as of mid-1952, has the net capability to in-

flict serious but not permanently crippling damage to the continental
strengths of the United States.

4. This Soviet capability is primarily that of surprise air attack us-

ing atomic bombs. The Soviet capability for inflicting direct damage on
the US by sabotage is small by comparison with damage that could be
inflicted by an atomic air attack. However, sabotage in conjunction with

The Intelligence Community 343

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From this point, a line is drawn connecting to the line noted in footnote 5 above.

Printed from a copy that indicates Smith signed the original.

Top Secret; Security Information.

1363_A25-A28.qxd 9/28/07 9:31 AM Page 343

an atomic air attack could significantly increase the total physical and
psychological impact. Such sabotage could include the use of atomic
weapons smuggled into the US if the Kremlin were disposed to accept
the considerably increased risk of premature disclosure which this op-
eration would entail.

5. The Soviet stockpile of atomic bombs, as of mid-1952, is prob-

ably appreciably less than 100. The nature and extent of the damage
that could be inflicted by a surprise air attack, involving the launching
against US targets of the entire Soviet stockpile of atomic bombs, would
vary according to the objectives governing the selection of targets.

a. An attack on US targets selected with the objective of inflicting

maximum overall damage to US armament production capacity and
military power would probably prevent the US from regaining its cur-
rent armament production capacity and military power for a period of
the order of 2 years.

b. An attack on US targets selected with the primary objective of

neutralizing US atomic capabilities (see sub-paragraph 6-a) would
probably not prevent an atomic counter attack from the continental US
of a size unacceptable to the Soviet Union in the light of its present de-
fenses and vulnerabilities.

c. An attack on US targets selected with the primary objective of

neutralizing US ability to sustain large scale military operations and to
produce new weapons of critical importance (see sub-paragraphs 6-b and
6-c), could, under circumstances considered probable for the enemy,
achieve such neutralization for a period of the order of 6 to 12 months.

d. Regardless of the primary objective of the attack or the basis of

target selection, the USSR is incapable of inflicting by such attack suf-
ficient mass casualties or disorganization to force US government
changes or decisions acceptable to the USSR (see sub-paragraph 6-d).

Objectives of the Attacks

6. We believe that any military action or sabotage undertaken by

the USSR against the continental US would be for the purposes listed
below. Achievement of the first three of these objectives is, for the pres-
ent at least, essential to the ultimate success of any Soviet war plan
against the western powers.

a. To prevent the launching of atomic attacks against the Soviet

Union in the light of its defenses and vulnerabilities. Probable primary
targets would include Strategic Air Command bases, aircraft and con-
trol centers, atomic production facilities and storage sites.

b. To neutralize US ability to sustain large scale military opera-

tions. Probable primary targets would include concentrated industries
critical and basic to war production; basic services, including power
and transport; ports and Naval bases; and atomic production facilities.

344 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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c. To neutralize US ability to develop or produce any new

weapons of critical importance. Probable primary targets would in-
clude Atomic Energy key facilities for new development, guided mis-
sile production and test installations, and applied research facilities.

d. To so neutralize the general industrial, economic, and psycho-

logical strength of the US that government decisions or changes ac-
ceptable to the Soviet Union would occur, or could be forced by addi-
tional pressures elsewhere in the world. Pursuit of this objective would
probably involve an effort to inflict mass casualities and cause disor-
ganization in urban areas. Probable primary targets would include all
those listed for other more specific purposes in sub-paragraphs 6-a,
6-b, and 6-c above, with the additional targets of government control
centers, population centers, and miscellaneous industry and supplies
wherever concentrated.

Method and Effectiveness of Attacks

Air Attacks.

By far the most effective means available to the

USSR for injuring the continental United States in the initial stage of
hostilities is air attack with atomic bombs. It is estimated that the USSR
is capable of carrying out air attacks against any target in the conti-
nental United States and Canada. Some targets listed as essential to its
objectives would be difficult to reach with Soviet capability of mid-
1952. USSR capabilities for air attack are estimated in detail as follows:

Penetration of US Defenses.

(1) The capability exists for the USSR to penetrate US, Alaskan

and Canadian defense with air attack at any time and place which it

might select. The factors favoring this capability are:

(a) The USSR has the initiative.

(b) The US aircraft control and warning net is not completed.

control and warning system. The extent to which the USSR can do

this is not known.

(d) The radar net will not detect low flying aircraft at dis-

tances which would make interception feasible.

(e) The US Ground Observer Corps is not yet fully effective.

(f) The regulation of air traffic into the United States is not suf-

ficiently rigid to make identification positive. Also electronic identi-

fication equipment is not available to supply all friendly aircraft.

(g) Sufficient all-weather fighters for US air defense forces are

not yet available. Crew deficiencies also exist.

(h) Russian bombers can overfly the range of US anti-aircraft

artillery.

(2) The net success in penetrating the US defenses in terms of

bombs on target would vary with the avenues chosen, the methods of

attack and depth of targets inside peripheral defenses, character of

individual targets and their local defenses, and the degree of surprise

attained. It is estimated that 65 to 85 per cent of bombs launched could

The Intelligence Community 345

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be delivered on target in an attack aimed at US armament production

facilities and military strength in general.

Effectiveness of Air Attack with Atomic Bombs.

As of mid-1952, the

USSR probably had a stockpile of 50 bombs of approximately 20 KT
yield, or the equivalent in bombs of different yields. It is possible that
the number of bombs was as low as 25 or as high as 100.

(1) Assuming that (1) the USSR had a stockpile of 100 bombs, (2) all

were allotted to the optimum targets in the US, (3) all were dropped with

near optimum placement, and (4) the entire attack was delivered in a

short period, the Soviet Union could inflict sufficient damage to prevent

the US from regaining its present armament production capacity and mil-

itary power for at least two years. However, the actual USSR stockpile is

probably appreciably less than 100 atomic weapons; optimum target

selection is improbable; and it is probable that the number of bombs de-

livered on target would be only 65 to 85 per cent of those launched. Con-

sequently the probable delay in recovery of US armament production

capacity and military power might well be less than two years.

(2) If the probable Soviet stockpile of atomic bombs were used

against US targets selected with a view to preventing the launching of

US atomic weapons (see sub-paragraph 6-a), we believe that the per-

centage of bombs on target would be substantially less than 65 to 85

percent. This estimate is based on the nature and location of the tar-

gets and on the fact that the aircraft element in these targets is mobile.

Such an attack, under circumstances considered probable for the en-

emy, would probably not prevent an atomic counter attack from the

continental US of a size unacceptable to the Soviet Union in the light

of its present defenses and vulnerabilities.

(3) If the probable Soviet stockpile were directed at the ability of

the US to sustain large scale military operations and to produce new

weapons of critical importance (see sub-paragraphs 6-b and 6-c), de-

livery capability should be high. Under circumstances considered prob-

able for the enemy, substantial neutralization of these US capabilities

could probably be achieved for a period of the order of 6 to 12 months.

(4) If the probable Soviet stockpile were used to achieve any of

the purposes stated in paragraph 6, some progress might be made to-

ward achieving the purpose described in sub-paragraph 6-d. However,

the degree of destruction required to achieve that purpose is believed

to be well beyond current Soviet capabilities.

Effectiveness of Air Attack with Conventional Bombs.

Using con-

ventional bombs, the USSR could not at the present time inflict injury
on the continental United States that would be significant in achieving
any of the purposes listed in paragraph 6.

346 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

As noted in paragraph 2 above, no estimate is expressed herein as to the effect of

a Soviet attack on US strengths overseas, or as to the likelihood that the Kremlin would
allocate parts of its striking power to such an attack. [Footnote in the original.]

US ability to sustain large scale military operations is considered here as a gen-

eral ability. If effects were analyzed in terms of sustaining particular military operations,
i.e. land operations, sea operations, air operations, amphibious and joint operations, dif-
ferent predictions would likely result for each. [Footnote in the original.]

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Effectiveness of Air Attack with Chemical, BW and Other Uncon-

ventional Weapons.

At the present time the USSR does not have the ca-

pability to use chemical, BW, or other unconventional weapons in air
attacks to achieve any of the purposes listed in paragraph 6.

Effectiveness of Airborne Troop Attacks.

The USSR could not ma-

terially contribute to the achievement of any of the purposes listed in
paragraph 6 by the use of airborne troop or commando air drops.

Effectiveness of Sea Attack.

Surface Forces.

The USSR could not inflict significant injury on

continental United States by use of Naval surface forces, as these sur-
face forces lack the strength and composition necessary for operations
against the continental United States.

Sub-surface Forces.

Soviet submarines are capable of reaching,

with little chance of detection, positions off the US coasts from which
personnel could be landed and missiles fired at land targets. There is
no evidence that the USSR as yet possesses an atomic missile that can
be fired from a submarine. Although the possibility exists that the USSR
does have such a weapon, we consider the damage resulting from such
attacks would be minor by comparison to that of atomic air attack, and
would not materially change the results to be expected from an air at-
tack which delivered the entire available stockpile.

10.

Sabotage.

The Soviet capability for inflicting direct damage on the

US by sabotage is small by comparison with damage that could be in-
flicted by an atomic air attack. However, sabotage in conjunction with an
atomic air attack could significantly increase the total physical and psy-
chological impact. Such sabotage could include the use of atomic weapons
smuggled into the US if the Kremlin were disposed to accept the con-
siderably increased risk of premature disclosure which this operation
would entail. USSR sabotage capabilities are estimated as follows:

Use of Saboteurs.

Measures to control the movement of potential

saboteurs across the borders of or within the United States do not com-
pletely prevent access to most sabotage targets in the United States. If
war occurs, however, the entry and departure of potential saboteurs
probably would be quickly and substantially curtailed. The freedom of
action of potential saboteurs also in this event would probably be
quickly and substantially curtailed by U.S. Government detention of
those Communists and others who are regarded as potential saboteurs
and of resident enemy aliens (including Soviet Bloc diplomatic and of-
ficial personnel). Plans for the accomplishment of such detention have
been prepared.

The Intelligence Community 347

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See Document 16.

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Physical Sabotage Capabilities against Specific Types of Targets

are

estimated as follows:

(1)

Industrial Installations and Facilities.

Sabotage capabilities are

high against facilities upon which a war mobilization, war production

and wartime civilian economy depend. Security supervision is main-

tained in critical plants engaged in industrial contracts with defense

agencies and also in certain essential supporting facilities. No like

supervision is maintained in plants serving the essential civilian

wartime economy. Inadequate visitor control in, and absence of au-

thority to remove potential saboteurs from, vital non-classified-contract

plants and inability to prevent Soviet inspired disruptive strikes, even

in classified-contract plants, further add to the vulnerability of these

industrial installations.

(2)

Key Military Installations

(including command facilities and other

facilities essential for logistical support of the military within an area).

Sabotage capabilities are slight in view of present deployment and readi-

ness of area military forces and other protective countermeasures.

(3)

Port Facilities.

Substantial sabotage capabilities exist, since the

program for safeguarding port facilities, adopted after evaluation of the

risks involved, has necessarily been limited primarily to major ports.

Even this limited program is proving difficult to implement in full.

(4)

Forests.

Sabotage capabilities consist chiefly of arson. Present

forest protection facilities are inadequate to prevent a substantial in-

crease in forest fire loss through sabotage. However, it is believed that

such losses would be limited to an extent that U.S. war strength would

not be critically affected.

(5)

Crops and Livestock.

While existing measure for safeguarding

the nation’s food supply are not adequate to prevent unconventional

attacks, they might serve to minimize damage thereto from such at-

tacks. It is believed that losses in this category would be limited to an

extent that U.S. war strength would not be critically affected.

(6)

Public Water Supplies

are generally vulnerable to temporary and

local BW contamination. The introduction of contaminants into water

already in a circulating system is a greater danger than such introduc-

tion on watersheds or in reservoirs.

(7)

Essential Government Administrative Operations.

Saboteurs have

some capability for assassination of key government officials, notwith-

standing protective measures to which they have been alerted. Sabo-

teurs also have the capability for disrupting the continuity of essential

and other government operations by the clandestine introduction of

chemical or biological agents into public buildings. Against this capa-

bility, existing countermeasures are only slightly effective.

Sabotage Devices.

Potential saboteurs can readily obtain a wide

variety of sabotage devices, including chemical and biological agents.
They can also obtain or produce non-fissionable component parts of
atomic bombs. Each of the foregoing is available in the United States or
procurable through smuggling, for which substantial opportunities ex-
ist over United States land and sea frontiers and through abuse of diplo-
matic immunity and courtesy. There also exists the possibility of intro-
ducing assembled atomic bombs from abroad by such smuggling. The
effective limit on sabotage capability will continue to be determined by

348 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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US controls on movements of persons and materials and on access to
critical targets rather than by the availability of sabotage devices.

With regard to BW agents, programs pertaining to disease report-

ing, immunization, research, training, stockpiling, alertness, protection
of veterinary biologicals and physical security of essential buildings
are under way in the appropriate agencies. Satisfactory execution of
these programs is essential to adequate defense against overt as well
as clandestine biological warfare attack.

Non-physical Sabotage.

While the continued propaganda and

other subversive efforts of the Communists probably are not without
some result, the prosecutions of national and local Communist leaders,
plus the increasing awareness of the American public of the seriousness
of this threat, are reducing the Communist potential in this field.

Tab A

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVE

A PROJECT TO PROVIDE A MORE ADEQUATE BASIS FOR

PLANNING FOR THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES

1. Pursuant to authorization by the President there is hereby di-

rected the development of the following comprehensive studies in or-
der to provide a more adequate basis for planning for the security of
the United States.

a. An estimate of the capability of the USSR to launch a military

attack on the Continental United States, to be prepared under the di-

rection of the Director of Central Intelligence as Chairman of the In-

telligence Advisory Committee.

b. An estimate of the capability of the USSR to conduct sabotage

and otherwise disrupt internal U.S. activities, to be prepared by the In-

terdepartmental Intelligence Conference.

c. An evaluation of U.S. military capability to counter potential

enemy capabilities as estimated in subparagraph a above, and an esti-

mate of the probable damage to the United States resulting from such

attack, to be prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the collabora-

tion, as required, of the Federal Civil Defense Administration.

d. An evaluation of ways and means available to counter poten-

tial enemy capabilities as estimated in subparagraph b above, and an

estimate of the probable damage to the United States resulting from

such enemy actions, to be prepared by the Interdepartmental Com-

mittee on Internal Security with the collaboration, as required of the

Federal Civil Defense Administration.

The Intelligence Community 349

Top Secret; Security Information.

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2. Upon the completion of the foregoing studies there will be pre-

pared by the Director of Central Intelligence in collaboration with the
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, the Interdepart-
mental Intelligence Conference and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a summary
evaluation of the net capability of the USSR to injure the Continental
United States.

3. The summary evaluation referred to in paragraph 2 above shall

be completed as soon as possible and shall be forwarded to the Na-
tional Security Council. Access thereto will be restricted to as few in-
dividuals as possible and only on an absolute need-to-know basis.

132. Memorandum From President Truman to Secretary of State

Acheson and Secretary of Defense Lovett

Washington, October 24, 1952.

SUBJECT

Communications Intelligence Activities

The communications intelligence (COMINT) activities of the

United States are a national responsibility. They must be so organized
and managed as to exploit to the maximum the available resources in
all participating departments and agencies and to satisfy the legitimate
intelligence requirements of all such departments and agencies.

I therefore designate the Secretaries of State and Defense as a Spe-

cial Committee of the National Security Council for COMINT, which
Committee shall, with the assistance of the Director of Central Intelli-
gence, establish policies governing COMINT activities, and keep me
advised of such policies through the Executive Secretary of the Na-
tional Security Council.

I further designate the Department of Defense as executive agent

of the Government, for the production of COMINT information.

I direct this Special Committee to prepare and issue directives

which shall include the provisions set forth below and such other pro-
visions as the Special Committee may determine to be necessary.

A directive to the United States Communications Intelligence Board

(USCIB).

This directive will replace the National Security Council In-

350 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: National Security Agency, Center For Cryptologic History. Top Secret.

320-672/B428-S/11008

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telligence Directive No. 9,

and shall prescribe USCIB’s new composi-

tion, responsibilities and procedures in the COMINT fields. This di-
rective shall include the following provisions:

a. USCIB shall be reconstituted as a body acting for and under the

Special Committee, and shall operate in accordance with the provisions
of the new directive. Only those departments or agencies represented
in USCIB are authorized to engage in COMINT activities.

b. The Board shall be composed of the following members:

(1) The Director of Central Intelligence, who shall be the Chair-

man of the Board.

(2) A representative of the Secretary of State.

(3) A representative of the Secretary of Defense.

(4) A representative of the Director of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation.

(5) The Director of the National Security Agency.

(6) A representative of the Department of the Army.

(7) A representative of the Department of the Navy.

(8) A representative of the Department of the Air Force.

(9) A representative of the Central Intelligence Agency.

c. The Board shall have a staff headed by an executive secretary

who shall be appointed by the Chairman with the approval of the ma-
jority of the Board.

d. It shall be the duty of the Board to advise and make recom-

mendations to the Secretary of Defense, in accordance with the fol-
lowing procedure, with respect to any matter relating to communica-
tions intelligence which falls within the jurisdiction of the Director of
NSA.

(1) The Board shall reach its decision by a majority vote. Each

member of the Board shall have one vote except the representatives of
the Secretary of State and of the Central Intelligence Agency who shall
each have two votes. The Director of Central Intelligence, as Chairman,
will have no vote. In the event that the Board votes and reaches a de-
cision, any dissenting member of the Board may appeal from such de-
cision within 7 days to the Special Committee. In the event that the
Board votes but fails to reach a decision, any member of the Board may
appeal within 7 days to the Special Committee. In either event the Spe-
cial Committee shall review the matter, and its determination thereon
shall be final. Appeals by the Director of NSA and/or the representa-
tives of the Military Departments shall only be filed with the approval
of the Secretary of Defense.

(2) If any matter is voted on by the Board but—

The Intelligence Community 351

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Dated March 10, 1950; see

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelli-

gence Establishment, Document 435. NSCID No. 9 Revised is printed as Document 257.

1363_A25-A28.qxd 9/28/07 9:31 AM Page 351

(a) no decision is reached and any member files an appeal;

(b) a decision is reached in which the representative of the Secre-

tary of Defense does not concur and files an appeal; no action shall be

taken with respect to the subject matter until the appeal is decided, pro-

vided that, if the Secretary of Defense determines, after consultation with

the Secretary of State, that the subject matter presents a problem of an

emergency nature and requires immediate action, his decision shall

govern, pending the result of the appeal. In such an emergency situa-

tion the appeal may be taken directly to the President.

(3) Recommendations of the Board adopted in accordance with

the foregoing procedures shall be binding on the Secretary of Defense.
Except on matters which have been voted on by the Board, the Direc-
tor of NSA shall discharge his responsibilities in accordance with his
own judgment, subject to the direction of the Secretary of Defense.

(4) The Director of NSA shall make such reports and furnish such

information from time to time to the Board, either orally or in writing,
as the Board may request, and shall bring to the attention of the Board
either in such reports or otherwise any new major policies or programs
in advance of their adoption by him.

e. It shall also be the duty of the Board as to matters not falling

within the jurisdiction of NSA;

(1) To coordinate the communications intelligence activities

among all departments and agencies authorized by the President to
participate therein;

(2) To initiate, to formulate policies concerning, and subject to the

provisions of NSCID No. 5,

to supervise all arrangements with for-

eign governments in the field of communications intelligence; and

(3) to consider and make recommendations concerning policies

relating to communications intelligence of common interest to the de-
partments and agencies, including security standards and practices,
and, for this purpose, to investigate and study the standards and prac-
tices of such departments and agencies in utilizing and protecting
COMINT information.

f. Any recommendation of the Board with respect to the matters

described in paragraph e above shall be binding on all departments or
agencies of the Government if it is adopted by the unanimous vote of
the members of the Board. Recommendations approved by a majority,
but not all, of the members of the Board shall be transmitted by it to
the Special Committee for such action as the Special Committee may
see fit to take.

g. The Board will meet monthly, or oftener at the call of the Chair-

man or any member, and shall determine its own procedures.

352 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Document 255.

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A directive to the Secretary of Defense.

This directive shall include

the following provisions:

a. Subject to the specific provisions of this directive, the Secretary

of Defense may delegate in whole or in part authority over the Direc-
tor of NSA within his department as he sees fit.

b. The COMINT mission of the National Security Agency (NSA)

shall be to provide an effective, unified organization and control of the
communications intelligence activities of the United States conducted
against foreign governments, to provide for integrated operational poli-
cies and procedures pertaining thereto. As used in this directive, the
terms “communications intelligence” or “COMINT” shall be construed
to mean all procedures and methods used in the interception of com-
munications other than foreign press and propaganda broadcasts and
the obtaining of information from such communications by other than
the intended recipients,

but shall exclude censorship and the produc-

tion and dissemination of finished intelligence.

c. NSA shall be administered by a Director, designated by the Sec-

retary of Defense after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who
shall serve for a minimum term of 4 years and who shall be eligible
for reappointment. The Director shall be a career commissioned offi-
cer of the armed services on active or reactivated status, and shall en-
joy at least 3-star rank during the period of his incumbency.

d. Under the Secretary of Defense, and in accordance with approved

policies of USCIB, the Director of NSA shall be responsible for accom-
plishing the mission of NSA. For this purpose all COMINT collection and
production resources of the United States are placed under his opera-
tional and technical control. When action by the Chiefs of the operating
agencies of the Services or civilian departments or agencies is required,
the Director shall normally issue instructions pertaining to COMINT op-
erations through them. However, due to the unique technical character
of COMINT operations, the Director is authorized to issue direct to any
operating elements under his operational control task assignments and
pertinent instructions which are within the capacity of such elements to
accomplish. He shall also have direct access to, and direct communica-
tion with, any elements of the Service or civilian COMINT agencies on
any other matters of operational and technical control as may be neces-
sary, and he is authorized to obtain such information and intelligence ma-
terial from them as he may require. All instructions issued by the Direc-
tor under the authority provided in this paragraph shall be mandatory,
subject only to appeal to the Secretary of Defense by the Chief of Service
or head of civilian department or agency concerned.

The Intelligence Community 353

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e. Specific responsibilities of the Director of NSA include the

following:

(1) Formulating necessary operational plans and policies for the

conduct of the U.S. COMINT activities.

(2) Conducting COMINT activities, including research and de-

velopment, as required to meet the needs of the departments and agen-

cies which are authorized to receive the products of COMINT.

(3) Determining, and submitting to appropriate authorities, re-

quirements for logistic support for the conduct of COMINT activities,

together with specific recommendations as to what each of the respon-

sible departments and agencies of the Government should supply.

(4) Within NSA’s field of authorized operations prescribing req-

uisite security regulations covering operating practices, including the

transmission, handling and distribution of COMINT material within

and among the COMINT elements under his operational or technical

control; and exercising the necessary monitoring and supervisory con-

trol, including inspections if necessary, to ensure compliance with the

regulations.

(5) Subject to the authorities granted the Director of Central In-

telligence under NSCID No. 5, conducting all liaison on COMINT mat-

ters with foreign governmental communications intelligence agencies.

f. To the extent he deems feasible and in consonance with the aims

of maximum over-all efficiency, economy, and effectiveness, the Direc-
tor shall centralize or consolidate the performance of COMINT func-
tions for which he is responsible. It is recognized that in certain cir-
cumstances elements of the Armed Forces and other agencies being
served will require close COMINT support. Where necessary for this
close support, direct operational control of specified COMINT facili-
ties and resources will be delegated by the Director, during such peri-
ods and for such tasks as are determined by him, to military com-
manders or to the Chiefs of other agencies supported.

g. The Director shall exercise such administrative control over

COMINT activities as he deems necessary to the effective performance
of his mission. Otherwise, administrative control of personnel and fa-
cilities will remain with the departments and agencies providing them.

h. The Director shall make provision for participation by repre-

sentatives of each of the departments and agencies eligible to receive
COMINT products in those offices of NSA where priorities of intercept
and processing are finally planned.

i. The Director shall have a civilian deputy whose primary re-

sponsibility shall be to ensure the mobilization and effective employ-
ment of the best available human and scientific resources in the field
of cryptologic research and development.

j. Nothing in this directive shall contravene the responsibilities of

the individual departments and agencies for the final evaluation of
COMINT information, its synthesis with information from other
sources, and the dissemination of finished intelligence to users.

354 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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3. The special nature of COMINT activities requires that they be

treated in all respects as being outside the framework of other or gen-
eral intelligence activities. Orders, directives, policies, or recommen-
dations of any authority of the Executive Branch relating to the col-
lection, production, security, handling, dissemination, or utilization of
intelligence, and/or classified material, shall not be applicable to
COMINT activities, unless specifically so stated and issued by compe-
tent departmental or agency authority represented on the Board. Other
National Security Council Intelligence Directives to the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence shall be construed as non-applicable to COMINT ac-
tivities, unless the National Security Council has made its directive
specifically applicable to COMINT.

Pursuant to this revision of NSCID No. 9, the National Security Agency was es-

tablished on November 4.

133. Report by the Psychological Strategy Board

PSB D–34

Washington, October 30, 1952.

NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT FOR THE

PERIOD JULY 1, 1952 THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 1952

[Omitted here are a title page, a copy of the November 3 trans-

mittal memorandum from Director Alan G. Kirk to NSC Executive Sec-
retary Lay, and a Table of Contents.]

I. Significant Psychological Activities During the

Period Under Review

1. The Board presents below a brief evaluative summary of psy-

chological activities during the reporting period on the part of the de-
partments and agencies responsible for psychological operations.

Capabilities by Area

2. Some progress toward our psychological goals has been

achieved in certain areas. Wide geographical gaps remain, however, in

The Intelligence Community 355

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 333, PSB D–34. Top

Secret; Security Information; Eyes Only.

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our capabilities for making an immediately effective psychological con-
tribution to the reduction and retraction of Soviet power and influence.
These gaps include the USSR itself, Communist China and most of the
European satellites. In other areas there has been progress, especially
in building capabilities for future development.

3. Radio broadcasting currently is the major active element being

employed in the psychological field against the USSR. The Russian
“jamming” continues to be a serious obstacle, and poses a problem in
the whole field of communications. Insofar as Communist China is con-
cerned, the situation is about the same but probably with less recep-
tivity due to shortages of receiving facilities among the masses.

Anti-American Attitudes

4. In the free world and especially in Western Europe, specific

grievances and generalized discontents continue to find expression in
anti-American sentiments and resentments of overt United States prop-
aganda and pressure. During the reporting period a substantial increase
was made in the volume of guidance and support material for indirect
and non-attributable propaganda. However, the above trend makes
clear the importance of still further increasing our efforts to develop
indirect and non-attributable information activities.

Western Europe

5. The benefactor-beneficiary relationship in this area continues to

cause difficulty for our psychological efforts to develop attitudes fa-
vorable to the position-of-strength strategy. European enthusiasm con-
tinues to lag for institutions looked on as specifically military, i.e.,
NATO and EDC. However, U.S. psychological action has contributed
to an increasing awareness of the communist danger in some countries,
notably France and Sweden; to the development of pro-integration at-
titudes in Western Germany; and to progress toward European func-
tional and political unity. All these gains, taken together with the
growth of military strength in Europe, contributed to counteracting the
spread of neutralist sentiments.

Middle East

6. The political crisis in Iran has materially reduced U.S. capabil-

ities to influence the present trend of events in that country, though
some limited results of non-attributable activities are reported. The
danger of further deterioration in Iran emphasizes the importance of
rapid preparation of psychological activities in neighboring countries,
where repercussions of such deterioration would be felt. In Egypt, the
political crisis similarly reduced current capabilities, but the present
situation contains both favorable and unfavorable elements that make
the future uncertain. In the area as a whole, little progress in the psy-

356 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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chological field can be reported for the quarter toward the achievement
of national policy objectives. A notable contribution to the national psy-
chological effort in the area, however, was the airlift by the United
States Air Force of some 3,800 Moslem pilgrims from Beirut to Jidda.

Far East

7. In Southeast Asia, awareness of United States aid was increased

appreciably during the reporting period by the psychological impact
of TCA and MSA agricultural, public health, and other aid programs.
Psychological capabilities in Southeast Asia have been expanded, es-
pecially in the non-attributable field, but little increase in current ef-
fectiveness is reported. The tendency in the area to identify the United
States with European colonial powers, and with indigenous leadership
groups which are opposed by revolutionary nationalist movements,
continues to present a psychological obstacle. In Japan, certain non-
attributable activities in the labor field continue to make progress.

Korea

8. Aside from direct psychological warfare in support of hostili-

ties, the psychological effort in Korea has exerted pressure on the com-
munists for an armistice and has stressed the principle of voluntary
repatriation of prisoners of war. This principle has gained widespread
acceptance in the non-communist world.

“Hate America” Propaganda

9. All the reporting departments and agencies have been concerned

with combatting the Soviet-Communist “Hate America” propaganda
campaign. A large volume of guidance and support material on this sub-
ject was provided for both overt and non-attributable propaganda chan-
nels. Emphasis was placed on the absurdity and evil purpose of the hate
campaign. Special steps were taken to coordinate the release by the De-
partment of Defense and its components of information on biological
and chemical warfare. The effectiveness of these activities cannot be
gauged in isolation from other United States operations.

Military Assets for the “Cold War”

10. A number of actions and programs of the Department of De-

fense and the military services during the reporting period, particularly
in Western Europe and the Middle East, illustrate the type of contribu-
tion these services can make to the national psychological effort. How-
ever, it is noted that there remains an unexploited potential for the use
of military psychological warfare assets in support of approved national
peacetime programs; but that considerable difficulty is encountered in ex-
ploiting this potential in the absence of specific authority and missions
upon which military psychological activities in peacetime may be based.
The feasibility of making such a delineation is under study.

The Intelligence Community 357

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[Omitted here are Part II, “The Work of the PSB;” Part III, “Sum-

maries of Reports”: A. Department of State, B. Department of Defense,
C. Central Intelligence Agency, and D. Field Representatives of Mutual
Security Agency; and Annexes A and B.]

134. Editorial Note

On November 5, 1952, James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary of the

National Security Council, transmitted a “Key Data Book” prepared by
the NSC Reporting Unit to President Truman. This briefing book con-
tained sections on the national psychological program and the foreign
intelligence program. For text, see

Foreign Relations,

1952–1954, volume

II, Part 1, pages 165–181.

135. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National

Security Council (Lay) to the National Security Council

Washington, November 13, 1952.

SUBJECT

Procedure for NSC 10/5 Matters

At the request of the Director of Central Intelligence, his memo-

randum outlining the procedures which the Psychological Strategy
Board has agreed to follow in carrying out its responsibilities under
NSC 10/5,

is transmitted herewith for the information of the statutory

members of the Council.

It is requested that special security precautions be taken in the handling

of this memorandum.

James S. Lay, Jr.

358 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s Secretary’s Files,

Subject File. Top Secret. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the Director of Central Intelligence (without enclosure), and the Director of the Psycho-
logical Strategy Board (without enclosure).

For NSC 10/5, see Document 90.

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Annex

Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Smith to
the Members of the Psychological Strategy Board

Washington, October 30, 1952.

SUBJECT

Procedure for NSC 10/5 Matters

In the field of unconventional and psychological operations the

Central Intelligence Agency is an executive and operating agency
charged with carrying out projects in support of national policies. These
projects include political and paramilitary operations, the general de-
sirability of which have been determined by the senior departments of
the Executive Branch of the Government. As an operating agent for
these departments, CIA requires more than policy guidance. The pro-
grams and major projects which it proposes to undertake in furthering
national policy should be carefully scrutinized before final approval,
and the net value of the operations themselves should be periodically
assessed by some authority outside the Agency, but representative both
of it and of the interested executive departments. The mounting cost
of these operations makes such prior assessment and continuous au-
dit a matter of great urgency.

Under the existing mechanism for providing policy guidance and

program approval, the Agency has continued in the position of having
to assume too much responsibility and authority. While in the field of
cold war both vision and imagination are essential, yet these qualities
must be controlled by selective judgment of a detached, objective
authority.

It is inevitable that cold war operations will continue over a long

period of time. They involve activities which do not lend themselves
to precise evaluation and it is impossible to judge in absolute terms the
successes or failures of particular programs. Unlike military operations
which require the continuous and increasing application of force to-
ward an abrupt and conclusive ending, activities of this type require a

The Intelligence Community 359

Top Secret; Security Information. For an earlier draft of this memorandum and

Joyce’s comments on it, see Document 129. There had been considerable discussion of
the inadequacies of the PSB preceding this memorandum. Documentation is in National
Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–54, 100.4–PSB/9–352, and ibid., S/S-NSC Files: Lot
62 D 333.

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fluctuating effort with no clear termination in prospect. For this rea-
son, it is all the more important that they should not be undertaken
unless all concerned are satisfied as to their desirability.

The responsibilities in their respective departments of the indi-

viduals who make up the PSB, and the demands made upon their time,
are such as to preclude their giving detailed study, analysis and review
to the covert operations of CIA. There is needed a method by which
these persons can depend, in the exercise of their responsibilities as
members of PSB, on the recommendations of qualified subordinates,
reserving their personal detailed consideration for those cases and mat-
ters which, by their nature, require their direct attention.

Here I have in mind the provision of a few highly qualified offi-

cers upon whom the principals could rely completely as their techni-
cal advisers, and whom their respective departments would accept in
that status. It would be essential that these selected officers have com-
petence to speak with the greatest degree of authority compatible with
the individual responsibilities of the members of the PSB on the vari-
ous matters to be considered, both in their capacity as advisers and
staff officers of the three principals and as representatives of the de-
partments from which they are seconded. Time would be lost and in-
security would result from formal reference of cold war projects to the
routine machinery of the major departments, since this would have the
inevitable result of allowing these matters to get down into the depths
of departmental staffs and to be fought over and widely discussed by
a large number of relatively junior officials. Hence, the selected staff
officers would have to be held responsible by the principals for the nec-
essary amount of coordinating and checking within their departments.

The Board set up a Panel in its paper dated February 20, 1952, sub-

ject: “Procedure for Handling 10/5 Matters in PSB”.

It is not equipped

nor staffed for prompt and decisive action. Panels of this size and na-
ture tend to be slowed down by procedural matters, and their energy
dissipated.

I believe a smaller group consisting of one representative from each

of the Departments of State and Defense and CIA, and with the Di-
rector of PSB as permanent chairman, can produce the results we de-
sire, provided these representatives have the work of this group to
which they are assigned as their primary responsibility, to take prior-
ity over any other work even, if necessary, to the exclusion of other du-
ties. I believe the Joint Chiefs of Staff should provide an advisor to this
Group and the Departments and Agency should furnish aides and cler-
ical assistance as may be necessary.

360 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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Document 104.

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I would stress to each Member of the Board the importance of se-

lecting a high-quality representative for this Group. Representatives on
the present Panel are excellent, but unhappily will not be available to us
much longer. Replacements must be found of similar stature, and who
will have the complete confidence of their respective departments and
agency. Needless to say, they require full support from the very top. The
success of this project will depend upon the persons selected by us.

Specifically, I recommend the Board amend its previous decisions

in this field and follow the procedure set forth below except in such
cases as may be otherwise provided by the President.

(1) Each Board member should designate as a member of a re-

viewing group a senior representative from his department or agency
who will be competent to represent such member in the review of NSC
10/5 programs and projects and to make recommendations thereon.
When designated, such individual should be fully empowered to ob-
tain quick, responsive and effective action on any such program and
project from any level of his department. The work incident to his as-
signment to this group should have priority over any other work so
that he will be sufficiently free of other duties to give all the time nec-
essary for such review. In the case of the Department of Defense, a gen-
eral or flag officer representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should also
be designated as military adviser to the reviewing group.

(2) The Director of PSB should chair the reviewing group.
(3) The reviewing group should not only review NSC 10/5 pro-

grams and major projects in the first instance and recommend their ap-
proval or disapproval either in whole or in part, but should also peri-
odically review such programs and projects and recommend whether
they are to be continued or discontinued, speeded or slowed, increased
or decreased.

(4) The reviewing group should propose to the PSB such amend-

ments to the present 10/5 Procedure as will implement the above rec-
ommendations, and thereafter propose to the PSB any further proce-
dures which will enable the group efficiently to expedite its review
responsibility.

(5) Final action in each case will be taken by the PSB.
If this procedure is concurred in, I recommend that it be brought

formally to the notice of the National Security Council as the method
which will be followed by the Board in carrying out its responsibilities
under NSC 10/5.

Walter B. Smith

The Intelligence Community 361

Printed from a copy that indicates Smith signed the original.

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136. Memorandum From the Director of the National Security

Agency (Canine) and Representatives of the Military Services
and Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Lovett

Washington, November 20, 1952.

SUBJECT

Formal Implementation of the Provisions of NSCID No. 9 Revised

REFERENCE

Secretary of Defense Memorandum of 4 November 1952,

subject: Interim

Implementation of NSCID No. 9 Revised

1. Pursuant to the requirements expressed in paragraph 3 of the

reference, a working group was formed and developed the inclosed
directives.

2. The proposed directives, concurred in by the undersigned, are

submitted for your approval.

3. In accordance with paragraph 1d of the reference, a list of di-

rectives, orders, or instructions relating to Communications Intelli-
gence matters issued by any authorities within the Department of De-
fense inconsistent or at variance with the provisions of NSCID No. 9
Revised or with the proposed implementing directives inclosed here-
with will be forwarded as soon as compiled.

Ralph J. Canine

Major General, US Army

Director, National Security Agency

Chairman

Robinson E. Duff

Major General, USA

Representing the Secretary of the Army

L.S. Howeth

Captain, USN

Representing the Secretary of the Navy

John B. Ackerman

Brigadier General, USAF

Representing the Secretary of the Air Force

362 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: National Security Agency, Center for Cryptologic History, Series V, A.28.

Top Secret; Security Information.

See Document 132. NSCID No. 9 Revised is printed as Document 257.

Not found.

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Edward H. Porter

Brigadier General, USAF

Representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosure

Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Lovett

Washington, December 5, 1952.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE

Secretary of the Army
Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of the Air Force
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director, Communications-Electronics
Director, National Security Agency

SUBJECT

Implementation of NSCID No. 9 Revised

REFERENCES

(a) NSCID No. 9 Revised, dated 24 October 1952
(b) Memorandum of 4 November 1952 from Secretary of Defense subject:

Interim Implementation of NSCID No. 9 Revised

1. This Directive is issued for the purpose of implementing the

provisions of reference (a) and supersedes reference (b).

2. The National Security Agency (NSA) is hereby established as an

agency within the framework of the Department of Defense with the
mission assigned to it in reference (a). For the purposes of this Directive,
NSA will be understood to consist of the Headquarters, subordinate
units, and facilities, including the personnel thereof, that are specifically
assigned or attached to, or provided for, NSA by the Secretary of De-
fense or other competent authority, and over which the Director, NSA,
exercises administrative, operational and technical control.

3. Pursuant to the provisions of reference (a), all Communications

Intelligence (COMINT) collection and production resources of the
Department of Defense are hereby placed under the operational and
technical control of the Director, NSA.

4. The Director, NSA, will arrange with the appropriate authorities

of other departments and agencies of the government for his assumption

The Intelligence Community 363

Top Secret; Security Information. Copies were sent to the Secretary of State, Di-

rector of Central Intelligence, and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
The date is handwritten on the enclosure.

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of operational and technical control of the COMINT collection and
COMINT production resources of those departments and agencies.

5. All military and civilian personnel, funds, records, equipment,

facilities, and other support available to or authorized for the Armed
Forces Security Agency (AFSA) are hereby made available to and au-
thorized for the National Security Agency. Arrangements heretofore in
effect for the provision of personnel, fiscal and other support for AFSA
shall continue in effect for NSA unless otherwise modified.

6. All directives, orders or instructions relating to COMINT mat-

ters issued by any authorities within the Department of Defense in-
consistent or at variance with the provisions of reference (a) will be im-
mediately brought to the attention of the Secretary of Defense by the
initiating authorities and/or the Director, NSA.

7. In fulfilling his assigned responsibilities, the Director, NSA, will

be guided by the provisions of reference (a) and he will:

a. Transmit the budget estimates and civilian manpower require-

ments of NSA, as approved by the Secretary of Defense, to appropri-

ate authorities for inclusion in designated appropriations of the Mili-

tary Departments or the Office of the Secretary of Defense. These

approved estimates and manpower requirements will not be subject to

review by the Military Departments.

b. Conform to the personnel, fiscal, and property accounting poli-

cies of the Secretary of Defense. A departmental property account is

authorized for NSA.

c. Review COMINT requirements, programs and budget estimates

of the Military Departments, insure the provision of an adequate bal-

anced program, and support these items in cooperation with the De-

partments concerned.

d. Establish procedures for production and procurement of spe-

cialized COMINT equipments under the cognizance of NSA.

e. Assure to the maximum practicable extent, in consonance with

Department of Defense policies, standardization of specialized COMINT

equipments and facilities.

f. Determine and make known to the Director, Communications-

Electronics, the requirements for rapid communications to meet the

needs of NSA. These will include a statement of anticipated traffic loads

and such additional data as will assist in fulfilling the requirements.

g. Determine and make known to appropriate authorities courier

service requirements as needed for the expeditious handling of

COMINT traffic and material.

h. In consonance with the policies of the Department of Defense,

provide means for review, coordination, and approval of all COMINT

research and development requirements.

i. Establish a research and development program adequate to ac-

complish the COMINT mission, and control the assignment and im-

plementation of all COMINT research and development projects.

j. In consonance with the policies of the Department of Defense,

provide technical guidance and support for COMINT training con-

ducted by the Military Departments and, to insure necessary levels of

technical competence, prescribe minimum standards for their COMINT

training curricula.

364 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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k. Conduct necessary specialized and advance COMINT training.

8. With reference to paragraph 7f above, the Director,

Communications-Electronics, with the assistance of the Joint Com-
munications-Electronics Committee, shall have the authority and re-
sponsibility for insuring that the Military Departments, within their
capabilities, fulfill the military communications requirements of NSA.

9. The COMINT responsibilities of the Military Departments will

include, among others, the following:

a. Providing the necessary COMINT facilities and resources for

the support of military operations and of the National COMINT effort

in accordance with assigned responsibilities.

b. Procuring, organizing, training, equipping, administering,

budgeting, and providing logistic support to their respective COMINT

units. This will include provision of adequate reserve programs to meet

emergency or wartime requirements.

c. Within the limits prescribed by public law and Department of

Defense policies, assigning military personnel to NSA for a minimum

period of thirty-six months. Longer assignment of specially qualified

personnel is authorized as may be arranged with the Department con-

cerned. The Military Departments may add, withdraw, or substitute

personnel within the authorized personnel strength of NSA, subject to

approval by the Director, NSA.

d. Advising the Director, NSA, regarding close support matters

and recommending the number and composition of COMINT units

needed to fulfill the close support requirements of the Departments.

e. Performing COMINT collection and production tasks as speci-

fied by the Director, NSA.

f. Submitting COMINT research and development requirements

directly to the Director, NSA, for his action, and accomplishing such

COMINT research and development and service testing as approved

or assigned by him. This does not preclude the Military Departments

from initiating and pursuing, subject to prompt notification to and ap-

proval by the Director, NSA, such research and development as may

be necessary to support their COMINT activities.

10. Where delegation of control is required in close support of a

military commander, the Director, NSA, will normally delegate opera-
tional control of specified COMINT facilities and resources to the
COMINT agency of the appropriate Military Department for assign-
ment to a subordinate unit.

11. The Director, NSA, is authorized to make requests of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, the Military Departments, and all other government
agencies and activities for information and assistance which his func-
tions and responsibilities may require and to furnish such agencies and
activities with information and assistance as appropriate.

Lovett

The Intelligence Community 365

Printed from a copy that indicates Lovett signed the original.

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Enclosure

Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Lovett

Washington, undated.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE

Secretary of the Army
Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of the Air Force
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director, Communications-Electronics
Director, National Security Agency

SUBJECT

Interim Responsibility for Communication Security

Pending the issuance of additional instructions, the responsibili-

ties for Communication Security (COMSEC) activities and related mat-
ters assigned to the Director, Armed Forces Security Agency, shall con-
tinue to be assigned to the Director, National Security Agency.

Lovett

Top Secret; Security Information.

Printed from a copy that indicates Lovett signed the original.

137. Memorandum From the Acting Deputy Director for

Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency (Amory) to
Director of Central Intelligence Smith

Washington, November 25, 1952.

SUBJECT

Senior Staff Action on the Summary Evaluation

366 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

320-672/B428-S/11008

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence,

Job 80–R01440R, Box 3, Folder 10. Top Secret. A handwritten notation on the memoran-
dum indicates it was prepared in the Office of National Estimates. A stamped notation
indicates that Smith saw the memorandum on November 26.

1363_A25-A28.qxd 9/28/07 9:31 AM Page 366

1. The Senior Staff approved paragraphs a. and b. of Enclosure A

as its recommendation for action at tomorrow’s meeting of the NSC.

2. In paragraph a., the reference to specific limitations of the sum-

mary evaluation as noted in your transmittal memorandum

was

deleted. Various individual members of the Senior Staff felt that there
are still other defects in the summary evaluation.

3. In paragraph b., your proposal for the preparation of terms of

reference was adopted, and it was further recommended that the NSC
instruct you to report on the needs for improved machinery for prepar-
ing a more adequate evaluation of the USSR’s net capability to inflict
direct injury on the United States.

4. The main point of controversy was your recommendation c., as

clarified in paragraph c. of the attached Enclosure. On this point
the Senior Staff decided to take no action at this time, on the under-
standing that you might feel free to put the proposal before the NSC
yourself.

5. The opposition to a Senior Staff recommendation at this time

came primarily from the military. JCS has just submitted to the Secre-
tary of Defense a lengthy memorandum on the subject,

which it was

felt could not be adequately considered prior to the NSC meeting. It
was evident from Admiral Wooldridge’s oral paraphrase that the JCS
view is that no additional machinery is needed to produce “Com-
mander’s Estimates,” the JCS being the agency responsible for and ca-
pable of producing such estimates.

Robert Amory, Jr.

Enclosure A

SENIOR STAFF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NSC ACTION

The National Security Council:

5. a.

Receives the summary evaluation,

Net Capability of the USSR

to Injure the Continental U.S.,

as an initial effort in response to the NSC

Directive issued by NSC Action No. 543,

and notes that it is charac-

terized by a number of limitations and inadequacies, including the fact

The Intelligence Community 367

320-672/B428-S/11008

Not found, but presumably it transmitted to the NSC a revised version of Smith’s

paper attached to Document 131.

Not found.

Top Secret.

The number “5” is handwritten in front of paragraphs a, b, and c.

Document 86.

1363_A25-A28.qxd 9/28/07 9:31 AM Page 367

that developments since the evaluation was prepared have rendered
it, in part, out of date.

5. b. Instructs the Director of Central Intelligence, in collaboration

with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Interdepartmental Intelligence Con-
ference, the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security and Of-
ficials of other governmental bodies as required, to prepare for early
submission to the NSC, terms of reference for a more adequate evalu-
ation of the USSR’s net capability to inflict direct injury on the United
States, and recommendations concerning the machinery necessary to
produce for the NSC such a coordinated evaluation.

DCI RECOMMENDATION (No Senior Staff Action)

5. c. Instructs the Director of Central Intelligence, in collaboration

with Officials of other governmental bodies as required, to examine the
adequacies of the present machinery, and to make recommendations
to the NSC concerning the character of any new machinery that may
be required in order to produce for the NSC coordinated evaluations,
in the nature of “Commander’s Estimates,” of the Soviet Bloc’s net ca-
pabilities and probable courses of action vis à vis the United States’ se-
curity interests. Such evaluations require the integration of national in-
telligence with adequate military, political, and economic operational
information on the United States’ capabilities and contemplated
courses of action.

368 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

320-672/B428-S/11008

For the discussion and the decision taken at the November 26 NSC meeting, see

Document 138. Additional documentation on this initiative, which led to the creation of
the Special Evaluation Subcommittee of the National Security Council (NSC 140),
approved by President Truman on January 19, 1953, is in

Foreign Relations,

1952–1954,

vol II., Part 1, pp. 205–208.

1363_A25-A28.qxd 9/28/07 9:31 AM Page 368

138. Memorandum for President Truman of Discussion at the

126th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, November 26, 1952.

[Omitted here are a short paragraph that indicates the President

presided at the meeting and discussion of agenda item 1: The Situa-
tion in the Far East.]

A Project To Provide a More Adequate Basis for Planning for the Se-

curity of the United States

(Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Sec-

retary, same subject, dated October 21, 1952; Memos for NSC from Ex-
ecutive Secretary, same subject, dated November 25 and 26, 1952, and
August 30, 1951;

Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject:

“Summary Evaluation of the Net Capability of the USSR to Injure the
Continental United States”, dated November 25, 1952;

NSC Action No.

543;

SE–14)

When the President turned to the second item on the Agenda Mr.

Lay called the Council’s attention to the views of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff on the report and to the latest changes recommended by the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence at the instance of the Internal Security
Committees and finally, to the two alternative recommendations made
by the Senior Staff to replace the first two recommendations by the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence. Mr. Lay pointed out that the Senior Staff
had taken no action on the third recommendation in General Smith’s
memorandum.

The President then asked General Smith to comment on the pro-

posals in his memorandum. After explaining briefly the background of
the present evaluation, General Smith summarized what he had heard
of the discussions in the Senior Staff on the first two of his three rec-
ommendations and called the Council’s attention to his most recent re-
vision of his third recommendation, which was at this point distrib-
uted to the members of the Council. General Smith then turned to the
views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and stated that he agreed with a num-
ber of the points made therein and disagreed with others. Firstly, there
could be no question of the need for the production of so-called “Com-
mander’s Estimates” for the use of the President and the National

The Intelligence Community 369

320-672/B428-S/11008

Source: Truman Library, President’s Secretary’s Files, National Security Council.

Top Secret; Security Information. Drafted on November 28, presumably by Lay.

None of these memoranda has been found, but presumably they transmitted to

the NSC versions of and comments on the paper attached to Document 131.

Not found.

Document 86.

See footnote 3, Document 131.

1363_A25-A28.qxd 9/28/07 9:31 AM Page 369

Security Council. The Joint Chiefs, said General Smith, do not believe that
the production of such estimates requires the creation of any new ma-
chinery. With this view General Smith said he could not agree, but added
that if the present evaluation actually met all the requirements of the Pres-
ident and the Council there was, of course, nothing more to be done.

General Smith then noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not be-

lieve that the Director of Central Intelligence was the appropriate offi-
cial to prepare Commander’s Estimates. With this view General Smith
found himself in agreement, but he went on to say that he did not think
that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were, themselves, the appropriate body to
prepare the kind of estimate which the President and the Council re-
quired. The data which must be amassed to provide the kind of report
that was required would by no means be purely military data. Those
agencies of the Government which were concerned with passive de-
fense, civilian defense, sabotage and the like, were also directly or in-
directly involved in the preparation of such estimates. Plainly, he con-
tinued, the problem was too large and too complicated for any one
Government agency to solve by itself. It seemed obvious to General
Smith that the National Security Council alone was the proper agency
to guide and coordinate such studies. Obviously it could not do this
directly, but it could do so by calling on the instrumentalities available
to it. With all deference to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concluded General
Smith, the problem which concerned the Council transcends the purely
military sphere, although General Smith conceded that it might well
be possible, as suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to have that body
monitor such a study provided the National Security Council was as-
sured that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would make use, in its preparation,
of the resources of all the Government agencies which were required.

The President then turned to Secretary Foster for his comment,

stating that the problem was obviously very controversial.

Secretary Foster said he would prefer to listen first to the views of

Mr. Gorrie, Mr. Wadsworth and others before stating his own.

Mr. Gorrie

expressed general agreement with the views stated by

General Smith and said that he agreed with the recommendations of-
fered to the Council by the Senior NSC Staff.

Mr. Wadsworth

also expressed agreement with the view of Gen-

eral Smith that the civilian agencies would have very significant con-
tributions to make in the preparation of such evaluations in the future.
Mr. Wadsworth further pointed out that he was not in a position to be

370 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

320-672/B428-S/11008

Jack Gorrie, Chairman of the National Security Resources Board.

James J. Wadsworth, Acting Administrator of the Federal Civil Defense

Administration.

1363_A25-A28.qxd 9/28/07 9:31 AM Page 370

as clear on this problem as he would have liked, since he had not been
permitted to examine the basic studies prepared by the Joint Chiefs
and others, to back up the conclusions which appeared in the current
report. Mr. Wadsworth concluded by stating his anxiety to be of max-
imum use in any future attempts along these lines.

Again called upon for his views, Secretary Foster stated that it

seemed to him that there were two fundamental points at issue. The
first of these was the adequacy of the present report on the net capa-
bility of the Soviet Union to inflict damage on the United States. Sec-
retary Foster said he was frank to admit that there were serious gaps
in this report as far as it constituted the basis for planning United States
courses of action. Some of these shortcomings, he added, derived from
the very nature of the beast. Such evaluations as the one in question
naturally involved the war plans of the United States. These plans are,
of course, very sensitive and the Chiefs of Staff quite properly leaned
over backward to protect the security of these plans. The inevitable re-
sult was to create difficulties for the civilian agencies, though it seemed
to him that these agencies could not appropriately expect the Joint
Chiefs to reveal the details of such plans. However, continued Secre-
tary Foster, he felt certain that he was speaking for the Joint Chiefs of
Staff when he stated that they would make available everything that
is really necessary to the production of this type of study to the ap-
propriate civilian officials if the latter were in a position to establish
their need to know. Furthermore, continued Secretary Foster, the Joint
Chiefs had expressed their readiness to provide oral presentations on
the problem to whatever group of the National Security Council it was
determined should receive such information. All-in-all, said Secretary
Foster, the present methods for producing such estimates were the best
that had been found so far and he believed, as a first attempt, the pres-
ent paper represented real progress even if it were obvious that fur-
ther progress was necessary. As a suggestion to that end, Secretary Fos-
ter thought an ad hoc committee should be set up to take a careful look
at the problem raised by General Smith’s memorandum and to try to
determine whether further evaluations of the type under consideration
should be coordinated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Director of
Central Intelligence, or by an augmented NSC staff.

Summing up, Secretary Foster said that he recommended that the

Council accept the first recommendation proposed by the Senior Staff.
As to the second Senior Staff recommendation, with respect to the
preparation of new terms of reference, there was some question as to
whether the Council ought to accept it. Whether, as Secretary Foster
put it, they patient can actually diagnose his own disease. Neverthe-
less, Secretary Foster stated that he had no specific recommendation to
substitute for the one proposed by the Senior Staff.

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The President then asked General Bradley if he desired to make

any comment.

General Bradley stated that he did not differ fundamentally with

the views expressed by General Smith. On the whole he was inclined
to believe that the NSC Staff was the group best fitted to undertake
studies such as these in the future. No single agency could do such
studies and no single agency should try. As to the furnishing of infor-
mation on United States capabilities and possible courses of action in
the military field, General Bradley emphasized that the Joint Chiefs
were wholly in favor of the “need to know” rule on sensitive material.
Within this reservation, however, the Chiefs were prepared to reveal
whatever was necessary for the preparation of such studies. In point
of fact, there were too many people who were curious about our war
plans and had no legitimate interest in them. General Bradley prom-
ised that the Joint Chiefs would do anything in their power in order
to achieve the kind of estimate needed, but would only monitor the ef-
fort as a last resort.

Asked for his views by the President, Secretary Bruce stated briefly

that he was in agreement with the recommendations proposed by the
Senior Staff.

General Smith then entered the discussion with the statement that

he was sure the Council could clean this matter up and that the differ-
ences could be ironed out. This was, he said, a phase of the old argu-
ment between G–2 and G–3. He illustrated the dilemma with which he
had been confronted in carrying out the task of preparing the present
report by noting that he had recently required certain assumptions with
respect to the civil defense capabilities of the USSR in the contingency
of an attack by the United States. We obtained these assumptions, he
stated, from the Joint Strategic planners orally, but when we came to
cast up the score and to write these vital assumptions into the report,
this was not permitted because the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not acted
on these assumptions. It was impossible to prepare a study of the net
capability of the USSR to damage the United States under such proce-
dures. Nevertheless, continued General Smith, by the use of assump-
tions supplied by the military it was certainly possible to prepare an
adequate evaluation without jeopardizing the security of war plans.

The President stated that the current discussion had been ex-

tremely interesting and productive, but that it seemed to him that the
problem posed in General Smith’s third recommendation ought to have
more study before the Council reached any conclusions on it. He ex-
pressed the hope that all the requisite agencies would get together to
provide a reasonable basis for Council action at a future meeting.

General Smith said that he thought it would be most helpful if Mr.

Amory, as a representative of the Director of Central Intelligence, could

372 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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sit down with representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in order to ex-
plain what was needed to achieve the right result.

With this proposal Secretary Foster expressed agreement and

added that he, himself, would be glad to talk with Mr. Amory.

Mr. Lay then inquired whether it was the desire of the Council to ac-

cept the two recommendations proposed by the Senior Staff, but to de-
fer action on the third recommendation proposed by General Smith and
amended by the paper which he had circulated earlier in the meeting.
The Council concurred in Mr. Lay’s understanding of the desired action.

Mr. Murray,

speaking for the Attorney General, stated that he had

one small point which involved the transposition of the words “as re-
quired” in the second recommendation by the Senior Staff. Mr. Mur-
ray stated that he was merely anxious to be assured that it was requi-
site for the Director of Central Intelligence to collaborate with all the
agencies mentioned in this paragraph in the production of the next
estimate.

Mr. Lay pointed out that this was the intention of the present lan-

guage and the Council agreed to the wording suggested by Mr. Murray.

In conclusion, Mr. Lay stated that he desired to emphasize the fact

that the NSC Staff had long recognized the need for more adequate
staff studies, not only of the type which the Council was today con-
sidering, but to provide the basis for better policy statements gener-
ally. Where such studies could best be made, whether under the NSC
Staff or elsewhere, was of course, he added, for the Council to decide,
but there could be no doubt that the NSC Staff was generally agreed
on the desirability of improvement. He felt that the NSC Staff could
undertake this work, but some reorganization would be required.

The President then repeated his view that the Council could come

to no firm conclusion on General Smith’s final recommendation at this
meeting, but that the matter should be the subject of further study.

The National Security Council:

a. Received the summary evaluation, “Net Capability of the USSR

to Injure the Continental United States”, transmitted by the reference
memorandum of October 21 and amended by the reference memo-
randum of November 25 on the same subject, as an initial effort in re-
sponse to the NSC directive issued by NSC Action No. 543, and noted
that it is characterized by a number of limitations and inadequacies,

The Intelligence Community 373

320-672/B428-S/11008

Not further identified.

Paragraphs a–c constituted NSC Action No. 687. (National Archives, RG 59,

S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) File: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security
Council)

1363_A25-A28.qxd 9/28/07 9:31 AM Page 373

including the fact that developments since the evaluation was prepared
have rendered it, in part, out of date.

b. Instructed the Director of Central Intelligence, in collaboration

with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Interdepartmental Intelligence Con-
ference, the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, and, as
required, officials of other governmental bodies, to prepare for early
submission to the National Security Council, terms of reference for a
more adequate evaluation of the USSR’s net capability to inflict direct
injury on the United States, and recommendations for the machinery
necessary to produce for the National Security Council such a coordi-
nated evaluation.

c. Deferred action, pending further study, on the recommenda-

tion in paragraph 5-c of the memorandum by the Director of Central
Intelligence enclosed with the reference memorandum of October 21,
amended as follows by the Director of Central Intelligence and circu-
lated at the meeting.

“c. Instruct the Director of Central Intelligence, in collaboration

with Officials of other governmental bodies as required, to examine the

inadequacies of the present machinery, and to make recommendations

to the NSC concerning the character of any new machinery that may

be required to produce for the NSC coordinated evaluations, in the na-

ture of ‘Commander’s Estimates,’ of the Soviet Bloc’s net capabilities

and probable courses of action vis-à-vis the United States’ security in-

terests. Such evaluations require the integration of national intelligence

with adequate military, political, and economic operational informa-

tion on the United States’ capabilities and contemplated courses of

action.”

Note:

The action in b above subsequently transmitted to the Di-

rector of Central Intelligence for implementation.

[Omitted here is discussion of agenda items 3: Reappraisal of

United States Objectives and Strategy for National Security, 4: The Na-
tional Psychological Effort, and 5: NSC Status of Projects.]

374 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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139. Paper Prepared by the Psychological Strategy Board

PSB D–31

Washington, November 26, 1952.

A STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR A NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL

PROGRAM WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO COLD WAR

OPERATIONS UNDER NSC 10/5

1. Almost all governmental policies and actions have psycholog-

ical content in that they bear on the minds and wills of other peoples.
An attempt to formulate a national psychological strategy covering
every intention and action having psychological impact in this sense
would encompass every aspect of governmental activity. This would
be an effort of unmanageable proportions. In order to formulate a na-
tional psychological strategy that will usefully subserve the national
policy it is necessary to divide the task into separate aspects of man-
ageable proportions. When we ask, “What can usefully be said about
ways and means of bringing about a retraction of Soviet power and in-
fluence?” we have selected one such aspect and have stated it in such
a way that we can perhaps deal with it. The following does not attempt
to deal with the problems involved in the distribution of resources be-
tween cold war operations and preparations in support of overt war.

2. NSC 10/5, paragraph 1, approved “the intensification of covert

operations designed in general order of emphasis to:

a. Place the maximum strain on the Soviet structure of power, in-

cluding the relationships between the USSR, its satellites and Com-

munist China; and when and where appropriate in the light of U.S.

and Soviet capabilities and the risk of war, contribute to the retraction

and reduction of Soviet power and influence to limits which no longer

constitute a threat to U.S. security.

The Intelligence Community 375

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 333, PSB D–31. Top

Secret; Security Information. A draft of this paper was sent to Under Secretary of State
Bruce, Deputy Secretary of Defense Foster, and Director of Central Intelligence Smith on
August 20 by the Director of the PSB, who described the paper as the product of half a
year’s work by a high level group under Admiral Stevens. (Ibid.) In analyzing the pa-
per for Bruce in an August 26 memorandum, Nitze stated that the chief virtue of the pa-
per was a negative: “it admits inability . . . to propose a strategic concept which outlines
a program designed to bring about a final solution of the cold war.” (Ibid.) Nitze had
made this same point to Stevens in a December 5, 1951, meeting (see Document 96). All
ellipses in the original.

In accordance with Presidential Directive of 4 April 1951, which establishes the

PSB as responsible for the formulation and promulgation, as guidance to the depart-
ments and agencies represented for psychological operations of over-all national psy-
chological objectives, policies and programs, and which defines psychological operations
as including all activities under NSC 59/1 and 10/2. [Footnote in the original. For the
Presidential Directive, see Document 60. For the text of NSC 59/1, see Document 2. For
NSC 10/2, see

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment,

Document 292. For NSC 10/5, see Document 90.]

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b. Strengthen the orientation toward the United States of the peo-

ples and nations of the free world, and increase their capacity and will

to resist Soviet domination.

c. Develop underground resistance and facilitate covert and guer-

rilla operations in strategic areas to the maximum practicable extent

consistent with 1-a above. . . .”

3. NSC 10/5, paragraph 2, directed “the Psychological Strategy

Board to assure that its strategic concept for a national psychological
program includes provision for covert operations designed to achieve
the objectives in paragraph 1 above.”

4. It is the object of this paper to outline a strategic concept for a

national psychological program with particular reference to cold war
operations under NSC 10/5. These operations are primarily covert in
character, but we believe a paper addressed to such operations will
provide a concept valuable to overt psychological operations under
NSC 59/1 as well, especially those which are concerned with bringing
about the retraction of Soviet power and influence.

5. The general objective of psychological operations in the cold

war can be subsumed under the general heading of contributing to the
“retraction and reduction of Soviet power and influence” whether by
operations designed to weaken Soviet power in the Communist orbit
or by operations designed to weaken Soviet influence by strengthen-
ing the free world.

6. Our national strategy, as defined in NSC 20/4,

paragraph 20,

is to “endeavor to achieve our general objectives by methods short of
war.” This national strategy calls for efforts to “encourage and promote
the gradual retraction of undue Russian power and influence from the
present perimeter areas around traditional Russian boundaries . . . ; to
eradicate the myth by which people remote from Soviet military in-
fluence are held in a position of subservience to Moscow . . . ; (and) to
create situations which will compel the Soviet government to recog-
nize the practical undesirability of acting on the basis of its present
concepts . . .”

7. In the absence of open hostilities, the cold war can be expected

to continue in one form or another as long as the Soviet Union, which
is to say, the Bolshevik Party, adheres to the aims and methods which it
has pursued ever since its accession to power, within as well as outside
the Party. Recognition of this—particularly public recognition—is nec-
essary for understanding and support of continuity of effort. The over-
throw of the Party by war or successful revolution appears to be the only
certain means of forcing such changes. One is excluded, and the other
so far beyond our current capabilities as to be presently unfeasible.

376 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

For NSC 20/4, see

Foreign Relations,

1948, vol. I, Part 2, pp. 662–669.

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8. We are unable at present to propose a strategic concept which

outlines a program designed to bring about a final solution of the cold
war because (a) we do not have and cannot clearly foresee the time
when we will have the capabilities, and (b), because without adequate
capabilities the risks involved are clearly disproportionate to the
probabilities of success. The time required to develop the necessary
capabilities is so great that the nature of an acceptable solution can-
not be determined with sufficient accuracy to serve as a guide. As our
capabilities increase, flexibility and opportunism in the light of events
appear presently more desirable than commitment to too specific a
goal.

9. We should continue to develop our capabilities for assist-

ing revolution and continue to re-appraise the situation. This will re-
quire both the development of further capabilities for the exploitation
of existing techniques and a major program for the development of
new techniques and approaches. It is possible that the cumulative ef-
fect of retraction of Soviet power and influence, together with future
events and the inherent problems with which the Soviet government
and the Bolshevik Party are faced may eventually bring about suffi-
cient change in their aims and methods to provide an acceptable so-
lution. Efforts to develop our capabilities and to bring about such a
retraction as opposed to a program for a definitive solution may be
regarded as the interim strategic concept for a national psychological
program.

10. Within the limits imposed by the terms of our national strat-

egy and the present level of our covert capabilities it is possible to ad-
vance certain general criteria for operations under 10/5, to test broad
fields of possible covert action against these criteria, and from a com-
bination of the two to give more precise form to the psychological op-
erations which should be prosecuted in accordance with the interim
strategic concept, and to provide an indication of priorities. Overt
propaganda should give appropriate support in accordance with pri-
orities as may be determined.

11. The general criteria which present covert operations under the

interim strategic concept should meet are those of effectiveness, feasi-
bility, acceptable risk, and flexibility.

Effectiveness:

The importance of the effects which successful op-

erations may be calculated to have in reducing Soviet influence and

power or in strengthening the free world against the exertion of Soviet

influence and power must be appreciable and must warrant the effort,

cost and risk of the operation. In general, priorities should be propor-

tional to anticipated effectiveness.

Feasibility:

Our capabilities in terms of trained manpower or ma-

terial, and local or international support, must be adequate to give rea-

sonable promise of success to the operation in the face of such capa-

bilities as the Communists may have to frustrate it.

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Acceptable risk:

The degree to which the undertaking or suc-

cessful conclusion of the operations may be calculated to provoke mil-
itary reaction from the Communists must be sufficiently limited as to
be an acceptable risk in terms of our national strategy.

Flexibility:

Operations should be of a type which lend them-

selves within reasonable limits to adaptation or modification to exploit
such opportunities or undertake such objectives as may become pos-
sible or advisable subsequent to actual initiation of the operation.

12. There is a wide range of activity currently in process to bring

about the retraction of Soviet power and influence which should con-
tinue. Many of these activities, although in themselves incapable of
producing clear and incontrovertible gains, are of great value in sup-
porting overt policies which can be expected to be effective. Omission
from the following discussion of many existing projects, does not im-
ply that they are not considered of value, but rather that the approved
projects should continue as presently conceived and planned, insofar
as they meet the above criteria.

13. Within the field of cold war covert operations, it is considered

that greatest emphasis should be placed upon the following broad
fields of activity, not necessarily in order of priority:

a. Weakening of Kremlin control over the internal assets of the

Soviet-controlled bloc, and increasingly occupying the Kremlin with

problems within this area.

b. Direct action to reduce subversive Soviet influence in those

areas of the free world that are most immediately threatened thereby.

c. Covert manipulation of key elements in unstable countries of

the free world to increase the stability and utility to the objectives of

U.S. foreign policy of those countries.

14. Within these three broad fields of activity, the following cate-

gories meet the criteria outlined above and should be given greater em-
phasis than they are currently receiving. Detailed studies may reveal
that effective action within some of these categories is beyond our ca-
pabilities. Also, events will undoubtedly indicate the desirability of
concentration on other lines of effort. This will require continuous re-
view of interim strategic policy.

Disintegration of Communist Parties Outside the Iron Curtain.

Communist parties in the free world are principal vehicles for Soviet
subversion. They are also much more accessible to us than are those
within the Iron Curtain. By a combination of covert and overt action
their effectiveness can be appreciably reduced and in some areas to-
tally nullified. Some of the means that can be employed are (a) re-
duction of financial support, (b) penetration and exposure, (c) insti-
gation of internal conflicts and dissensions among individuals and
groups, (d) outlawing of local parties, (e) legal action of all types
against individuals and groups, (f) promotion of ideological devia-

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tions, (g) creating and intensifying difficulties with local governments
and public opinion.

Individual priority studies should be made by CIA of the detailed

methods which can be most effectively employed against the CPs in
France, Italy, India, Japan, Iran, and Guatemala, and an appraisal of
the probable over-all effectiveness of such an effort should be made for
each of those countries.

A special study should be made by CIA, similar in scope, directed

towards disintegrating the influence of the CP and individual com-
munists on the present Argentine government.

Detachment of Albania.

Because of Albania’s unique geographi-

cal position, its detachment from the Soviet orbit may be feasible. The
principal advantage gained would be its psychological effects both in
subjugated countries and in areas under intense Soviet pressure, al-
though there would also be useful additional by-products of a military
nature, especially as regards the position of Yugoslavia and Greece. It
would be a demonstration that a continuing Soviet advance is not in-
evitable and that a retraction of Soviet power is practically possible. A
preliminary estimate indicates that detachment could be accomplished
by Albanian personnel and without the overt participation of Western
military forces.

A detailed plan should be made [

less than 1 line not declassified

]

covering each step in such action up to its successful completion, in-
cluding time phasing and all logistic aspects. Estimates should be
made of personnel and material requirements, together with plans
for meeting them. Detailed appraisal should be made of the probable
degree of secrecy that could be maintained throughout [

⁄

lines not

declassified

]. The extent to which preliminary disorganizing of the

Albanian economy would contribute to the success of the operation
should be appraised.

If such studies continue to indicate feasibility, the State Depart-

ment should investigate the feasibility and effectiveness of obtaining
the acquiescence or the active support of Great Britain as well as Yu-
goslavia, Greece and Italy, together with the practicability of reaching
agreements on political objectives which would preclude such future
difficulties as efforts at domination by these neighboring countries. The
necessity of recognition of such a revolutionary government should be
appraised, and the necessity, feasibility and timing of overt economic
and logistic assistance, together with its amount and cost.

Breeding Suspicion and Dissension Within the Communist System.

The inherent suspicion and lack of mutual trust and confidence

within the communist system and our own experience in exploiting
them gives grounds for belief that we would be able to increase this
suspicion far beyond what we have hitherto accomplished, to the point

The Intelligence Community 379

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of systematic removal or elimination of personnel in important and
effective positions. The communist reservoir of able and experienced
personnel is not unlimited, and individuals of demonstrated power
and effectiveness would be excellent targets. Many techniques are
available to apply to these ends, but our access to and knowledge of
conditions within the satellites indicate that the best chances of suc-
cess would be obtained by breeding distrust among satellite person-
nel and between those individuals and Moscow, although such efforts
within the Soviet Union should be included to the maximum of our
capabilities. It should be noted that this category involves a narrower
objective than broad attempts to disrupt the system by a variety of
means other than marking individuals for suspicion and distrust. It
has a definite relationship to and should be correlated with the de-
fective program.

[

1 paragraph (1

⁄

lines) not declassified

]

Efforts Directed Towards Disruption of Soviet and European Satel-

lite Economies

[

less than 1 line not declassified

The special vulnerabilities of the Soviet economic system are sub-

ject to exploitation on a strategic basis. Such exploitation can be used
to produce a reduction in economic and military potential and indi-
rectly to bring about the defection of key Communist officials. [

2 lines

not declassified

]

(1) [

1 paragraph (7 lines) not declassified

]

(2) Covert activities against illegal trade channels still offer

possibilities of effecting further appreciable reduction in the volume

of imports of strategic commodities into the Soviet orbit, [

1 line not

declassified

(3) A wide range of passive economic sabotage activities may be

undertaken by Eastern Europeans under present conditions with rela-

tive safety. If the incentive of self-interest is added, effectiveness of such

a program would be increased [

2 lines not declassified

(4) [

1 paragraph (6 lines) not declassified

]

Covert Political Action to Strengthen Critical Free World Areas

Against Developments Which Might be Favorable to Communist Objectives.

Covert action in this category, directed largely toward covert ma-

nipulation of key individuals, should be designed to shore up and ori-
ent favorably to U.S. interests the governments of areas which are crit-
ical to U.S. interests and which are in danger of developing regimes or
conditions inimical to U.S. interests. Egypt, Iran, Japan, India and cer-
tain Latin American countries should receive priority in this category.

380 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

The priority for these countries shall not be at the expense of continuing efforts

in Germany, Italy and France. [Footnote in the original.]

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Operations on Formosa and among the Overseas Chinese, directed to-
wards broadening the base of support of the Chinese Nationalist Gov-
ernment would also fall into this category.

[

⁄

lines not declassified

] should make concrete correlated propos-

als within the foregoing framework.

Recommendations

1. It is recommended that the progressive retraction and reduc-

tion of Soviet power and influence in accordance with our capabilities
and subject to the limitation of acceptable risk be accepted as the in-
terim strategic concept for a national psychological program with par-
ticular reference to cold war operations under NSC 10/5.

2. It is recommended that the responsible agencies place greatest

emphasis in these operations on the three broad fields of activity iden-
tified in paragraph 13 above. This recommendation is without preju-
dice to those arrangements now in effect whereby a responsible agency
is to make preparations for activities after D-Day in support of ap-
proved war plans.

3. It is recommended that the responsible agencies give priority

within those broad fields to determining the detailed practicability and
desirability of proceeding along the lines indicted under each category
described in paragraph 14 above. It is further recommended that where
such studies indicate that the foregoing criteria will be met, the indi-
cated actions be given priority in both national and agency programs
proportionate to their probable effectiveness.

4. It is also recommended that our covert capabilities continue to

be developed with increasing vigor along all lines whose eventual em-
ployment may be expected to bring about more drastic reductions in
Soviet power and influence.

5. It is also recommended that this interim strategic concept be

kept under continuous review, and revised in the light of future de-
velopments at least annually and also as additional categories of ac-
tion appear to meet the specified criteria.

Feasibility of Logistic Support

Acceptance of this concept is without prejudice to later logistic fea-

sibility testing by the Department of Defense of specific courses of ac-
tion which would require logistic support of that Department.

The Intelligence Community 381

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140. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Smith to

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Bradley)

Washington, December 12, 1952.

SUBJECT

Overseas CIA Logistical Support Bases

REFERENCES

a) Secretary of Defense TS Memo #23579, dated 6 October 1949, Support of

Covert Operations of CIA

b) TS Memo #81056 from CIA to Joint Subsidiary Plans Division/Joint Chiefs of

Staff, dated 13 June 1952, subject as above

c) TS Memo #81111 from Joint Subsidiary Plans Division/Joint Chiefs of Staff to

CIA, dated 26 June 1952, subject as above (SPDM–257–52)

d) TS Memo #81949 from CIA to Joint Subsidiary Plans Division/Joint Chiefs of

Staff, dated 19 August 1952, subject as above

1. In accordance with NSC 10/2

CIA is not only charged with the

mission of conducting cold war but also that of planning for covert op-
erations in time of war in collaboration with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
It is essential to establish logistical support for hot war plans prior to
D-Day. Rather than create separate parallel lines of supply for similar
materiels with the military services, it is desired to continue in collab-
oration with the Department of Defense in the establishment of sup-
port installations, to be used not only for hot war requirements but also
for CIA’s cold war support. Further, it is believed appropriate that the
agency should use Department of Defense hot war stocks for cold war
needs on a reimbursable basis.

2. Based on our operational plans, a world-wide support base con-

cept was formed locating the bases at military installations. The CIA

382 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01731R, Box 8.

Top Secret; Security Information. Sent through the Chief of the Joint Subsidiary Plans
Division. An attached note from RWF (not identified) to DCI Smith, December 10, indi-
cates that DD/P prepared the memorandum, which was approved in CPM, DD/P (with
Wisner recommending signature), and DD/A. The note indicated that JSPD had coor-
dinated the logistical planning and added that the military did not wish to go further
with detailed planning until the JCS approved the planning concept, and signing the
memorandum meant only approving the support and base concept, not the actual au-
thorization of funds. A notation on the note indicates that Smith saw it on December 12.
The enclosures, a table entitled Recapitulation for CIA Logistical Support and an earlier
December 8 draft of the memorandum, are not printed. Ellipsis in the original.

None of the references (a–d) was found.

For NSC 10/2, see

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Es-

tablishment, Document 292.

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base will be considered a tenant unit on the military base. It is con-
templated that the major bases will be located [

⁄

lines not declassified

3. A major logistical support base will consist of a CIA base head-

quarters, training, communications, medical accommodation for evac-
uees and storage for six months’ hot war requirements as well as pro-
vide logistical support for CIA operational groups or headquarters. The
latest revised estimate of requirements on a broad basis is listed in the
attached enclosure. Informal planning along the lines indicated has
been carried out by elements of CIA with the Joint Subsidiary Plans
Division of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the general planning is con-
sistent with and complementary to approved plans for wartime mili-
tary operations.

4. At such time as detailed plans are firm and approved by the

Department of Defense and this Agency, CIA accepts the obligation to
reimburse the Department of Defense for its proportionate share of
these construction requirements in accordance with Reference (a) as
follows:

“Personnel, Supplies, and Equipment will be transported to over-

seas storage points under military control and supplies and equipment

will be stored and protected at such points without reimbursement

where additional, extraordinary expenses to the Department of Defense

are not involved. . . Where the service incurs additional, extraordinary

expenses in providing transportation or establishing and maintaining

at overseas points, dumps for covert operations, the CIA must make

reimbursement therefor.”

5. It is requested that the strategic planning of this base concept

be approved, and that the military services be so advised and directed
to assist in the preparation of detailed plans.

Walter B. Smith

The Intelligence Community 383

Printed from a copy that indicates Smith signed the original.

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141. Letter From the Executive Secretary of the National Security

Council (Lay) to the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (Hoover)

Washington, December 17, 1952.

My Dear Mr. Hoover:

On October 31 you formally advised this office of certain obser-

vations in connection with National Security Council Intelligence Di-
rective No. 9 (NSCID 9) as revised on October 24,

and you requested

that they be brought to the attention of the appropriate members of the
NSC. Those observations were, in effect, as follows:

1. The Attorney General, as Chief Legal Officer of the Govern-

ment, should be a member of the Special Committee of the NSC when-

ever matters of interest to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) are

before that Committee; and it should be made explicit that the FBI is

to assist the Attorney General and the Special Committee when such

matters are before the Committee.

2. The right granted to the United States Communications Intelli-

gence Board (USCIB) “to investigate and study the standards and prac-

tices of its member agencies and departments in utilizing and protect-

ing COMINT (communications intelligence) information” is too broad

and may lead to abuse.

3. The authority granted to the Director, NSA “to have direct ac-

cess to . . . any elements of the . . . civilian COMINT agencies on any

matters of operational and technical control as may be necessary” also

is too broad, as is the Director’s authority “to obtain such information

and intelligence material from (those agencies) as he may require.”

With reference to the first point above, I am informed that it was

the understanding when the Directive was drafted, that the Attorney
General, under the established procedures of the NSC, would be a
member of the Special Committee whenever matters of interest to the
FBI were before that Committee; and that in such instances, the Attor-
ney General could, as a matter of course, have the assistance of the Bu-
reau. That understanding has been confirmed by the President when,
in approving this Directive, he directed that this procedure is to be fol-
lowed. NSCID 9 will be revised accordingly regarding the membership
of the Special Committee.

In connection with your second and third points, the Secretaries

of State and Defense acting as the Special Committee of the NSC for

384 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

320-672/B428-S/11008

Source: National Security Agency, Center for Cryptologic History, Series XVI, C.6

(Other Staff Papers). Top Secret; Security Information. Ellipsis in the original.

See Document 132. Hoover’s comments have not been found.

1363_A25-A28.qxd 9/28/07 9:31 AM Page 384

COMINT with the assistance of the Director of Central Intelligence,
have directed me to advise you as follows.

It is understood that your concern regarding these latter two points

is that they might result in encroachment upon or interference with the
unique responsibilities of the FBI in the internal security field and that,
consequently, you desire that the FBI be granted explicit exemption
from those portions of the Directive.

With specific reference to your second point, paragraph 1f of the

Directive states that the Board’s authority in the matter under discus-
sion shall be binding only if it is adopted by the unanimous vote of
the members of the Board. Furthermore, this paragraph prescribes that
any recommendation of this sort approved by a majority, but not all,
of the members of the Board shall automatically be transmitted by the
Board to the Special Committee. No such action of the Board therefore
can be binding on you unless you agree to it and, in the event of dis-
agreement, the matter would be considered by the Special Committee,
augmented by the Attorney General, as a matter of course and not as
a matter of formal appeal on your part.

With specific reference to your third point, above, paragraph 2f of

the Directive recognizes that elements of the Armed Forces and other
agencies will require close COMINT support and that necessary direct
operational control of specified COMINT facilities and resources will
be delegated by the Director to the chiefs of other agencies. The types
of operations contemplated by the FBI undoubtedly would fall within
the meaning of a close support requirement for the accomplishment of
your mission, in which case it would be possible for you to arrange
with the Director, NSA, for the assignment to your Bureau of such fa-
cilities as are needed for this requirement.

In connection with the authority granted to the Director, NSA, to

have direct access to any elements of civilian COMINT agencies and
to obtain information and intelligence material from those agencies,
such access is always established through mutually prescribed chan-
nels. However, the vital element of security would be eliminated if
normal channels of interdepartmental exchange were prescribed for the
conduct of COMINT business. On the other hand, all members of the
Board would be handicapped severely if they could not participate lat-
erally in all phases of the COMINT operation through mutually ac-
ceptable channels.

With reference to your reservation regarding the allocation of votes

in USCIB, which was raised orally by your representatives in addition
to the points made in your letter, this device was only designed as an
administrative mechanism to provide a reasonable dividing line be-
tween civilian and non-civilian issues if such were to arise. In view of
your reservation, however, the Special Committee has decided that the

The Intelligence Community 385

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FBI representative should cast two votes at Board meetings—as is pro-
vided for the representative of the Secretary of State and the Director
of Central Intelligence—and that the representative of the Secretary of
Defense should also cast two votes. This would equalize your voting
strength with that of the other civilian members and still provide the
possible advantage of the reasonable dividing line. NSCID 9 will be
amended accordingly.

It may be pertinent in conclusion to review the reasons for the ex-

istence of NSCID 9. That Directive was issued for the following reasons:

1. To set forth with exactitude the fundamental principle that the

COMINT activities of the U.S. are a national responsibility rather than
a matter of primary interest to any one of the departments or agencies
concerned.

2. To delineate clearly the broad lines of policy which will govern

this mutual assumption of responsibility.

3. To reconstitute USCIB in a manner which will assure an orderly,

precise, secure and effective complex of COMINT activities.

4. To set up the most rapid and equitable system which not only

would give full protection to the individual agencies and departments
on the Board but also would provide final adjudication, as needed, by
the Chief Executive.

The Directive, amended as indicated above, would appear to ac-

complish the foregoing as regards all agencies participating in COMINT
activities. On the other hand, excepting the FBI from adherence to
portions of the Directive would weaken the Directive to a point where
it would have little meaning or value because the fundamental princi-
ple of its creation would have been destroyed. Since COMINT must be
set apart from the normal operations of Government and a special
mechanism created to handle COMINT activities, those activities must
be coordinated by the bodies which have been created to handle them—
namely, the Special Committee and USCIB—on a basis of mutual re-
sponsibility with equitable representation of all interested departments
and agencies.

In summary, however, nothing in the directive should be construed

to encroach upon or interfere with the unique responsibilities of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation in the field of internal security. This
will be made explicit by adding a paragraph to this effect in NSCID 9.

Sincerely yours,

James S. Lay, Jr.

386 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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142. Memorandum From Robert P. Joyce of the Policy Planning

Staff to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)

Washington, December 31, 1952.

SUBJECT

[

less than 1 line not declassified

] Activities directed against Poland

I attach hereto a copy of Warsaw’s cable No. 338 of December 27,

midnight.

Yesterday I called [

less than 1 line not declassified

] to meet

with me and Mr. Vedeler of EE for a discussion of the implications of
this cable and the broadcast on December 29 by the Warsaw station in
English Morse which sets forth the Polish line on American espionage
activities in Poland, etc. I attach hereto FBIS Report No. 252,

which I

think you will desire to read in full.

[

1 paragraph (14 lines) not declassified

]

At the meeting of the Consultants to OPC yesterday afternoon

(General Magruder for Defense, Colonel Wright representing General
Young of the JCS, and myself representing this Department), the whole
Polish operation was gone into at length [

less than 1 line not declassi-

fied

]. The following facts and assumptions emerged:

[

6 paragraphs (18

⁄

lines) not declassified

]

I need not point out that this affair represents an appalling set-

back [

less than 1 line not declassified

] the U.S. Government. There may

be political repercussions which might make it exceedingly difficult or
impossible for our diplomatic mission to maintain itself in Warsaw. An-
other telegram in from our Embassy on December 27 pointed out that
the Polish Foreign Office had advised the Embassy that only Ameri-
can Embassy officers on the diplomatic list would be immune from
Polish jurisdiction, including the provisions of the Polish legislation on
espionage activity.

We know too little today to arrive at any conclu-

sion as to whether [

less than 1 line not declassified

] activities in Poland

over the past two years are directly related to recent moves indicating
that the Polish authorities are moving in on the American Embassy in
the same pattern that has been established in other Eastern Satellite
capitals. EE is watching this entire situation closely, and I have arranged

The Intelligence Community 387

Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, NSC 10 Series, 1952. Top

Secret. A notation on the memorandum reads: “Please return to S/P—Joyce.”

This telegram transmitted a Polish newspaper account that reported that Polish

authorities had apprehended two U.S. spies who had parachuted from a plane into
Poland. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–54, 711.5248/12–2752)

Not found.

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for [

less than 1 line not declassified

] to bring in as soon as it is received

all information received from abroad [

less than 1 line not declassified

[

⁄

lines not declassified

] You will recall that the Korean war was al-

ready three or four months old, and that there was a very strong feel-
ing within the Military Establishment that the Korean war, as an act of
overt Communist military aggression, probably represented the open-
ing stage of Soviet aggression involving real danger of an all-out con-
flict. Late in 1950 and early in 1951 the Military Establishment became
intensely interested in the concept of “retardation”. This concept meant
that everything possible should be done [

less than 1 line not declassified

]

to develop resistance mechanisms within the Eastern European Satel-
lite area which might be activated and heavily re-supplied in the event
of war. The objective was to develop large-scale guerrilla warfare and
sabotage forces behind the Soviet lines. [

less than 1 line not declassified

]

heavy pressure by our Military Establishment to accelerate these
activities.

You will recall that early in 1951 General Smith produced his so-

called Scope, Pace and Magnitude Paper, and there was consideration
by the NSC of the CIA’s mission.

More than anything else, this U.S.

Military requirement for retardation on a vast scale impelled General
Smith to have the NSC re-affirm his charter, particularly as related to
the vastly expensive activities in connection with the development of
retardation.

During this period almost two years ago, both the State Depart-

ment, the CIA and notably General Magruder were convinced that the
Psychological Warfare Division (General McClure) in the Department
of the Army as well as other senior officers in the Army and Air Force
were engaging in a very great deal of wishful thinking as to what could
be done by clandestine means in Eastern Europe to develop resistance
mechanisms capable of producing a massive retardation contribution.
This thinking within the Military resulted from, in my opinion, almost
complete ignorance of Eastern Europe and what a highly developed
totalitarian police state could accomplish in the way of snuffing out
anything remotely related to so-called resistance organizations. Nev-
ertheless, the CIA, General Magruder and I did not feel that we could
block what the Army desired to see accomplished in this field. We could
only, and we did what we could, endeavor to educate the Army to the
realities of life in an Eastern European Soviet Satellite and to warn that
perhaps very little indeed could be accomplished in peace time in the
way of setting up an organized mechanism capable of springing into

388 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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Reference is to Smith’s paper (see Document 68) which was the basis of NSC 10/5

(Document 90).

1363_A25-A28.qxd 9/28/07 9:31 AM Page 388

being on D-Europe Day. The State Department representatives natu-
rally could not oppose covert activities, the objectives of which related
to the national security and were designed to contribute to the mili-
tary effort of the Western Allies in resisting Soviet attack on Western
Europe. As stated above, General Magruder and I, as well as General
Balmer, the Joint Chiefs of Staff representative as a consultant to OPC
of CIA, could only point out the extreme difficulties of accomplishing
anything and endeavor to persuade the Military that their Planners
should not, repeat not, in the development of strategic plans, count on
a resistance potential behind the enemy lines in the first stages of an
all-out war.

In the meeting [

less than 1 line not declassified

] yesterday both Gen-

eral Magruder and General Balmer stated that there still exists in the
Department of the Army a highly optimistic appreciation of what can
be done in the way of guerrilla activity in time of war based on re-
sistance mechanisms developed in times of peace. General Magruder
recalled that recently in a briefing General Collins himself had referred
to the destruction by resistance elements of bridges behind the enemy
lines in Eastern Europe in case of war, his idea apparently being that
such actions present no great difficulties of accomplishment. The fact
is that large bridges to be destroyed by demolition require charges in-
volving tons and tons of explosives which must be carefully and some-
times painfully placed. Needless to say, all strategic bridges will be
heavily guarded by military detachments in time of war.

The Air Force has also exerted pressure on the CIA to develop es-

cape and evasion capabilities in Eastern Europe in time of war. The Air
Force interest is, of course, easily explained and quite understandable.
The fact remains that the setting up of escape and evasion routes, safe
houses and recruiting of native personnel in peace time is an infinitely
complicated, dangerous and time-consuming process.

Prior to the meeting in Paris early in March, 1952 of the Eastern

European Chiefs of Mission, I addressed a memorandum on February
1, 1952 to Messrs. Bonbright, Barbour and Campbell,

which contains

the following paragraphs:

“A general explanation might be given to the chiefs of mission

alone, as to the aspects of so-called positive political action within the

Soviet orbit, i.e., plans and preparations which are designed to lay the

groundwork for massive internal resistance in case of war. In the light

of these considerations, do the chiefs of mission consider that the risks

involved should and must be taken?

The Intelligence Community 389

A handwritten notation in the margin reads, “and peace!”

Not found.

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“What suggestions have the chiefs of mission for the timing, phas-

ing, scope and pace of positive political action by covert means behind

the Iron Curtain? This question might be dealt with country by coun-

try and individually with the several chiefs of mission.

“It seems to me that these questions lie close to the heart of our

strategy for the cold war for the next few years. I believe that our rep-

resentatives on the spot not only could contribute a great deal which

would be helpful in Washington but also that they should be aware of

current plans and activities in the countries to which they are assigned.”

The Record of Discussions of the meeting in Paris contains the fol-

lowing paragraph under “Conclusions and Recommendations”:

“II. 3.

Covert Operations.

Such operations are a necessary part of

the total effort aimed at weakening the Soviet grip on the satellites.

They should be aimed not only at securing a maximum of intelligence

but also at breaking down the Soviet system of control and

building or-

ganizations for future action.

It must be recognized, however, that oper-

ations of this character may endanger the continued functioning of our

diplomatic missions in the countries concerned.”

The point of the foregoing is to illustrate that all of the Chiefs of

Mission present at the Paris meeting agreed that in the national interest
it was necessary for the CIA to do what it could to develop covert mech-
anisms within the Eastern European satellite countries. With respect to
Poland, I talked in Paris individually with Ambassador Flack. He re-
ferred to the fact that the United States had more friends to the square
inch in Poland than perhaps in any other satellite country and men-
tioned the five million Poles in the United States. He did point out,
however, that the Sovietization of Poland had moved forward rapidly
and that Poland had now become an efficient Police State with in-
formers everywhere and with Soviet officials in all key points of the
government, particularly in the US. In other words, in spite of the ex-
treme difficulties and risk, Flack’s own judgment was that it might be
possible to do something in Poland, and in any event the attempt
should be made.

[

1 paragraph (11

⁄

lines) not declassified

]

General Balmer of the Joint Chiefs of Staff attended the meetings

with the British and was provided with a copy of the agreed minutes.
He has advised me that the somewhat pessimistic evaluation of capa-
bilities for clandestine activities in Eastern Europe which came out of
these meetings with the British was very useful indeed in counteract-
ing some of the far too optimistic ideas existing within the Departments
of the Army and the Air Force.

390 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

320-672/B428-S/11008

Not found.

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The Military Establishment for obvious strategic reasons was pri-

marily interested in Poland insofar as retardation and escape and eva-
sion were concerned. In addition, opportunities within Poland were re-
garded as much greater than in the other satellites, with the possible
exception of Albania. The Poles historically hate and fear the Russians.
The Poles have perhaps the strongest feeling of nationalism in Eastern
Europe and a long tradition of conspiratorial and underground activity.
[

3 lines not declassified

] To sum up, the situation was about as follows:

1. Pressure on the CIA by our Military Establishment to develop

something in Poland was very great indeed.

2. The Department of State could not and did not oppose [

less than

1 line not declassified

] efforts to develop resistance organizations in

Poland, and the Department was constantly advised of what was be-

ing done [

less than 1 line not declassified

The end result was as set forth in the first part of this memoran-

dum. In other words, the efforts in Poland resulted in an extremely im-
portant set back which might have serious repercussions on the oper-
ations of our Embassy in Warsaw. In addition, the Polish UB has
obtained information on the techniques and objectives of American
clandestine activities. The Warsaw Government has made extremely
clever and probably most effective propaganda use out of this fiasco.
(See FBIS Report No. 252–1952)

[

4 lines not declassified

] I suggest that the following conclusions might

possibly be derived from this experience in Poland:

1. It has become impossible, with only the existing techniques and

contacts, [

less than 1 line not declassified

] to operate in the satellite area

of Eastern Europe. The perfection of totalitarian police state techniques

is approaching “1984” efficiency to a degree where “resistance” can

probably exist only

in the minds

of the enslaved peoples of the Soviet

orbit in Europe.

2. No resistance

organization

can survive in the Soviet orbit, with

the possible exception of Albania.

3. [

8 lines not declassified

]

4. Unless new techniques are developed, perhaps nothing can be

accomplished in the Soviet orbit in Eastern Europe except by a mass

approach through the air waves, balloon operations and leaflet drops.

Recommendations:

1. The Department of State should devote careful study to [

less

than 1 line not declassified

] operations within Poland. The Department

should then provide political guidance [

less than 1 line not declassified

]

in terms of long-range political objectives in Eastern Europe, such guid-
ance to provide the framework within which covert operations should
or should not be attempted.

2. The entire subject of cold war activities by clandestine means

directed against the Soviet orbit in Eastern Europe should be studied

The Intelligence Community 391

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by the Psychological Strategy Board or whatever top level agency might
succeed it under the new Administration. (Perhaps the committee
presided over by Mr. William H. Jackson

might review the documen-

tation mentioned in this memorandum. I understand this committee
will review “cold war” activities, particularly in the Soviet orbit in
Europe.)

Robert P. Joyce

See Document 151.

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

143. Report by the Psychological Strategy Board

PSB D–35

Washington, January 5, 1953.

NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT AS OF

DECEMBER 31, 1952

[Omitted here is Section I, “Purpose and Framework.”]

II. Summary of Significant Psychological Activities

1. The Board presents below a brief evaluative summary of the sta-

tus of our national psychological programs as of December 31, 1952, based
on the appended Progress Reports of recent significant activities by the
departments and agencies responsible for psychological operations.

General Comments

2. U.S. capabilities for psychological action, within the limits of

the world power position, are slowly but steadily improving, but they
remain inadequate for taking immediately effective psychological ac-
tion contributing to a retraction of the Kremlin’s power and influence.

392 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 333, PSB D–35. Top

Secret; Security Information. Annex A, Report of the Department of State; Annex B, Re-
port of the Department of Defense; Annex C, Report of the Central Intelligence Agency;
and Annex D, Report of the Mutual Security Agency, are not printed. Annex C was spe-
cially classified and was not found. A covering note, which reads, “This report was ap-
proved by the Board at its Seventeenth Meeting, January 15, 1953,” was signed by Sec-
retary to the Board Charles E. Johnson.

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3. Progress has been made in planning and coordinating interde-

partmental and inter-agency action, in making use of indigenous re-
sources for “gray” or unattributed operations, in building up poten-
tialities for increased “black” or covert activity, and in expanding under
existing programs technical facilities for radio broadcasting.

4. Our national psychological effort is at greatest disadvantage in

the USSR and Communist China. In these areas, radio broadcasting re-
mains almost the only weapon we are now employing on any signifi-
cant scale. Even here, Russian jamming presents a very serious prob-
lem, although evidence continues to appear that broadcasts are heard
by a limited audience on whom they have some effect. In Communist
China listening facilities for the masses are severely limited.

5. In the Soviet satellite states of Eastern Europe also, radio broad-

casting constitutes the major active element at our disposal. In these
countries, too, jamming constitutes an obstacle, although at present a
less serious one, perhaps, than in the USSR. In the case of some of the
satellites, however, some progress has been made in building up other
capabilities for psychological activities.

6. More positive psychological action directed against the Soviet

orbit necessarily awaits a greater development of our over-all capabil-
ities, and an accompanying adjustment of our basic national policy. In
the present interim position, until a more aggressive strategic concept
becomes feasible, psychological planning and programming against the
orbit has gone ahead on the basis of doing everything possible to ag-
gravate its internal conflicts in the hope that this will subsequently help
to bring about a retraction of Kremlin control and influence.

7. U.S. psychological programs outside the Iron Curtain, where

the major portion of the national psychological effort has been applied,
have moved with moderate success toward the achievement of our ob-
jectives in certain areas. The psychological impact of American aid pro-
grams has, despite some difficulties, in most respects been favorable.
With regard to the psychological problems arising from the large num-
bers of American personnel abroad, considerable progress has been
made in respect to U.S. troops. Some progress is recorded toward meet-
ing the “neutralist” menace. The US–UN stand against forcible repa-
triation of Korean prisoners of war has gained general acceptance with
good psychological effect. There is closer and more effective coopera-
tion between the various agencies carrying out American psychologi-
cal programs abroad, and steadily increasing recognition of the role of
psychological operations in world affairs.

Related Activities

8. Certain related activities are covered in a specially classified sec-

tion of this report, Annex C.

The Intelligence Community 393

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Area Summary

9. In

Western Europe

there have been set-backs, such as the delay

in ratification of the European Defense Community accords and the
decision of the European member governments to cut their defense
contributions under NATO. But the over-all picture contains bright el-
ements as well. The reports of all PSB reporting agencies indicate that,
as 1952 ends, communism is on a slow but definitely perceptible de-
cline (with the possible exception of Italy). Furthermore, there is agree-
ment that U.S. psychological programs have made an effective if mod-
est contribution to this decline. Communism remains the major
long-term threat, of course; but other forces tending to disrupt free
world solidarity, and other forms of anti-Americanism, such as “neu-
tralism,” constitute more immediate problems.

10. In the

Middle East

the picture is not so bright. Iran is an obvi-

ous danger spot and a classic example of the difficulties and potential
dangers confronting the continued existence of freedom in countries
where extreme nationalism exists as a major problem in itself, and one
that is aggravated and complicated by the fact that it can be easily in-
flamed and exploited by communism. Tension arising from some of
the same elements that are found in Iran is growing in Iraq. In both
these cases, as in the other Arab countries of the area, it can not be con-
fidently asserted that there has been progress in the psychological field.
In

North Africa,

nationalist ferment presents increasingly complex prob-

lems of a psychological character, rendered more acute by the presence
of important American air bases within the area.

11. This does not mean, however, that the picture in the Middle

East is entirely dark. Favorable effects continue from such psycholog-
ical initiatives as the Mecca airlift, and the visit of the Fleet to the area.
Our economic and military aid programs, and their active psycholog-
ical exploitation, have produced good results, particularly in

Turkey,

which represents an encouragingly stable and friendly factor.

12. In

South and Southeast Asia,

all the problems and potential dan-

gers in the situation are still present; but from the reports emerges the
impression that gradually U.S. capabilities for holding our own in the
psychological struggle there are being improved. Both on the overt in-
formation side and in non-attributable activities significant gains have
been registered, particularly in the Philippines, Indo-China, and Thai-
land. In the

Indian sub-Continent

too, slow progress continues. Wise ex-

ploitation of the psychological possibilities of our aid programs, the
agreement to extend military aid to Pakistan, and U.S. acceptance in
the UN of the Indian Resolution on Korea—subsequently rejected out
of hand by the Soviet bloc—have all had a favorable effect.

13. In the

Far East,

psychological activities are steadily if slowly ex-

panding. A psychological plan to deal with the problems raised by the

394 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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presence of U.S. troops in

Japan

is now being prepared. Better use is be-

ing made of Japanese indigenous organizations and other resources in
combatting communism. New psychological activities under the Far
East Command include moves to build up escape operations in

Korea

and strengthen and improve the organization responsible for uncon-
ventional warfare. A number of psychological programs designed to
take advantage of the proximity of U.S. and communist forces in Korea
have been undertaken. Efforts to penetrate

Red China

were being slowly

developed, with a significant increase in leaflet dropping, radio broad-
casting, and some other activities of a non-attributable nature.

14. In

Latin America,

likewise, the spread of communism and the

growing threat of Peronism have led us to increase our capabilities for
combatting these and other anti-American forces. Overt information
efforts are combining with TCA aid programs and non-attributable ac-
tivities on an increasing scale. It is evident from current reports, how-
ever, that more will be required before we can take care of the dual
Communist-Peronista threat to hemisphere unity.

Special Problems

15. Coordinated efforts of all the departments and agencies con-

cerned had, by the year’s end, been undertaken to minimize the im-
pact of the communist germ warfare charges. Similarly, the Soviet
“Hate America” campaign, as well as the so-called Campaign of Peace,
seem to be declining in effectiveness outside the Iron Curtain, thanks,
in part at least, to persistent and better-coordinated U.S. efforts to coun-
teract them. The long-term implications of these campaigns remain se-
rious, however. There are manifest indications of the effectiveness of
the “Hate America” campaign inside the Iron Curtain countries, and
the need for more effective counter measures continues great.

16. Major psychological problems continue to be raised by our

commercial and immigration policies. The repercussions of our trade
and tariff restrictions tend in some countries to diminish the psycho-
logical effects of our economic aid programs. The restrictions on im-
migration and the complications of our visa policy continue to offset
some of the best efforts of our psychological operations.

17. Quietly effective use appears to have been made of the psy-

chological possibilities inherent in our development of novel atomic
and other weapons.

[Omitted here are Section III, “The Work of PSB,” and the annexes.]

The Intelligence Community 395

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144. Memorandum From Secretary of State Acheson and the

Director for Mutual Security (Harriman) to the Executive
Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)

Washington, January 19, 1953.

SUBJECT

Sixth Progress Report on NSC 104/2, “U.S. Policies and Programs in the
Economic Field which may Affect the War Potential of the Soviet Bloc”

REFERENCES

A. NSC 104/2
B. Memorandum for NSC from Executive Secretary, “Assignment of

Responsibilities for Economic Defense”, dated November 7, 1951,

transmitting Memorandum by the President on this subject

C. Memorandum for NSC from Executive Secretary, “Assignment of

Responsibilities for Economic Defense”, dated January 25, 1952

transmitting

Memorandum of Agreement between the Secretary of State and the
Administrator of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act

In accordance with the President’s directive on the assignment of

responsibilities for economic defense under NSC 104/2 and the memo-
randum of agreement between the Secretary of State and the Adminis-
trator of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act, there is submitted
herewith the sixth progress report on NSC 104/2.

It is requested that

this be circulated to the members of the Council for their information.

Dean Acheson

Appendix II

RESEARCH AND INTELLIGENCE FOR ECONOMIC DEFENSE

There are two principal tasks of the intelligence and research un-

derlying the operations and policy formulation of economic defense.

396 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, OCB Files, NSC

104, Memoranda 1952–53, Box 61. Secret; Security Information. A handwritten notation
on the memorandum indicates that it was delivered to Lay at the NSC on January 19 by
security messenger.

NSC 104/2 is printed in

Foreign Relations,

1951, vol. I, pp. 1059–1064.

See footnote 4, Document 116.

Ibid.

The 24-page progress report and Appendix 1, Replies from COCOM Countries

on Prior Commitments Issue, are attached but not printed.

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. The signature block for the

Director of Mutual Security is blank.

Secret; Security Information.

320-672/B428-S/11008

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One is the task of appraising the overall relative economic capabilities
and vulnerabilities of the Soviet bloc and the West in terms of economic
defense measures and programs; this is a long range problem of large
dimensions. The other task is that of keeping close and continuous
touch with current East-West trade patterns and practices and economic
developments within the Soviet bloc and the West; this is essential to
provide the basic facts on specific relative vulnerabilities for purposes
of current economic defense operations and negotiations.

The drafts prepared in connection with the proposed National In-

telligence Estimate (NIE) 59 represent a systematic attempt to appraise
the relative overall vulnerabilities of the Free World and the Soviet bloc.
It is clear, however, that the materials available for any accurate ap-
praisal of specific Soviet bloc vulnerabilities are still meager. Further-
more, the analysis of such materials is still in a very early stage of de-
velopment, and much more work is needed in this important area.
Meanwhile, the demands for basic trade analysis and other data needed
for day-to-day operations continue to be insistent and continue on the
increase. The problem is to plan the work for both the short-run or cur-
rent operating and policy needs and the broader, longer run needs so
as to achieve the maximum benefit for the East-West trade program.

The progress made in recent months in the fields of shipping and

foreign trade intelligence for economic defense backstopping is sum-
marized below.

There has been a notable increase in attention given to shipping

intelligence, and a number of papers on this subject have been pre-
pared; considerable work remains to be done, however. Included in
this effort has been the joint development with the British of an agreed
intelligence estimate of the facts concerning trade with Communist
China, including the volume of trade and the number and capacity of
vessels engaged in the trade.

A second area in which progress has been made in the past sev-

eral months is the preparation of commodity studies of strategic items
entering into East-West trade. In connection with the work of the OIT
technical task groups, (see

Title II Activities

in body of report) CIA and

the Department of State prepared, and Intelligence Advisory Commit-
tee (IAC) agencies have to some extent reviewed, commodity analyses
of a number of International List II and III items. A few of these stud-
ies, on lead, pyrites, electrical machinery, marine boilers and tires and
tubes, represented comprehensive analyses. An intensive study of rub-
ber has also been in progress. A great many others, although not com-
prehensive, represented very considerable efforts in the utilization of
available data. The work was extensive and, though not exhaustive be-
cause of the time element and competing priorities, represents an im-
portant step forward. It is hoped that by the end of 1953 comprehen-
sive analyses will be available on the requirements, production, and

The Intelligence Community 397

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trade of the Soviet bloc in each of the major items considered to be of
important strategic value to the bloc, particularly those items subject
to less-than-embargo control.

The companion project to the commodity studies was initiated

early in 1952, and is a series of country-by-country studies analyzing
the trade relations between the principal Western European countries
and the important Soviet bloc countries with which they trade. Work
on these analyses has only begun. The analyses are needed in policy
planning on “decreasing reliance” and in implementing the Battle Act,
and are aimed at affording policy officers a better factual background
in gauging the bargaining positions of the individual countries trad-
ing with the Soviet bloc. The analyses would also serve to uncover
prospective difficulties before they have come to a head. Given more
time, it is sometimes possible to avoid the shipment of strategic goods
by a Western country without prejudicing its economic and political
position. This intelligence need in the trade field was stressed in the
fourth progress report on NSC 104/2.

To date, two comprehensive bilateral trade studies have been pre-

pared, and three others are in process. These studies involve consid-
erable expenditure of man-hours, but the results justify more work in
this field.

In addition to the above analyses, The Department of Commerce

has been pursuing two projects in the compilation of trade statistics,
in accordance with interdepartmental arrangements made early in
1952. One is the compilation, from published and supplementary trade
material, of the trade of each of the significant Free World countries
with the Soviet bloc, by country and commodity. Useful reference ta-
bles have been issued quarterly on many of these countries and, on
others, less frequently. The second part of the project is the collation of
classified data which the individual COCOM countries submit monthly
on their exports (or licenses granted for export) to the Soviet bloc of
items included in the International Lists. The Department of Commerce
summaries provide data from which the trends and pattern of this trade
can be more readily discerned in certain cases and from which answers
to specific commodity or country problems can be developed with
much less effort than was formerly required in dealing with the indi-
vidual monthly reports. This work, which marks an important initial
step in the development of the needed statistical base, is being reviewed
in an interagency committee.

The Intelligence Working Group (IWG) established under

EDAC–IAC sponsorship was quite active in the second half of 1952.

398 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

320-672/B428-S/11008

Not printed. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, OCB Files,

NSC 104, Memoranda 1952–53, Box 61)

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320-672/B428-S/11008

The IWG has provided closer working relationships between the in-
telligence agencies, on one hand, and the policy and operating sections,
on the other, with the latter able to indicate directly their needs and to
assist in providing necessary background for the work they initiate.
Although there is inevitably room for considerable improvement in
the treatment of specific problems, the IWG is improving intelligence
support of economic defense policy and operations. One of its most
significant current projects is the establishment of a unit which will col-
late the extensive data now being received on Soviet bloc procurement
efforts, particularly those efforts which involve evasions of Western
economic security controls. The details of the project are not yet fully
worked out, but it has been approved in principle.

In conclusion, there should be mentioned the general problem of

disseminating National Intelligence to foreign Governments and in-
ternational bodies. One difficulty which has impeded United States
negotiations on economic defense matters could be eliminated by es-
tablishing a better procedure so that our negotiators might use the ma-
terial contained in intelligence documents to maximum advantage.
Such use of intelligence is inhibited by the pervasive difficulty of en-
suring that security is maintained in the course of using such mate-
rial. This problem should be explored to determine whether amend-
ments to pertinent NSC directives and other regulations would be
desirable.

145. Memorandum From Robert P. Joyce of the Policy Planning

Staff to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)

Washington, January 27, 1953.

There is forwarded to you herewith two memoranda, both dated

yesterday, on the general subject of the secret intelligence activities and
the covert operations abroad of the CIA. The first memorandum, signed
by me, is designed to provide background material and to set in the
proper framework the second memorandum, which is signed by Out-
erbridge Horsey and prepared by all of us in this Office (Horsey, Berry,
Strong, McFadden and myself).

The Intelligence Community 399

Source: National Archives, RG 59, INR Files: Lot 58 D 776, State–CIA Relations.

Top Secret. A handwritten notation on the memorandum reads, “R—Mr. Howe” (Fisher
Howe, Deputy Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence).

J. Lampton Berry, Robert C. Strong, and William McFadden.

1363_A29-A34.qxd 9/28/07 9:32 AM Page 399

The basic purpose of these memoranda is to raise fundamental

problems with regard to the CIA operation abroad and the guidance
and control of these activities to insure that they shall be closely geared
in with our overall strategy and political objectives. The memorandum
signed by Horsey has been shown to Messrs. Armstrong and Howe,
who have indicated to us that they are in general agreement with the
analysis plus the conclusions and recommendations which flow there-
from. Armstrong’s office, of course, has a large interest in the subject
of the relations between this Department and the CIA, and I am sure
you will want to bring Armstrong and Howe into any discussions based
on this material.

The memorandum signed by me I have drafted in a manner and

with the idea in mind that it might be read and discussed in due course
by General Smith and Mr. Allen W. Dulles.

I am sure you will have

your own ideas as to the timing and manner in which this might be
accomplished if you agree with me that it should be. It would also be
my suggestion that these two memoranda, together with the material
referred to in them, might very well be placed before the William H.
Jackson Committee,

which will study the psychological warfare effect

of the government.

Robert P. Joyce

Annex 1

Memorandum From Robert P. Joyce of the Policy Planning
Staff to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)

Washington, January 26, 1953.

SUBJECT

The Department of State and the CIA

400 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

320-672/B428-S/11008

Allen W. Dulles succeeded Walter Bedell Smith, who resigned as Director of Cen-

tral Intelligence on February 9 and became Under Secretary of State on the same day.
Allen W. Dulles was appointed Director of Central Intelligence the same day, was con-
firmed by the Senate on February 23, and was sworn in on February 26.

See Document 151 regarding the June 30 Jackson Committee report.

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Top Secret; Security Information.

1363_A29-A34.qxd 9/28/07 9:32 AM Page 400

There is forwarded to you herewith a memorandum dated Janu-

ary 26, 1953

which has been prepared in this office by Messrs. Horsey,

Berry, Strong, McFadden and myself. In this connection, I refer to my
memorandum addressed to you on December 17, 1952 with particular
reference to the so-called Kaji case in Tokyo as well as to my memo-
randum addressed to you on December 31, 1952 entitled “CIA Activi-
ties Directed Against Poland”.

In the former memorandum I suggested

that before my departure I should write a memorandum for you em-
bodying certain conclusions I have reached as a result of four years
close working relationship with OPC of CIA. The memorandum for-
warded to you today endeavors to pose important problems which
have recently arisen as a result of CIA covert activities in the field which
have caused, are still causing, and will probably continue to cause se-
rious embarrassment to the conduct of U.S. foreign relations. In the
memorandum referred to in the previous sentence, my colleagues and
I have endeavored to pose the basic questions with regard to Depart-
ment of State and CIA relationships which we believe the new ad-
ministration will desire to deal with in the immediate future as they
relate to the presumed new policy of more “dynamism” with regard
to the conduct of the cold war.

The kernel of the problem, as I see it, is that the operations abroad,

in the field of secret intelligence as well as secret operations, have in-
creasingly tended to be less and less geared into what I understand to
be the present overall strategy of the United States in the management
of its foreign relations. Perhaps a better way of stating it would be to
say that CIA covert activities lack sufficient policy guidance and con-
trol, the inevitable result being that such activities, on occasion, are not
in the national interest nor do they support our overall policy objec-
tives. The memorandum of January 26, 1953 endeavors to meet this
problem head on in the hope that CIA activities abroad may be re-
studied on the National Security Council level and perhaps a new look
be taken by President Eisenhower himself.

I set forth below certain thoughts and conclusions I have arrived

at which might be helpful in providing information of a background
and historical nature relating to the organization, growth and present
operations of the Central Intelligence Agency. These observations re-
late primarily to OPC of CIA.

The Intelligence Community 401

320-672/B428-S/11008

Printed below.

The memorandum on the Kaji case was not found, although documentation on

the repercussions of the arrest and detection in Japan of Waturu Kaji, a Japanese national,
by U.S. authorities is in National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 794.0221. For the mem-
orandum on Poland, see Document 142.

1363_A29-A34.qxd 9/28/07 9:32 AM Page 401

I. Political Background—1949 and 1950

In the autumn of 1949, OPC of CIA was a relatively small and com-

pact unit within the framework of but somewhat independently situ-
ated in the CIA organization. It was busily preparing to set up mech-
anisms through which it could engage in so-called psychological and
political warfare by covert means as defined in NSC 10/2.

In Sep-

tember, 1949, the Russians produced their first atomic explosion sev-
eral years ahead of what I understand to be the best calculated esti-
mates. Soviet political warfare on a world-wide scale was constantly
being stepped up to subvert, divide, weaken and eventually control
large and important areas of the free world in which the U.S. had a
vital stake. On June 25, 1950 the North Korean Communists, under
Russian control, crossed one of the frontiers of the free world by mil-
itary force. The Communist guerrilla attacks against the French and the
Vietnamese were assuming the proportions of a major war; Soviet pres-
sure against Iran was increasing; Communist guerrilla warfare in
Malaya was being stepped up; the Chinese Communists were taking
over Tibet; the Communists were succeeding in Guatemala, etc., etc.
Tito’s Yugoslavia was under constant menace of a military attack by
the Soviet satellites of Eastern Europe.

All of these facts produced within the United States Government

and among the American people a sense of urgency to prepare for the
possibility of additional Communist attacks against the free world
which might lead to an all out military conflict, including an attack
against the United States. We started our military build-up on a vast
scale during the last part of 1950. During this period, both within the
government as well as outside, there suddenly developed an intense
interest in so-called psychological or political warfare. This caused con-
siderable pressure to be exerted against OPC of CIA immediately to
engage in psychological and political warfare activities by covert
means. At the same time, exceedingly strong pressure was exerted upon
OPC of CIA by the Defense Establishment to accomplish in the short-
est possible time those responsibilities set forth in NSC 10/2 relating
to preparing for resistance activities and guerrilla warfare behind the
enemy lines in case of war. You will recall that during the last part of
1950 powerful elements within the Military Establishment considered
that perhaps the Russians in 1954 or 1955 would attain a degree of mil-
itary preparation and atomic capability which might lead the leaders
in the Kremlin either to endeavor to obtain their objectives by the use
of overt military force on a grand scale, or the Kremlin would exert the
threat of force and subversion to obtain control of strategic portions of

402 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

320-672/B428-S/11008

For NSC 10/2, see

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Es-

tablishment, Document 292.

1363_A29-A34.qxd 9/28/07 9:32 AM Page 402

the non-Communist world. This would necessarily lead to such reac-
tions upon our part that the danger of an all out conflict would indeed
be very great. Underlying these considerations, was the over-riding fact
that China was added to the Communist world and Chinese Commu-
nist military forces threatened Southeast Asia.

II. Expansion of OPC

The objective world situation late in 1950 and early in 1951 (or at

least the subjective reaction thereto on the part of the Government and
the people of the United States) and the pressures referred to above led
to a vast expansion of OPC of CIA. The emphasis understandably given
by the Military to prepare for war and the pressures to organize
behind-the-lines resistance, led to constantly increasing emphasis
within the OPC on preparations for a hot war. (In this connection, I re-
fer to my memorandum of December 31, 1952 with regard to [

less than

1 line not declassified

] activities in Poland.) OPC tended to become more

and more of a military and para-military planning agency. At the same
time, OPC was endeavoring to meet the demands and pressures for in-
creased activity in the field of covert political action. I believe that the
end result of this situation was that OPC tried to do too much in too
little time with inadequate personnel. I believe that Mr. Frank G. Wis-
ner would agree with this estimate. I may say that qualified personnel
in this country for OPC planning and operations is extraordinarily dif-
ficult to come by and difficult to train.

Some unhappy results of this haste inevitably followed:
[

7 paragraphs (74 lines) not declassified

]

III. Learning the Hard Way

For the reasons stated above, it is my conclusion that these fail-

ures of the CIA are not exclusively CIA failures, but are rather

Ameri-

can failures

attributable, to sum up, to the following factors:

1. The American characteristic of impatience and “wanting to get

the job done”. The American belief that if enough money, personnel
and effort are applied, everything is possible and can be accomplished
either instanter or certainly within a year or two.

2. The CIA approach during the past three years has been far too

heavily influenced by the thinking within and without the Government
that we had very little time. It is my personal view that NSC 68

gave

expression to and reflected much of this thinking.

3. The role of covert operations in the conduct of foreign policy

has been exaggerated. Quietly, securely, and expertly handled political

The Intelligence Community 403

320-672/B428-S/11008

Regarding NSC 68, “United States Objectives and Programs for National Secu-

rity,” April 14, 1950, see Document 5.

1363_A29-A34.qxd 9/28/07 9:32 AM Page 403

and intelligence operations can undoubtedly make a valuable and,
on rare occasions, a crucial contribution to the national security, but
only if such activities are of a highly professional character. They can
never “win the cold war”, but only make a modest but significant
contribution.

4. The CIA, as General Smith himself has stated repeatedly, has

tried to take on too much in too little time. CIA has obtained the serv-
ices of a great number of highly talented, loyal and high caliber Amer-
icans. Many of them, however, have the characteristics mentioned in
paragraph No. 1 above. In the medium levels of CIA there are many
persons who consider the Department of State to be negative and timid.
These persons over-estimate the role of special operations by clandes-
tine methods and under-rate the difficulties and pitfalls in our deal-
ings with both our allies and our opponents. The

Congressional Record,

issue of January 14, 1953, No. 6, page A–157, contains the following
statement from a study of “psychological strategy” prepared by for-
mer Congressman O.K. Armstrong:

“High success in the performances of its [the CIA’s]

important

tasks, has been due in largest measure to the leadership and direction

of Bedell Smith and Allen Dulles. Major handicap, according to a sum-

mary of

interviews by key personnel

is due to lack of coordination, or

more accurately cooperation, by some echelons of the State Department

in following recommendations

made by CIA for the security of the na-

tion.” (Italics supplied)

IV. Observations and Suggestions

[

11 paragraphs (59 lines) not declassified

]

V. Conclusions

The foregoing, I fear, may sound perhaps captiously critical and

negative insofar as the CIA is concerned. I hope that it is not taken in
this sense. There is a great deal of light in the picture.

My own feeling is that the CIA has made remarkable progress dur-

ing the past five years in perhaps the most tricky, sensitive and deli-
cate of all governmental operations demanding the highest degree of
sophistication and experience. It takes many, many years to build up
what we may term a covert apparatus. The Russians have had thirty-
five years experience. We have had five. The only way to learn the in-
telligence business is to engage in it. The CIA has been actively en-
gaging in this business under the enormous pressures referred to in
previous sections of this memorandum. Glaring mistakes have been
made, but solid accomplishments have already been achieved. It is my
belief that the senior officials of the CIA are entirely aware of the de-

404 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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Brackets in the original.

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ficiencies of the organization in its field activities, and remedial action
is being taken to tighten up and increase security. The training and in-
doctrination process has been vastly improved and men who have
shown no talent for the intelligence business have been released.

The CIA organization has made progress in recruiting, training

and seasoning a group of highly talented men who are coming to con-
sider American Intelligence their life career. Amateurism is giving
place to an increasing degree of professionalism. It is being realized
that an intelligence bull is misplaced in the world china shop of 1953
and that a cat and later a soft-treading leopard is a more suitable and
effective animal. I believe that a greater degree of discipline has been
established and that there is a real understanding growing up within
the secret intelligence activities and special operations fields that in-
telligence is not a policy-creating function within the Government and
can never be. Although there are still some officers within the CIA
who have a feeling that intelligence operations abroad are an end in
themselves and should be conducted independently of and without
interference from policy-making and implementing American offi-
cials. I believe this must and will be corrected with time and a greater
degree of discipline in government. The U.S. responsibility is such that
amateurism, free-wheeling and heavy-handedness cannot be permit-
ted in 1953. Our friends and allies must have confidence not only in
the goodness of our intentions and objectives but also in our judg-
ment, discretion and methods. Our dangerous adversaries turn our
mistakes against us with telling effect, and this does not make for the
confidence in our leadership which we must have to exercise it effec-
tively in the crucial years to come.

One more observation: If we comport ourselves in the international

arena as though we are urgently preparing for a perhaps inevitable
conflict with the Soviet world, we add fuel to fears and inspire counter-
action which increase the danger of just such a conflict. This is a most
difficult problem—to prepare for war to prevent it—but we must some-
how solve it in the next few years to come.

Robert P. Joyce

The Intelligence Community 405

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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Annex 2

Memorandum From Outerbridge Horsey of the Policy
Planning Staff to the Deputy Under Secretary of State
(Matthews)

Washington, January 26, 1953.

SUBJECT

The Department of State and CIA Operations Abroad

Problem:

To review CIA–State relationships, in secret intelligence and in

covert operations, with the double objective (a) of insuring that

all

CIA

field activities are of optimum value in the prosecution of United States
foreign policy objectives and (b) of diminishing the risk of results harm-
ful to those objectives.

Discussion:

Recent integration within CIA, at headquarters and in the field, of

the two main fields, “secret intelligence” and “covert operations,” em-
phasizes their interdependence. Even in the previous state of more or
less water-tight separation of the two activities,

either

might have af-

fected, and indeed did affect, the conduct of foreign policy.

“Secret intelligence” is used herein to describe what NSCID–5

defines as “all organized federal espionage operations outside the
United States . . . for the collection of foreign intelligence information
. . . in connection with the national security . . .” (Counter-espionage is
excluded from this discussion) Secret intelligence activities are con-
ducted by the Director of Central Intelligence. Moreover, he has re-
sponsibility for coordinating covert and overt intelligence activities.
The senior U.S. representative in each country has the responsibility
for coordinating

overt

intelligence collection activities, but there is no

recognition in theory or in practice of the fact that

secret

intelligence

activities can affect the conduct of foreign policy. By law the Director
of Central Intelligence is responsible for the protection of intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. In general this has
in practice resulted in the withholding of detailed information on se-

406 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Top Secret; Security Information. Drafted by Horsey, Joyce, Berry, Strong and

McFadden. Ellipsis in the original.

Document 255.

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cret intelligence activities in both the planning and execution stages.
The Department and Chiefs of Mission in the field are briefed from
time to time on the broad lines of secret intelligence activities in a par-
ticular country. The positive intelligence information developed by CIA
is furnished, in some measure and with varying degrees of prompt-
ness to Chiefs of Mission in the field, and in greater measure and con-
siderably more delay to the Department in Washington. Occasionally,
CIA will seek policy guidance before or while a particular operation is
being conducted, but it does not necessarily follow the advice given;
nor is it obliged to do so. In general, information on intelligence col-
lection operations themselves is not sufficiently specific or timely to
permit effective policy guidance, even if the Department were required
to provide such guidance, which it is not.

NSC 50

calls for “closer liaison” between CIA and State and for

strengthening the “guidance” received by CIA from intelligence con-
sumers, but the context of these references makes it clear that they re-
late to the nature of the intelligence to be collected and not to the pol-
icy implications of the conduct of intelligence collection activities. Any
operations in a foreign country, however, are bound to have implica-
tions for the overt conduct of relations with the country concerned. In-
deed they can have very serious results, leading to the undermining
of the stability of a friendly government, the loss of public confidence
in the U.S. or giving substance to Soviet anti-U.S. charges. The judg-
ment as to whether and in what manner a covert proceeding of any
kind is likely to affect overall objectives in the country concerned is
one which in the final analysis can be made only by the agency re-
sponsible for the conduct of overall policy.

The British meet the problem of political guidance on secret intel-

ligence activities, as well as the larger problem of coordinating all other
foreign intelligence activities, by giving an inter-agency committee, of
which the Foreign Office representative is automatically Chairman,
close policy control over the entire foreign intelligence effort of the U.K.
The MI–6 man in the field, although he belongs to an independent or-
ganization whose chief reports directly to the Prime Minister, is given
the specific responsibility of clearing with the Ambassador when his
activities are likely to affect the conduct of overt relations. The MI–6
man is able to discern the likelihood of political consequences because
he is part of a small highly-trained professional corps, and because
awareness of political factors is an essential qualification. A serious fail-
ure to do so costs him his job.

The Intelligence Community 407

See

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment,

Document 384.

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The immense range of CIA’s secret intelligence activities, the

paucity of trained personnel with good political judgment, the extent
of our involvement in many foreign countries and the serious results
of mistakes, would seem to require that the authority of the Secretary
of State and of the principal U.S. representatives in each foreign coun-
try be extended in some measure into the “secret intelligence” field.
This is all the more necessary because of the recent merging of the “se-
cret intelligence” and “covert operations” functions within CIA. Since
the necessity of continuous political guidance in the second category
is unquestioned, such extension of the Department’s authority would
seem to be the logical corollary of that merging.

The exclusion of the Department and its representatives in the field

from any right to full knowledge of what is going on in the intelligence
field, and of giving policy guidance thereon, has been applied in prac-
tice not only to the subject matter of NSCID–5 but also to the prelim-
inary or fact-finding stages of “covert operations.” (The latter are de-
fined for the present purpose as activities authorized by NSC 10/2 and
NSC 10/5.)

These fact-finding operations can, however, have just as

serious political consequences, for good or for ill, as the actual opera-
tions themselves. Moreover, it is hard to draw the dividing line in a
given case between the “intelligence” phase and the “operations” phase
when a “project” is submitted through the joint machinery for clear-
ance under paragraph 3(d)(1) of NSC 10/2. And CIA is the agency
which under the present system draws the dividing line.

As to “covert operations” themselves, NSC 10/2 of course recog-

nized their intimate relationship to the overt conduct of policy. This re-
lationship was emphasized by providing that the Secretary of State
should nominate the man initially in charge of these operations. NSC
10/2 said further that covert operations should be “planned and con-
ducted in a manner consistent with U.S. foreign and military policies
and with covert activities” but it left with the Director of Central Intel-
ligence the responsibility for insuring that they were so conducted.
Committee machinery for inter-departmental clearance was established,
with the right of appeal to the NSC itself in case of serious differences.

The very nature of covert operations, the necessary use of a sepa-

rate communications system and considerations of security in practice
leave the initiative largely in the hands of CIA Headquarters and CIA
representatives in the field. Because of lack of knowledge, the policy
makers are often precluded from giving the necessary guidance. Be-
cause many of the questions involved do not concern two of the mem-
bers (JCS and Defense) of the Committee of “OPC Consultants,” be-

408 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

For NSC 10/2, see ibid., Document 292. For NSC 10/5, see Document 90.

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cause a number of personal relationships between CIA and State op-
posite numbers have grown up, and because it is not always used by
CIA, this Committee machinery has not been fully effective. In spite of
full cooperation at the top levels of CIA on policy coordination in ac-
cordance with the letter and spirit of NSC 10/2 there has been a ten-
dency toward free-wheeling

at the operating level. There have been

a number of failures recently to obtain State Department clearance,
sometimes the explanation being given that the matter was not thought
to involve a policy question, sometimes that the responsible officers in
the State Department could not be reached in time, and at least once
with no valid explanation. A number of recent experiences underline
the necessity of CIA also recognizing in practice the mandate of NSC
10/2 to clear with State as well as with JCS and Defense the political
implications of projects of a para-military nature. On the other hand,
there are a number of examples of close and fruitful relations between
CIA and the State Department. This type of cooperation, as well as
close relationships which have developed at some posts in the field is,
however, largely the accidental result of the personalities involved
rather than of the system itself. The momentum of a large and organi-
zationally independent government organization inevitably pulls away
from cooperation.

If covert operations are to be a really effective arm of foreign pol-

icy, the policy officers of the State Department must, through tightly
organized machinery, be brought into more intimate relationship with

all

stages of covert operations and particularly the planning or “intel-

ligence” stages.

In summary, political guidance by the State Department on “covert

operations” is increasingly difficult to get across in view of (1) the merg-
ing within CIA of responsibility for these operations with that for se-
cret intelligence collection; (2) the difficulty in practice of distinguish-
ing between the two types of operation and CIA freedom from policy
guidance on the second; (3) the immense range of both types of activ-
ity, particularly in view of the military pressure to develop resistance
and stay-behind organizations; (4) the lack of full knowledge on the
part of the Department of State of what is going on in both fields un-
til and unless CIA chooses to give such information or something
“blows.”

Recommendation:

The Secretary of State and the principal U.S. representative in each

country, as part of their overall responsibility for the conduct of U.S.

The Intelligence Community 409

An attached handwritten note reads, “It is interesting and pertinent to note that

it is current in CIA to say that the State Dept calls anything ‘free wheeling’ which rep-
resents a new idea.”

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foreign relations, should have authority, acting through designated rep-
resentatives agreeable to CIA in a manner which will not prejudice se-
curity or limit effectiveness, to insure that

all

covert activities abroad,

including those defined earlier as “secret intelligence”, are

planned and

conducted

consistently with U.S. foreign policy and with the overt ex-

ecution of that policy.

Outerbridge Horsey

There is no indication as to what action, if any, was taken in the Department to

implement this recommendation.

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

146. National Security Council Report

NSC 142

Washington, February 10, 1953.

[Omitted here are a table of contents and Section I, “Objective,”

consisting of a quote from the National Security Act of 1947 outlining
the duties of the CIA.]

II. STATUS OF UNITED STATES PROGRAMS

FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1952

[Omitted here are Parts 1–6. Part 1, The Military Program, was

prepared by the Department of Defense. Part 2, The Mobilization Pro-
gram, was prepared by the Office of Defense Mobilization. Part 3, The
Mutual Security Program, was prepared by the Office of the Director
for Mutual Security. Part 4, The Civil Defense Program, was prepared
by the Federal Civil Defense Administration. Part 5, The Stockpiling
Program, was prepared by the Department of Defense. Part 6, The
Psychological Program was prepared by the Psychological Strategy
Board.]

410 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 142, Box 69.

Top Secret, Security Information. NSC 142 consisted of eight parts, each prepared by the
agency having primary responsibility for that particular national security program. The
composite report was circulated to the NSC by NSC Executive Secretary Lay on Febru-
ary 10. Only Parts 7 and 8 are printed. Part 7 was prepared by the CIA, dated February
6, and concurred in by the IAC. Part 8 was not found attached but a text from another
Record Group is included here.

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No. 7—The Foreign Intelligence Program

II. Coordination

Coordination among the intelligence agencies, so essential to pro-

ducing adequate intelligence for national security purposes, is gener-
ally good. Although no recommendations on this subject have been
made to the NSC during the year by the Director of Central Intelli-
gence, several improvements in intelligence coordination have been ac-
complished by mutual agreement among the intelligence agencies and
others. Such activities are under constant review and improvements
can also be expected during 1953.

III. National Estimates

1. The organization and procedures established since October 1950

for the production of national intelligence estimates have now been
proved in practice. The totality of resources of the entire intelligence com-
munity is drawn upon to produce national intelligence estimates, and
they can be improved only as we strengthen these resources. These esti-
mates derive authority from the manner of their preparation and from
the active participation of all the responsible intelligence agency heads in
their final review and adoption. Agency dissents are recorded where es-
timates would be watered down by further efforts to secure agreement.

2. A production program for national intelligence estimates has

been initiated. It provides for a re-examination of existing estimates on
critical areas or problems as well as the production of new estimates
designed to improve the coverage of important topics. Special effort is
being made to schedule the completion of basic estimates on the USSR
in advance of the review of budget estimates and NATO plans.

3. Close coordination between planners and policy-makers on the

one hand and the intelligence community on the other is continually
being pressed in an effort to make the intelligence produced both use-
ful and timely. The IAC mechanism is most useful when the NSC is
furnished with a coordinated intelligence view in advance of the time
when the policy is fixed.

4. “Post-mortems,” designed to reveal deficiencies in the prepa-

ration of selected estimates and to stimulate corrective action, have
been continued. The experience of past months in this procedure, par-
ticularly as applied in the case of estimates on the Far East, indicates
that the results are beneficial.

IV. Political, Social, and Cultural Intelligence

1. The status of political, social and cultural intelligence is very

good, due allowance being made for the paucity of information on the

The Intelligence Community 411

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There is no section I.

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Soviet Orbit and the difficulties of collecting it. Facilities for the pro-
duction of such intelligence, however, are adequate only for the most
urgent needs of the IAC agencies. Less pressing demands can be met
only partially and inadequately.

2. The principal deficiency in this field is in the effort devoted to

the exhaustive research on which sound estimates and analysis on cur-
rent development depend. Only the USSR can be regarded as ade-
quately covered in this respect, the European Satellites and Western
Europe nearly so. The agencies have applied special effort to develop-
ing intelligence on China. Surveys of present programs both within the
Government and in private research are making possible an integrated
and maximal use of resources. On medium priority areas, such as Iran,
Indochina and India, there is considerable lag between production of
immediate interpretation and analysis of longer term factors. On low
priority areas, such as Africa and Latin America, such factors receive
even less study. World Communism, outside the Soviet Orbit, is satis-
factorily covered with respect to party strength, political maneuverings
and relationships to the Moscow propaganda lines. Research into mat-
ters of organization, financial support and infiltration into political and
social organizations is inadequate.

V. Armed Forces Intelligence

1. Operational Intelligence

Intelligence needed in support of current military operations in

Korea is generally excellent. Information on installations and on de-
velopments in Manchuria, such as the movement and activities of the
Chinese Communist Forces and North Korean units north of the Yalu
River, is inadequate. Reliable information of the enemy’s long-range
plans and intentions is practically non-existent. Little improvement in
these deficiencies can be expected in the near future despite our efforts.

2. Order of Battle and Equipment

Order of battle and equipment information on the USSR, Com-

munist China, and—to a lesser degree—the European Satellites is par-
tial and inadequate, primarily because of the extreme difficulty of col-
lection. Intelligence on Communist Bloc units and equipment in most
areas with which the United States or nations friendly to the United
States are in contact is more nearly complete and reliable.

Information on the navies of the Soviet Bloc is, however, in gen-

eral, satisfactory and adequate because of the greater accessibility of
naval forces to observation. Coverage on order of battle intelligence
and equipment is generally adequate in respect of nations outside of
the Iron Curtain, except in the case of some neutral nations whose na-
tional policy restricts our access to such information.

412 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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3. Targeting

The assembly and analysis of encyclopedic target data on eco-

nomic and industrial vulnerabilities is well along for the Soviet Orbit
and is in intermediate research stages for Western Europe and the Far
East; increased research emphasis is being placed upon military tar-
gets. Current target systems studies are reasonably adequate to sup-
port joint operational planning but more vigorous data collection ef-
forts will be required to maintain these studies on a current basis. In
particular, target intelligence required to counter the Soviet atomic
threat is handicapped by gaps in current information on Soviet
weapons, stockpiling arrangements and delivery capabilities. Produc-
tion of dossiers for priority combat targets is almost complete for the
USSR but coverage varies considerably for the Satellite and approach
areas. Finally, extensive tactical target coverage has been completed on
areas adjoining the Korean theater but on other areas is in various
stages of completion.

4. Support for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

NATO requests have been filled with the best available intelligence

consistent with the National Disclosure Policy. Intelligence studies and
intelligence to assist in the establishment of basic intelligence files for
the NATO echelons are provided to the NATO Standing Group. Re-
leasable current studies and reports pertinent to the area and the mis-
sion of the NATO major commands are continuously provided.

VI. Economic Intelligence

1. Foreign economic intelligence on the free world presents few

serious problems, mainly those that arise from the wealth of material
and multiplicity of sources. For the Soviet Bloc, however, such intelli-
gence is far from adequate. Apart from aggregate statistics of uncer-
tain reliability published by the Soviet government, the intelligence
community is confined to exploiting a diminishing flow of low-grade
data, much of which is becoming increasingly out-of-date. Only by tak-
ing advantage of every possible item of information in the course of a
comprehensive, thoroughly planned, and coordinated study can na-
tional security needs for knowledge of the Bloc’s economic capabilities
and vulnerabilities be met. This may mean the subordination of short-
term requirements to the long-range program and a resolute and imag-
inative attack on problems of centralized indexing and exploitation of
all pertinent materials, whether overt or classified. Within the limits of
available materials, the next twelve months are expected to see the pro-
duction of individual industry studies of greater substance than any
now available. These will form the foundation for inter-industry stud-
ies and other over-all analysis.

The Intelligence Community 413

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2. In the field of economic warfare and support for collective con-

trols, machinery has been established to speed up the processing and
evaluation of spot data into intelligence on which action can be taken
by the Economic Defense Advisory Committee and the covert services.
There has been established a coordinating committee which is assist-
ing in bringing available intelligence more quickly and fully to bear on
questions arising under this program.

3. The target analysis and production activities outlined in Section

Armed Forces Intelligence,

involve the large-scale processing of for-

eign economic and technological data.

4. The heavy research requirements in the economic field make it

imperative that duplicate efforts be kept at an absolute minimum. An
even more determined effort to accomplish this objective will be made
during the coming year.

VII. Scientific and Technical Intelligence

1. Scientific and technical intelligence regarding the USSR and

Satellites made important progress during 1952; however, current
knowledge is still inadequate in terms of national security needs. In
order to obtain sounder scientific estimates in many fields, it is now
more apparent than ever that there is a need for serious interagency
study and development of new and unconventional technical means
of collecting scientific intelligence information. Efforts with this type
of collection show considerable promise, and the development and ex-
pansion of these and other techniques is being explored.

2. With the concurrence of the IAC, the DCI on 14 August 1952 is-

sued a directive delineating areas of dominant interests in the general
field of scientific and technical intelligence,

allocating primary pro-

duction responsibility between CIA and the intelligence agencies of the
Department of Defense. At the same time he established a Scientific Es-
timates Committee (SEC), primarily concerned with integrating scien-
tific and technical intelligence opinion for the production of national
intelligence. Coordination of technical intelligence for purposes other
than the production of national intelligence is the responsibility of the
military intelligence agencies, with CIA and the SEC maintaining ap-
propriate liaison.

3. There has been continued improvement in our knowledge of

Soviet accomplishments in the production of fissionable materials and
their conversion to atomic weapons. Intelligence estimates on the sta-
tus of USSR plutonium production are now reasonably sound, and
good bases have been established for estimating Soviet capabilities for

414 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Document 126.

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future expansion of the production of this material. However, the ab-
sence of sufficient evidence on which to base conclusions on installed
or planned isotope separation capacity for the production of U–235 is
one of the most important gaps in intelligence on the Soviet Atomic
Energy Program. Also, the evidence on activities in the thermonuclear
field is poor. Extensive collection and research programs have been un-
dertaken which may result in improvement during the coming year.

4. Scientific and technical intelligence on conventional military

weapons and equipment of all types is good so far as standardized
items in current use are concerned. Necessarily, knowledge of weapons
improvements in many cases must await Service use. In regard to de-
velopment of air weapons, information is partial and inadequate.
Knowledge of current Soviet guided missiles programs is poor, al-
though certain projects based on German developments are fairly well
known.

5. While our knowledge of Soviet biological and chemical warfare

programs continues to be poor, the agencies have undertaken collec-
tion and research programs which may result in improvement during
1953.

6. On basic scientific research, which is CIA’s responsibility, ma-

jor gaps exist in the intelligence in the countries behind the Iron Cur-
tain, and present estimates of long-range development are very weak.
However, knowledge of the current status of over-all Soviet scientific
research and development is believed to be more nearly adequate. Dur-
ing 1953, further improvements, particularly in long-range predictions,
are expected to result from present plans for improving overt collec-
tion of pertinent information, a more complete and systematic ex-
ploitation of open scientific literature, and a concerted intelligence re-
search effort on basic foreign scientific activities.

VIII. Psychological Intelligence

Overt and covert propaganda and psychological warfare programs

have developed to an unprecedented degree in the past two years. The
intelligence needs of these programs fall largely within the framework
of political and sociological intelligence. The orientation and organi-
zation of the material for the psychological warfare user calls for un-
accustomed depth and detail both in the field reporting and in analy-
sis. State is initiating a reorganization designed to increase coordination
of governmental and private research in this field. Inasmuch as research
contracts of military operational agencies involve social science proj-
ects of use to intelligence, the coordination of these with intelligence
agencies is important. The Research and Development Board has es-
tablished a psychological warfare committee to integrate such contact
within Defense. Liaison between State, Defense, and CIA should insure
coordination for mutual benefit.

The Intelligence Community 415

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IX. Geographic Intelligence

1. Geographic research of IAC agencies on foreign areas, includ-

ing evaluations of foreign mapping activities, is providing regional re-
ports and staff studies for policy and operational planning. Coordi-
nated geographic and map intelligence studies are also undertaken in
support of the National Intelligence Survey program.

2. Current geographic and mapping information on the Soviet Bloc

and adjacent areas is grossly inadequate. Geographic intelligence research
gives particular attention to the regional analysis of those geographic facts
that are required in support of planning and operational intelligence for
these areas. Within CIA, emphasis is also placed on the study of current
developments in Soviet mapping activities and programs.

X. Basic Intelligence

1. The program of National Intelligence Surveys (NIS), which was

begun in 1949 as an interdepartmental cooperative venture, was in-
tended to meet with U.S. Government’s demands for encyclopedic fac-
tual intelligence on a world-wide basis. Since the NIS program was be-
gun 1,490 individual sections have been produced on 59 of the 108 NIS
areas, which is the equivalent of approximately 23 complete NIS. Based
upon the rate of production established during the last quarter of FY
1952, a production goal of the equivalent of approximately 10 complete
NIS has been set for FY 1953, and production to December 31, 1952 in-
dicates that this goal will probably be attained.

2. NIS production is scheduled in accordance with JCS priorities

and intelligence agency capabilities. Limitations of the latter have pre-
cluded production of NIS on

all

JCS high priority areas and made it

necessary to undertake partial surveys on some other areas. However,
NIS production on the group of 24 areas of highest priority is approx-
imately 48% complete, whereas the entire program is about 22% com-
plete. NIS on ten individual areas are over 75% complete, and five of
these are in the JCS high priority list. Geographic research support for
NIS has been excellent.

3. In general the quality of the NIS is good, and can be expected

to improve as the gaps in information are filled and revisions are pub-
lished under the Maintenance Program which was started in FY 1952.
Coordination within and between all IAC and non-IAC agencies en-
gaged in the NIS program is excellent and suitable liaison is maintained
with the JCS.

XI. Warning of Attack—Current Intelligence

1. As noted above, current information on the Soviet Orbit is par-

tial and inadequate. Accordingly, conclusions concerning Soviet and
Communist intentions to initiate hostilities at any given time must be
tentative generalizations drawn from inadequate evidence. They are

416 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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often based on estimates of the over-all situation rather than on de-
tailed factual information.

2. The IAC Watch Committee provides a sound foundation for ex-

tracting intelligence from partial and inadequate information. In sup-
porting the work of the committee, the intelligence agencies make care-
ful cross-checks of information from all sources against an elaborate
analysis of possible indicators of Soviet intentions. This method is not
relied on exclusively; other approaches are constantly being tried.

3. In general there has been improvement during the past two

years in the ability of current intelligence to provide prompt notice and
preliminary evaluations of events and developments in the Soviet as
well as in the neutral and friendly areas. This improvement is attrib-
utable to increased skill and knowledge of intelligence analysts and to
a deepening sense of common purpose among the IAC agencies.

There is no guarantee that intelligence will be able to give adequate

warning of attack prior to actual detection of hostile formations.

Under cer-

tain circumstances, some last-minute defensive and offensive prepara-
tions on the Soviet periphery may, however, be detected. Opportunity
for detection of indications of Soviet or Satellite attack varies from fair
in the border areas of Germany and Korea to extremely poor in the
Transcaucasus and Southeast Asia. Each agency maintains its own 24-
hour Watch arrangements to handle any information that is received.

XII. Collection

1. The Foreign Service

In general, the collection activities of the Foreign Service are sat-

isfactory. Intelligence needs are met most adequately in the political
field, less so in certain aspects of the economic field, and least satis-
factorily in the scientific, technical and psychological fields. These de-
ficiencies are generally attributable to a lack of specialized competence
in those fields which are not closely related to the basic diplomatic
functions of the Foreign Service. Remedial action has been taken by es-
tablishing a comprehensive economic reporting program and a con-
tinuing program of providing Foreign Service posts with more com-
plete and effective guidance on intelligence needs. Additional remedial
measures in progress concern:

a. the greater use of overseas personnel of certain operational pro-

grams in collecting basic intelligence information, particularly in the

psychological and sociological fields; and

b. the recognition of the role of the Foreign Service in the national

intelligence effort through the revision of the Foreign Service Manual to

include for the first time specific and detailed intelligence instructions.

As a result of a recent study measures to meet the needs for basic

scientific information are being carried out.

The Intelligence Community 417

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2. Service Attaché System

The Service Attaché System furnishes extensive useful military in-

formation on countries outside the Iron Curtain. Attachés in the Soviet-
bloc countries obtain and transmit a considerable volume of valuable
information although, under the restrictions imposed on them by Com-
munist governments, the coverage which they provide cannot be consid-
ered adequate. The Service Attaché System has been strengthened since
the beginning of the Korean conflict through the opening of new offices
and the assignment of additional officers to important posts. Constant
efforts are being made to improve the collection capabilities of Service
Attachés by the development of new collection guides and techniques.

3. Overseas Commands

Armed Forces Commands in Europe are acquiring extensive in-

formation. While intelligence collection on the Soviet Union itself is
partial and inadequate, it is good in the Eastern Zones of Germany and
Austria. Considerable information is gathered by European Commands
from returned PW’s, escapees, and refugees.

Collection of intelligence in the Far East is adequate on friendly

and neutral areas but is partial and inadequate on Communist China
and Eastern Siberia. Tripartite Agreements among the respective serv-
ice agencies for exchange of intelligence on Southeast Asia have con-
siderably enhanced collection capabilities in the area and are expected
to improve this situation.

4. Aerial Reconnaissance

Because of overriding considerations of other than an intelligence

nature, the Armed Services have not as yet exploited fully their over-
flight capabilities in aerial reconnaissance. Photo reconnaissance capa-
bilities have increased, with a resulting improvement in contributions in
this field. The contributions of radar reconnaissance are only fair, as com-
pared to photo reconnaissance, but are being improved. Photo interpre-
tation capability is generally deficient in the Armed Services; corrective
measures are underway. The use of photo intelligence in the analysis of
economic and scientific developments in respect of the Soviet Orbit is
being strengthened. Research and development effort is being expended
on free balloons, piloted and pilotless vehicles (“guided missiles” and
satellites) to overcome a lack of special reconnaissance vehicles. Research
continues in the improvement of various detecting devices.

5. (This paragraph is being given separate limited distribution for

security reasons.)

418 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Not found.

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6. Domestic Collection

Through offices located in key cities throughout the U.S., CIA per-

forms a service of common concern in actively collecting foreign intelli-
gence information from business, financial, educational, and other non-
governmental organizations and private individuals. The cooperation of
these organizations and individuals has consistently been, and contin-
ues to be, excellent. Particular effort has been recently directed to the col-
lection of data on foreign scientific and technical developments, and to
the exploitation of the dwindling sources of economic and political in-
formation on Communist China. Because the interests of the intelligence-
producing agencies have become more sharply directed toward the So-
viet Orbit, the domestic collection effort is increasingly pointed in that
direction, with particular emphasis on foreign nationality groups within
the United States, defectors, and other recently arrived aliens.

7. Foreign Radio Broadcasts

a. Monitoring

Immediate and extensive coverage of foreign news, information,

and propaganda broadcasts is provided by a world-wide monitoring
network, maintained by CIA as a service of common concern. A
Moscow broadcast can be received in Washington in translation or sum-
mary within one hour. Coverage of the Soviet Orbit is excellent, except
for parts of Asia and the Baltic States. Progress made during 1952 to-
wards closing these gaps included: the activation of a station at
Hokkaido, Japan, to monitor northeast Asian broadcasts; negotiations
with the British Broadcasting Company for monitoring of Baltic and
northwestern USSR transmitters by the BBC under existing reciprocal
arrangements; and a monitoring survey in Pakistan to explore the pos-
sibilities of covering hitherto unmonitorable Central Asian broadcasts.

b. Propaganda Analysis

Propaganda Analysis in support of psychological warfare activi-

ties and overt programs such as the VOA, has been further improved.
Quantitative and content analysis of radio propaganda has been sup-
plemented by some analysis of published propaganda and press ma-
terial. More rapid and specialized support on radio propaganda is now
provided to “watch” groups and estimating offices.

8. Foreign Materials and Equipment

The collection and technical analysis of Soviet Orbit products has

continued to aid in the assessment of USSR scientific, economic, and
technological capabilities, although the procurement during 1952 of
significant items has not come up to expectations. Foreign materials
and equipment are vital to the factory markings analysis program. Ow-
ing to the relative stability of the fighting front in Korea, the amount

The Intelligence Community 419

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of captured materiel of intelligence importance has declined. At pres-
ent the most productive channels for selective procurement of Soviet
manufactured items and raw materials are official U.S. missions and
covert CIA components overseas. Items procured reasonably success-
fully through such channels during the year included power tools,
pharmaceuticals, rubber products, and metallurgical samples. Im-
provement in the coordination, through the Joint Materiel Intelligence
Agency, of technical analysis requirements and exploitation activities
has resulted in a greater yield of information from Soviet objects
acquired.

9. Monitoring of Radio Jamming

Under NSC 66/1

the agencies undertook the construction and or-

ganization of a monitoring system to obtain information on Soviet jam-
ming and related activities in the radio frequency spectrum. A pilot
operation involving a very limited number of stations is being estab-
lished. Adequate information as to the extent of Soviet jamming, con-
centration of the jamming stations, and related information must await
the initiation and implementation of a much-expanded program.

XIII. Support and Collation Facilities

1. Availability of Materials

With a few exceptions, all pertinent foreign positive intelligence,

both raw and finished, is distributed among all interested IAC agen-
cies. In addition to the distribution of current material, there is a con-
tinuing effort to locate and extract pertinent information from the large
volume of intelligence material that was collected during and after the
war, and from other collections in overseas files. The sheer volume of
these materials presents formidable and as yet unsolved problems. No
IAC agency, utilizing existing techniques, is in a position to record and
store all this material and to make the information contained therein
readily available to analysts requiring it. Remedy for this problem is
being sought through the refinement of agency responsibilities and the
development of machine indexing techniques.

2. Library Facilities

While the libraries of the IAC agencies are not yet self-sufficient,

they are equipped to satisfy most of the major needs of their users.
Their utility can be increased and their effectiveness can be im-
proved in connection with current plans for improving central refer-
ence facilities.

420 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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For NSC 66/1, “Intelligence Support for the Voice of America With Regard to So-

viet Jamming,” see Document 44.

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3. Biographic Information

Each IAC agency maintains files of biographic data on foreign per-

sonalities for its own particular purposes and makes such data avail-
able to the other agencies upon request. Excellent data can be made
available on political, military, and scientific personalities outside the
Iron Curtain; coverage within the Soviet Orbit is necessarily partial and
inadequate. Personalities in the economic and industrial fields are
poorly covered at present although there is considerable information
available. Means of improvement are currently being studied. As a re-
sult of recent arrangements between the State Department and CIA,
the latter is discontinuing biographic intelligence in the political, so-
cial, and cultural fields and will in the future depend on the Depart-
ment of State for such intelligence.

4. Photographic Files

The several Defense agencies and CIA each maintain photographic

and related documentary libraries consistent with their requirements
and responsibilities. Material in each library is available to the IAC
community. Continuing effort must be exerted to increase the quality
and quantity of this source of intelligence.

5. Map Procurement and Reference Services

[

⁄

lines not declassified

] Results during the past three years have

proved the effectiveness of overt collection of maps and related infor-
mation through the Foreign Service Geographic Attaché program.
Increased emphasis is being placed on the collection of maps and
engineering drawings from domestic sources. Service Attaché channels
are also being used. The currently published foreign maps required for
intelligence activities are received on a continuing basis through ex-
change arrangements between the Department of State and many for-
eign official mapping agencies. These exchanges are in addition to those
of an operational character maintained by the Military Services.
Excellent map reference services in support of intelligence require-
ments are maintained by close working arrangements between the map
libraries.

6. Foreign Language Publications

The exploitation of foreign language publications for intelligence

purposes is presently undertaken in varying degrees by each agency.
[

⁄

lines not declassified

] Currently, the IAC agencies are considering

plans with reference to the exploitation of foreign language publica-
tions which might result in improved coordination in procurement, ex-
ploitation, and indexing for intelligence purposes.

Translation is also done by each agency, though coordination is ef-

fected to prevent duplication. Overseas abstracting from foreign language

The Intelligence Community 421

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publications is presently performed at a number of diplomatic posts.
This work is coordinated with similar CIA and departmental activities
in the U.S. to avoid duplication and to make the maximum use of avail-
able linguists.

Most publications needed for the intelligence effort are now being

obtained, though major gaps exist in regard to Soviet Bloc materials.
Through overt and covert channels there is an increasing effort to im-
prove procurement in this latter category.

7. External Research

External research in the social sciences of particular interest to in-

telligence has presented difficult problems of coordination. In order to
improve coordination CIA and the Department of State are jointly
strengthening the latter’s External Research Staff, and the Department
of Defense has taken steps to ensure necessary coordination of exter-
nal research contacts on psychological warfare among military agen-
cies. It is expected that liaison arrangements between the Department
of Defense, Department of State, and CIA in this field will produce
substantial progress during the current year in minimizing duplication,
ensuring community benefit of finished research and facilitate more ra-
tional letting of external research contracts. Evaluation of this program
as it affects the Department of Defense cannot as yet be given.

No. 8. The Internal Security Program

Recent information regarding the feasibility of hand-portable

atomic weapons makes possible their clandestine use and thus requires
a complete reappraisal, which is underway, of virtually the whole in-
ternal security program. Action on initial countermeasures, approved
by the President on December 29, 1952, is being taken by the IIC, the
ICIS, and the AEC.

Domestic counter-intelligence has been improved by a great ex-

pansion of informant coverage, with emphasis on subversive move-
ments and key industrial facilities. By vigorous prosecution of func-
tionaries of the Communist Party, USA under the Smith Act, and by
action to compel registration of the Party as a Communist action or-
ganization under the Internal Security Act of 1950, the Party’s National
Board has been neutralized, its leaders convicted or forced into hiding,
Party and bail funds depleted, membership reduced appreciably
and recruitment drastically hampered. However, such vigorous action

422 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: National Archives, RG 273, NSC Representative on Internal Security, NSC

142, Box 46. Top Secret; Security Information. Prepared jointly by the Interdepartmental
Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security. An
attached statement on the objective of the internal security program, consisting of a quo-
tation from NSC 142, is not printed.

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has also driven the Party further underground and made counter-
intelligence and continued prosecution more difficult. Investigative
agencies assert the need for more intelligence regarding Soviet and
satellite espionage and sabotage organizations, additional manpower,
and additional funds for military internal security programs.

In the event of war, plans are ready for immediate apprehension

of 20,000 dangerous civilians. Related programs are being prepared to
neutralize dangerous U.S. military personnel, enemy aliens and diplo-
matic personnel. Accordingly, most potentially dangerous individuals
should be neutralized within the initial period of a Soviet attack.

Although Executive Order 10290

on the safeguarding of classified

security information is in force, an acceptable degree of security for
such information will not be achieved until satisfactory standards of
clearance are established for access to such information by government
employees and consultants, by non-government personnel in classified
contract work, and by representatives of foreign governments. ICIS rec-
ommendations on personnel security and access have been made but
not adopted. (The ICIS has not participated in the Loyalty program.)

There is a high degree of installation security for some sensitive

government buildings and areas, but uniform standards have not yet
been generally achieved. Some progress has been made in industrial
installation security, but protective programs do not include control of
sub-contracting plants of classified contractors nor essential civilian
wartime industrial facilities. Legal sanction is lacking to remove secu-
rity risks in industry and there is difficulty in preventing strikes by
Communist-infiltrated unions. Plant visitors are inadequately identi-
fied and checked. Accordingly, it should come as no surprise if acts of
sabotage occur.

The port security program, limited to major ports, has not achieved

reasonable security as regards fire protection and harbor entrance guard-
ing. No effective security program is in force for telecommunications.

Control over the entry of dangerous aliens has not been achieved,

largely because of personnel limitations in the Coast Guard and the Cus-
toms and Immigration Service, lack of control over alien crewmen, in-
adequate surveillance of foreign vessels, and poor control over foreign
diplomatic and official personnel. The Omnibus Immigration Act, ef-
fective December 24, 1952,

provides authority for remedying some in-

adequacies in entry control. There is little control over illegal entry by
coastal or plane landings. On departures from the U.S., there are few
effective exit controls operative, although there is limited screening of

The Intelligence Community 423

For E.O. 10290, see 3 CFR 1949–53 compilation, pp. 790–797 or 16 FR 9795.

66 Stat. 163–281.

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crewmen under the Magnuson Act. Export and monetary controls pres-
ent no significant problems.

Arrangements to report unconventional attacks have been made,

but countermeasures provide little security against clandestine AW, BW
and CW unconventional attacks.

147. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles

to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (Vandenberg)

Washington, May 20, 1953.

SUBJECT

Air Resupply and Communications (ARC) Wing Program

1. In the fall of 1950, you informed this Agency

that, in anticipa-

tion of CIA requirements for support of covert operations, the U.S. Air
Force was organizing several Special Operational Wings. At that time,
it was contemplated that a total of seven such wings, which are now
designated Air Resupply and Communications (ARC) Wings, would
be organized. About a year later, the magnitude of this program was
reconsidered in the light of over-all manpower limitations and the num-
ber of wings was reduced from seven to four. We now understand that
consideration is being given to a still further curtailment which will re-
duce the number of wings to two, and that as a part of this plan the
500th ARC Wing will move from Wheelus Field, Libya, to Molesworth
Air Force Base, England, and the 581st ARC Wing from Clark Field,
R. F., to Okinawa.

2. We are, of course, cognizant of the many problems which con-

front the USAF at this time. However, the reduction of the number of
ARC Wings to only two has serious implications upon our plans both
for current operations and in the event of a “hot” war.

3. During the “cold war,” CIA has a very substantial and grow-

ing requirement for support in the serial transport, handling and stor-
age of its matériel and supplies. This Agency depends upon the ARC
Wings to furnish a major part of such support. Manifestly, full utiliza-

424 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for Operations,

Job 79–01228A, Box 8. Top Secret; Security Information. Cleared by Wisner and Cabell.

This communication has not been further identified.

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tion of the capabilities of the ARC Wings cannot be achieved rapidly,
but it is believed that a good beginning toward such full utilization has
been made and we are looking forward to a continuing expansion of
our joint operations.

4. The wartime mission of the ARC Wings is stated to be: (1) air

support of Unconventional Warfare Operations; and (2) the prepara-
tion and dissemination of Psychological Warfare materials. While no
formal agreement exists that the Wings will be available to support CIA
covert operations, this Agency has always assumed that they would
be, and war plans have been made on that basis. These war plans re-
quire the availability of effective air support facilities on D-Day for the
immediate support of guerrilla and resistance operations. Following
D-Day, there will be an increasing requirement for this type support to
meet war plans jointly developed by the CIA and the JCS. As I am sure
you are aware, air support of covert operations requires that the per-
sonnel be highly trained in the peculiar techniques involved and have
the specialized equipment to implement these techniques.

5. If our understanding of the planned reduction to two wings is

correct, it appears to us that improved utilization of the capabilities of
the ARC Wings under both “cold war” and “hot war” conditions, could
be effected if storage and packaging facilities could be retained in the
Tripoli area, thus giving greater flexibility to the support which the
580th ARC Wing could render to us in the European-Near Eastern-
African area. In effect, therefore, the Tripoli facilities would be a satel-
lite of the permanent base at Molesworth. Similarly, in the Far East we
would very much like to see comparable satellite facilities maintained
at Clark Field because of the vital necessity of maintaining an adequate
base in the sensitive Southeast Asia area. Our objective, which we be-
lieve is apparent, is to insure the maximum utility of ARC by the main-
tenance of additional packing and storage facilities at Tripoli and at
Clark. These facilities would give ARC, and in turn CIA, greatly in-
creased flexibility and would enhance the operational utility of these
organizations. By maintaining these additional packing and storage fa-
cilities, the reduction in the ARC program from four to two wings, in
our opinion, would be minimized.

6. For obvious reasons, it is impossible for this Agency to predict

accurately the time and place where ARC Wing facilities will be most
needed. However, in an endeavor to exploit to the utmost the capabil-
ities of the two wings to give maximum support to the conduct of covert
operations, the possibility of creating satellite facilities as outlined
above is offered. While the movement of aircraft presents no major
problem, the transfer of substantial amounts of supplies and matériel
is very difficult to achieve, especially so under wartime conditions.

7. Request that USAF units capable of rendering the above sup-

port be included in the over-all Air Force program.

The Intelligence Community 425

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8. In the event that you feel that this memorandum should have

been addressed to the Secretary of Defense, request you so advise.

Allen W. Dulles

Printed from a copy that indicates Dulles signed the original.

148. Editorial Note

The United States Government supported the creation of a Vol-

unteer Freedom Corps, to comprise nationals of Eastern European
countries (other than East Germany). Major U.S. allies opposed the
proposal, and consequently, it died a slow death. Consideration of the
Volunteer Freedom Corps is covered extensively in

Foreign Relations,

1952–1954, volume VIII. The Department of State had major reserva-
tions about the proposals, some of which were raised by Under Secre-
tary Smith in the 145th meeting of the National Security Council, May
20, 1953. (Ibid., pages 213–218)

149. Memorandum From William P. Bundy of the Office of

National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency to
Director of Central Intelligence Dulles

Washington, May 26, 1953.

SUBJECT

NSC 140/1, the Edwards Report

426 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence,

Job 80–R01440R, Box 3. Top Secret; Security Information; Special Security Handling. A
stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Dulles saw it on June 3.

Documentation on NSC 140/1, May 18, 1953, also known as the Edwards Report,

is in

Foreign Relations,

1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, pp. 328–349, 355–360, and 367–370.

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1. Attached is the Edwards Report,

just in case it should arise in

the discussion of the Armaments question.

2. For your present purposes, the following are worth noting:
a. The Report assumes a Soviet stockpile of 120 in mid-1953 and

300 in mid-1955, and proceeds from these figures with an allocation of
these levels between: (1) SAC bases in US; (2) SAC bases overseas; (3)
other US targets. The assumed stockpile levels are the median JAEIC
figures, and the presumed allocations are regarded as logical attempts
to inflict maximum damage on the US—they do not claim to be

the

al-

location the Soviets would necessarily make. As General Edwards is
pointing out in his separate letter, a need exists for a systematic study
of Soviet strategy in the event of war.

b. General Webster of the JCS “neither concurs nor non-concurs.”

This unfortunate position is the result of the fact that the original terms
of reference called for considering overseas installations, with reference
to their importance to defence of the continental US and to a US coun-
teroffensive. This limitation was insisted on by General Bradley per-
sonally, in the original oral discussions with General Smith, specifically
in order to avoid covering “every PT boat in the Adriatic.” It was the
understanding of all who participated in the original laying out of the
project that we would stick to the fewest possible bases abroad, and
those would be related to the

air

effort. Unfortunately the word “air”

was omitted from the written form, although the Edwards Committee
orally agreed to interpret it in this way. Thus, the JCS working group
got off and allocated a very small number of bombs (10, I believe) to

non-air

targets such as ports and major ground supply dumps. The

Committee threw out this allocation and stuck to the air bases—and at
the last minute General Webster took the stand that he could not sign
the report! The actual difference is minimal, and should not really af-
fect the substance. But there it is.

3. In its basic conclusions, the report fully supports statements that

the Soviets could probably damage the US critically in the next few
years. While the damage predicated for mid-1955 is less than some
thought it would be, the curve of bombs-on-target is obviously rising
between mid-1953 and mid-1955. The Committee did not consider the
possible effect of the early warning McGill and Lincoln lines, since it
was thought they could not be effective by mid-1955. Whether the curve
can be levelled off by defensive measures is now in controversy.

WPB

The Intelligence Community 427

Attached but not printed.

Reference may be to Allen Dulles’ participation in the May 27 NSC meeting which

discussed armaments and American policy. A memorandum of that discussion is ibid.,
Part 2, pp. 1169–1174.

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150. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles to the

Chairman of the Continental Defense Committee (Bull)

Washington, June 30, 1953.

Dear General Bull:

In response to your request of June 15,

for the views of this Agency

on organizational arrangements to provide the best possible continu-
ing production of Net Capability Estimates, the following thoughts are
submitted:

There is no need to argue the necessity for reliable estimates of net

capabilities as the basis for national policy formulation. These can only
be prepared by careful integration of gross-capability intelligence of
the enemy with our capabilities and plans, so that the net result of the
interplay may be forecast as accurately as possible. This need is not
confined to the problem of defense of North America but is equally
inescapable for planning US requirements and commitments in any
part of the globe.

The President and the NSC in practice and pursuant to statutory

authority depend on the Director of Central Intelligence, representing
the coordinated views of the Intelligence Agencies, for foreign intelli-
gence estimates, and on the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, speak-
ing as their representative, for military advice. Thus what is required
to furnish the President and Council with guidance in the most useful
and complete form is the effective amalgamation of the functions of
the two.

Responsibility for such combined analysis cannot rightly be as-

signed to one of these advisers to the exclusion of the other, for both
are coordinate staff officers serving the same commander. Each must
consider the factors developed by the other in order to eliminate
reliance on arbitrary assumptions and produce valid and realistic
forecasts.

It is my view, therefore, that the President and Council should es-

tablish a permanent subcommittee on Net Capability Estimates to be
composed of:

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director of Central Intelligence

428 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence,

Job 80–R01440R, Box 3. Top Secret. Security Information. In connection with the NSC’s
evaluation of the net capabilities of the Soviet Union (NSC 140/1), General Bull chaired
a committee on continental defense, which was supposed to complete its report in mid-
July. See

Foreign Relations,

1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, p. 368.

Not further identified.

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and that this subcommittee be charged with providing, on its initiative
or as requested by the Council, estimates of net capabilities as needed
to support the formulation of national policy.

The manner in which this subcommittee would discharge its func-

tion should be left flexible and might very well differ substantially ac-
cording to the nature of the estimate undertaken. It should have au-
thority to secure support and information from all executive branches
of the government and should be required to consult with such agen-
cies and interdepartmental committees as may be able to contribute
significantly to any estimate. The subcommittee should take such ac-
tion as may be necessary to preserve the security of highly sensitive
information such as U.S. war plans and intelligence sources.

I believe you will find that the views expressed herein are sub-

stantially the same as those stated by General Smith in his memoran-
dum of 14 October 1952 to the Executive Secretary of the National Se-
curity Council,

and orally to the National Security Council on 26

November 1952,

and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 17 December 1952.

Thus, though the need has long been recognized, no general or con-
tinuing machinery has yet been established. It is my earnest hope that
as a result of the recommendations of your Committee, the Council
will take necessary action along the lines I have indicated.

Sincerely yours,

Allen W. Dulles

Document 131.

See Document 138.

No record of these oral comments has been found.

Printed from a copy that indicates Dulles signed the original.

151. Editorial Note

The Report of the President’s Committee on International Infor-

mation Activities (the Jackson Committee report), June 30, 1953, dealt
in part with intelligence and intelligence-related activities. For the text
of the report, see

Foreign Relations,

1952–1954, volume II, Part 2, pages

1795–1874. For a progress report on implementation of the report, pre-
pared by the Operations Coordinating Board and circulated on Octo-
ber 1, 1953, see ibid., pages 1877–1899.

The Intelligence Community 429

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152. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of

Defense (Kyes)

Washington, July 15, 1953.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE

Secretaries of the Military Departments
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Assistant Secretaries of Defense
Chairmen of Boards, Committees and Councils, OSD
Assistants to the Secretary of Defense
Directors of Offices, OSD

SUBJECT

Reorganization—Office of Special Operations, Office of the Secretary of Defense

REFERENCES

Department of Defense Directive C-5132.1
Department of Defense Directive S-3140.1

General Graves B. Erskine, USMC (Retired), has been appointed

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and Director, Office of Special Op-
erations, Office of the Secretary of Defense. His office and responsibil-
ities are within the immediate purview of the Deputy Secretary of De-
fense, to whom he will report.

All functions formerly assigned to the Deputy for Psychological

Policy and to the Office of Psychological Policy, Office of the Secretary
of Defense, are hereby assigned to the Office of Special Operations; the
Office of Psychological Policy is therefore abolished; and personnel
thereof assigned to the Office of Special Operations.

The functions of the Office of Special Operations encompass all psy-

chological operations activities in which the Department of Defense par-
ticipates, including monitorship of psychological warfare planning, op-
erations, and research and development; as well as unconventional
warfare, international information activities, and other operations of a
similar nature which are within the cognizance of the Psychological Strat-
egy Board, its successor agencies, or within the provisions of NSC 10/2,

430 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for Operations,

Job 79–01228A, Box 8. Secret; Security Information.

The two references were not found.

See

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment,

Document 292.

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NSC 10/5,

NSC 59/1,

and the report by the President’s Committee on

International Information Activities.

It is also the function of the Office of Special Operations to advise

and assist the Secretary of Defense and his staff on all matters per-
taining to the national intelligence effort, including those provided un-
der NSCID No. 9 Revised,

in which the Office of the Secretary of De-

fense has a direct interest or designated responsibility.

It is the duty of the Director, Office of Special Operations, to pro-

vide staff support for the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secre-
tary of Defense in these fields and to perform such other duties as may
be assigned. The Director, Office of Special Operations, will provide
principal staff representation for the Office of the Secretary of Defense
in all such matters with other departments and agencies of the U.S.
Government.

For these purposes the Director, Office of Special Operations, is

herewith delegated the authority to obtain such reports and informa-
tion from the military departments as are necessary to carry out his re-
sponsibilities, and is authorized to request the military departments to
issue the necessary directives to obtain such reports and information.

In the performance of these functions, the Director, Office of Spe-

cial Operations, will to the extent practical, utilize the advice, assist-
ance, and appropriate facilities of the military departments. Such uti-
lization shall not, however, be construed or so utilized as to circum-
vent the existing command channels through the Secretaries of the mil-
itary departments for the formal communication of approved policies,
plans, or other directives.

The reference directives remain in effect except as modified by

this memorandum with respect to subordination and title of office
pending their reissuance or recision after completion of anticipated
National Security Council–Executive Branch reorganization now un-
der consideration.

Roger M. Kyes

The Intelligence Community 431

Document 90.

Document 2.

See Document 151.

Document 257.

Printed from a copy that indicates Kyes signed the original.

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153. Report by the Psychological Strategy Board

PSB D–47

Washington, July 29, 1953.

STATUS REPORT ON THE NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL

EFFORT AS OF JUNE 30, 1953

[Omitted here are a cover page, title page, and table of contents.]

I. Status of the Program on June 30, 1953

1. The Board presents below a brief evaluative summary of the

status of our national psychological programs as of June 30, 1953, based
largely on the appended Progress Reports by the departments and
agencies responsible for operations.

General

2. While the President’s Committee on International Information

Activities studied the whole problem of the world struggle with a view
to basic improvements in the U.S. position, the struggle, on the psy-
chological as on other fronts, was conducted with increased vigor. The
most far-reaching opportunity came with Stalin’s death. The Presi-
dent’s speech of April 16

was signally successful in capitalizing on the

situation by appealing to the new leaders for an era of worldwide peace
and friendship. The world at large received the speech with great en-
thusiasm, and the follow up support through psychological exploita-
tion added to the initial success.

3. Further exploitation of events behind the Iron Curtain has been

guided by the requirement that psychological operations must be
keyed in with political action. After Stalin’s death, the next major oc-
casion for such action followed the outbreaks in Czechoslovakia and
East Germany. Plans and operations were stepped up accordingly, with
prospect of conducting a major campaign in the long-range contest to
take full advantage of the consequences of Stalin’s death.

4. Outside of the Soviet orbit the developments on the psycho-

logical front have been characterized by a disappointing deterioriation

432 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 333, PSB D–47. Top

Secret. PSB D–47, a Progress Report by the Psychological Strategy Board, was submit-
ted to the President and the National Security Council on July 29. The title page of the
report indicates that it was prepared pursuant to a May 27 memorandum from NSC Ex-
ecutive Secretary Lay to the Acting Director of the Psychological Strategy Board which
has not been found. Also on the title page is a note by Charles E. Johnson, Secretary to
the Board, indicating that the Board approved the report at its July 29 meeting.

Reference is to President Eisenhower’s “The Chance for Peace” speech; text in

Public Papers: Eisenhower, 1953,

pp. 179–188.

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in the attitudes towards the U.S. Non-Communist press and public opin-
ion in Western Europe has reflected mounting criticism of U.S. foreign
policy (the possible trend back to isolationism), and alleged anti-
Communist “hysteria”. These unfavorable attitudes in combination
with a generally more receptive reaction among Western European peo-
ples to the Soviet “peace offensive” now constitute an intensification of
anti-American feeling among significant elements of European opinion.

5. World opinion has also been markedly unfavorable towards the

development of U.S. foreign trade policies. At the same time that we
are sharply reducing our programs for economic assistance, it has felt
that we are providing little indication that our markets are to be opened
up to foreign goods. Congressional criticism of our allies for their prac-
tices in the field of East-West trade, in combination with the new So-
viet line on expansion of trade with the free world, has begun to have
an adverse psychological impact around the world.

6. Urgent planning for stronger psychological measures based on

Thailand was set in motion as the result of the invasion of Laos and
the accompanying threat of Communist aggression in Southeast Asia.

7. While our overt psychological capabilities have been reduced

by personnel difficulties, pressures in the Congress and appropriations
cuts, covert capabilities continued to make sound progress, and faster
and more energetic teamwork was secured through closer relations
with the NSC and the operating agencies.

Areas

8. Within the

USSR

itself, radio still constitutes the only impor-

tant means used currently to reach the Russian people. Jamming by
the Russian radio of our broadcasts continues to present a major prob-
lem. There was however, a perceptible increase in effectiveness of our
radio resources in the last six months due to the inauguration of Ra-
dio Liberation and the stepped-up activity of Radio Free Russia. In ad-
dition to the radio, leaflet distribution was utilized to reach Soviet mil-
itary forces stationed outside the USSR.

9. Similarly, in

Communist China,

the major psychological activi-

ties presently available are radio and leaflet drops. Both of these are
being substantially increased. Through

Hongkong,

increased use is be-

ing made of overt, grey and black propaganda channels with the Chi-
nese Mainland.

10. In the

European Satellites

likewise, radio is our major propaganda

communications medium. RIAS, RFE, and VOA have contributed to the
building up of pressures that may be instrumental in weakening the
Kremlin’s control of the satellites. In most of these

Satellite States,

progress

in other forms of psychological activity, mainly unattributable, has
been slow, and has centered on the build-up of operating potential. There

The Intelligence Community 433

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has, however, been increased action, including leaflet drops, in certain
satellites—notably Albania, Bulgaria, and Rumania.

11. A high degree of access to

East Germany

was maintained de-

spite increasing Soviet security restriction. Virtually the entire area has
been continuously subjected to U.S. psychological programs through
mainly indigenous channels.

12. In

Western Europe,

the presence of U.S. Armed Forces and the

Military Aid program provided a significant psychological impact. In-
creased emphasis on troop acceptance programs enlisting the positive
cooperation of the governments and the local authorities has brought
about a definite improvement in most areas in the problem of avoid-
ing friction between U.S. military personnel and foreign populations.

13. Among the principal problems that have confronted U.S. psy-

chological efforts in Western Europe during the past six months are in-
creased criticism of the U.S. and, especially since Stalin’s death, the
Soviet “Peace Offensive”. It is evident that many, if not all, Western Eu-
ropean governments have been influenced to some extent by the Krem-
lin’s tension-reducing tactics. The effect has been to retard progress
toward a number of our objectives, including the build-up of Western de-
fenses, the ratification of EDC, and attainment of European integration.

14. The U.S. counter-offensive has included fullest exploitation by

the Department of State’s Information Program of the President’s In-
augural address

and of his April 16 speech challenging the new lead-

ers of the USSR to prove their peaceful professions by deeds, not words.
Copies of the latter were presented to Foreign Offices all over the world
in advance of delivery and kinescopes of the entire speech were sent
to seventy-three posts within a day of its delivery. One of these was
shown over BBC television on April 20 to an estimated audience of
6,000,000. Five million pamphlets, handbills, and leaflets on the speech
were prepared and distributed, and a documentary film of it in thirty-
five languages had been produced and shipped by May 2.

15. In

Italy,

U.S. efforts to aid the reelection of the Democratic

Center Parties fell considerably short of their objective. The DeGasperi
Coalition was returned to office by a slender margin and the Commu-
nists and extreme Rightists registered significant gains.

16. In

France,

the municipal elections in May showed that the

Communists had suffered a slight set-back in rural areas, but had main-
tained their position in the industrial areas in larger cities. Govern-
mental instability was a troublesome factor during the period and a re-
laxation of earlier French official measures to reduce the power of the
Communist Party in France resulted. The repercussions of some Con-

434 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Ibid., pp. 1–8.

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gressional investigations, as well as of the Rosenberg executions, in
conjunction with the Kremlin’s peace campaign, appear to have con-
tributed to an increase in neutralism.

17. In the

United Kingdom

also, there appears to have been a

marked increase in neutralism in its special British form of Bevanism.
Although the belief is still widely held that Western unity must be
preserved, three major elements contribute to the growth of anti-
American feeling:

(1) The belief that the U.S. is deeply divided on basic international

policies,

(2) The development of the Soviet “peace offensive”, and

(3) The desire to exercise a more positive and independent initia-

tive in international affairs.

18. In

West Germany and Berlin,

the recent riots touched off greatly

increased pressures for unification, complicating the problems of Ger-
man ratification of the EDC. With this exception, however, U.S. psy-
chological programs in Berlin and West Germany, as well as their pro-
jection into East Germany, appear to have been fairly effective in
promoting progress toward our major goal of a Democratic Germany
integrated into Western defense efforts. Since late March German press
opinion has reflected a decline in confidence in U.S. leadership. This
was temporarily halted by the President’s April 16 speech, but has since
been resumed. The two major factors contributing to this are: (1) the
Soviet “peace offensive” and (2) lack of agreement within the U.S. on
policy towards Germany.

19. In the

Near and Middle East and South Asia,

neutralism, and the

tendency to associate the U.S. with “colonialism”, continued to present
a major obstacle to the attainment of U.S. psychological objectives. In the
Arab States, the alleged pro-Israel bias on the part of the U.S. remained
a major handicap, although the visits to Middle Eastern capitals by Sec-
retary Dulles and Mr. Stassen may have alleviated this problem, at least
temporarily. IIA has continuously exploited the beneficial aspects of these
visits in its output to the area. Turkey, Pakistan, and Greece appear to
be the brightest spots in this area, psychologically speaking.

20. In the

Far East,

the resumption of Korean truce talks raised ma-

jor psychological problems. The exchange of sick and wounded pris-
oners necessitated special measures to deal with “brain washing”. Steps
were taken to achieve more effectively coordinated guidance on infor-
mation matters concerning Korea through the channels of the Psycho-
logical Operations Coordinating Committee. The offer of a reward to
MIG pilot defectors was followed by an immediate and significant shift
in Communist air tactics over the Korean battle area.

21. In

Japan,

severe economic problems and growing neutralist

resistance to the U.S. objective of Japanese rearmament have been

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trouble spots in a picture otherwise fairly satisfactory. “Grey” and un-
attributable activities have progressed favorably.

22. In

Latin America,

our capabilities for effective psychological ac-

tion increased in a number of countries, for the most part in the field of
unattributable activity. There has been growing dissatisfaction in many
Latin American countries directed mainly against American economic
policies. To help offset this, a major psychological move was Dr. Milton
Eisenhower’s goodwill tour of South America initiated late in June.

Special Items

23. Emergency assistance provided by U.S. Armed Forces in cases

of national catastrophe has made material contributions to U.S. psycho-
logical efforts in

The Netherlands, England, Turkey, Greece, Iran, Ecuador,

and

Japan.

24. A grant of 1,000,000 tons of wheat to

Pakistan

has had a simi-

larly favorable effect.

25. Carefully planned exploitation of U.S. leadership in the atomic

field, with a coordinated public information program on the Nevada
weapons tests and other special weapons, as well as certain news leaks
that gave rise to widespread speculation as to the explosion of a
thermo-nuclear device at Eniwetok atoll, contributed to the U.S. psy-
chological effort.

[Omitted here are Section II. The Work of PSB; Annex A, Report

of the Department of State; Annex B, Report of the Department of De-
fense; Annex C, Report of the Mutual Security Agency; and Annex D,
General Appraisal.]

154. Editorial Note

In March 1951, Jacobo Arbenz Guzman was sworn in as President

of Guatemala. A climate of labor unrest and fears of a possible Sovi-
etization of Guatemala soon prompted opposition groups to begin plot-
ting against the Arbenz regime. Prominent among the plotters was an
exiled army colonel, Carlos Castillo Armas. Castillo Armas, based in
Honduras, had the active support of Nicaragua’s Anastasio Somoza
and the United Fruit Company. By early 1952, the CIA, concerned about
Arbenz’s growing reliance on left-wing activists, including members
of the Communist Party, had made contact with Castillo Armas. Plans
for assistance were dropped in October 1952, however, after rumors of
U.S. involvement became widespread and Arbenz’s forces began tak-
ing preemptive action.

436 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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155. National Security Council Report

NSC 161

Washington, August 14, 1953.

STATUS OF UNITED STATES PROGRAMS FOR

NATIONAL SECURITY AS OF JUNE 30, 1953

[Omitted here are Parts 1–8 of the report.]

No. 9—The Foreign Intelligence Program

(In concurring in this report, the IAC agencies wish to point out

that the effects of recent budget cuts on intelligence activities cannot
be assessed at this time, and are therefore not reflected in this report.)

I. Coordination

1. Coordination among the intelligence agencies, so essential to

producing adequate intelligence for national security purposes and to
reducing cost by avoiding duplication, is improving. There is still some
duplication of effort which adds to the cost of intelligence, but steps
are being taken continually to reduce this to a minimum.

2. On March 7, at the recommendation of the Director of Central

Intelligence, with the concurrence of the members of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee, the NSC issued NSCID No. 16,

directing the

DCI to ensure coordination of procurement and processing of foreign
language publications. No other recommendations for coordination
have been made to the NSC during the past six months; however,
several improvements in intelligence coordination have been ac-
complished by mutual agreement among the intelligence agencies
and others. There are at present, in addition to the Intelligence Advi-
sory Committee established by NSCID No. 1,

nine interdepart-

mental committees to coordinate important intelligence programs in
atomic energy, domestic exploitation, defection, watch procedures,
economic intelligence, economic warfare intelligence, scientific
intelligence, clandestine intelligence priorities and foreign language
publications.

438 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 161 Mem-

oranda, Box 74. Top Secret; Security Information. NSC 161 replaced NSC 142. For NSC
142, see Document 146. Although NSC 161 was dated and circulated on August 14, Part
No. 9 was completed, concurred in, and dated August 4.

Document 258.

See

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment,

Document 432.

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II. National Estimates

1. The organization and procedures established since October 1950

for the production of national intelligence estimates continue to oper-
ate satisfactorily. The totality of resources of the entire intelligence com-
munity is drawn upon to produce national intelligence estimates, and
they can be improved only as we strengthen these resources. These
estimates derive authority from the manner of their preparation and
from the active participation of all the responsible intelligence agency
heads in their final review and adoption. Agency dissents are recorded
where estimates would be watered down by further efforts to secure
agreement.

2. A production program for national intelligence estimates is pre-

pared annually and reviewed quarterly at which time obligatory
changes are made. This program provides for a re-examination of ex-
isting estimates on critical areas or problems as well as the production
of new estimates designed to improve the coverage of important top-
ics. Continued emphasis is placed on the completion of basic estimates
on the USSR in advance of the review of U.S. budget estimates and
NATO plans.

3. Close coordination between planners and policy-makers on the

4. Special efforts are being made to get greater precision and clar-

ity in estimates generally. As a particular case, considerable progress
was made in NIE–65, “Soviet Bloc Capabilities through 1957”, (16 June
1953), over NIE–64, “Soviet Bloc Capabilities through Mid-1954”, (12
November 1952):

a. Greater analytical precision in the section on political warfare

capabilities, which concentrates upon the critical areas of the world,

and which distinguishes between the capability to overthrow govern-

ments and the capability to influence governments and peoples.

b. Greater emphasis on scientific and technical factors, which oc-

cupy about a quarter of the discussion in NIE–65.

c. Greater clarity in the military strengths and capabilities sections,

with fewer figures, more emphasis on military programs, and a more

specific analysis of Bloc air defenses and of Soviet capabilities to de-

liver atomic weapons in the U.S.

The Intelligence Community 439

Extracts of NIE 65 are printed ibid., 1952–1954, vol. VIII, Document 599. A de-

classified text of NIE 64 is in National Archives, RG 263, National Intelligence Estimates.

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III. Political, Social and Cultural Intelligence

1. The status of political, social and cultural intelligence has been

very good, due allowance being made for the paucity of information
on the Soviet Orbit and the difficulties of collecting it. Facilities for the
production of such intelligence, however, have been adequate only for
the needs of the NSC and the most urgent needs of the IAC agencies.
Less pressing demands have been met only partially and inadequately.

2. The principal deficiency in this field, which varies from slight

to serious, has been in the resources devoted to the exhaustive cover-
age and research on which sound estimates and analyses depend. Cov-
erage of the USSR, the Eastern European Satellite complex, and China,
has been most nearly adequate. Relatively lower priority has been
given to research on other areas, with Western Europe, Japan and
Southeast Asia at the upper end of the scale, graduating downward to
Latin America and Africa. The inadequacy of resources has been re-
flected chiefly in an inability to prosecute sustained research programs
at all desired points. Nonetheless, there has remained sufficient flexi-
bility to produce individual studies of considerable depth on selected
major problems. World Communism, outside the Soviet Orbit, has been
satisfactorily covered with respect to party strength, political maneu-
verings and relationships to the Moscow propaganda lines. Research
into matters of organization, financial support and infiltration into po-
litical and social organizations has been less satisfactory.

IV. Armed Forces Intelligence

1. Operational Intelligence

Intelligence covering the combat zone area for the support of cur-

rent military operations in Korea is generally adequate. There still re-
mains a serious deficiency in our ability to obtain timely identification
of or information on the movements or locations of Chinese forces in
all areas behind the immediate front line armies in Korea back through
Manchuria into China. Information on installations and on develop-
ments in Manchuria, such as types and extent of training, reorganiza-
tion and resupply of the Chinese Communist Forces and North Korean
units north of the Yalu River is inadequate. This deficiency remains
substantially unchanged. Reliable information on the enemy’s long-
range plans and intentions is practically non-existent.

The extent of our information on Chinese Communist activities in

South China is inadequate. The United States is dependent on French
and Associated States sources for operational intelligence concerning
the Viet Minh and to a lesser extent for information on the Chinese
Communists in the border areas contiguous to Indochina. The present
level of information would be inadequate for support of operations by
U.S. forces; however, inherent in any commitment of U.S. forces would

440 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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be the rapid development of combat and operational intelligence ef-
forts. The Five-power Intelligence Conference exchanges have in-
creased U.S. knowledge of the Viet Minh.

A possible early augmentation of U.S. intelligence personnel in In-

dochina should improve present U.S. coverage in that area. However,
the picture for the major target area in Asia, i.e., Communist China, is
very dark.

The achievement of any major improvement must depend on the

increase in scope and efficiency of clandestine operations against mil-
itary targets.

2. Order of Battle and Equipment

Order of battle and equipment information on the USSR, Com-

munist China and—to a lesser degree—the European Satellites is par-
tial and inadequate, primarily because of the extreme difficulty of col-
lection. Intelligence on Communist Bloc units and equipment in most
areas with which the United States or nations friendly to the United
States are in contact is more nearly complete and reliable.

Coverage on order of battle intelligence and equipment is gener-

ally adequate in respect of nations outside of the Iron Curtain, except
in the case of some neutral nations whose national policy restricts our
access to such information.

3. Targeting

The assembly and analysis of encyclopedic target data on eco-

nomic and industrial vulnerabilities is well along for the Soviet Orbit
and is in intermediate research stages for Western Europe and the Far
East; increasing research emphasis continues on military targets. Cur-
rent target systems studies are reasonably adequate to support joint
operational planning but more vigorous data collection efforts will be
required to maintain these studies on a current basis and to support
extended systems analysis to meet detailed service requirements.

Target intelligence required to counter the Soviet atomic threat con-

tinues to be handicapped by gaps in current information on Soviet
weapons, stockpiling arrangements, delivery capabilities and specific
air base potentials.

Initial production of dossiers for priority combat targets is almost

complete for the USSR but coverage varies considerably for the satel-
lite and approach areas. Extensive tactical target coverage has been
completed on areas adjoining Korean theater but on other areas is in
various stages of completion.

4. Support for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

NATO requests have been filled with the best available intelligence

consistent with the National Disclosure Policy. Intelligence studies and

The Intelligence Community 441

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intelligence to assist in the establishment of basic intelligence files are
provided to the NATO Standing Group and NATO major commands.
Releasable current studies and reports pertinent to the area and the
mission of the NATO major commands are continuously provided.

V. Economic Intelligence

1. Foreign economic intelligence on the free world presents few

serious problems, mainly those that arise from the wealth of material
of variable quality and from the multiplicity of sources. For the Soviet
Bloc, however, such intelligence is far from adequate. The Soviet gov-
ernment does publish some aggregate statistics of uncertain reliability
which, however, can be profitably utilized by careful analysis. Apart
from this source, the intelligence community is confined to exploiting
a diminishing flow of low-grade data, much of which is becoming in-
creasingly out of date. Only by taking advantage of every possible item
of information in the course of a comprehensive, thoroughly planned
and coordinated study can national security needs for knowledge of
the Bloc’s economic capabilities and vulnerabilities by met. This may
mean the subordination of short-term requirements to the long-range
program and a resolute and imaginative attack on problems of cen-
tralized indexing and exploitation of all pertinent materials, whether
overt or classified. Individual industry studies now being produced
will form the foundation for interindustry and other over-all analyses.
Maximum utilization of available data will result from the application
of improved statistical and other techniques.

2. In the field of economic warfare and support for allied collec-

tive controls, intelligence coverage of movements of carriers engaged
in trade with the Soviet Bloc is excellent; however, information on the
cargoes of these carriers is inadequate. Machinery has been established
to speed up the processing and evaluation of spot data into intelligence
on which action can be taken by the Economic Defense Advisory Com-
mittee and the covert services. In this regard, increased attention is be-
ing given to current trade transactions. There has been established a
coordinating committee which is assisting in bringing available intel-
ligence more quickly and fully to bear on questions arising under this
program.

3. The target analysis and production activities outlined in Section

IV,

Armed Forces Intelligence,

continue to involve the large-scale proc-

essing of foreign economic and technological data.

4. The heavy research requirements in the economic field make it

imperative that duplicate efforts be kept at an absolute minimum.
Closer integration of research programming among the various agen-
cies concerned with economic research for intelligence is being devel-
oped through the Economic Intelligence Committee.

442 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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VI. Scientific and Technical Intelligence

1. Scientific and technical intelligence regarding the USSR and

Satellites continued to make some progress during the first half of 1953.
However, in the last analysis, production of realistic estimates is still
dependent upon securing information on Soviet objectives and
progress. There continues to be improvement in the analysis and eval-
uation of available information; however, the flow of information of a
scientific and technical nature from conventional sources is becoming
increasingly inadequate. As a consequence, there is an urgent need for
the further development and utilization of new and improved meth-
ods and techniques for the collection of scientific and technical intelli-
gence information. Efforts along these lines have progressed slowly in
the past six months, notwithstanding present potential in the fields of
non-communication electromagnetic interception (“noise-listening”)
and photographic reconnaissance.

2. A review of the effects of DCID 3/4

(which allocated primary

production responsibilities between CIA and the departments of the
Department of Defense and established the Scientific Estimates Com-
mittee (SEC)) was scheduled for the first half of 1953. In order to pro-
vide more time for an appraisal of the effects of this directive, the re-
view has been postponed until August 1953.

3. Through detailed studies of Soviet scientific personnel, scien-

tific literature, and through improvements in long-range detection tech-
niques, continued improvement has been achieved in knowledge of So-
viet accomplishments in the production of fissionable materials which
form the basis of the Soviet atomic weapons stockpile. A reasonably
good basis has been established for estimates of plutonium production
to date and for predicting Soviet capabilities for future expansion in
the production of this material. However, the absence of sufficient ev-
idence on which to base conclusions on installed or planned isotope
separation capacity for the production of uranium–235 results at the
present time in one of the most important gaps in intelligence on the
Soviet atomic energy program. Of equal significance is the lack of ev-
idence in the thermonuclear field. In the face of increasing difficulties
in the collection of relevant information, studies in depth of personnel
and research activities looking toward the selection of additional use-
ful targets offers some hope of further improvement in our knowledge
during the forthcoming year. To protect sources of intelligence in this
field, and assure the availability of a maximum amount of significant
technical intelligence data, the DCI, with the concurrence of the IAC,

The Intelligence Community 443

Document 126.

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on 11 April 1953 issued a directive establishing controls for the dis-
semination of information on the detection of atomic weapons tests
within the USSR.

4. Existing scientific and technical intelligence on conventional So-

viet armaments other than naval continues to be good so far as stand-
ardized items in current use are concerned. However, intelligence on
weapons and equipments pertaining to the Soviet air offensive and de-
fensive capabilities remains generally inadequate. Information regard-
ing Soviet guided missiles programs is also poor, although certain proj-
ects based on German developments are becoming better known. In
general, knowledge of key scientists, test facilities, and trends in mili-
tary research and development remains too inadequate to be a sound
basis for predicting future Soviet weapons and equipment.

5. While the existence of a Soviet biological warfare program has

not been positively confirmed, there continue to be indications sup-
porting the belief that such a program does exist. Existence of a Soviet
chemical warfare program has been confirmed; however, very little ad-
ditional information related to this program has been received in the
past six months. The limited progress obtained in chemical warfare in-
telligence has come from increased utilization of Soviet open literature
in related fields. The extreme scarcity of intelligence in both fields of-
fers an opportunity for the Soviets to obtain technological surprise.

6. Some progress has been made in the exploitation of open sci-

entific literature and in research in depth on institutions, but knowl-
edge of basic scientific research and development behind the Iron Cur-
tain remains inadequate. Information on Soviet long-range scientific
development programs is similarly poor. Information on the quantity
of Soviet scientific and engineering manpower is reasonably adequate,
but estimates of its quality remain less satisfactory. In view of the in-
creasing importance of such basic scientific information to the predic-
tion of future Soviet potential, a concentrated effort to improve intelli-
gence in this field is planned for the coming months.

VII. Psychological Intelligence

1. Overt and covert propaganda and psychological warfare pro-

grams have developed to an unprecedented degree in the past two
years. The intelligence needs of these programs fall largely within the
framework of political and sociological intelligence. The orientation
and organization of the material for the psychological warfare user calls
for unaccustomed depth and detail both in the field reporting and in
analysis.

444 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Not further identified.

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2. The Department of State has created a Psychological Intelli-

gence Research Staff designed to increase coordination of governmen-
tal and private research in this field.

3. The final report of the Advisory Group on Psychological and

Unconventional Warfare to the Research and Development Board rec-
ommended methods by which research in these fields might be better
balanced and integrated within the Department of Defense. Because of
the pending reorganization of the research and development structure
in the Department of Defense, the report has not been acted upon.

4. A major deficiency in this field is the lack of information and

of coordinated effort among intelligence agencies in determining re-
sistance potential, psychological vulnerabilities, and of our propaganda
effectiveness with respect to target audiences behind the Iron Curtain.
Encouraging progress has been made individually by intelligence agen-
cies in the development of an intelligence basis for the support of psy-
chological warfare activities. The results produced thus far do not meet
operational requirements, in part because of the difficulty of defining
those needs.

VIII. Geographic Intelligence

1. Geographic research of IAC agencies on foreign areas, includ-

ing evaluations of foreign mapping activities, is providing (a) regional
studies, (b) objective and area analyses in support of covert operations,
and (c) staff studies for policy and operational planning. Coordinated
geographic and map intelligence studies are also undertaken in sup-
port of the National Intelligence Survey program.

2. Current geographic and mapping information on the Soviet

Bloc and adjacent areas is inadequate. Geographic intelligence research
gives particular attention to the regional analysis of those geographic
facts that are required in support of planning and operational intelli-
gence for these areas. Emphasis has been placed on the exploitation
and utilization of available Russian technical literature in filling criti-
cal gaps. Within CIA, particular attention has also been given to the
study of current developments in Soviet mapping activities and
programs.

IX. Basic Intelligence

1. The program of National Intelligence Surveys (NIS), which was

begun in 1948 as an interdepartmental cooperative venture, was in-
tended to meet the U.S. Government’s demands for encyclopedic fac-
tual intelligence on a world-wide basis. Since the NIS program was
begun 1,729 individual sections have been produced on 66 of the 108
NIS areas, which is the equivalent of approximately 26 complete NIS.
Of this number, 1,224 have been published. For the first time during
the history of the program, the rate of production by contributing

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agencies equivalent to 8 NIS, as established by the JCS, was attained
in fiscal year 1953. Based on this performance, a similar production
program has been established for fiscal year 1954.

2. NIS production is scheduled in accordance with JCS priorities

and intelligence agency capabilities. Limitations of the latter have pre-
cluded production of NIS on

all

JCS high priority areas and made it

necessary to undertake partial surveys on some other areas. However,
NIS production on the group of 19 areas and 4 ocean areas of highest
priority is approximately 54% complete, whereas the entire program is
about 28% complete. NIS on twelve individual areas are over 75% com-
plete, and five of these are in the JCS high priority list. Geographic re-
search support for NIS has been excellent.

3. In general the quality of the NIS is good, and can be expected

to improve as the gaps in information are filled and revisions are pub-
lished under the Maintenance Program which was started in fiscal year
1952. However, the time lag between production and publication still
remains a problem. Coordination within and between all IAC and non-
IAC agencies engaged in the NIS program is excellent and suitable li-
aison is maintained with the JCS.

X. Warning of Attack

1. Conclusions concerning Soviet and Communist intentions to

initiate hostilities at any given time must be tentative generalizations
drawn from inadequate evidence. They must usually be based on
estimates of the overall situation, adjusted to available current factual
information.

2. The IAC Watch Committee provides an interagency mechanism

for assuring that new, detailed information is quickly pooled and eval-
uated. Maximum use is thus made of partial and inadequate informa-
tion. In supporting the work of the committee, the intelligence agen-
cies make careful cross-checks of information from all sources against
an elaborate analysis of possible indicators of Soviet intentions. This
method is not relied on exclusively; other approaches are constantly
being tried.

3. In general there has been improvement during the past two and

one half years in the ability of intelligence to provide prompt notice
and preliminary evaluations of events and developments in the Soviet
as well as in the neutral and friendly areas.

4. Intelligence cannot assure adequate warning of attack prior to

actual detection of hostile formations. Under certain circumstances,
some indications of defensive and offensive preparations on the Soviet
periphery may, however, be detected. Capability for detection of indi-
cations of Soviet or Satellite attack varies from fair in the border areas
of Germany and Austria to extremely poor in the Transcaucasus and

446 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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Far East. Each agency maintains its own 24-hour Watch arrangements
to handle any information that is received.

XI. Collection

1. The Foreign Service

In general, the collection activities of the Foreign Service have been

satisfactory. Intelligence needs have been met most adequately in the
political field, less so in certain aspects of the economic field, and least
satisfactorily in the scientific, technical and psychological fields. These
deficiencies have been generally attributable to a lack of specialized
personnel in those fields which are not closely related to the basic diplo-
matic functions of the Foreign Service. Remedial action has been taken
by establishing a comprehensive economic reporting program and a
continuing program of providing Foreign Service posts with more com-
plete and effective guidance on intelligence needs. Additional reme-
dial measures in progress concern:

a. the greater use of overseas personnel of certain operational pro-

grams in collecting basic intelligence information, particularly in the

psychological and sociological fields, and,

b. the recognition of the role of the Foreign Service in the na-

tional intelligence effort through the revision of the Foreign Service

Manual to include for the first time specific and detailed intelligence

instructions.

As a result of a recent study, measures to meet the needs for basic sci-
entific information are being carried out.

2. Service Attaché System

The Service Attaché System furnishes extensive useful military in-

formation on countries outside the Iron Curtain. Attachés in the Soviet
Bloc countries obtain and transmit a considerable volume of valuable
information, although under the restrictions imposed on them by Com-
munist governments, the coverage which they provide cannot be con-
sidered adequate. The Service Attaché System has been strengthened since
the beginning of the Korean conflict through the opening of new offices
and the assignment of additional officers to important posts. Constant ef-
forts are being made to improve the collection capabilities of Service At-
tachés by the development of new collection guides and techniques.

3. Overseas Commands

Armed Forces Commands in Europe are acquiring extensive in-

formation. While intelligence collection on the Soviet Union itself is
partial and inadequate, it is good in the Eastern Zone of Germany and
Austria. Considerable information is gathered by European Commands
from returned PW’s, escapees and refugees.

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Collection of intelligence in the Far East is adequate on friendly

and neutral areas but is partial and inadequate on Communist China
and Eastern Siberia.

4. Aerial Reconnaissance

Because of the overriding considerations of other than intelligence

nature, the Armed Services have not as yet exploited fully their over-
flight capabilities in aerial reconnaissance. Photo reconnaissance capa-
bilities have increased, with a resulting improvement in contributions
in this field. The contributions of radar reconnaissance are only fair as
compared to photo reconnaissance, but are being improved. Photo in-
terpretation capability is generally deficient in the Armed Services; cor-
rective measures are underway. The use of photo intelligence in the
analysis of economic and scientific developments in respect of the So-
viet Orbit is being strengthened. Research and development effort is
being expended on free balloons, piloted and pilotless vehicles
(“guided missiles” and satellites) to overcome a lack of special recon-
naissance vehicles. Research continues in the improvement of various
detecting devices.

5. (This paragraph is being given separate limited distribution for

security reasons.)

6. Domestic Collection

As a service of common concern for the entire intelligence com-

munity, CIA collects foreign intelligence information from non-
governmental organizations and individuals in the U.S., through field
offices and resident agencies in 28 cities. During the past six months,
the rate of production of intelligence information reports has dropped
slightly, due to: (a) increased emphasis on quality and selectivity in re-
porting, (b) distribution of information of limited interest to one or two
consumers only, rather than wide dissemination in report form, and (c)
servicing of special requirements for information in support of intelli-
gence operations. To improve the collection of foreign technical infor-
mation, arrangements have been made with the Air Technical Intelli-
gence Center for the assignment of three air technical officers to three
CIA field offices, in accordance with the provisions of NSCID No. 7.

Methods of exploiting foreign nationality groups and aliens within the
U.S. are being intensively studied in an effort to increase the flow of
information on the Soviet Bloc.

448 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

A handwritten note at the end of this sentence reads, “(see next page).” The in-

serted page was filed at the end of the report and is printed below as an attachment.

For text, see

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Estab-

lishment, Document 427.

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7. Foreign Radio Broadcasts

a. Monitoring

CIA’s world-wide monitoring network provides rapid and volu-

minous coverage of foreign news, information and propaganda broad-
casts as a service of common concern. Speed in field operations and in
reporting of important information to Washington is such that the in-
telligence agencies may receive, by wire service, the translated text of
the first part of a long Moscow broadcast while the Russian station is
still transmitting the final portions of the broadcast. The Soviet Orbit
is well covered, except for Central Asia and the Baltic States. During
the past six months, the possibility of establishing a station in Pakistan
to monitor Central Asian broadcasts has been explored but the plan is
now tabled, with IAC concurrence, in favor of further developing Asian
coverage from existing stations in Cyprus and Japan. Tentative dis-
cussions have been held with Japanese Government officials concern-
ing eventual joint monitoring operations, and a survey made of the
monitoring potential on the west coast of Honshu. Coverage of Baltic
and northwestern USSR transmitters by the British Broadcasting Com-
pany still awaits BBC budgetary approval.

b. Propaganda Analysis

Requirements of estimating offices and psychological warfare ac-

tivities have resulted in a slight shift in emphasis in the propaganda
analysis effort, leading away from the preparation of weekly reviews
of the whole propaganda field and towards the production of more nu-
merous specialized propaganda studies on substantive intelligence
problems.

8. Foreign Materials and Equipment

Collection of Soviet bloc items from overt sources has increased

appreciably during the past six months and has provided useful data
to economic and scientific intelligence and to the factory markings pro-
gram. While military operations in Korea have not led to the capture
of many important military end-items since January, plans are under
consideration for more intensive exploitation and analysis of captured
explosives, propellants and other material available in the Far Eastern
theater. Significant information on aircraft components was obtained
from inspection of the MIG 15’s which landed in Denmark. Non-
military items recently acquired through covert channels include sev-
eral Soviet electronics measuring machines and a teletype printer of
the type currently used in the Soviet communications system. The Joint
Technical Intelligence Subcommittee of the JIC has absorbed the func-
tions of the former Joint Materiel Intelligence Agency in the collection
and exploitation of foreign materials.

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9. Monitoring of Radio Jamming

Under NSC 66/1

the agencies undertook the construction and or-

ganization of a monitoring system to obtain information on Soviet jam-
ming and related activities in the radio frequency spectrum. A pilot op-
eration involving a very limited number of stations is being established.
Adequate information as to the extent of Soviet jamming, concentra-
tion of the jamming stations, and related information must await the
initiation and implementation of a much-expanded program.

10. Travel Folder Program

The IAC has instituted a program for guiding and facilitating the

collection of intelligence information through U.S. and U.K. official
travel within the Soviet Orbit. Travel briefs to orient travelers and train-
ing of potential travelers to observe industrial, military and scientific
facilities should improve collection.

XII. Support and Collation Facilities

1. Availability of Materials

With few exceptions, all pertinent foreign positive intelligence is

distributed among all interested IAC agencies. In addition to the dis-
tribution of current material, there is a continuing effort to locate and
extract pertinent information from the large volume of intelligence ma-
terial that was collected during and after the war, both in the United
States and overseas. The sheer volume of these materials presents dif-
ficult problems of storage, analysis, and collation before they can be
made readily available for research analysts and current intelligence
purposes. The use of microfilm and machine techniques is providing
assistance in dealing with these problems.

2. Reference Facilities

CIA provides a central reference facility for the IAC agencies

through its collection of basic intelligence documents received from all
sources. In addition, separate files of specialized intelligence data and
materials are maintained to supplement the basic collection of the IAC
agencies. These include biographic data, industrial data, photographs
and motion picture films.

3. Library Facilities

Library services in the IAC agencies should become increasingly

effective as a result of new measures for interlibrary cooperation in
publications procurement, indexing and reference service.

450 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Document 44.

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Another measure, stemming from the scarcity of Soviet Orbit pub-

lications, is CIA sponsorship of publication by the Library of Congress
of the

Monthly List of Russian Accessions

and the

Cyrillic Subject Union

Catalog.

Both services are based on cooperative reporting of holdings

by all major U.S. libraries specializing in Slavic publications.

4. Biographic Information

Each IAC agency maintains a file of biographic data on foreign

personalities in the categories for which they have been assigned ba-
sic responsibility, and makes such data available to the other agencies
upon request. Excellent data can be made available on political, mili-
tary, economic, and scientific personalities. The depth of coverage
varies with the intelligence interest, and with availability of source ma-
terial. In those Iron Curtain areas where information is not easily ob-
tained, the IAC agencies provide for more comprehensive coverage of
the press, radio, and scientific and technical literature. There are ex-
tensive programs for the exploitation of displaced persons, returning
PW’s, and defectors, as well as other personnel having a knowledge of
personalities in various areas. Every effort is made to include in
dossiers that biographic information which is needed by intelligence
researchers, such as political orientation, ability, susceptibility to psy-
chological warfare, probable course of action, past career, religion, mar-
ital status, associates, membership in cliques, location, etc.

5. Industrial Information

Specialized data to meet departmental needs are maintained by

the Defense Agencies. CIA collates all other types of foreign industrial
information, including research establishments doing industrial re-
search and development work. The material is maintained by individ-
ual establishment and is controlled by a tabulating card indexing sys-
tem. References to industrial end-products are being indexed by
tabulating machine methods to speed the analysis of data being sup-
plied to all IAC agencies.

6. Photographs and Motion Picture Films

The several Defense agencies and CIA each maintain photographic

and related documentary libraries, including motion picture films, con-
sistent with their requirements and responsibilities. Except for post-
war coverage of Soviet and Satellite Areas, the photographic support
is nearly adequate for present needs.

7. Map Procurement and Reference Service

Procurement of foreign-published maps and information on map-

ping abroad is coordinated by a staff within CIA serving an interagency
map committee. Results during the past three years have proved the

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Document 258.

effectiveness of overt collection of maps and related information
through the Foreign Service Geographic Attaché program. Increased
emphasis is being placed on the collection of maps and engineering
drawings from domestic sources. Service Attaché channels are also be-
ing used. The currently published foreign maps required for intelli-
gence activities are received on a continuing basis through exchange
arrangements between the Department of State and many foreign of-
ficial mapping agencies. These exchanges are in addition to those of an
operational character maintained by the Military Service. Excellent map
reference services in support of intelligence requirements are main-
tained by close working arrangements between the map libraries.

8. Foreign Language Publications

Approval of NSCID 16

has given new impetus to cooperative

IAC activity in this field, and definite progress is being made toward
implementation of the directive. An interagency advisory committee
and its subcommittees are working on methods of improving the co-
ordination of procurement and exploitation of foreign language publi-
cations for intelligence purposes. CIA is taking action to centralize its
library, reference, and indexing services for foreign language books and
periodicals, and to facilitate the use of such services by other agencies.
Efforts are being made to coordinate operations, apportion the work-
load, and reduce duplication between the following activities: overseas
abstracting by US missions to satisfy the local and departmental needs;
exploitation by various agencies of technical and other publications to
fulfill specific requirements; and exploitation by CIA of foreign lan-
guage publications for information of interest to more than one intel-
ligence agency. A central index of translations, maintained by CIA, pre-
vents duplication between the translating activities carried on by each
agency, and makes the translated product accessible to other intelli-
gence consumers.

Good coverage of foreign publications needed for the intelligence

effort is now being obtained, although further intensive collection ac-
tion should be undertaken with regard to Soviet Bloc and Communist
Chinese publications.

9. External Research

Plans for developing further coordination of external and con-

tractual research in the social sciences (i.e., non-governmental) of in-
terest to intelligence suffered modification when the Department of
State felt obliged to cut back severely its expenditure in the External

452 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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Research Staff. Contributions from CIA and the Department of Defense
will permit continuation of the existing program, but by no means full
realization of the scale of operation which seemed to be in sight before
the current budgetary allocations were determined. For the foreseeable
future, therefore, there will continue to be imperfections in the efforts
to minimize duplication in external research, to insure community ben-
efit from such research and to facilitate the rational letting of external
research contracts.

Positive recommendations for a better balanced and integrated

program of research in the fields of psychological and unconventional
warfare within the Department of Defense have been made by an ad-
visory group to the RDB. Action on the report has been deferred pend-
ing reorganizations of the research and development program of the
Defense Department.

The Economic Intelligence Committee plans to compile a report of

all government sponsored economic external research on the Soviet
Bloc classified through Secret. The report would include completed re-
search, research in progress, and contemplated research.

Note:

In lieu of a financial statement, not included in the above re-

port, the Director of Central Intelligence will make an oral report to
the National Security Council on CIA’s expenditures. The oral report
will pertain only to CIA data and will not include expenditures on in-
telligence made by the other members of the intelligence community.

Attachment

Paragraph 5, “Espionage”, of Part XI, “Collection”,

in No. 9, The Foreign Intelligence Program

Since the submission of the last report, the difficulties incident to

the collection of covert intelligence within the Soviet and Satellite or-
bit remain unchanged. Basic control procedures exercised by the vari-
ous opposition security services make it more and more apparent that
“black” penetration of denied areas is increasingly hazardous, and be-
cause of its illegal nature does not insure accessibility to strategic tar-
gets. In addition, the pressure of these control procedures is a contin-
uing and serious threat to the limited assets painfully created by
successful operations in the past. Although the situation is relatively
less critical in Satellite areas, particularly East Germany, recent events
may even endanger this coverage.

The Intelligence Community 453

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In an effort to meet this situation, the covert mechanism has main-

tained a high degree of flexibility in order that all possible avenues of
approach are carefully examined in relation to changing conditions. In
this regard steps have been taken to exploit the recent tempering of con-
trols on foreign travel to the Soviet orbit. The validity of this approach
will depend largely on the extent to which the Soviet Union wishes to
push its “peace offensive” by a relaxation of travel controls, and the
availability of properly motivated individuals who will naturally blend
into this framework. These contingencies do not permit an optimistic
outlook but represent a possible alternative, and perhaps in time may
serve to avoid an almost complete dependence on illegal entry.

Suffice it to say that progress in the delicate and highly special-

ized field of covert intelligence collection is hardly perceptible on a
short-range reporting base and significant successes in the immediate
future do not seem likely. At the same time meaningful and usable in-
telligence is being produced, support facilities developed and strength-
ened, and valuable experience, both in operations and career develop-
ment of personnel, is being acquired.

156. Editorial Note

[

text not declassified

]

157. White House Press Release

Denver, September 2, 1953.

EXECUTIVE ORDER 10483 ESTABLISHING THE OPERATIONS

COORDINATING BOARD

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and

statutes, and as President of the United States, it is hereby ordered as
follows:

454 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66 D 148, PCG. No clas-

sification marking. The press release was issued from Lowry Air Force Base. Eisenhower
was vacationing at the “Summer White House” in Colorado.

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Section 1. (a) In order to provide for the integrated implementa-

tion of national security policies by the several agencies, there is hereby
established an Operations Coordinating Board, hereinafter referred to
as the Board, which shall report to the National Security Council.

(b) The Board shall have as members the following: (1) the Under

Secretary of State, who shall represent the Secretary of State and shall be
the chairman of the Board, (2) the Deputy Secretary of Defense, who
shall represent the Secretary of Defense, (3) the Director of the Foreign
Operations Administration, (4) the Director of Central Intelligence, and
(5) a representative of the President to be designated by the President.
Each head of agency referred to in items (1) to (4), inclusive, in this sec-
tion 1(b) may provide for an alternate member who shall serve as a mem-
ber of the Board in lieu of the regular member representing the agency
concerned when such regular member is for reasons beyond his control
unable to attend any meeting of the Board; and any alternate member
shall while serving as such have in all respects the same status as a mem-
ber of the Board as does the regular member in lieu of whom he serves.

der section 1(b) hereof) to which the President from time to time assigns
responsibilities for the implementation of national security policies, shall
assign a representative to serve on the Board when the Board is dealing
with subjects bearing directly upon the responsibilities of such head.
Each such representative shall be an Under Secretary or corresponding
official and when so serving such representative shall have the same sta-
tus on the Board as the members provided for in the said section 1(b).

(d) The Special Assistant to the President for National Security Af-

fairs may attend any meeting of the Board. The Director of the United
States Information Agency shall advise the Board at its request.

Section 2. The National Security Council having recommended a

national security policy and the President having approved it, the Board
shall (1) whenever the President shall hereafter so direct, advise with
the agencies concerned as to (a) their detailed operational planning re-
sponsibilities respecting such policy, (b) the coordination of the inter-
departmental aspects of the detailed operational plans developed by
the agencies to carry out such policy, (c) the timely and coordinated ex-
ecution of such policy and plans, and (d) the execution of each security
action or project so that it shall make its full contribution to the attain-
ment of national security objectives and to the particular climate of opin-
ion the United States is seeking to achieve in the world, and (2) initiate
new proposals for action within the framework of national security poli-
cies in response to opportunity and changes in the situation. The Board
shall perform such other advisory functions as the President may
assign to it and shall from time to time make reports to the National
Security Council with respect to the carrying out of this order.

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Section 3. Consonant with law, each agency represented on the

Board shall, as may be necessary for the purpose of effectuating this
order, furnish assistance to the Board in accordance with section 214
of the Act of May 3, 1945, 59 Stat. 134 (31 U.S.C. 691).

Such assistance

may include detailing employees to the Board, one of whom may serve
as its Executive Officer, to perform such functions, consistent with the
purposes of this order, as the Board may assign to them.

Section 4. The Psychological Strategy Board shall be abolished not

later than sixty days after the date of this order and its outstanding af-
fairs shall be wound up by the Operations Coordinating Board.

Section 5. As used herein, the word “agency” may be construed

to mean any instrumentality of the executive branch of the Govern-
ment, including any executive department.

Section 6. Nothing in this order shall be construed either to con-

fer upon the Board any function with respect to internal security or to
in any manner abrogate or restrict any function vested by law in, or
assigned pursuant to law to, any agency or head of agency (including
the Office of Defense Mobilization and the Director of the Office of De-
fense Mobilization).

Dwight D. Eisenhower

This section of the act authorizes Executive branch departments to use appro-

priations to support interagency boards.

Printed from a copy that indicates Eisenhower signed the original.

158. Memorandum From President Eisenhower to the Executive

Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)

Denver, September 2, 1953.

I have signed today Executive Order 10483

establishing the Op-

erations Coordinating Board and abolishing the Psychological Strategy
Board.

456 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 430, Establishing Ex-

ecutive Order. Top Secret; Special Security; Eyes Only. By memorandum of September
3, Lay transmitted the memorandum to the Under Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary
of Defense, Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, Director of Central In-
telligence, and to C.D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President, for appropriate im-
plementation. (Ibid., OCG Files: Lot 62 D 430, Establishing Executive Order)

Document 157.

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Supplementary to that Executive Order, I hereby direct that the

necessary classified actions be taken to accomplish the following:

Additional Functions of the Operations Coordinating Board

The following are assigned as additional functions of the Opera-

tions Coordinating Board:

a. The functions of the Psychological Strategy Board assigned in

paragraphs 2 and 3 of NSC 10/5

approved October 23, 1951, insofar

as those functions relate to major programs.

b. The policy coordinating functions provided for in paragraph

3d(1) of NSC 10/2

approved June 18, 1948, under such procedures as

the Board shall determine in order to insure the proper degree of
security.

c. The functions of the Psychological Operations Coordinating

Committee established pursuant to NSC 59/1

approved March 9, 1950,

as modified by the President’s directive of April 4, 1951

directing the

establishment of the Psychological Strategy Board.

Coastal Raiding and Maritime Interdiction Operations (China)

a. Responsibility for the support of, and training for, the above

operations shall be transferred from the Central Intelligence Agency to
the Department of Defense at such time or times as appropriate
arrangements may be made and approved by the OCB.

b. Those clandestine operations presently conducted by CIA in

conjunction with such operations shall remain the responsibility of the
Director of Central Intelligence, or be discontinued as appropriate.

c. The Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall determine, on

the basis of the plans and recommendations of the agencies concerned,
how much of the personnel, property, record, and unexpended bal-
ances of appropriations and other funds available, or to be made avail-
able in connection with these operations, shall be transferred to the De-
partment of Defense.

Other

a. The President’s directive of April 4, 1951, directing the estab-

lishment of the Psychological Strategy Board, is rescinded.

b. The Consultants Group established pursuant to NSC 10/2, ap-

proved June 18, 1948, is to be abolished.

The Intelligence Community 457

Document 90.

See

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment,

Document 292.

Document 2.

See Document 60.

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c. The Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee referred

to above is to be abolished.

d. The Operations Coordinating Board shall not perform any of

the functions assigned in the NSC 17 series

to the Interdepartmental

Committee for Internal Security and to the Interdepartmental Intelli-
gence Conference.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

The NSC 17 series of 1948–1949 dealt with internal security. No reports in this

series are printed. Documentation is in the National Archives, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files:
Lot 63 D 351, NSC 17, Box 49.

Printed from a copy that indicates Eisenhower signed the original.

159. Letter From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant for

Intelligence and Research (Armstrong) to the Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence (Cabell)

Washington, September 9, 1953.

Dear General Cabell:

The 1954 budget of the Foreign Service has been substantially re-

duced. This reduction comes at a time when there are demands, re-
quirements, many of particular concern to CIA, for an increase in in-
telligence collection activities. Moreover, this reduction will no doubt
continue in effect in subsequent years, and will thus have a long-term
effect on the functions of the Foreign Service, including the collection
of intelligence information from overt sources. Such collection has in-
cluded: (a) collection of foreign publications; (b) collection of maps and
cartographic data; (c) peripheral reporting; (d) collection of scientific
information; (e) foreign press monitoring services.

The Department recognizes that these overt collection activities are

responsibilities of the Foreign Service and are important to the national
security. They are hence of concern to the Director of Central Intelli-
gence in view of his duty to advise the National Security Council in
such matters.

In an effort to satisfy these demands of intelligence and to con-

tinue to carry out the Department’s responsibilities for the direction

458 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff, Job 84–00161R, HS/HC–195,

Box 3. Confidential. This copy is “Tab A to IAC–D–73.”

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and management of the Foreign Service of the United States, the De-
partment proposes in the attached document

a framework within

which, on the basis of national security needs, it would be possible for
the Director to meet his responsibilities. Under this proposal, CIA could
provide financial support for collection activities beyond a stated min-
imum which the Department can provide under its budget.

The Department believes that, if this framework is acceptable, it

would probably be desirable to consult or at least inform IAC on this
proposal and, if appropriate, advise the NSC. Furthermore, the De-
partment believes that, when and as appropriate, there should be con-
sultation with the Bureau of the Budget and with the proper commit-
tees of Congress.

Sincerely yours,

W. Park Armstrong, Jr.

Not found.

Printed from a copy that indicates Armstrong signed the original.

160. Minutes of the First Meeting of the Operations Coordinating

Board

Washington, September 17, 1953, 12:30 p.m.

PRESENT

General Walter B. Smith, Under Secretary of State—Chairman
Mr. Allen Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence
Mr. C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President for Cold War Operations
Mr. William H. Godel, alternate for the Deputy Secretary of Defense
Mr. William M. Rand, alternate for the Director, Foreign Operations

Administration

Mr. Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Mr. George A. Morgan

1. The Board designated Mr. C. D. Jackson to serve for the time

being as its Acting Executive Officer and George A. Morgan to serve
as his Acting Deputy.

The Intelligence Community 459

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 430, Minutes. Secret;

Security Information. The meeting was held in C.D. Jackson’s office.

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2. The Board authorized the Acting Executive Officer to use the

PSB staff and resources for OCB work until other arrangements are
made.

3. The Board decided that the general pattern of present PSB ad-

ministrative support arrangement should be continued for the balance
of this fiscal year.

4. Noting that the table of organization for OCB staff should be

authorized and an administrative support agreement concluded by
September 30, the Board instructed Mr. Morgan to prepare drafts for
consideration at the next Board meeting. The Board indicated that the
OCB staff should be kept to a minimum and developed only as the
workload demands. The basic function should be that of a working
secretariat, including that of acting as chairmen and executive secre-
taries of meetings and generally serving as catalysts in the coordina-
tion process, but there should also be a small nucleus of planners.

5. The Board noted that all PSB approved papers and projects re-

main in force until specifically dealt with by OCB.

6. It was agreed that Mr. Jackson should review existing PSB proj-

ects and approved papers and make recommendations to the Board for
their disposition.

7. The need for good backstopping of the Board in the member

agencies was discussed. It was agreed that each Board member would
have a principal assistant for this purpose who would attend formal
Board meetings. It was also suggested that these assistants and Mr.
Morgan serve as a senior staff to screen work for the Board, but deci-
sion on this proposal was reserved pending further study.

8. The need for close liaison and a sound division of labor with

the NSC Planning Board was stressed. Mr. Morgan was instructed to
circulate OCB papers to Mr. Cutler for information, notify him of meet-
ings, and in consultation with him recommend any further arrange-
ments needed for OCB–NSC liaison. Mr. Cutler designated Mr. T. B.
Koons of the NSC Staff to maintain standing liaison with Mr. Morgan
on OCB matters, and also noted that Mr. Morgan attends Planning
Board meetings as an adviser. With regard to assignments to OCB from
NSC, Mr. Cutler mentioned a number of implementation assignments
to other agencies now in force. It was agreed that these assignments
would stay as they are rather than being transferred to OCB at this
time, thus giving OCB a chance to start without assuming such a back-
load of accumulated responsibilities. Mr. Cutler agreed to put a mem-
orandum of this agreement in the NSC records and to send Mr. Mor-
gan a copy.

9. The Board noted its obligation to make progress reports to the

NSC and decided that these should ordinarily be made at intervals of
six months, and otherwise only when specially needed.

460 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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10. The Board decided to continue existing arrangements for han-

dling 10/2 matters through a panel composed of representatives of
State, Defense and CIA, with the addition that the panel is to be chaired
by Mr. Jackson and that FOA is to designate one officer who will be
invited to attend meetings when matters of concern to FOA are dis-
cussed. Mr. Dulles reserved the right to bring certain matters in this
field directly to the Board.

11. It was agreed that Mr. Morgan should hold a meeting of ap-

propriate representatives next week to discuss recommendations for
OCB assuming the functions of POCC.

12. The Board decided to continue meeting usually on Wednes-

days at 12:30 and to follow the informal meeting with a formal meet-
ing at 1:30, which would also be attended by the principal assistant of
each Board member and necessary secretariat.

13. The Board directed that staff work on the two Christmas proj-

ects

begun by PSB should be completed in time for the Board to make

the necessary decisions at its next meeting, including a decision on rel-
ative investment in the two projects in proportion to their relative value.

Walter B. Smith

Chairman

The projects are documented in

Foreign Relations,

1952–1954, vol. VIII, pp. 103–108.

161. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles

to the President’s Special Assistant (Jackson)

Washington, September 25, 1953.

SUBJECT

Russian Satellite Minorities

REFERENCE

Memorandum from Mr. Jackson to the members of the PSB, dated 1 September
1953

The Intelligence Community 461

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff, Job 83–00764R, HS/CSG–2291,

Box 1. Secret; Security Information. Drafted by [

name not declassified

] on September 15

and rewritten by Wisner on September 16. Copies were sent to the Under Secretary of
Defense, the Under Secretary of State, the Director of the Foreign Operations Adminis-
tration, Robert Cutler, and George Morgan.

Not found.

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1. We agree with your suggestion that a thorough review of our

present policy toward the Soviet nationalities should be made. It ap-
pears that most of the decisions reached affecting the development of
psychological warfare against the USSR may not have given the most
appropriate emphasis to the exploitation of the non-Russian ethnic
groups within the Soviet Union. As I understand the matter, the old
State Department policy has rested in large part upon the contention
that a showing of interest, on our part, in the non-Russian peoples will
arouse the antagonism of the Great Russians, who would interpret our
actions as designed to dismember the Soviet Union, and could, for that
reason, be turned against us propagandistically as well as exploited
within Russia as a strong appeal for internal unity and support of the
Kremlin regime. Within the framework of this approach a policy of
non-predetermination or ultimate self-determination has been adopted
and adhered to by all covert asset facilities under our control. Since Be-
ria’s liquidation,

and in view of the latest developments in the Soviet

Union, however, we feel that re-evaluation of our present position is
desirable. The purpose of such a review should be not to abandon the
policy of non-predetermination, but rather to extend its application to
permit fuller exploitation of the vulnerabilities inherent in the Soviet
system.

2. In this connection, it is my understanding that as a result of the

proposed merger of the two PSB documents, i.e. D–40 and D–45,

the

Soviet nationalities issue will be once more reviewed by the new OCB
working group. Their findings and recommendations will then be sub-
mitted either through the Department of State or Mr. George Morgan,

to the NSC Planning Board. We can, therefore, expect that the final doc-
ument will be presented to the NSC, and after its approval it will serve
as policy authorization for implementation of activities in connection
with this important issue.

3. I have one further observation to make in this connection, even

though I appreciate that it is at the risk of going into certain details
with which I believe you are quite familiar. The old policy upon which
we have been basing our actions and certain of our more important
operations, has never, to the best of my knowledge, achieved formal

462 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Lavrenty Beria, head of Soviet internal security, was arrested in the Soviet Union

in July 1953. His execution was publicly announced December 23, 1953.

PSB D–40, April 23, is in National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 333,

PSB Documents. PSB D–45 is in Eisenhower Library, PSB Documents, Master Book of,
Vol. IV, folder 1, Interim US Psychological Strategy Plan for the Exploitation of Unrest
in Satellite Europe, NSC Registry Series, NSC Staff Papers, Box 16.

Acting Director, Psychological Strategy Board.

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“governmental status”. By this I mean that the policy has never been
threshed out at the higher policy levels of Government or gone into
with sufficient thoroughness, and certainly I do not think it has been
gone into by the present Administration to the depth that I consider
warranted by a matter of such importance. I know that you are well
acquainted with the various sharply-conflicting points of view which
make this such a controversial issue both within the ranks of the So-
viet emigration and also in American public opinion (including con-
gressional opinion). One of the unfortunate results of this controversy
is that in the present atmosphere and in the absence of a sufficiently
authoritative policy determination, the governmental officials charged
with responsibility for the execution of the policy are subject to criti-
cism and attack to a degree which is unnecessary, and which would,
in my judgment, be minimized if we had a sufficiently clear and high-
level determination of policy.

Allen W. Dulles

Printed from a copy that indicates Dulles signed the original.

162. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans of the

Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner) to Director of Central
Intelligence Dulles

Washington, October 7, 1953.

SUBJECT

Comments of DD/P on Certain of the Proposed Additions and Deletions in the
Revision of NSC 10/2 and NSC 10/5

1. I question the desirability of deleting in its entirety the language

of old paragraph 2. of NSC 10/2

for the reason that by such complete

deletion it seems to me that we deprive ourselves unnecessarily of the
evidence that there has been a deliberate and conscious determination

The Intelligence Community 463

Source: Central Intelligence Agency Office of the Deputy Director for Operations,

Job 79–01228A. Top Secret; Security Information. Copies to COP/DD/P, C/PP, C/PPC,
and C/PM.

Printed in

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establish-

ment, Document 292. The comments referred to have not been further identified.

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on the part of the NSC that covert operations and espionage and
counter-espionage operations should be placed within the structure of
the Central Intelligence Agency, and that the two should be correlated
under the control of the Director of Central Intelligence. I agree that
portions of the old language should be deleted for various reasons,
since they are no longer applicable and may be undesirable. However,
because of the lengthy and often heated philosophical and bureaucratic
discussions about the desirability of having CIA made responsible for
covert operations other than intelligence—and in view of the criticisms
and attacks which are still being leveled against the Agency along this
very line—it seems to me useful for us to be able to point to this lan-
guage which is a clear and unequivocal indication of a determination
of the long disputed issue by the NSC. My purposes in this regard
could be accomplished by the following minor changes in the language
of the paragraph. I would retain the first sentence as written, since this
is a useful reconfirmation of the fact that the CIA is charged by the
NSC with conducting espionage and counter-espionage operations
abroad. (We are having enough trouble with other members of the in-
telligence community at the present time to render it undesirable for
us to voluntarily sacrifice any language from an important Govern-
mental document which either provides or confirms our authority
in this particular field.) The last sentence could be changed to read as
follows:

“It is therefore determined to be desirable that the responsibility

for covert operations should be retained within the structure of the

Central Intelligence Agency where they can best be correlated with es-

pionage and counter-espionage operations under the control of the Di-

rector of Central Intelligence.”

2. Concerning the proposed deletion of paragraph 2. of NSC

10/5,

I assume that this is deleted for the reason that the responsibil-

ity and authority of the OCB is sufficiently spelled out in the Execu-
tive Order 10483

plus the present supplemental memorandum of 3

September 1953.

3. I question the abandonment of the language of paragraph 3.c.

of NSC 10/5. This language we fought hard to get into NSC 10/5 and
felt at the time that we required it in order to receive the most satis-
factory assurance available that we would have some help in lining up
support for our activities and operations from the Departments of State

464 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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Document 90.

Document 157.

An apparent reference to Document 158, or Wisner may have been referring to

the September 3 date when NSC Executive Secretary Lay transmitted the Executive
order to the involved government officials for implementation.

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and Defense. If this language is deleted in its entirety, we are thrown
back on our own resources entirely and will have no tangible “legal”
basis for levying demands upon the other departments and no ap-
proved mechanism for laying on such demands. If anything, further
consideration should be given to the inclusion of the newly created IIA
organization and FOA (formerly ECA–MSA) as departments or agen-
cies upon which we should be in a position to call for such assistance
and support as they may be capable of providing.

4. In paragraph 3.b. at the bottom of page 3 of Attachment A, I

would recommend the insertion of the word “official” between the
words “with” and “overt.” The present language dangles a bit since
the overt activities referred to are not in any way specified.

5. In paragraph 4. I notice that the old language of NSC 10/2 is

retained intact, and although the language is pretty good from our
standpoint in its present form, it does not provide for situations such
as Korea. The present language speaks of “active theaters of

war

where

American forces are engaged.” It is my recollection that General Smith
worked out language with the Pentagon and the Far East Command
to cover the in-between situation and undeclared hostilities, and the
language of the telegrams by which this agreement was arrived at and
established might be profitably consulted in this connection.

6. For better clarification of the proposed new sentence at the

end of paragraph 5. I would recommend the insertion of the words
“conceived as” between the words “initially” and “covert”; and also
the inclusion of a comma between the words “definitions” and “and
responsibility”.

Frank G. Wisner

Printed from a copy that indicates Wisner signed the original.

163. Editorial Note

NSC 162/2 of October 30, 1953, “Basic National Security Policy,”

set forth President Eisenhower’s Cold War strategy, which included
several policy formulations of importance to the intelligence com-
munity. NSC 162/2 declared that United States security required the
development and maintenance of an intelligence system capable of:
“1) collecting and analyzing indications of hostile intentions that would
give maximum prior warning of possible aggression or subversion in

The Intelligence Community 465

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any area of the world; 2) accurately evaluating the capabilities of for-
eign countries, friendly and neutral as well as enemy, to undertake mil-
itary, political, economic and subversive courses of action affecting U.S.
security; and 3) forecasting potential foreign developments having a
bearing on U.S. national security.”

As a means to reduce Soviet capabilities to control or influence the

free world, NSC 162/2 also called on the government to: “a) take overt
and covert measures to discredit Soviet prestige and ideology as ef-
fective instruments of Soviet power, and to reduce the strength of com-
munist parties and other pro-Soviet elements; b) take all feasible diplo-
matic, political, economic and covert measures to counter any threat
of a party or individuals directly or indirectly responsive to Soviet con-
trol to achieve dominant power in a free world country; and c) un-
dertake selective, positive actions to eliminate Soviet-Communist con-
trol over any areas of the free world.” NSC 162/2 is printed in full in

Foreign Relations,

1952–1954, volume II, Part 1, pages 577–597.

164. Memorandum From Colonel Brad J. Smith in the Office of

Special Operations of the Department of Defense to the
Secretary of Defense’s Assistant for Special Operations
(Erskine)

Washington, November 18, 1953.

SUBJECT

Overflights

1. In a conversation with Fred Ayer (Special Assistant to the Secre-

tary of the Air Force for Intelligence) today, I learned that at the IAC meet-
ing on 17 November, General Samford brought up the subject of over-
flights to Mr. Allen Dulles.

General Samford is reported to have said that

he was “tired of pushing on one end of a strand of limp spaghetti,” and
Mr. Dulles agreed to bring the matter of overflights up before the NSC.

2. We have a copy of a paper on overflights which was written

some time ago by Fred Ayer.

It is possible that this may be of interest

466 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: National Archives, RG 330, OSD Files, Office of Special Operations, OSO

Chronological File Jan. 1–Nov. 30, 1953. Top Secret; Security Information.

The minutes of the November 17 meeting have not been found.

Not found.

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to you and might be worth bringing to Mr. Kyes’ attention for intro-
duction at an OCB discussion some time, especially since it appears
that the subject will be introduced at an NSC meeting.

3. Mr. Ayer also mentioned having sent to you a paper on balloon

overflights.

Balloon overflights seem to me to present a very interest-

ing possibility in that the balloons will travel at approximately 80,000
feet, some thousands of feet out of interception range.

4. The Air Force is presently planning a test of the balloon over-

flight capability which involves releasing the balloons in Hawaii and
hoping to pick them up some place on the West Coast. If the test proves
successful, the Air Force will then be able to present the Secretary of
Defense with a film strip of pictures taken at five-minute intervals from
80,000 feet of the path followed by the balloon for 2400 miles, along
with a recommendation that we investigate the possibility of balloon
overflights in the Soviet Union.

5. I understand the balloon project (in USSR)

will cost about

$40,000,000.

B.J. Smith

Not found.

The words “(in USSR)” were inserted by hand.

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

165. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Kyes) to

Director of Central Intelligence Dulles

Washington, December 4, 1953.

Dear Allen:

In the course of my trip through Europe in September, my atten-

tion was drawn to a number of areas in which there appear to be se-
rious weaknesses in the furtherance of our over-all intelligence effort.
While I do not have personal knowledge of some of the items which I
shall mention, General Erskine, at my request, examined the intelli-
gence picture from the field commanders’ point of view and provided

The Intelligence Community 467

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 95–G00278R, Box 1.

Top Secret; Security Information.

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me with the benefit of his observations. I realize, of course, that most,
if not all these matters are no strangers to you, but perhaps my views
will not be amiss as a slightly different slant.

I am fully convinced that the successful prosecution of any mili-

tary program has its very foundation in the quantity, quality, and
proper dissemination of intelligence. I am very aware that deficiencies
exist in the Department of Defense intelligence agencies and am tak-
ing steps to correct those faults. Correction of the following deficien-
cies, which lie in the covert field and, therefore, fall within your
purview, appears to be of vital importance to the country:

a. Lateral dissemination of information by CIA field agencies to lo-

cal commanders appears necessary and logical. For example, it seems
that USCINCEUR should receive CIA field reports directly and not be
required to wait for distribution of screened material from Washington.

b. The penetration of the “iron curtain” by covert means falls far

short of our requirements. [

⁄

lines not declassified

]

c. [

1 paragraph (7 lines) not declassified

]

d. [

1 paragraph (9

⁄

lines) not declassified

]

There are other points which should be discussed in detail. I’m

sure you will agree that improved coordination between our agencies
will improve the efficiency of our respective intelligence operations. I
therefore suggest that our appropriate staff officers meet as soon as
possible to go over these matters of common interest. General Erskine
will represent the Department of Defense if you concur.

With best personal regards,
Yours sincerely,

Roger M. Kyes

Printed from a copy that indicates Kyes signed the original.

166. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles

to Deputy Secretary of Defense Kyes

Washington, December 29, 1953.

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Direc-

tor for Operations, Job 79–01228A, Box 13. Top Secret. 1 page not
declassified.]

468 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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167. Draft Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans of

the Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner) to Director of
Central Intelligence Dulles

Washington, January 8, 1954.

SUBJECT

Policy Guidance for CIA planning to “capitalize on and exploit new uprisings in
the satellites”

1. Referring to our conversations of Wednesday afternoon, 6 Jan-

uary, at which time you informed me of certain statements made to
you by Mr. C. D. Jackson at or following the OCB meeting of the same
day, I have looked into the questions of policy guidance and the sta-
tus of our own planning in this field. I do not find that we have ever
received definitive or authoritative policy guidance of the kind which
would authorize us to proceed with the development of plans of a gen-
eral character to either whip up or exploit uprisings which may occur
in the satellites. The only policy guidance which tends to bear on this
subject which I have been able to locate is as follows:

a. The guidance which we have received to “keep the pot

simmering—but to avoid boiling it over”.

FILL IN APPROPRIATE REFERENCES HERE,
INCLUDING EXCHANGES WITH HICOG, ETC., AS
WELL AS REFERENCES TO MR. DULLES’ OWN
EXCHANGES WITH TRUSCOTT ON THIS SUBJECT

(about the end of the summer).

b. The “Winter of Unrest” paper,

the salient features of which are

__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
c. The OCB instruction—already executed—to stockpile certain

quantities of explosives and demolition materials at forward points in
Europe. These materials have been so stockpiled in order to be available

The Intelligence Community 469

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for Operations,

Job 79–01228A, Box 18. Secret. Drafted by Wisner and Helms. A note in the upper right
corner reads, “Orig. To C/ w/note asking him to get together w/C/PPC and concert on
rounding this out and filling in the gaps. CC sent to Ballmer w/similar message.”

Not found.

A handwritten note in the margin next to this paragraph reads, “NSC 174? [two

illegible words] a balanced program.” NSC 174 is printed in

Foreign Relations,

1952–1954,

vol. VIII, pp. 110–127.

Not found.

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in case of need, but we have NO policy guidance governing the infil-
tration thereof either at the present time or under any specific set of
circumstances in the future.

2. The fact that there appears to be a lack of understanding at

higher governmental levels on this general subject is, I believe, a very
serious matter. I think it is essential that we take steps promptly with
a view to either

a. Disabusing the minds of those who believe we are all set to go,

or are in the process of developing plans to touch off or support up-
risings in the satellites; or

b. Getting some governmental policy direction in this field which

will clarify our responsibilities and position.

3. Actually, it is my own understanding, which is shared by Dick

Helms and by Tracy Barnes—with both of whom I have discussed the
matter—that present governmental policy does not provide for or
support the stirring up or the provision of significant quantities of sup-
port to satellite uprisings. I have never understood how it is possible
to support from outside a satellite country a revolt or unrest of any
kind which is not sufficiently strong, in and of itself, to unseat the gov-
ernment in power. This support can only be provided by armed mili-
tary forces prepared to march to the active assistance of the revolu-
tionists for the purpose of helping them complete their attempted coup
and providing the strength necessary to consolidate and hold their
gains. To the best of my knowledge there is no historical precedent for
a successful revolt in a country where the weight of a large army of a
foreign power, supporting the existing regime, is either in the country
or standing on its borders ready to move. Nor is it my understanding
that there is any US policy decision in being, nor any adequate US
forces to back up any such decision, to move in and give support to
an attempted revolt.

4. None of the foregoing is to say that we should not continue to

encourage resistance to the Soviet satellite regimes in order to keep the
pressure on and to retard the consolidation of Soviet controls in those
areas. This is what I understand our policy directives to amount to at
the present time, but it is one of the most difficult, unanswered ques-
tions of the day as to what US or Western policy would be in case of
an attempted revolt occurring in any of the satellites within the fore-
seeable future and prior to the withdrawal of Soviet military power
from the immediate or adjacent area. This is the question which has
been posed to us repeatedly by European statesmen, of whom Ernst
Reuter was one of the most succinct propounders. You may recall his
repeated predictions that there would be further outbreaks of unrest,
perhaps as early as the Spring of this year, in Eastern Germany, and he
asked just what the West would propose to do in such event. He tended

470 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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to answer his own question by speculating that we would probably be
forced to stand idly by wringing our hands and seeing all possibility
of future resistance go down in bloody liquidation unless we were able
meanwhile, through diplomatic action of the most courageous and
forceful character, to bring about a retraction of Soviet power.

168. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles to the

Assistant Chief of Staff (G–2) of the Army (Trudeau)

Washington, January 25, 1954.

Dear General Trudeau:

In your letter of 24 December 1953

you suggested that problems

relating to clandestine intelligence required a clarification of NSCID
#5

rather than an “Agreed Activities” paper.

NSCID #5 is a fundamental statement of policy. Prior to its issuance

the underlying philosophies and problems were debated at length at
all levels in the interested offices of the Executive Branch of the Gov-
ernment and by appropriate congressional groups. Each formal study
of the problem of clandestine intelligence operations, after debate of
the various views presented, came without exception to an acceptance
of the principles reflected in NSCID #5.

A revision was issued on 28 August 1951

to meet new conditions

arising from the Korean War and the establishment of NATO, but the
paper as revised is still a statement of basic responsibilities rather than
an attempt to spell out the conditions that will govern all conceivable
relationships and circumstances. There is, however, ample flexibility in
the concept stated in NSCID #5 to meet all such circumstances, and
changing needs can best be met by corollary agreements, based on
NSCID #5, which can be readily achieved without calling into play the
full machinery of the National Security Council, which inevitably
would require a rather prolonged procedure.

The Intelligence Community 471

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 95–G00278R, Box 1,

Folder 27. Secret. Drafted on January 4, and rewritten by C.P. Cabell on January 22. A
legal opinion by CIA General Counsel Lawrence Houston is ibid.

Not printed. (Ibid., Folder 24)

See

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment,

Document 423.

Document 255.

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Therefore, rather than seek a change in NSCID #5, I would prefer

to pursue the problem of a coordinated program on the basis of the
“Agreed Activities” paper which representatives of the Armed Services
prepared in collaboration with representatives of this Agency, in June
of last year. We are now awaiting with interest the return of this draft
agreement which I understand the JIC ad hoc committee dealing with
this problem planned to rework on the basis of comments from com-
manders in the field.

I would therefore urge that you use your influence to bring about

early resumption of negotiation leading to a final “Agreed Activities”
paper.

Sincerely,

Allen W. Dulles

Printed from a copy that indicates Dulles signed the original.

169. Director of Central Intelligence Directive 15/1

Washington, February 4, 1954.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR PRODUCTION OF ECONOMIC

INTELLIGENCE: SOVIET BLOC

Pursuant to the provisions of NSCID–1, NSCID–3, and NSCID–15,

and for the purpose of strengthening the over-all governmental intel-
ligence structure for the production of economic intelligence on the So-
viet Bloc, the following policies and allocations are hereby established:

472 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: National Archives, RG 59, INR Historical Files: Lot 58 D 776, DCI Direc-

tives. Confidential. A typed note reads: “Agreed text CIA/State 2/5/54.” For a revised
version of this directive, see Document 191.

The term “Soviet Bloc” as used in this Directive covers the USSR; Poland, Czecho-

slovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, East Germany; Communist China and
North Korea. Supplements to this directive may reduce this coverage or extend it to other
areas under Soviet domination, if such modification is warranted. [Footnote in the
original.]

For NSCID No. 1, see Document 256; for NSCID No. 3, see

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 426; for NSCID No.
15, see Document 254.

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1. Policies

1.1 In discharging allocated responsibilities and effecting integra-

tion of economic intelligence, the interested departments and agencies
will apply the following basic principles:

a. No complete separation of areas of interest is possible or nec-

essarily desirable in economic intelligence activities.

b. Full and free interchange of all intelligence information and fin-

ished intelligence and schedules of research programs, including ex-

ternal research, between all agencies concerned is essential.

c. No one agency is considered to be the final authority in any

field; conclusions may be questioned by other IAC agencies and dis-

sents recorded.

1.2 An agency charged with primary responsibility in a particu-

lar field will develop special competence in that field and will normally
carry out most of the research in that field.

1.3 Any agency may make such studies as it believes necessary to

supplement intelligence obtained from other agencies in order to ful-
fill its departmental functions; however, basic research studies should
not normally be undertaken without prior discussion with the agen-
cies having primary responsibility for the subject matter involved.

1.4 Each intelligence agency will endeavor to coordinate the in-

telligence activities of its technical services and its other facilities hav-
ing economic intelligence production capabilities with the work of the
IAC intelligence agencies and to make available to those agencies the
intelligence produced by such services and facilities.

2. Responsibility for Economic Intelligence Production

2.1 Responsibility for research and for the production of economic

intelligence on the Soviet Bloc is allocated as follows:

a. The Department of State shall have primary responsibility for

those aspects of intelligence production in which economic and polit-

ical analysis are interdependent. It will produce intelligence on eco-

nomic policy and politico-economic trends and will undertake such

other analyses and studies as may be required in fulfilling its assigned

primary production responsibilities.

b. The Department of Defense shall have primary responsi-

bility for the production of intelligence on the military aspects of the econ-

omy. They will produce intelligence on military requirements, logistics,

ships and ship movements, and on production of military end items, and

will undertake such other analyses and studies as may be required in ful-

filling their assigned primary production responsibilities.

c. The CIA shall have primary responsibility, as a service of com-

mon concern, for intelligence production on all aspects and all sectors

of the economy, except for those specified in 2.1 (a) and (b). With full

recognition given to the intelligence produced by other agencies, it shall

supplement this intelligence by such independent analyses and stud-

ies as may be necessary to produce integrated economic intelligence

on the total economy of the Soviet Bloc.

The Intelligence Community 473

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2.2 It is recognized that, despite the above-mentioned allocations

of primary production responsibilities, there will be areas of common
or overlapping interest which require continuing interagency liaison
and such working-level conferences as may be appropriate.

3. Responsibility for Economic Intelligence Coordination

3.1 To assist the Central Intelligence Agency is carrying out its co-

ordinating responsibility, the Economic Intelligence Committee shall
continue to perform the functions outlined in IAC D–22/1 (revised).

3.2 In accordance therewith, the Economic Intelligence Commit-

tee shall, upon request of the Office of National Estimates, prepare co-
ordinated contributions to comprehensive estimates of Soviet Bloc Ca-
pabilities scheduled in the approved program of National Intelligence
Estimates.

Document 72.

Printed from an unsigned copy.

170. Editorial Note

Sections of NSC 5407 (which replaced NSC 161), “Status of United

States Programs for National Security as of December 31, 1953,” were
circulated on February 17, 1954, and in subsequent circulars as they
were prepared. The report was discussed at the 187th, 188th, and 190th
meetings of the NSC on March 4, 11, and 25, 1954. (National Archives,
RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5407) Part 8, “The Foreign
Intelligence Program” was prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency.
(Eisenhower Library, White House Office, Office of the Special Assist-
ant for National Security Affairs, NSC Series, Status of Projects, NSC
5407, Boxes 4–5) NSC 5407 is discussed in an editorial note in

Foreign

Relations,

1952–1954, volume II, Part 1, page 633.

474 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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171. Note From the Executive Secretary of the National Security

Council (Lay) to the National Security Council

NSC 5412

Washington, March 15, 1954.

COVERT OPERATIONS

REFERENCES

A. Memo for the Statutory Members of the NSC from Executive Secretary,

subject: “The NSC 10 Series”, dated March 3, 1954

B. NSC 10/2

C. NSC 10/5

The President has this date approved the enclosed National Secu-

rity Council directive on the subject, as submitted by the reference
memorandum and adopted by the other statutory members of the Na-
tional Security Council, and directs its implementation by all executive
departments and agencies of the U.S. Government concerned, as indi-
cated therein.

Accordingly, as set forth in paragraph 7 of the enclosure, NSC 10/2,

NSC 10/5 and certain provisions relating thereto of the President’s
memorandum to the Executive Secretary, NSC, supplementing Execu-
tive Order 10483,

are hereby superseded.

It is requested that special security precautions be observed in the han-

dling of the enclosed directive and that access to it be very strictly limited on
an absolute need-to-know basis.

It is further requested that all copies of the reference memorandum be re-

turned to this office for destruction upon receipt of this report.

James S. Lay, Jr.

The Intelligence Community 475

Source: Eisenhower Library, Special Assistant to the President for National Secu-

rity Affairs Records. Top Secret. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Executive Officer, Operations Coordi-
nating Board.

Not found.

See

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment,

Document 292.

Document 90.

See Documents 157 and 158.

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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Enclosure

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVE

ON COVERT OPERATIONS

1. The National Security Council, taking cognizance of the vicious

covert activities of the USSR and Communist China and the govern-
ments, parties and groups dominated by them (hereinafter collectively
referred to as “International Communism”) to discredit and defeat the
aims and activities of the United States and other powers of the free
world, determined, as set forth in NSC directives 10/2 and 10/5, that,
in the interests of world peace and U.S. national security, the overt for-
eign activities of the U.S. Government should be supplemented by
covert operations.

2. The Central Intelligence Agency had already been charged by

the National Security Council with conducting espionage and counter-
espionage operations abroad. It therefore seemed desirable, for opera-
tional reasons, not to create a new agency for covert operations, but,
subject to directives from the NSC, to place the responsibility for them
on the Central Intelligence Agency and correlate them with espionage
and counterespionage operations under the over-all control of the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence.

3. The NSC has determined that such covert operations shall to

the greatest extent practicable, in the light of U.S. and Soviet capabili-
ties and taking into account the risk of war, be designed to:

a. Create and exploit troublesome problems for International

Communism, impair relations between the USSR and Communist

China and between them and their satellites, complicate control within

the USSR, Communist China and between them and their satellites,

and retard the growth of the military and economic potential of the So-

viet bloc.

b. Discredit the prestige and ideology of International Commu-

nism, and reduce the strength of its parties and other elements.

c. Counter any threat of a party or individuals directly or indi-

rectly responsive to Communist control to achieve dominant power in

a free world country.

d. Reduce International Communist control over any areas of the

world.

e. Strengthen the orientation toward the United States of the peo-

ples and nations of the free world, accentuate, wherever possible, the

identity of interest between such peoples and nations and the United

States as well as favoring, where appropriate, those groups genuinely

advocating or believing in the advancement of such mutual interests,

476 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Top Secret.

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and increase the capacity and will of such peoples and nations to re-

sist International Communism.

f. In accordance with established policies and to the extent prac-

ticable in areas dominated or threatened by International Communism,

develop underground resistance and facilitate covert and guerrilla op-

erations and ensure availability of those forces in the event of war, in-

cluding wherever practicable provisions of a base upon which the mil-

itary may expand these forces in time of war within acting theaters of

operations as well as provision for stay-behind assets and escape and

evasion facilities.

4. Under the authority of Section 102(d)(5) of the National Secu-

rity Act of 1947, the National Security Council hereby directs that the
Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for:

a. Ensuring, through designated representatives of the Secretary

of State and of the Secretary of Defense, that covert operations are

planned and conducted in a manner consistent with United States for-

eign and military policies and with overt activities, and consulting with

and obtaining advice from the Operations Coordinating Board and

other departments or agencies as appropriate.

b. Informing, through appropriate channels and on a need-to-

know basis, agencies of the U.S. Government, both at home and abroad

(including diplomatic and military representatives), of such operations

as will affect them.

5. In addition to the provisions of paragraph 4, the following pro-

visions shall apply to wartime covert operations:

a. Plans for covert operations to be conducted in active theaters

of war and any other areas in which U.S. forces are engaged in com-

bat operations will be drawn up with the assistance of the Department

of Defense and will be in consonance with and complementary to ap-

proved war plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Covert operations in active theaters of war and any other areas

in which U.S. forces are engaged in combat operations will be con-

ducted under such command and control relationships as have been

or may in the future be approved by the Department of Defense.

6. As used in this directive, “covert operations” shall be under-

stood to be all activities conducted pursuant to this directive which are
so planned and executed that any U.S. Government responsibility for
them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the
U.S. Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them.
Specifically, such operations shall include any covert activities related
to: propaganda; political action; economic warfare; preventive direct
action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition; escape and eva-
sion and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states or
groups including assistance to underground resistance movements,
guerrillas and refugee liberation groups; support of indigenous and
anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world; de-
ception plans and operations; and all activities compatible with this

The Intelligence Community 477

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directive necessary to accomplish the foregoing. Such operations shall
not include: armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage
and counterespionage, nor cover and deception for military operations.

7. This directive supersedes and rescinds NSC 10/2 and NSC

10/5. Subparagraphs “a” and “b” under the heading “Additional Func-
tions of the Operations Coordinating Board” on page 1 of the Presi-
dent’s memorandum for the Executive Secretary, National Security
Council, supplementing Executive Order 10483, are superseded by the
following provisions:

a. Except as the President otherwise directs, the members of the

Operations Coordinating Board shall, under appropriate security

arrangements, be advised in advance of major programs involving

covert operations related to National Security Council policies.

b. The designated representatives of the Secretaries of State and

Defense referred to in paragraph 4-a above shall keep the Board Mem-

bers of their respective departments advised as to matters on which

they are consulted by the Director of Central Intelligence, and which

have been or are to be referred to the Operations Coordinating Board.

c. The Operations Coordinating Board will be the normal channel

for securing coordination of support among the Departments of State

and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency.

172. Minutes of a Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Committee

IAC–M–145

Washington, March 16, 1954.

Director of Central Intelligence

Allen W. Dulles

Presiding

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Special Assistant for Intelligence, Department of State
Major General Arthur G. Trudeau, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of

the Army

Rear Admiral H. C. Daniel, acting for Director of Naval Intelligence, Department

of the Navy

Major General John A. Samford, Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, United

States Air Force

478 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 85–500362R, Box 2.

Secret. The meeting was held in the DCI’s conference room.

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Colonel Samuel M. Lansing, acting for Deputy Director for Intelligence, The

Joint Staff

Dr. Charles H. Reichardt, Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the

IAC

Mr. Victor P. Keay, acting for Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of

Investigation

ALSO PRESENT

Lt. Gen. Charles P. Cabell, Central Intelligence Agency
Dr. Sherman Kent, Central Intelligence Agency
**Dr. H. Marshall Chadwell, Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. James Q. Reber, Central Intelligence Agency
[

name not declassified

], Central Intelligence Agency

Lt. Gen. Harold R. Bull (Ret.), Central Intelligence Agency
*Mr. Ludwell L. Montague, Central Intelligence Agency

[

name not declassified

], Central Intelligence Agency

*Mr. William P. Bundy, Central Intelligence Agency
[

name not declassified

], Central Intelligence Agency

[

name not declassified

], Central Intelligence Agency

[

name not declassified

], Central Intelligence Agency

[

name not declassified

], Central Intelligence Agency

[

name not declassified

], Central Intelligence Agency

[

name not declassified

], USMCR, Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. William C. Trueheart, Department of State
*Mr. E. W. Doherty, Department of State

*Mr. Miron Burgin, Department of State

*Mr. J. W. Lydman, Department of State

Lt. Col. Roland L. Kolb, Department of the Army
Lt. Col. James G. Martin, Department of the Army
Lt. Col. Vasco J. Fenili, Department of the Army
Captain Allan L. Reed, USN, Department of the Navy
Cmdr. James G. Thorburn, Jr., Department of the Navy
Colonel Donald H. Ainsworth, United States Air Force
Colonel John J. Morrow, United States Air Force
Colonel Charles F. Gillis, United States Air Force
Mr. John A. Power, United States Air Force
Captain Ray E. Malpass, USN, The Joint Staff
Colonel Orin H. Moore, The Joint Staff
Lt. Col. Perry H. Penn, The Joint Staff
*Mr. John Easton, The Joint Staff

Richard D. Drain

Secretary

[Omitted here is discussion of unrelated agenda items.]

The Intelligence Community 479

Attended Executive Session. [Footnote in the original.]

[Attended] Part of Meeting. [Footnote in the original.]

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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Soviet Capabilities in Guided Missiles

(IAC–D–81, 10 March)

Action:

Agreed to defer action until a later meeeting.

Discussion:

Admiral Daniel and Colonel Lansing felt that the

subject was one allocated to the departments of the Department of De-
fense by DCID 3/4

and that to handle a matter primarily in the

weapons field through the national intelligence machinery might lead
to overcrowding an already overworked mechanism. General Trudeau
suggested that the entire community is concerned with at least the col-
lection effort in this field, an effort which needs stepping up before ex-
isting estimates can be much improved. Mention was made of a cur-
rent JIC study (603/16, November 1953)

pertinent extracts from which

the service members felt might be made available to the Federal Civil
Defense Administration.

8. General Samford thought it desirable to respond as fully as pos-

sible to present and future requestors involved with this subject. He
doubted that less than a National Estimate would meet the need.

9. Mr. Dulles recognized that this subject had grown in impor-

tance since DCID 3/4 was issued almost two years ago and may re-
quire treatment different from that suggested in the Directive. He in-
vited members to consider the matter further, pending a full discussion
at a later meeting.

[Omitted here is discussion of unrelated agenda items.]

480 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Not found.

Document 126.

Not further identified.

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173. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, March 25, 1954.

PREPARATION OF COORDINATED EVALUATIONS

OF THE NET CAPABILITIES OF THE USSR TO INFLICT

DIRECT INJURY ON THE UNITED STATES

Problem

1. To create appropriate organizational machinery for the prepa-

ration of continuing coordinated evaluations of the net capabilities of
the USSR to inflict direct injury on the United States, and to direct the
preparation of such an evaluation.

Discussion

Introduction

2. By memorandum dated 10 March 1954, pursuant to NSC Action

873-d., the Director of Defense Mobilization has submitted certain rec-
ommendations relative to the organizational aspects of the continental
defense program.

These recommendations do not cover parts of Chap-

ter VI of NSC 159,

specifically paragraphs 129–131 relating to questions

of “net evaluation” organization. Since these questions are substantially
different from the issues of operational organization, it is appropriate to
deal with the two in separate papers, whether final action is taken by
the National Security Council itself or by the Planning Board.

The Intelligence Community 481

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence,

Job 80–R01440R, Box 3. Secret. A note on the paper indicates that the DCI and DD/I saw
it on May 4, 1954. All ellipses in the original.

Memorandum from ODM Director Arthur S. Flemming to Cutler, March 10.

(Eisenhower Library, White House Office, NSC Staff Papers, Disaster File Series, Box 22,
Continental Defense) NSC Action No. 873, taken at the 158th meeting of the NSC on Au-
gust 6, 1953, directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the NSC Planning Board to submit fur-
ther recommendations on continental defense to the Council. In addition, Flemming was
directed by the President to establish a special task force to study and make recom-
mendations on improving government organization with respect to internal security
functions. A copy of NSC Action No. 873 is in National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC (Mis-
cellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Records of Action.

NSC 159, “Continental Defense,” circulated to the NSC on July 22, was the report

of the Continental Defense Committee chaired by General Bull (see footnote 1, Docu-
ment 150). A copy of NSC 159 is in National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D
351, NSC 159 Series.

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History

3. Two previous evaluations in this field have been prepared for

the Council, the history being as follows:

a. On August 30, 1951, the Council directed that the Director of

Central Intelligence, in collaboration with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS),

the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS), and the

Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC), prepare a summary

evaluation, covering Soviet net capability against the continental

United States as of mid-1952.

After considerable delay and difficulty,

such an evaluation was submitted to the Council on October 14, 1952,

with an accompanying memorandum by the then Director pointing out

shortcomings of the report and recommending that he, DCI, be directed

to examine into the creation of new and better machinery to integrate

operational data with intelligence in this field.

On November 25, 1952,

the Secretary of Defense forwarded to the Council the views of the JCS

on the question,

and there ensued negotiations in which JCS, CIA,

ICIS, and IIC participated and which eventuated in the directive set

forth as NSC 140, approved by the President on January 19, 1953.

b. Under this directive, a Subcommittee headed by Lt. General Id-

wal H. Edwards (USAF ret.) completed and submitted to the Council

on May 18, 1953 its report, NSC 140/1.

This differed from the previ-

ous study in that (1) it was projected for two years into the future,

through mid-1955; (2) in addition to the continental United States, de-

fined key installations overseas were considered; (3) instead of using

maximum estimates of Soviet strength, as had been substantially done

before, the evaluation used a probable estimate level in this regard, and

assumed a Soviet strategy regarded as being consistent with these es-

timated capabilities. The Report was given to the Planning Board’s

Continental Defense Committee, the so-called Bull Committee, and was

used by that Committee along with other relevant materials in the

preparation of NSC 159.

4. The Report of the Bull Committee, NSC 159, July 22, 1953, re-

ferred to the substance of the Edwards Report (para. 9), and also con-
sidered in some detail the problem of permanent organization (paras.
129–131) recommending that a new evaluation be undertaken in two
phases, the first covering Soviet attack capabilities—to be done jointly
by the JCS and CIA—and the second covering damage, or vulnerabil-
ity to the estimated attack capabilities—to be done by a separate Com-
mittee under NSC direction. NSC 159, para. 30, further noted that the
Council “might well wish to establish a permanent subcommittee on

482 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

See Document 86.

The evaluation and the accompanying memorandum have not been found. See

Document 138.

Not found.

See

Foreign Relations,

1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, pp. 205–208.

NSC 140/1 is ibid., pp. 328–349.

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‘Net Capabilities Estimates’ composed of the Chairman of the JCS and
the Director of Central Intelligence . . .”

5. Concurrently, the question of net evaluations in general was

considered by The President’s Committee on International Information
Activities, the Jackson Committee. In its Report submitted to the Coun-
cil on June 30, 1953, the Jackson Committee specifically recommended
that machinery for the preparation of such evaluations should be cre-
ated.

(Jackson Committee Report, pp. 3, 118, Recommendation No. 1)

Action by the Council or any agency on this recommendation was de-
ferred pending the submission of the ODM report directed by NSC Ac-
tion 873 d. to be submitted pursuant to NSC 159 and NSC 159/4.

Importance of the Net Evaluation

6. In view of the usefulness of the Edwards Report and the sub-

sequent recommendations of the Bull and Jackson Committees, the im-
portance and desirability of continuing net evaluations of Soviet ca-
pability to injure the United States may be regarded as established. For
purposes of Council consideration of problems relating to continental
defense or the defense of US installations overseas, it is meaningless
to have gross estimates of Soviet nuclear capabilities, air strength, etc.,
unless these are merged with existing US and Allied defensive capa-
bilities so as to produce an evaluation of the net Soviet capability, pres-
ent and prospective.

Organizational Problems

Method of Operation.

Experience with the 1951–52 project demon-

strated emphatically that it was not satisfactory to conduct a net eval-
uation on the basis of one-shot contributions by several agencies,
melded by one agency or by a group. The Edwards Subcommittee op-
erated on the basis of continuing exchange of material by a tightly-knit
operating group producing in effect “successive approximations” lead-
ing to a final refined product. Wherever the responsibility may be
placed, and on whatever basis agencies participate, this method of op-
eration is essential. Moreover, this method of operation can also be em-
ployed—as it was by the Edwards group—to minimize the security
problem involved in the handling of sensitive information that must
be supplied particularly by JCS, CIA, and FBI.

Allocation of Responsibility.

Three allocations have so far been

tried or proposed.

The Edwards Subcommittee

consisted of a Chairman

appointed by the Council (General Edwards was actually nominated
by the JCS), and representatives of JCS, CIA, the ICIS, and IIC. Other

The Intelligence Community 483

Extracts from the Jackson Committee Report are ibid., Part 2, pp. 1795–1874. See

also Document 151.

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agencies, notably ODM and FCDA, were in the position of contribu-
tors and advisors, but did not participate in the final work of the Sub-
committee.

The NSC 159 recommendation

would divide the work into

two stages, with JCS and CIA acting jointly in the first, and with the
second, or damage, stage handled by an ad hoc committee chaired by
an NSC representative and including Defense, ICIS, IIC, ODM and
FCDA.

The JCS views on NSC 159,

submitted to the Council on Sep-

tember 1, 1953, take the position that the Department of Defense has
adequate resources in conjunction with “other agencies,” to prepare
the needed evaluation without resort to additional machinery. This ap-
pears to mean that primary responsibility should be placed solely in
Defense, with power to call on other agencies as needed. The great dif-
ference between these three methods illustrates the complexity of the
problem of allocating responsibility so as to bring in all interested agen-
cies to an appropriate degree and at the same time to have a workable
set-up. The following points appear relevant:

a. A fully refined net evaluation involves consideration of several

elements, for which different agencies have primary responsibility. At

a minimum, these include Soviet gross overt attack and defense capa-

bilities. CIA and Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) agencies con-

cerned with foreign intelligence),

Soviet gross clandestine attack ca-

pabilities (IIC, CIA, AEC principally), Soviet strategy (all intelligence

agencies), US military defensive and gross retaliatory capabilities (JCS),

US non-military defensive capabilities (ODM, FCDA), US internal se-

curity capabilities (ICIS), and US vulnerability in terms of damage to

be expected from various scales and types of attack (Defense, ODM,

FCDA principally). None of these can be considered in isolation. To il-

lustrate, the Soviet attack strategy would be based in part on the So-

viet estimate of US weaknesses and gaps in defense, and in part also

on the Soviet estimate of the degree of damage that might be inflicted.

Hence, it becomes necessary to take theoretical possibilities of attack

and “war-game” them through from a Soviet standpoint. In theory at

least, this could not be done properly without constant and full par-

ticipation of all interested agencies.

b. On the other hand, such a multi-agency exercise is on its face

impractical and endlessly time-consuming. Some compromise must be

struck, as was done in setting up the Edwards Subcommittee.

c. It is readily possible to separate out the elements relating to US

vulnerability in terms of damage. Moreover, although, as indicated in

a above these are theoretically interlinked with Soviet strategy, in prac-

tice damage estimates based on assumed hypothetical levels of attack

would be adequate, since in any event such estimates would be “broad-

brush” in character. Thus it is reasonable to separate out the damage

aspect, and charge this phase to a separate group.

484 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

The principal IAC agencies are State, the three services, and the Joint Intelligence

Group of the Joint Staff. [Footnote in the original.]

[

5 lines not declassified.

] [Footnote in the original.]

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d. However, it appears neither logical nor practicable to combine

that damage aspect with the internal security aspect for which ICIS and

IIC are primarily responsible. The principal internal security problem

belongs in the “capabilities” rather than the “damage” category, since

it concerns Soviet clandestine introduction of nuclear or other weapons.

Thus, the Edwards Subcommittee setup was logical on this point. As

a practical matter, the internal security agencies are believed to have

felt that the Edwards and Bull Reports placed at too low a level the

likelihood of Soviet employment of clandestine capabilities. However,

assuming the internal security agencies have produced an estimate of

the likelihood of detection if the Soviets used clandestine means, the

ultimate question of whether the Soviets would be prepared to take

this risk is certainly one of basic Soviet strategy involving broader con-

siderations than those for which the internal security agencies are re-

sponsible. The split shown by Mr. McDonnell’s dissent to NSC 159 can-

not be remedied by any organizational changes, although of course the

internal security agencies should participate fully in the final judgment.

e. As to the position stated in the JCS views on NSC 159, it is not

known whether the views are firmly held by the JCS or by the De-

partment of Defense. The particular subject of Continental Defense is

one aspect of the larger problem of a permanent organization for pro-

ducing net evaluations on Soviet capabilities, and CIA’s views on this

matter have been stated in the Director’s letter to General Bull, dated

30 June 1953,

a copy of which has been circulated to the Planning

Board. In brief, it appears to CIA that to place pre-eminent responsi-

bility in the JCS would be to overlook the legal responsibilities of the

Director of Central Intelligence in the field of national intelligence, un-

der the National Security Act of 1947. The President and the NSC in

practice and pursuant to statutory authority depend on the Director of

Central Intelligence, representing the coordinated views of the Intelli-

gence Agencies, for foreign intelligence estimates, and on the Chair-

man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, speaking as the representative of the

services, for military advice. Thus, the President and Council can best

receive guidance in the most useful and complete form through an ef-

fective amalgamation of the functions of the two.

Personnel and Facilities.

If it is accepted that a tightly-knit oper-

ating group is the appropriate method of operation, questions of per-
sonnel and facilities become important. In the case of the Edwards Sub-
committee, these were handled by the furnishing of facilities in the JCS
area of the Department of Defense and by the furnishing of secretarial
and other personnel by the JCS and CIA. It is believed that these
arrangements were satisfactory, and that they could be repeated with-
out strain on the contributing agencies.

Target Date, Scope and Projection Period

10.

Target Date.

Since national policy in the field of continental de-

fense is now laid down comprehensively in NSC 5408,

with programs

The Intelligence Community 485

Document 150.

See

Foreign Relations,

1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, pp. 609–633.

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extended for some years into the future, it appears unlikely that there
will be a major overhauling of this policy during 1954, barring drastic
changes in the intelligence picture of Soviet capabilities or intentions.

11. The Edwards Subcommittee completed its work in four

months, but found that this was too short a period in which to go into
all of the important aspects. The Edwards Subcommittee had particu-
lar difficulty with the question of Soviet strategy in the event of war,
whether the Soviets would allocate the bulk of their stockpile to the
US or a large part of it against non-US targets. A successor group may
find it desirable to submit this question to thorough intelligence con-
sideration, based on the material on capabilities and damage devel-
oped by the group. This question was referred to by General Edwards
in a personal memorandum to the Executive Secretary, NSC, dated 19
May 1953.

General Edwards also referred to the desirability of cov-

ering the extent of strategic warning that might be expected, of a vul-
nerability study, and of a psychological study of the effects on the peo-
ple of the US of assumed levels of atomic attacks. In view of the
complexity of these problems, it appears highly desirable that the
new study be allowed at least six months, and if possible longer, for
completion.

12. To allow six months or more for a new evaluation would throw

the completion after 1 October 1954, and would eliminate its useful-
ness as a supporting element for work on the FY 1956 budget. How-
ever, this disadvantage appears outweighed by the considerations
stated in paragraph 11.

13.

Scope.

The Edwards Report considered not only the continen-

tal United States but also key US installations outside the US, consid-
ered in terms of the usefulness of such installations to US counter-
offensive action. There was some difficulty about the definition of such
overseas installations, leading to a misunderstanding affecting the JCS
submission. Apart from avoiding a repetition of this, the scope of the
Edwards Report appeared workable.

14.

Projection.

The Edwards Report projected its conclusions for-

ward for two years, and General Edwards recommended that future
studies adopt a projection period not greater than this. For planning
purposes it would be desirable to have a longer projection period, since
many policy decisions cannot bear fruit for three or more years. How-
ever, from a working standpoint, it would be extremely difficult to get
a firm enough picture of either Soviet or US capabilities, in order to do

486 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

General Edwards’ memorandum to the NSC Executive Secretary, May 19, pro-

vided comments by the Special Evaluation Subcommittee concerning future evaluations
of the Soviet Union’s net capabilities to damage the United States. (National Archives,
RG 273, Policy Papers, NSC 140, Box 56)

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the “war-gaming” exercise. The Planning Board should consider
whether the policy considerations should outweigh working difficul-
ties and limitations.

Recommendations

In the light of the foregoing, it is recommended that the National

Security Council issue an appropriate directive or directives:

Establishing a Net Evaluation Subcommittee composed of

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central

Intelligence.

Charging this Subcommittee with the responsibility for pro-

viding estimates of net capabilities as needed to support the formula-

tion of national policy.

c. Directing that this Subcommittee prepare by 1 March 1955 an

evaluation, covering the period through (mid-1957), of the net capa-

bilities of the USSR to inflict direct injury on the continental United

States and on key US installations overseas, the latter being defined in

terms of their importance to US counter-offensive action.

d. Attaching to the Subcommittee, for the purpose of this evalu-

ation, the Chairman of the ICIS and IIC respectively, with full right of

participation on all matters concerning Soviet capabilities that involve

internal security of the US, and of the likelihood of Soviet employment

of such capabilities in the event of attack.

e. Establishing a Vulnerability Subcommittee composed of the Sec-

retary of Defense, the Director of Defense Mobilization, and the Fed-

eral Civil Defense Administrator, with power to call upon other agen-

cies for contributions.

f. Directing this Vulnerability Subcommittee to prepare appropri-

ate studies of the damage, both material and psychological, that might

be inflicted on the US under assumed levels of Soviet delivery of nu-

clear weapons or other attack, such studies to be furnished to the Net

Evaluation Subcommittee and to be incorporated in the evaluation di-

rected under paragraph c above. For this purpose, the Chairman of the

Vulnerability Subcommittee, or his representative, should be attached

to the Net Evaluation Subcommittee in the preparation of the final

evaluation.

The Intelligence Community 487

Items a. and b. could be separated from the rest. Arguably the others would re-

quire only Planning Board action. [Footnote in the original. NSC 5423, “Directive for a
Net Capabilities Evaluation Subcommittee,” June 23, 1954, subsequently established the
subcommittee. Additional documentation on the creation and work of the subcommit-
tee is in

Foreign Relations,

1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, pp. 800–802, and ibid., 1955–1957,

vol. XIX, pp. 1, 2, passim.]

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174. Draft Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence

Dulles to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Dodge)

Washington, March 30, 1954.

I am writing this memorandum with reference to the policy, rec-

ommended by the National Security Council and approved by the Pres-
ident, for increasing observation of Soviet Bloc diplomatic representa-
tives, including personnel with international organizations, while
within the continental United States, with special reference to those
whose activities are suspected to extend beyond the scope of normal
diplomatic assignments. This policy was most recently stated in par.
20b(9) of NSC 5408.

As you know, the President has approved this

program being undertaken by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

It is our opinion that it may be very helpful to our activities out-

side of the United States to have such a selective surveillance intensi-
fied within the United States, and that such a program may have a po-
tential in the field of foreign intelligence information which could be
exploited on a continuing basis. The individuals who would be under
surveillance are in this country temporarily and eventually will depart
for their own or other countries. Information and leads derived from
this program would be of assistance to the Central Intelligence Agency
in carrying out its responsibilities with regard to this class of persons
outside the United States.

We understand that the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s budget

for Fiscal Year 1955, which has been approved by the Bureau of the
Budget and is before the committees of the Congress, made no provi-
sion for this increased activity and contains no funds which can be al-
located to its support. Because a program for observation of foreign
diplomats is one of considerable sensitivity, it is not considered desir-
able to reopen the Bureau’s budget for Fiscal Year 1955, which is now
before the Congress, in view of the obviously attendant publicity. We

488 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: Eisenhower Library, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Records, NSC Series, Briefing Notes, CIA-Funds, Box 4. Top Secret. A copy was sent to
the Attorney General for the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Two handwrit-
ten notations in the upper right corner read: “Copy given to Cabell March 31” and, in a
different handwriting, “RC draft after talking with P.” RC was Robert Cutler, the Spe-
cial Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. A brief memorandum of con-
versation by Cutler describing his talk with the President, at 11:30 a.m. on March 30, is
in ibid. The President’s views are reflected in this draft memorandum, which Cutler pre-
sumably prepared for Dulles’ signature.

NSC 5408 is printed in

Foreign Relations,

1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, pp. 609–633.

Paragraph 20b(9) is redacted, however. The fully declassified text of NSC 5408 is in Na-
tional Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5408.

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are, therefore, proposing, because of our interest in developing this pro-
gram on an experimental basis, that the Central Intelligence Agency
make available during Fiscal Year 1955 to the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation, funds from its Contingency Reserve up to an amount to
bring the program to the full stage of development considered desir-
able by the FBI by the end of Fiscal Year 1955; [

1 line not declassified

If the program is deemed successful during the course of its de-

velopment in Fiscal Year 1955, it is understood that the Federal Bureau
of Investigation would provide for the entire activity for Fiscal Year
1956 and thereafter in its regular budget requests to the Congress, and
would continue to make available to the Central Intelligence Agency
the information and leads derived from thereafter carrying out the pro-
gram which would be of assistance to the Central Intelligence Agency.

The Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

has explained to the President how this matter is to be arranged. Your
approval of this proposal is, accordingly, requested.

Upon receipt of

such approval, I will discuss the matter with the Chairmen of the House
and Senate Appropriation Committees.

Director

Central Intelligence Agency

The Intelligence Community 489

A March 15 letter from Dodge to Dulles indicates Bureau of the Budget approval

of the monetary transfer. (Eisenhower Library, Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs Records, NSC Series, Briefing Notes, CIA-Funds, Box 4)

The draft memorandum is unsigned.

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175. Minutes of a Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Committee

IAC–M–150

Washington, May 4, 1954.

Director of Central Intelligence

Allen W. Dulles

Presiding

Lt. Gen. Harold R. Bull (Ret.)

Presiding

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Special Assistant for Intelligence, Department of State
Brigadier General John M. Willems, acting for Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2,

Department of the Army

Rear Admiral H. C. Daniel, acting for Director of Naval Intelligence, Department

of the Navy

Major General John A. Samford, Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, United

States Air Force

Brigadier General Edward H. Porter, Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint

Staff

Dr. Charles H. Reichardt, Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC
Mr. Meffert W. Kuhrtz, acting for Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of

Investigation

ALSO PRESENT

Mr. Robert Amory, Jr., Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Huntington D. Sheldon, Central Intelligence Agency
*Dr. H. Marshall Chadwell, Central Intelligence Agency
[

name not declassified

] Central Intelligence Agency

name not declassified

] Central Intelligence Agency

*Mr. Ludwell L. Montague, Central Intelligence Agency
*[

name not declassified

] Central Intelligence Agency

*Mr. R. Jack Smith, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Harold P. Ford, Central Intelligence Agency
*[

name not declassified

] Central Intelligence Agency

[

name not declassified

] Central Intelligence Agency

Dr. Allan Evans, Department of State
Lt. Colonel Vasco J. Fenili, Department of the Army
Lt. Colonel James P. Barry, Department of the Army
Lt. Colonel H. N. Maples, Department of the Army
Captain N. E. Smith, USN, Department of the Navy
Mr. Lawrence Healey, Department of the Navy
Brigadier General Millard Lewis, United States Air Force

490 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 85–S00362R, Box 2.

Secret. The meeting was held in the DCI’s conference room.

Part of meeting. [Footnote in the original.]

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Colonel Donald H. Ainsworth, United States Air Force
Colonel John J. Morrow, United States Air Force
Colonel Robert Totten, United States Air Force
Mr. Donald F. Benjamin, United States Air Force
Mr. Samuel S. Rockwell, United States Air Force
Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton, The Joint Staff
Colonel Samuel M. Lansing, The Joint Staff
Captain Ray E. Malpass, USN, The Joint Staff

Richard D. Drain

Secretary

Approval of Minutes

(IAC–M–149, 28 April)

Action:

Approved.

Progress Report, Ad Hoc Committee (Watch)

(IAC–D–6/1 (Revised) 26

April 1954)

Action:

Approved the ad hoc committee’s recommendations as

follows:

a. The Terms of Reference (attachment 1)

were approved as

amended, subject to final concurrence by the FBI member before is-
suance as DCID 1/2.

b. Implementation of the Terms of Reference and activation of the

Indications Center (see attachment 2) should be effected on 1 July 1954
or earlier if practicable.

c. The Ad Hoc IAC Committee (Watch) should continue in exis-

tence at least until activation of the Indications Center, should continue
supervision of the preparation of the Indications Intelligence Plan (see
attachment 3), should prepare for the convening of the proposed con-
ference to systematize and coordinate collection of indications infor-
mation and intelligence, and should continue its examination of rele-
vant systems, procedures, and channels. The ad hoc committee, in its
continuing examination of channels for transmission of warning, was
asked to develop procedures to insure timely alerting of IAC members,
IAC agencies, and other appropriate Government bodies.

Discussion:

Mr. Dulles stressed the great importance of adequately

performing the watch function, as exemplified by its recognition in

The Intelligence Community 491

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Not printed.

Not found.

Attachments 1–3 were not found.

Document 179.

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176. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, May 4, 1954.

SUBJECT

Meeting in Office of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Tuesday, 4 May
1954, with Admiral Radford; Mr. Amory, and General Bull were present with the
DCI and Rear Admiral Layton, General Porter, and two other officers were also
present

1. In the meeting which started at 3 P. M., Mr. Dulles explained

his purpose by stating that he was hopeful that the Director of Central
Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff could by ex-
changing views come to an agreement on the proposal for proper “Or-
ganizational Arrangements for Continental Defense.”

2. Mr. Dulles noted the divergence of judgments between the Joint

Chiefs of Staff and others on one side, and CIA and others on the other
side as indicated in the two solutions (alternatives A and B of para. 9
to NSC Action 873–d)

recommended in papers relating to the “Net ca-

pabilities of the USSR to inflict damage on the US,” which is now up
for resolution by the NSC. He felt that this discussion today could clear
up some misapprehension and lead to an agreed view.

3. Mr. Dulles explained that there was a dual responsibility shared

equally by the Director of CIA and the JCS for advising the NSC on
the intelligence and operational features respectively of an appraisal of
the net capabilities of the USSR to inflict direct injury on the US. He
noted that other agencies would have responsibility also but only in
limited areas requiring only part time participation to the extent nec-
essary to insure that their responsibilities are fully met but not to the
extent requiring a disclosure of war plans, or the extensive use of other
highly secret documents. He emphasized also that CIA participation
would be on a very limited high level basis, and that the few CIA rep-
resentatives involved would be professional men who could be trusted
to protect all information made available to them. He did not expect
that revelation of war plans as such would be found necessary but that
operational information would be required. He pointed out that he
could not carry out his full responsibility as DCI without such knowl-
edge of our own capabilities.

The Intelligence Community 493

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence,

Job 80–R01440R, Box 3. Secret. Drafted by General Bull on May 27. Amory wrote
“Concur” followed by his signature below General Bull’s initials at the end of the
memorandum.

See footnote 2, Document 173.

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4. Admiral Radford replied that he frankly didn’t understand why

there was any necessity for this high level organization to make a com-
manders estimate. He felt that if CIA made its coordinated intelligence
estimate, the JCS and the Defense Department were, with this estimate
available, competent to do the rest of the evaluation for the NSC and
the President, based on their own knowledge of and responsibility for
operational matters and war plans. He saw no need for setting up an-
other coordinating agency. He didn’t see this need as recently carried
out in the Continental Defense field.

5. General Bull pointed out that a single intelligence estimate of

gross capabilities was not the final word on intelligence—that it was
necessary to work by phases in a process of comparing gross intelli-
gence estimates with our operational capabilities. This procedure
would result in new intelligence estimates based on a knowledge of
our own strengths and dispositions such as the Kremlin is believed to
have to guide its decisions. This knowledge is not now available to our
own national intelligence agency. Such a procedure for comparing ca-
pabilities on both sides, we believe, is essential and is a shared re-
sponsibility of DCI and Defense.

6. Mr. Dulles again emphasized that he did not want to pry into

those areas of classified information not essential to carrying out his
responsibility and stated that although the NSC planning for develop-
ing the net evaluation was stated as urgent he would not press for ac-
tion at the next NSC meeting pending further consideration by Admi-
ral Radford.

7. Mr. Amory called Admiral Radford’s attention to the fact that

since no defense can be perfect, there will always be a portion of any
major attacking force that will get through. This hostile force, repre-
senting the remaining net capability of the enemy at that time, retains
a capability for attack. It continues to be the Director’s responsibility
to evaluate this capability as it was his responsibility before and dur-
ing the operation.

8. In response to Admiral Radford’s expressed desire to give it

more thought, the Director, in leaving, stated he would be pleased to
discuss the problem further and felt sure they could work it out.

H. R. B.

494 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

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177. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Continental

Defense Committee (Bull) to Director of Central
Intelligence Dulles

Washington, May 5, 1954.

SUBJECT

Net Evaluation Procedures

1. In addition to the point that we have been making that the DCI

has a

legal responsibility

to advise the Commander (and his NSC) on his

intelligence estimates of both gross and net capabilities, probable in-
tentions and probable courses of action, there are much more potent
arguments in favor of joint intelligence operational consideration as
follows:

a. Admiral Radford and others infer that all they need is the nor-

mal estimate of

gross capabilities

which they in the Defense Department

can then use in working out the net capabilities. This view is not only
an oversimplification of the problem but it puts the Director in the po-
sition of abdicating his responsibilities for estimating for “The Com-
mander” the Bloc’s probable

intentions and probable courses of action.

This

the Director

cannot do

in a satisfactory and useful manner in a vacuum,

excluded from knowledge

of our

own deployments

and our

own capabilities.

If the Director’s estimates are done in this manner he is asked to esti-
mate the thinking of the Kremlin leaders which is based on their in-
telligence of our capabilities which they most certainly know in great
detail, whereas the Director in his estimate is permitted to have no such
comparable knowledge. The Director’s knowledge of US and allied ca-
pabilities and dispositions must be at least comparable to the intelli-
gence possessed by the Kremlin leadership. To think, as I believe Ad-
miral Radford and the military in general do, that the Commander’s
estimate is made by G–3 after receiving a G–2 contribution overlooks
the sound procedures which govern all good staff operations in the
G–2/G–3 field.

b. No G–2 makes his estimates of enemy capabilities, probable

courses of action, or probable intentions or advises his Commander in
an operational vacuum. By the closest hour by hour contact and joint
daily or more frequent briefings, he is always able to make his estimate
of probable hostile courses of action based on not only the enemy new

The Intelligence Community 495

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence,

Job 80–R0440R, Box 3. Secret. The typed words “Condensed by Robert Amory, Jr.”
(with Amory’s handwritten initials) appear below Bull’s signature at the end of the
memorandum.

1363_A35-A40.qxd 9/28/07 9:33 AM Page 495

capabilities in manpower, weapons, organization, training, leadership,
dispositions, etc. but also from his estimate of what the enemy proba-
bly knows concerning our own strengths, dispositions and intentions.

c. The Director as our National G–2 should have the same rights

and duties as any G–2 in the lower echelons has. Otherwise he cannot
fulfill his legal responsibilities.

2. Although I recognize that a case can be made that the “national

level” presents different problems with a justified restriction on reve-
lation of war plans, certain planned courses of action, certain disposi-
tions, weapons development, etc. should be made available to DCI and
IAC on a very strict “need-to-know” basis, I believe a clear definition
of intelligence requirements in the operational field could be worked
out jointly and I doubt that a knowledge of detailed war plans would
be necessary. In general, DCI should get only operational information
which it is reasonable to expect the enemy to have in whole or in part.

We have no present mechanism to meet our minimum needs. We

are blocked by self imposed departmental restrictions or ground rules
which severely limit our intelligence investigation of our own force—
a handicap not imposed on our enemies.

3. I want to point out also from my experience a real stumbling

block in getting Defense to accept our proposal. That is, the broaden-
ing of the responsible group to include other agencies such as IIC and
ICIS who have a similar justification for full responsibility in their more
limited field—hostile attack on the Continental US by Soviet agents.
Their exclusion from overall responsibility can be justified on practical
grounds only but I think it must be done to make the joint effort work.
I think it might be acceptable to insure them the right and duty to be
heard at appropriate times and to comment on the final report or at
least segments thereof that bear in any way on their responsible inter-
ests. I believe you should support the probable Defense Department
desire to exclude them but to do so on a practical basis related to their
total lack of

responsibility

in the fields of foreign intelligence and for-

eign deployments and war plans which quite rightly should be kept
on a strict “need-to-know”. They will resist as we have but I believe
the exclusion can be justified on grounds acceptable to the NSC.

H.R. Bull

496 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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179. Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 1/2

Washington, May 11, 1954.

TERMS OF REFERENCE, WATCH COMMITTEE OF THE IAC

Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 6, NSCID No. 1,

and

paragraph 10,a,(1) of NSC 162/2,

approved by the President on 30 Oc-

tober 1953, the following terms of reference for the Watch Committee
of the IAC are hereby established:

Preamble

The Soviet/Communist bloc, as a potential aggressor, has the ca-

pability to initiate suddenly at any time and in a place and by meth-
ods of its own choosing, hostile action

in such strength as to gravely

threaten the security of the United States. The mission of providing
earliest possible warning of hostile action will be undertaken by the
IAC agencies, within the scope of their responsibilities, as of the high-
est priority. The proper discharge of this mission depends upon the
carrying out of complementary watch and estimating functions.

A. Name

Watch Committee of the IAC

B. Mission

To provide earliest possible warning to the United States Govern-

ment of hostile action by the USSR, or its allies, which endangers the
security of the United States.

C. Functions

1. To develop and operate on a current and continuing basis an

intelligence plan for the levying upon IAC members, and the request-
ing from other U.S. agencies through appropriate channels, of the in-
telligence requirements necessary to provide the maximum degree of
advance warning and for recommending the collection priorities of
these requirements.

2. To analyze and evaluate information and intelligence, both cur-

rent and cumulative, on an all-source basis, furnished by the IAC agen-

498 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66 D 148, Misc. NSC Memos.

Secret. NSC Executive Secretary Lay circulated this directive under cover of a memo-
randum to the National Security Council dated June 1.

Document 255.

Text in

Foreign Relations,

1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, p. 577–597.

Aggressive action by armed forces, or by organizations or individuals in support

of military strategy. [Footnote in the original.]

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cies relating to the imminence of hostilities, and to develop therefrom
the conclusions as to indications of:

a. Soviet/Communist intentions to initiate hostilities against

1 the continental United States, U.S. possessions, or U.S. forces

abroad,

2 U.S. allies or their forces,

3 areas peripheral to the Soviet Orbit.

b. any other development, actual or potential, susceptible of di-

rect exploitation by Soviet/Communist hostile action which would
jeopardize the security of the United States.

3. To report promptly their conclusions, together with significant

indications, to the principals of the IAC and other appropriate recipi-
ents. In the event of an impending critical situation, IAC principals will
be immediately advised after which the provisions of paragraph 6,
NSCID No. 1, will apply.

4. To make recommendations to the IAC, or member agencies

thereof, including such divergent views as may be recorded.

5. The Watch Committee shall avoid duplicating IAC estimative

functions.

D. Composition and Organization

1. The Watch Committee will be composed of a Senior Officer rep-

resenting each IAC member organization, one of whom will be desig-
nated by the DCI, after consultation with the IAC, as Chairman for a
specified period. The Committee will be supported by an Indications
Center, headed by a Director to be provided by CIA and consisting of
an administrative Secretariat and an Indications Group.

[Omitted here is an organizational chart of the Watch Committee.]
2. The Watch Committee will meet on a regular schedule as de-

termined by the Committee and on special occasions when requested
by one or more of its members or their principals.

E. Duties and Responsibilities

The Watch Committee shall discharge, or direct the Indications

Center in the discharge of, the below-listed duties and responsibilities.

1. Develop and operate on a current and continuing basis the

Watch Committee Intelligence Plan for systematizing, energizing, and
coordinating through appropriate channels the world-wide collection
by U.S. agencies of information and intelligence pertinent to the Watch
Committee mission.

2. Arrange through the IAC or the appropriate member thereof

for exploitation of every domestic and foreign source of information
and intelligence pertinent to the Watch Committee mission; and, among
other actions, arrange, at appropriate times, that representatives of IAC

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field intelligence activities confer with the IAC and the Watch Com-
mittee in order effectively to coordinate, but not direct, field intelli-
gence activities with the activities of the Watch Committee.

3. Arrange with the IAC agencies for a systematic screening of all

information and intelligence received by them by any means for the
purpose of immediately extracting and forwarding to the Indications
Center all items which may contain indications of Soviet/Communist
intentions as set forth in C, 2 above (this procedure is in addition to
the action called for in paragraph 6 of NSCID No. 1); an agency eval-
uation, where appropriate, will be forwarded as soon as possible.

4. Members will maintain close and intimate liaison with their re-

spective parent agencies to assist them in ensuring that all pertinent
information and intelligence is being made available to the Indications
Center.

5. Continuously screen all pertinent information and intelligence

received from all IAC agencies for indications relating to the Watch
Committee mission.

6. Develop promptly an early evaluation and analysis of each indi-

cation in coordination with the intelligence agency or agencies best qual-
ified to deal with the field of intelligence to which the indication belongs.

7. Coordinate with the individual members of the Watch Com-

mittee the selection of indications for consideration by the Committee
in regular and special meetings.

8. Prepare material for use by the Watch Committee to assist in its

deliberations and the formulation of its conclusions.

9. Coordinate the reproduction and dissemination of approved

Watch Committee reports.

10. Maintain in readily usable form a complete and integrated file

of all available information and intelligence pertinent to the Watch
Committee mission.

11. Maintain wall maps, charts and other display material which

will most effectively assist in illustrating and interpreting graphically
the current and cumulative indications.

12. Concurrently, but not as a substitute for current methods of

analysis and evaluation, develop and test (with outside assistance if de-
sirable) the application of mechanical aids and techniques to the problem
on an experimental basis with a view to their eventual use in assisting
effectively the Watch Committee in the accomplishment of its mission.

13. Perform such additional tasks as shall be required by the IAC

in the discharge of the Watch Committee mission.

500 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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Printed from an unsigned copy.

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180. Memorandum From the Chief of the International

Organizations Division, Central Intelligence Agency (Brader)
to the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence
Agency (Wisner)

Washington, May 14, 1954.

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Direc-

tor for Operations, Job 79–01228A, Box 24. Secret. 2 pages not
declassified.]

181. Paper Prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board

Washington, May 14, 1954.

PRINCIPLES TO ASSURE COORDINATION

OF GRAY ACTIVITIES

1. Purpose

1.1 To assure coordination of information (which term as used in

this paper includes propaganda and other related activities) unattrib-
uted to the U.S. Government, the National Security Council, in NSC
165/1,

dated 24 October 1953:

a. Authorized the U.S. Information Agency, when considered ad-

visable, and except in the case of operations of the Voice of America,

to communicate with other peoples without attribution to the U.S. Gov-

ernment on matters for which attribution could be assumed by the Gov-

ernment if necessary, and

b. Directed that the Operations Coordinating Board agree upon

principles which will govern such unattributed activities (hereinafter

such activities are included in the definition of gray).

These principles, having been agreed upon by the OCB, are pub-

lished herewith for the guidance of officials concerned.

1.2 The intent of this paper is to underline the need for field

coordination, to insure that all information activities are conducted

The Intelligence Community 501

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff, Job 83–00036R, Box 5. Secret.

OCB Executive Officer Staats circulated this paper to the Operations Coordinating Board
by memorandum on May 18. (Ibid.)

Entitled “Mission of USIA”; text in

Foreign Relations,

1952–1954, vol. II, Part 2,

pp. 1752–1754.

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securely and effectively, to prevent duplication and to avoid embar-
rassment to the U.S. Government. Responsibilities in the white and
black fields are clearly established, but in the gray field responsibility
has been assigned to more than one agency. Therefore, this paper con-
cerns itself primarily with the criteria to use in determining whether
USIA or the Department of State or the OCB designee will undertake
a particular gray activity. Thus to carry out fully the intent of this pa-
per, there must be close liaison in the field among representatives of
the agencies concerned so that each item of gray activity will be con-
sidered in light of:

a. The assignments of responsibility and the criteria set forth in

Paragraph 3.

b. The merits of the case, assets available, and other considera-

tions which may apply locally.

1.3 Chiefs of Diplomatic Missions or Principal Officers (the rank-

ing State Department official at a subordinate post) have the overall re-
sponsibility for insuring that field coordination at all posts for which
they have supervisory responsibility is satisfactory (Paragraph 4.2).
Moreover, State and USIA both at headquarters and in the field will be
responsible for initiating liaison with the OCB designee concerning their
respective gray activities, so that the latter knows of existing or con-
templated activities and can preserve the security of its own activities.

2. Definitions

For the purpose of this paper, the following definitions of terms

are used in describing both the content of information and the type of
activity.

White

Acknowledged as an official statement or act of the U.S.
Government, or emanates from a source associated closely
enough with the U.S. Government to reflect an official view-
point. The information is true and factual. It also includes
all output identified as coming from U.S. official sources.

Gray

The true source (U.S. Government) is not revealed
to the target audience. The activity engaged in plausibly
appears to emanate from a non-official American source,
or an indigenous, non-hostile source, or there may be no
attribution.

Gray is that information whose content is

such that the effect will be increased if the hand of the
U.S. Government and in some cases any American partic-

502 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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In areas where activity is conducted without any attribution and it may result in

embarrassment to an agency of the U.S. Government, liaison officers will carefully weigh
all aspects of the proposed activity before deciding whether such an operation should
be undertaken. [Footnote in the original.]

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ipation are not revealed. It is simply a means for the
U.S. to present viewpoints which are in the interest of
U.S. foreign policy, but which will be acceptable or more
acceptable to the intended target audience than will an of-
ficial government statement.

Black

The activity engaged in appears to emanate from a
source (government, party, group, organization, person)
usually hostile in nature. The interest of the U.S. Govern-
ment is concealed and the U.S. Government would deny
responsibility. The content may be partially or completely
fabricated, but that which is fabricated is made to appear
credible to the target audience. Black activity is also usually
designed to cause embarrassment to the ostensible source
or to force the ostensible source to take action against its
will.

3. Responsibility for Operations

3.1 Since the responsibility is assigned for gray activity to more

than one agency, liaison officers in the field, and in Washington when-
ever necessary, must determine which agency will undertake an ac-
tivity. The inherent risk must be assessed by means of criteria set forth
in Paragraph 3.4, bearing in mind that activities in which USIA or State
engage must be those which the U.S. Government could acknowledge
if necessary.

3.2 Authorized to engage in white activity directed at foreign au-

diences are: The State Department, USIA, the Foreign Operations Ad-
ministration (as assigned in Reorganization Plans 7 and 8) the Defense
Department and other U.S. Government departments and agencies as
necessary.

3.3 Responsibility for engaging in black propaganda and other re-

lated activities is assigned solely to the designee of the OCB. Likewise
it should be kept in mind that activities, either gray or black, conducted
into denied areas from their peripheries, other than radio, are the sole
responsibility of the OCB designee.

3.4 Responsibility for gray is assigned to the OCB designee, USIA

and State. The following criteria will assist in determining the responsi-
bility for the execution of a proposed gray activity. If the answer to any
of the three questions below is affirmative, the activity is the sole re-
sponsibility of the OCB designee. If government interest is not to be re-
vealed but the answer to all three questions listed below is negative, the
activity may fall within the charter of State, USIA or the OCB designee:

a. Would the disclosure of the source occasion serious embar-

rassment to the U.S. Government or to the agencies responsible for the

information activity?

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b. Would the activity or the materials disseminated be seriously

discredited if it were to become known that the U.S. Government were

responsible?

c. Would the outlet be seriously damaged if it were to become

known that the activity is subsidized or otherwise assisted by the

U.S. Government?

3.5 The Department of State and USIA may engage in gray activity

which can be acknowledged by the U.S. Government if necessary, pro-
vided that before a decision or commitment is made, the OCB designee’s
representative, wherever one is stationed, is consulted and his concur-
rence obtained. Concurrence shall be given unless the OCB designee is
of the opinion that a proposed operation will jeopardize its activities or
established mechanisms, or does not comply with the criteria in 3.4. In
giving its concurrence the OCB designee is not assuming responsibility
for the successful completion of an activity conducted by another agency.
Necessary coordination between State and USIA and the OCB designee
will be undertaken through liaison channels described in paragraph 4.
Wherever the OCB designee has no such representative approval of the
Chief of Diplomatic Mission or Principal Officer will be obtained.

4. Machinery for Application of the Criteria

4.1 The coordination required for application of the criteria stated

in Paragraph 3.4 is to be achieved by creation and use of appropriate
liaison arrangements in the field and in Washington.

4.2 The Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, the Direc-

tor of USIA and the designee of the OCB will each designate mutually
acceptable points of contact in selected missions for field coordination.
In any case in which an agency authorized to engage in gray activities
proposes to use the personnel or facilities of the Department of De-
fense abroad, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Oper-
ations) will designate a mutually acceptable point of contact at the ap-
propriate location. Responsibility is vested in the Chiefs of Diplomatic
Missions or Principal Officers for insuring that field coordination at all
posts for which they have supervisory responsibility is adequate, that
criteria are correctly applied, and that decisions are within the frame-
work of national policy.

4.3 Coordination in Washington, to supplement that in the field,

is the responsibility of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Af-
fairs and the Director of USIA. They will be responsible for initiating
appropriate liaison arrangements and clearances within and between
their respective departments and with the designee of the OCB.

4.4 Whenever deemed necessary by the Assistant Secretary of

State for Public Affairs, the Director of USIA and the OCB designee,
representatives of other United States Agencies engaged in informa-
tion activities abroad will be included in such coordination machinery.

504 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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In any case in which an agency authorized to engage in gray activities
proposes to use the personnel or facilities of the Department of De-
fense abroad, the representative of that Department designated pur-
suant to paragraph 4.2 shall be informed of the nature of the activity.

4.5 Whenever the field representatives of the agencies herein con-

cerned are unable to reach an agreement as to which agency will un-
dertake a gray project, the matter will be referred to Washington for ad-
vice and decision by the appropriate representatives of the agencies
involved. Communications from the field on such matters will be via the
channels of the OCB designee whenever the OCB designee is mentioned.

4.6 The designated liaison officers at each station in the field will

meet at the earliest practicable date to review all gray operations of
State and USIA which are currently functioning, and apply the criteria
herein described to determine if they should be continued, transferred
to the OCB designee, or terminated.

182. Draft National Security Council Directive

NSC 5423

Washington, June 23, 1954.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVE FOR A NET

CAPABILITIES EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE

1. Pursuant to authorization of the President there is hereby di-

rected the preparation of a report assessing the net capabilities of the
USSR, in the event of general war, to inflict direct injury upon the con-
tinental United States and key U.S. installations overseas. This net ca-
pabilities report will cover the period through July 1, 1957 and should
be submitted to the Council on or before November 1, 1954. It will
cover all types of attack, direct or clandestine, and will deal primarily
with the initial phases of war, i.e., the period during which all or most
of the Soviet stockpile of nuclear weapons might be expended. It will

The Intelligence Community 505

Source: National Archives, RG 273, NSC Policy Papers, NSC 5432, Box 32. Top

Secret. The draft was circulated to the National Security Council under cover of a June
23 note from NSC Executive Secretary Lay. The draft was approved by the President on
June 24. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, Annotated List of In-
dividual NSC Papers) NSC 5423 superseded NSC 140. For documentation on the NSC
140 series, see

Foreign Relations,

1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, pp. 205–208, 328–349, 355–360,

368–370, and ibid., Part 2, 1177–1178. For a CIA view of the evolution of Net Capabili-
ties Estimates, see Document 189.

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include consideration of the several courses of action which the USSR
is capable of executing and in support of which the Soviet nuclear
weapons stockpile might be expended. In determining the net effect of
an attack, the report will take into account the mid-1957 status of
presently approved defense programs.

2. In order to carry out this directive, there is hereby established a

Net Capabilities Evaluation Subcommittee of the NSC composed of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence,
and the following members for the specific purposes noted below:

a. The Chairman of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

and the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Se-
curity for matters relating to internal security;

b. The Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, for matters relat-

ing to continuity of government, sufficiency and continuity of indus-
try, and urban vulnerability;

c. The Federal Civil Defense Administrator for matters relating to

civil defense;

d. The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, for matters relat-

ing to Atomic Energy Commission activities.

3. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will serve as Chair-

man of the Net Capabilities Evaluation Subcommittee. The Subcom-
mittee will have a temporary staff, composed of individuals assigned
by the participating agencies and headed by a Director chosen by the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intel-
ligence. It is expected that members of this staff will be assigned to this
project as their primary duty during the period of preparation of the
net capabilities report.

4. The functions of the Net Capabilities Evaluation Subcommittee

will include:

a. Responsibility for the security of the project during the period

of preparation of the report.

b. General supervision of the project at all stages including:

(1) Preparation of subsidiary terms of reference as a guide for pre-

liminary reports on selected factors essential to the assessment, these

preliminary reports to be contributed to the project by the various agen-

cies concerned.

(2) Preparation of planning or intelligence assumptions to be used

as a basis for preliminary reports by the various agencies.

(3) Review of preliminary reports contributed and issuance of re-

quests for reconsideration or amplification.

(4) Examination of data used in preparation of preliminary reports

as necessary and provided that war plans and intelligence sources and

methods are not unnecessarily disclosed.

(5) Decisions concerning handling and distribution of preliminary

reports and data contributed by the various agencies.

506 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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c. Preparation of intermediate working papers as required.
d. Preparation and submission of the final report for considera-

tion by the NSC.

5. The National Security Council staff will furnish an Executive Sec-

retary for the Subcommittee. The agencies participating in the work of
the Subcommittee are hereby requested to furnish appropriate adminis-
trative services. All personnel participating in the work of the Subcom-
mittee will have appropriate security clearances and will be instructed
in whatever special security measures the Subcommittee adopts.

6. The Net Capabilities Evaluation Subcommittee hereby estab-

lished is empowered under the terms of this directive to call on any
agency of the government for relevant information, evaluations, and
estimates, subject only to establishment of appropriate security
arrangements and careful limitation of access to highly sensitive ma-
terial so that there will not be any unnecessary disclosure of war plans
or intelligence sources and methods.

7. Distribution of the final report of the Subcommittee will be de-

termined by the President.

183. Report by the Operations Coordinating Board

Washington, July 21, 1954.

REPORT ON NSC 59/1

AND NSC 127/1

1. NSC 59/1, “The Foreign Information Program and Psycholog-

ical Warfare Planning,” approved by the President March 19, 1950, has
been largely superseded by subsequent directives, notably: Reorgani-
zation Plan No. 8,

which established the United States Information

Agency; the President’s letter of June 1, 1953, to heads of Executive

The Intelligence Community 507

Source: National Archives, RG 273, National Security Council Files, NSC 127/1.

Secret. Attached to the report is OCB Acting Executive Officer George Morgan’s July 22
covering memorandum to NSC Executive Secretary Lay, which indicated that the Op-
erations Coordinating Board approved the report on July 21. The report was forwarded
to the National Security Council under cover of a July 23 memorandum from NSC Ex-
ecutive Secretary Lay. (Ibid.)

Document 2.

See Document 123.

See

Foreign Relations,

1952–1954, vol. II, Part 2, pp. 1709–1711.

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Departments;

and Executive Order No. 10483,

which established the Op-

erations Coordinating Board. The functions of the Psychological Opera-
tions Coordinating Committee, established pursuant to NSC 59/1, were
transferred by the President by a special memorandum to the NSC dated
September 3, 1953,

to the Operations Coordinating Board. The POCC has

been discontinued as a separate coordinating arrangement. OCB arrange-
ments for former POCC functions are described in Annex “A”.

2. The OCB has noted with approval certain interagency relation-

ships and arrangements as indicated in Annex “A”. It is considered
that these arrangements will serve the requirements of interdepart-
mental coordination of international information activities until such
time and under such conditions of hostilities as the President may oth-
erwise direct. In the event that the NSC in its consideration of over-all
policy and organizational arrangements with respect to prescribed the-
aters of war determines that an information and psychological warfare
arrangement may be required different from that set forth in Annex
“A”, the OCB when directed by the NSC, will develop specific recom-
mendations for its consideration.

3. NSC 127/1, approved by the National Security Council on July

24, 1952, NSC Action No. 657, concurred in a plan for conducting psy-
chological operations during general hostilities submitted by the Psy-
chological Strategy Board, subject to two modifications:

a. Overt information facilities and personnel in military theaters

of operations were to be made available to the U.S. military commander
designated by the JCS during a period of hostilities. Determination of
the facilities and personnel so transferred and their later return were
to be coordinated by the Psychological Strategy Board.

b. Subsequently, the responsibility for the determination was

placed upon the organization established pursuant to NSC 59/1.

4. The President approved NSC 127/1 as a basis for emergency

planning related to sudden general hostilities and directed that sub-
sidiary plans and measures should provide maximum flexibility for the
President in determining the ultimate organization required for full
scale general hostilities.

5. NSC 127/1 was designed for a period of full mobilization or

general hostilities and therefore did not apply to the hostilities in Ko-
rea. Subsequent to the approval of NSC 127/1, the President on March
12, 1953 assigned responsibility to the ODM and the Bureau of the

508 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Text in

Public Papers: Eisenhower, 1953,

pp. 351–354.

Document 157.

The memorandum is dated September 2; see Document 158.

Entitled “Interagency Liaison with U.S. Information Agency,” dated June 28. Not

printed.

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Budget, under the coordination of the President’s Advisory Commit-
tee on Reorganization, for the development of a plan of organization
for full mobilization required for general hostilities. No specific plan
related to information and psychological warfare activities has yet been
developed. The OCB apparently has no responsibility under NSC 127/1
for any aspects of this planning.

6. A PSB contingency plan, D–11b, “National Overt Propaganda Pol-

icy Guidance for General War,”

is still in effect and will continue to be

utilized as appropriate. The OCB will refer it for revision or other dis-
posal by the appropriate authority as indicated by the plan of organiza-
tion for full mobilization (par. 5 above) when provisions for information
and psychological warfare activities have been developed and approved.

Recommendation

It is recommended:
7. That the NSC, recognizing that the organizational aspects of

NSC 59/1 and NSC 127/1 are obsolete, rescind these papers without
prejudice to the principles of operation and the responsibilities of de-
partments and agencies to engage in psychological warfare and psy-
chological warfare planning enunciated therein or elsewhere.

8. That the NSC note that the OCB serves as the body for dealing

with requirements for interdepartmental coordination concerning over-
seas information and psychological warfare activities in carrying out
NSC assignments or upon specific request by participating depart-
ments and agencies.

9. That the NSC note that the OCB developed, on an urgent ba-

sis, a detailed contingency plan for information and psychological war-
fare activities in Indochina and that the OCB will not develop any fur-
ther detailed subsidiary plans of this type for designated areas unless
so directed by the NSC.

Not found.

184. Editorial Note

In July 1953 Congress created the Commission on the Organization

of the Executive Branch of the Government to look into the organization
of the Executive Branch and report back to the Congress. (P.L. 108, ap-
proved July 10, 1953; 67 Stat. 142) On July 24, 1953, President Eisenhower
named former President Herbert Hoover as chairman of the commis-
sion. (

Public Papers: Eisenhower, 1953,

page 516) The Hoover Commission,

The Intelligence Community 509

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as it was called, delegated a small sub-group, or task force, under Gen-
eral Mark W. Clark to review the relationship of the intelligence or-
ganizations to the executive.

President Eisenhower, wanting a separate report on the CIA’s Di-

rectorate of Plans to be presented to him personally and not to Con-
gress, asked General James H. Doolittle to conduct a special study. See
Document 185. For the Doolittle report, see Document 192.

The Doolittle report was made available to General Clark’s task

force, which completed classified and unclassified reports in May 1955.
A May 4, 1955, memorandum from the Secretary of State’s Acting
Special Assistant for Intelligence and Research Fisher Howe to Under
Secretary of State Hoover described the work of the Clark task force,
its members’ contacts with Department of State officials, and the
Department’s views on areas needing improvement. (National
Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1955–60, 711.5200/5–455) The classified
version of the Clark report is Document 220; the unclassified version
is Document 221.

185. Letter From President Eisenhower to General James H.

Doolittle

Washington, July 26, 1954.

Panel of Consultants on Covert Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency

Dear General Doolittle:

I have requested you, and you have agreed, to act as Chairman of

a panel of consultants to conduct a study of the covert activities of the
Central Intelligence Agency. With your concurrence I have invited
Messrs. William B. Franke, Morris Hadley, and William Pawley to act
with you as members of the panel. Mr. S. Paul Johnston has kindly
agreed to serve as Executive Director of the panel.

It is my desire that the Panel of Consultants should undertake a

comprehensive study of the covert activities of the Central Intelligence
Agency, in particular those carried out under the terms of NSCID #5

510 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: Eisenhower Library, Administration Series. Secret.

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of August 28, 1951,

and NSC 5412 of March 15, 1954.

You will con-

sider the personnel factors, the security, the adequacy, the efficacy and
the relative costs of these operations and, as far as possible, equate the
cost of the over-all efforts to the results achieved. You will make any
recommendations calculated to improve the conduct of these opera-
tions. To the extent that agencies of the Government, other than the
Central Intelligence Agency, are engaged in covert operations which
may parallel, duplicate, or supplement the operations of CIA, you may
investigate such other operations conducted by any other department
or agency of the Government in order to insure, insofar as practicable,
that the field of foreign clandestine operations is adequately covered
and that there is no unnecessary duplication of effort or expense.

In view of the particularly sensitive nature of these covert opera-

tions, their relation to the conduct of our foreign policy, and the fact
that these sensitive operations are carried on pursuant to National Se-
curity Council action approved by me, I desire that your report be made
to me personally and classified Top Secret. I will determine whether or
not the report or any part thereof should have any further dissemina-
tion. I should appreciate it if your report could be available to me prior
to October 1, 1954.

As you know, the Commission on Organization of the Executive

Branch of the Government, generally known as the Hoover Commis-
sion, is constituting a Task Force to study and make recommendations
with respect to the organization and methods of operations of the CIA.

General Mark W. Clark has been designated by Mr. Hoover to head
this Task Force which, I understand, will probably be organized and
start its work sometime in September next. Under the law constituting
the Hoover Commission, the Task Force shall study and investigate the
present organization and methods of operation of the Agency to de-
termine what changes therein are necessary to accomplish the policy
of Congress to promote economy, efficiency, and improved service by:

a. recommending methods and procedures for reducing expendi-

tures to the lowest amount consistent with the efficient performance of

essential services, activities and functions;

b. eliminating duplication and overlapping of services, activities,

and functions;

c. consolidating services, activities, and functions of a similar nature;

d. abolishing services, activities, and functions not necessary to

the efficient conduct of Government;

e. eliminating nonessential services, functions, and activities

which are competitive with private enterprise;

f. defining responsibilities of officials; and

The Intelligence Community 511

Document 255.

Document 171.

See Documents 184, 220, and 221.

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g. relocating agencies now responsible directly to the President in

departments or other agencies.

As the work of the Hoover Task Force will get under way shortly,

I suggest that you and General Clark confer in order to avoid any un-
necessary duplication of work as between you. The distinction between
the work of your Study Group and of the Hoover Task Force is this:

You will deal with the covert activities of the CIA as indicated in

paragraph (2) above, and your report will be submitted to me. General

Clark’s Task Force will deal largely with the organization and meth-

ods of operation of the CIA and other related agencies within the lim-

its prescribed in the law as outlined in paragraph (4) above. Reports

of the Hoover Commission are made to the Congress.

The purpose of these studies, both that of the Hoover Task Force

and that of your Group, is to insure that the United States Government
develops an appropriate mechanism for carrying out its over-all intel-
ligence responsibilities and the related covert operations. I consider
these operations are essential to our national security in these days
when international Communism is aggressively pressing its world-
wide subversive program.

Sincerely,

Printed from an unsigned copy.

186. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of

Defense Wilson

Washington, August 3, 1954.

SUBJECT

Information and Recommendation Concerning Warning Facilities of the
Intelligence Community

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have been informed that the Director of

Central Intelligence has submitted a memorandum to the National

512 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 62 D 1. Secret. A covering mem-

orandum from NSC Executive Secretary Lay, August 4, forwarded the JCS memoran-
dum to the National Security Council, in connection with discussion of the warning fa-
cilities of the intelligence community at its August 5 meeting. For the discussion at that
meeting, see Document 187.

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Security Council (NSC)

recommending that the President direct all ap-

propriate departments and agencies of the government to keep the In-
telligence Advisory Committee (IAC) Watch Committee informed con-
cerning diplomatic, political, military, or other courses of action by the
United States, contemplated or in process of execution, which might bring
about military reaction or early hostile action by the USSR, or its allies,
endangering the security of the United States. The Director of Central
Intelligence further recommends that all information and intelligence
pertinent to its mission, without restriction because of source, policy or
operational sensitivity, be made available to the Watch Committee.

2. The directive recommended by the Director of Central Intelli-

gence is not interpreted to mean that either the Watch Committee or
the National Indications Center (NIC) will be furnished U.S. War Plans
because under the present policy the United States will not initiate hos-
tilities with the USSR or its allies.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that this directive will make

available to the Watch Committee information on operations of a very
sensitive nature that should be strictly maintained in a “need-to-know”
status to reduce danger of disclosure to a minimum. However, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff consider that knowledge of such sensitive operations must
be provided the Watch Committee if it is to carry out its mission of pro-
viding early warning to the United States of hostile action by the USSR,
or its allies, which endangers the security of the United States. Therefore,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Secretary of Defense support
the recommendation of the Director of Central Intelligence in principle.

4. The method recommended by the Director of Central Intelli-

gence by which the information is transmitted to the Watch Commit-
tee and its subordinate organization, the National Indications Center,
and the handling of such information by that Committee and Center
thereafter requires clarification to make it more precise. Also, to ensure
that the Services will not be expected to furnish the Watch Committee
with a myriad of small details of operations, the transmission and han-
dling of which would overload the Service organizations as well as the
NIC, it is considered that the governmental departments and agencies
should be required to furnish the NIC only with the information which
they believe to be of sufficient importance to cause military reaction or
early hostile action by the USSR, or its allies.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore recommend that you support

the recommendations of the Director of Central Intelligence as modi-
fied by the changes below (changes to the Director of Central Intelli-
gence recommendations indicated in the usual manner):

The Intelligence Community 513

Dated July 22. A copy of DCID 1/2 is attached. (National Archives, RG 273, Of-

ficial Minutes, 1947–1961, 209th Meeting, Box 42)

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“Ask the Council to recommend that the President direct all ap-

propriate departments and agencies of the Government:

“a. To keep the IAC Watch Committee (as established by DCID 1/2)

informed, through arrangements with the Director, National Indications

Center, on behalf of the Chairman of the Watch Committee, concerning

diplomatic, political, military, or other courses of action by the U.S., con-

templated

approved for immediate implementation

or in process of execu-

tion, which

they believe to be of sufficient import that it

might bring about

military reaction or early hostile action by the USSR, or its allies,

thus

engandering the security of the U.S.

This information is for the explicit and

express use of the Watch Committee and those members of the NIC who need

to know of it in order to perform their functions.

“b. To make fully available to the IAC Watch Committee through

appropriate arrangements with the Director, National Indications Cen-

ter, on behalf of the Chairman, all information and intelligence perti-

nent to its mission, without restriction because of source, policy or op-

erational sensitivity.”

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff urge that full consideration be given by

the NSC to the need for careful development of the method of transmit-
ting and using this information. They consider that this method should
be developed by the IAC, which is the agency responsible for the Watch
function. Furthermore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it extremely im-
portant that information of action to be taken by the United States not be
transmitted until the action is approved for immediate implementation.
If a directive on this subject should provide otherwise, the strategic plan-
ning of the United States would be given an undesirable dissemination.
To further insure against undesirable dissemination, the recommendation
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff includes a provision that information of an op-
erational nature is for exclusive use within the Watch Committee.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

N. F. Twining

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

514 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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187. Memorandum of Discussion at the 209th Meeting of the

National Security Council

Washington, August 5, 1954.

SUBJECT

Discussion at the 209th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday,
August 5, 1954

Present at the 209th meeting of the Council were the President of

the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States;
the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign
Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobi-
lization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney
General (for Items 1, 2 and 3); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the
Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Items 1 and 2); the Federal
Civil Defense Administrator (for Items 1 and 2); the Chairman, Coun-
cil of Economic Advisers (for Items 1 and 2); the Acting Director, U. S.
Information Agency (for Item 5); the Acting Secretary of the Army, the
Acting Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force (for
Items 1 and 2); General Twining for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
(for Items 1 and 2); the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, the Chief of Naval
Operations, and the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps (for Items 1 and
2); Elbert P. Tuttle, Department of the Treasury; Robert R. Bowie, De-
partment of State; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to
the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; the
Deputy Assistant to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and
the Coordinator, NSC Planning Board Assistants.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the

main points taken.

[Omitted here are agenda Item 1: Review of Past Activities and the Fu-
ture Program of the National Security Council, and Item 2: Guidelines
Under NSC 162/2 for FY 1956 (NSC 5422/1). Agenda Item 2 is printed
in

Foreign Relations,

1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, pp. 700–715.]

The Intelligence Community 515

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only.

Drafted by Marion W. Boggs, Coordinator, NSC Planning Board Assistants, on August 6.

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3. Transmittal of Information and Recommendation for Future Action

Concerning Warning Facilities of the Intelligence Community

(Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated
July 26 and August 4, 1954)

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council on the background of this problem.

Revised CIA recommendations, entitled “Suggested NSC Action, Item
3”, were distributed, and paragraph 2 of this document was read aloud
(copy filed in the minutes of the meeting).

Mr. Allen Dulles said that an effort was being made to improve

the intelligence mechanism for providing early warning of a possible
attack. An indication center was being set up under the Watch Com-
mittee to study all possible items which might alert us to danger. This
center would need to have not only foreign intelligence, but also in-
formation on U.S. policies which might produce hostile reactions in en-
emy countries. Mr. Dulles felt that it would be unwise to adopt the for-
mula suggested by the Defense agencies, to the effect that the Watch
Committee would be kept informed only of those U.S. policies which
in the judgment of the agency passing on the information might bring
about hostile enemy reaction.

The President said the only purpose of these arrangements was to

get the right information to the people who had to study it. He would
not want a lot of inconsequential information to be passed on to the
Watch Committee. He suggested that significant information on U.S.
policies might be transmitted to the Watch Committee.

The Attorney General felt that the CIA recommendations tended

to set up a kind of supervision over the FBI. He requested assurance
that adoption of these recommendations would require no change in
FBI methods or operations. He asked whether CIA was not now re-
ceiving all the information it needed. Mr. Dulles said he did not know,
because he did not know what information was being held back.

The President called attention to paragraph 2-c of the CIA recom-

mendations. He said that decision as to withholding information from
the Watch Committee should be referred to him only if the Director of
Central Intelligence and the other agency involved disagreed. He reit-
erated his desire that the Watch Committee get all the information that
could be of real use to it, and suggested that the CIA recommenda-
tions, as amended at the meeting, be adopted subject to the Director
of Central Intelligence and the Director of the FBI agreeing on edito-
rial changes not affecting the substance.

516 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

See Document 186 and footnotes 1 and 2 thereto.

Not found, but for substance, see NSC Action No. 1195, below.

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The National Security Council:

a. Noted that Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1/2

states

the following mission of the Watch Committee of the Intelligence Ad-
visory Committee:

To provide earliest possible warning to the United States Govern-

ment of hostile action by the USSR, or its allies, which endangers the
security of the United States.

b. Recommended that the President, subject to the Director of Cen-

tral Intelligence and the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
agreeing upon editorial changes not affecting the substance, issue the
following directive to all appropriate departments and agencies of the
Government:

(1) To make fully available to the IAC Watch Committee all sig-

nificant information and intelligence pertinent to its mission and func-
tions (as defined in DCID 1/2), without restriction because of source,
policy or operational sensitivity.

(2) To keep the IAC Watch Committee informed concerning sig-

nificant diplomatic, political, military, or other courses of action by the
U.S., approved for immediate implementation or in process of execu-
tion, which might bring about military reaction or early hostile action
by the USSR, or its allies, thus endangering the security of the U.S. This
information is for the explicit and express use of the Watch Commit-
tee and those members of the NIC who need to know of it in order to
perform their functions.

(3) When, in the opinion of an agency or department, overriding

considerations affecting the national security exist which justify an ex-
ception to (1) or (2) above, the decision as to withholding or delaying
the transmission of the information to the Watch Committee shall be
taken up with the Director of Central Intelligence and, if there is dis-
agreement, referred to the President.

Note:

The action in b above subsequently transmitted to the Di-

rector of Central Intelligence for appropriate action.

[Omitted here is Agenda Item 4: Significant Developments Affecting U.S.
Security.]

The Intelligence Community 517

The following constituted NSC Action No. 1195, August 5. (National Archives,

RG 59, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National
Security Council) The directive adopted in NSC Action 1195–b was subsequently ap-
proved by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the FBI with some ed-
itorial changes that did not affect substance, and by President Eisenhower on Novem-
ber 30. The approved directive was circulated as NSC 5438 of the same date. (National
Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5438)

Document 179.

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5. Coordination of Economic, Psychological and Political Warfare, and

Foreign Information Activities

(NSC Action No. 1183)

Discussion of this question arose in connection with Item 6 be-

low, “The Foreign Information Program and Psychological Warfare
Planning”.

The President recalled that he had previously emphasized the need

for coordination of economic warfare activities (NSC Action No. 1183).
It now seemed to him that his previous idea—that we needed a Di-
rector of Economic Warfare—had been too narrow. Perhaps we needed
a director of unconventional or non-military warfare. Policy decisions
in this field should, of course, be taken by the Council, but we also
need a mechanism for objective study, for digesting information, and
for coordinating implementation. He did not want half a dozen dif-
ferent agencies reporting to the Council on this subject. Perhaps the
Planning Board might be supplemented by a special group to study
this neglected field.

The President then noted that the Bureau of the Budget is now

studying the coordination of economic warfare. He requested the Di-
rector, Bureau of the Budget, to broaden this study to include the plac-
ing of responsibility within the Executive Branch for coordinating eco-
nomic warfare, psychological warfare, political warfare, and foreign
information.

Mr. Cutler said that a large part of the issue in this field revolved

around the question of who would run psychological warfare in the
event of war—the military or State. The President said neither one; in
time of war these operations would have to be conducted under the
general direction of the President.

The National Security Council:

Noted the President’s request that the Bureau of the Budget ex-

pand its study regarding the coordination of economic warfare activi-

ties pursuant to NSC Action No. 1183, to include the placing of re-

sponsibility within the Executive Branch for coordinating economic

warfare, psychological warfare, political warfare, and foreign infor-

mation activities.

Note:

The above action subsequently transmitted to the Director,

Bureau of the Budget.

518 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

In NSC Action No. 1183, taken at its 207th meeting, July 22, the Council noted

the President’s request that the Bureau of the Budget prepare recommendations regard-
ing responsibility for coordination of economic warfare activities. (National Archives,
RG 59, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National
Security Council)

The following constituted NSC Action No. 1197, August 5. (Ibid.)

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6. The Foreign Information Program and Psychological Warfare Planning

(Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated
July 23 and August 4, 1954; NSC 59/1; NSC 127/1)

Mr. Lay briefed the Council on the background of this problem,

calling attention to the OCB recommendations transmitted by the ref-
erence memorandum of July 23, and the views of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum of August 4. Mr. Cut-
ler felt that the President’s request for the study described in the pre-
ceding item did not entirely obviate the need for rescinding NSC 59/1
and NSC 127/1, as recommended by OCB. These papers were antique
wreckage; they were completely out of date and referred to agencies
which no longer existed.

The President said he hesitated to rescind these policies since the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the reference memorandum of August 4, ob-
jected to such a course. He thought we could let this antique wreck-
age stay on the books, even though it was recognized as obsolete, un-
til the Council received a further report on the coordination of
economic, psychological and political warfare.

The National Security Council:

Noted that NSC 59/1 and NSC 127/1 are deemed obsolete, but

deferred further action with respect thereto pending receipt of the study

described in the preceding item.

Marion W. Boggs

The Intelligence Community 519

Lay’s July 23 memorandum transmitted the OCB report, dated July 21 (Document

183). For NSC 59/1, March 9, 1950, see Document 2. For NSC 127/1, see Document 123.

The following constituted NSC Action No. 1198, August 5, 1954. (National

Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) File: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the
National Security Council)

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188. Memorandum From the Deputy Operations Coordinator in

the Office of the Under Secretary of State (Hulick) to the
Under Secretary of State (Hoover)

Washington, August 23, 1954.

SUBJECT

The Doolittle Survey

I have reduced to writing some ideas contained in the attached

memorandum which I thought I might use in briefing the Doolittle
team on covert operations of CIA. I am far from certain, however, in
my own mind, as to whether the two examples I have singled out as
illustrative of where improvement is needed and is actively being
sought are the kind of things you consider as appropriate for the De-
partment to raise before the Doolittle group. I should appreciate re-
ceiving your guidance on this matter.

As to the list of questions, I discussed these with Frank Wisner.

He thought they were appropriate. He was concerned, however, about
the possibility of the Assistant Secretaries striking a critical note, due
to the fact that in some instances operations have been carried out with-
out their knowledge but with a higher clearance from you. He hoped
that in the morning briefing it would be made clear to the survey group
that there have been occasions when an operation was cleared only at
the top; and that these instances could give cause for an Assistant Sec-
retary to believe the operation had had no policy clearance whatsoever.

Attachment

BRIEFING NOTES

I. The office of the Deputy Operations Coordinator, directly re-

sponsible to the Under Secretary, performs the functions called for un-
der paragraph 4 of NSC 5412.

All covert operations are cleared in ad-

vance with the Department through this office, which provides the
Agency with written policy guidances. The office consists of three of-
ficers, one responsible for Western and Eastern Europe, one for the Far

520 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, NSC 5412, 1954–57, NSC 10

Series. Top Secret. Drafted by Hulick.

Top Secret.

Document 171.

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East and South East Asia and one for the Near and Middle East and
Latin America. Working closely with this office but not physically lo-
cated in it are a Special Assistant in the Public Affairs office of the De-
partment and a Special Assistant for Emigré matters in the Office of
Eastern European Affairs. It provides a two-way channel of commu-
nication between the substantive offices of the Department and oper-
ational offices of the Agency.

In order to provide maximum security and control over the coor-

dination of covert operations all personal contact between officers in
the Department and the Agency on specific projects is supposed to be
channeled through this office. To a very large degree that is now the
case. The exceptions are occasions when the Director of CIA approaches
the Secretary or Under Secretary directly on highly sensitive matters.
All records of written communications are filed in this office. No copies
are permitted to be filed elsewhere in the Department. While policy
guidance is obtained from the responsible substantive areas, the final
guidances in written form are prepared in this office only.

CIA covert annexes to OCB progress reports on NSC policy pa-

pers are presented to the Under Secretary through this office, which
can also make them available to the State Department members of OCB
Working Groups.

II. There are two outstanding problems in the field of covert op-

erations which have not yet been satisfactorily resolved.

1. The Free Europe Committee (FEC) and Radio Free Europe (RFE)

are powerful propaganda and psychological political instruments
which are controlled by the Agency and are supposed to operate un-
der policy guidance from the Department. The FEC was created in 1949
as a private organization, financed partly by private donations and
partly by funds from the Agency, the latter accounting for about two
thirds to three fourths of the money.

The purpose of FEC was to provide a means of supporting and

utilizing prominent political exiles from communist-dominated coun-
tries without recognizing these groups as Governments in Exile and to
avoid complications for the Department which maintained diplomatic
relations with the Communist Governments of the countries from
which they fled.

The two major functions performed by FEC are (1) support and

utilization of émigré groups as symbols of resistance and (2) broad-
casts to the peoples of Eastern Europe through RFE. Both FEC and RFE,
which has its base in Munich, Germany, have grown into very large
establishments, staffed by highly competent people. They produce their
own analysis of developments behind the Iron Curtain and develop
their own programs to influence the people and cause difficulties for
the Communist regimes.

The Intelligence Community 521

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While FEC and RFE are supposed to function within the frame-

work of official US policy and under policy guidance from the De-
partment, they have been gradually assuming a degree of independ-
ence of operation, which has created a control problem. Decisions
involving matters of policy consequence are frequently taken by FEC
and RFE without reference to the Department through the Agency. This
is a matter of real concern which the Department and the Agency are
currently attempting to resolve.

2. The second outstanding problem is that of evolving ways and

means of coping more satisfactorily with the political repercussions
when a covert operation is uncovered. We are deeply involved in many
countries in the use of covert assets to influence developments in a
manner favorable to US objectives. While each such case must be han-
dled to a large degree on its own merits, there is a need for establish-
ing a few basic principles of operation. Due to a still prevalent lack of
knowledge and understanding of the support role of CIA under NSC
5412 on the part of some officials, both in Washington and in the field,
there is often a division of opinion as to how such emergencies should
be handled. This division can freeze initiative and timely action and
produce compromise positions which are not adequate to meet the
problem. The division of opinion, it is believed, stems in part at least
from an underlying opposition on the part of some officials to covert
operations of CIA.

The solution to this problem must be sought through an educa-

tional process with more briefings in depth by CIA of State Depart-
ment and Foreign Service officers on the task of CIA and the manner
in which it attempts to discharge its responsibility. Improvements
should also result gradually through the efforts of this office to bring
about an ever closer coordination between the Department and CIA,
so that carefully considered policy guidance is provided in advance by
the substantive offices of the Department for each covert operation in
support of overt policies as defined in the various NSC documents.

On the part of CIA officials it is necessary that they deal with com-

plete frankness with this office and leave to its judgment which offi-
cers in the Department are to be consulted in order to obtain proper
policy guidance for specific covert operations. There is still a tendency
on the part of some CIA officials to be so secretive that even this office
sometimes has the feeling that it does not know all that it should in
order to discharge its responsibility. In order to establish the requisite
degree of mutual confidence between the Agency and the Department
both sides must contribute so that the inhibitions and respective re-
serves developed on both sides during the early formative years of CIA
gradually fade away.

It is of the utmost importance that all responsible officials in State

and CIA recognize the fact that NSC 5412 provides for joint CIA-State

522 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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implementation on NSC policies; that use of covert operations in sup-
port of our overt efforts in the field of foreign policy is an established
fact; that final decision on the timing and nature of such covert oper-
ations rests with the Department; that when a covert operation goes
sour it is a matter of concern to the US Government and not just CIA;
and that problems arising out of exposed covert operations must be
met and minimized by the joint efforts of CIA and State as a team.

III. The following are types of questions which might be asked of

the Assistant Secretaries:

1. Have the Agency’s covert operations been generally effective in

furthering implementation of overt US policy objectives? If so, can you
cite specific examples?

2. If there have been instances in which covert operations have

been harmful, do you believe they could have been avoided? Did they
result from failure of the Agency to coordinate or did they represent
coordinated operations involving a calculated risk?

3. Are you satisfied that there is proper coordination and prior

policy guidance for all covert operations conducted by the Agency in
your area?

189. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, August 25, 1954.

THE “NET ESTIMATES” PROBLEM

Introduction.

One of the most basic problems faced by intelligence

agencies is that of obtaining adequate information of operational mat-
ters and of using such information to produce meaningful “net esti-
mates” of the capabilities and intentions of other nations, taking ac-
count of our own acts and facts as they must appear to others. In
general, U.S. doctrine in the military services has prescribed a sharper
separation between intelligence and operations than exists in the UK
and some, if not most, other nations, although in the practical opera-
tion of field staffs this separation is usually mitigated or overcome

The Intelligence Community 523

Source: National Archives, RG 263, HS/HC: HRP 82–2/00022, Box 1, HS/HC 111,

Misc. Documents. Secret. The original went to General Clark; copies were sent to Assis-
tant Director for National Estimates (Kent), Deputy Director for Intelligence (Amory),
and William Bundy.

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through working understandings. At the highest levels in the services,
however, and even in the State Department, there is a strong tendency
either to keep operational matters wholly in “operational” channels,
or, if they are conveyed to intelligence offices, to impose restrictions
against discussion with outside agencies. This memorandum deals
with efforts made by CIA since the fall of 1950 to meet this problem,
in three contexts: (1) National Intelligence Estimates handled through
regular machinery; (2) specific “net estimates” or “net evaluations”
handled by special machinery; (3) the Watch Committee, handling in-
telligence from the warning standpoint.

1. Operational Information and National Intelligence Estimates.

In the NIE field, a distinction must be made between the furnish-

ing of operational

assumptions

and the furnishing of specific operational

facts,

especially concerning our own capabilities. The former has never

presented great difficulties, and is now in satisfactory shape. The lat-
ter, however, has been troublesome on several occasions, and no satis-
factory overall solution has been reached.

In one type of estimate, dealing with the consequences of possi-

ble U. S. courses of action, operational assumptions as to U.S. policy
are the foundation of the estimate. The only problem is that of ensur-
ing that the assumptions have appropriate backing, and this is now
usually done through the CIA Adviser to the NSC Planning Board, who
may consult the Planning Board as a whole or may deal directly with
the departments most concerned. Assumptions are cleared at whatever
level is necessary to assure their solidity.

In the more general type of estimate, dealing with probable de-

velopments in a given situation, it is occasionally necessary to have—
in addition to the always implicit assumption of no drastic change in
overall US policy—specific assumptions on such matters as US aid
levels, where the US may affect the situation drastically and immedi-
ately. Since the estimate may be designed to provide the basis for pol-
icy in these very respects, it is sometimes necessary to make an arbi-
trary assumption for the future. For example, the currently pending
estimate on developments in Taiwan, to be completed for submission
to the Planning Board when the question of aid levels is discussed,
will be based on the assumption that the scope and nature of US pro-
grams remains as at present. Thus, the estimate will not purport to be
definitive (even within the usual limits of predictability) but will be a
benchmark obviously subject to adjustment if a decision is made to
alter the scope and nature of the programs . . . .

In any event, there is

no substantial present problem in obtaining such assumptions, which

524 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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Ellipsis in the original.

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are usually framed in consultation with the CIA Advisor to the NSC
Planning Board, or occasionally directly by departments principally
concerned.

In contrast with the relative simplicity of the policy-assumptions

problem, the problem of obtaining specific own-capability facts—or
even assumptions—has been complex and difficult. Early in the his-
tory of the present NIE machinery, in April 1951, an ad hoc solution
was reached for one case, an estimate (NIE 27)

on the likelihood of in-

vasion of Taiwan. For this estimate, it was obvious that the intelligence
community needed to know, generally at least, the dispositions of US
forces in the area, since these forces were the principal obstacle to Chi-
nese Communist action. After some negotiation via the service intelli-
gence heads, appropriate “assumptions” approximating the real facts
were provided and used.

This specific case was not then made the basis for a general solu-

tion, although the need was discussed at the working level. No spe-
cific proposal was submitted by O/NE to the Director, or by him to
other agencies.

In two major fields, experience has subsequently highlighted the

vacuity of estimates prepared without clear knowledge of our own ca-
pabilities. With respect to Soviet Bloc capabilities to attack Western Eu-
rope, all estimates through 1950 had been able to proceed on the as-
sumption of virtually no Western opposition. From 1951 onward, this
assumption became increasingly less valid, and in the preparation of
the estimates there were prolonged discussions leading finally to the
use of a fairly meaningless formula that the Soviet Bloc could “launch”
a lot of campaigns, including a full-scale offensive in Western Europe.
Whether any meaningful answer could have been provided in Wash-
ington without duplicating the activities of SHAPE is doubtful, but the
fact is that no machinery existed even for getting and incorporating
(with proper credit) the current conclusions of SHAPE. As they finally
stood the estimates were certainly not helpful to anyone on this point.

It was the second field, however, that of air defense of the Soviet

Union, which seemed to General Smith even more forceful, and the ex-
perience in this field, in the spring and summer of 1952, contributed
heavily to the campaign launched by him in October 1952, as discussed
in the next section. What happened was simple. A pioneer national es-
timate on Soviet air defense capabilities ran into prolonged agency dis-
agreements, in which it became more and more clear that any de-
scription of the effectiveness of Soviet defenses depended entirely on
assumptions as to our capabilities and strategy of attack. Eventually, it

The Intelligence Community 525

For NIE 27, see

Foreign Relations,

1951, vol. VII, Part 2, pp. 1623–1624.

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was recognized that without clear guidance on these matters the esti-
mate was, in the words of General Smith, merely an inventory of So-
viet assets, and it was finally approved by the Intelligence Advisory
Committee after most qualitative statements had been cut out, and af-
ter the title had been altered to, “The Scale and Nature of the Soviet
Air Defense Effort 1952–54.”

So far as National Intelligence Estimates are concerned, the situa-

tion since then has been as before—that operational information is not
made available to the intelligence community on any systematic basis
adequate for its employment in such estimates. With the development
of increasingly close and cordial working relationships both in the IAC
itself and at the National Estimates Board and Staff levels, it is safe to
say that a great deal of such information is in fact fed informally into
the estimates. But much operational information is still withheld
wholly, and the overall situation is far from satisfactory.

2. Special Machinery for “Net Estimates”

In the summer of 1951, concern over continental defense, within

the National Security Council, led to discussion of the need for an au-
thoritative “evaluation” of the net capability of the USSR to injure the
United States. Although General Smith made no affirmative effort to
have sole primary responsibility for the effort—and in fact is believed
to have expressed his opposition to the assignment—the Joint Chiefs
of Staff were diffident, and the upshot was an NSC directive, of Au-
gust 30, 1951,

that DCI prepare a “summary evaluation” in collabo-

ration with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with the internal security
committees.

The resulting exercise, handled through regular channels and

without any central mechanism, was a nightmare. The Intelligence Ad-
visory Committee speedily produced the necessary basic estimate of
Soviet gross capabilities (SE–14, 18 October 1951),

and the internal se-

curity committees furnished adequate contributions. However, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff contribution was delayed for several months and
when finally produced, in May 1952, proved to be based on the most
extreme possible estimates of Soviet capabilities and on several other
questionable assumptions, of a largely intelligence nature, concerning
Soviet attack strategy. General Smith regarded this contribution as un-
satisfactory and assigned two members of the Board of National Esti-
mates, Mr. E. M. Hoover and Vice Admiral B. M. Bieri (former Deputy

526 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

See footnote 2, Document 120.

NSC Action No. 543, Document 86.

Not printed. (National Archives, RG 263, Soviet NIEs, 1950–1955, # 20, Box 1) The

actual date of SE–14 is October 23, 1951.

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Chief of Naval Operations), to the task of producing an integrated eval-
uation merging all contributions, and modifying the JCS contribution.
The ensuing procedure was trying to all concerned. It finally produced
a report which General Smith accepted as the best obtainable in the cir-
cumstances, and which he forwarded to the NSC on 14 October 1952.

In his accompanying memorandum General Smith noted the de-

fects of the report, and gave three “primary reasons” for them. The
third of these was:

“c. There is at present no machinery to plan, guide, coordinate

and produce an appraisal or estimate based on the integration of na-

tional intelligence with military, political, and economic operational

data dealing with our own capabilities.”

General Smith recommended that as an interim measure he be in-
structed to prepare terms of reference for a more adequate study of the
problem, and that the Council:

“c. Concurrently, instruct the Director of Central Intelligence to ex-

amine, in collaboration with officials of other governmental bodies as

needed, the adequacy of present machinery, and the character of any

new machinery that may be required in order to plan, guide, coordinate,

and produce for the National Security Council, upon request, evalua-

tions in the nature of ‘Commander’s Estimates,’ of the USSR’s capabili-

ties and intentions vis-à-vis the United States, based upon the integra-

tion of military, political, and economic operational data dealing with

United States’ capabilities and intentions, and national intelligence.”

When General Smith’s recommendations were forwarded by the

Secretary of Defense to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment, the JCS
responded by a sharply critical memorandum, dated November 21,
1952.

There ensued negotiations, which were limited to the terms of

reference and procedure for a new study, but which also gave an op-
portunity for General Smith to clarify his ideas to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff on the overall problem. In the light of the change of administra-
tions then in process it was finally decided to let the overall recom-
mendation (subparagraph c. quoted above) lie over, while proceeding
with a new “net evaluation” on the basis of an entirely novel proce-
dure. This procedure, embodied in NSC 140,

was approved by Presi-

dent Truman on January 19, 1953, and accepted by the Eisenhower Ad-
ministration without change. It created a Special Evaluation
Subcommittee, chaired by a direct Presidential appointee, Lt. General
Idwal H. Edwards, USAF (Ret.)—who was in fact nominated by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff under a gentlemen’s agreement with General

The Intelligence Community 527

Document 131.

Not found, but see Document 137 and footnote 3 thereto.

For NSC 140, see

Foreign Relations,

1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, pp. 205–208.

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Smith—with representatives of the JCS, CIA, and the internal security
committees as full members.

The so-called Edwards Committee was given a very short dead-

line, May 15, 1953, for the preparation of a new net evaluation to serve
as the basis for a policy appraisal of the whole field of continental de-
fense. Through the able leadership of General Edwards and with a large
share of credit also to Lt. General H. R. Bull, representing CIA, the
deadline was met. The resulting report (NSC 140/1, May 18, 1953)

al-

though slightly marred by one misunderstanding with the JCS work-
ing level on terms of reference, was a highly valuable effort substan-
tively. Organizationally it seemed to CIA, and, it is believed, to the NSC
Secretariat and to others familiar with the earlier failure and with the
general problem, to prove that net evaluations or estimates could be
done, even on the most complex problems, through a process of con-
stant interchange of intelligence and operational information (under
appropriate security safeguards), and that the resulting net papers were
a vast improvement on anything that could be done by intelligence and
operations working at arms’ length from each other.

With this pioneer demonstration, attention turned for a time back

to the more general problem. Largely as a result of CIA urging, the re-
port of the President’s Committee on International Information Activ-
ities (Jackson Committee), published June 30, 1953,

included as its

very first recommendation the following:

“1. The necessary measures should be taken to provide net esti-

mates of political, economic and military capabilities.” (Page 3)

While this recommendation might have provided a lever for re-

opening the over-all question and resurrecting General Smith’s rec-
ommendation c. of the preceding October (which was still technically
unfinished business in the NSC), two factors combined to make this
appear undesirable to the DCI. One was the replacement of most of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff in August 1953; the other was the fact that in
its policy consideration of continental defense (NSC 159 series)

the

NSC referred all organization questions to the Office of Defense Mo-
bilization for study (NSC action No. 873 d., August 1953).

Since it

was at first thought that Office of Defense Mobilization’s study would
be quickly completed, it seemed clearly wiser to await it, and to work
out agreement with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a proper procedure in

528 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Text is ibid, pp. 328–349. See also Document 149.

See Document 151.

See

Foreign Relations,

1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, pp. 465–489.

See footnote 2, Document 173.

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the limited field of continental defense before taking up the over-all
question again.

As it worked out, ODM encountered substantial delay both in

preparing its recommendations and in getting them cleared by the NSC
Planning Board. Only in April 1954 did ODM’s paper become avail-
able to NSC.

At this point the JCS comment on the ODM proposals

revealed that the “new Chiefs” were not happy about a net estimates
procedure under which ultimate final responsibility was not vested
solely in them, and there ensued a round of negotiations between Mr.
Dulles and Admiral Radford, which clarified the issue but failed to pro-
duce agreement.

A split paper was finally submitted to the President

and the NSC on June 9, 1954,

and the issue was resolved by the Pres-

ident in favor of joint responsibility in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence, with other government
agencies represented on an appropriate basis.

The President desig-

nated Admiral Radford as Chairman for the exercise, which is now pro-
ceeding with a deadline of 1 November 1954. Rear Admiral Robbins is
directing the project on Admiral Radford’s behalf, while General Bull
is again representing CIA. Substantively the scope of the study has
been broadened to cover specifically all key US installations overseas,
thus making possible a far more refined and comprehensive view of
Soviet attack strategy than was possible in the Edwards group. Proce-
durally, it appears at this writing that the project is being handled at
the working level with a greater degree of close cooperation even than
in the Edwards group.

During the course of the negotiations on the particular continental

defense problem, the over-all issue was discussed, and the Director, of
Central Intelligence proposed that the device of joint responsibility in
DCI and the Chairman of the JCS, the one as intelligence adviser, the
other as military adviser, to the President and the NSC, be extended
generally to cover problems for which a specific net evaluation, or net
estimate, procedure is appropriate. (Such problems, generally speaking,
would be those of substantial scope, involving a complicated study of
the interplay of US action and Soviet counteraction. In situations where
action on both sides would be simple and predictable, the use of joint
machinery might not be warranted.) For the present, this suggestion is
not being pressed, since the success of the new continental defense proj-
ect appears to be important in any decision.

The Intelligence Community 529

Not found.

See Documents 176 and 177.

Not found.

See Document 182.

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3. The Watch Committee and Operational Information

For that part of the intelligence community that concentrates on

providing warning of hostile action, knowledge of US or allied opera-
tions may be even more vital than for more long-range intelligence ef-
forts. Without such knowledge false warnings may be given, available
intelligence may be seriously misconstrued (in either direction), and
intelligence effort may not be focused properly at points and areas of
tension.

The 1948–54 history of this problem is covered in detail in reports

prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence, the CIA component par-
ticularly charged with the watch function and with support of the
Watch Committee. The essence of the story is that there has been no
remotely adequate procedure for keeping the Watch Committee in-
formed of operational matters that could have a bearing on its activi-
ties. However, as a result of the work of an ad hoc Committee desig-
nated by the IAC in 1953 to review the whole Watch Committee process,
the Director of Central Intelligence, in July 1954, submitted to the NSC,
and the President approved in principle, a directive that operational
information necessary to the Watch Committee’s mission be furnished
to it, under appropriate security safeguards.

At the date of writing,

the exact wording of this directive remains to be ironed out with the
FBI Director. In CIA’s judgment the substance of this directive will pro-
vide a broad and adequate basis for the proper functioning of the Watch
Committee in this respect, though no doubt particular problems of de-
tail and interpretation will arise. The directive provides that in cases
where an agency believes that overriding security considerations pre-
clude release of information (conceded to be significant to the Watch
Committee), the matter shall be referred initially to DCI, thereafter to
the President if DCI and the referring agency are unable to resolve it.
Thus, the Director should be in a position to iron out difficulties as they
arise.

It is significant that this directive has had the full support of the

JCS, in principle and in its general breadth.

This JCS attitude may be

a significant indication of the possibilities for further improvement in
the fields of national estimates and of special net evaluation machin-
ery, discussed in the earlier sections of this memorandum.

530 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

President Eisenhower approved at the 209th meeting of the NSC; see Document

187.

See Document 186.

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190. Papers Prepared by a Working Group of the Operations

Coordinating Board Assistants for the Operations
Coordinating Board

Washington, August 25, 1954.

LIST OF AGREED COURSES OF ACTION

JULY 1, 1954 TO DECEMBER 31, 1954

TO IMPLEMENT NSC 174

During the six-month period beginning July 1, 1954 the depart-

ments and agencies plan to take the following specific actions having
a relationship to courses of action set forth in NSC 174 and other per-
tinent NSC documents. Underlining indicates quotations from para-
graphs of NSC 174. Where actions are not cited, this indicates that while
the department or agency follows in its day-to-day operations the poli-
cies set forth, no explicit project in regard to those paragraphs can
presently be specified.

The responsibility of the working group is to suggest general

courses of action to implement the specific objectives set forth in NSC
174. The development of detailed plans to carry out such courses of
action is the function of the several responsible agencies.

Take overt and covert measures to discredit Soviet prestige and ideol-

ogy as effective instruments of Soviet power, and to reduce the strength of
Communist parties and other pro-Soviet elements.

(NSC 162/2, Para. 43a.)

(NSC 174, Para. 9)

The Intelligence Community 531

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 174. Top

Secret. Circulated to the OCB on August 20 by Staats for discussion at the OCB’s Au-
gust 25 meeting. A September 7 memorandum by Staats indicates that the OCB approved
the two papers at its meeting. (Ibid.)

NSC 174, “U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Satellites,” is dated December 11. (Na-

tional Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 174 Series) Extracts from NSC
174 and NSC discussion of the issue are in

Foreign Relations,

1952–1954, vol. VIII, pp.

110–128. NSC 174 was referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinat-
ing agency designated by the President.

Although NSC 162/2 does not appear to provide specific policy guidelines for

the starred courses of action when applied to the USSR, it is understood that NSC 162/2
does not direct the abandonment of current operating policies and programs whether
overt or covert along these lines. Furthermore, NSC 174, Para. 9, provides as
follows . . . “feasible political, economic, propaganda and covert measures are required
to create and exploit troublesome problems for the USSR. . .” Accordingly, in the absence
of detailed NSC guidance on policy toward the Soviet Union it is assumed that these
courses of action are applicable to the USSR. New projects should be carefully consid-
ered, however, in terms of the Policy Conclusions set forth in NSC 162/2.

Note:

Above

footnote applies to all asterisks. [Footnote in the original. Underlined text is printed in
italics. NSC 162/2, “Basic National Security Policy,” is dated October 30, 1953. (National
Archives, RG 59. S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 162 Series)]

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Actions to be taken:

a. At the General Assembly of the United Nations beginning Sep-

tember 21, 1954, support the following actions which are expected to
have the result of discrediting the position of the USSR:

(1) Review of the report of the Disarmament Commission.

(2) Review of the report of the UN Commission for the unifica-

tion and rehabilitation of Korea.

(3) Review of the report of the Collective Measures Committee on

methods which might be used to maintain and strengthen international

peace and security.

(4) Review of the question of admission of new members to the

UN.

(5) Review of report of ECOSOC on evidence of existence of forced

labor.

(6) Review of the Special Committee on the question of defining

aggression.

b. Initiate or resume discussion in the UN General Assembly of:

(1) The Austrian Treaty question.

(2) Various items regarding human rights.

(3) Measures for the peaceful solution of the problem of prison-

ers of war.

c. Anticipate and counteract Soviet moves in the UN General As-

sembly concerning:

(1) Admission of Communist China.

(2) East-West trade.

(3) Guatemala.

d. Assure effective propaganda support of the U.S. position on the

issues set forth in a., b., and c., above. (State, primary—USIA and CIA
supporting)

e. The case of the F–84 shot down by Czech fighters in 1953 will

be expedited for presentation before the International Court of Jus-
tice. If good case is developed for B–29 and RB–50 shot down in Far
East by Soviet fighters, these cases should be presented to I.C.J. (State,
primary—Defense, supporting)

f. Press representations for return of U.S. citizens held in USSR—

if no favorable response appropriate publicity will be considered. Also
continue efforts to secure release of U.S. citizens held in jail in Czecho-
slovakia. (State, primary—USIA and CIA, supporting)

g. Develop and use for overseas distribution three special films

designed to demonstrate the Communist technique of takeover and
control of sovereign nations. (USIA, primary)

h. Spotlight policies and problems of agriculture in Soviet bloc—

exposing failures and playing up ingenious peasant passive resistance.
(USIA, primary)

532 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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Problems of Communism

is being published as an attributed bi-

monthly publication and plans are now well advanced for an unat-
tributed monthly publication which will be devoted to problems of the
Soviet orbit. (USIA, primary)

j. Place emphasis upon the fact the satellites are captive countries

controlled through various techniques by the Soviet military machine,
as supporting materials are developed and opportunities are presented.
(USIA, primary—CIA and Defense, supporting)

k. Employ selected persons who have lived under or suffered at

the hands of Communist tyranny for speaking tours sponsored by civic
organizations in U.S. and selected areas abroad. (State and USIA,
primary—FOA and Defense, supporting)

2. Strengthen covert activities in support of the Basic Objectives set forth

in paragraphs 10 and 11 of NSC 174.

Actions to be taken:

CIA to report on separately. (CIA, primary)
3.

Use appropriate means short of military force to oppose, and to con-

tribute to the eventual elimination of, Soviet domination over the satellites;
including, when appropriate, concert with NATO or other friendly powers,
resort to UN procedures, and, if possible, negotiation with the USSR.

(NSC

174, Para. 12)
Actions to be taken:

a. Take such actions as may be appropriate to exploit the Greek-

Turk-Yugoslav Friendship Pact as a factor influencing the satellites.
(State, primary—USIA, Defense and CIA, supporting)

4. Encourage and assist the satellite peoples in resistance to their Soviet-

dominated regimes, maintaining their hopes of eventual freedom from Soviet
domination, while avoiding:

a. Incitement to premature revolt.
b. Commitments on the nature and timing of any U.S. action to bring

about liberation.

c. Incitement to action when the probable reprisals or other results would

yield a net loss in terms of U.S. objectives.

(NSC 174, Para. 13)

Actions to be taken:

a. Emphasize in appropriate ways our continued interest in East-

ern Europe and our refusal to recognize Soviet domination of the area
as permanent. (State, primary—USIA and CIA, supporting)

The Intelligence Community 533

For example, account should be taken of the undesirability of provoking the liquidation

of important resistance movements or creating false hopes of U.S. intervention.

[Footnote in the

original. Subsequent asterisks apparently refer to this note.]

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b. Support and offer guidance where appropriate to the Kersten

Committee. (State, primary—USIA, supporting)

c. Exploit the elections in Czechoslovakia. (State, primary—CIA

and USIA, supporting)

d. In the event EDC ratification occurs during the period, issue

a statement or emphasize the concept of a free European Community
open to countries of Eastern Europe upon their liberation from Soviet
Communist tyranny. (State, primary—USIA and CIA, supporting)

Develop and encourage, as appropriate, increased use of passive re-

sistance by the peoples of the [USSR and] satellites.

* (NSC 174, Para. 14)

Be prepared to exploit any future disturbances similar to the East

German riots of 1953 by planning courses of action which would best serve
U.S. interests in such events.

(NSC 174, Para. 15)

Actions to be taken:

a. Keep harvest results for the current year under review and be

prepared to exploit significant shortages with offers of food or other
appropriate action. (State, primary—CIA and FOA, supporting)

b. On the basis of an analysis of the June 17, 1953 East German

uprising develop specific courses of action to be taken in the event of
a similar occurrence in the future and report thereon by December 1,
1954. (USIA and CIA, primary)

Foster satellite nationalism as a force against Soviet imperialism, while

avoiding commitments to national ambitions which would interfere with U.S.
post-liberation objectives.

(NSC 174, Para. 16)

Actions to be taken:

a. Appropriate statements will be issued and exploited commem-

orating the following national holidays of the satellite states and other
suitable occasions, such as: August 15, Commemoration of Poles stop-
ping Russians on Vistula; August 20, Commemoration of Warsaw Up-
rising; August 20, St. Stephens Day (Hungarian National Holiday); Sep-
tember 28, Anniversary of Petkov’s Execution (Bulgaria); October 28,
Czechoslovakian Independence Day; November 18, Latvian Independ-
ence Day; December 25, Christmas (Gregorian calendar). (State,
primary—USIA and CIA, support)

8. C

ooperate with other forces—such as religious, cultural, social—

which are natural allies in the struggle against Soviet imperialism.

* (NSC

174, Para. 17)
Actions to be taken:

a. Determine whether a practical program of cultural and techni-

cal exchange of persons with the Soviet bloc can be developed. (State,
primary—CIA and USIA, supporting)

534 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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All brackets in the original.

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b. Ensure maximum exploitation in the interest of the U.S. of vis-

its to the U.S. by delegations from countries behind the iron curtain.
(State and USIA, primary—Defense and CIA, supporting)

Stimulate and exploit conflicts within the communist ruling groups

in [the USSR and in] each satellite, among such groups, and between them
and the Kremlin.

* (NSC 174, Para. 18)

Actions to be taken:

a. Continue to exploit indications of internal conflict within the

satellite ruling groups and between them and the Kremlin, such as con-
flicts growing out of the:

(1) “New economic courses.” (USIA, primary—CIA, supporting)

(2) The satellite government reorganizations undertaken in con-

formity with the Kremlin’s desire to emphasize a collective leadership.

(USIA, primary—CIA, supporting)

(3) Instances of difficulty between a satellite and the USSR as, for

example, deliberate snubs of cultural delegations in the USSR or trou-

ble with Soviet occupation (and line of communication) troops in the

satellites. (USIA, primary)

10.

Foster disaffection in [the USSR and] satellite armed forces and po-

lice, to diminish their reliability in suppressing domestic disturbances and
their will to fight in the event of war.

* (NSC 174, Para. 19)

Actions to be taken:

a. Display military strength of U.S. whenever appropriate, such

as the visits of U.S. Fleet units to Baltic, or visits of U.S. Air Force air-
craft to significant points where news of the event will reach target na-
tions. (Defense and State jointly)

b. As opportunity offers and material is available, emphasize any

conflicts within Soviet and satellite security forces and between them and
other elements of the population. (USIA, primary—CIA, supporting)

c. Wherever found, exploit dissatisfaction with Soviet “advisors”

and key personnel among officers and men of the satellite armies.
(USIA, primary—CIA and State, supporting)

d. Exploit as a propaganda theme the idea that the USSR will use

the satellite armed forces as cannon fodder in the event of war. (CIA,
primary—USIA, supporting)

11.

Encourage defection of [USSR and] key satellite personnel and pos-

sible VFC recruits, but not mass defection [in the case of the satellites]; and
assist in the resettlement and rehabilitation of refugees who do escape.

* (NSC

174, Para. 22)
Actions to be taken:

a. Support implementation of the extensive operational plan for

Phase A of Escapee Program approved by OCB, including the expedi-
tious implementation of the Refugee Relief Act of 1953. (FOA and State,
primary—CIA, Defense and USIA, supporting)

The Intelligence Community 535

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12.

Support or make use of refugees or exile organizations which can

contribute to the attainment of U.S. objectives, but do not recognize govern-
ments-in-exile.

* (NSC 174, Para. 23)

Actions to be taken:

a. Take appropriate action such as messages on national days,

speeches by government officials, etc., to bolster the prestige of exile
organizations meeting the above criteria. (State, primary—USIA and
CIA, supporting)

b. Support relief and rehabilitation projects which are advanced

by accredited groups or organizations affecting refugee or exile or-
ganizations which can contribute to the attainment of U.S. objectives.
(FOA, primary)

13.

Maintain flexibility in U.S. economic policies toward the Soviet bloc,

and toward individual satellites, in order to gain maximum advantage with
the limited economic weapons at hand (both restrictions and incentives).

(NSC

174, Para. 25)
Actions to be taken:

a. The Economic Defense Advisory Committee (EDAC) and its

member agencies, in line with the decisions of the April and July, 1954
meetings of the Consultative Group in Paris, are carrying out U.S. re-
sponsibilities for the following:

(1) Implementing, in coordination with COCOM countries, pro-

visions for the more effective enforcement of strategic trade controls
on a more limited list of commodities exported to the Soviet bloc. (FOA,
primary)

(2) Implementing plans approved by the Consultative Group for

expanded exchange of information among members of COCOM and
views on Soviet bloc trade trends and tactics. (FOA, primary)

b. Develop plans for making available surplus agricultural com-

modities in the U.S. to the peoples of the Soviet bloc, as “targets of op-
portunity” present themselves in accordance with basic guidelines and
criteria approved by the OCB for the disposal of such commodities.
(State and FOA, primary—CIA, supporting)

14.

Continue U.S. diplomatic missions in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hun-

gary, and Rumania as long as may be in the U.S. interest, and keep under re-
view the possibility of resuming diplomatic relations with Bulgaria and Al-
bania.

(NSC 174, Para. 26)

Actions to be taken:

a. Consider the desirability of consulting further with Congress

concerning resumption of diplomatic relations with Bulgaria. (State,
primary)

15.

Exploit the existence, and encourage the development, of the

Yugoslav-Greek-Turkish entente as a means of weakening Soviet power in

536 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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the Balkan satellites and as an example of free association of independent
Balkan nations serving as a potential alternative to Soviet rule.

(NSC 174,

Para. 27)
Actions to be taken:

a. Continue negotiations for a solution to the Trieste problem in

order to clear way for further integration of Yugoslavia into the West-
ern Defense pattern and the strengthening of the Western position.
(State, primary)

b. Take such actions as may be appropriate to exploit the Greek-

Turk-Yugoslav Friendship Pact as a factor influencing the satellites.
(State, primary—USIA, Defense and CIA, supporting)

c. Explore the advisability of encouraging the Greek and Turkish

governments to seek the cooperation of the Bulgarian Government in
a survey of the upper Meric-Evros River looking to joint development
of the river. (State and FOA, primary—CIA, supporting)

16.

Keep the situation with respect to Albania under continuing sur-

veillance with a view to the possibility of detachment of that country from the
Soviet bloc at such time as its detachment might be judged to serve the over-
all U.S. interest.

(NSC 174, Para. 28)

Actions to be taken:

a. Upon completion of present negotiations for a favorable settle-

ment of the Trieste problem, examine the situation with respect to Al-
bania and the possibility of detachment of that country from the So-
viet bloc. (CIA, primary—State and Defense, supporting)

17.

Exploit to the fullest extent compatible with the policies regarding Ger-

many as a whole and Berlin, the special opportunities offered by West Berlin and
the facilities of the Federal Republic to undermine Soviet power in East Germany.
Place the Soviets in East Germany on the defensive by such measures as may be
taken to keep alive the hope of German reunification.

(NSC 174, Para. 29)

Actions to be taken:

Detailed plans for action against East Germany are set forth in the

Progress Report of the Working Group for NSC 5404/1, dated June 8,
1954.

That Group has primary responsibility for coordinating activi-

ties concerning Berlin.

18.

Emphasize (a) the right of the peoples of Eastern Europe to inde-

pendent governments of their own choosing, and (b) the violation of interna-
tional agreements by the Soviet and satellite governments, whereby they have
been deprived of that right, particularly the Yalta Declaration on Liberated

The Intelligence Community 537

For text of the financial appendix to NSC 5404/1, January 25, see

Foreign Rela-

tions,

1952–1954, vol. VII, Part 2, pp. 1390–1394. The full text of and the progress reports

on NSC 5404/1 are in the National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC
5404 Series, Box 77.

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Europe and the Treaties of Peace with Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania.

(NSC

174, Para. 30)
Actions to be taken:

a. Develop opportunities for high U.S. officials through speeches

and other means to emphasize the right of the peoples of Eastern Eu-
rope to independent governments of their own choosing and the vio-
lation of international agreements by the Soviet and satellite states.
(State, primary)

b. Develop opportunities to exploit the voluminous documentary

materials being compiled in the Department of State to demonstrate
satellite treaty violations. (State, primary—USIA and CIA, supporting)

ADDITIONAL ACTIONS TO IMPLEMENT NSC 174 WHICH HAVE

NOT BEEN ACCEPTED BY WORKING GROUP

There follows a list of additional actions to implement NSC 174

which have not been accepted by the Working Group for the reasons
stated therein:

1. Distribute inexpensive commodities by balloon or other simi-

lar means to people in the Soviet orbit in such a way that it will be
non-attributable to the U.S. Government.

Reason for non-acceptance:

On September 23 and October 21, 1953 the OCB approved pur-

chase and stockpiling of balloons but determined that final decision

for use of balloons for this purpose would be made by the Board. Sub-

sequent to that date no agency has recommended a specific project and

no target of opportunity has arisen.

2. Implement the plan to detach Albania from the Soviet orbit.

Reason for non-acceptance:

a. State believes no action should be taken to implement this plan

while negotiations over Trieste are underway.

b. If Trieste problem is satisfactorily resolved, agreement covering

future status of Albania should be obtained from neighboring states

(Yugoslavia, Greece, Italy) before any action for liberation is under-

taken. (See paragraph 16 of “Operational Plans for Period July 1, 1954

to December 31, 1954” for current Working Group recommendations.)

3. Train leaders and prepare plans for supplying weapons and

equipment for use in future riots and disturbances in the satellite areas.

Reason for non-acceptance:

CIA will make separate submission.

538 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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4. Develop extensive covert operations to organize resistance

groups among the peoples of the satellites which, in the event of war,
can offer significant armed resistance to communist forces or, in the
event of an upsurge of popular feeling similar to the East German
riots of 1953, can stage a coup d’etat.

Reasons for non-acceptance:

CIA will make separate submission.

191. Director of Central Intelligence Directive 15/1

Washington, September 14, 1954.

PRODUCTION AND COORDINATION OF

FOREIGN ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE

Pursuant to the provisions of NSCID Nos. 1, 3, and 15,

and for

the purpose of strengthening the over-all governmental intelligence
structure for the production and coordination of foreign economic in-
telligence relating to the national security, the following policies and
operating procedures are hereby established:

1. Policies

In carrying out their foreign economic intelligence activities and

responsibilities, and in order to effect a better coordination in the pro-
duction and exchange of foreign economic intelligence, the interested
departments and agencies will apply the following basic principles:

a. No complete separation of interests is possible or necessarily

desirable in economic intelligence activities.

b. Full and free interchange of all pertinent information, finished

intelligence, and schedules of research programs, including external re-
search, between all agencies concerned is essential.

c. No one agency is considered to be the undisputed authority in

any field; conclusions may be questioned by other IAC agencies and
dissents recorded.

The Intelligence Community 539

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff, Job 84–B00389R, Box 4, Folder

43. Confidential. This directive is an updated text of Document 169.

For NSCID No. 1 Revised, see Document 256; for NSCID No. 3, see

Foreign Rela-

tions,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 426; for NSCID

No. 15, see Document 254.

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d. Each agency will be responsible for fulfilling its departmental

requirements for economic intelligence; it will give full recognition to
the finished intelligence produced by other agencies, but any agency
may make such studies as it believes necessary to supplement the in-
telligence produced by other agencies. However, basic research stud-
ies should not normally be undertaken or disseminated outside the
producing agency without consultation with the agency having pri-
mary responsibility for the subject matter involved.

e. An agency charged with primary responsibility in a particular

field will develop special competence in that field and will normally
carry out most of the research in that field.

f. Each intelligence agency will endeavor to coordinate the intel-

ligence activities of its Technical Services and its other facilities having
economic intelligence production capabilities with the work of the IAC
intelligence agencies and to make available to those agencies the in-
telligence produced by such Services and facilities.

2. Allocation of Primary Production Responsibilities

a. Production of military-economic intelligence on all foreign

countries, including by way of illustration intelligence on military re-
quirements, military materiel production, shipbuilding and ship move-
ments, logistic capabilities, economic vulnerabilities to all forms of mil-
itary attack, and target system analysis (including specific location,
physical vulnerability, and supplementary studies as required), is the
responsibility of the departments of the Department of Defense.

b. Production of intelligence on all foreign countries on economic

doctrines, political and social aspects of economic organizations and
institutions such as trade unions, and on the relationships between po-
litical and economic policies, is the responsibility of the Department of
State.

c. Production of all economic intelligence on the Soviet Bloc

the responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency except as indicated
herein. In addition, it will supplement the intelligence produced by
other agencies by conducting such independent analyses and studies
as may be necessary to produce integrated economic intelligence on
the Bloc.

d. Production of all economic intelligence on foreign countries

outside the Soviet Bloc is the responsibility of the Department of State
except as indicated in paragraph 2.a.

540 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

As used herein, “Soviet Bloc” includes USSR, Communist China, Poland, Czecho-

slovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Soviet occupied portions of Germany
and Austria, and Communist dominated portions of Korea and Indo-China. [Footnote
in the original.]

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e. Despite the above mentioned allocations of primary production

responsibilities, there will be areas of common or overlapping interest
(including, for example, Soviet Bloc economic policies, East-West trade,
and inland transportation) which will require continuing interagency
liaison and cooperation.

f. The existing allocations of production responsibility for National

Intelligence Surveys (NIS) are not changed by this directive even though
such allocations may, in some instances, be at variance with agency re-
sponsibilities specified in paragraphs 2.a., b., c., and d. However, the EIC
will from time to time examine such allocations and after consulting with
the NIS Committee will make appropriate recommendations.

3. Responsibility for Economic Intelligence Coordination

a. To assist the Central Intelligence Agency in carrying out its re-

sponsibilities with respect to coordination, the Economic Intelligence
Committee (EIC) will continue to perform the functions outlined in
IAC–D–22/1 (Revised), 29 May 1951.

Further, the EIC will be respon-

sible for (1) reviewing from time to time the allocations of responsibil-
ity assigned herein; (2) determining how the provisions of this direc-
tive apply, particularly in areas of common or overlapping interest; and
(3) recommending to the IAC appropriate changes in the allocations of
responsibility assigned herein.

b. In order to minimize the duplication of effort and expense: (1)

the EIC will prepare and circulate consolidated periodic lists of the eco-
nomic research being conducted within the intelligence agencies; and
(2) agencies sponsoring external research projects, involving more than
$5,000, in support of economic intelligence production will submit de-
scriptions of the scope of such projects to the EIC for review. The EIC
will endeavor to present its recommendations in advance of final ap-
proval by the contracting agency. In its periodic reports to the IAC the
EIC will include a summary of actions on these projects.

Allen W. Dulles

Director of Central Intelligence

The Intelligence Community 541

Document 72.

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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192. Report by the Special Study Group

Washington, undated.

REPORT ON THE COVERT ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

I. Introduction

The acquisition and proper evaluation of adequate and reliable in-

telligence on the capabilities and intentions of Soviet Russia is today’s
most important military and political requirement. Several agencies of
Government and many thousands of capable and dedicated people are
engaged in the accomplishment of this task. Because the United States
is relatively new at the game, and because we are opposed by a police
state enemy whose social discipline and whose security measures have
been built up and maintained at a high level for many years, the us-
able information we are obtaining is still far short of our needs.

As long as it remains national policy, another important require-

ment is an aggressive covert psychological, political and paramilitary
organization more effective, more unique and, if necessary, more ruth-
less than that employed by the enemy. No one should be permitted to
stand in the way of the prompt, efficient and secure accomplishment
of this mission.

In the carrying out of this policy and in order to reach minimal

standards for national safety under present world conditions, two
things must be done. First, the agencies charged by law with the col-
lection, evaluation and distribution of intelligence must be strength-
ened and coordinated to the greatest practicable degree. This is a
primary concern of the National Security Council and must be ac-
complished at the national policy level. Those elements of the problem
that fall within the scope of our directive are dealt with in the report
which follows. The second consideration is less tangible but equally
important. It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy
whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever means and
at whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game. Hitherto accept-
able norms of human conduct do not apply. If the United States is to

542 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Community Management Staff, Job

82–M0311R, Box 1, Folder 23. Top Secret. Regarding the origins of this report, also known
as the Doolittle Report, see Documents 184 and 185. It was forwarded to the President
under cover of a September 30 letter signed by J.H. Doolittle, Chairman, and members
of the Special Study Group William B. Franke, Morris Hadley, and William D. Pawley.
The covering letter, the table of contents, and the appendices (B–D) are not printed. Ap-
pendix A is a copy of Document 185.

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survive, long-standing American concepts of “fair play” must be re-
considered. We must develop effective espionage and counterespi-
onage services and must learn to subvert, sabotage and destroy our en-
emies by more clever, more sophisticated and more effective methods
than those used against us. It may become necessary that the Ameri-
can people be made acquainted with, understand and support this fun-
damentally repugnant philosophy.

Because of the tight security controls that have been established

by the U.S.S.R. and its satellites, the problem of infiltration by human
agents is extremely difficult. Most borders are made physically secure
by elaborate systems of fencing, lights, mines, etc., backed up by con-
stant surveillance. Once across borders—by parachute, or by any other
means—escape from detection is extremely difficult because of con-
stant checks on personnel activities and personal documentation. The
information we have obtained by this method of acquisition has been
negligible and the cost in effort, dollars and human lives prohibitive.

The defection of Soviet and satellite personnel offers a more prof-

itable field for exploitation. The Agency is properly focusing a great
deal of its effort in this direction, [

1 line not declassified

]. The informa-

tion obtained from this source has been of value but is sporadic and
incomplete.

A still greater potential lies in communications intelligence. This

leads to the conviction that much more effort should be expended in
exploring every possible scientific and technical avenue of approach to
the intelligence problem. The study group has been extensively briefed
by C.I.A. personnel and by the Armed Services in the methods and
equipment that are presently in use and under development in this
area. We have also had the benefit of advice from certain civilian con-
sultants who are working on such special projects. We are impressed
by what has been done, but feel that there is an immense potential yet
to be explored. We believe that every known technique should be in-
tensively applied and new ones should be developed to increase our
intelligence acquisition by communications and electronic surveillance,
high altitude visual, photographic and radar reconnaissance with
manned or unmanned vehicles, upper atmosphere and oceanographic
studies, physical and chemical research, etc. From such sources may
come early warning of impending attack. No price is too high to pay
for this knowledge.

In the short time that has been available to us we have been in-

tensively briefed by the Director and staff of the Central Intelligence
Agency, by the rest of the intelligence community, and by the princi-
pal users of the intelligence product. We have conferred with repre-
sentatives of other interested Government agencies and with certain
knowledgable individuals whose past experience and present thinking

The Intelligence Community 543

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have made their views of value. The procedures which have been fol-
lowed, and the list of witnesses who have been heard are detailed in
Appendix B, attached. Our findings and recommendations follow.

II. Conclusions and Recommendations

With respect to the Central Intelligence Agency in general we con-

clude: (a) that its placement in the overall organization of the Govern-
ment is proper; (b) that the laws under which it operates are adequate;
(c) that the established provisions for its financial support are suffi-
ciently flexible to meet its current operational needs; (d) that in spite
of the limitations imposed by its relatively short life and rapid expan-
sion it is doing a creditable job; (e) that it is gradually improving its
capabilities, and (f) that it is exercising care to insure the loyalty of its
personnel.

There are, however, important areas in which the C.I.A. covert or-

ganization, administration and operations can and should be im-
proved. The Agency is aware of these deficiencies and in many cases
steps are being taken toward their solution.

While we believe our study to have been as comprehensive as pos-

sible in the time available to us, we realize that it is not complete. We
are well aware of the tremendous problems facing the Director and staff
of an organization such as C.I.A. and appreciate the sincere efforts be-
ing made to solve them. In an attempt to be constructive and in the
hope that we may be helpful, we make the following recommendations:

A. With Respect to Personnel

That the Agency personnel competence level be raised. The

Agency should continually strive to achieve this and if necessary re-
duce its present work load to expedite its realization. Necessary steps
are:

1. Elimination of personnel who can never achieve a sufficiently

high degree of competence to meet the C.I.A. standard. This will en-
tail a substantial reduction in present personnel. There is no place in
C.I.A. for mediocrity.

2. Review and improvement of recruitment plans and procedures

in order to obtain higher quality applicants for Agency jobs. The time
required to process them should be reduced.

3. Continual improvement of the present excellent training facili-

ties and capabilities in all covert activities to keep step with future
requirements.

4. An intensified training program to include those key personnel

in the covert services who require additional training, by rotation
through C.I.A. training facilities. At present at least 10 percent of total
covert personnel should be in training.

544 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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5. Assignment to field stations and to country areas of only those

people who are fully qualified to handle the highly specialized prob-
lems involved.

6. Maintaining the position of Director above political considera-

tions in order to assure tenure and continuity as in the F.B.I.

B. With Respect to Security

That greater security be developed at all levels of the Agency to

the end that the good name of the United States and the fulfilment of
C.I.A.’s important mission may not be jeopardized. The following steps
should be taken to accomplish these objectives:

1. Elimination, to the maximum extent practicable, of provisional

and preliminary clearances in the security processing of prospective
Agency personnel.

2. Improved and more standardized security processing of alien

operational personnel prior to their use by the covert services overseas.

3. Immediate completion of full field investigations and poly-

graph examinations of the several hundred Agency personnel who
have not yet been fully processed.

4. Establishing of uniform and tighter security procedures at head-

quarters and suitable safeguards in the field the better to insure the se-
curity of the Agency’s facilities, operations, sources and methods.

5. Insurance of the closest possible coordination of the counteres-

pionage activities of the covert services with the over-all counterintel-
ligence activities of the Office of Security to prevent, or detect and elim-
inate, any penetrations of C.I.A.

6. Augmentation of the present sound policy of polygraphing all

new employees and all personnel returning from overseas assignments
to include periodic rechecks of all personnel, on a more comprehen-
sive basis, whenever effective counterintelligence practices indicate.

7. Creation of greater security consciousness on the part of all per-

sonnel by improving initial indoctrination courses and by conducting
regular “security awareness” programs.

8. Imposition of severe penalties upon employees at any and all

levels who advertently or inadvertently violate security.

9. Establishment of a uniform system for the submission by all

overseas missions of regular reports on the status of personnel, phys-
ical, documentary and related elements of security. Such reports should
be submitted to the Office of Security with copies to the Inspector Gen-
eral and to the appropriate division of the Deputy Director of Plans.

10. Periodic security inspections by the Security Office of overseas

missions and of DD/P’s divisions, staffs and facilities in the United
States.

The Intelligence Community 545

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11. Rigid adherence to the “need-to-know” requirement as the ba-

sis for dissemination of classified intelligence developed by the covert
services and for intra-Agency dissemination of classified data.

12. Continuous indoctrination and guidance to correct the natu-

ral tendency to overclassify documents originating in the Agency.

13. Promulgation of definitive standards and procedures govern-

ing cover for the guidance of all personnel. There should be a contin-
uing program of monitoring cover in foreign installations. Personnel
departing for overseas assignments should be more adequately briefed
concerning the importance of cover generally, and in particular their
mission and personal cover.

14. Insurance that officials of proprietary organizations adhere to

C.I.A.’s security regulations in order to avoid disclosure, breach, or com-
promise of the Agency’s covert association with such organizations.

15. Assignment of qualified security officers to the larger propri-

etary organizations to aid in avoiding security compromises.

16. Formulation for immediate implementation of emergency

plans and preparations, geared to the specific needs of each overseas
mission and station, to insure, as far as possible, adequate safeguard-
ing of personnel and safeguarding or destruction of material, in the
event of emergency.

17. Concentration of C.I.A.’s headquarters operations in fewer

buildings with increased emphasis in the interim on improvement of
the physical security of C.I.A.’s many buildings and the classified data
and materials contained therein.

C. With Respect to Coordination and Operations

That one agency be charged with the coordination of all covert op-

erations in peacetime, subject to the provision that necessary flexibil-
ity be achievable in time of war. The covert operating capabilities of
C.I.A. must be continually improved. Steps toward these ends are:

1. Implementation of NSC 5412

which now makes C.I.A. the co-

ordinating agency pending a national emergency.

2. Preparation and test of a readily implementable plan for the im-

mediate and effective availability of local covert assets to theater com-
manders at the outbreak of war in their areas.

3. Immediate resolution, by the National Security Council, of the

misunderstandings that still exist between C.I.A. and some of the
Armed Services with respect to “agreed activities.”

4. Development of better understanding between other agencies

and C.I.A. relative to exploitation of Soviet and satellite defectors.

546 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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Document 171.

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5. A greater interchange of information, at all working levels, be-

tween C.I.A. and the military services regarding their intelligence pro-
grams and policies.

6. Improvement at all levels of coordination of C.I.A. covert ac-

tivities with the State Department.

7. Establishment of definite world-wide objectives for the future, and

formulation of a comprehensive long-range plan for their achievement.

8. Use, in all areas, of governmental cover by C.I.A. personnel only

when other cover is not suitable or cannot be made available.

9. Active development of non-governmental cover.
10. The planting of agents under very deep cover in all areas in-

cluding those that may not be of immediate interest, and the careful
preservation of such assets.

11. More effective use of “proprietary project” cover through bet-

ter planning and by using personnel having adequate business and
area experience.

D. With Respect to Organization and Administration

That an intensive organizational study be made to the end of

streamlining functions, clarifying lines of responsibility and authority,
reducing overhead and increasing efficiency and effectiveness. From
our relatively brief examination of organization it is obvious that:

1. The present elaborate staff structure of the Deputy Director for

Plans should be simplified.

2. The covert organization should be so located, organized and

administered as to maintain maximum security with reference to per-
sonnel and activities.

3. The Inspector General should operate on an Agency-wide ba-

sis with authority and responsibility to investigate and report on all
activities of the Agency.

4. The activities of the Operations Coordination Board under the

N.S.C. should be broadened to provide the D.C.I. with adequate sup-
port on the more important covert projects.

5. Despite the recommended reduction in present personnel and

budgetary economies that the C.I.A. must continue to grow in capac-
ity until it is able to meet, entirely, its national commitments.

6. Centralized accommodations, hand-tailored to its needs, should

be provided to house the Agency.

E. With Respect to Cost Factors

That although the activities of C.I.A. should be expanded, costs of

present operations should be reduced. This can be in part, accom-
plished through:

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1. The exercise of better control over expenditures for all covert

projects, and specifically that (except for those of an extremely sensi-
tive nature) they be made subject to review and approval by the
Agency’s Project Review Committee.

2. Furnishing the Comptroller (under proper security provisions)

with sufficient information on all covert projects to enable him to ex-
ercise proper accounting control on a fiscal year basis.

III. Discussion

Introduction—History and Growth of C.I.A.

The Central Intelligence Agency is an organization of mixed ori-

gins and recent growth.

The overt side of C.I.A., well described by the Agency’s title, took

over in 1947 from the former Central Intelligence Group. It receives the
intelligence collected by all government agencies, processes it, dis-
seminates and files it. This phase of the work is well administered un-
der the Deputy Director of Intelligence and serves the whole intelli-
gence community. Since 1947 it has grown to its present size of
approximately [

number not declassified

The covert side of C.I.A. started with O.S.O. (Office of Special Op-

erations) which was a remnant of the former O.S.S. Next came O.P.C.
(Office of Policy Coordination) which was the “Cold War Shop,” an
offshoot of the State Department. The two operated under C.I.A. in vir-
tual independence of each other until they underwent a shot-gun mar-
riage in 1952, and were put under a Deputy Director for Plans. This
covert side now numbers approximately [

number not declassified

] on the

regular table of organization, and approximately as many more en-
gaged in special projects, or about [

number not declassified

] in all.

Supporting and serving Intelligence and Plans are about [

number

not declassified

] more persons, of whom about two-thirds are grouped un-

der a Deputy Director for Administration, and about one-third are un-
der Directors or Assistant Directors reporting directly to the Director of
Central Intelligence himself, as in the case of Personnel, Training, and
Communications. The work of these [

number not declassified

] is largely in

support of covert operations, as the requirements of the overt intelli-
gence side are relatively simpler, whether for training or for support.

Additional personnel on special projects bring the current total to

approximately [

number not declassified

]. In 1947 the total was less than

[

number not declassified

]. This represents a [

number not declassified

] in-

crease in seven years.

(

Note:

Throughout this report we have considered as “covert” all

activities that are not “overt.” Specifically, we have included under
“covert” the operations assigned to the Agency by NSC 5412 as well
as its clandestine espionage and counterespionage operations.)

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A. The Personnel Factors

The most important elements in the successful conduct of covert

intelligence operations are the people who run them, —from top man-
agement down to the agent under deepest cover. First consideration,
therefore, must be given to the recruitment, selection, training and
evaluation of the most highly competent people available. They must
then be assigned to jobs where they can be used most effectively and
be given whatever support they require to enable them to carry out
their missions.

In the past this Agency has not been entirely successful in achiev-

ing this result. In its short history it has suffered from lack of continu-
ity in policy direction and management. At its inception it suffered
from an inheritance of mixed and sometimes mutually antagonistic el-
ements from O.S.S. and other predecessor agencies. Then, at a stage
when still groping toward a stabilized peacetime program, it was sud-
denly called upon to meet the requirements of the Korean War.

Under this pressure it “ballooned” out into a vast and sprawling

organization manned by a large number of people some of whom were
of doubtful competence. Of necessity, sensitive positions were some-
times filled with people having little or no training for their jobs.

Fortunately, the Agency did possess an invaluable asset in the form

of a hard core of capable and devoted men as a part of its World War
II inheritance, and did succeed in attracting to this cadre an apprecia-
ble number of capable people. In some areas they have done, and are
doing, an excellent job, but it appears from a personnel standpoint, that
C.I.A. tends to accept more commitments than are warranted by its hu-
man assets. This leads us to the belief that an immediate re-evaluation
of all programs should be undertaken by the Project Review Commit-
tee to eliminate those of lesser importance and to cut back the activity
rates of all but the most essential to bring the over-all program into a
more realistic coincidence with current Agency capabilities. When im-
proved recruitment, adequate training and over-all experience level jus-
tify, Agency activity may again be accelerated.

We have made a study of the educational and experience back-

ground of the 34 key people in the Agency’s chain of command. From
this the following composite figures emerge: all are natural born U.S.
citizens; they range in age from 38 to 66 yrs., averaging 47.9 yrs; 32 are
married; 17 have 1 or more dependent children; 21 are wholly de-
pendent on government salary; all but 2 are college graduates; 13 have
advanced degrees. Twelve have had 1 or more years business experi-
ence; all but 6 have served in the U.S. Armed Forces; 15 have had in-
telligence experience (O.S.S., Armed Forces, etc.) prior to 1947; and 10
have had specialized C.I.A. training. Of this group 32 have had 3 years
or more service with C.I.A., 20 have had 5 years or more, and 15 have

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been with the Agency for the full 7 years since it was established in its
present form in 1947.

The Office of Personnel supplied an excellent statistical study cov-

ering [

number not declassified

] staff employees and agents on the roster

as of 30 June 1954 from which the following data were taken: males
make up 58 percent of total, females, 42 percent; average age is 34.2
years and two-thirds are in the 25–39 year age bracket. As for educa-
tion, approximately 68 percent of the total are high school graduates,
some 47 percent have B.A. (or equivalent) degrees, and about 24 per-
cent have done post-graduate work or possess advanced degrees.
Forty-five percent have served 3 years or more with the C.I.A. Look-
ing at prior intelligence experience, which includes service with the
Armed Forces or with the Agency’s predecessor organizations, and re-
alizing that all Agency personnel do not require such training, 71 per-
cent had none, but 29 percent have had 1 year or more and 11 percent
2 or more years. Of the Agency total, 73 percent have had some for-
eign language training or experience, and nearly half have had some
prior foreign area knowledge. Slightly over 50 percent are Armed Serv-
ice veterans.

From the above we feel that the present personnel potential of the

Agency is reasonably good. There is convincing evidence, however,
that “dead wood” exists at virtually all levels. We have heard critics
remark to the effect that there are too many ex-military people. We have
been advised that some people coming back to headquarters from over-
seas assignments are sometimes not assigned to new jobs for long pe-
riods. Uncertainties in policy, frequent internal reorganizations, to-
gether with competition from industry frequently cause good people
to seek employment outside. As in other governmental agencies, there
is a tendency through inertia or because of a desire for financial secu-
rity, for the mediocre to stay. As a result, despite the continual and nec-
essary acquisition of additional good people, the competence level of
the Agency is not rising as rapidly as is desirable. Prompt and drastic
action to increase the rate of improvement is indicated. We are of the
opinion that a planned reduction of at least 10 percent in present per-
sonnel can and should be achieved without reducing the amount and
quality of Agency output.

We have been briefed on the Career Service Plan by means of which

the Agency hopes to increase personnel stability. Whether the plan will
achieve this result is as yet unknown, but it will not in itself solve the
Agency’s personnel problems. Nevertheless we believe that a sound
Career Service Plan is desirable and should be implemented as
promptly as possible.

The C.I.A. has a recruitment program operating in colleges and

universities throughout the United States. This program has not been

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entirely successful in producing either the quantity or the quality of
applicants needed for Agency requirements.

In part, this is due to the general shortage of technically trained

people vis-à-vis heavy current demands by industry in practically all
fields. On the other hand we have heard criticism from scholastic
sources that the C.I.A. approach, both to the school and to the indi-
vidual, is not what it should be, and furthermore, that many poten-
tially good people are lost because of the very great length of time that
now elapses between initial contact and entry into the job.

Clearance of new personnel at present averages 90 days. The F.B.I.

takes only 30 days maximum for clearing its own personnel. Although
we appreciate fully the special problems involved in C.I.A., we believe
it is both practical and essential to reduce the present 90 day period as
much as possible.

Many applicants find the necessary clearance procedures unpalat-

able and annoying. Some are repelled by misunderstanding of the pur-
pose of polygraphic examination and the techniques employed. Some
(particularly in scientific fields where future professional reputation may
depend upon publication of papers, etc.) are unwilling to accept the im-
plications of a lifetime of anonymity, or of life under a pseudonym. We
do not suggest that these requirements be abandoned or relaxed in any
degree. We are certain that they are necessary for maximum security and
success of covert operations. But some better means of approach should
be developed to assure the prospective employee that he is necessary, and
to persuade him that in this Agency he can find a desirable career and at
the same time perform a vital service to his country.

We have been impressed by the excellence of the Agency’s train-

ing facilities and the competence of its instructor personnel. Our com-
ment is that insufficient use is made of these facilities. It is obvious that
the language, communication and clandestine agent training centers
which we inspected are being operated far under capacity levels. This,
of course, is a reflection of the slacking off in recruiting programs, but
it suggests also that adequate use of the facilities is not now being made
to improve the over-all quality of Agency covert activities by new train-
ing or refresher training of personnel already in the Agency.

We are aware that the present tendency of the Agency to take on

more work than it can handle satisfactorily has limited optimum use
of the training facilities, but it cannot be repeated too frequently that
in C.I.A. covert operations quality is more important than quantity. A
small number of competent people in a sensitive agency can be more
useful than a large number of incompetents. In the long run it will pay
to stop some of the less essential operations now to permit 10–15 per-
cent of Agency covert personnel to go into training. As the backlog of
inadequately trained personnel is reduced and the competence level of
Agency personnel increased, this percentage may be lowered.

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B. The Security Factors

Nothing is more important in the planning and execution of

C.I.A.’s covert activities than continuing recognition at all levels
throughout the Agency of the importance of security in all of its as-
pects. Although many sound and important security steps have already
been put into effect by the Agency, in view of the outstanding impor-
tance of C.I.A.’s mission to the national security, constant effort must
be made to improve security wherever possible.

We have been thoroughly briefed by the Security Office of the

Deputy Director of Administration (DD/A), and by appropriate offices
of the Deputy Director of Plans (DD/P) on personnel, physical, docu-
mentary, operational and cover security. We have examined the
Agency’s methods of screening out undesirable applicants or present
employees by interrogation, field investigation and polygraph tech-
niques. We have also examined DD/P’s methods of processing alien
operational personnel prior to their use by the covert services overseas.

We believe that C.I.A.’s security clearance criteria for prospective

Agency personnel are sound. Without exception, they should be fully
adhered to in practice. The granting of provisional or other interim
clearances should be minimized. Full background investigations and
polygraph examinations should continue to be prerequisite to hiring
for all positions. Individuals now on the rolls who have not had the
benefit of these full security clearance procedures should be so
processed at the earliest possible date. (At the time of our study there
were 132 headquarters and 531 field personnel who had not been poly-
graphed because they had entered on duty prior to the institution of
the polygraph program in 1948.)

We are impressed with the competent manner in which the poly-

graph program is handled in the Agency and with the results obtained
therefrom. Polygraph examination has proved extremely useful in
identifying sexual perverts and other security risks. To September 1,
1954, [

number not declassified

] polygraph examinations had been con-

ducted, resulting in the elimination of [

number not declassified

] individ-

uals as security risks. We endorse the Agency’s continuation of the
polygraph program as an aid to investigation and interrogation as long
as the present high standards govern the use of this device.

There is considerable room for improvement in existing security pro-

cessing procedures for alien operational personnel. Because some per-
sonnel must be used for immediate short term operations, it may some-
times be difficult to apply full security clearance procedures to them. [

⁄

lines not declassified.

]

[

1 paragraph (10 lines) not declassified

]

A uniform requirement should be established for the submission

by all overseas missions of regular reports on the status of personnel,

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physical, documentary and related elements of security. Such reports
should be submitted to the Office of Security with copies to the In-
spector General and the appropriate division of DD/P. We recommend
that periodic security inspections should be made by the Office of Se-
curity of all overseas missions and of DD/P’s headquarters and other
facilities in the United States. Tighter security procedures at head-
quarters and particularly in the field will better insure the security of
the Agency’s facilities, operations, sources and methods. Implementa-
tion of these recommendations should aid in raising the level of secu-
rity throughout the entire Agency, particularly throughout the covert
services.

If such a system of reporting and inspecting is adopted, the Di-

rector can, for the first time, look to one office for the security of the
entire Agency. He will then have a more precise and timely picture of
security-related developments throughout the Agency.

We cannot emphasize too strongly the importance of the continu-

ation and intensification of C.I.A.’s counterintelligence efforts to pre-
vent, or detect and eliminate penetrations of C.I.A. We endorse fully
the present counterintelligence practices of the Agency which include
polygraphing all personnel returning from overseas assignments, au-
tomatic security checks and file reviews of personnel being considered
for transfer in the field or reassignment at headquarters, security checks
of personnel nominated for special types of clearance, etc. We do not
think that periodic re-investigation of all personnel is now necessary,
but we believe that comprehensive rechecks of personnel should be
made on a selective basis whenever sound counterintelligence prac-
tices dictate. Questionable cases should be intensively investigated and
expeditiously resolved.

The counterespionage activities of the clandestine services can be

one of the most fertile sources of information concerning attempted pen-
etrations of C.I.A. Appropriate steps should be taken to insure the clos-
est possible coordination of DD/P’s counterespionage activities in this
field with the over-all counterintelligence activities of the Office of Se-
curity. Any penetration attempt made against C.I.A., whether it involves
Agency personnel and/or clandestine intelligence operations, can never
be fully controlled and exploited until all information concerning such
attempts—whether made in the United States or overseas—is channeled
through one focal point, preferably the Security Office.

“Security consciousness” is an obvious “must” for all C.I.A. person-

nel. Constant efforts should be made to improve the Agency’s security
indoctrination courses. Regular “security awareness” programs should
be inaugurated in order that all personnel may be reminded of the con-
tinuing need for “security consciousness” in the conduct of their day-to-
day affairs.

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Most breaches of security committed by C.I.A. personnel appear

to be inadvertent rather than intentional. The net effect of such breaches
on the national security is the same regardless of intent. Without ex-
ception, an inflexible attitude must be adopted with respect to security
breaches and severe penalties meted out to employees at all levels who
advertently or inadvertently violate security.

Too easy access to much of C.I.A.’s classified data is a potential

source of trouble. Except for the tight restrictions drawn around super-
sensitive material, large segments of C.I.A.’s files are open to inspec-
tion and use by Agency personnel without qualification as to “need-
to-know.” Improvement is needed in carrying out the “need-to-know”
rule as a basis for intra-Agency, as well as interdepartmental, distri-
bution of C.I.A.’s classified data. This situation is aggravated consid-
erably by the fact that there are too many duplicate records. The secu-
rity of C.I.A.’s data is further jeopardized by a tendency to over-classify
documentary data originating in the Agency, a condition which oper-
ates in derogation of the security classification system as a whole.

Considering C.I.A.’s unduly dispersed headquarters (43 buildings

in the Washington area), its physical security program is reasonably
good. The potential security risks inherent in such wide-spread dis-
persal make it essential that the Agency continue its efforts to consol-
idate the headquarters facilities into fewer, more adequate buildings.

The physical security measures in effect at C.I.A. installations

which were visited in the general vicinity of Washington are excellent.
The physical security of overseas installations visited by representa-
tives of our study group appeared to vary with local circumstances and
conditions. The limited number of inspections made was not sufficient
to allow of definitive conclusions as to the general security of all over-
seas missions. There appear to be, however, no basic, minimum phys-
ical security requirements governing these missions or stations, except
for the safeguarding of classified documents. We believe that accept-
able minimum standards should be promulgated immediately and that
regular inspections by qualified Security Office personnel should be
made to enforce them.

Detailed plans and preparations should be made for immediate

implementation of war-emergency measures by all overseas missions
and stations, tailored to the local conditions. They should provide for
maximum safeguarding of Agency personnel and operations, and for
adequate safeguarding or destruction of classified data and material in
the custody of the installations in question.

Secure cover is an inherent part of all clandestine operations. The

security of some of the Agency’s cover devices is excellent, security of
others is inadequate. Cover security is a problem that requires contin-
uous and exhaustive study. Detailed standards and procedures, poli-

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cies and regulations, should be issued for the guidance of the person-
nel concerned. There is need for more adequate briefing of personnel
departing for overseas assignments concerning the cover of their mis-
sions and their personal cover problems. The Office of Security should
continually monitor the cover devices used in all foreign stations.

Maintaining proper cover in proprietary organizations requires

that all personnel concerned actually live within the cover framework
at all times. Vulnerable points are the channels of communications be-
tween C.I.A. and the proprietary organizations as well as contacts be-
tween personnel of such organizations and other personnel of the
Agency. Another vulnerable feature is in the assignment of personnel
from the Agency to the proprietary organizations and the hiring of out-
side personnel. Any person who has previously served in a known ca-
pacity with the Agency is a potential security hazard if associated with
any proprietary organization. A like hazard exists if a person is hired
on the outside by the organization without first obtaining a complete
clearance from the Agency.

Professionally qualified security officers should be placed on the staff

of the larger proprietary organizations. Experience shows that organiza-
tions so staffed usually have fewer security compromises. Close coordi-
nation should be maintained with the Agency on the matter of request-
ing surveys of proposed “business” sites before they are acquired, so that
any potential security hazard on or near the premises may be disclosed.
All officials of proprietary organizations must be indoctrinated in the ne-
cessity of conforming with the security requirements of the Agency. Ne-
glect of certain basic security requirements by such officials can lead to
disclosure, breach, or compromise of the covert association.

C. Coordination and Operations

The success of the covert operations of C.I.A. depends upon how

efficiently they are conducted and how well they are coordinated with
other agencies of the Government. These criteria prevail both in peace
and in war, but both coordination and operations are necessarily some-
what different during each of these periods. Peace in any ordinarily ac-
cepted sense of the word, appears to be impossible of achievement in
the foreseeable future. The covert operations of the Agency must there-
fore be planned and coordinated in order to meet the requirements of
a continuing cold war situation as well as the requirements of possible
hot war. C.I.A. has this obligation under NSCD 5412 (March 15, 1954).

Looking toward the possible outbreak of actual hostilities in any

theater of operations, a detailed plan should be developed now delin-
eating the wartime headquarters responsibilities of C.I.A. to insure that
appropriate policy guidance, integrated with N.S.C. and J.C.S. plans,
be furnished to C.I.A. representatives in the field. In an emergency
situation time obviously will not permit referral of all critical covert

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operational questions to Washington. Furthermore, the needs of com-
manders in the field may require the immediate transfer of many lo-
cal C.I.A. covert operational assets to their commands. It is absolutely
essential, therefore, that well-considered, well-implemented and pre-
tested plans be prepared in advance to insure smooth transfer of such
assets and to deal with any other local covert operational problems.

In the case of espionage and counterespionage operations there is

disagreement between C.I.A. and some of the military services which
has yet to be resolved. This relates to the area of “agreed activities”
(NSCID 5, August 28, 1951)

as to which a dispute has dragged on for

years. Some of the services feel that certain foreign espionage and coun-
terespionage operations must be run directly by them. The Director of
Central Intelligence has been desirous of securing the voluntary agree-
ment of the Armed Services, and has submitted various proposals to
them as to the delimitation of these areas of “agreed activities.” To date
the attempts to resolve the differences have been unavailing. We believe
that the prime responsibility for the failure does not lie with C.I.A., but
with these services. In fact, we believe that the Director of Central In-
telligence, in his desire to reach an amicable solution, has gone further
than was intended by the N.S.C. directives. Since agreement has not been
reached on a voluntary basis, the dispute should be resolved by the
N.S.C. In the settlement of this dispute, in addition to recognizing the
right of the Armed Services to perform counterintelligence activities for
the security of their own installations and personnel, the Armed Services
should be allowed to engage in espionage and counterespionage oper-
ations (provided they are coordinated by the Director of Central Intelli-
gence) until such time as C.I.A. has the capability to perform all espi-
onage and counterespionage operations outside the United States.

In order to avoid undue delay in the resolution of such problems

in the future, the Director of Central Intelligence (as coordinator of all
foreign intelligence) should report regularly to the N.S.C. on the sta-
tus of efforts to implement N.S.C. directives, with particular emphasis
on major unresolved questions.

Inasmuch as the exploitation of Soviet and satellite defectors out-

side the United States has been a source of annoyance (and even hos-
tility) on the part of some of the military services and other agencies
toward C.I.A. and vice versa, we believe that steps should be taken im-
mediately to insure full implementation of the defector program in ac-
cordance with the spirit and letter of NSCID 13 (Jan. 19, 1950).

556 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Document 255.

Referenced in

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Estab-

lishment, Document 433.

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The misunderstandings which exist between C.I.A. and the Armed

Services stem largely from insufficient exchange of information and co-
ordination with respect to espionage, counterespionage, and covert op-
erations. We have been advised, for example, that in certain instances
C.I.A. operators appear to have been too secretive with respect to in-
formation which is of direct interest to the military services and vice
versa. We have been told of incidents where important covert opera-
tions have been “blown” because C.I.A. and military intelligence units
were operating

against

each other, without knowledge of each other’s

interest or activity. The relationship that exists in various countries be-
tween covert C.I.A. personnel and the military attachés is not always
satisfactory. Attachés and MAAG’s are playing important roles in the
collection of foreign intelligence and in the defector program, and it is,
therefore, essential that closer coordination and greater exchange of in-
formation be established between C.I.A.’s representatives and the mil-
itary at every foreign station.

Misunderstandings between some of the services and the Agency

are not confined to overseas operations. A lack of knowledge of plans,
facilities, and operations seems to exist in some areas between the Pen-
tagon and C.I.A. Compartmentation can be carried too far. Improve-
ment in collaboration at the working levels is particularly essential.

Relations with C.I.A.’s other principal customer, the Department

of State, also are not entirely satisfactory. In Washington, coordination
seems to be reasonably good with well-established liaison channels,
but misunderstandings seem to exist at many overseas stations. There
is a feeling that C.I.A. is making too much use of [

less than 1 line not

declassified

] cover in many places. Such official cover is thin, at best,

and any compromise creates embarrassing situations. In some areas
C.I.A. personnel have not coordinated their activities sufficiently with
those who should know of them in our embassies. As a result, people
have worked at cross purposes, with unfortunate results. It is realized
that there are situations in which disclosure of plan and purpose should
be held to a minimum number of people, but in all cases the Senior
U.S. Representative should be sufficiently advised to insure proper co-
ordination in accordance with approved N.S.C. intelligence directives.

D. Organization and Administration

In the course of investigating the covert operations of the Agency,

we were briefed on the organization of the individual components of
the DD/P complex. We also had the benefit of the thinking of a num-
ber of key Agency people with respect to the DD/P organization as a
whole. As a result certain general observations with respect to DD/P
organization have emerged which are germane to the problem of the
efficiency and economy of its operations.

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From the remarks that have been made on the subject of Agency

history and personnel problems, it is clear that the organization is still
in an evolutionary stage. It has suffered from a mixed inheritance, a
lack of policy continuity, tremendous pressures to accept commitments
beyond its capacity to perform, and a mushroom expansion. As a re-
sult there has been an absence of long-range planning with consequent
organizational difficulties. We are strongly of the opinion that further
streamlining of organization, clarification of functions, and straighten-
ing of lines of authority will result in more and better work with fewer
people at lower costs.

The covert activities of C.I.A. fall under the direction of the Deputy

Director for Plans (DD/P). They are presently conducted by a compli-
cated organization of a mixed straight-line and functional type in which
staff has been superimposed on staff to such an extent that duplication
of effort, conflicting command authority, and division of responsibility
have inevitably resulted in dilution of the total effort.

There are six principal staffs in the DD/P complex ranging in size

from [

number not declassified

] people, totaling [

number not declassified

These are superimposed over seven area divisions ranging in size from
[

number not declassified

]. Five of the staffs have subordinate divisions,

and two of the staffs have subordinate staffs. In addition, each of the
divisions has its own set of staffs. Altogether, the DD/P complex to-
tals over 40 major units.

We are strongly of the opinion, based upon our limited review of

the DD/P element, that consideration of a complete reorganiza-
tion of the element is needed. As an indication of the type organiza-
tion that might be more effective and less costly, we have included in
this report for consideration purposes only, a revised organization chart
as Appendix D. A chart of the present DD/P organization is also in-
cluded, for purposes of comparison, as Appendix C. The personnel con-
templated under the revised DD/P organization would number ap-
proximately 1,000 less than are presently employed by this element.

In considering any reorganization, we cannot emphasize too

strongly our feelings with respect to the need for greater security in all
DD/P operations. As the covert side of C.I.A., it should operate with
a maximum of anonymity. Knowledge of its physical location, opera-
tion and the identity of its personnel should be kept on an absolutely
need-to-know basis.

We feel that continuous inspection and closer control (both fiscal and

operational) over covert activities are necessary. We realize that certain
security risks are involved but we believe they can be handled properly.

The subject of fiscal control, and the relationship of the Comp-

troller to the organization are discussed under Section E following.

The concept of an Inspector General for the Agency is sound. He

should report only to the Director. He should be given the greatest pos-

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sible latitude and authority to inspect all aspects of the Agency at any
time, including the Director’s own office and the DD/P complex. We
believe that any limitations that have been placed on this function in
the past should be completely removed.

Because of the rapid expansion of the Agency, its operations are

conducted in some 43 buildings in the Washington area. Some of these
buildings are of temporary wartime construction and constitute a fire
hazard. This forced decentralization of operations results in great loss
of time of personnel whose duties require them frequently to visit var-
ious buildings of the Agency; it increases security problems; and it re-
sults in a great reduction in over-all efficiency. We recommend that
sympathetic consideration be given to the Agency’s effort to obtain
funds with which to provide centralized accommodations for its ac-
tivities, and we suggest that these accommodations would best serve
the peculiar requirements of the Agency if they were hand-tailored to
its needs. We are of the opinion that in a relatively short time the ex-
penditure required would be self-liquidating.

Although in the present organizational plan of the Government

C.I.A. seems to be well integrated into the Intelligence Community at
the National Security Council level, events have occurred recently (for
example—Guatemala) which indicate that gaps exist in high level plan-
ning and coordination of important covert operations which may ex-
pose the U.S. Government to unnecessary risks of compromise. Over-
all policy guidance comes from N.S.C., and is satisfactory, but better
coordination is needed for the more important covert activities of C.I.A.
at the national level. This is the function of the Operations Coordina-
tion Board, but at the present time it does not appear to be giving the
Agency adequate guidance and advice on the more important covert
projects. The activities of the Board should be broadened in order to
provide the D.C.I. with the support he needs on such projects.

E. The Cost Factors

The budgetary procedures of the Agency were reviewed with the

Agency Comptroller and representatives of the Bureau of the Budget
and appear to be satisfactory. Between the fiscal years ended June 30,
1947 and 1955 the total budget has increased from approximately [

dol-

lar figures not declassified

], the latter figure including a reserve fund of

[

dollar figure not declassified

]. The 1955 fiscal year budget exclusive of

the reserve fund is divided approximately as follows:

Direct costs:

Covert operations

[

dollar figure not declassified

]

Overt operations

[

dollar figure not declassified

]

Indirect or support costs:

[

dollar figure not declassified

]

[

dollar figure not declassified

]

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Since indirect or support costs are relatively proportionate to di-

rect costs, the total budget may be considered to be approximately
[

number not declassified

] for covert and [

number not declassified

] for overt

operations.

The number of civilian employees of the Agency under personnel

ceilings has increased from [

number not declassified

] at June 30, 1947, to

an estimated [

number not declassified

] for the fiscal year ending June 30,

1955, and military personnel has increased during the same period from
[

number not declassified

] to [

number not declassified

]. The aggregate of

[

number not declassified

] for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1955 will be

allocated as follows:

Covert operations:

Foreign Intelligence

[

dollar amount not declassified

]

Political & Psychological

[

dollar amount not declassified

]

Paramilitary

[

dollar amount not declassified

]

Overt operations

[

dollar amount not declassified

]

Indirect or support elements

[

dollar amount not declassified

]

[

dollar amount not declassified

]

This total does not include individuals under contract, who are not reg-
ular employees of the Agency, individuals under deep cover and those
engaged in proprietary enterprises, and indigenous personnel. The ag-
gregate of persons in these categories is estimated at [

number not de-

classified

], most of whom are engaged in covert operations.

The actual number of individuals to be engaged on Agency activ-

ities for the fiscal year 1955 will, therefore, be approximately [

number

not declassified

The covert operations of the Agency are budgeted and accounted

for on a project basis except for headquarters and overseas support
costs. Political and psychological and paramilitary projects exceeding
a specified minimum dollar total are in general reviewed and approved
by a Project Review Committee. Foreign Intelligence projects are not
subject to review by this committee but are authorized by the Director
of the Agency, the Deputy Director of the Agency, the Deputy Direc-
tor of Plans, or certain other individuals depending upon the estimated
dollar costs of individual projects. We believe that for purposes of con-
trol and as an aid in auditing, Foreign Intelligence projects (except those
of an extremely sensitive nature) should be made subject to review and
approval by the Project Review Committee.

Due to DD/P’s present secrecy policies with respect to Foreign In-

telligence projects, the Comptroller of the Agency is unable to main-
tain meaningful records showing the expenditures made for individ-
ual projects in this category. The Foreign Intelligence Staff keeps certain

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records of such expenditures but on the basis of a calendar rather than
a fiscal year. We believe that the Comptroller should be furnished with
information which will enable him to record, control and account for
the costs of the individual projects of this element of the Agency. Ad-
equate protection for security purposes can and should be provided
within the Office of the Comptroller.

Certain other projects in the political and psychological and para-

military areas, of a sensitive nature are occasionally developed and
processed without full information with respect thereto being given to
the Deputy Director for Administration and the Comptroller. Since, of
necessity, the funds must be made available by the Comptroller, it is
inevitable that he will have knowledge that operations of this nature
are being conducted and it is unlikely that more specific information
relating to the projects can long be kept secret from him. In one par-
ticular instance where substantial sums were expended, the Comp-
troller was called upon to make the expenditures with no supporting
data being furnished to him at the time or at any future date. When
we requested breakdowns of costs of the operation we found that they
were available only in the area division involved and that they were
incomplete and unsatisfactory. We are of the opinion that this devia-
tion from the normal procedure of placing upon the Comptroller the
responsibility of accounting for expenditures is unsound, and is not
justified by the claim that the security of the operation is improved by
this deviation.

We are of the opinion that the administrative plans for individ-

ual covert projects are not in all instances as complete in detail as is
desirable and that if they were amplified the Comptroller and the
Auditor-in-Chief would be in a much better position to carry out their
respective duties and responsibilities.

193. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 19, 1954.

The President saw General Doolittle and other members of the

Committee appointed to investigate the activities of the CIA.

The Intelligence Community 561

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administrative Series, Dulles, Allen, Box

13. No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the memorandum.

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The report was presented by General Doolittle,

who said they had

gone over it with Allen Dulles for three reasons: (1) to be absolutely
fair; (2) to study Mr. Dulles better to watch for his reactions to a report
not wholly favorable; (3) and their hope that the maximum good would
come out of the report. Mr. Dulles made several recommendations that
were incorporated in the report.

The President prefaced his remarks by saying that of course Mr.

Dulles knew, as does everyone, that no two men would have the same
judgments about certain things. That what we wanted to know was
did we have a good man for the CIA head, and was he being selective
and skillful in getting his assistants, and was his team working together
in the best interests of the United States.

General Doolittle emphasized that the report was constructive crit-

icism and in no sense a white wash. Some of the recommendations
were very technical.

About Dulles: his principal strength is his unique knowledge of

his subject; he has his whole heart in it, his life, he is a man of great
honesty, integrity, loyally supported by his staff. His weakness, or the
weakness of the CIA is in the organization—it grew like topsy, sloppy
organization. Mr. Dulles surrounds himself with people in whom he
has loyalty but not competence. There is a lack of discipline in the or-
ganization. There is a complete lack of security consciousness through-
out organization. Too much information is leaked at cocktail party.

There is the family relationship with the Secretary of State. Such

relationship can be important as it leads to protection of one by the
other or influence of one by the other. Doolittle feels that it is a rela-
tionship that it would be better not to have exist. The President thought,
however, there was something more favorable to be said about the re-
lationship; he appointed Allen Dulles in full knowledge of the rela-
tionship and thinks it might be beneficial.

About Dulles’ two chief assistants. Frank Wisner is a chap of great

promise but not a good organizer.

About Dulles’ readiness to accept criticism, Doolittle said he is highly

emotional; wherever criticism was against him he took it well; he fought
for his staff people, however, to the point of becoming emotional.

Doolittle had said that Bedell Smith had at one time said that

Dulles was too emotional to be in this critical spot. He said further he
thought his emotionalism was far worse than it appeared on the sur-
face. The President said he had never seen him show the slightest dis-
turbance. He said further that we must remember that here is one of

562 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

For the written report, see Document 192.

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the most peculiar types of operation any government can have, and
that it probably takes a strange kind of genius to run it. The President
said that what did disturb him was what the Committee reported about
his assistants—Wisner and Cabell. Doolittle said in his opinion Allen
Dulles did not have an administrative individual in either. Eisenhower
said he was convinced no military man could do the job. President
pointed out importance of Allen Dulles’ contacts throughout world.
President further said, with reference to lack of security, that it was
completely frustrating to find always evidence that people are talking.
Security Council has gotten pretty good.

President said his next move would be to get Dulles in and talk

to him about it. The relationship with Secretary of State did not dis-
turb him because part of CIA’s work is extension of work of State De-
partment. He further feels the confidential relationship between the
two brothers is a good thing.

Someone in room said Bissell was not a good man. Also that Amory

was an exceptionally fine man.

President said we were interested in two things: (1) improvement

within CIA itself; (2) improvement in relationship and better under-
standing between CIA and rest of intelligence committees in government.

President said he was astonished at the difficulty of getting good

administrators in government; that he had found a good many fine ad-
ministrators throughout his long career.

194. Letter From Edwin H. Land, Chairman of the Technological

Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee,
Office of Defense Mobilization, to Director of Central
Intelligence Dulles

Washington, November 5, 1954.

Dear Mr. Dulles:

Here is the brief report from our panel telling why we think over-

flight is urgent and presently feasible. I am not sure that we have made

The Intelligence Community 563

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for Science and

Technology, Job 33–02415A, Box 1, Folder 7. Top Secret; Eyes Only. The role of the Tech-
nological Capabilities Panel in the development of the U–2 is discussed at length in Chap-
ter 1 of

The CIA and the U–2 Program, 1954–1974,

by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E.

Welzenbach.

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it clear that we feel there are many reasons why this activity is appro-
priate for CIA, always with Air Force assistance. We told you that this
seems to us the kind of action and technique that is right for the con-
temporary version of CIA; a modern and scientific way for an Agency
that is always supposed to be looking, to do its looking. Quite strongly,
we feel that you must always assert your first right to pioneer in sci-
entific techniques for collecting intelligence—and choosing such part-
ners to assist you as may be needed. This present opportunity for aer-
ial photography seems to us a fine place to start.

With best wishes,

Edwin H. Land

For: Project 3, Technological Capabilities Panel

Office of Defense Mobilization

Executive Office of the President

Project Members:

E. H. Land

James G. Baker

Joseph W. Kennedy

Edward M. Purcell

John W. Tukey

Attachment

Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence Dulles

Washington, November 5, 1954.

SUBJECT

A Unique Opportunity for Comprehensive Intelligence

For many years it has been clear that aerial photographs of Rus-

sia would provide direct knowledge of her growth, of new centers of
activity in obscure regions, and of military targets that would be im-
portant if ever we were forced into war. During a period in which Rus-
sia has free access to the geography of all our bases and major nuclear
facilities, as well as to our entire military and civilian economy, we have

564 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Baker and Purcell were at Harvard University, Kennedy at Washington Univer-

sity in St. Louis, and Tukey at Princeton University.

Top Secret; Eyes Only.

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been blocked from the corresponding knowledge about Russia. We
have been forced to imagine what her program is, and it could well be
argued that peace is always in danger when one great power is es-
sentially ignorant of the major economic, military, and political activi-
ties within the interior zone of another great power. This ignorance
leads to somewhat frantic preparations for both offensive and defen-
sive action, and may lead to a state of unbearable national tension. Un-
fortunately, it is the U.S., the more mature, more civilized, and more
responsible country that must bear the burden of not knowing what is
happening in Russia. We cannot fulfill our responsibility for main-
taining the peace if we are left in ignorance of Russian activity.

While aerial photography could be the most powerful single tool

for acquiring information, it has until now been dangerous to fly over
Russia. Up till now, the planes might rather readily be detected, less
readily attacked, and possibly even destroyed. Thus no statesman
could have run the risk of provocation toward war that an intensive
program of overflights might produce. The Air Force has, for a long
time, studied a program of overflight as a natural aspect of its Recon-
naissance mission and has, in recent months, considered several pro-
posals for airplanes designed for this purpose. While it is important
that such research and development continue in the Air Force, for the
present it seems rather dangerous for one of our military arms to en-
gage directly in extensive overflight.

On the other hand, because it is vital that certain knowledge

about industrial growth, strategic targets, and guided missile sites be
obtained at once, we recommend that CIA, as a civilian organization,
undertake (with the Air Force assistance) a covert program of selected
flights. Fortunately, a jet powered glider has been carefully studied by
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation for overflight purposes. This manufac-
turer proposes to take full responsibility for the design, mock-up, build-
ing, secret testing and field maintenance of this extraordinary and un-
orthodox vehicle, making it feasible for a CIA task force to undertake
this vital activity. Such a task force requires highly specialized and able
guidance in procurement and operation (by Air Force officers for air-
craft, by scientists for photographic and electronic equipment). The
Lockheed super glider will fly at 70,000 feet, well out of reach of pres-
ent Russian interception and high enough to have a good chance of
avoiding detection. The plane itself is so light (15,000 lbs.), so obviously
unarmed and devoid of military usefulness, that it would minimize af-
front to the Russians even if through some remote mischance it were
detected and identified.

Since the proposed mission of this plane is first of all photographic,

and only secondarily electronic, a word should be said about the in-
formation expected from the photographs, as well as about the effects

The Intelligence Community 565

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of the cloud cover over Russia. Photographs are appended

that

demonstrate the large information content of pictures taken from these
great altitudes. A single mission in clear weather can photograph in re-
vealing detail a strip of Russia 200 miles wide by 2,500 miles long.
Cloud cover will reduce completeness, of course, but clouds are not a
serious obstacle because one can afford to wait for good weather; al-
ternate routes over clear areas can be selected in flight; and finally, the
number of intelligence targets accessible during a single mission is so
large that even a partial sampling would yield an extraordinary amount
of intelligence.

The opportunity for safe overflight may last only a few years, be-

cause the Russians will develop radars and interceptors or guided mis-
sile defenses for the 70,000 foot region. We therefore recommend im-
mediate action through special channels in CIA in procuring the
Lockheed glider and in establishing the CIA task force. No proposal or
program that we have seen in intelligence planning can so quickly bring
so much vital information at so little risk and at so little cost. We be-
lieve that these planes can go where we need to have them go effi-
ciently and safely, and that no amount of fragmentary and indirect in-
telligence can be pieced together to be equivalent to such positive
information as can thus be provided.

It is recommended that

(a) The Central Intelligence Agency establish an initial task force

to complete any necessary feasibility studies in a few weeks, and that,
assuming successful completion of the studies, the following further
actions be taken.

(b) A permanent task force, including Air Force supporting ele-

ments, be set up under suitable cover to provide guidance on pro-
curement, to consolidate requirements and plan missions in view of
priority and feasibility, to maintain the operation on a continuing ba-
sis, and to carry out the dissemination of the resulting information in
a manner consistent with its special security requirements.

sisting of CL–282 aircraft with photographic and electronic equipment,
be authorized.

(d) Such high altitude overflights be authorized in principle.

566 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Not found.

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Attachment

A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY FOR COMPREHENSIVE

INTELLIGENCE—A SUMMARY

Opportunity

Collection of large amounts of information at a minimum of risk

through prompt development of a special, high altitude airplane. As-
surance of thousands of photographs that will yield critical analysis of
vast Soviet complexes. Protection of mission by decisive altitude ad-
vantage over Soviet interception. This protection good for only a few
years, thus assured only through very prompt action.

Objectives

Providing adequate locations and analyses of Russian targets (in-

cluding those newly discovered).

More accurate assessment of Soviet Order of Battle and of early

warning indicators, thus improving our defenses against surprise
attack.

Appraising Soviet guided missile development (through photos of

test range, etc.).

Improving estimates of Soviet ability to deliver nuclear weapons

and of their capacity to produce them.

Disclosing new developments which might otherwise lead to tech-

nological surprise.

Appraising Soviet industrial and economic progress.

Organization

Secret task force under Central Intelligence Agency with strong

Air Force staff assistance to equip and carry out entire mission up to
point where flow of useful new intelligence is established. Task force
to include top experts selected from Government agencies, armed serv-
ices, universities and industry to provide for most effective application
of science and technology toward fulfillment of this objective.

Vehicle

Special “powered glider” CL–282 aircraft proposed by Lockheed.

ALTITUDE–70,000 feet. SPEED–500 kt. RANGE–3,000 n. mi. GROSS
WEIGHT–15,000 lbs. TAKE-OFF DISTANCE–1,200 feet. CREW–lone

The Intelligence Community 567

Top Secret; Eyes Only.

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pilot in heated, pressurized suit. AVAILABILITY–four aircraft for field
use in 17 months assured by Lockheed.

Cameras

Standard Trimetrogon for charting entire overflown strip. Focal

lengths from 12–48 inches to be used in multiple mounts for main work
load. Special long focal length spotting camera for detailing concen-
trated areas down to objects as small as a man. Clear identification of
Roads, Railroads, Power Lines, Industrial Plants, Air Fields, Parked
Aircraft, Missile Sites and the like within a strip 200 miles wide by 2,500
miles long per flight.

Electronics

Electronics intercept [

less than 1 line not declassified

] data to be

recorded on special automatic recorders preset for selected frequencies.
More extensive electronic data available by optional use of additional
electronic gear in place of photographic gear.

Schedule

New intelligence to start flowing within twenty months.

Cost

$22,000,000 to initial flow of significant intelligence. (Includes pro-

curement of design, development and test of six CL–282 aircraft, train-
ing and operation of special task force and initial logistic support.)

195. Editorial Note

Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles prepared a paper for

a review of national security policy then underway on November 18,
1954. Dulles reviewed the evolving dynamics of the superpower com-
petition, predicting that, over the next few years, the Soviet Union
would become a more formidable competitor with the West in all re-
gions of the world. To respond to this growing competition (which
Dulles believed would remain primarily diplomatic, economic, and cul-
tural, and was not likely to result in a ground war), Dulles noted that
the United States needed “to employ in a closely coordinated fashion
all the cold war weapons at its disposal.” To do so, the government re-
quired “the decisive coordination of political, military, economic and
covert actions.” The text is in

Foreign Relations,

1952–1954, volume II,

Part 1, pages 776–781.

568 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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197. Memorandum by the Intelligence Advisory Committee

Washington, November 23, 1954.

SUBJECT

Intelligence

In our opinion there are serious gaps in our Intelligence covering

the Soviet Bloc areas, particularly in relation to our ability to determine
the capabilities of the Soviet Union to launch nuclear attacks against
the U.S. and to detect indications of their intentions to do so. We be-
lieve that we could have a substantially improved capability of filling
these gaps through the use of aerial reconnaissance and photography,
and that today these methods are the most practicable additional means
to this end.

Allen W. Dulles

Director of Central Intelligence

W. Park Armstrong, Jr.

Spec. Asst. for Intelligence
Department of State

Arthur G. Trudeau

Major General, USA
Asst. Chief of Staff, G–2
Department of the Army

John A. Samford

Major General, USAF
Director of Intelligence
Department of the Air Force

Carl F. Espe

Rear Admiral, USN
Director of Naval Intelligence

570 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for Science and

Technology, Job 33–02415A, Box 1. Top Secret. Although no addressee is given on the
memorandum, it went to the President who alone made the decision on overflights.

Printed from a copy that shows that Carl Reichardt signed for Traynor above

Traynor’s typed signature and that shows only Roach’s typed signature.

320-672/B428-S/11008

Edwin T. Layton

Rear Admiral, USN
Dep. Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff, JCS

Harry S. Traynor

Atomic Energy Commission
Representative to the IAD

Ralph R. Roach

Acting Asst. to the Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

1363_A35-A40.qxd 9/28/07 9:33 AM Page 570

198. Memorandum by Director of Central Intelligence Dulles

Washington, November 24, 1954.

SUBJECT

Reconnaissance

You are familiar with the large gaps in our Intelligence coverage

of the Soviet Union which prevent us from obtaining adequate knowl-
edge of Soviet intentions and, in important respects, of Soviet capabil-
ities; and in particular, with respect to their capabilities and intentions
to launch nuclear attacks on the United States. You are familiar, too,
with the current and growing difficulties in the way of filling those
gaps by the more classic means.

In my considered judgment, as well as that of the other members

of the Intelligence Community, there is not the prospect of gaining this
vital Intelligence without the conduct of systematic and repeated air re-
connaissance over the Soviet Union itself. (Even this does not assure ad-
equacy, but will certainly provide a much closer approach to adequacy.)
The members of the Doolittle Committee in their report,

expressed their

belief that every known technique should be used and new ones de-
veloped to increase our Intelligence by high altitude photographic re-
connaissance and other means, and that no price would be too high to
pay for the knowledge to be derived therefrom. Thus, there is a defi-
nite and urgent National requirement for photographic and electronic
reconnaissance overflights of the Soviet Bloc.

While we have been considering the problem for a long time (you

may recall a discussion I had with you some months ago concerning
overflights), Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., and members of Project 3, Tech-
nological Capabilities Panel, Office of Defense Mobilization, (E.H.
Land, James G. Baker, Joseph W. Kennedy, Edward M. Purcell and John
W. Tukey) have independently arrived at essentially the same conclu-
sion.

I have also discussed it with Secretary Talbott and with General

Twining.

We are all agreed that the requirement is an urgent one and

The Intelligence Community 571

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for Science and

Technology, Job 33–02415A, Box 1. Top Secret. The date is handwritten. Although no ad-
dressee is shown, internal references indicate the memorandum was addressed to Pres-
ident Eisenhower, who made the decision on overflights.

Document 192.

Document 194.

Document 196.

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that with suitable direction and support, it is feasible of accomplish-
ment with minimum risk.

An existing Air Force aircraft type (the Canberra)

is considered

capable of modification to give it a ceiling of around 65,000 feet. At
such an altitude now, the expectation that it would be detected is very
low indeed, and the possibility that it would be intercepted and shot
down is practically nil. The possibility of forced landing in enemy ter-
ritory exists, but the chances of that are low. The repercussions of its
falling into enemy hands can be mitigated if the aircraft should be
manned by non-official U.S. personnel. To the extent practicable, we
would try to man the aircraft with Poles or other non-U.S. nationals.
The aircraft itself, if not completely destroyed, would bear no mark-
ings that would clearly identify its origin. (The Canberra itself is nearly
identical with its British prototype.)

As a follow-on to the Canberra, we would simultaneously proceed

with the procurement of specially designed reconnaissance aircraft
with more advanced performance characteristics, that would take it to
around 70,000 feet.

In addition to this high altitude day reconnaissance, we would re-

sort to very low altitude reconnaissance at night with appropriate air-
craft. Whereas the night reconnaissance would not provide a substi-
tute for the high altitude day photography, nevertheless it would give
an opportunity for supplementary reconnaissance, exploiting such
technical developments as infrared photography and certain electron-
ics techniques.

Of course, not even the 70,000 foot opportunity will be of indefi-

nite duration. Our problem will be one of keeping ahead and creating
new opportunities as the old disappear.

We are all agreed also that, in order to attain a status of readiness

to launch these flights as early as desired, and then to conduct them,
extraordinary procedures would have to be adopted for aircraft, crew
and equipment procurement, testing, training, and for operations. This
would require the greatest possible collaboration between the Air Force
and the Central Intelligence Agency.

I recommend that you:

a. Approve the existence of a National requirement for the above

reconnaissance overflights.

b. By approval of this document, direct the Secretary of the Air

Force and the Director of Central Intelligence to establish as a matter

572 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

The aircraft became known as the RB–69.

This aircraft would become the U–2.

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of urgency, a collaborative project for the procurement and testing of
the necessary aircraft and equipment, and for the procurement and
training of the necessary crews (such crews to be [

less than 1 line not

declassified

] to the extent practicable). The Director of Central Intelli-

gence is also hereby authorized to obligate in Fiscal Year 1955 an
amount not to exceed [

dollar amount not declassified

] from the [

less than

1 line not declassified

] for aircraft procurement, and it is expected as the

project develops additional authority will be sought by him for funds
for maintenance, training, operations, etc.

c. By approval of this document, direct the Secretary of the Air

Force and the Director of Central Intelligence, subject to appropriate
policy guidance as directed, to conduct at the earliest possible date, the
reconnaissance overflights, and to do so in such a way as to reduce the
risk of involvement of the U.S. to the minimum practicable.

Allen W. Dulles

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

199. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, November 24, 1954, 8:10 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary of State (for part of meeting)
Secretary of Defense
Mr. Allen Dulles
Secretary of Air Force
General Twining
Lt. General Cabell
Lt. General Putt
Colonel Goodpaster

Authorization was sought from the President to go ahead on a pro-

gram to produce thirty special high performance aircraft at a cost of
about $35 million. The President approved this action. Mr. Allen Dulles
indicated that his organization could not finance this whole sum
without drawing attention to it, and it was agreed that Defense would
seek to carry a substantial part of the financing.

The Intelligence Community 573

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Ann Whitman Diary. Top Secret.

Drafted by Goodpaster on November 24.

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The Secretary of Defense sought the President’s agreement to tak-

ing one last look at the type of operations planned when the aircraft
are available. The President indicated agreement.

To a question by the President, the Secretary of State indicated that

difficulties might arise out of these operations, but that “we could live
through them.”

In summary, the President directed those present to go ahead and

get the equipment, but before initiating operations to come in for one
last look at the plans.

200. Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 4/3

Washington, December 14, 1954.

COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES

1. Pursuant to National Security Council Intelligence Directive

No. 4,

paragraph 1, the following comprehensive national intelligence

objectives, generally applicable to all foreign countries and areas, are
hereby established:

a. Basic descriptive data as outlined in NIS Standard Instructions.
b. Social, economic, and political stability and trends of develop-

ment; susceptibility to foreign influence or coercion; vulnerability to
subversion.

c. Military capabilities and vulnerabilities, offensive and defen-

sive, including economic, scientific and technical, and psychological
factors.

574 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC Intelligence

Directives. Secret. DCID 4/3 and DCID 4/4 (Document 201) were attached to a single
cover page, which indicated that both had been prepared by the Director of Central In-
telligence in collaboration with members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee pur-
suant to National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 4, and that they were ap-
proved on December 14.

Text in

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment,

Document 422.

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d. Capabilities to influence, coerce, or subvert other governments

and peoples; capabilities for espionage, sabotage, and other clandes-
tine operations in other countries.

e. Foreign policy, including strategic concepts and intentions; in-

ternational alignment, with particular reference to alignment with or
against the US or the USSR; disposition and intention to interfere in
the internal affairs of other states; preparation for and intention to re-
sort to armed action against other states.

2. Priority national intelligence objectives, with reference to spe-

cific countries and subjects, will be set forth in a separate DCID.

3. DCID 4/1 “National Intelligence Objectives,” 5 February 1948,

is hereby rescinded.

Allen W. Dulles

Director of Central Intelligence

Not printed. (Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff, Job 84–B00389R, HS/

HC–600, Box 4)

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

201. Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 4/4

Washington, December 14, 1954.

PRIORITY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES

1. Pursuant to National Security Council Intelligence Directive

No. 4,

paragraph 2, the following list of priority national intelligence

objectives is established as a guide for the coordination of intelligence
collection and production in response to requirements relating to the
formulation and execution of national security policy.

2. By definition, all items in this listing are deemed to be critical

national intelligence factors requiring priority attention and effort.

The Intelligence Community 575

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Box 2517, NSC In-

telligence Directives. Secret. DCID 4/3 and DCID 4/4 were attached to a single cover
page; see footnote 1, Document 200.

Text in

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment,

Document 422.

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Distinction is made, however, between three levels of priority within
the general priority category. Order of listing within these three
groups is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no signif-
icance with respect to the relative priority of specific items within the
group.

[Omitted here is a graphic depicting priority levels.]
3. In order to afford a stable basis for intelligence planning, this

directive is designed to remain valid over an extended period. It will
be reviewed semiannually, or on the request of any member of the IAC.
It is recognized that urgent interim requirements may arise requiring
ad hoc treatment, and that the criteria on which the following priori-
ties are established shall remain under continuing review.

4. DCID 4/2 is hereby rescinded.

I. Highest Priority Objectives:

Those of such critical importance as to

require a maximum intelligence effort.

a. Soviet over-all politico-military strategy, intentions, and plans,

particularly Soviet intentions and plans to initiate hostilities using So-
viet or Satellite armed forces.

b. Chinese Communist over-all politico-military strategy, inten-

tions, and plans, particularly Chinese Communist intentions and plans
to initiate hostilities using Chinese Communist armed forces.

c. Soviet development, production, disposition, and employment

of weapons and other components of weapons systems requisite for
nuclear attack on the United States and/or key US overseas installa-
tions or for defense of the Soviet Bloc against air attack. Particular ref-
erence is made to the development, production, and employment of:
(1) nuclear weapons; (2) delivery systems, including aircraft, guided
missiles, and related base facilities; and (3) the components of the So-
viet air defense systems.

d. Soviet capabilities, plans, and intentions for the clandestine de-

livery of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.

576 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

DCID 4/2, “Priority List of Critical National Intelligence Objectives,” was issued

28 September 1950 and revised 12 June 1952 and 4 August 1953. [Footnote in the origi-
nal DCID 4/2 is Document 25]

Note: Order of listing within Category I is a matter of convenience in presenta-

tion and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of specific items within
that category. [Footnote in the original.]

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II. High Priority Objectives:

Those of such high importance as to

warrant an intensive intelligence effort.

The USSR and European Satellites

a. The Soviet estimate of US and allied capabilities and intentions,

of US and allied economic and political stability, and of the strength,
cohesion, and probable development of the NATO Bloc.

b. Major Soviet international political objectives and courses of ac-

tion, including economic policies and actions, with particular reference
to courses designed to weaken and disrupt the NATO alliance or to fo-
ment antagonism between Western and Asian powers.

c. Soviet political strengths and weaknesses: the actual locus of

political power in the USSR; actual or potential personal or policy con-
flicts within the ruling group; Soviet-Satellite relations, with particular
reference to the character and degree of Soviet control; the strengths
and weaknesses of the Soviet and Satellite apparatus of police control;
the extent of actual disaffection and of potential resistance in the So-
viet and Satellite populations.

d. The character of the Soviet (including Satellite) economy, with

particular reference to its ability to support a major war; the motiva-
tion, character, and magnitude of current economic development pro-
grams, their implementation, and their effect upon the economic, po-
litical, and military strength of the Soviet Bloc.

e. Soviet and Satellite scientific and technical strengths and weak-

nesses affecting Soviet economic and military capabilities.

f. The strength, composition, disposition, capabilities, and weak-

nesses of the Soviet and Satellite armed forces, including their strate-
gic and tactical doctrine, their political reliability, their logistical sup-
port, and military production and stockpiling.

[

29 paragraphs (86

⁄

lines) not declassified

]

Allen W. Dulles

Director of Central Intelligence

The Intelligence Community 577

[

⁄

lines not declassified.

] [Footnote in the original.]

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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202. Paper by James Q. Reber of the Planning and Coordination

Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, December 23, 1954.

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION COLLECTION PROGRAM AND

THE COORDINATION OF REQUIREMENTS

1. Coordination of collection requirements which are responsive to

the intelligence production programs of the IAC and its member agen-
cies is fundamental to obtain the maximum benefit from the collection
activities of the Government. A number of these production programs
have been fairly defined. They include: the NIS (now in its eighth year),
National Intelligence Estimates with its annual program and post-
mortem procedures, research in economic, scientific and technical intel-
ligence, and the Watch Committee and the National Indications Center.
The recently approved Priority National Intelligence Objectives (DCID–
4/4)

are intended to provide more discriminating guidance than hereto-

fore to these production programs, from which, in the main, require-
ments for collection stem directly rather than from the DCID–4/4.

2. Because of the size and number of the research elements in the

intelligence community and their remoteness from collection activities,
the function of collection requirements is the vital link which warrants
constant and careful attention in order to assure that collection activi-
ties are supporting, without duplication or other needless collection,
the priority production programs.

3. It is believed that a first step in providing such attention is to

bring together in one place the essential, factual material on what col-
lection mechanisms exist and how requirements are today levied and
coordinated. The attached paper purports to be an initial, though ad-
mittedly incomplete, statement of such.

4. This paper has been prepared through the cooperation of offi-

cers within CIA who are close to and have some responsibility for mat-
ters described herein. As it may be amended and improved, it might
serve several purposes:

(a) The Director and the IAC might use it in budget presentations

to inform the Bureau of the Budget of this segment of intelligence

activities

578 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: National Archives, RG 59, INR Files: Lot 58 D 776, Collection and Dis-

semination. Secret.

Document 201.

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(b) It might serve as a bench mark established at this time and

place which would later serve as a point of reference and measurement

of our program in the future

activities involved in the coordination of collection requirements and

in ways not previously possible, thus serving as an educational paper

(d) Insofar as it is complete and authorative, it should serve as a

base for those who have the responsibility for seeking to effect im-

provements in directing the collection of intelligence information to-

ward the most useful purposes.

5. Facts about big bureaucracy with its many people and many

procedures are difficult to come by. Accordingly suggestions from the
readers of this document as to how it can be made more accurate and
useful would be appreciated.

6. It has been recommended to the Director by the Board of Na-

tional Estimates in connection with its proposed review of DCID–4/2
(National Intelligence Objectives)

that the Director initiate a review of

the coordination of collection requirements. Such a review would nec-
essarily require among other things an understanding of the way in
which the collection mechanisms themselves are administered, their
capabilities and their relations with producers as well as requirements
officers. While a general review, such as proposed, is appealing it
should also be kept in mind that there are continual efforts directed to-
ward improvement in specific areas. For example, as a means of ef-
fecting improvement in the handling of defector exploitation for intel-
ligence purposes the IAC at its meeting of 20 December 1954 instituted
certain new arrangements. Of course, a general review and special at-
tention to specific collection problems could go forward hand in hand.

James Q. Reber

The Intelligence Community 579

Document 25.

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, December 23, 1954.

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION COLLECTION PROGRAM AND

THE COORDINATION OF REQUIREMENTS

The Foreign Service of the United States:

Instructions to the For-

eign Service for collection are in the last analysis the responsibility of
the Assistant Secretaries of the respective bureaus in the Department
of State. Except for agricultural reporting which is now administered
by law directly

by the Department of Agriculture, the Department of

State must provide reporting of interest to the U.S. Government with
its many non-intelligence interests as well as to the IAC Community.
It must also be recalled that this same Foreign Service has other major
responsibilities, namely, representation to foreign governments and
protection of U.S. interests abroad. The desk officers in each political
bureau depend to a considerable extent upon the intelligence organi-
zation of the Department of State for the preparation and coordination
of requirements for intelligence reporting.

Increased attention to the collection of information abroad for the

use of intelligence is reflected in the new chapter (900) of the Foreign
Service Manual which deals with this subject. In the economic field the
“R” Area in the Department of State cooperates with the Division of
Foreign Service Reporting to insure that insofar as possible available
resources of the Foreign Service are not requested to collect informa-
tion available in Washington and that requirements relevant to national
security are given precedence over those for less vital functions of the
Government (such as development of information about possible mar-
kets for U.S. products abroad). State “R” has invited the assistance of
ORR and the Economic Intelligence Committee (EIC) to assist in the
preparation of guides for economic reporting. The intelligence organ-

580 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Secret. There is no drafting information on the paper.

There are current negotiations between the Departments of State and Agriculture

which have resulted in a temporary agreement for the continuance of agricultural re-
porting on the Soviet Bloc by State. These talks are continuing with regard to State’s as-
sistance to Agriculture for agricultural reporting on the Free World (many areas not cov-
ered by AAs [Agricultural Attachés] can be covered in part by State). [Footnote in the
original.]

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ization in State has also invited CIA/OCI to participate in the prepa-
ration of instructions for political reporting.

It should also be borne in mind that the “R” Area itself is an im-

portant originator of requirements for reporting in the political, cul-
tural and social field and that while it has access to other collection
mechanisms, the Foreign Service is a prime collector of information in
the area of intelligence assigned to State. The establishment of a na-
tional intelligence estimating program and the demand on the “R” Area
of State for contributions thereto represent an important influence in
guiding the “R” Area to requisition information on gaps of funda-
mental importance. There are comparable effects upon reporting by
virtue of the “R” Area’s participation in the Watch process, as well as
in the NIS production.

Peripheral Reporting Program:

This program was established as a

separate collection device within the Foreign Service under the Chiefs
of Mission. Its purpose is to obtain information on the Soviet Bloc coun-
tries by the assignment of competent officers to certain posts contigu-
ous to the Soviet Bloc where the potential data on that area is substan-
tial. This was necessary as a means of supplementing the reporting from
missions behind the Iron Curtain area where many local restrictions are
imposed on our staffs. At present, peripheral reporting units are located
in Frankfurt, Vienna, Paris, Tel Aviv and Istanbul. In Frankfurt the pe-
ripheral reporting unit prepares comprehensive studies in the political,
cultural, sociological and economical fields based on information col-
lected on the USSR; these reports are called SPONGE reports.

The peripheral reporting officers make use of a variety of sources

including defectors, escapees, refugees, travelers and officials of other
governments located in the same areas as the peripheral units. The orig-
inal emphasis was upon collection from arrivals from behind the Iron
Curtain. Peripheral officers are now encouraged to develop other
sources among the indigenous travelers to and from the Soviet Bloc
and staffs of other government located in the same countries as the pe-
ripheral reporting unit. While the peripheral units are encouraged to
develop sources as indicated above, the main sources at present are as
follows:

Frankfurt (defectors)

Vienna (refugees)

Paris (émigrés and groups of émigrés)

Tel Aviv (refugees and recent émigrés from Iron Curtain

countries)

Istanbul (émigrés and a few arrivals from Bulgaria)

Foreign Map Procurement:

The requirements of all the mapping

agencies of the U.S. Government for foreign maps are coordinated by
CIA and the Interagency Map Procurement Coordinating Committee

The Intelligence Community 581

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on which sit the representatives of the mapping agencies. The MPC is
chaired by the Chief of the Map Library Division, CIA/ORR, who also
serves as the Special Assistant to the Director, Office of Libraries and
Intelligence Acquisition, Department of State (also designated infor-
mally, “Special Assistant for Maps”). Under the direction of the Spe-
cial Assistant for Maps, foreign maps are procured through the De-
partment of State and Foreign Service. Although the function of overt
collection of maps abroad rests with the Department of State, the geo-
graphic research function has been transferred from State to CIA; hence,
the CIA direction of a State collection program. Four map procurement
officers are stationed in the field and part-time map procurement ac-
tivity is assigned to other foreign service officers stationed in other ar-
eas. Salaries and administrative support of these field officers are the
responsibility of State and during recent budget reductions two map
procurement officers were dropped despite the efforts of CIA to per-
suade the Department of State to retain them.

The above program for the collection of foreign maps has been in

existence seven years. Procurement has been routinized by the estab-
lishment of informal exchange agreements (140) with certain countries
under which new map production is received in Washington through
the Foreign Service posts.

Requirements of CIA and Department of Defense components for

maps, air photography and other map information which is available
from U.S. firms engaged overseas in mapping and intelligence pho-
tography are prepared in the Map Library Division, ORR/CIA for pro-
curement by CIA/OO/C.

Frequently, an approaching assignment for production of an NIS

Chapter IX (Map and Chart Approval) on a given area has provided a
stimulus for procurement of foreign maps on that area in time for use
in Washington in producing the Chapter. In other cases foreign map
requirements are in direct response to individual agency research proj-
ects or to recognized gaps in foreign map coverage.

The coordinated interagency map procurement program does not

conflict with the map exchange agreements between the mapping com-
ponents of Defense and the opposite agencies in foreign countries.
Some of these agreements pertain to joint mapping programs with
other NATO countries. Agreements between the Army Map Service
and the NATO countries’ mapping agencies provide the bulk of topo-
graphical maps on NATO countries (and their colonies).

Foreign Publications Procurement

is coordinated by the DCI in

pursuance of the responsibility placed upon him in NSCID–16.

An in-

582 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Document 258.

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teragency committee has been established which seeks to identify those
areas in which needed publications may be obtained through the co-
operative action of agencies who have collecting capabilities as well as
to be alert to new means of procurement. Overt publications pro-
curement in the field is divided among military attachés, collection
arms of military commands overseas, and personnel of the Foreign
Service. The attachés and overseas commands concentrate on publi-
cations required by their parent organizations, while Foreign Service
personnel fill the requirements of the Department of State, CIA and
about 20 other Government agencies such as the Library of Congress
and the Department of Agriculture. For this purpose the Foreign
Service maintains at the present time six full-time Publications Pro-
curement Officers (in Moscow, Paris, Berlin, New Delhi, Tokyo, and
Hong Kong) and assigns the function on a part-time basis to an offi-
cer in other important posts. The degree of coordination and cooper-
ation among service attachés and Foreign Service officers varies
greatly from post to post. The Foreign Branch of the CIA Library, serv-
ing for this purpose as an operating arm of the Division of Acquisi-
tion and Distribution of the Department of State, in the last two years
since its establishment, has attempted to improve procurement by for-
mulating more detailed guidance for publications procurement offi-
cers, by providing them with evaluation on their efforts, and by work-
ing closely with those personnel in the defense departments engaged
in preparing collection requirements for the service attachés in order
that the most effective field procurement channel may be utilized in
any given procurement situation. When publications are not available
through overt channels, arrangements are made whenever possible
to obtain the materials through clandestine collection by CIA. As a re-
sult of the USIA Survey, the NSCID–16 subcommittee on Procurement
will explore with USIA the extent to which their library centers abroad
can assist in procurement.

Military Attachés:

The attachés of the military services are

guided by the “Essential Elements of Information” published in one
form or another under the direction of the Chiefs of Intelligence in G–2,
ONI and AFOIN. The EEI have been developed painstakingly and rep-
resent the comprehensive needs of the individual services. Within this
general framework specific or ad hoc requirements are levied upon the
attachés as current needs arise or, more systematically, as required to
meet the needs of each service and the JIC in its service to the JCS, in
response to the national intelligence estimating program for military
contributions and in response to both the original and maintenance
production of NIS sections assigned to the military.

General Comment With Regard to 1 to 5 above:

The foregoing is in

accordance with the allocation of responsibility for overt collection

The Intelligence Community 583

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abroad as outlined in NSCID–2.

Each agency is free to collect economic

and scientific and technical intelligence information in accordance with
its needs. Under NSCID–2 injunction, information, by whomever col-
lected, shall immediately be transmitted to the agency most concerned
as well as made available to all other interested agencies. These facili-
ties are to be utilized so as to avoid unproductive duplication and un-
coordinated overlap; “within budgetary limitations” they are to insure
that “full flow of intelligence information which is the major need of
all departments and agencies for the accomplishment of their respec-
tive missions”. In the field, the senior U.S. representative in each for-
eign area is responsible for the coordination of “all normal collection
activities in his area”. The manner in which this is done will vary from
post to post, both in respect to the personalities involved and the size
and importance of the mission. In March 1954 the Department of State
sent a special instruction to all Chiefs of Mission reiterating the coor-
dinating role of mission chiefs under NSCID–2 and urging maximum
use of all available personnel including military attachés. At the same
time, the Army, Navy and Air Force dispatched similar messages to all
attachés, urging maximum cooperation with mission chiefs in devel-
oping coordinated collection programs.

Regular Collection Offices:

Each intelligence agency maintains a

collection office to coordinate requirements from its research offices,
assist their research offices in determining the availability of the infor-
mation in Washington (either in its own agency or another agency),
levy requirements on collectors (either its own collection arm or those
of other agencies) and disseminate the information collected against
requirements.

CIA/OCD/LD’s liaison officers, initially working through cleared

liaison authorities in other (non-IAC) government agencies, ferret
through those “non intelligence” government agencies known or be-
lieved to have (or capable of obtaining) foreign intelligence. CIA/
OCD/LD collects such intelligence either against specific requests or
spontaneously.

CIA/OCD/LD administers a debriefing program, making avail-

able to CIA the knowledge of government officials who have been
abroad. The debriefing program is not limited as to area or subject but
is, of course, limited only by the knowledge of the returned officials.

Collection of Foreign Intelligence Within The United States from Non-

governmental sources:

On a selective basis is the responsibility of CIA

584 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

For text, see

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Estab-

lishment, Document 425.

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(OO/C) as a service of common concern (NSCID–7).

Guidance in this

selection is provided by the continuing requirements statements of the
research elements of CIA and the other IAC agencies, in addition to
consumer evaluations of reports and supplemented by continuous li-
aison to discuss specific needs and individual sources.

To assure that this service is of maximum value to consumers, con-

ferences are being scheduled at the working level in all of the member
agencies. In addition, four specific interagency arrangements are either
completed or well on the way to completion:

(a) Three specialized ATIC officers have been placed in domestic

field offices to guide and actually engage in the collection of technical
information. The assignment of a fourth officer, trained in air elec-
tronics, is expected shortly.

(b) A similar arrangement has been worked out through G–2

for the assignment of two Signal Corps Intelligence officers to domes-
tic field offices in an effort to increase the quantity and quality of
telecommunications-intelligence collection. One of these officers is al-
ready being processed.

telligence of the Air Force and with the Air Research and Development
Command to facilitate the exploitation of civilian employees at the var-
ious ARDC centers for intelligence information not otherwise available
to the member agencies.

(d) Tentative arrangements have been concluded with G–2 for a

similar program to be established in the near future with the seven
Army Technical Services.

A fifth specific effort to produce more effective and coordinated

intelligence collection consisted of a program to analyze critically all
requirements which have been received by Contact Division from the
producing elements of CIA and the other IAC agencies, and to codify
in readily usable form all basic requirements currently outstanding.

Radio Monitoring:

Under NSCID–6

a central radio monitoring

service (CIA/FBID) is established and the monitoring of foreign prop-
aganda and press broadcasts for the collection of intelligence informa-
tion by other federal agencies is specifically precluded.

Since radio monitoring does not lend itself to exploitation for spe-

cific information on specific subjects, guides or “targets” are provided
by IAC offices each week. These are requests for translation of what
is said by area transmitters in comment on, reaction to, or mention of
specific subjects, events or people. Additionally, a list of long-range or

The Intelligence Community 585

Ibid., Document 427.

Ibid., Document 424.

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standing requirements stated in broad terms is provided quarterly. Both
target lists are distributed to field installations in order that the desired
information may be selected from the great volume of monitored ra-
dio broadcasting.

Specific collection requests, especially on the technical aspects of

radio monitoring, but sometimes on the content of radio broadcasts,
are levied on CIA/FBID either formally by the requester through
CIA/OCD, or informally to the Liaison Officer, FBID.

Additional guidance is obtained from study of intelligence defi-

ciencies and the NIS and NIE programs. Some requirements are self-
evident, e.g., radio monitoring coverage of Central Asia provides
unique information on an area of the world not otherwise covered to
any appreciable extent by intelligence collection activities. Before in-
vesting funds and personnel in meeting a requirement such as this,
FBID solicits the IAC agencies to determine their interest.

10.

The Collection and Exploitation of Soviet Materials for Intelligence

Purposes

is carried out under two programs which are coordinated. On

the one hand the military has established a committee known as the
Joint Technical Intelligence Subcommittee (JTIS) with the responsibil-
ity for coordinating military requirements for Soviet materials, relay-
ing them to field components with a capability for collection and co-
ordination of the exploitation of Soviet material. Civilian requirements
(those of CIA, State and AEC) are coordinated by a “Sovmat Staff” in
CIA/OO which levies requirements against not only foreign service
and military collection units but also, when appropriate, against CIA’s
clandestine collection service. Through the participation of the Chief
of the Sovmat Staff as an Advisor to the Chairman of JTIS coordina-
tion between these two programs is provided.

11.

The Travel Folder Program

is designed to obtain the maximum

information from within the Soviet Orbit by direct personal observa-
tions on the part of American officials stationed in U.S. Missions be-
hind the Iron Curtain. Approved by the IAC, the program is super-
vised by CIA in consultation with the Economic Intelligence
Committee. The program consists of the coordination of IAC require-
ments (mainly economic, scientific, technical, and military), briefing
and debriefing of travelers, the preparation of comprehensive reports
of their observations, [

⁄

lines not declassified

12.

Research Units Abroad

sponsored by CIA (strategic divisions)

attempt to bring to the field more intimately the kind of guidance which
would make field collection more meaningful in terms of headquar-
ters programs. [

5 lines not declassified

]

13.

Collection of U.S. Files Abroad

was undertaken by CIA in 1951.

A team microfilmed documents containing intelligence information in
the files of the U.S. agencies all over Europe, in anticipation of the pos-

586 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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sible overruning of Europe by Russia and the consequent loss of the
information in such documents. In general, such microfilming was not
conducted in response to specific requirements and was mainly com-
posed of industrial data regarding West European countries.

The entire collection of some 2,000 reels of film is available in the

CIA Industrial Register. Few of the files microfilmed have been in-
dexed, but the team identified them in terms of subject matter when-
ever possible and in terms of source or area when subject matter in-
formation was not available. Selected portions of the collection have
been incorporated into IR files, and a more complete index is being
prepared on a low priority basis.

No direct requirements are levied against the file. The IR analysts

use this information, among other sources in their files, when incom-
ing requirements indicate its utility, as do other research analysts when
using IR files.

14.

Captured Enemy Documents:

Plans have been established for co-

ordination in the exploitation of captured enemy documents in wartime
under a joint military agency known as the Armed Services Documents
Intelligence Center. Civilian agencies requirements will be satisfied in
this program by virtue of a CIA representative serving as an Assistant
Director in the Center who coordinates the requirements of CIA, State
and AEC.

15.

The National Security Agency

is guided in its collection activi-

ties through a USCIB subcommittee (Intelligence Committee) whose
function includes requirements coordination. This subcommittee, com-
posed of the intelligence agencies representatives, operates under a
rather highly sophisticated system of identifying priorities.

16.

In the Field of Indications

responsibility to improve the coordi-

nation of collection is set forth in DCID–1/2.

The Watch Committee

is supposed to “develop and operate on a current and continuing ba-
sis the Watch Committee Intelligence Plan for systematizing, energiz-
ing and coordinating through the appropriate channels the world-wide
collection by U.S. agencies of information and intelligence pertinent to
the Watch Committee mission.”

17. [

1 paragraph (24 lines) not declassified

]

18.

External Research:

Members of the intelligence community, as

well as several other Government agencies, sponsor external research
projects on foreign areas, thus providing an additional source of foreign
intelligence. This research is performed by Government agencies and
private institutions, each of them using whatever sources are available
to them. Government agencies, contracting for private research on

The Intelligence Community 587

Document 179.

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foreign areas, frequently supply such contractors with intelligence in-
formation which is, of course, supplemented by the contractors’ own
resources. Government agencies conducting research on behalf of other
Government agencies are exploited by informal interagency contact
and by such regular collection offices as CIA/OCD.

External research on foreign areas, although performed in response

to departmental needs, is subject to certain coordination efforts by the
intelligence community. These efforts are:

a. A clearing house for information provided by the External Re-

search Staff, Department of State (ERS), a joint operation of State, CIA
and Defense;

b. Informal monthly discussions among external research admin-

istrators of various agencies to exchange information on what they are
doing and what needs to be done;

c. An Advisory Panel on Research in Special Operations appointed

by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Development
consisting of outside specialists to provide guidance to the Department
of Defense. USIA, CIA, State, FOA and OCB are represented on the
Panel by associate members; and

d. On 11 December 1954 the DCI proposed to USIA, State, De-

fense, OCB and FOA that agencies with intelligence needs in the prop-
aganda and psychological warfare and foreign information fields co-
operate in the development of a government-wide program of external
research in support of such activities. Each agency would retain com-
plete responsibility for its departmental external research program but
would benefit by coordination of its program with other agencies hav-
ing related missions.

19.

ELINT:

Collection of information by the detection, reception

and recording of non-communication electronic radiations is carried
on by the three services and by CIA/DDP. Analysis of material which
has been collected is conducted separately by the Air Force and jointly
by Army and Navy through the Army-Navy Electronic Evaluation
Group, (NAEEG). There is limited and spasmodic coordination in the
field with respect to detection, reception and recording of ELINT col-
lection. There is little or no coordination between the groups working
on the analysis of collected material. Present ELINT collection activi-
ties carried on by the services are primarily directed toward OB type
information such as the identification and location of radio stations,
long-range navigation systems and so forth. Insofar as it has devel-
oped, the CIA/DDP collection effort is directed toward the detection
of new and unusual electronic emanations.

20.

Interrogations

of returning POWs, refugees and defectors have

been the subject of various activities by the IAC agencies—[

19 lines not

declassified

588 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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[

1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified

]

Coordination of the U.S. Defector Program at the Washington level

is accomplished by the Interagency Defector Committee (IDC). [

⁄

lines

not declassified

]

The Armed Services have established a center (Armed Services

Prisoner Interrogation Center) to coordinate the exploitation of POWs.
CIA, State and AEC’s interests are represented by an Assistant Direc-
tor at the Center. Although its mission is interrogation of captured pris-
oners, it participated in the interrogation of American POWs who had
been held and then released by the Chinese.

21.

Clandestine Collection Activities of the U.S. Government

include

CIA/FI, which also has access to any intelligence products of clandes-
tine operations, the clandestine services of the three military agencies
and AFOAT. The coordination of requirements for clandestine collec-
tion by CIA has been effected through the establishment of the Intera-
gency Priorities Committee for Clandestine Collection. Further devel-
opment in the efficient utilization of all sources of the Government for
clandestine collection is being developed through the proposal for
agreed activities under NSCID–5

now under negotiation between the

Director and the intelligence chiefs of the military agencies. The coor-
dination of information collected by AFOAT and all other sources is
assured, insofar as possible, under DCID 11/1.

In the main, as far as

the direction of collection is concerned, the effect of this would be to
alert AFOAT in the event that information regarding an atomic explo-
sion by the Russians were detected by one of the services other than
AFOAT in order that it could promptly institute collection activity.

22.

Press Monitoring

is done by some of the posts of the Foreign

Service in order to provide themselves with current press opinion. This
press monitoring activity varies from post to post; in Latin America
only one post (Rio de Janeiro), in Europe 19 posts, in Far East 11 posts
and in Near East and Africa 22 posts conduct press monitoring.

Current monitoring of the press of our two major enemies, USSR

and Red China, is performed in Moscow and Hong Kong respectively.
In Moscow there is the Joint Press Reading Service (JPRS), [

less than 1

line not declassified

]. The JPRS reviews and abstracts from the major

newspapers and periodicals of the USSR and issues two translated

The Intelligence Community 589

For NSCID No. 5, December 12, 1947, see

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emer-

gence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 423. For the revision of August 28,
1951, see Document 255.

DCID 11/1, December 7, 1954, “Control of Information Regarding Foreign Nu-

clear Explosions,” is in Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff, Job 84–B00389R, Box
4, Folder: HS/HC–600.

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series, Section A covers foreign affairs and Section B domestic news. In
addition, abstracts of leading periodicals are prepared separately. Dis-
semination is made by State within the Government and to a few pri-
vate institutions. The Hong Kong Press Monitoring Service has access
to (a) [

2 lines not declassified

] as well as (b) to U.S. procured Chinese

mainland publications. The HKPMS issues three press summaries titles:
Review of the Hong Kong Press (issued almost daily covering the main
articles of the Hong Kong press), Summary of the Chinese Mainland
Press (produced on the average of three or four issues per week cover-
ing the main topics of the Chinese language press and dividing the top-
ics in catagories of subject interest), and Current Background (a study
of various topics of political, economic and sociological significance
based on press articles extending over an indefinite period of time).
Wide dissemination of these press summaries is given within the U.S.
Government and to 25 private academic institutions or individuals.

In addition to the press summaries prepared by embassy em-

ployees (whether Foreign Service or USIA, etc.) the missions frequently
obtain press summaries from other governments. In approximately 15
posts, press summaries of the British are obtained while to a much
lesser extent, press summaries prepared by the French are received. In
nine posts, press summaries prepared by the host government are re-
ceived and in one post (Tehran) a press summary prepared by the USSR
is received. Dissemination of press summaries back to Washington and
within the Government varies from post to post. A review of the press
monitoring activities was prepared by State/IAD and distributed
within the Government for the information of the users.

No headquarters requirements are levied for overseas press mon-

itoring and consequently no coordination is required.

23.

Photographic Intelligence Collection and Requirements:

Intelli-

gence photography is collected from the air, on the ground, or as
records from radarscope presentations. The U.S. Air Force and U.S.
Navy operating squadrons and attachés collect approximately 75% and
15% respectively with the rest attributable to U.S. Army, CIA, and other
miscellaneous sources. Most of the aerial photography collected by the
Army for the Army Map Service is purchased from commercial or-
ganizations. CIA concentrates its effort toward the collection of aerial
photos from certain firms and foreign governments.

Aerial and ground photographs are required by the intelligence

analysts and mapping agencies throughout the IAC to corroborate
other intelligence data and fill existing gaps in intelligence. They are
essential to the production and maintenance of accurate large-scale
topographic maps and the preparation of strategic and tactical target
programs (Air Force) now in progress. CIA intelligence analysts require
photographic intelligence in support of intelligence objectives, which

590 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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may be geographic, economic, scientific, or military in nature and to
support clandestine operations.

While procedures exist in each agency for the coordination of its

photographic requirements, there has been established, on the invita-
tion of AFOIN in 1948, an Interagency Graphics Research Coordinat-
ing Group. Orginally, the group was composed of the three services; it
was joined by CIA in 1951. This Group, meeting monthly, exchanges
information regarding photo requirements, location of desired pho-
tography, overseas commercial mapping activities and related matters.
Highly classified and highest priority aerial photographic requirements
are reviewed and coordinated by JCS Plans and Policy with final con-
currence of State, Military and CIA.

203. Paper Prepared by a Working Group of the Operations

Coordinating Board

Washington, January 5, 1955.

ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE
DETACHMENT OF A MAJOR EUROPEAN SOVIET SATELLITE

Summary

1. Acting on the suggestion of the Board Assistants, the OCB, at

its meeting of August 25, 1954,

requested the Working Group to re-

view additional possible actions to implement NSC 174,

particularly

a major coordinated effort by appropriate agencies designed to detach
one of the important European satellites from the Soviet bloc. The
Working Group was requested to submit a preliminary staff analysis
to the Board which would point up the policy and strategic implica-
tions and feasibility factors that would be involved in such an effort.

The Intelligence Community 591

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, USSR and Satel-

lites Documents 1953–56. Top Secret. A January 11 covering memorandum from Elmer
B. Staats, Executive Officer of the Operations Coordinating Board, to the Operations Co-
ordinating Board, noted that at its January 5 meeting the Board approved the recom-
mendations in the paper. No further record of this meeting has been found.

See Document 190 and footnote 1 thereto.

See footnote 2, Document 190.

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At their meeting of August 13, 1954,

the Board Assistants agreed that

Albania should not be considered as an “important” satellite for the
purposes of this study.

2. The Working Group first reviewed existing intelligence esti-

mates of the political situation concerning all of the Eastern European
satellites. Then a study was made of the methods that might be used
to detach a satellite. U.S. capabilities for such action were reviewed and
conclusions flowing from the analysis were drawn. Studies on the vul-
nerabilities of East Germany and Czechoslovakia were prepared espe-
cially for this review.

3. The analysis indicates that the instrumentalities of Soviet do-

minion in the political, economic and cultural fields, backed by mili-
tary force, continue to be effective in maintaining control over the satel-
lites. The progressive sovietization of the political, social and economic
structure of the satellites, the orientation of the local economies towards
the East and the concentrated effort at indoctrination of the rising gen-
eration have served further to support Moscow’s control over the satel-
lite areas. The Soviet orbit nevertheless has vulnerabilities which are
susceptible to exploitation by the United States.

4. Without attempting to be categorical, it is the opinion of the

Working Group that soft treatment cannot be expected to effect the ba-
sic changes in the nature of communist regimes which would conform
to U.S. objectives; and that therefore, except when relaxations are cal-
culated to obtain carefully defined limited objectives within a short
time span or to protect the people against the regime under special cir-
cumstances of internal tension, pressures should be increased against
any part of the Soviet orbit where suitable opportunities appear. The
importance of this subject justifies study of appropriate implementing
actions consistent with U.S. policy as it develops.

Recommendation

It is recommended that the Board concur in the following:
a. At present, given the strength of the Soviet position, no major

Soviet satellite presents vulnerabilities of such extent that their ex-
ploitation can be expected to result in its detachment from the Soviet
bloc.

b. U.S. capabilities under present conditions are not sufficient to

accomplish the detachment of any major Soviet satellite by means short
of war.

c. Unless the power balance between the United States and the

Soviet Union changes drastically in our favor, there is little likelihood

592 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

No record of this meeting has been found.

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of detaching a major satellite at any time without grave risk of war ex-
cept by negotiation. The only satellite which now lends itself to possi-
ble detachment by this means is East Germany. If an effort against this
satellite were to be undertaken with any hope of success it would re-
quire a concentration of political, economic and psychological meas-
ures directed to this end. A study of the requirements of such a con-
centrated effort should now be undertaken with East Germany as a
target in order that advantage may be taken of any future development
making possible the unification of Germany by negotiation on terms
acceptable to the U.S.

[Omitted here are 36 pages of analysis supporting the summary.]

204. Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 5/1

Washington, January 11, 1955.

COORDINATION OF THE FOREIGN CLANDESTINE

COLLECTION ACTIVITIES OF THE ARMED SERVICES WITH

THOSE OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Pursuant to the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, as

amended,

and for the purpose of defining under NSCID No. 5,

those

clandestine collection activities which the Armed Services conduct in

The Intelligence Community 593

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC Intelligence

Directives. Secret. On January 11, NSC Executive Secretary Lay circulated this directive
by memorandum to the National Security Council and noted that the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence would make reference to it and other directives in his quarterly oral re-
port at the January 13 NSC meeting. (Ibid.) In a January 12 memorandum to the Secre-
tary of State, Armstrong also transmitted this directive and described it as follows:
“Specifically, DCID 5/1, attached, defines the respective areas of responsibility of CIA
and the armed services in the field of clandestine intelligence. As such it represents a
long sought agreement between Defense and CIA in this very sensitive, very complex,
but very important field. Neither the NSC nor DCI Intelligence Directive provides for
coordination with the Department on clandestine intelligence activities which bear upon
foreign policy, although coordination of this kind is specifically provided in directives
pertaining to covert [psychological] Operations.

I do not, however, recommend that any re-

vision be made at this time.”

(Ibid., S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66 D 95, National Intelligence Ob-

jectives) Brackets and emphasis in the original.

Pursuant to P.L. 216 of August 10, 1949, National Security Act amendments of

1949, the Department of Defense was established to coordinate and direct the U.S. Army,
Navy, and Air Force. (63 Stat. 578)

Document 255.

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order to carry out their responsibilities and assigned missions, and to
protect the security of their foreign based military commands or in-
stallations, and for the purpose of coordinating such activities with
those of the Central Intelligence Agency (except in areas where United
States armed forces are engaged in active combat operations, in which
event the provisions of paragraph 10 of NSCID #5 shall be deemed ap-
plicable), the following is established:

1. Where United States military commands or installation are lo-

cated outside of the United States and its possessions, the command-
ers thereof may conduct such foreign clandestine collection activities
as they deem essential to the execution of their assigned missions, in
accordance with the principles and procedures set forth hereinafter.

2. Review and coordination of plans for the clandestine collection

activities of the Armed Services and plans of the Central Intelligence
Agency for the clandestine collection of information of interest to the
Armed Services will be accomplished with each service to the extent
practicable at the national level.

3. In order to assure field coordination of clandestine collection

activities, the designated representatives of the military commanders
concerned and of the Director of Central Intelligence will review to-
gether all such activities of those military commanders, as well as the
operational plans and procedures therefor. They will also review to-
gether those clandestine collection activities of the Central Intelligence
Agency which are undertaken in direct support of the military com-
manders concerned. Coordination may involve the creation and uti-
lization of common support facilities, the exchange of operational in-
formation, and the establishment of informal committees.

4. In the event that the designated representative of the Director of

Central Intelligence considers an activity, plan or agent to be potentially
harmful to the over-all clandestine effort, the proposed action will not be
carried out except as provided in paragraph 5 below, without prior ap-
proval resulting from agreement between the appropriate military serv-
ice intelligence chief and the Director of Central Intelligence.

5. In those instances when the military commander considers the

action proposed in paragraph 4 above to be essential to the immediate
conduct of his mission or critical to the security of his forces, and time
does not permit referral of the issue to Washington, the action may pro-
ceed on the responsibility of the military commander, pending resolution
in Washington. The military commander will inform the designated rep-
resentative of the Director of Central Intelligence as to his action.

594 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Upon the issuance of this Directive, a systematic review and adjustment, where

necessary, of ongoing operations will be made in the field in conformity with the pro-
visions of this Directive. [Footnote in the original.]

Printed from an unsigned copy.

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205. Memorandum From the National Security Council

Representative on Internal Security (Coyne) to the President’s
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Cutler) and the
Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)

Washington, February 8, 1955.

CIA–The Doolittle Report on CIA’s Covert Activities

Last Friday night

at the invitation of Allen Dulles, General Doolit-

tle, Bill Franke and I dined with Mr. Dulles and several of his key of-
ficials (Messrs. Cabell, Kirkpatrick, Wisner, White, Bissell, Helms,
Balmer, Scott, Angleton and Roosevelt). Following the dinner Mr.
Dulles and his associates gave us a detailed fill-in on the progress made
thus far by CIA in its efforts to implement the recommendations of the
Doolittle Report.

Highlights of their oral progress report follow.

NSCID #5:

Agreement has been reached between CIA and the

military services with respect to the conduct of certain espionage and
counterespionage operations overseas. (I think this will mark a very
substantial step forward, if it serves to clarify those areas of “agreed
activities” which have been the subject of considerable controversy for
several years.)

Operational Security Clearances:

An agreement has been drawn

with respect to the security clearance of agent, service and proprietary
personnel which is satisfactory to the DD/P and SO areas of the Agency.

Counterespionage:

A highly experienced official has been newly

installed as the Chief of this area of the DD/P complex and improved
procedures are being put into effect.

Polygraph Program:

The backlog of unpolygraphed personnel

has been virtually eliminated.

Cover Problems:

Renewed efforts are underway to cope with the

very difficult, practical problem of developing varied covers suitable for
CIA’s needs on both long-term and short-term bases. Allen Dulles thinks
more might be done on this score, including increased use of aliens.

Buildings:

Varied and repeated efforts are being made with lit-

tle success to improve the present office-housing situation which finds

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 86–B00269R, Box 3,

Folder 9. Top Secret. Drafted by Coyne. Coyne forwarded a copy to DCI Dulles under
cover of a February 18 memorandum, commenting that the President had seen the mem-
orandum and could be preparing to talk with Dulles about it.

February 4.

Document 192.

For NSCID No. 5 Revised, see Document 256.

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596 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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CIA, through no fault of its own, located in 34 buildings in the Wash-
ington area.

DD/Support:

All normal functions of the Agency, exclusive of

DD/I, DD/P, and IG have been combined under the newly created of-
fice of the Deputy Director for Support. By this action, personnel, ad-
ministration, fiscal, communications and related matters are pulled to-
gether under one head. Allen Dulles believes—and I agree—that this
should have the effect of rendering more coordinated and better sup-
port to the various operational segments of the Agency.

Organization of the DD/P Offices:

Steps have been initiated to

streamline the DD/P set-up. Allen Dulles and Wisner are pressing to
get this done.

Training:

Continuing efforts are being made to improve the train-

ing of personnel. Specific programs have been initiated for this purpose.

10.

Projects Review:

A new Review Committee is about to be set

up which will continue the complicated task of examining projects with
a view to eliminating those which are less essential so that available
resources may be allocated to those of greater importance to the
Agency’s mission.

11.

Long-Range Planning:

Continued emphasis is being afforded

this matter and expert scientific and other outside personnel (such as
Land and Killian) are being tapped to assure maximum results.

As Mr. Dulles and his assistants briefed us our views were solicited

and were quite freely given.

I was impressed, but not at all surprised, at the very constructive

approach which Allen Dulles and all of his associates have taken to the
Doolittle Report. I am convinced that assiduous efforts are being made
by the Agency to profit by such of the recommendations contained
therein as may be meritorious. The fact that Allen Dulles would take
the time to consult members of an extinct committee is as unusual as
it is desirable, and it speaks well of Allen Dulles’ continuing efforts to
improve the performance of the many important national security re-
sponsibilities which devolve upon CIA. (The use of the participants in
the Doolittle survey in a continuing, consultative capacity strikes me
as being highly desirable in view of the background which they have
accumulated concerning the covert operations of CIA. Allen Dulles has
in mind consulting with these same people on future occasions.)

I suggest that you give the President a brief oral fill-in on the fore-

going when the opportunity presents itself. I suggest also that a word of
appreciation from the President to Allen Dulles would be well deserved.

J. Patrick Coyne

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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206. Memorandum of Agreement Between the Central

Intelligence Agency and the Department of Justice

Washington, February 10, 1955.

Memorandum of Agreement Between the Attorney General of the

United States and the Central Intelligence Agency for the

Entry of Aliens of Interest to the Central Intelligence

Agency Under Special Circumstances

The Central Intelligence Agency has frequent need for the covert

temporary entry of aliens into the United States for intelligence and
operational purposes within its jurisdiction.

To effectuate entry in such cases, the Central Intelligence Agency

will submit each such alien’s case in writing to the Commissioner of
Immigration and Naturalization with the request to defer inspection
of the subject upon arrival and parole to the Central Intelligence Agency
under the authority of Section 212(d)(5) of this Immigration and Na-
tionality Act.

In order that the intelligence benefits to be derived from such en-

tries not be outweighed by the dangers, if any, to the internal security
of the United States by the presence of such aliens, the Central Intelli-
gence Agency agrees that it will take all necessary steps to establish
the bona fides of each prospective entrant prior to submittal to the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service. It further agrees: (a) That this
method of entry will only be utilized where it is strictly in the national
interest; (b) That each request will be accompanied by a summary of
pertinent background and biographical data with particular emphasis
on aspects bearing on internal security and admissibility under the im-
migration laws, as well as the result of a current check of the FBI files;
and (c) That the place, time and manner of arrival will be coordinated
with the Service in advance thereof.

Each alien whose entry is authorized by the Commissioner under

the foregoing procedure will be paroled for such period of time as may
be agreed on by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Service, in
no instance to exceed one year. Further extensions of parole, similarly

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 95–G00278R, Box 1.

Secret. Dulles also sent a February 10 memorandum to Wisner stressing CIA’s responsi-
bility for determining the bona fides of aliens admitted under this agreement and di-
recting him to ensure that all elements of the CIA under his control be informed of the
contents of the memorandum. (Ibid.)

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598 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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limited, may be authorized thereafter on a written statement of need,
which will include the results of a current security check.

Upon arrival each alien will execute an agreement acknowledging

parole status in a form satisfactory to the Central Intelligence Agency
and the Service.

After parole of such aliens, the Central Intelligence Agency will

assume responsibility for care, supervision and control of a kind and
degree it believes consistent with the internal security needs of the
United States during continuance of their parole status. Further, in the
case of any alien whose physical custody is not to be maintained or is
to be terminated, the Central Intelligence Agency will keep the Service
informed as to his activities and whereabouts for the duration of his
parole status. In addition, the Central Intelligence Agency will arrange
for presentation of each alien for registration pursuant to law at a time
and place satisfactory to the Service.

Upon completion of their intelligence or operational purposes in

the United States, or if internal security reasons so require, these aliens
will be removed therefrom through the arrangements and at the ex-
pense of the Central Intelligence Agency, except in these cases in which
other disposition is made of a nature satisfactory to the Service. Also,
the Central Intelligence Agency will inform the Service sufficiently in
advance of each proposed departure as to permit verification thereof
if the Service so elects.

In accordance with past practice, the Service will apprise the FBI

of the entry and departure or other disposition of these aliens.

The Service will maintain separate and secure files under this

agreement.

Herbert Brownell, Jr.

Attorney General

Allen W. Dulles

Director of Central Intelligence

Printed from a copy that indicates Brownell and Dulles signed the original.

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207. National Security Council Directive

NSC 5511

Washington, February 14, 1955.

DIRECTIVE ON A NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE

1. Pursuant to the recommendations of the National Security Coun-

cil in NSC Action No. 1260–b (November 4, 1954) and my subsequent
approval thereof,

I hereby establish a permanent procedure to provide

integrated evaluations of the net capabilities of the USSR, in the event
of general war, to inflict direct injury upon the continental U.S. and key
U.S. installations overseas, and to provide a continual watch for changes
which would significantly alter those net capabilities.

2. Each integrated evaluation should:

a. Cover all types of attack, overt or clandestine;

b. Include consideration of the several courses of action which the

USSR is capable of executing; and

c. Take into account the estimated future status of approved mil-

itary and non-military U.S. defense programs.

3. Each integrated evaluation report should estimate from the

practical standpoint the extent and effect of direct injury, including ra-
dioactive fall-out, upon the continental U.S. and key U.S. installations
overseas, resulting from the most probable types and weights of at-
tacks which the USSR is capable of delivering during approximately

Source: National Archives, RG 273, NSC 5511. Top Secret. This directive was cir-

culated by Acting Executive Secretary Gleason to the National Security Council. Copies
were sent to the Secretary of the Treasury, Attorney General, Director of the Bureau of
the Budget, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Federal Civil Defense Ad-
ministrator, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director of Central Intelligence, Chair-
man of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, and Chairman of the Interde-
partmental Committee on Internal Security, with a note stating that the directive had
been approved by the President on the same date. See also

Foreign Relations,

1955–1957,

vol. XIX, pp. 56–57; and for the subcommittee’s presentations to the National Security
Council in 1955, 1956, and 1957, see ibid., pp. 126–130 and 672–676.

This NSC action reads: “Adopted the recommendation of the Net Capabilities

Evaluation Subcommittee that there be established a permanent procedure to insure a
continuous evaluation of the general nature of the one made by this Subcommittee, and
a continual watch for significant changes; such procedure to provide for a report to the
National Security Council at least once a year and, in any event, at whatever time changes
become apparent that would significantly alter the net capabilities of the USSR to inflict
direct injury upon the continental U.S. and key U.S. installations overseas.” President
Eisenhower subsequently approved this recommendation “with the understanding that
the nature of the permanent procedures, including appropriate staffing, would be
subject to future determination by the President.” (National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC
(Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council,
Box 102)

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the first thirty days of general war, taking into account the effect of U.S.
counterattacks during this period. A separate evaluation will be made,
assuming each of the following types of initial attack:

a. An initial surprise attack, based on a USSR decision to give first

priority to damage to the continental U.S., with no strategic warning

but with tactical warning intervals appropriate to target location and

type of attack.

b. An initial attack, based on a USSR decision to balance all factors

involved in initiating general war; preceded by the amount of strategic

warning estimated to be most likely under those circumstances.

c. An initial attack preceded by sufficient strategic warning to

place U.S. military and non-military defenses in a condition of full alert

and to initiate U.S. retaliatory action.

4. Integrated evaluations should be submitted to the Council on

or before October 1 of each year, and relate to the situation on a criti-
cal date normally about three years in the future. In addition to these
annual integrated evaluations, an integrated evaluation should be sub-
mitted to the Council at such times as the Subcommittee feels that a
change has become apparent that would significantly alter the net ca-
pabilities of the USSR to inflict direct injury upon the continental U.S.
and key U.S. installations overseas. The first integrated evaluation
should be submitted to the Council on or before October 1, 1955.

5. In order to prepare these integrated evaluations I hereby es-

tablish a Net Evaluation Subcommittee of the National Security Coun-
cil, composed of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who will
serve as Chairman, the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization,
the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, the Director of Central Intel-
ligence, the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Confer-
ence, and the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Inter-
nal Security. Each Subcommittee member shall be consulted regarding
and given ample opportunity to review the following prior to adop-
tion by the Subcommittee: (a) subsidiary terms of reference, (b) the as-
sumptions to be used as a basis for each evaluation report, (c) the com-
plete evaluation report (less background material, which shall be made
available only on a “need to know” basis), and (d) any recommenda-
tions which the Subcommittee may choose to submit. The Chairman
of the Subcommittee, in consultation with the Director, will prepare
regulations and establish procedures for the handling of highly sensi-
tive information

required in the preparation of an evaluation report

so as to safeguard its security on a strict “need to know” basis and to

600 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

320-672/B428-S/11008

Information such as that relating to war plans, new weapons and equipment,

techniques and tactics for their employment, the vulnerability of U.S. defenses, and do-
mestic and foreign intelligence sources and methods. [Footnote in the original.]

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preclude the assembly of an unwarranted amount of sensitive infor-
mation in one document.

6. In all matters relating to AEC activities, it is expected that the

Subcommittee shall consult with and obtain the advice and assistance
of the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

7. Subcommittee members are designated to act as individuals,

but each shall have the right to consult, at his discretion and under ap-
propriate security safeguards, with his agency or committee prior to
Subcommittee action on matters normally within the cognizance of his
committee or agency. In subscribing to the reports and recommenda-
tions of the Subcommittee the individual members shall not be ex-
pected to assume responsibility for technical matters or conclusions not
normally within the cognizance of his own parent committee or agency.
Reports as submitted to the Council should show, so far as possible by
textual footnotes, any dissents by Subcommittee members.

8. The Subcommittee will have a staff, composed of individuals

assigned by member agencies, as required by the Director, and under
the direction of a Director whom I shall designate. The Director may
be compensated through the National Security Council from contribu-
tions by the member agencies.

9. The Net Evaluation Subcommittee hereby established is em-

powered under the terms of this Directive to call on any agency of the
Government for relevant information, evaluations, and estimates, sub-
ject only to establishment of appropriate security regulations and pro-
cedures for the handling of highly sensitive information as provided
under paragraph 5, above.

10. Distribution of each completed Subcommittee report will be

determined at the time by me.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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208. Executive Order No. 10598

Washington, February 28, 1955.

AMENDING EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 10483, ESTABLISHING

THE OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and

statutes, and as President of the United States, it is ordered that sub-
sections (b) and (d) of Section 1 of Executive Order No. 10483 of Sep-
tember 2, 1953 (18 F.R. 5379)

be, and they are hereby, amended to read,

respectively, as follows:

“(b) The Board shall have as members the following: (1) the Un-

der Secretary of State, who shall represent the Secretary of State and
shall be the chairman of the Board, (2) the Deputy Secretary of Defense,
who shall represent the Secretary of Defense, (3) the Director of the
Foreign Operations Administration, (4) the Director of Central Intelli-
gence, (5) the Director of the United States Information Agency, and
(6) one or more representatives of the President to be designated by
the President. Each head of agency referred to in items (1) to (5), in-
clusive, in this Section 1 (b) may provide for an alternate member who
shall serve as a member of the Board in lieu of the regular member rep-
resenting the agency concerned when such regular member is for rea-
sons beyond his control unable to attend any meeting of the Board; and
any alternate member shall while serving as such have in all respects
the same status as a member of the Board as does the regular member
in lieu of whom he serves.”

“(d) The Special Assistant to the President for National Security

Affairs may attend any meeting of the Board.”

Dwight D. Eisenhower

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 86–T00268R, Box 9. Un-

classified. Reprinted from

Federal Register

55–1831, Vol. 20, Number 41, March 1, 1955.

Document 157.

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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209. National Security Council Report

NSC 5509

Washington, March 2, 1955.

STATUS OF UNITED STATES PROGRAMS FOR NATIONAL

SECURITY AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1954

[Omitted here are Parts 1–6.]

Part 7—The Foreign Intelligence Program

(Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency

and Concurred in by the Intelligence

Advisory Committee)

[Omitted here is the Table of Contents.]

Note:

Paragraph 10a of NSC 162/2

sets forth the primary missions

of the US intelligence system in support of basic national security re-
quirements. This report presents a statement and evaluation of capa-
bilities to carry out these objectives as of December 31, 1954. Section I
of the report is addressed primarily to the first of these three objectives
(warning of aggression) and Section II to the other two (capabilities
and intentions of foreign countries). Section III deals with problems of
collection related to all three objectives. Problems of covert collection
are considered in Section IV.

I. Warning of Aggression

”Collecting and analyzing indications of hostile intentions that would

give maximum prior warning of possible aggression or subversion in any area
of the world.”

NSC 162/2, para. 10a(1)

National Intelligence Objectives.

Pursuant to NSCID #4

the IAC

on December 14, 1954, approved a new statement of “Priority National
Intelligence Objectives” (DCID 4/4)

which was prepared in the light

of NSC 162/2. This basic revision of priority national intelligence
objectives, which will be reviewed semi-annually, provides improved

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5509 Memoranda,

Box 85. Top Secret. NSC 5509, prepared by various U.S. Government agencies for the
National Security Council, is described in

Foreign Relations,

1955–1957, vol. XIX, pp. 58–59

Ellipsis in the original.

Superseded by NSC 5501, approved January 7, 1955. The missions of the US in-

telligence system are reaffirmed in the same words (para. 56). [Footnote in the original.
For NSC 162/2, see ibid., 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, pp. 577–597. For NSC 5501, “Basic
National Security Policy,” January 7, 1955, see ibid.

1955–1957, vol. XIX, pp. 24–39.]

See ibid., 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 422.

Document 201.

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guidance to research and collection throughout the intelligence com-
munity and focuses attention upon those intelligence area of greatest
security concern.

Watch Committee of the IAC.

For the purpose of supporting the

mission of the IAC Watch Committee “to provide earliest possible
warning to the United States Government of hostile action by the USSR,
or its allies, which endangers the security of the United States” there
has now been established, under the direction of the committee, an In-
dications Center. This center is staffed by representatives of the intel-
ligence agencies who, in coordination with their parent agencies, ana-
lyze information from all sources and select and collate indications of
Soviet/Communist hostile action or intentions affecting U.S. national
security for the consideration of the Watch Committee. This function
is in counterdistinction to the warning provided through radar, spot-
ters, and filter centers. For further support of the mission of the Watch
Committee, there was issued on November 30, 1954, NSC 5438, “Trans-
mittal of Information to the IAC Watch Committee,”

which author-

izes and directs appropriate departments and agencies of the Govern-
ment to make fully available to the IAC Watch Committee all
information and intelligence pertinent to its mission and functions.

Evaluation of U.S. Warning Capabilites.

On September 14, 1954,

the IAC approved SNIE 11–8–54, “Probable Warning of Soviet Attack
on the U.S. Through Mid-1957,”

which estimates the amount of ad-

vance warning to be expected in the event of various types of attack
which might be initiated by the USSR. It concludes that the U.S. could
expect possibly as much as six months and not less than 30 days warn-
ing of Soviet preparations for a full-scale ground, sea, and air attack in
the event of prior mobilization. It also concludes, however, that par-
ticularly by 1957 only a few hours or in some cases no specific warn-
ing, other than that provided by early warning radar, could be relied
upon in event of various types and scales of surprise attack. A periodic
review and revision of this estimate is contemplated.

Our advance warning largely depends on sifting a large quantity

of material to discover those indications of enemy activity which sug-
gest that measures are being taken to implement a decision to attack.
The enemy’s choice of the type of attack greatly affects our advance
warning capability. We are largely dependent on radar and forward
observation stations for early warning of air attack, in the event that
our intelligence fails to discover indications of preparations therefor
and if the USSR should risk launching such an attack without prior

See Document 187 and footnote 4 thereto.

Not printed. (National Archives, RG 263, Soviet NIE’s, 1950–1955, #68, Box 1)

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mobilization. We lack adequate penetrations of the Soviet Bloc that can
be relied on to provide warning in the event that the enemy is willing
to risk a surprise attack without extensive mobilization. Reports of
troop movements and logistical activity are usually reported too late
or are too inconclusive to give adequate early warning in such an event.
We are exploiting all available sources of information and constantly
striving to develop new and improved means of detection of attack.

As stated in SNIE 11–8–54, “The warning process is . . . affected by

the whole context of events in which it operates, including psycho-
logical factors and even pure chance. It cannot be regarded as a me-
chanical process which it is possible for intelligence to set up once and
for all and which thereafter operates automatically.”

II. Estimating the Capabilities and Intentions of Foreign Countries

”Accurately evaluating the capabilities of foreign countries, friendly and

neutral as well as enemy, to undertake military, political, economic, and sub-
versive courses of action affecting U.S. security.”

NSC 162/2, para. 10a(2)

”Forecasting potential foreign developments having a bearing on U.S.

national security.”

NSC 162/2, para. 10a(3)

National Intelligence Objectives.

DCID 4/3

and 4/4 set up, re-

spectively, comprehensive objectives for all countries and areas, and
priority objectives for specific countries and subjects. DCID 4/4 par-
ticularly delineates more precisely than has been done heretofore the
specific aspects of capabilities and intentions of certain countries that
deserve priority attention.

National Intelligence Estimates.

Since the last report (NSC 5430,

Part 8),

several major estimates have been produced dealing with So-

viet Bloc capabilities and probable courses of action. Included in this
group were three basic annual reviews: “Soviet Capabilities and Prob-
ably Courses of Action Through Mid-1959,”

”Communist Courses of

Action in Asia Through 1957,”

and “Probable Developments in the

European Satellites Through Mid-1956.”

In addition, three estimates

were produced directly or indirectly in support of the NSC Study of
“Net Capabilities of the USSR to Inflict Direct Injury Upon the Conti-

Document 200.

NSC 5430, Part 8, “The Foreign Intelligence Program and Related Activities,”

dated August 18, 1954, is in National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC
5430 Series.

Reference is to NIE 11–4–54, September 14, 1954; extracts are in

Foreign Relations,

1952–1954, vol. VIII, pp. 1235–1238.

Reference is to NIE 10–7–54, November 23, 1954; ibid., vol. XIV, pp. 930–944.

Reference is to NIE 12–54, August 24, 1954, not printed. (National Archives, RG

59, INR Files: Lot 78 D 394, Record Sets of NIE’s SE’s and SNIE’s)

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nental U.S. and Key U.S. Installations Overseas”:

”Soviet Gross Ca-

pabilities for Attacks on the U.S. and Key Overseas Installations
Through 1 July 1957,”

”Probable Warning of Soviet Attack on the U.S.

as of Mid-1957,” and “Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in
the Guided Missile Field.”

Seventeen estimates were produced on

countries outside the Soviet Bloc. Much emphasis was given to the Far
East, particularly to Indochina. Of the 24 NIE’s published during the
six-month period, 16 were related to specific NSC papers or policy
decisions.

Continuing evaluation is taking place on means for improving the

quality of National Intelligence Estimates. The entire production of
1953 and the first six months of 1954 have been reviewed in order to
identify and correct intelligence deficiencies. In addition, there is now
before the IAC a special detailed “post-mortem” of NIE 11–6–54, “So-
viet Capabilities and Probable Programs in the Guided Missile Field.”

Basic Intelligence.

The initial world coverage of the National In-

telligence Survey is essentially 45% completed, including 2400 indi-
vidual sections, mainly on JCS high priority areas. Present production
is slightly below the scheduled rate of approximately 8 equivalent NIS
per year. The over-all quality is being improved by better collection in
support of the program

Military Intelligence

General.

At the present time, military intelligence is generally

adequate to provide broad measurements of the military, logistic, in-
dustrial, and governmental control strengths of the USSR, Communist
China, and the Satellites. However, significant detailed information
available is fragmentary and it is essential to develop means to over-
come present deficiencies in the collection field in order adequately to
support U.S. military plans, programs, and operations.

Limited gains were made during the past six months in the fol-

lowing fields: analysis of performance characteristics of new types of
Soviet aircraft; data on the development of Soviet nuclear weapons, in-
formation on modifications of Soviet tactical doctrine in nuclear war-
fare; technical methods and devices for intelligence collection; Chinese
Communist ground force dispositions; and knowledge of Soviet war-
ship construction.

Not found. Soviet capabilities were discussed by the National Security Council

on November 4, 1954; see

Foreign Relations,

1955–1957, vol. XIX, p. 25, footnote 5.

Reference is to SNIE 11–7A–54, September 14, 1954, not printed. (National

Archives, RG 263, Soviet NIE’s, Box 1, # 67)

Reference is to NIE 11–6–54, October 5, 1954, not printed. (Ibid., RG 59, INR His-

torical Files: Lot 78 D 394, Record Sets of NIE’s, SE’s and SNIE’s)

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Nevertheless, military intelligence on the USSR and, to a lesser ex-

tent on Communist China and the Satellites, is inadequate in many crit-
ical fields. There is a serious lack of specific and detailed information
on the following: the development, production, and deployment of
guided missiles; other unconventional weapons; newly developed or
modified conventional weapons; delivery systems, logistical capabili-
ties and support; some components of the air defense system; and sci-
entific and technical strengths as they affect military capabilities. Our
knowledge continues to be inadequate on the movements and dispo-
sitions of Soviet Bloc forces, particularly in the USSR. The cessation of
hostilities in Indochina has resulted in a reduction of military intelli-
gence on the Viet Minh.

Our knowledge of Soviet atomic energy progress is referred to in

paragraph 7b below. With respect to information on: (1) specific allo-
cations by the USSR of available nuclear materials to types of weapons
in the small, medium and large yield categories; (2) specific allocations
of nuclear weapons and warheads to various delivery systems; and (3)
actual disposition of nuclear weapons and warheads, our requirements
continue to be unfulfilled.

Target Materials Production.

Approximately 80% of the minimal

requirements for air target materials, in the Air Objective Folder Pro-
gram (OAFP), in support of joint war plans are complete. The remain-
ing 20% of the minimal requirements are scheduled for completion by
the end of CY 1955. Other air target materials, desired by the Services
for development of the optimum opportunities for air action, are ap-
proximately 50% satisfied. Production to satisfy the remainder of these
requirements continues to the maximum extent practicable and con-
sonant with priority emphasis on highest and earliest readiness in sup-
port of joint war plans.

The Director of Naval Intelligence notes that the rate of production of air target

materials for the highest priority (all-weather) Navy targets continues to be a matter of
concern. The Target Area Analysis Radar (TAAR) is considered to be the most signifi-
cant piece of target material developed and produced for-all weather, medium to high
altitude operations. Between July 1952 and July 1954 the Navy nominated 632 all-weather
targets for inclusion in the Air Objectives Folder Program for production of TAAR’s. As
of December 1, 1954, TAAR production had not been started for 52%. TAAR production
was in process for 22%, and TAAR had been completed for 26%. The TAAR is seldom
useful for low-level, all-weather mining but charts can serve adequately where there are
steep gradients along the shore. In other cases the capability for conducting these oper-
ations is greatly reduced. No intelligence solution appears possible. Low-level, high-
speed aircraft missions require special charts for navigation and approach which are not
now available. However, such charts are under development. [Footnote in the original.]

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Political Intelligence

The Soviet Bloc and Communist China.

Political intelligence on the

Soviet Orbit is built mainly upon the careful screening and evaluation
of overt materials from the Soviet and Chinese Communist press, ra-
dio, and other information media. The flow of current material, plus
the accumulated body of evaluated data and the development of a
group of experienced analysts, make possible a reasonably accurate in-
terpretation of political developments in the Soviet/Communist world.

Recent defections of fairly high level Soviet officials have served

to confirm important aspects of existing intelligence analysis. Similarly,
the observed course of events over the past year has borne out in most
substantial particulars the intelligence estimates of probable post-Stalin
developments in the USSR.

Our capability for assessing specific short-term intentions of the

USSR and Communist China is inherently limited by the closed char-
acter of the Soviet and Communist Chinese decision-making systems.
Although the Soviet/Communist regimes cannot mask their general
international aims and attitudes, only a very high level penetration of
these governments would make possible fully assured assessments of
particular Soviet/Communist plans and intended actions.

The Free World.

As a part of a long term look at the prospects

in the cold war, special emphasis has been placed during the past six
months on the situation in the underdeveloped areas of Asia, Africa,
and Latin America; Communist capabilities in the Free World; and at-
titudes and reactions in the Free World and in the Soviet Bloc to nu-
clear weapons developments.

The revolution which overthrew a Communist regime in

Guatemala and the disclosure of the Tudeh

ring in the Iranian army

have made available to U.S. intelligence a new body of material on
Communist tactics of infiltration and control. Analysis of these mate-
rials is expected to provide an improved understanding of Communist
subversive capabilities in underdeveloped countries.

Economic Intelligence

General.

Economic intelligence, like political intelligence, is es-

sentially the product of collation and analysis of data from primarily
overt sources. Economic intelligence on the Soviet Bloc has improved
as a result of additional systematic analysis of the Soviet potential
industries. Experimentation is under way on new economic research
techniques for the evaluation of Soviet capabilities for supporting

Iranian Communist Party.

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specialized weapons programs. Among the major unsolved problems are
Soviet defense expenditures and Soviet agricultural growth capabilities.

Communist China.

Economic research effort and the flow of in-

telligence materials on Communist China have increased, resulting in
a better appreciation of Chinese Communist productive capabilities
and of Sino-Soviet economic relationships. The output of certain basic
industries, such as electric power, and iron and steel, is reasonably well
established. Further information and research are required to deter-
mine agricultural and handicraft output, chemical and munitions out-
put, transportation capabilities, and over-all per capita consumption.

Economic Defense.

In addition to a continuing review of major

commodity problems for East-West trade controls, intelligence support
for economic defense includes an assessment of possible long-run eco-
nomic developments within the Soviet Bloc as they relate to economic
defense policies. Intelligence support for enforcement of economic de-
fense measures has been maintained in spite of diminishing informa-
tion on trade transactions. Intelligence on shipping engaged in Soviet
Bloc trade continues to be good, and there has been some improve-
ment in cargo information. Continued joint conferences with the UK
have produced substantial agreement on intelligence concerning Free
World trade with Communist China, although significant differences
still exist as to the type and quantity of cargoes reaching Communist
China from or via Hong Kong and other trans-shipment points. More-
over, information on unrecorded shipments remains inadequate.

Free World.

Economic intelligence production on the Free World

has concentrated on analysis of (a) improved economic conditions in
Western Europe; (b) the unfavorable outlook for Japanese foreign trade;
and (c) the problem of economic development in underdeveloped ar-
eas. The results of this effort have been satisfactory.

Coordination.

The Economic Intelligence Committee (EIC) has

taken a more active part in guiding economic intelligence production
and has continued its surveys to uncover economic research and col-
lection deficiencies. In September, the EIC coordinated a draft DCID
15/1,

later approved by the IAC, which delineates IAC agency re-

sponsibilities for production and coordination of foreign economic in-
telligence related to national security.

Scientific and Technical Intelligence

General.

Through intensified collection and research our un-

derstanding of Soviet basic scientific capabilities, including the quality
and quantity of their scientific manpower, has improved. In specific

Document 191.

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fields of science and technology, however, vast gaps in our knowledge
still exist. Substantial improvement will require successful application
of new collection techniques and improved analytical processes now
under development.

Atomic Energy.

The most significant advances in atomic energy

intelligence have resulted from the extensive Soviet nuclear weapons
test program and the return of German technical personnel from the
USSR. Data from the weapons test program and related information
received during the past six months have made more clear the current
status of Soviet nuclear development and indicate that several nuclear
weapon types are probably being stockpiled. These same data and in-
formation furnish guidelines for estimating the future course of Soviet
nuclear developments. Interrogation of German returnees has con-
firmed previous reports of the activities of German scientists in the So-
viet atomic program and has provided information that raises some-
what the level of confidence in the estimates of Soviet U-235 production
given in NIE 11–3–54.

The apportionment between weapons types of

the Soviet fissionable material stockpile, although susceptible of esti-
mate by indirect methods of varying reliability, cannot yet be confirmed
by direct evidence.

Guided Missiles.

Preparation of the first NIE on guided missiles

revealed critical gaps in our knowledge. While certain new collection
techniques and data reduction methods give promise of better infor-
mation, their development has not yet progressed to the point of pro-
viding the information required. A U.S./UK intelligence conference on
Soviet guided missiles capabilities, held in London in November, found
the independently prepared U.S. and UK estimates to be relatively
close.

Biological Warfare.

Following production of SEC 2–54, “Soviet

Biological Warfare Capabilities Through 1960”,

the first community-

wide estimate in this field, a joint study of critical deficiencies in bio-
logical warfare intelligence and recommended means for their elimi-
nation has been undertaken. Coordinated all-source research by IAC
member agencies on certain suspected Soviet biological warfare in-
stallations has been largely completed. Despite these efforts, positive
knowledge of the existence and nature of a Soviet BW program has yet
to be established.

Not printed. (National Archives, RG 263, Soviet NIE’s, 1950–1955, Box 1)

IAC–D–81/6, “Reports of the US/UK Intelligence Conferences on Electronics

and Guided Missiles,” January 27, 1955, is not printed. (Central Intelligence Agency, Ex-
ecutive Registry, Job 85–S00362R, Box 5, Folder 8)

Not printed. (Ibid., Transnational Issues Job 79–R00825A, Box 105)

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Intelligence Support for Foreign Information and Psychological War-

fare Programs

The survey of USIA’s intelligence needs and assets reported in

IAC–D–55/7

was approved by the DCI, USIA, and the Department

of State. Pertinent recommendations were approved by the IAC. The
survey report defined the types of intelligence and intelligence infor-
mation required to meet USIA’s essential needs, which are, in the main,
also the needs of other agencies with related programs. Arrangements
have now been made to insure that USIA, to the maximum extent pos-
sible, will receive the pertinent products of the existing intelligence or-
ganizations. To strengthen existing facilities, increased funds have been
allocated for the expansion and acceleration of production of relevant
parts of the NIS program. To meet the specialized needs of USIA, uti-
lizing the intelligence produced by other agencies as required, an in-
telligence unit has been established with USIA accompanied by the
abolition of certain USIA offices. It is expected in the near future that
certain intelligence assets of USIA will be made available to the intel-
ligence community.

III. Collection

The Foreign Service.

Reporting from and collection by the For-

eign Service, a primary overt source of intelligence information, con-
tinues for the most part to meet expectations.

Reporting from behind the Iron Curtain.

Reporting remains inad-

equate in the political and sociological fields, principally because of re-
strictions on movement and the size of missions. Generally speaking,
reporting from and on the USSR from the intelligence point of view
has shown some slight gain; in the case of the Satellites, there has been
a decline, at least in political reporting. Some improvement in report-
ing has been hoped for because of the greater cordiality of Soviet Bloc
officials in their contacts with Western representatives, but little is yet
evident. On the other hand, a decrease in the flow of overtly collected
materials is expected as a result of probable retaliatory action by the
governments of the USSR and Satellites to recent and pending U.S.
travel and access restrictions on Soviet diplomatic personnel.

Reporting outside the Bloc.

The principal handicap to improved

Foreign Service reporting is reduced staff. However, strengthened
inter-agency coordination of collection and requirements has con-
tributed to improved reporting, especially in the economic field.

Not printed. (Ibid., History Staff, Job 84–00161R, Box 3, Folder 6) It was the ba-

sis for Acting Director of Central Intelligence Cabell’s recommendation that the NSC des-
ignate CIA to disseminate national intelligence to USIA. His memorandum is in National
Archives, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSCID’s.

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Publications Procurement.

The continued absence of satisfactory

publications procurement from London and the Middle East is having
a cumulative effect and for some areas is beginning to impair analy-
sis-in-depth.

Map Procurement.

Collection of maps from the Soviet Bloc has

been limited, by continued security restrictions, to atlases and small-
scale maps. There has been a marked decrease in the procurement of
maps and map intelligence from Latin America and from Northwest
Europe, because of lack of specialized collectors in these areas.

Agricultural Reporting.

Under recent legislation, agricultural at-

tachés will report directly to the Department of Agriculture. However,
by subsequent agreement between the Department of Agriculture and
the Department of State, the latter will continue to be responsible for
agricultural reporting from the Soviet Bloc.

Military Attaché System.

The attaché system continues to be a

major source of military intelligence. It provides good coverage out-
side the Soviet Bloc, but the capabilities of attachés in countries within
the Bloc continue to be drastically restricted by counter-intelligence
measures. In view of these basic restrictions, active consideration is be-
ing given to training of military attachés in special observation tech-
niques, including photography and recording. Also, an improved pro-
gram of collection guidance has been initiated to relate attaché activities
more directly to urgent requirements. However, these measures will
still leave overt collection capabilities far short of being able to meet
military intelligence requirements in Soviet Bloc areas. Substantial im-
provement in military intelligence collection under present personnel,
equipment and operating expense limitations will depend upon im-
proved coordination, guidance, and the development of new collection
techniques.

Overseas Command.

Overseas commands continue to be impor-

tant sources of information on Communist armed forces and war po-
tential within the limitations noted in II–4 and IV.

Aerial Reconnaissance.

The trend toward exploiting aerial recon-

naissance opportunities continues together with improving capabili-
ties. Reconnaissance operations continue to be performed within the
framework of policy considerations of other than an intelligence na-
ture. Research and development are producing promising results in
equipment and techniques. Establishment of an Army Photo Interpre-
tation Center has been approved.

Exploitation of Defectors.

Soviet and Satellite defectors as well as

East German scientists who, after working under contract in the USSR,
were returned to East Germany and defected to the West, continue to
provide valuable intelligence on the Soviet Orbit. The rate of defection
remains constant. In the last six months, 10 Satellite and 7 Soviet bona

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fide defectors were received at the Defector Reception Center, Germany,
while 28 German scientists were received by the Returnee Exploitation
Group. MVD

defectors Yuri Rastvorov, Nikolai Khokhlov and an un-

surfaced lieutenant colonel, and the Polish Security Official, Josef
Swiatlo, although defecting early in 1954, made outstanding contribu-
tions to U.S. intelligence and psychological warfare programs during
this period. The U.S. also received the intelligence benefits from de-
fectors received by various other friendly Western countries.

Domestic Collection.

This continues to be productive. The possi-

bility of increased travel by private U.S. individuals within the Soviet
Union may expand the collection potential of such sources. Further
progress has been made in the coordination of the activities of CIA and
the military services in the collection of foreign scientific and technical
information from U.S. sources within the framework of NSCID #7.

Foreign Radio Broadcasts.

World-wide radio monitoring coverage

continues at approximately the same level as a year ago. However, in-
stallations have been improved and the processing of monitored ma-
terial has been further perfected.

Foreign Materials and Equipment.

Continuing Soviet efforts to in-

crease the export of Bloc products and more extensive Soviet partici-
pation in international trade fairs have facilitated the collection of So-
viet and Satellite non-military items. There has been a steady increase
in the acquisition of factory markings data on Soviet Bloc equipment.
With the exploitation of available military equipment nearly com-
pleted, emphasis is now directed toward the exploitation of civilian
equipment available through commercial channels.

10.

Programs in Electronics

Monitoring of Radio Jamming.

Monitoring of the reception of U.S.

broadcasts to the Soviet Bloc, increased under the authority of NSC
169

by the use of intercept facilities at U.S. embassies behind the Iron

Curtain, contributed significantly to VOA and RFE operations, and was
therefore accelerated. In addition, a project to locate and collect data
on the Soviet radio jamming system has had significant results.

Non-Communications Electronic Intercept (ELINT).

ELINT collec-

tion activities have assisted materially in gathering information on So-
viet equipment and systems, including identification of AI radar in op-

Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Soviet foreign intelligence apparatus had

been renamed the KGB in 1954.

See

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment,

Document 427.

NSC 169, “Electro-Magnetic Communications,” October 27, 1953, received final

approval by the President on October 22, 1953. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC
Files: Lot 63 D 351, Serial Master Files of NSC Documents)

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erational use and the establishment of the general nature of Soviet nav-
igational systems. Much remains to be done before a satisfactory inte-
gration of the U.S. ELINT effort can be achieved. Meanwhile, liaison
with foreign activities in this field, primarily those of the UK, has im-
proved.

11.

Travel Folder Program.

The 1955 schedule for revision of Travel

Folders will reflect the priority selections of the entire U.S. intelligence
community. It will involve 29 routes and 39 town briefs in the USSR
and country questionnaires for 5 Satellites.

12.

Foreign Language Publications.

Further progress has been made

in the coordination of foreign publications procurement, particularly
from Communist China, and a greater and speedier flow of publica-
tions from that area is expected in 1955.

IV. Covert Collection of Intelligence Relating to the Soviet Bloc

1. During the last six months, clandestine operating conditions

within the Soviet Orbit have been affected by two opposed trends—a
tightening of internal security measures in both the Far East and
Europe on the one hand, and a relaxation of travel restrictions to and
from the Orbit on the other. One has made the maintenance of clan-
destine mechanisms and assets in Communist countries increasingly
difficult; the other has opened up new opportunities to exploit legal
travellers; i.e., Communist officials who travel in the West and West-
ern officials, businessmen, and students who travel in the Orbit. This
legal-traveller program in 1954 resulted in 335 positive intelligence
reports.

2. A greater counterespionage effort and closer cooperation with

friendly intelligence services have resulted in a heavier flow of both
positive and operational data which will make possible a more con-
centrated effort directed towards Soviet and Satellite personalities and
installations abroad. In this connection, the constantly expanding use
of technical surveillance facilities to cover Soviet and Satellite installa-
tions abroad has been found increasingly valuable. In addition, some
new approaches to denied area operations such as ELINT are being
further developed.

3. In order to coordinate more effectively intelligence collection with

outstanding requirements capabilities, a program designed to give bet-
ter guidance to the field is being completed. Although an overall increase
in the quantity of intelligence is noted, deficiencies in the quality of in-
formation and the specific coverage of priority targets still exist.

4. In certain categories, however, the quality of intelligence infor-

mation obtained on the USSR has improved. Intelligence information
of considerable significance has been obtained on Soviet Army tactical
doctrine and on modifications thereof for nuclear warfare.

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210. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of the Budget

(Hughes) to President Eisenhower

Washington, March 3, 1955.

SUBJECT

Coordination of Economic, Psychological, Political Warfare, and Foreign
Information Activities (NSC Actions Nos. 1183

and 1197)

1. When you assigned this study to the Bureau of the Budget, you

indicated that its primary purpose should be to answer two questions:
(1) What is the present status of this work and how are responsibili-
ties placed, and (2) What were my recommendations for improving
planning methods and effectiveness?

2. On November 23, 1954,

I reported to you on the first question

by supplying you with (1) a chart and narrative description indicating

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66 D 148, Coordination of

Psychological and other Warfare Activities. Secret. Sent on March 3 to members of the
National Security Council for discussion at the March 10 NSC meeting. (Ibid.) In a Feb-
ruary 7 memorandum, Comptroller of the Department of State, Isaac W. Carpenter, Jr.,
had informed Under Secretary of State Hoover that all Department of State Assistant
Secretaries opposed the proposals and recommendations in this memorandum. (Ibid.)
For example, Special Assistant for Intelligence and Research Armstrong opposed cre-
ation of the “Rockefeller Board” as duplicative in a February 3, memorandum to Car-
penter. (National Archives, RG 59, INR Files: Lot 58 D 776, 1945–60, Box 2, Rockefeller
Board) In a February 4 memorandum to Deputy Under Secretary of State for Adminis-
tration Henderson, Max Bishop, Operations Coordinator, Office of the Under Secretary
of State, also opposed the proposal as diluting the authority of the Operations Coordi-
nating Board. (Ibid., Records of the Bureau of Administration: Lot 62 D 220, TS Records
on Interagency Relations, 1948–61, OCB) Despite Department of State opposition, the
President approved the proposal on March 10. See

Foreign Relations,

1955–1957, vol. XIX,

p. 62.

At its 207th meeting on July 22, 1954, the National Security Council, in NSC Ac-

tion No. 1183, “Coordination of Economic Warfare Activities,” noted the President’s re-
quest that the Bureau of the Budget study and prepare recommendations for NSC con-
sideration on placing responsibility within the Executive Branch for coordinating all U.S.
economic warfare activities. The NSC later transmitted NSC Action No. 1183 to the Di-
rector of the Bureau of the Budget for implementation. (National Archives, RG 59,
S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security
Council)

See Document 187 and footnote 7 thereto.

In the November 24, 1954, memorandum to the President, Hughes wrote that he

would await the report on economic warfare then being prepared by Joseph M. Dodge,
Special Assistant to the President for foreign economic affairs, before formally submitting
the study requested by the President. Accompanying that memorandum were prelimi-
nary reports on the existing organization of the Executive Branch involved in the forward
planning and coordination of economic, psychological, and political warfare, and infor-
mation and a summary of the principal problems raised by that organization. (National
Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66 D 148, Coordination of Economic, Psychological
and Political Warfare and Foreign Information Activities)

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the functions of agencies involved, committee memberships, etc., which
were found to be in existence at the time our study was launched, and
(2) a summary of the principal problems raised by the organization as it
then existed. Copies of those papers, together with a copy of my memo-
randum of transmittal to you, have been supplied to the members of the
National Security Council and to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. The results of this study have been reviewed by a group con-

sisting of Presidential Assistants Cutler and Rockefeller, Under Secre-
tary of State Hoover,

Deputy Secretary of Defense Anderson, Director

of Central Intelligence Dulles, and former Under Secretary of State
Smith.

The recommendations contained in this memorandum are

based upon their advice and have their concurrence.

4. Two closely related organizational studies were conducted con-

currently with our review. One was the study of our information activ-
ities made for you by Mr. William H. Jackson.

The other was the study

conducted by Mr. Joseph M. Dodge of executive branch organization for
planning and coordinating foreign economic policy.

This latter study

was conducted in close cooperation with the Bureau of the Budget and
with your Advisory Committee on Government Organization.

Enclosure to Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated De-

cember 13, 1954. [Footnote in the original.]

On January 29, Hughes prepared a draft memorandum to respond to the Presi-

dent’s request for a study on the coordination of economic, psychological, and political
warfare and foreign information activities. That draft was reviewed by officers in the
Department of State. Commenting on the January 29 paper, Robert R. Bowie of S/P rec-
ommended to Acting Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr., on February 4 that “every
effort be made to head off the formation” of what he perceived as a potential cold war
strategy board to be headed by Nelson Rockefeller. On February 14 Hughes sent a re-
vised draft to Under Secretary of State Hoover, DCI Dulles, and Deputy Under Secre-
tary of Defense Anderson. Presumably, the remarks appearing in this memorandum are
in response to the revised draft of February 14. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC
Files: Lot 66 D 148, Planning Coordination Group)

Walter Bedell Smith.

See Document 184.

Apparently this refers to a staff study prepared by Dodge in response to a July

12, 1954, request by President Eisenhower. On November 22, 1954, Dodge presented the
President with the final draft of his report, entitled “The Development and Coordina-
tion of Foreign Economic Policy.” As a result of the Dodge study, the Council on For-
eign Economic Policy was established, and on December 11, 1954, President Eisenhower
appointed Dodge as the first chairman of that council. (“Organization, Procedures and
Accomplishments of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy;” Eisenhower Library,
Council on Foreign Economic Policy: Records, 1954–1961) The White House press re-
lease of December 11, 1954, announcing Dodge’s appointment is in Department of State

Bulletin,

December 27, 1954, pp. 987–988.

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5. At your request, the Budget Bureau and the Advisory Com-

mittee on Government Organization are currently working with Mr.
Stassen and Mr. Dodge to develop for your consideration a pattern of
organization for the conduct of foreign assistance programs. This mat-
ter is scheduled to be disposed of soon as it involves basic considera-
tions which must affect your request in the near future to the Congress
for authority to carry on foreign aid programs in fiscal year 1956 and
subsequent years.

6. In addition, the following recent decisions have been made

which affect the subject matter of this report:

a. The appointment of Mr. Dodge as Special Assistant to the Pres-

ident for foreign economic affairs and the establishment of the Coun-
cil on Foreign Economic Policy.

b. The appointment of Mr. Nelson Rockefeller as Special Assistant

to the President to provide leadership on your behalf in the develop-
ment of increased understanding and cooperation among all peoples
and in reviewing and developing methods and programs by which the
various departments and agencies of the Government may effectively
contribute to such cooperation and understanding.

c. The assignment to a Special Committee chaired by Mr. Rocke-

feller of responsibility for coordinating the implementation of the poli-
cies contained in NSC 5505/1

and NSC 5502/1.

7. In addition to placing into effect the above-mentioned reor-

ganizations, I should like to recommend further proposals for im-
proving planning methods and effectiveness in the area which you re-
quested us to study.

Organization in Connection with Planning Coordination

A. The Present Situation

1. In making recommendations for improving planning methods

and coordination of economic, psychological, political warfare and for-
eign information activities, and their relation to the military program,
certain existing responsibilities have been kept clearly in mind.

a. The NSC Planning Board, utilizing the resources and staffs of

the component agencies (assisted by a small NSC staff), is responsible
for developing recommendations for national security policy for con-
sideration by the NSC and transmittal to the President. Neither the

NSC 5505/1, “Exploitation of Soviet and European Satellite Vulnerabilities,” Jan-

uary 31, is printed in

Foreign Relations,

1955–1957, vol. XXIV, pp. 20–22.

NSC 5502/1, “U.S. Policy Toward Russian Anti-Soviet Political Activities,” Jan-

uary 31, is printed ibid., pp. 12–19.

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NSC nor its Planning Board has any responsibility for developing op-
erating programs under approved national security policy.

b. When the President has approved a national security policy,

recommended by the NSC, the agencies of Government which have
functions germane to its execution are responsible to him for devising
plans and taking actions to carry such policy into effect.

c. The Operations Coordinating Board has two major responsibilities:
(1) Whenever the President directs, as to an approved national se-

curity policy, the OCB shall (a) advise with the operating agencies con-
cerned as to the coordination of the interdepartmental aspects of the
detailed operational plans developed by such agencies to carry out such
policy and as to the timely and coordinated execution of such opera-
tional plans, and (b) initiate proposals for action within the framework
of national security policies in response to opportunity and changes in
the situation. The operating agencies concerned have the responsibil-
ity for developing and carrying out their respective programs under
approved national security policies or other approved policies trans-
mitted by the President to OCB.

(2) Under NSC 5412,

the Central Intelligence Agency’s charter

for covert operations, the members of OCB are advised in advance of
major programs involving covert operations relating to policies and the
OCB is the normal channel for securing coordination of support for
covert work among the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA.
Later in this paper it is recommended that NSC 5412 be amended to
remove any conflict with the functions assigned to the Special Com-
mittee referred to in d. below and with the duties recommended be-
low to be given to the Planning Coordination Group.

d. As indicated above, the President recently approved the estab-

lishment of a Special Committee under the Chairmanship of Special
Assistant Nelson Rockefeller to coordinate the implementation of poli-
cies contained in NSC 5502/1 and NSC 5505/1. Besides the Special
Assistant as Chairman, this Special Committee is composed of the Un-
der Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence (each of whom may be represented in
day-to-day operations by deputies appointed by them), with partici-
pation as appropriate of representatives of the Department of Justice,
the Foreign Operations Administration, the U.S. Information Agency,
and other interested departments and agencies. The duties of this
Special Committee include reviewing current programs and develop-
ing new programs to carry out the above-mentioned national security
policies, ensuring coordination of actions taken thereunder, and

Document 171.

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making evaluative progress reports to the President through the
National Security Council. This Special Committee mechanism was
established in this connection because of need for high-level, restricted
attention to developing the sensitive programs, and the coordination
of actions thereunder, called for by the above-mentioned national
security policies.

e. At present, except for operations exclusively covert, the OCB,

through working committees representative of the responsible agencies,
coordinates the implementation of the plans and programs proposed by
such agencies to carry out approved policies. In the case of covert oper-
ations, other than under NSC 5502/1 and NSC 5505/1, such coordina-
tion is effected through direct liaison between the CIA and the Depart-
ments of State and Defense and other departments and agencies as well
as through the members of the OCB as prescribed in NSC 5412.

B. Proposals

1. As stated above, the working up of plans and programs to im-

plement national security policies rests with the agencies primarily re-
sponsible therefor. But there is a continuing need in Government to in-
fuse in such plans and programs dynamic, new and imaginative ideas,
to diagnose precisely how best to meet the over-all problems of a given
country or area, to bring into balance all aspects of a problem and all re-
sources available to solve it, to find ways effectively to utilize U.S. pri-
vate organizations and foreign individuals and groups and foreign pub-
lic and private organizations. The promotion of such imaginative
planning, based on the best intelligence obtainable, should materially
aid in coordinating economic, psychological, political warfare, and for-
eign information activities so as to further international cooperation and
understanding, to reduce the Communist threat, to strengthen friendly
ties with the U.S., to promote the freedom, well being, and dignity of
the individual man, and to improve the world climate of opinion.

2. It is believed that a small, high-level group should be given re-

sponsibility for meeting the need just referred to. This group would
aid in developing planning in both overt and covert fields.

3. To accomplish this objective, it is recommended as follows:
a.

The above-mentioned Special Committee, consisting of the

Special Assistant, Mr. Rockefeller, the Under Secretary of State, the
Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence (plus
representation from other agencies when appropriate), established to
coordinate the implementation of policies under NSC 5502/1 and
5505/1 should be reestablished, within the framework of OCB, where

A note in the margin reads: “approved by the President March 4, 1955.”

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it might be designated as the Planning Coordination Group. This body
would be a special grouping of OCB members chaired by Mr. Rocke-
feller and reporting directly to the Chairman of OCB. It would have
such small staff as might be convenient to its special purpose, includ-
ing the duties assigned to it under c. below. Such staff, while distinct
from the OCB staff, could call upon OCB for housekeeping services
and other administrative assistance. The Chairman of OCB will, from
time to time, transmit progress reports of the Planning Coordination
Group to the President through the National Security Council.

b. The Special Assistant, Mr. Rockefeller, should be designated a

member of the OCB under Section 1 (b) (5) of Executive Order No.
10,483

and should also be designated vice chairman of the Board.

c. The Planning Coordination Group, with reference to overt and

covert actions to implement those national security policies appropriate
to its functions, including those assigned to OCB for coordination, should
advise and assist the responsible operating agencies in the coordinated
development of plans and programs to carry out such national security
policies. The implementation of such plans and programs, with respect
to overt actions, will be coordinated by the Operations Coordinating
Board. In addition, the Planning Coordination Group should hereafter
be advised in advance of major covert programs initiated by the Central
Intelligence Agency under NSC 5412 or as otherwise directed, and
should be the normal channel for giving policy approval for such pro-
grams as well as for securing coordination of support therefor among
the Departments of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence
Agency. With reference to NSC 5502/1 and NSC 5505/1: the necessary
action should be taken to revise NSC Action No. 1314–d, January 27,
1955,

to substitute the Planning Coordination Group for the above men-

tioned Special Committee and to bring the resulting arrangement into
conformity with the foregoing provisions of this paragraph.

d. The Planning Coordination Group should keep close and con-

tinuing contact with the work of the Operations Coordinating Board.

Document 157.

NSC Action No. 1314–d, “Exploitation of Soviet and European Satellite Vulnera-

bilities,” was discussed at the 234th meeting of the National Security Council on January
27. The cited paragraph concerned the NSC recommendation that the President designate
a special committee to be headed by Nelson A. Rockefeller to review programs to carry out
policy stated in NSC 5505, “Exploitation of Soviet and European Satellite Vulnerabilities,”
dated January 18. On March 10 at the 240th meeting of the National Security Council, the
special committee was replaced by the Planning Coordination Group through an amend-
ment to NSC Action No. 1314–d by NSC Action No. 1349, “Coordination of Economic, Psy-
chological and Political Warfare and Foreign Information Activities.” (National Archives,
RG 59, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Se-
curity Council, 1955)

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The Planning Coordination Group would not itself engage in opera-
tions or enter into the stream of agency operations.

e. Because action respecting covert operations should be restricted

so far as possible to those who have a need to know and should be
kept at a high level, it is recommended that NSC 5412 be amended so
as to substitute therein the members of the Planning Coordination
Group specifically mentioned in 3 a. above for the members of the OCB,
and to bring the resulting arrangement into conformity with the fore-
going provisions of 3 c. above.

f. The location of the Planning Coordination Group within the

framework of OCB is in line with the basic principle of integration in
national security policy formulation and implementation. The work to
be done by this group can contribute greatly to the imaginative dy-
namic quality and the effectiveness of coordinated agency planning to
carry out approved national security policies.

Rowland Hughes

On March 10 President Eisenhower designated Rockefeller a member of the Op-

erations Coordinating Board and the OCB Vice Chairman. The President also asked Rock-
efeller to serve as chairman of the Planning Coordination Group. (Eisenhower Library,
Whitman File, Administration Series, Rockefeller, Nelson, 1952–1955) At its 240th meet-
ing that same day, the National Security Council noted that the President had signed the
March 10 letter requesting Rockefeller to assume the responsibilities. The NSC then ap-
proved the recommended amendments to NSC 5412. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File,
NSC Meetings, 1955) See Document 212.

Printed from a copy that indicates Hughes signed the original.

211. Editorial Note

In the course of a discussion on the Formosa crisis in the President’s

office at 2:30 p.m. on March 11, 1955, which was attended by Secretary
of State Dulles, DCI Dulles, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Rad-
ford, Chief of Staff of the Air Force Twining, Chief of Naval Operations
Carney, the President’s Staff Secretary Goodpaster, and Special Assistant
for National Security Affairs Cutler, President Eisenhower also raised
some more general questions regarding U.S. intelligence, as follows:

“i. The President complained about conflicting intelligence infor-

mation coming to him. He said he wanted steps taken to centralize and

centrally evaluate all intelligence. It was agreed that the NIC should

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be ‘beefed up’ and put on a 24 hour basis. Secretary Dulles said there

are three aspects to intelligence:

“a. rapid communication of intelligence from the field

“b. coordination of intelligence in Washington

“c. obtaining accurate intelligence as to Chinat loyalty on

Formosa

“The President said that—under emergent circumstances like the

present—he wanted (1) intelligence transmitted from the field to Wash-

ington very fast; (2) a prompt evaluation of such intelligence at a cen-

tral point where all interested agencies were represented, so as to ob-

tain a commonly agreed assessment as quickly as possible; (3) in the

case of something ‘hot’, a warning to himself and other key persons,

pending such central evaluation.” (Memorandum for the Record pre-

pared by Cutler; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Se-

ries, Formosa—Visit to CINCPAC) The full text of Cutler’s memorandum

is printed in

Foreign Relations

, 1955–1957, volume II, pp. 355–360.

212. National Security Council Directive

NSC 5412/1

Washington, March 12, 1955.

COVERT OPERATIONS

1. The National Security Council, taking cognizance of the vicious

covert activities of the USSR and Communist China and the govern-
ments, parties and groups dominated by them (hereinafter collectively
referred to an “International Communism”) to discredit and defeat the
aims and activities of the United States and other powers of the free
world, determined, as set forth in NSC directives 10/2

and 10/5

that,

in the interests of world peace and U.S. national security, the overt for-
eign activities of the U.S. Government should be supplemented by
covert operations.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Special Assistant to the President for National Secu-

rity Affairs Records. Top Secret. This Directive was circulated under cover of a March 12
note from Executive Secretary Lay to the National Security Council. The note indicates
that the President approved the directive, which superseded NSC 5412, that same day.
The NSC approved the amendments to NSC 5412 (Document 171) at its March 10 meet-
ing. See Document 210 and footnote 16 thereto.

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Docu-

ment 292.

Document 90.

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2. The Central Intelligence Agency had already been charged by

the National Security Council with conducting espionage and counter-
espionage operations abroad. It therefore seemed desirable, for opera-
tional reasons, not to create a new agency for covert operations, but,
subject to directives from the NSC, to place the responsibility for them
on the Central Intelligence Agency and correlate them with espionage
and counter-espionage operations under the overall control of the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence.

3. The NSC has determined that such covert operations shall to

the greatest extent practicable, in the light of U.S. and Soviet capabili-
ties and taking into account the risk of war, be designed to:

a. Create and exploit troublesome problems for International

Communism, impair relations between the USSR and Communist
China and between them and their satellites, complicate control within
the USSR, Communist China and their satellites, and retard the growth
of the military and economic potential of the Soviet bloc.

b. Discredit the prestige and ideology of International Commu-

nism, and reduce the strength of its parties and other elements.

c. Counter any threat of a party or individuals directly or indi-

rectly responsive to Communist control to achieve dominant power in
a free world country.

d. Reduce International Communist control over any areas of the

world.

e. Strengthen the orientation toward the United States of the peo-

ples and nations of the free world, accentuate, wherever possible, the
identity of interest between such peoples and nations and the United
States as well as favoring, where appropriate, those groups genuinely
advocating or believing in the advancement of such mutual interests,
and increase the capacity and will of such peoples and nations to re-
sist International Communism.

f. In accordance with established policies and to the extent prac-

ticable in areas dominated or threatened by International Communism,
develop underground resistance and facilitate covert and guerrilla op-
erations and ensure availability of those forces in the event of war, in-
cluding wherever practicable provision of a base upon which the mil-
itary may expand these forces in time of war within active theaters of
operations as well as provision for stay-behind assets and escape and
evasion facilities.

4. Under the authority of Section 102(d)(5) of the National Secu-

rity Act of 1947, the National Security Council hereby directs that the
Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for:

a. Ensuring, through designated representatives of the Secretary

of State and of the Secretary of Defense, that covert operations are
planned and conducted in a manner consistent with United States for-
eign and military policies and with overt activities, and consulting with
and obtaining advice from the Planning Coordination Group of the
Operations Coordinating Board and other departments or agencies as
appropriate.

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b. Informing, through appropriate channels and on a need-to-

know basis, agencies of the U.S. government, both at home and abroad

(including diplomatic and military representatives), of such operations

as will affect them.

5. In addition to the provisions of paragraph 4, the following pro-

visions shall apply to wartime covert operations:

a. Plans for covert operations to be conducted in active theaters

of war and any other areas in which U.S. forces are engaged in com-

bat operations will be drawn up with the assistance of the Department

of Defense and will be in consonance with and complementary to ap-

proved war plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Covert operations in active theaters of war and any other area

in which U.S. forces are engaged in combat operations will be con-

ducted under such command and control relationships as have been

or may in the future be approved by the Department of Defense.

6. As used in this directive, “covert operations” shall be under-

stood to be all activities conducted pursuant to this directive which are
so planned and executed that any U.S. Government responsibility for
them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the
U.S. Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them.
Specifically, such operations shall include any covert activities related
to: propaganda, political action; economic warfare; preventive direct ac-
tion, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition; escape and evasion
and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states or groups
including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas
and refugee liberation groups; support of indigenous and anti-comu-
nist elements in threatened countries of the free world; deception plans
and operations; and all activities compatible with this directive neces-
sary to accomplish the foregoing. Such operations shall not include:
armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage and counter-es-
pionage, nor cover and deception for military operations.

7. This directive supersedes and rescinds NSC 10/2, NSC 10/5,

and NSC 5412. Subparagraphs “a” and “b” under the heading “Addi-
tional Functions of the Operations Coordinating Board” on page 1 of
the President’s memorandum for the Executive Secretary, National
Security Council, supplementing Executive Order 10483,

are super-

seded by the following provisions:

a. Except as the President otherwise directs, the regular members

of the Planning Coordination Group shall hereafter be advised in ad-

vance of major covert programs initiated by the Central Intelligence

Agency under this policy or as otherwise directed, and shall be the nor-

mal channel for giving policy approval for such programs as well as

Document 157. The President’s memorandum is Document 158.

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for securing coordination of support therefor among the Departments

of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency.

b. The designated representatives of the Secretaries of State and

Defense referred to in paragraph 4-a above shall keep the members of

the Planning Coordination Group from their respective departments

advised as to matters on which they are consulted by the Director of

Central Intelligence, and which have been or are to be referred to the

Planning Coordination Group.

213. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National

Security Council (Lay) to the National Security Council

Washington, March 15, 1955.

SUBJECT

The Foreign Information Program and Psychological Warfare Planning

REFERENCES

A. NSC 59/1

B. NSC 127/1

C. NSC Action. Nos. 1197

and 1198

D. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated February 8, 1955

1. The attached NSC Staff memorandum sets forth a brief review

of measures which have been periodically considered or adopted
within the Executive Branch to provide organizational arrangements
and principles for coordination and planning in the field of psycho-
logical operations. It illustrates the difficulties and divergences of opin-
ion hitherto encountered in attempting to provide adequate direction
and coordination for psychological operations at a high governmental

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 127/1. Top

Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretary of the Treasury, Director of the Bureau of the
Budget, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Director of Central Intelligence. All
ellipses in the original.

Document 2.

Document 123.

See footnote 3, Document 210.

In NSC Action No. 1198, “The Foreign Information Program and Psychological

Warfare Planning,” the National Security Council, on August 5, 1954, noted that NSC
59/1 and NSC 127/1 had been deemed obsolete. The Council, however, deferred fur-
ther action pending completion of the Bureau of the Budget study on coordination
of economic, psychological and political warfare and foreign information activities.
(National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Ac-
tion by the National Security Council, 1954)

Not found; see numbered paragraph 6 below.

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626 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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level. It also affords a historical record to those presently concerned
with the desirability of providing further policy and organizational
arrangements in this area.

2. NSC 59/1 (“The Foreign Information Program and Psycholog-

ical Warfare Planning”, March 9, 1950) and NSC 127/1 (“Plan for Con-
ducting Psychological Operations During General Hostilities”, July 25,
1952) have clearly become obsolete in many of their provisions due to
major change in Executive branch organization during the past few
years. Therefore, they should be rescinded, revised, or otherwise dealt
with.

3. The current status of action on these policies has developed in

the following manner.

a. A special memorandum from the President to the NSC, dated

September 3, 1953,

transferred the functions of the POCC (established

pursuant to NSC 59/1) to the OCB. The OCB continued only the POCC
Subcommittee, the “X-Day Working Group”, charged with developing
plans for psychological operations in support of hostilities.

b. The “X-Day Working Group” was authorized by OCB in the lat-

ter part of 1953 to propose revisions in NSC 127/1 deemed necessary in
the light of the numerous Executive Branch organizational changes
brought about since the adoption of the policy in question.

c. In carrying out their task, the X-Day Committee found itself un-

able to make agreed recommendations on several major issues due to
departmental conflict of views.

d. As a result, the OCB in its report to the NSC dated July 23,

1954,

recommended recision of NSC 59/1` and NSC 127/1, “without

prejudice to the principles of operation and the responsibilities of de-
partments and agencies to engage in psychological warfare and psy-
chological warfare planning enunciated therein or elsewhere”.

4. On August 3, 1954, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted recom-

mendations to the NSC opposing recision of NSC 59/1 and NSC 127/1,
pointing out that these policies, although obsolete in some respects,
contained “essential formal statements of national policy on psycho-
logical warfare matters”.

5. The NSC on August 5, 1954, deferred further action with re-

spect to NSC 59/1 and NSC 127/1, pending receipt of a study from
the Bureau of the Budget which was to include “the placing of re-
sponsibility within the Executive Branch for coordinating economic

Document 158.

Not found, but for a memorandum of discussion of this paper by the National

Security Council on August 5, 1954, see Document 187.

Not printed, but see Document 187.

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warfare, psychological warfare and foreign information activities”.

However, the study in question does not deal specifically with the prob-
lems posed by NSC 59/1 and NSC 127/1.

6. In a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense dated January

11, 1955, subsequently circulated to the NSC on February 8, 1955 with
a supporting memorandum from the Secretary of Defense, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff reaffirmed their views of August 3, 1954 and addition-
ally set forth certain provisions which should be contained in any re-
vised policy.

7. As suggested by the attached historical summary, a number of

major issues are identifiable, which must be dealt with in any attempt
to provide for organizational arrangements in this area:

Departmental Responsibility.

State’s primary prerogative for giv-

ing in this area in peacetime policy guidance, with related responsi-
bilities, has been generally recognized. Military prerogatives in
wartime have been likewise generally recognized. However, the orga-
nizational expression of carrying out these responsibilities has varied
considerably (ICS, IFIO, NPSB, PSB, OCB).

The Necessity of Continuity.

This concept has been approached

in various ways, including:

(1) The organization for coordination of planning in this area

should be the same in peace and war;

(2) Peacetime arrangements should generally prevail on a tempo-

rary basis during the first stages of general war—to be modified or re-

placed later by a permanent organization whose nature and authority

would subsequently by determined;

(3) A special

interim organization

should be provided for in peace-

time to be activated during the initial stages of general hostilities (or

limited war);

(4) A

permanent

organization should be provided for in peace-

time for the period of general war, or some variant of this concept
with (3);

(5) No binding decision should be made at this time on the na-

ture of the permanent organization for coordination and planning dur-
ing general hostilities.

The Governmental Level of Responsibility.

(1) Should the organization be at the Assistant Secretary level or

higher?

(2) Should the organization have the authority to make psycho-

logical warfare policy and to issue directives, operational and other, or
should it be more exclusively coordinating in nature?

This was NSC Action No. 1198; see footnote 9, Document 187.

Not found but see numbered paragraph 31 in the attachment printed below.

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628 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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(3) To what extent should the organization have an independent

staff?

(4) What provision should be made for access to the top policy-

making levels in the Government and to the President?

(5) To what extent should the directing officer of such an organi-

zation be independent from the departments and have direct access to
the President?

(6) To what extent does the changed nature of general war as

presently envisaged bear on the necessity and importance of estab-
lishing in peacetime an organization for the conduct of psychological
operations in the initial stages of general war?

(7) To what extent is it necessary in peacetime to provide, in the

psychological warfare area, trained personnel and stockpiled resources
for use in wartime?

8. In view of the past history in this field and the nature of the is-

sues identified in the preceding paragraph, it is believed that a high
level review of the existing arrangements in the light of NSC 59/1 and
NSC 127/1 should be undertaken with a view to preparing appropri-
ate recommendations for consideration by the National Security Coun-
cil. Such a review should be undertaken with a full understanding of
the existing arrangements and current plans and programs in this field,
as well as the status of planning for the possibility of limited or gen-
eral war.

9. Mr. Cutler therefore recommends that the responsibility for mak-

ing such a review and recommendations be assigned to Mr. Nelson Rock-
efeller as Special Assistant to the President “to provide leadership in the
development of increased understanding and cooperation among all
peoples and in reviewing and developing methods and programs by
which the various departments and agencies of the Government may ef-
fectively contribute to such cooperation and understanding”. In this as-
signment Mr. Rockefeller should be provided with such advice and
assistance as he requires from the Bureau of the Budget, the Office of
Defense Mobilization and the Operations Coordinating Board as well as
the responsible operating departments and agencies.

10. Mr. Rockefeller and the NSC Planning Board concur in the

above recommendation.

James S. Lay, Jr.

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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Attachment

SUMMARY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE ARRANGEMENTS

WITHIN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT SINCE WORLD WAR II

(with particular respect to the problems posed by

NSC 59/1 and 127/1)

World War II

1. Approximately six months after U.S. entry into World War II,

the OWI (Office of War Information) was established by Executive Or-
der in June 1942.

The OWI was responsible for domestic and overt

foreign information programs and answered directly to the President.
Policy guidance was provided by the Committee on War Information,
chaired by the Director of OWI, with representation which included
the departments of State, War, and Navy.

2. Subsequently, in 1943, the OSS (Office of Strategic Services) was

established and made responsible, among other functions, for the con-
duct of covert information and propaganda activities abroad, answer-
ing to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. There was no psychological warfare organization for the serv-

ices as a whole, although there was created within SHAEF a special
psychological warfare staff division on a level with G–2. In theaters of
military operations, each commander set up his own psychological
warfare organization and coordinated psychological warfare with his
combat operations.

Post-World War II

4. Following the end of the war, the OSS was dissolved and cer-

tain overt activities of the OWI, including the VOA facilities, were trans-
ferred to the Department of State. At the same time the CIA took over
the intelligence and covert psychological warfare activities of the OSS.
The military services retained their psychological warfare units on a
greatly reduced scale, though they conducted significant activities in
this area through the reorientation program necessitated by the occu-
pation of Germany and Japan. This was the status of organization
within the Government in early 1947 when the exigencies of the cur-
rent cold war posed increased challenges and demands on U.S. activ-
ities in this field.

Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the paper.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order No. 9182 on June 13,

1942. (Department of State

Bulletin

, June 27, 1942, p. 566)

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630 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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5. At the end of 1947, by interdepartmental agreement, the State

Department was charged with the responsibility for current peacetime
propaganda activities (NSC 4 Dec. 9, 1947).

To provide for closer

policy coordination and integration of facilities and programs, an In-
terdepartmental Coordinating Staff (ICS) was established under the
direction of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. Repre-
sentatives of State, Army, Navy, Air Force and CIA participated on this
joint staff. The organization was to develop psychological objectives
for cold war programs and to coordinate the activities of the operating
agencies.

6. This agreement accordingly placed responsibility upon the Sec-

retary of State for peacetime psychological operations during the cold
war; the question of wartime conduct of psychological warfare was not
covered by this early agreement but was left for further study. Early in
1949, interdepartmental agreement was reached on the establishment
in the State Department of a planning organization to develop plans
for interim arrangements for foreign and domestic information pro-
grams and overt psychological operations abroad during the initial
stages of war (NSC 43, March 9, 1949).

The director of this planning

staff was appointed by the Secretary of State in consultation with di-
rectly interested agencies. The staff was composed of State and mili-
tary personnel, with liaison representatives from CIA and NSRB. Pol-
icy consultants to the director of the staff were designated by the
Secretary of State and Defense, the Director of CIA and the Chairman
of the NSRB. The functions and personnel of this staff overlapped to a
considerable degree with the Interdepartmental Coordinating Staff
(ICS). This condition and subsequent experience led to a review of ex-
isting arrangements (see NSC 43/1, Aug. 2, 1949).

NSC 59/1

7. As a result, in March 1950 revised basic principles for handling

psychological warfare planning and operations were adopted and put
into effect. (NSC 59/1, March 9, 1950). The principle that propaganda
in both peace and war is a continuing mechanism of national policy
directed toward the achievement of national aims was reaffirmed. Un-
der NSC 59/1, the Secretary of State was charged with responsibility
for:

See

Foreign Relations

, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment,

Documents 252–265.

NSC 43, “Planning for Wartime Conduct of Overt Psychological Warfare,” is in

National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 43 Series.

Ibid.

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a. The formulation of policy and plans for the National Foreign

Information program during peacetime.

b. The formulation of national psychological warfare policy in

time of national emergency or threat of war and during the initial stages

of war.

c. The coordination of policy and plans for these activities with

other appropriate agencies. The policy and planning for periods of

emergency and the initial stages of war were to be coordinated with

the joint war plans of the Department of Defense, and where such

plans had a direct impact on war plans, they were to be subject to JCS

concurrence.

8. In accordance with NSC 59/1, a revised central planning and

coordinating mechanism based on the consolidation of the former Staffs
was established to deal with these responsibilities. The ICS became the
Interdepartmental Foreign Information Staff (IFIS). The director was
appointed by the Secretary of State and was in fact the Assistant Sec-
retary of State for Public Affairs. The group of consultants was retained.
This combined mechanism became the Interdepartmental Foreign In-
formation Organization (IFIO).

9. Again there was avoided coming fully to grips with the issue

of jurisdictional responsibility for psychological warfare policy and di-
rection during war, because of the fundamental differences between
State and the military services on the question. Agreement had
been reached only for planning through the initial stages of war, but
even this concept was left without precise definition. This arrangement
proved unsatisfactory and the cause of friction from many aspects.

10. The IFIS joint staff was charged with planning for emergency

and wartime psychological operations and completed a study shortly
after the outbreak of war in Korea on the assignment of psychological
warfare responsibilities for the initial stages of war (defined as D plus
90) and for the subsequent stages of war. This study was transmitted
to the departments for adoption in July 1950.

It provided that:

a. During the initial stages of war, the Secretary of State would:

(1) Formulate psychological warfare policy and issue policy guid-

ance directives to operating agencies.

The IFIO became the body charged with psychological warfare policy in time of

national emergency or during the initial stages of war. Following the Presidential direc-
tive of April 4, 1951, establishing the PSB, the IFIO was redesignated the POCC, Psy-
chological Operations Coordinating Committee. The POCC created a subcommittee, the
X-Day working group, to prepare the required plans. [Footnote in the original. For the
April 4 directive, see Document 60.]

The study cited presumably is NSC 74 of July 10, 1950, “A Plan for National Psy-

chological Warfare,” which was sent to NSC members and the Secretary of the Treasury.
The NSC did not formally approve NSC 74. A copy is in National Archives, RG 59,
S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 74. See also Document 17.

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632 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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(2) Coordinate these functions with agencies executing psycho-

logical warfare functions.

(3) Prepare detailed plans and programs for implementation of

policies.

(4) In areas other than theaters of military operations, execute overt

psychological warfare programs, provide for coordination with covert

psychological warfare and coordinate U.S. psychological warfare poli-

cies and operations with our allies.

b. To handle psychological warfare during the subsequent stages

of war, there should be established an independent agency:

(1) Authorized to issue directives to operating agencies.

(2) Providing for representation of the operating agencies.

(3) Authorized to provide coordination with our allies.

(4) Having direct access to the President, but recognizing the au-

thority of the State Department in areas other than theaters of military

operations, the Department of Defense having authority in such theaters.

11. Furthermore, for the initial stages of war, an interdepartmen-

tal board was to be established within the State Department to act as
the “executive agent” of the Secretary of State in formulating policy
plans for, and coordination of, the world-wide conduct of psychologi-
cal warfare.

12. The transition from the peacetime organization to the initial

stages of war organization was to take place on D-Day, or earlier at the
discretion of the President. The IFIO would be designated the Interim
Psychological Warfare Board and strengthened; as executive agent for
the Secretary of State, it would issue directives.

13. These recommendations led to further controversy. In the fall

of 1950 Secretary of Defense Johnson advocated the immediate estab-
lishment of the Interim Psychological Warfare Board in the Executive
Office of the President and immediate consideration of the question of
composition and urgency of a National Psychological Warfare Board.
He proposed that the latter Board would be independent of existing de-
partments and have full-time public members in the majority. On the
other hand, the Department of State was not willing to accept estab-
lishment of the Interim Board as an executive agent for the Secretary of
State at that time. The issue was posed as to whether or not such an in-
terim board would impair the Secretary of State’s responsibility for the
conduct of foreign affairs. Accordingly, an impasse developed.

14. Meanwhile, in August 1950, in the light of the Korean devel-

opments, State strengthened the IFIO organization. The interdepart-
mental consultants group was expanded and renamed the National
Psychological Strategy Board. It was headed by the Assistant Secretary
of State for Public Affairs and was composed of representatives of the
Secretary of Defense, the JCS, the Director of CIA and the Army as Ex-
ecutive Agent of the JCS for the conduct of psychological warfare in
Korea.

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See Document 60.

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15. Attempting to break the organizational deadlock, State pro-

posed in December 1950 a new concept, emphasizing continuing psy-
chological effort (rather than phased operations) for both peace and
war. The conclusion was that the same organization should be re-
sponsible for formulation of policy and programs in both peace and
war. It was proposed to place responsibility for all phases in the Sec-
retary of State with an interdepartmental coordinating agent to advise
the Secretary on policy and to coordinate planning operations. This
proposal was rejected by Defense.

16. A new memorandum of agreement and disagreement was then

worked out interdepartmentally. It set forth the issue somewhat as fol-
lows. Agreement was reached on the following points:

a. The peace-to-war phasing was eliminated and the need for or-

ganizational and policy continuity recognized. The responsibility of the
JCS in theaters of military operations and of State in other areas was
reaffirmed.

b. A single official, designated by the President:
(1) Should be responsible for formulation of psychological policy

within the framework of approved national policy and coordination
and evaluation of the psychological effort; and

(2) Should be authorized to issue policy guidance to the operating

agencies.

c. Representatives at the policy levels, also agencies executing ma-

jor portions of the psychological effort, should advise this official and
coordinate operations.

17. There was disagreement as to whether or not the single offi-

cial designated by the President should be the Secretary of State or an
independent official responsible to the President. Arguments were put
forth for both propositions, and the matter was referred to the Presi-
dent for decision in January 1951.

Establishment of the Psychological Strategy Board.

18. The problem was worked on by the BOB, the NSC Staff,

and a final agreement was negotiated by the agencies concerned. This
resulted in the directive of the President on June 20, 1951, establishing
the Psychological Strategy Board.

The principle of psychological op-

erations was recognized. However the designation of a single official
as the focus of responsibility was replaced by the concept of a Board
composed of the Undersecretary of State, the Undersecretary of De-
fense, and the Director of CIA. A director appointed by the President
served under the Board, and was placed in a position to take initiative

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634 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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in, and give direction to, government-wide psychological operations.
The Board was directed particularly to:

a. provide more effective plans of psychological operations within

the framework of approved national policies;

b. coordinate psychological operations of all departments and

agencies of government, and

c. evaluate the effectiveness of the national psychological effort.

19. In the meantime the IFIO have been continuing to struggle

with the formulation of a “national psychological warfare plan” for
general war, to include principles of operation, delineation of respon-
sibilites and organizational principles, etc. Since the PSB now had been
given authority for such planning, the IFIO plan along with alternate
departmental versions was, accordingly, referred for further study and
action to the PSB.

NSC 127/1

20. The PSB in due course resubmitted the plan for conducting

psychological operations during general hostilities to the NSC for ap-
proval, (NSC 127/1). It provided, among other things:

a. A statement of national objectives which will maintain in a con-

dition of general hostilities (based on NSC 20/4).

b. Basic principles of operations.

c. Delineation of responsibilities, including:

(1) PSB responsibility for formulation and promulgation as guid-

ance of over-all national psychological objectives, policies and programs,

and for the coordination and evaluation of the national psychological

effort (para. 7, NSC 127/1).

(2) The JCS to be responsible, in conformity with national policy

and PSB guidance, for planning and execution of U.S. psychological

operations in military theaters of operations (para. 8, NSC 127/1).

(3) State in conformity with national policy and PSB guidance re-

sponsible for the planning and execution of U.S. overt psychological

operations in areas other than military theaters of operations (para. 9,

NSC 127/1).

(4) “In situations in which a military theater of operations em-

braces territory of a government which exercises civil authority and to

which a U.S. diplomatic mission is accredited . . . the Department of

State shall be responsible for the U.S. information program directed to-

ward the nations of the country concerned”. (para. 10, NSC 127/1).

(5) “The Psychological Strategy Board shall insure through the

government agency or agencies appropriate . . . any necessary coordi-

nation of national psychological operations, policies, or plans with the

appropriate agencies of other governments” (para. 14, NSC 127/1).

NSC 20/4, “U.S. Objectives With Respect to the USSR To Counter Soviet Threats

to U.S. Security,” November 23, 1948, is printed in

Foreign Relations,

1948, vol. I, Part 2,

pp. 662–669.

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21. NSC 127/1 further provides that plans for the transfer of fa-

cilities and personnel from State and other overt agencies to military
control in military theaters of operations should be coordinated
through the organization established pursuant to NSC 59/1 (the
POCC). Originally the PSB draft of 127/1 had provided for such co-
ordination by the PSB, but this was changed subsequent to a recom-
mendation by the Bureau of the Budget. In approving NSC 127/1 the
President made clear that this policy was to serve as a basis for emer-
gency planning relating to sudden general hostilities and “directed
that the subsidiary plans and measures authorized provide maxi-
mum flexibility whenever the President deems it desirable to deter-
mine the ultimate organization appropriate to protracted full-scale
general hostilities” (NSC 127/1, Note by the Executive Secretary, July
25, 1952).

Establishment of the Operations Coordinating Board

22. The effort of the Psychological Strategy Board to carry out its

variegated mission was not a happy one. In reviewing its activities the
Jackson Committee

found that:

“there is no ‘strategic concept for psychological operations’ separate

and distinct from a strategic concept for gaining national aims without

war. When PSB has developed, for example, a ‘regional psychological

plan’, it has really formulated a plan for the achievement of national

aims involving the use of propaganda, diplomacy, economic pressure

and military strength in various combinations. It is this fact which has

caused so much controversy between PSB and the established plan-

ning agencies within the State Department”.

Accordingly, the Jackson Committee recommended abolishment of the
PSB and the establishment of the OCB as a coordinating body which
would:

a. Aid in coordinating the implementation of detailed operational

plans prepared by responsible departments and agencies to carry out

approved NSC policies.

b. Assure the timely and coordinated carrying out of such plans.

c. Initiate new proposals for action within the framework of na-

tional security policies in response to opportunity and other changes

in the situation.

d. Assure that each project or action was so executed as to make

its full contribution to the particular “climate of opinion” which the

United States is seeking to achieve in the war.

See Document 151.

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Subsequent Arrangements for X-Day Planning

23. The Jackson Committee noted that the POCC, which had ex-

isted as a mechanism through which the State Department could co-
ordinate the Foreign Information Program, was responsive to a neces-
sary function, but recommended that the POCC be abolished and its
function made a responsibility of the OCB and the OCB staff.

24. As a result, in a special memorandum to the NSC by the Pres-

ident, dated September 3, 1953 the functions of the POCC were trans-
ferred to the OCB. The OCB did not immediately abolish the POCC,
but after the lapse of a little time discontinued it as a separate coordi-
nating arrangement. However, the OCB continued an ad hoc commit-
tee on X-Day planning to carry on the work of developing plans for
conducting psychological operations in support of hostilities, which
had been the function of the “X-Day Committee” of the now defunct
POCC.

25. In the fall of 1953 the ad hoc Committee on X-Day planning

reported to the OCB that due to reorganization measures within the
Government subsequent to NSC 127/1, revision of this policy was nec-
essary in order that the X-Day Committee could go ahead with their
tasks. Reorganization Plan No. 8 had established the USIA.

Execu-

tive Order No. 10483 had established the OCB, and the functions of
the POCC had been transferred to the former. The X-Day working
group felt that 127/1 could be revised easily in order to take into ac-
count these changes within the Government structure. Accordingly,
it was authorized to present proposals for such revisions to the OCB
for transmittal to the NSC. These proposals did not long remain
“non-controversial” as was originally hoped. On March 22 the X-Day
Working Committee presented proposals to the OCB for the revision
of NSC 127/1, which in effect reopened many of the old arguments be-
tween the agencies concerning jurisdiction and the conduct of psy-
chological operations during wartime. The matter was further compli-
cated by trying to propose revisions to cover all types of hostilities,
in order that “support planning should anticipate as far as possible
every such situation from limited combat, as in Korea, to general war”.
There was no agreement within the Committee on the following ma-
jor issues:

a. DOD, USIA and CIA representatives supported the position that

in time of hostilities the Operations Coordinating Board should be re-

sponsible for “the formulation of national psychological objectives”

and “the coordination of psychological operations and programs”.

On June 1, 1953, President Eisenhower submitted Reorganization Plan No. 8 to

Congress. The text and supplementary information on that plan are printed in Depart-
ment of State

Bulletin,

June 14, 1953, pp. 849–856.

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b. The State representative supported the position that the OCB

should be responsible for “assuring the formulation and coordination

of guidance” and “the coordination of programs” for psychological op-

erations in time of hostilities. (This would leave to the OCB to deter-

mine where the organization to provide guidance should be estab-

lished, within the OCB or outside, etc.).

c. On the military enclave situation (NSC 127/1, para. 10), Defense,

CIA and USIA supported the position that the military commander

should have the responsibility of coordinating over-all psychological

operations, with the USIA operations “insofar as practicable” being

placed under his direction as an entity in charge of a designee of the

USIA when the former deems it necessary for support of the military

operations.

d. State supported the position that in this situation USIA should

operate under the direction of the State Department Chief of Mission.

The area of disagreement was possibly even broader, however, for

the State Department representative with the X-Day Working Group

reserved State’s rights throughout to reconsider further at a higher

level.

26. The OCB considered this problem (primarily at the Board As-

sistants’ level) for some time and in its report to the NSC on the sub-
ject, dated July 21, 1954, generally came to the conclusion that the ju-
risdictional issues raised concerning final authority over psychological
operations during general war were (a) difficult of resolution at the
present time, and (b) did not perhaps need to be resolved at the pres-
ent time.

27. The OCB recommended:

a. That the NSC rescind NSC 59/1 and NSC 127/1 “without prej-

udice to the principles of operation and the responsibilities of depart-

ments and agencies to engage in psychological warfare and psycho-

logical warfare planning enunciated therein or elsewhere.”

b. “That the NSC note that the OCB serves as the body for deal-

ing with requirements for interdepartmental coordination concerning

overseas information and psychological warfare activities in carrying

out NSC assignments or upon specific request by participating de-

partments and agencies.”

c. “That the NSC note that the OCB developed, on an urgent ba-

sis, a detailed contingency plan for information and psychological war-

fare activities in Indochina and that the OCB will not develop any fur-

ther detailed subsidiary plans of this type for designated areas unless

so directed by the NSC.” (the implication being that if and when lim-

ited, rather than general, war should occur the OCB could develop

plans and coordinating arrangements for Psywar operations which

would be appropriate in the circumstances).

Current Status

28. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in their views dated 3 August 1954

objected to the recision of NSC 59/1 and 121/1 on the grounds that
“although obsolete in certain organizational respects, (they) contain es-
sential formal statements of national policy on psychological warfare

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638 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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matters. Without a formal statement of responsibilities of governmen-
tal agencies concerned, there can be no valid basis for psychological
warfare planning”. The JCS further recommended that NSC 59/1 and
NSC 127/1 should be revised or superseded.

29. On August 5, 1954, by NSC Action No. 1198, further action

with respect to NSC 59/1 and NSC 127/1 was deferred pending re-
ceipt of an expanded study by the Bureau of the Budget (NSC Action
No. 1197) which was “to include the placing of responsibility within
the executive branch for coordinating economic warfare, psychologi-
cal warfare, political warfare, and foreign information activities”. How-
ever, the Bureau of the Budget was not specifically directed to propose
a solution to the organizational and jurisdictional problems concern-
ing psychological warfare operations during hostilities which are raised
by NSC 127/1 and which have such a long history, and its projected
report does not propose a solution to this matter.

30. In a letter to the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization dated

February 7, 1955,

the Executive Officer of the Operations Coordinat-

ing Board noted that the OCB is currently responsible for the coordi-
nation of the transfer of overt information facilities, personnel, etc., to
the theater commander in a period of general war “and that adequate
authority and procedures exist utilizing the OCB structure to carry out
this responsibility in a limited conflict.” However, he further com-
mented that in the absence of detailed plans for full mobilization in
time of war, it did not appear to be feasible for the OCB to develop
such plans for psychological warfare to be applicable in the event of
general war.

31. In a memorandum dated January 11, 1955, subsequently cir-

culated to the NSC on February 8, 1955, with a supporting memoran-
dum from the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirmed
their views of August 3, 1954, and specifically proposed that any doc-
ument designed to supersede NSC 59/1 and NSC 127/1 should:

“a. Contain an approved definition of psychological warfare.

“b. Contain an approved definition of psychological operations.

“c. Adequately define responsibility and authority for the conduct

of psychological warfare under conditions of declared war or hostili-

ties involving the engagement of U.S. forces under conditions short of

declared war.

“d. Delineate agency responsibility for use of facilities within a

theater.

“e. Provide guidance for the orderly transfer of facilities at the be-

ginning of hostilities.

“f. Provide for a coordinated psychological warfare effort by all

agencies of government.”

Not found.

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214. Memorandum of Discussion at the 247th Meeting of the

National Security Council

Washington, May 5, 1955.

SUBJECT

Discussion at the 247th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday,
May 5, 1955

[Omitted here is a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. Status of United States Programs for National Security As of December

31, 1954: The Internal Security Program (NSC 5509, Part 8)

Mr. Coyne introduced his presentation with a brief analysis of the

internal security arrangements under the National Security Council,
with particular reference to the functions, responsibilities and mem-
bership of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) and the
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS). He thereafter
indicated that he would confine his presentation to five major prob-
lems relating to internal security. He added that he would pause at the
end of his discussion of each of these five problems, to answer any
questions.

Mr. Coyne then analyzed the Communist movement in the United

States, using charts to illustrate his major points. At the conclusion of
this discussion the President inquired, apropos of Mr. Coyne’s state-
ment that publishing activities helped to provide revenues for the Com-
munist Party, USA, what publishing houses were maintained by the
Communist Party and what kinds of material they published. Mr.
Coyne and others described the publications, and the President then
inquired whether such publications were clearly tabbed as Communist
in character. Mr. Coyne replied that this was not normally the case, but
that it was not difficult to discover their character after a brief reading.

The Vice President inquired as to the character of the firm which

published the Matusow book.

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover explained the back-

grounds of Angus Cameron and Albert Kahn, who had published this
volume.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by

Gleason on May 6.

A copy of NSC 5509, Part 8, is in the National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files:

Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5509 Series.

Reference is to Harvey Matusow,

False Witness

(New York: Cameron and Kahn,

1955).

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At the conclusion of this discussion Mr. Coyne continued with his

presentation, dealing successively with the following subjects: (1) So-
viet bloc intelligence targets, overt and covert; (2) legal and illegal
entry of foreign persons and materials into the United States; (3) the se-
curity of critical facilities; and (4) the security of vital information. (A
copy of Mr. Coyne’s report is filed with the minutes of the meeting.)

At the conclusion of the presentation the President referred to the

account given by Mr. Coyne of the manner in which a Czech courier
had brought into Idlewild from Montreal six diplomatic pouches con-
taining 1500 pounds of contents, while managing to avoid either cus-
toms or immigration inspection. The President said he could not imag-
ine how an individual with so much material could have avoided some
kind of customs inspection. Mr. Coyne replied that the courier in ques-
tion had simply managed to fool both the customs and immigration
officials, and had removed his pouches in an automobile which had
been sent for that purpose.

The President said that despite the privileges of diplomatic im-

munity, would it not be right that if we catch an individual planning
to evade our regulations, that individual should lose his diplomatic
inviolability?

Mr. Coyne said that he would prefer that members of the State De-

partment answer the President’s question. Secretary Hoover stated that
while it would be possible to go after a particular man, it would be ex-
tremely difficult to change the system which allowed for the inviola-
bility of the diplomatic pouch. We could declare an individual persona
non grata. Mr. Rose,

acting for the Secretary of the Treasury, recalled

the circumstances of the case Mr. Coyne had cited, and indicated that
the Embassy of Czechoslovakia had firmly denied that its courier had
evaded regulations.

The President said he was sure of at least one thing. He would not

feel that he was a very good and effective administrator if he could not
think up some way to delay such an individual as this Czech courier
long enough to discover what were the contents of his baggage and
pouches without actually opening them.

Secretary Wilson said that was it not obvious that there was con-

sistent abuse of the pouch privilege by Soviet bloc people. The Presi-
dent replied that of course they consistently abused the privilege, but
the difficulty was that the United States in turn was dependent on be-
ing able to transmit diplomatic pouches to and from its missions in
countries behind the Iron Curtain. Indeed, in one respect at least it

Not found.

H. Chapman Rose, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury.

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needed these pouches more than the Soviet bloc diplomats, because it
was necessary in many cases to send food in the pouches.

Mr. Allen Dulles said that he was convinced that there were cer-

tain additional steps which the United States could take to reduce So-
viet bloc abuse of the pouch privilege, although, he said, many of his
people in the Central Intelligence Agency did not agree with this point
of view.

The President said that he hated to be a sucker when he knew that

the other fellow was fooling and abusing him.

Mr. Coyne assured the President that certain members of the Coun-

cil, including Admiral Radford, not to mention the members of the two
internal security committees, were hard at work to see what additional
actions we could take to cope with this problem

Admiral Radford said that he was indeed interested, and had tried

to canvass the three Services as to possible reduction of their depend-
ence on pouch material sent to Washington by the Military Attachés.
He had not been very successful in persuading them that it was un-
necessary to rely so heavily on this pouch material. Nevertheless, he
still felt personally that the United States loses more than it gains by
its strict adherence to the inviolability of the diplomatic pouch as a
means of securing intelligence materials on the Soviet bloc.

The President said that he thought it would be a good idea to con-

tact our Embassies in the Soviet bloc countries and to ascertain from
them just how important our own pouches really are. If this impor-
tance proved not to be vital, we might contemplate new regulations.
In any event, said the President, he admitted that the problem of con-
trolling abuse of the pouch was not as easy as it looked on the surface.

Mr. Dillon Anderson then inquired of the President whether he

wished further study and recommendations by the two internal secu-
rity committees on this subject. The Attorney General, Mr. J. Edgar
Hoover and Mr. Coyne pointed out that the two committees were al-
ready engaged in restudying the problem.

Governor Stassen, reverting to the problem of illegal entries into

the United States from foreign countries, which Mr. Coyne had un-
derlined, inquired whether the time may not be close at hand when
everyone in the United States must be compelled to have an identifi-
cation card. It might, for example, be possible to insist on such identi-
fication cards under cover of the requirements for civil defense. The
President replied that of course the system of identification cards had
been common in many European countries for a good many years, but
he believed that an attempt to introduce this system in the United States
would raise a great political storm, although it might be possible to get
by with a civil defense cover.

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642 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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The National Security Council:

a. Noted and discussed an oral briefing on the subject by the NSC

Representative on Internal Security, based upon Part 8 or NSC 5509.

b. Noted that the internal security committees are preparing a re-

port for Council consideration on the internal security problems cre-

ated by Soviet bloc use of the diplomatic pouch in relation to U.S. use

of the diplomatic pouch in the Soviet bloc countries.

Note

: The action in b above subsequently transmitted to the Chair-

men, IIC and ICIS.

[Omitted here are the remaining agenda items.]

Paragraphs a–b and the Note that follow constituted NSC Action No. 1390. (Na-

tional Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action
of the National Security Council)

215. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles

to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Erskine)

Washington, May 7, 1955.

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job

95–G00278B, Box 1, Folder 29. Top Secret. 1 page not declassified.]

216. Memorandum From the Chief of Foreign Intelligence,

Central Intelligence Agency (Steward) to Director of Central
Intelligence Dulles

Washington, May 10, 1955.

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director

of Operations, Job 79–01228A, Box 30. Secret. 3 pages not declassified.]

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Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff, Job 84–B00389R, Box 4. Secret.

Drafted by J.M. Ault in the Office of Research and Reports.

Soviet Materials.

Not found.

Brackets in the original.

217. Memorandum From the Assistant Director of the Office of

Research and Reports, Central Intelligence Agency (Guthe)
to the Assistant to the Deputy Director for Intelligence
(Planning), Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, May 13, 1955.

SUBJECT

Sovmat

Program

REFERENCE

Memorandum from Assistant to DD/I (Planning) to AD/RR, dated 20 April
1955, same subject

1. The collection and exploitation of Soviet Bloc materials has long

been considered by this Office to be a potential source of valuable, pos-
itive, economic intelligence information. The potential of this source
has also been recognized by the ORR [Office of Research and Reports]

Panel of Economic Consultants in at least two of their annual reports.
Economic intelligence information to be derived in this fashion could
either be confirmatory or could provide economic information unob-
tainable from other sources.

2. The development of the Sovmat Program has not been, for the

most part, as was initially anticipated. While collection of the majority
of Sovmat type items is a matter of opportunity and consequently can
be geared only to a long range research program, this Office has not
been completely satisfied with respect to the length of time involved,
the cost and the responsiveness of exploitation reports for these items.
The answers to the specific questions raised in the referenced memo-
randum reflect the nature of our dissatisfaction.

3. The research programs of this Office require information such

as that sought through the Sovmat Program. Because of the many dis-
appointing results from the Sovmat Program, serious consideration is
being given to other sources which while lacking the same potential,
can provide somewhat similar information on the same items which
would be more timely and responsive to our requirements. This would
also effect a considerable savings of money for what appears to be un-
justifiable expense for exploitation.

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644 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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Brackets in the original.

4. The following comments concerning the Sovmat Program are

submitted in response to the specific questions raised in the referenced
memorandum:

a) Do you consider the time between levying the requirements

and receipt of report of exploitation excessive?

[Answer]

It has been the experience of this Office that economic

exploitation requirements are usually fulfilled by the following general
categories of exploitation facilities:

[

Heading and 1 paragraph (10 lines) not declassified

]

Exploitation Facilities of the Armed Services

The Sovmat Staff has direct contact with the separate Services

through their representation to the Joint Technical Intelligence Sub-
committee (JTIS). After serving our exploitation requirements on the
Services, the Sovmat Staff has indicated by memoranda to this Office
that they have no further responsibility for the requirements and that
the Office of Collection and Dissemination is the proper channel for
obtaining exploitation reports. The exploitation reports prepared by the
Services are not published in the Sovmat “OO-T”series, but follow their
own format. A check of some of these reports which have been received
by this Office indicates that the time between receipt of the item by the
Services and receipt of the published exploitation report will vary be-
tween one and two years.

Recently, a JTIS publication identified all exploitation reports pre-

pared by the various Services and CIA. According to this publication,
the exploitation reports vary in their degree of availability and are not
all disseminated. There is not sufficient description of the reports listed
in this publication to indicate whether the exploitation requested by
this Office has been accomplished.

An inquiry was made of Liaison Division/DCD [Domestic Con-

tact Division, DDP]

to ascertain the method by which exploitation re-

ports were acquired from the Services in response to our requirements.
It was discovered that DCD has no record of the requirements which
are served on the Services by Sovmat Staff and has no follow-up in-
struction from the Sovmat Staff. Hence, no reports will be received in
direct response to our requirements and we will receive only such re-
ports as will be disseminated by the Services.

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A specific document request was made through Liaison Division,

OOD for an exploitation report on Soviet ammunition, which was
described as a “Preliminary Report” by the Ordnance Corps and was
never disseminated nor was it listed in the JTIS publication. We dis-
covered that the report contained [

2 lines not declassified

]. Such infor-

mation was of considerable value to this Office. A similar situation was
discovered in requesting a non-disseminated report from another Ser-
vice with respect to Soviet ball bearings.

Under these circumstances, the time interval between levying re-

quirements and the receipt of exploitation reports is certainly excessive
and there is no certainty that an exploitation report will be received,
or if exploitation is accomplished, that it will include our requirements.

Exploitation Facilities of Non-Military Government Agencies

This Office does not consider the time interval between levying

requirements and receipt of exploitation reports to be excessive where
the exploitation is accomplished by non-military government agencies.

b. Do you consider that the best and most economical means are

used for exploitation of Sovmat materials?

The Sovmat Staff notifies this Office of the cost of exploitation only

in those instances where in their judgment there is an unusual charge
or where they feel that additional justification, other than the require-
ment, is warranted. This Office has, therefore, no knowledge of the ex-
ploitation cost of a great majority of the exploitation accomplished in
response to our requirements.

In most instances where this Office has been made aware of the

exploitation cost, it does appear that there is excessive cost for the ex-
ploitation contemplated in a number of our requirements and the best
and most economical means are not always used for exploitation. It is
felt that greater reliance should be placed on this Office by the Sovmat
Staff for substantive guidance, interpretation of our requirements, and
suggestions for exploiting facilities and companies with a view toward
minimizing the cost of exploitation.

[

1 paragraph (16 lines) not declassified

]

There are additional instances which have tended to create the im-

pression in this Office that the cost of exploitation is excessive. As for
example, where we had requested that an exploiting facility prepare a
brief evaluation of a Sovmat item, the exploitation report forwarded
by the Sovmat Staff for evaluation by this Office contained the results
of elaborate testing and comprehensive technical description, far in
excess of our request. On the exploitation reports, the Office checked
to evaluate the reports in the requesting Office or an Office with a ma-
jor interest. Since this Office was the only Office requested to evaluate,
it was presumed that we were the only requester. On other exploita-
tion reports where ORR and OSI [the Office of Scientific Intelligence,

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646 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Brackets in the original.

320-672/B428-S/11008

DDI]

were both indicated as requesting Offices, informal discussion

between interested analysts of the two Offices has revealed that the re-
port goes far beyond the interest of either Office.

c. [

2 paragraphs (12 lines) not declassified

]

d. Do you have any suggestions for improvement of the Sovmat

Program?

This Office has frequently made suggestions to the Sovmat Staff

for improvement in the Sovmat Program through regular channels. For
example, in January 1954 this Office forwarded comments by Ambas-
sador [Joseph]

Flack of Embassy Warsaw and Mr. George Atkins, a

former employee of Embassy Moscow, which described difficulties in
the Sovmat Program. Comments received by this Office from return-
ing attachés and State personnel regarding lack of adequate collection
guidance have been informally discussed with the Sovmat Staff. A con-
tinuous flow of evaluations from this Office call to the attention of the
Sovmat Staff specific instances where the exploitation reports might
better be focused on requirements of this Office.

Some of the major suggestions of this Office which might be con-

sidered for improvement of the Sovmat Program are outlined below
and stem in part from the comments in preceding paragraphs:

1. The Sovmat Staff should arrange for adequate follow-up on

exploitation requirements served on the Services to insure, insofar as
possible, that the requirements are accomplished by the Services and
that exploitation reports are received in response to these requirements.

2. The Sovmat Staff should provide exploitation cost information

and whenever possible, total procurement costs to enable the request-
ing Offices to consider this factor in the preparation of the periodic re-
visions of the Sovmat Collection Guide. This information will have a
direct influence in the preparation of collection requests for the same
or similar items. In this way, adequate prior consideration will be given
to insure that the value of the information to be derived from the item
is commensurate with the cost of procurement and exploitation.

3. The Sovmat Staff should utilize the special knowledge of the

requesting Offices for substantive guidance, interpretation of require-
ments, and suggestions for exploiting facilities. It cannot be expected
that the Offices can provide adequate support to the Sovmat Staff in a
mere exchange of memoranda. [

19 lines not declassified

]

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Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

320-672/B428-S/11008

4. Greater emphasis should be made by the Sovmat Staff in coor-

dinating the common interests of several Offices in certain types of
items to establish periodic collection and standard exploitation of the
items. This would eliminate any possibility of duplication of collection,
incomplete exploitation, and excessive administrative and exploitation
costs. As examples of programs which can be effected where there is
this community of interest in similar items, [

2 lines not declassified

] there

is mutual interest in the same type products. Standard collection pro-
cedures have been arranged. The result is a minimum of administra-
tive detail and cost and complete and satisfactory exploitation for all
interested Agencies.

5. The Sovmat Staff should take greater advantage of the sug-

gested exploitation section of the [

1 line not declassified

] in order to an-

ticipate exploitation for those items which are expected to be purchased
or have been purchased and are awaiting shipment.

6. The Sovmat Staff should consider the practicality of having one

or two industry experts evaluate an item at CIA facilities together with
representatives of the respecting Offices prior to formulation of ex-
tensive exploitation requirements. An example of the value of this
practice can be shown in the examination of a [

2 lines not declassified

This examination evaluation precluded costly and comprehensive
exploitation.

7. The Sovmat Staff should provide more adequate collection sup-

port and cooperation in those instances where high priority collection
and exploitation is required by this Office. As an example of the lack of
cooperation and support we have received from the Sovmat Staff in this
respect, our recent priority requirements for collection and exploitation
of a [

10 lines not declassified

]. Furthermore, the Sovmat Staff advised this

Office that they preferred to rely on existing procedures for such col-
lection and exploitation. As we could not provide detailed information
on the collection of the sample and because of the reluctance of the
Sovmat Staff to interfere with regular channels, we were required to
obtain the information on the basis of informal relationships and out-
side of liaison channels which were available to the Sovmat Staff.

Otto B. Guthe

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648 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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218. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to All

Diplomatic and Consular Posts

CA–7918

Washington, May 14, 1955.

SUBJECT

The Watch Committee and the National Indications Center

The purpose of this instruction is to review the responsibility of

the

Watch Committee

of the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) of

the National Security Council, and to provide notice of the establish-
ment of the

National Indications Center

(NIC), which has been set up to

increase the Watch Committee’s capability to discharge its mission. The
instruction is being circulated to Foreign Service posts to provide in-
formation on how posts should cooperate in carrying out the respon-
sibility the Department bears to the Watch Committee and the NIC.

The Watch Committee

is chaired by the Deputy Director of the Cen-

tral Intelligence Agency, at present Lt. Gen. Cabell, and his senior rep-
resentatives from each of the following: State, Army, Navy, Air Force,
JIG, CIA, AEC, and the FBI. Its mission is: “To provide earliest possi-
ble warning to the United States Government of hostile action of the
USSR, or its allies, which endangers the security of the United States.”
(“Hostile action” is defined as aggressive action by armed forces or or-
ganizations or individuals in support of military strategy.)

The Watch Committee

has the following functions:

1. To analyze and evaluate information and intelligence, both

current and cumulative furnished by IAC agencies relating to the
imminence of hostilities, and to develop therefrom conclusions as to
indications of:

a. Soviet/Communist intentions to initiate hostilities against the

continental US, US possessions, or US forces abroad; US Allies or their

forces; areas peripheral to the Soviet Orbit.

b. Any other development, actual or potential, susceptible of di-

rect exploitation by Soviet/Communist hostile action which would

jeopardize the security of the U.S.

2. To report promptly their conclusions to the principals of the

IAC and to other appropriate recipients. If immediate action or deci-
sion on the part of the President or the National Security Council seems

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1955–60, 101. 2/5–1455. Secret.

Drafted by McAfee on May 3, cleared in 10 bureaus, and approved by Furnas.

1363_A44-A48.qxd 9/28/07 9:34 AM Page 648

to be required a meeting of the IAC will be convened by the Director
of Central Intelligence.

The Watch Committee

is always on call for emergency sessions and

meets regularly on Wednesday of each week.

The

National Indications Center

has been established to provide a

central staff devoting full time to the problems faced by the Watch Com-
mittee. It is charged, among other responsibilities with:

1. Developing and operating the Watch Committee Intelligence

plan for world wide collection of information pertinent to the Watch
Committee mission;

2. Arranging for exploitation of all sources of information bearing

on the mission;

3. Arranging with IAC agencies for systematic screening of all in-

formation and intelligence received by them for the purpose of for-
warding to the Indications Center all items which contain indications
of Soviet/Communist intentions.

In support of the Watch Committee and NIC, the President on 30

November 1954 approved NSC 5438,

directing all appropriate de-

partments and agencies of the Government:

“1. To make fully available to the IAC Watch Committee all in-

formation and intelligence of reasonable credibility pertinent to its mis-
sion and functions without restriction because of source, policy or op-
erational sensitivity.

“2. To keep the IAC Watch Committee informed concerning sig-

nificant diplomatic, political, military, or other courses of action by the
U.S., approved for immediate implementation or in process of execu-
tion, which might bring about military reaction or early hostile action
by the USSR, or its allies, thus endangering the security of the U.S. This
information is for the explicit and express use of the Watch Commit-
tee and those members of the National Indications Center who need
to know of it in order to perform their functions.”

The Department of State’s responsibility to the

Watch Committee

and the

National Indications Center

covers evaluation of political and

economic indications which might bear on Soviet/Communist intent
to initiate hostilities. Within the Department, the Office of the Special
Assistant, Intelligence (R) bears the responsibility for the discharge of
the Department’s commitments. However, the responsibility to be
checking constantly for such indications is shared by the other areas
of the Department and by Foreign Service posts. Information on any

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Regarding NSC 5438, see Document 187 and footnote 4 thereto.

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650 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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such indications should be brought immediately to the attention of the
Department by telegram when appropriate, and should be followed
up when necessary by dispatch containing available further informa-
tion, including information on the source and reliability of the report.

At posts where Service Attachés or CAS are present, the informa-

tion should also be passed to those officers.

Directly bearing on the question of Soviet/Communist intent to ini-

tiate hostilities, of course, would be information on attempts to smuggle
fissionable material or other types of unconventional warfare weapons
or sabotage devices into the country. Any information of this type should
be reported immediately by telegram and followed by dispatch provid-
ing full details as to the source and reliability of the information, the ori-
gin and destination of the material and the alleged use to be made of it.
At posts having CAS or Legal Attachés, all available information should
also be passed to them.

This instruction neither supersedes nor modifies any other extant

instruction concerning the requirements of other government agencies
for specialized information having to do with threats to the security
of the United States (e.g. Secret Circular Instruction, June 17, 1952
concerning the smuggling into the U.S. of radiological, biological,
chemical, and other weapons, or sabotage devices.)

Hoover

McAfee elaborated on the watch functions of the Department of State in an

August 19 memorandum to Robert G. Barnes, Director of the Executive Secretariat, for dis-
tribution throughout the Department. According to McAfee, the Department was charged
with evaluating diplomatic indications of Soviet/Chinese intent to initiate hostilities and
for reporting to the Watch Committee significant Soviet/Communist hostile reactions to
certain U.S. diplomatic negotiations and economic measures. In particular, Department of-
ficials were asked to look for such indications when reviewing memoranda of conversation
and observing Soviet reactions to U.S. negotiations for base rights, military assistance pacts,
or transit rights with states adjacent to the Soviet orbit, and to such steps as preclusive pur-
chasing, embargoes, blockade, and interference with Soviet/Communist marine or air trans-
port. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1955–60, 101.2/8–1955)

Not found.

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219. Editorial Note

NSC 5520, “U.S. Scientific Satellite Program,” was discussed by the

National Security Council at its May 26, 1955, meeting and approved by
the President on May 27. The potential for intelligence collection was a
major factor in the decision to proceed with satellite development. NSC
5520 is printed in

Foreign Relations

, 1955–1957, volume XI, pages 723–732.

220. Report by the Task Force on Intelligence Activities of the

Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch
of the Government

Washington, May 1955.

PREFACE

Scope of the Study

“Intelligence”—A Definition

The fate of the nation well may rest on accurate and complete in-

telligence data which may serve as a trustworthy guide for top-level
governmental decisions on policy and action in a troubled world where
so many forces and ideologies work at cross purposes.

The Congress has recognized the importance of the role of intelli-

gence in our national security. It has authorized the expenditure of vast

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 86–B00269R, Box 1.

Top Secret. Regarding the background to this report, see Document 185. This report,
which includes two appendices, is attached to a transmittal letter from the task force
members to Herbert Hoover, May 1955, not printed. The letter outlined the task force’s
awareness of “the grave responsibility implicit in its assigned mission,” and it expressed
the members’ “personal appreciation for the wholehearted and enthusiastic cooperation
given us by the departments and agencies involved.” It also noted, however, that “the
task force was severely hampered by the security restrictions imposed upon it in its
survey of the clandestine operations of the Central Intelligence Agency. While the ne-
cessity for carefully safeguarding sensitive material is well recognized, the fact remains
that the restrictions complicated the conduct of the survey of this vital segment of our
national intelligence community.” The letter also transmitted the unclassified report,
which was subsequently published and sent to Congress (Document 221). Only the Pref-
ace and Introduction to the classified report are printed here.

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sums of money by appropriate departments and agencies to carry on
this work.

Immediately after World War II, at the suggestion of the Chief

Executive of our Government, the Congress approved the creation of
a new agency unique and in many ways strange to our democratic
form of government. It is known as the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA).

The CIA operates without the customary legislative restraints and

reins under which other departments must function. Its work is veiled
in secrecy, and it is virtually a law unto itself.

In order to evaluate the extent and effectiveness of intelligence as

carried out under these conditions, the Task Force on Intelligence Ac-
tivities found that it was confronted at the outset with the problem of
arriving at a common understanding and agreement on the meaning
of the word “intelligence,” as applied to its own areas of work and
investigation.

The word has many definitions and is subject to varying shades

of interpretation and meaning. In a certain context it might refer to
“ability to learn”; in another context, “intellect,” or perhaps “ability to
meet a new situation”; and in yet another sense, “common sense.”

In the search for an acceptable definition as applied to our own

field of study, it was found that each department or agency surveyed
had its own definition. Many of these definitions were lengthy, and in-
volved use of words requiring additional interpretation or delimitation
to get to their precise application.

The task force sought a definition as simple and clear as possible

and arrived at the following:

“Intelligence deals with all the things which should be known in

advance of initiating a course of action.”

Useful for our purposes, also, as a supplemental and expanded

definition is that given in the Dictionary of United States Military Terms
for Joint Usage:

“INTELLIGENCE—The product resulting from the collection,

evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of all available in-
formation which concerns one or more aspects of foreign nations or of
areas of operations, and which is immediately or potentially signifi-
cant to planning.”

Scope of Task Force Study Refined

Initially, this task force was instructed by the Commission on Or-

ganization of the Executive Branch of the Government, hereinafter
referred to as the Commission or the Hoover Commission, to study
and make recommendations as to the structure and administration

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of the Central Intelligence Agency and other kindred intelligence
activities.

Later, those instructions were changed by the Commission to em-

brace studies of

all

intelligence activities of the Federal Government

and to submit recommendations to effect changes considered neces-
sary to promote economy, efficiency, and improved service in this field.

The task force gave thorough consideration to the decision of the

Commission to broaden the scope of the task-force studies to include
all intelligence activities of the Federal Government. It developed that
there are at least twelve major departments and agencies which, in one
manner or another, are engaged in intelligence. Among these are the
Department of State, the Department of Defense (including the Army,
Navy, Air Force, and Joint Chiefs of Staff), the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Department of Com-
merce, and the Department of Agriculture. In addition, there are ten or
more minor agencies or activities which expend public funds directly
or indirectly on behalf of the intelligence effort of the Government.

Thus, under the broad definition of its terms of reference, the task

force was confronted with the Herculean job of studying and report-
ing on more than twenty major and minor departments and agencies.
It readily became apparent that any attempt to spread the efforts of the
task force over such a large area would mean either that only minor
results could be expected within the allotted time or the work period
should be extended beyond the date contemplated for dissolution of
the Commission on May 31, 1955. Therefore, it was apparent that the
scope of the task-force work had to be refined if any useful results were
to be derived from its efforts and expenditure of funds.

Positive Foreign Intelligence Vital

The most pressing need under present conditions is for those of-

ficials in responsible positions in Government, especially those re-
sponsible for foreign policy, to have readily available full and factual
foreign intelligence. The word “foreign” as used here denotes the tar-
get of information as distinct from the geographical source.

Thus, it appeared to the task force that within the given time limit

the best interests of the Government would be served if the task force
directed its attention to the departments and agencies whose entire or
primary responsibilities lie in the field of positive foreign intelligence
as it pertains to national defense and security, and in whose care vast
sums of money and unique authority have been entrusted. These are
the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Central In-
telligence Agency, the National Security Council, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (to the extent that it deals in security intelligence), and
the intelligence activities of the Atomic Energy Commission.

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Directive to the Task Force

Accordingly, a proposal to delimit the scope of the task-force stud-

ies was made to and approved by the Commission, as follows:

Survey the work of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Cover all ac-

tivities of CIA, wherever located, including but not limited to collec-

tion, evaluation, and dissemination of intelligence, obligation and

expenditure of funds, examination of auditing of funds, security, per-

sonnel, projects carried out through other agencies, relationship and

coordination with other governmental intelligence agencies, commu-

nications, supply and storage; a determination of the responsibilities

of the agency, as prescribed by legislative enactment or administrative

action, and a study as to whether the responsibilities have been ade-

quately defined and are being implemented.

Survey the intelligence activities of the Department of Defense.

Cover

all intelligence activities, wherever located, of the Department of De-
fense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Security Agency, Army, Navy, and
Air Force, including, but not limited to, collection, evaluation, and dis-
semination of intelligence, obligation and expenditure of funds, secu-
rity, personnel, projects carried out through other agencies, communi-
cations, relationship and coordination with other governmental
intelligence agencies, supply and storage; a determination of the re-
sponsibilities of the Department and all its elements for intelligence, as
prescribed by legislative enactment or administrative action, and a study
as to whether the responsibilities have been adequately defined and are
being implemented. No survey will be made of the organization or or-
ganizational structure of tactical units in the Army, Navy, and Air Force
engaged primarily in producing tactical or combat intelligence.

Survey the intelligence activities of the Department of State.

Cover

all intelligence activities related to national defense, wherever located,
of the Department of State, including but not limited to, collection,
evaluation, and dissemination of intelligence, obligation and expendi-
ture of funds, security, personnel, projects carried out through other
agencies, communications, relationship and coordination with other
governmental intelligence agencies, and supply; a determination of the
responsibilities of the Department for intelligence, as prescribed by leg-
islative enactment or administrative action, and a study as to whether
the responsibilities have been adequately defined and are being
implemented.

Survey the intelligence activities of the National Security Council.

In-

clude a study of the history, legislation, development, organization, and

operations of the National Security Council as they affect intelligence

activities. Include study of the Operations Coordinating Board, the In-

telligence Advisory Committee, and related activities.

Survey limited segments of the intelligence activities of other agen-

cies.

The segments to be studied would be developed as the task force

gathers information.

General Considerations.

Determine which of the intelligence serv-

ices, activities, and functions performed by any of the agencies sur-

veyed are (a) essential; (b) not necessary; (c) of similar nature, and what

consolidations are in the public interest; (d) non-essential, and which

are competitive with private enterprise; and (e) duplicate or overlap

those of other agencies.

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This requires a determination in the basic surveys outlined in para-

graphs 1 to 5 as to what services, activities, and functions are being
performed by each agency studied. Upon completion of the basic sur-
veys, a functional survey of the work done by the agencies would be
undertaken from the data developed. With such a scope, the task force
would cover, among other things:

(1) The intelligence function of the National Security Council.

(2) The value and effectiveness of the information supplied by the

operating agencies.

(3) The effectiveness of the coordination of intelligence agencies.

(4) The organization, procedures, methods, and performance of the

several Government agencies in the field of overt and covert intelligence.

(5) An examination of the operation and physical plant of

the agencies as to economy, adequacy, effect on efficiency, and

utilization.

(6) The various programs of the several agencies in such fields as

training, research and development, stockpiling, reference material,

and security.

(7) The personnel policies and manpower utilization.

(8) All programs and procedures for the collection, development,

and dissemination of information to include collection apparatus and

dissemination media.

(9) The interrelationship between the several areas thus assigned

and actual areas of coverage, mutual support of one another.

In the execution of this extensive undertaking, the task force, in

certain areas, had to employ the “sampling” method, particularly in
the case of the study of those activities of the agencies overseas.

Sensitive Portions of Agencies Surveyed

In giving its approval of the foregoing proposal, the Commission

directed that a first paragraph be added as follows:

“1. The study and survey of the sensitive portions of the agencies

will be undertaken by General Clark with a minimum staff on a ‘need-

to-know’ basis.”

Pursuant to the foregoing directive, arrangements were made

orally between Mr. Allen Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, and General Mark W. Clark, chairman of the Task Force on In-
telligence Activities, initially for General Clark and Colonel Herman
O. Lane, a member of the task-force staff, to have access to CIA activ-
ities, both overt and covert. Shortly after this arrangement was imple-
mented, it developed that a requirement existed for at least one addi-
tional member of the task force to have access to covert activities of the
agency. Accordingly, Admiral Richard L. Connolly’s name was added
to the list.

This arrangement continued until a decision was made that cer-

tain members of the task force and staff should inspect intelligence ac-
tivities in the European and Far East areas. Since General Clark was

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unable to take part in one of these inspection trips, the problem con-
fronting the task forces, as a result of the existing restrictions on the
clearance of the task force to sensitive material of the agency, was pre-
sented to the Director of Central Intelligence. The following quoted let-
ter was received from the director:

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Washington 25, D.C.

Office of the Director

27 January 1955

General J.G. Christiansen
Staff Director
Task Force on Intelligence Activities
Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government
Washington D.C.
Dear General Christiansen:

With further reference to your letter of 20 January 1955,

and our

telephone conversations of yesterday evening and today, I have
arranged clearance for Mr. Henry Kearns and for you to have access
to CIA activities, both overt and covert, in connection with your trip
to the Pacific area. It is also understood that all members of the Task
Force and you, yourself, will be cleared to consider the report with re-
spect to both overt and covert activities of the CIA which may be sub-
mitted by those members of your staff who have been cleared for on-
the-spot investigation of those activities. I quite appreciate that this is
necessary in connection with the preparation of the Task Force report.

This procedure has been cleared with Governor Adams.
Faithfully yours,

Allen W. Dulles

Director

Cost of the Intelligence Effort

Precise figures on the cost in money and manpower engaged in

intelligence activities in the interest of national defense and security
are not a matter of record. Any attempt to compile such data accurately
would require the expenditure of money out of all proportion to the
value of the findings. The task force estimates, however, that the an-
nual expenditure is in the order of $800 million.

Not found.

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Organization of the Task Force

Security Impact on Selection of Personnel

The Task Force on Intelligence Activities was the last to be au-

thorized by the Hoover Commission. The director and deputy of the
staff assumed their duties on October 1, 1954. The limited pool of avail-
able personnel in the United States with prior experience in the intel-
ligence field influenced to some extent the structure of the staff and its
methods of operation.

Personnel of the Intelligence Task Force and of the staff had to be

screened carefully for background security and possible prejudicial in-
terest arising from prior association with departments and agencies un-
der investigation.

Before a member of the task force or staff could have access to any

material, a security background investigation was conducted and the
individual declared by proper authority to be eligible for access to “Top
Secret” information. In each case where the inquiry involved access to
atomic energy data, a special clearance was obtained.

It was found that each department and agency had evolved its cri-

teria, practices, and standards for clearance. The task force adopted a
policy in conformity with the policies and requirements of the depart-
ment or agency involved in each specific investigation.

In the interest of security and economy, the task force also decided

to keep its staff as compact as possible. Sensitive material was studied
generally on the premises of the agencies.

Staff Organization

After careful consideration by the task force of the possible meth-

ods of organizing the staff and its work, it was decided that the most
practical course would be to assign some teams composed of one or
two staff members to study specific agencies, and to delegate to other
teams specific across-the-board survey functions. Individual task force
members were assigned across-the-board responsibilities paralleling the
work of designated staff teams. Thus, all members would be in a posi-
tion to interject their influence and guidance in the staff activities and
at the same time obtain valuable first-hand knowledge of the overall
problem.

Initially, five staff study groups were organized. Some were as-

signed responsibility for study of a single department; others, where
feasible, covered two or more agencies.

The restrictions imposed on the staff in its survey of the Central

Intelligence Agency necessitated that the work be broken down into
two classifications, with one group studying the covert aspects of CIA,
and the other surveying the overt operations of the Agency. These two
teams carefully coordinated and correlated their studies, except where

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information on the more sensitive areas of the Agency’s work was re-
stricted to designated individuals. This arrangement proved very cum-
bersome, was time-consuming, and seriously interfered with the con-
duct of the survey.

As each task group completed the study of a particular depart-

ment or agency, it was assigned to studies of specific functions com-
mon to two or more agencies.

Procedures for Gathering Data

The task force scrupulously avoided the use of questionnaires. The

statistical matter which appears throughout this report was extracted
from documentary files maintained by the departments and agencies.

The task force and staff had the benefit of detailed briefings by each

agency studied. These briefings were characterized by informality. Oral
questions and answers were the rule rather than the exception. No ver-
batim transcriptions of the conversations and comments of witnesses
were deemed necessary. In some instances, however, copies of the pre-
pared briefings were furnished to the staff for ready reference.

Discussions were had with all echelons of personnel in each de-

partment and agency, from the clerk at the working level to and in-
cluding the Secretary of State, the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of
Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence.

The task force also had the benefit of expert advice from many in-

dividuals who are not in Government employ but who previously oc-
cupied positions of prime responsibility in the development of our
present intelligence operations and organization. Their help and ad-
vice were of inestimable value.

Some of these witnesses appeared before the task force at no ex-

pense to the Government and at considerable personal sacrifice. The
task force wishes to express its unqualified appreciation to these
public-spirited individuals in private life who gave freely of their time,
and who by their objective approach to the problem materially en-
lightened the task force.

Teams Make First-Hand Studies Abroad

In order to obtain a clearer picture of intelligence operations, two

teams, each composed of a member or members of the task force and
members of the staff, were sent abroad for on-the-spot investigations.
One team visited the European sector and the other went to the Far
East.

These staff groups had discussions with the senior United States

representatives, senior military commanders, and representatives of the
Central Intelligence Agency in the countries visited. The visits and dis-
cussions afforded the task force first-hand information which could be
obtained in no other fashion.

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The conclusions reached and the recommendations contained in

this report reflect the benefits of those personal tours of inspection.

Results of the Recommendations Made in 1948 by the First Hoover

Commission As They Related to Intelligence

The first Hoover Commission

directed its attention primarily to

the functional responsibilities and relationships of the heads of the var-
ious departments and agencies established under the National Secu-
rity Act. The principal recommendation relating directly to intelligence
was incorporated in the following general recommendation:

“That more adequate and effective relations be developed at work-

ing level among the appropriate committees of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

on one hand, and the National Security Council, Central Intelligence

Agency, Research and Development Board, Munitions Board, and the

National Security Resources Board on the other hand. That vigorous

steps be taken to improve the Central Intelligence Agency and its

work.”

Results

The Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1953

transferred the functions

of the National Security Resources Board and Munitions Board to the
Office of Defense Mobilization. The functions of the Research and De-
velopment Board were transferred to the Secretary of Defense by Re-
organization Plan No. 6 of 1953,

where they are incorporated in the

functions of the Assistant Secretary of Research and Development.
There are apparently no relationships on working levels in the intelli-
gence field between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of Defense
Mobilization, except through the representation of the Secretary of De-
fense in the National Security Council. As far as the intelligence rela-
tions between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Central Intelligence
Agency on working levels are concerned, they are implicit in the rep-
resentation of the joint intelligence group of the Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs
of Staff, on the Intelligence Advisory Committee. The degree of coor-
dination effected through these relationships will be discussed more
fully in this report in the section devoted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The steps taken subsequent to the publication of the report of the first
Hoover Commission to improve the Central Intelligence Agency are

Some documentation on the first Hoover Commission (1948) is in

Foreign Rela-

tions

, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Documents 351–352, 360,

and 399.

Effective June 12, 1953; 67 Stat. 634.

Effective June 30, 1953; 67 Stat. 638.

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discussed in the following paragraphs relating to the recommendations
of the task force of the first Hoover Commission.

Observations, Recommendations, and Results of the Task Force on

Intelligence Activities within the National Defense Organization

The task force of the first Hoover Commission confined its obser-

vations and recommendations to the Central Intelligence Agency, its
internal problems, and its relationships with the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the State Department, the National Security Council, and the intelli-
gence agencies of the three military services.

The present task force has been unable to determine the degree to

which these observations and recommendations were published and
disseminated, except as they are reflected in the recommendation of
the Commission discussed previously. However, as they influenced to
some degree the direction of the efforts of this task force, a brief dis-
cussion of the observations of this task force in the same areas is be-
lieved to be pertinent.

Observations of the Task Force of First Hoover Commission and Comments

of this Task Force Thereon

1. “Judgment as to the effectiveness of the CIA must be tempered

by considerations of its apparent youth, its lack of tradition and es-
tablished, time-tried procedures, and of continuity of personnel.” The
soundness of that observation is self-evident and is supported by the
observations of this task force as set forth in its report.

2. “There seems to be an excess of administrative personnel, and

there is undue interference with operating agencies. Reduction of ad-
ministrative overhead is possible and desirable, and interference with
operating agencies should be eliminated.” There still exists some ex-
cess of administrative personnel because of considerations relating to
compartmentalization for security reasons, and because of the fact that
the agency is now scattered among thirty-four buildings. This admin-
istrative overhead is a matter of constant concern and study to the
agency. Plans for new construction have been initiated and funds will
be requested.

3. “The CIA is scattered among twenty-two buildings, causing

many administrative difficulties, although some scattering may be
desirable for security reasons.” The number of buildings now occupied
by the agency has been increased to thirty-four, thus magnifying the
administrative difficulties.

4. “The CIA has fallen short of its objectives as a source of national

intelligence, especially in the fields of scientific intelligence, including
medical. This information should be evaluated centrally.” This obser-
vation will be commented upon in the discussion following recom-
mendation 3 below.

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5. “The CIA’s main problem is one of securing and retaining qual-

ified personnel. This is also true of other intelligence agencies.” The se-
curing and retaining of qualified personnel has been largely solved by
the agency as it has had sufficient funds to attract the best qualified
people, sometimes, unfortunately, at the expense of the intelligence
agencies of the three services. This situation will be discussed more
fully in the section covering the Central Intelligence Agency and the
military services.

6. “The services must rid their intelligence estimates of service

bias.” Attempts on the part of service intelligence agencies to present
honest intelligence estimates particular to that agency are sometimes
“slanted” by the command echelons of the services in support of budg-
etary requests. This tendency should not be charged to intelligence
agencies, which on the whole, are doing an honest job as far as this
task force has been able to observe.

7. [

1 paragraph (7 lines) not declassified

]

8. “Thought should be given to desirability of splitting CIA in time

of war, and transferring operational services, such as open and covert
collection, to the Department of Defense. Changes should be made in
peacetime organization to facilitate this split.” Much thought has been
given by the officials of the CIA and the military services concerning
the proper relationships in time of war between the CIA and the mil-
itary services. Present plans of the CIA do not contemplate the trans-
fer of any of CIA’s current functions and responsibilities to the De-
partment of Defense in time of war. However, current plans (approved
by the Secretary of Defense and the DCI) envisage the transfer of op-
erational control over CIA’s component forces in active theaters of war
where American Forces are engaged to the military commander thereof,
who will exercise such control in the same manner as control is exer-
cised by him over components of the Army, Navy, and Air Force as-
signed to the same command (see Appendix II). The task force believes
that the seriousness of this ever-present problem warrants continued
study to arrive, if possible, at the most suitable solution prior to the
outbreak of war.

9. “The military services, including Joint Chiefs of Staff, tend to

withhold details of operational information and military plans on the
grounds of security.” This situation has not been solved to the com-
plete satisfaction of all interested parties.

10. “The ties binding the JCS, among others, to the CIA are too

tenuous.” This observation resulted in recommendation 3 of the task
force and will be commented on in the discussion following that
recommendation.

11. “Any proposals for the revision of laws so as to permit convic-

tion,

regardless of intent,

in cases of dangerous disclosures by indiscreet

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and irresponsible persons, should be examined most carefully by Con-
gress in the light of our concepts of freedom.” As far as this task force
has been able to determine, no statutory authority exists or is contem-
plated which covers the situation of former employees who may, negli-
gently or otherwise,

without intent,

make unauthorized disclosures.

12. “The National Security Organization, as established by the Na-

tional Security Act of 1947, is soundly conceived. In order to improve
operations, the NSC should give more thought and attention to the re-
lationships of CIA with other agencies, and by working through the
Secretaries of State and Defense, should encourage the improvement
of other intelligence agencies.” This observation is incorporated in rec-
ommendation 1 of the task force below.

13. “Such of the reforms as suggested by this committee, as well as

those of the Dulles Committee,

should be made promptly, but when ac-

tion has been taken, the agencies affected should be permitted a period
of internal development free from examination and its attendant pub-
licity.” Any comment on this sound observation would be redundant.

Recommendations of the Task Force of the First Hoover Commission

1. “That more adequate and effective relations be established at the

working levels between appropriate committees of the JCS and the Joint
Staff and their countermembers in (1) the National Security Council,
(2) the Central Intelligence Agency, (3) the Research and Development
Board, (4) the Munitions Board, and (5) the National Security Resources
Board, to the end that in their strategic planning the JCS will weigh ad-
equately and on a systematic, reciprocal basis, considerations of foreign
policy, intelligence, scientific research and development, and economic
capabilities.” This recommendation is substantially the same as the rec-
ommendation of the commission, and the results will be discussed in the
sections of this report devoted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. “That the Secretary of Defense be the sole representative of the

national military establishment on the National Security Council. The
Committee suggests, however, in order that the JCS may be fully and
currently posted on our national policy, that they be invited, as a gen-
eral rule, to attend meetings of the NSC, but without membership
thereon. The civilian departmental secretaries, although not members,
should also be invited to attend council meetings in appropriate cir-
cumstances.” The National Security Act of 1947, as amended, now pro-
vides that the Secretary of Defense is the sole National Defense Estab-
lishment member. However, secretaries and under secretaries of the
military departments may serve as members at the pleasure of the Pres-

For a summary of the Dulles Committee Report, see

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950,

Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 358.

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ident. The law also provides that the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be the prin-
cipal military advisers to the President, the National Security Council,
and the Secretary of Defense. It has been observed by this task force that
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff habitually attends the meetings
of the National Security Council and the other members attend for those
items in which the Joint Chiefs are concerned. When departmental mat-
ters are before the Council which are of concern to the Secretaries of the
Army, Navy, or Air Force, the secretary concerned will be invited and
may bring his military chief as an adviser, in which case that military
chief will not be attending in his role as a member of the JCS.

3. “That vigorous efforts be made to improve the internal struc-

ture of the CIA and the quality of its product, especially in the fields
of scientific and medical intelligence; that there be established within
the agency at the top echelon an evaluation board or section composed
of competent and experienced personnel who would have no admin-
istrative responsibility and whose duties would be confined solely to
intelligence evaluation; and that positive efforts be made to foster
relations of mutual confidence between the CIA and the several de-
partments and agencies it serves.” This task force has observed that
positive efforts have been made to improve the quality of scientific and
medical intelligence. The Office of Scientific Intelligence is adequately
staffed to include medical personnel. In the quality of its products, this
agency is definitely handicapped by the inability of the intelligence
community as a whole to collect information from the Soviet bloc. The
Office of National Estimates is a top-echelon evaluation board, com-
posed of competent and experienced personnel with no administrative
responsibilities and whose duties are confined solely to intelligence
evaluation, the product of which appears in the form of national esti-
mates. Specific recommendations with regard to deficiencies in the re-
lations of the Central Intelligence Agency with the services will be
found in those sections devoted to CIA and the Department of Defense.

4. “That the Research and Development Board and the CIA, as a

joint undertaking, establish immediately within one or the other agency
an efficient and capable unit to collect, collate, and evaluate scientific
and medical intelligence, in order that our present glaring deficiencies
in this field be promptly eliminated.” The Research and Development
Board has been dissolved and its functions transferred to the Secretary
of Defense. Progress made by the Central Intelligence Agency in the
field of scientific and medical intelligence is fully discussed in the sec-
tion of this report devoted to that agency.

INTRODUCTION

The machinery for accomplishing our intelligence objectives, here-

inafter called the intelligence community when referred to as a whole,
includes the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council,

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the National Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and
the intelligence sections of the Department of State, of the Army, the
Navy, and the Air Force, and of the Atomic Energy Commission. Some
of these agencies approach or exceed the operations of the CIA in func-
tions and in expenditures. However, since CIA is charged with the over-
all responsibility for coordinating the output of all intelligence forces,
the task force gave special attention to the work of that Agency.

Our investigations showed that the sensitive and vital work of the

intelligence community is being led by a group which is sincere, and
dedicated to the service of the nation. We discovered no valid ground
for the suspicion that the CIA or any other element of the intelligence
family was being effectively contaminated by any organized subver-
sive or Communistic clique. Charges were made by some individuals
alleging a few members of the intelligence community to be poor se-
curity risks. All such cases, except those obviously without merit, were
investigated by proper authority, or investigations are in the process
of being made.

On the basis of its comprehensive studies, the task force feels that

the American people can and should give their full confidence and sup-
port to the intelligence program, and contribute in every possible way
to the vital work in which these agencies are engaged. We found the
Director of Central Intelligence to be industrious, objective, selfless, en-
thusiastic, and imaginative. We are convinced, however, that in his en-
thusiasm he has taken upon himself too many burdensome duties and
responsibilities on the operational side of CIA’s activities. The task force
feels that certain administrative flaws have developed in the CIA,
which must be corrected to give proper emphasis and direction to its
basic responsibilities

The major aim would be greater concentration on the collection of

intelligence information from our primary target—Russia and her satel-
lites, and Communist China.

The task force is deeply concerned over the lack of adequate in-

telligence data from behind the Iron Curtain. The information we need
on the political plans, scientific progress, and military potential of the
Communists is there to be had, and we must exert every conceivable
and practicable effort to get it. Proper directional emphasis, aggressive
leadership, boldness and persistence are essential to achieve the de-
sired results.

The glamor and excitement of some angles of our intelligence ef-

fort must not be permitted to overshadow other vital phases of the
work or cause neglect of primary functions. A majority of the task force
is convinced that an internal reorganization of the CIA is necessary to
give assurance that each of these functions receives adequate attention
without diversionary interest.

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A reference to the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, approved June 20,

1949, which exempted the Central Intelligence Agency from disclosure of certain infor-
mation concerning its organization such as functions, official titles, and number of per-
sonnel. (63 Stat. 208)

320-672/B428-S/11008

The task force further is concerned over the absence of satisfactory

machinery for surveillance of the stewardship of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. It is making recommendations which it believes will pro-
vide the proper type of “watch-dog” commission as a means of reestab-
lishing that relationship between the CIA and the Congress so essential
to and characteristic of our democratic form of government, but which
was abrogated by the enactment of Public Law 110

and other statutes

relating to the Agency. It would include representatives of both Houses
of Congress and of the Chief Executive. Its duties would embrace a re-
view of the operations and effectiveness not only of the CIA, but also
of all other intelligence agencies.

One of the aims in the creation of a compact commission of this

type would be to keep the public assured of the essential and trust-
worthy accomplishments of our intelligence forces, and to enlist pub-
lic support and participation in the intelligence effort.

Action of this sort is needed to promote a general awareness and

appreciation among the people of the significance and objectives of the
intelligence program. There is a corollary demand for clarification of
misunderstandings which have arisen in the public mind, largely as a
result of the misapplication of secrecy. However, it must be recognized
that intelligence operations require a large element of secrecy as an es-
sential to success.

The task force further is greatly concerned about the inadequate

guidance being given to NSA by the United States Communication In-
telligence Board, and about certain aspects of communications. Rec-
ommendations to improve the current status are made in Appendix I,
Parts 1 and 2.

The intelligence community should draw more widely on the

available pool of retired citizens with wide previous business experi-
ence in the foreign field, and among retired military personnel who
have specialized over a long period in the intelligence field. It should
develop a more attractive program of career incentives for its officials,
and of benefits for its overseas employees.

Recommendations to achieve these desirable results are being of-

fered by the task force.

[Omitted here are the body of the report and the Appendices.]

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221. Report by the Commission on Organization of the Executive

Branch of the Government to the Congress

Washington, June 1955.

[Omitted here are a list of the members of the Commission and of

the Task Force on Intelligence Activities, a transmittal letter, table of
contents, acknowledgments, and preface.]

PART I

The task force, in order to give assurance to the Nation that all

segments of the Intelligence Activities are efficiently carried out and
that the expenditures are properly administered, recommends that a
permanent “watchdog” committee be created. They recommend that
such a committee be created from Members of the Senate and House,
together with eminent citizens serving part time as needed, to be ap-
pointed by the President.

The Commission believes, however, that while mixed congres-

sional and citizens committees for temporary service are useful and
helpful to undertake specific problems and to investigate and make
recommendations, such committees, if permanent, present difficulties.
We therefore make the following recommendation.

Recommendation

(a) That the President appoint a committee of experienced private

citizens, who shall have the responsibility to examine and report to him
periodically on the work of Government foreign intelligence activities.
This committee should also give such information to the public as the
President may direct. The committee should function on a part-time
and per diem basis.

(b) That the Congress consider creating a Joint Congressional

Committee on Foreign Intelligence, similar to the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy. In such case, the two committees, one presidential and
the other congressional, could collaborate on matters of special im-
portance to the national security.

Other measures requiring legislation or of an administrative char-

acter are recommended by the task force and we suggest these for the
consideration of the Congress and the Departments concerned.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 86–B00269R, Box 14.

Unclassified. The title page of Part II bears the date May 1955, but it was released with
the rest of this publication on June 29, 1955. Regarding the preparation of this report,
see Document 220 and footnote 1 thereto. For Eisenhower’s Implementation of Recom-
mendation (a) above, see

Public Papers: Eisenhower,

1956, p. 72.

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The unclassified report of the task force requires no detailed re-

view, and we therefore include it in full as Part II of this report.

PART II

Report on Intelligence Activities in the Federal Government

[Omitted here are the title page of Part II, names of the commis-

sioners and task force personnel, a table of contents, acknowledgments,
transmittal letter, and preface.]

Introduction

The machinery for accomplishing our Intelligence objectives here-

after called the Intelligence community when referred to as a whole,
includes the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Coun-
cil, the National Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
and the Intelligence sections of the Department of State, of the Army,
the Navy, and the Air Force, and of the Atomic Energy Commission.
Some of these agencies approach or exceed the operations of the
CIA in functions and in expenditures. However, since CIA is charged
with the overall responsibility for coordinating the output of all In-
telligence forces, the task force gave special attention to the work of
that agency.

Our investigations showed that the sensitive and vital work of the

Intelligence community is being led by a group which is sincere and ded-
icated to the service of the Nation. We discovered no valid ground for
the suspicion that the CIA or any other element of the Intelligence fam-
ily was being effectively contaminated by any organized subversive or
communistic clique. Charges were made by some individuals alleging a
few members of the Intelligence community were poor security risks. All
such cases, except those obviously without merit, were investigated by
proper authority, or investigations are in the process of being made.

On the basis of its comprehensive studies, the task force feels that

the American people can and should give their full confidence and sup-
port to the Intelligence program, and contribute in every possible way
to the vital work in which these agencies are engaged. We found the
Director of Central Intelligence to be industrious, objective, selfless, en-
thusiastic, and imaginative. We are convinced, however, that in his en-
thusiasm he has taken upon himself too many burdensome duties and
responsibilities on the operational side of CIA’s activities. The task force
feels that certain administrative flaws have developed in the CIA,
which must be corrected to give proper emphasis and direction to its
basic responsibilities.

The major aim would be greater concentration on the collection of

Intelligence information from our primary target—Russia and her satel-
lites, and Communist China.

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The task force is deeply concerned over the lack of adequate In-

telligence data from behind the Iron Curtain. Proper directional em-
phasis, aggressive leadership, boldness, and persistence are essential
to achieve the desired results.

The glamor and excitement of some angles of our Intelligence ef-

fort must not be permitted to overshadow other vital phases of the
work or to cause neglect of primary functions. A majority of the task
force is convinced that an internal reorganization of the CIA is neces-
sary to give assurance that each of these functions gets adequate at-
tention with diversionary interest.

The task force further is concerned over the absence of satisfactory

and other statutes

One of the aims in the creation of a compact commission of this

type would be to keep the public assured of the essential and trust-
worthy accomplishments of our Intelligence forces, and to enlist pub-
lic support and participation in the Intelligence effort.

Action of this sort is needed to promote a general awareness and

appreciation among the people of the significance and objectives of the
Intelligence program. There is a corollary demand for clarification of
misunderstandings which have arisen in the public mind, largely as a
result of the misapplication of secrecy. However, it must be recognized
that Intelligence operations require a large element of secrecy as an es-
sential to success.

The Intelligence community should draw more widely on the

available pool of retired citizens with wide previous business experi-
ence in the foreign field, and among retired military personnel who
have specialized over a long period in the Intelligence field. It should
develop a more attractive program of career incentives for its officials,
and of benefits for its overseas employees.

Recommendations to achieve these desirable results are being of-

fered by the task force.

See footnote 7, Document 220.

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Scope of the Studies

Early Instructions

Initially, this task force was instructed by the Commission on

Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (hereafter
referred to as the Hoover Commission or the Commission) to study
and make recommendations as to the structure and administration of
the Central Intelligence Agency.

Later, those instructions were changed by the Commission to em-

brace studies of

all

Intelligence operations of the Federal Government

and recommendations for changes necessary to promote economy, ef-
ficiency, and improved service in this field.

The task force gave thorough consideration to the decision of the

Commission to broaden the scope of the studies. It found at least 12
major departments and agencies engaged in Intelligence in one form
or another. In addition, 10 or more minor agencies or activities expend
public funds directly or indirectly in behalf of the Intelligence effort of
the Government.

Thus, under the broad definition of its terms of reference, the task

force was confronted with the Herculean job of studying and report-
ing on more than a score of major and minor departments and agen-
cies. It quickly became evident that any attempt to spread its investi-
gations over such a large area would mean that only sketchy results
could be achieved within the allotted time.

Task Force Procedure Revised

The most pressing need under present conditions is for officials in

important positions in Government, particularly those responsible for
foreign policy, to have readily available full and factual foreign Intel-
ligence. (The word “foreign” as used here denotes the target of infor-
mation as distinct from the geographical source.)

Accordingly, the task force suggested to the Commission that the

best results could be obtained if the dimensions of the inquiry were
limited to certain key departments and agencies.

This proposal was approved by the Commission with the under-

standing that the task force would determine which of the Intelligence
services, activities, and functions of the agencies surveyed it consid-
ered essential; those not necessary, or of similar nature and requiring
consolidation in the public interest; those nonessential and competitive
with private enterprise; and those representing duplication or over-
lapping of work between agencies. Under this revised program, the
task force would cover, among other matters:

(1) The Intelligence functions of the National Security Council.

(2) The value and effectiveness of the information supplied by the

operating agencies.

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(3) The effectiveness of the coordination of Intelligence activities.

(4) The organization, procedures, methods, and performance of

the Government agencies in the field of Intelligence.

(5) An examination of the operation and physical plant of the

agencies as to economy, adequacy, effect on efficiency, and utilization.

(6) The various programs of the agencies in such fields as train-

ing, research and development, stockpiling, reference material, and

security.

(7) Personnel policies and manpower utilization.

(8) All programs and procedures for the collection, development,

and dissemination of Intelligence information within the Government,

including collection apparatus and dissemination media.

(9) Effectiveness of the coverage by the various agencies of their

specific areas of assignment, and extent of teamwork between these

agencies.

Two Reports Prepared

In the preparation of this report, the task force was motivated by

a sincere desire to present as complete an account of its findings as con-
sidered judgment indicated would best serve the public interest. Cer-
tain other facts and recommendations prepared by the task force have
been omitted from this report on the ground that their disclosure pub-
licly might give aid and comfort to our potential enemies or might jeop-
ardize our national defense and security. These findings have been in-
corporated in a separate, highly classified, comprehensive report which
has been placed in the hands of the Chairman of the Commission.

Teams Make Firsthand Studies Abroad

In order to obtain a clearer picture of intelligence operations, two

teams were sent abroad for on-the-spot investigations. Each team was
composed of a member or members of the task force and members of
the staff. One group visited the European sector and the other went to
the Far East.

These staff groups held conferences with the senior United States

representatives and senior military commanders in the countries vis-
ited. The visits and discussions provided the task force with firsthand
information which could have been obtained in no other fashion.

The conclusions reached and the recommendations contained in this

report, and in the more comprehensive report to the Chairman of the
Commission, reflect the benefit of those personal tours of inspection.

Organization of the Task Force

Security Impact on the Selection of Personnel

The Task Force on Intelligence Activities was the last investigative

group authorized by the Hoover Commission. The director and deputy
of the staff assumed their duties on October 1, 1954. The limited pool
of available personnel in this country with prior experience in the In-

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telligence field influenced to some extent the structure of the staff and
its methods of operation.

The task force personnel and staff had to be screened carefully for

background security and possible prejudicial interest arising from prior
association with departments and agencies embraced in the survey.

Before a member of the task force or staff could have access to any

It was found that each department and agency had developed its

own criteria, practices, and standards for clearance. The task force
adopted a policy in conformity with the policies and requirements of
the department or agency involved in each specific inquiry.

In the interest of security and economy, the task force also decided

to keep its staff as compact as possible. Sensitive material generally
was studied on the premises of the agencies.

Staff Organization

After careful consideration by the task force of various possible

methods of organizing the staff and its work, it was decided that the
most practical course would be to assign teams composed of 1 or 2 staff
members to study specific agencies, and to delegate to other teams spe-
cific across-the-board survey functions. Individual task force members
were assigned across-the-board responsibilities paralleling the work of
designated staff teams.

Thus, all task force members were in a position to interject their

influence and guidance in the staff activities and at the same time ob-
tain valuable firsthand knowledge of the overall problem.

Procedures for Gathering Data

The task force and staff had the benefit of detailed briefings by top

officials and employees of each agency studied. These briefings were
characterized by informality. Oral questions and answers usually were
employed. In some instances, however, copies of prepared briefings
were furnished to the staff for ready reference.

Discussions were had with many echelons of personnel in each

department and agency, from the clerks up to and including the heads
of the executive departments.

In the execution of its extensive undertaking, the task force in cer-

tain areas found it necessary to employ the “sampling” method, par-
ticularly in the case of the study of activities overseas.

The task force also received expert advice from many individu-

als no longer in Government employ, but who previously occupied

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positions of prime responsibility in the development of our present
Intelligence operations and organization. Some of these witnesses ap-
peared before the task force at no expense to the Government and at
considerable personal sacrifice. Their help and suggestions were of in-
estimable value.

“Intelligence”—A Definition

[Omitted here is language similar to the Preface of Document 220.]

I. The Intelligence Community—National Level

The National Security Council

The function of the National Security Council is to advise the Pres-

ident with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military
policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military
services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to
cooperate more effectively in matters involving national security.

The Council is composed of the President, the Vice President, the

Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of the Foreign Operations
Administration, the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, the
Secretaries and Under Secretaries of other executive departments and
military departments when appointed by the President, to serve at his
pleasure.

The Council, in addition to performing such other functions as the

President may direct, for the purpose of coordinating more effectively
the policies and functions of the departments and agencies of the Gov-
ernment relating to national security, subject to the direction of the Pres-
ident, shall:

1. Assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of

the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power,
in the interest of national security, for the purpose of making recom-
mendations to the President to meet these problems.

2. Consider policies on matters of common interest to the depart-

ments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national se-
curity, and make recommendations to the President on these matters.

In order to accomplish its mission, the National Security Council

has at its disposal several groups which function in varying degrees
within the field of national Intelligence.

Duties of Special Assistant to the President

The Council is linked closely to the President, not only because the

Chief Executive is Chairman and a member of it, but also because of the
designation by him of a Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs who, as a member of the White House Staff, has constant
and direct access to the President and enjoys his complete confidence.

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This Special Assistant to the President is, in fact if not in name, the

Executive Officer of the NSC and is chairman of the highly important
Planning Board of the NSC.

He personally briefs the President on national security affairs, and

with the President’s approval prepares the agenda for the NSC meet-
ings. This Special Assistant to the President does not preside at any
NSC meeting, but sits (just beneath the Council itself) at the apex of
the NSC administrative machinery.

Progress in National Intelligence Policies

The National Security Council has issued several Intelligence direc-

tives.

They express the policy by which the Intelligence effort is guided

and coordinated; establish, within the Intelligence community, commit-
tees for the fulfillment of specific Intelligence functions; and pinpoint the
responsibility for specific duties in designated fields of Intelligence.

The national Intelligence policy, as expressed in these directives,

calls for integration of all departmental Intelligence relating to national
security through a process of coordination of effort by the Director of
Central Intelligence and correlation of Intelligence by the Central In-
telligence Agency.

Other groups have been established as appendages to the Coun-

cil, through some of which Intelligence, advice, and recommendations
have been received by the Council for its use in advising and making
recommendations to the President.

The Central Intelligence Agency

The Central Intelligence Agency, created by the National Security

Act of 1947,

is charged with the responsibility of coordinating, evalu-

ating, and distributing Intelligence data affecting the national security.
The Director of Central Intelligence gives advice and recommendations
to the National Security Council on such matters.

The CIA well may attribute its existence to the surprise attack on

Pearl Harbor and to the postwar investigation into the part Intelligence
or lack of Intelligence played in the failure of our military forces to re-
ceive adequate and prompt warning of the impending Japanese attack.

That investigation of events leading up to the “day of infamy” im-

pressed upon Congress the fact that information necessary to antici-
pate the attack actually was available to the Government; but that there
was no system in existence to assure that the information, properly

National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs) issued from 1950–1955

are printed at the end of this volume. Earlier directives are in

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950,

Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment.

61 Stat. 343.

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evaluated, would be brought to the attention of the President and his
chief advisers so that appropriate decisions could be made and timely
instructions transmitted to the interested military commanders.

It also demonstrated that in the prewar Government organization

no single official was responsible for whatever failure of Intelligence
was involved; and the blame for the military surprise fell, justly or un-
justly, on the military commanders present and immediately involved
in the debacle.

Therefore, in 1947, when legislation for a national Intelligence or-

ganization was being considered, there was a widespread feeling among
members of the Congress that responsibility for the coordination of the
production of national Intelligence, as distinguished from departmental
Intelligence, and for its dissemination, must be centered at one point.

Creation of the Central Intelligence Agency, with its Director

charged with the coordination of the Intelligence effort, was author-
ized to fill this need. The Director of Central Intelligence, in the per-
formance of this responsibility, receives pertinent information from all
branches of the Government engaging in collection of Intelligence, in-
cluding the Atomic Energy Commission.

The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 provides for the ad-

ministration of the Agency and grants the Director wide autonomous
authority.

II. The Intelligence Community—Departmental Level

Department of Defense

Office of Special Operations (OSO)

Authority, Responsibility, and Functions

The responsibility of the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Ac-

tivities in the military services is not specifically defined in legislation
or Executive order, but is implicit in the following provision of the Na-
tional Security Act of 1947:

The Secretary of Defense shall be the principal assistant to the Pres-

ident in all matters relating to the Department of Defense. Under direc-

tion of the President, and subject to the provisions of this Act, he shall

have direction, authority, and control over the Department of Defense.

The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) was

designated to fulfill a requirement for staff participation and repre-
sentation in matters affecting defense and national Intelligence efforts.
His authority and responsibilities are set forth in various directives and
memoranda of the Secretary of Defense.

The organization is small and is neither intended nor prepared to

exercise administrative control over day-to-day Intelligence activities
of the armed services.

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Joint Chiefs of Staff

Joint Intelligence Unit

As an adjunct of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, there is a Joint Intelli-

gence Committee composed of the Intelligence chiefs of the members
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The committee members are: the Deputy
Director for Intelligence of the Joint Staff, who acts as committee chair-
man; the G–2 of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; and the
Director of Intelligence, Air Force.

The Deputy Director for Intelligence of the Joint Staff heads the

Joint Intelligence Group, performing the Intelligence functions and du-
ties assigned to him by the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Director of
the Joint Staff.

Inasmuch as the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff are within

the Department of Defense, the Joint Intelligence Group supports the
Secretary of Defense in Intelligence matters.

Department of the Army

Responsibilites of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, Intelligence (AC/S, G–2)

The AC/S, G–2, under supervision of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff—

and of the Comptroller of the Army, within his scope of responsibility—
plans, coordinates and supervises the collection, evaluation and dis-
semination of Intelligence information pertaining to the war potential,
topography, military forces and military activities of foreign nations, and
the strategic vulnerability of the United States and its possessions.

The AC/S, G–2, also gives staff guidance and coordination to the

Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) and to the Army Intelligence Center
(AIC).

Attaché System

Army efforts in the Intelligence collection field are carried out

largely through its Attaché System which maintains stations in many
foreign countries.

Officers are assigned in the Attaché System on a highly selective

basis in conformity with rigid requirements and standards established
for candidates for this type of duty.

After selection, officers are assigned to language and Intelligence

schools to prepare them for their assignments.

G–2 Training Interest

G–2’s training interest lies principally in the areas of policy guid-

ance and planning. The training division establishes the policies under
which Intelligence and language schools operate, and monitors their
program.

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Elements of the division also monitor training programs in the In-

telligence field, which are conducted by the various field commands
and agencies, to insure conformance with G–2’s guidance.

Counter-Intelligence Corps

This Corps operates under the command of a major general, who

is also, in effect, a deputy of AC/S, G–2, for CIC matters. However,
while the Corps commander is responsible for certain administrative
and security functions, he does not exercise a true command control
over the personnel of the Corps. Based on the principle that security
is a function of command, elements of the Corps generally are assigned
to field units and operate directly under command of the unit to which
they are assigned.

The mission of the CIC is to ferret out any treason, sedition,

subversive activity or disaffection, and to detect and prevent enemy
espionage or sabotage within the Army Establishment and its area of
jurisdiction.

In the pursuit of their primary functions, members of the Army’s

Counter-Intelligence Corps acquire some intelligence data, and these
are fed into the Intelligence system.

Relationship to Other Agencies

G–2 operates generally in a healthy atmosphere of cooperation and

understanding in its relationship with other segments of the Intelli-
gence community. Committee, subcommittee, and working groups pro-
vide for ready interchange of material, practices, methods, and other
pertinent Intelligence information.

Much of the effectiveness of this system is achieved through per-

sonal contacts. Material of an urgent nature can be disseminated
throughout the Intelligence community through these contacts with-
out being delayed to await scheduled committee meetings. There is
positive evidence of an aggressive willingness and desire among those
engaged at the working level to promote the overall Intelligence effort.

Language Training Program

Language training for the Attaché System and for the Foreign Area

Specialist Training (FAST) is conducted at the Army Language School
in Monterey, Calif. Use also is made of the Naval Language School in
Washington, D.C., and civilian colleges. The Army conducts language
courses for CIC personnel at Fort Holabird, Md.

Department of the Navy

Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)

The Office of Naval Intelligence is part of the organization of

the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. The Director of Naval

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Intelligence is designated as an Assistant Chief of Naval Operations,
and reports directly to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations. He also has
a direct responsibility to the Secretary of the Navy.

Under the authority and direction of the Chief of Naval Opera-

tions, the Director of Naval Intelligence is required to administer, op-
erate, and maintain an Intelligence service fulfilling the Intelligence and
counterintelligence requirements of the Department of the Navy for
the purpose of:

1. Informing the Naval Establishment of the war-making capabil-

ities and intentions of foreign nations.

2. Providing the Naval Establishment with the Intelligence needed

for plans and operations.

3. Warning naval authority of threats to security of the Naval

Establishment.

4. Providing the naval contributions to joint, national, and inter-

national Intelligence.

5. Promoting the maximum Intelligence readiness of the operat-

ing forces and other components of the Naval Establishment.

6. Coordinating the Intelligence effort of the Naval Establishment.
7. Developing and promulgating, subject to approval of the Sec-

retary of the Navy, policies for the protection of classified matter, in-
cluding such policies applicable to industrial security.

8. Advising the Chief of Naval Operations concerning all matters

relating to naval Intelligence and security policies for the protection of
classified matter.

Organization in the Field

In the field, three organizations assist in carrying out the Intelli-

gence mission of the Navy:

1. Naval District Intelligence Officers, who are under ONI’s man-

agement control and operate in the continental United States and in
certain outlying areas.

2. Intelligence organizations within the forces afloat, which, al-

though directly under their respective commanders, are still under
ONI’s technical supervision.

3. The Naval Attaché System, which also is under jurisdiction of

the ONI.

The primary functions of the District Intelligence Officers are the

conduct of counterintelligence and the implementation of security
policies. The District Intelligence Officer serves on the staff of his
Naval District Commandant, and in certain designated districts has
additional duty on the staff of the commander of the sea frontier in
which his district is located. The Naval District Intelligence Offices are

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the major source of domestic counterintelligence of special concern to
the Navy.

In the forces afloat, each area, fleet, type and task force commander,

and all flag officers exercising command have a staff Intelligence sec-
tion. This is headed by an Intelligence officer who is responsible for
the collection, processing, and dissemination of Intelligence for the
command. ONI supports their Intelligence requirements and assigns
them collection missions within their capabilities to execute.

Naval Attaché System

Naval attachés and their staffs are officially a part of ONI, but they

also have a responsibility to the Ambassador or Minister who is the
chief of the diplomatic mission to which they are assigned. Normally,
attachés are stationed only in those countries which are of primary
naval interest to ONI.

Each of the ambassadors to countries having ports of call for our

naval elements would like to have a naval attaché to take care of many
problems arising from these visits and the attendant shore leaves.

Administration

Administrative work in the Office of Naval Intelligence is handled

by the Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence, Administration. Man-
power and management surveys are conducted continuously by this
division to maintain efficiency and economy throughout ONI.

“Special Duty Only”

Most of the military personnel assigned to Intelligence duties are

line officers, not specialists. The Military Personnel Act of 1947

made

provision for Intelligence specialists in the Regular Navy. However, since
by law none of these “Special Duty Only” officers may succeed to com-
mand, and since command is the usual stepping stone to flag rank, the
“Special Duty Only” class of service is unpopular among line officers.

Department of the Air Force

Organization for Intelligence Work

The civilian staff of the Secretary of the Air Force includes a Spe-

cial Assistant for Intelligence who is responsible for review and eval-
uation of all matters pertaining to plans, policies, and programs rela-
tive to the Air Force Intelligence program. He is also charged with
supervision and ultimate review of the personnel security program,
both military and civilian.

61 Stat. 512.

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The Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, is responsible for the Air

Force Intelligence activities, communications activities, and atomic en-
ergy matters.

The Department’s Inspector General is responsible to the Chief of

Staff, USAF. Among his other duties, he conducts investigations of mat-
ters involving major crimes, violations of public trust, subversive ac-
tivities, sabotage and espionage; and performs related counterintelli-
gence functions for the Department.

The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, USAF, is directly re-

sponsible to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations. This organizational
relationship places him in a position subordinate to a Deputy Chief of
Staff. The interposing of an echelon between the major Intelligence el-
ement of the Air Force and the Department’s Chief of Staff and certain
other functional Deputy Chiefs of Staff, such as the Comptroller, af-
fects adversely the efficiency of staff operation. Elevation of the Direc-
tor of Intelligence to the level of Deputy Chief of Staff would greatly
enhance the prestige of Intelligence in the Air Force. This is a desirable
and appropriate step in view of the tremendous importance of Intelli-
gence in the overall mission of the Air Force.

Air Force Intelligence Training

Recognizing the need for continuing Intelligence training, the Air

Force has established such a program for officers and airmen, em-
bracing courses ranging from those of an introductory nature to those
appropriate for staff officers in higher headquarters.

In addition to the service schools, college facilities are used for lan-

guage training and special studies. Training courses are also available
for Air Force reserve personnel.

The Air Force training program generally is adequate for current

requirements, even in technical areas where the personnel turnover is
heavy. Periodic studies should be made, however, to assure the ade-
quacy of training facilities in relation to worldwide staff requirements.
The staffing of foreign posts with inadequately trained personnel may
be not only uneconomical, but might result also in the loss of oppor-
tunities to collect Intelligence.

Department of State

Responsibility for Foreign Policy

A primary function of the Secretary of State is to act as principal

adviser to the President in the determination of American foreign pol-
icy and to implement and supervise its execution by diplomatic means.
By virtue of the authority the Secretary exercises over all the activities
of the Department and the Foreign Service, he derives principal sup-
port for the accomplishment of this task from the Under Secretaries,

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the Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, the
Special Assistant—Intelligence, and the Director of the Policy Planning
Staff.

The Special Assistant—Intelligence, with rank equivalent to that

of an Assistant Secretary, develops and implements a coordinated pro-
gram for foreign Intelligence for the Department and for producing re-
ports essential to determination and execution of foreign policy.

Effect of Diplomacy on the Overall Collection of Intelligence

The task force has recognized the incompatibility in method between

the practice of diplomacy and the more direct and active operations in-
cident to the collection of Intelligence and the conduct of cold war.

While all contribute to the end in view, conflicts between them

must be resolved, usually on a high level, and always in the national
interest. It must be realized that diplomacy is not an end in itself; that,
while political ends must be served and unjustifiable risks avoided, the
collection of Intelligence is a vital element in the fight to preserve our
national welfare and existence. Instances have come to the attention of
the task force where too conservative an attitude has prevailed, often
to the detriment of vigorous and timely action in the field.

Creation of the Intelligence Area

Prior to World War II, Intelligence for the support of American for-

eign policy was produced by the inadequate research staffs of depart-
mental policy offices which had many other duties to perform. Cre-
ation of the Intelligence Area of that Department, by Executive Order
9621 of September 20, 1945, recognized the need for improving the
quality of Intelligence demanded by the tense international situation.

The Secretary of State is a member of the National Security Coun-

cil. The Intelligence Area provides staff assistance to the Secretary and
senior policy officers of the Department of State, and maintains liaison
with the other members of the Intelligence community in the discharge
of the Department’s responsibility in the total Intelligence program of
the Government.

Better Quarters Needed

The Intelligence Area maintains its offices and records in a con-

verted apartment building, which does not constitute satisfactory
quarters for this special type of work. The cost of adequate security
measures consequently is high.

Existing plans for an addition to the New State Building, if ap-

proved under the provisions of Public Law 519, would improve work-
ing conditions and efficiency, produce savings through the vacating of
leased spaces, and reduce costs of security, maintenance, and miscel-
laneous services for this branch of the Intelligence effort.

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Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

A Bureau of Investigation was created, under jurisdiction of the

Attorney General of the United States, by Executive order of July 26,
1908. The policies now followed in the administration of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation were established in 1924, and in July 1935, this
agency became known as the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

In view of the limited activities of the FBI in the positive and for-

eign Intelligence fields, a detailed study of this agency was not made.
However, its functions in the counterintelligence effort were studied
with deep interest by the task force, in order to fill out the Intelligence
picture.

We found the Director of the FBI, through his forcefulness, initia-

tive, and managerial ability, to have developed his agency into a model
organization of its kind. We are confident that in the FBI we have a
most effective counterintelligence service.

FBI Responsibilities in Counterintelligence

Among other assigned responsibilities, the FBI has jurisdiction

over investigations relating to espionage, sabotage, treason, and other
matters pertaining to the internal security of the United States. This ju-
risdiction places the FBI directly in the field of counterintelligence.

Executive Order 10450 (May 27, 1953),

which established the se-

curity procedure covering “all persons seeking the privilege of em-
ployment or privileged to be employed in the departments and agen-
cies of the Government,” provides that:

All investigations conducted by any other agencies, which develop

adverse information involving loyalty or information showing coer-

cion of an employee to act contrary to the interests of the national se-

curity, shall be referred promptly to the Federal Bureau of Investiga-

tion for a full field investigation.

Relationship to Other Departments and Agencies

The Director of the FBI—along with the Assistant Chief of Staff,

G–2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence, De-
partment of the Navy; and the Director of Special Investigations, the
Inspector General, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force—is a member of the
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) which is responsible
for the coordination of the investigation of all domestic espionage,
counterespionage, sabotage, subversion, and other related Intelligence
matters affecting internal security.

18 FR 2489 and 26 FR 6967.

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The IIC Charter does not disturb the responsibilities of the mem-

ber agencies, but makes mandatory such action of those agencies as is
necessary to insure complete investigative coverage of this field with-
out duplication of effort, through appropriate exchange and coordina-
tion of information and action among the various pertinent agencies
and departments of the Government.

III. Foreign Intelligence

Evolution of Our Plans

Traditionally, Americans are a peace-loving people. But, a philos-

ophy of peace is no guarantee of peace. In a tortured world where
greed, intrigue, and lust for power exist, protection of liberty and as-
surance of survival lie in alertness and strength. Alertness involves ad-
equate Intelligence data on which to base adequate preparedness.

From the beginning, the United States has tried consistently to main-

tain relationships with other countries openly and to refrain from partic-
ipation in secret treaties. This principle likewise established the early pat-
tern for the conduct of our Intelligence activities. The collection of
information concerning political and military policies and plans of for-
eign governments was accomplished openly and with the full knowledge
of the foreign powers. The work was performed through the offices of
our diplomatic representatives abroad and accredited military attachés.

A substantial volume of material was collected, but there was no

machinery at home to pull this information together into a cohesive
mass and to draw from it logical conclusions upon which to base na-
tional policy and future plans.

On July 11, 1941, the Chief Executive, in his capacity as

Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, established an Office of the
Coordinator of Information to

collect and analyze information data, military or otherwise, which may

bear upon national defense strategy; to interpret and correlate such strate-

gic information; to make it available to the President and such other of-

ficials as the President may determine, and to carry out, when requested

by the President, such supplementary activities as may facilitate the se-

curing of strategic information not available to the Government.

This office came into being only 5 months before Pearl Harbor.

Through a process of evolution, there finally emerged the Office

of Strategic Services as an operating agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
This organization remained intact until the end of World War II.

Postwar Organization

In the fall of 1944, the Chief Executive wrote to the Director of

Strategic Services requesting recommendations as to the organization
of a postwar Intelligence organization. The Director submitted a plan

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for the creation of a central Intelligence service. The plan placed the
proposed central Intelligence service in the Executive Office of the Pres-
ident and called for the appointment by the President of a Director of
Intelligence who would discharge and perform his functions and du-
ties under the direction and supervision of the President.

It also provided for the establishment of an Intelligence Advisory

Board consisting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, and such
others as the President deemed necessary. The duties of the board
would be to advise and assist the Director of Intelligence.

The plan placed in the hands of the Director the work of coordi-

nating, collecting, evaluating, and disseminating Intelligence for na-
tional purposes. It also recognized that various departments of the Gov-
ernment should have their own Intelligence bureaus for the collection
and processing of such information and material as might be needed
in the performance of their daily functions and duties. Each of these
bureaus would be under the sole control of its department head and
would not be encroached upon or impaired by the functions granted
to any other governmental Intelligence agency.

The plan further contemplated that in time of war or unlimited

emergency, all programs of such an agency in areas of actual or projected
military operations would be coordinated with military plans and be
subject to the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; or in case of the con-
solidation of the armed services, under the supreme commander.

Functions Divided

Under the pressure of prompt dissolution of wartime agencies, the

Chief Executive, on September 20, 1945, divided the functions, per-
sonnel, and physical resources of the Office of Strategic Services be-
tween the State Department and the War Department. The research and
presentation element was transferred to the State Department, to be
absorbed or liquidated so that the element would cease to exist on De-
cember 31, 1945.

On January 22, 1946, the Chief Executive created the National In-

telligence Authority consisting of the Secretaries of State, War, and
Navy, and the President’s personal representative, to plan, develop,
and coordinate Federal foreign Intelligence activities so as to assure
the most effective accomplishment of the Intelligence mission for na-
tional security. This presidential directive also created a Central In-
telligence Group (CIG) under the direction of a Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI), designated by the President to assist the National

See

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, for

key documents dealing with the organization and administration of U.S. Government
intelligence organizations during that period.

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Intelligence Authority (NIA) and to be responsible to it. The directive
specified that the head of the CIG would sit as a member of the NIA.

It charged the Central Intelligence Group with the task of correlat-

ing, evaluating, and disseminating Intelligence relating to the national
security; with coordinating such activities of the Intelligence agencies of
the State, War, and Navy Departments as related to the national secu-
rity; and with performing other services of common concern.

By the National Security Act of 1947, as amended (Public Law 253,

80th Cong., July 26, 1947), the Congress established a National Secu-
rity Council (NSC) which took the place of the old National Intelli-
gence Authority; and created under the National Security Council a
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with a Director of Central Intelli-
gence (DCI) as its head. The National Intelligence Authority ceased to
exist.

Under the provisions of this act, the National Security Council es-

tablished an Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) made up of the
various Intelligence chiefs, to advise the Director of Central Intelligence
in his efforts to coordinate the Intelligence activities of the Nation.

[Omitted here is Section IV, Intelligence Personnel and Security.]

V. “Watchdog” Commission

The task force fully realizes that the Central Intelligence Agency,

as a major fountain of Intelligence for the Nation, must of necessity op-
erate in an atmosphere of secrecy and with an unusual amount of free-
dom and independence. Obviously, it cannot achieve its full purpose
if subjected to open scrutiny and the extensive checks and balances
which apply to the average governmental agency.

Because of its peculiar position, the CIA has been freed by the Con-

gress from outside surveillance of its operations and its fiscal accounts.
There is always a danger that such freedom from restraints could inspire
laxity and abuses which might prove costly to the American people.

Although the task force has discovered no indication of abuse of

powers by the CIA or other Intelligence agencies, it nevertheless is
firmly convinced, as a matter of future insurance, that some reliable,
systematic review of all the agencies and their operations should be
provided by congressional action as a checkrein to assure both the Con-
gress and the people that this hub of the Intelligence effort is func-
tioning in an efficient, effective, and reasonably economical manner.

Within the Armed Services Committee, there is a liaison channel

between the Congress and CIA which serves a worthy purpose, but
which cannot include private citizens in its membership and has not
attempted to encompass the wide scope of service and continuity which
this task force considers essential for “watchdog” purposes.

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The task force recognizes that secrecy is necessary for proper op-

eration of our foreign Intelligence Activities but is concerned over the
possibility of the growth of license and abuses of power where disclo-
sure of costs, organization, personnel, and functions are precluded
by law.

On the other hand, sporadic investigations in this field might in-

advertently result in unauthorized disclosure of classified information
to the detriment of the Intelligence effort. Periodic audits or studies by
some qualified, impartial agency would remove both of these dangers
and would also allay any suspicions and distrust which have devel-
oped in the public mind by the complete secrecy of these operations.
Such a procedure also might serve to shield our Intelligence program
from unjustifiable attacks upon the agencies concerned, and enhance
public confidence and support of this vital work.

The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 legalized the admin-

istrative procedures for the Agency. It was passed by the Congress on
the unanimous recommendation of the Armed Services Committee.

Agency Gets Wide Exemptions

The Act exempts the Agency from compliance with any provision

of law limiting transfers of appropriations; any requirements for pub-
lication or disclosure of the organization, functions, names, official ti-
tles, salaries or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency; and
any regulations relating to the expenditure of Government funds.

The widespread conviction among Members of Congress that this

situation should be corrected is indicated by the fact that more than a
score of resolutions have been introduced in the current session call-
ing for a review or watch over our Intelligence activities, usually by a
large joint committee of the two Houses.

The task force, however, envisions as the proper agency for this

watchdog job a small, permanent commission modeled after the Com-
mission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government—
a bipartisan group including members of both Houses of Congress and
distinguished private citizens appointed by the President.

Members chosen from private life to serve on this proposed

watchdog commission should come from a select group of loyal, qual-
ified, and public-spirited citizens who command the respect and con-
fidence of the American people.

Comprehensive periodic studies of the foreign Intelligence Activ-

ities of the United States would be made by the commission, with spe-
cial attention to the questions of whether the assigned work of these
Intelligence agencies is being carried on efficiently and effectively;
whether there is any unnecessary overlapping or duplication of effort
between civilian and military Intelligence agencies; whether the staffs

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are a size justified by their assigned functions and producing the Intel-
ligence required for the security of the Nation; whether expenditures are
within budget authorizations and in keeping with the expressed intent
of the Congress; whether fiscal policies and procedures are in conform-
ity with sound accounting principles and practices to the maximum ex-
tent possible; whether any of their activities or policies are in conflict
with the foreign policy aims and program of the United States; and
whether the effort of any of these Intelligence agencies is being dissi-
pated or adversely affected by assignment of added functions alien to
Intelligence. The commission would require a small permanent staff,
with the usual provisions for employing attorneys, experts, consultants,
and auditors, for expenses and for compensation of members and em-
ployees. It would be empowered to hold hearings and to subpoena wit-
nesses, under adequate safeguards to prevent the public disclosure of
classified defense information which it might receive; but would have
the authority to demand and receive from any source any information
it might need for its own use.

The overall aim would be the promotion of aggressive leadership

which would unify the Intelligence effort, make it more productive,
and inspire a higher spirit of teamwork through elimination of petty
competitive jealousies.

Would Study Complaints

The proposed commission should hold itself available to receive

and to study all complaints against any of our Intelligence agencies; to
maintain a familiarity with the activities of these agencies as a safe-
guard against the abuse of their proper functions; to consider requests
of the agencies for legislation, and, where advisable, to support the
needs of the Intelligence community before the Congress, and advise
the Congress on the effects of proposed legislation on our Intelligence
effort. An integral part of its duties would be reports of its findings
and its recommendations to the President and to the Congress annu-
ally and at such other times as might be appropriate or necessary.

One of the fundamental purposes of these reports would be to

keep the public informed, within the bounds of security, of the value
and the vital accomplishments of the Intelligence community and pro-
vide an answer to unfounded complaints and criticisms which have
tended to arouse fears and distrust of the Intelligence effort in the minds
of the people.

Public support thus engendered certainly would improve the ef-

fectiveness of the Intelligence operations, and foster public participa-
tion in the collection of overt Intelligence data. The people who sup-
port these operations are entitled to assurance that the investment is
paying dividends. With such assurance, they would develop an en-

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thusiasm and alertness which could bring in valuable information at
times to supplement the work of the regular Intelligence forces.

VI. Functional Intelligence

Map Procurement

The task force found map requirements and production for Intel-

ligence purposes well coordinated. Through the years, there has de-
veloped by mutual cooperation among the departments and agencies,
a committee whose primary function is to prevent duplication in map
procurement.

There is established within the Bureau of the Budget an Examiner

of Surveys and Maps, who coordinates all map-making programs to
avoid duplication and overlapping of functions. The system seems to
be efficient and effective.

Trustworthy and up-to-date Intelligence cartography is one of the

major elements utilized in Intelligence operations. The cost of this
phase of the work is substantial, but we found this expense to be jus-
tified by the results achieved.

Intelligence Libraries

On the basis of visits made to the Intelligence libraries maintained

by the military services, the CIA, and the State Department, the task
force believes that these libraries in general are efficiently operated.
There is a workable system in effect among the agencies for notifica-
tion of availability and exchange of information.

There has been considerable discussion of the idea of putting all

the material in the possession of all Intelligence agencies in one cen-
tral library.

The value of a library depends on the ready accessibility of its ma-

terial to the users. Its use and effectiveness declines when those who
need it must become involved in complicated procedures and delays
in obtaining material.

The task force feels that a central library would foster the devel-

opment of private desk-side libraries and the retention by individuals
of material for protracted periods, with the resultant denial or delay
in access to others. Establishment of a central library, therefore, seems
impracticable.

However, for the purpose of providing ready reference and more

facile access to the various Intelligence data by any department or
agency, the task force suggests that all departments within the Defense
Establishment and the Department of State adopt the single-index sys-
tem based on the Intelligence subject code now in use by the CIA and
the Air Force libraries. The value of such a standardized procedure
probably would be well worth the expense involved.

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Various elements in the Intelligence family have come up with di-

vergent definitions and interpretations of certain words and phrases
in common use by the Intelligence community. The resultant confu-
sion could be eliminated by standardization. To that end, the task force
proposes that the National Security Council produce an agreed glos-
sary of terms and definitions and provide for periodic review of this
glossary.

VII. Conclusions and Recommendations

In summarizing its findings and its recommendations, the task

force at the outset found, in general, that the Intelligence effort is be-
ing pursued in a diligent and dedicated manner. It noted throughout
the Intelligence community an atmosphere of urgency and a desire to
get on with the job of breaking through security barriers erected by our
potential enemies.

However, instances of inefficient practices were disclosed, and rec-

ommendations to correct them have been made.

The domestic counterintelligence effort was found to be effectively

coordinated among the departments and agencies concerned. Positive
direction and mutual support are provided through the operations of
the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepart-
mental Committee on Internal Security. Specific responsibility in the
domestic area of each counterintelligence agency is established par-
tially by statute, and is further definitively specified by a “Delimita-
tions Agreement” to prevent overlapping and duplication of effort.

Recommendations covering overseas counterintelligence opera-

tions, carried out by the military services and the Central Intelligence
Agency, are contained in our classified report.

The domestic security and counterintelligence functions of the

Federal Bureau of Investigation were found to be conducted efficiently
and effectively. This Bureau renders competent and highly cooperative
assistance to other Government Intelligence agencies and performs an
essential and important function in the overall intelligence effort.

The National Intelligence Survey is an invaluable publication

which provides the essential elements of basic Intelligence in all areas
of the world. While its production involves an extensive and expen-
sive effort, all members of the Intelligence community derive an im-
mediate benefit from the contributions they make to it and profit from
the final product. There always will be a continuing requirement for
keeping this survey up to date.

Administrative Flaws Noted

The task force concluded that the legislation and organiza-

tional setup for Intelligence purposes are soundly conceived, but that

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administrative flaws are in evidence. Accordingly, it has pointed most
of its suggestions in that direction.

Failure to produce certain elements of Intelligence has been due

in part to the restrictive effects of some of our national attitudes and
policies toward the collection of Intelligence so necessary for effective
resistance to Soviet aggression. Also, among some of those responsible
for implementation of our foreign policy by diplomacy and negotia-
tion, there seems to exist an abhorrence to anything that might lead to
diplomatic or even protocol complications.

This negative attitude, usually at the desk level, at times has sti-

fled initiative and action in the collection of Intelligence. Some of these
efforts, if permitted to proceed properly, might have brought direct and
immediate results and made positive contributions to the national wel-
fare that would have justified the attendant political risks and possi-
ble inconsequential diplomatic embarrassment.

Data on Soviet Bloc Inadequate

Security measures adopted by the Communists have been pro-

vokingly conceived and boldly employed. They have been quite effec-
tive in comparison with our security measures, which have permitted
the collection of vital secrets in this country with relative ease. The in-
formation we need, particularly for our Armed Forces, is potentially
available. Through concentration on the prime target we must exert
every conceivable and practicable effort to get it. Success in this field
depends on greater boldness at the policy level, a willingness to accept
certain calculated political and diplomatic risks, and full use of tech-
nological capabilities.

The task force is of the opinion that the Director of Central Intel-

ligence should employ an Executive Director, or “chief of staff,” of the
Agency so that the DCI might be relieved of the chore of many day-
to-day administrative and operational problems, and thus be able to
give more time to the broad, overall direction of the Agency and the
coordination of the entire Intelligence effort.

Recommendations With Respect to Personnel

The effectiveness of our national Intelligence effort is measured to

a large degree by the character and ability of the personnel, both mil-
itary and civilian, engaged in this work. The diligent and dedicated ef-
fort of the Intelligence community was evident to the task force.

Some problems, however, exist in the personnel management field.

These problems, taken collectively, seriously affect the morale, the
availability, and the quality of the Intelligence personnel.

The task force presents detailed recommendations later in this

report, with a view to improving the prestige of the civilian analyst;

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developing real career incentives in Intelligence; relieving the critical
shortage of qualified Intelligence personnel by tapping the valuable
pool of retired civilian business men and experience abroad, and of es-
pecially trained and qualified retired military personnel; broadening
the base of civilian employment to provide greater flexibility of re-
cruitment of the best qualified individuals; improving the conditions
of service of CIA personnel stationed abroad, and increasing the salaries
of certain key officials in CIA.

Recommendation No. 1

That the Central Intelligence Agency be reorganized internally to

produce greater emphasis on certain of its basic statutory functions;

and

That the Director of Central Intelligence employ an executive of-

ficer or “Chief of Staff” of that Agency.

Recommendation No. 2

That a small, permanent bipartisan commission, composed of

members of both Houses of the Congress and other public-spirited cit-
izens commanding the utmost national respect and confidence, be es-
tablished by act of Congress to make periodic surveys of the organi-
zation, functions, policies, and results of the Government agencies
handling foreign Intelligence operations; and to report, under adequate
security safeguards, its findings and recommendations to the Congress,
and to the President, annually and at such other times as may be nec-
essary or advisable. The proposed “watchdog” commission should be
empowered by law to demand and receive any information it needed
for its own use. It would be patterned after the Commission on Orga-
nization of the Executive Branch of the Government (Hoover Com-
mission). Appointments by the President of persons from private life
to the proposed Commission should be made from a select list of dis-
tinguished individuals of unquestioned loyalty, integrity, and ability,
with records of unselfish service to the Nation.

The tremendous importance to our country of the Intelligence func-

tion, and the unpublicized and selfless duties performed, demand that
the prestige of this function, and of the personnel involved, be recog-
nized through the use of adequate career incentives and benefits to en-
courage full development of talent within the Intelligence community.

Details and supporting factual matter relating to this recommendation are con-

tained in the separate classified report of the task force. They cannot be incorporated in
this public report for security reasons. [Footnote in the original.]

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Recommendation No. 3

That the Executive Pay Bill of 1949

be amended to increase the

annual salary of the Director of Central Intelligence to the equivalent
of the pay of the Deputy Secretary of Defense (now $20,000); to bring
the compensation of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence up to
$17,500, the same as that of most Under Secretaries of the executive
branch; and to provide operating directors of areas of responsibility in
Intelligence with proportionate salaries; and

That the chiefs of the various Intelligence units of the military serv-

ices be elevated in the organizational structure to the level of Deputy
Chiefs of Staff in the Army and the Air Force, and Deputy Chief of
Naval Operations in the Navy; and

That the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 be amended to

provide:

(a) Additional medical and hospital benefits and services for de-

pendents of CIA employees when stationed overseas, similar to the
benefits authorized for dependents of members of the Foreign Service.

(b) Statutory leave benefits (and accumulation of leave) for em-

ployees of CIA overseas, as now applied to members of the Foreign
Service.

Retired civilians with long business experience in the foreign field

constitute a possible source of important contributions to the Intelli-
gence effort, and this resource should be exploited fully. There is also
a valuable reservoir of retired military personnel with foreign experi-
ence which might well be utilized. One major advantage in the ex-
ploitation of these groups would be the speed with which they could
be fitted into the Intelligence picture because they would come in with
a large part of the necessary training already behind them.

Recommendation No. 4

That the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 be amended to

authorize employment by the CIA of retired military personnel of the
armed services without any arbitrary limitation on the number of such
employees (the limit now is 15) and without regard to the law limit-
ing their compensation; except that such personnel should be author-
ized to accept either their military retirement pay plus any difference
between their retired pay and the proper pay of the office they would
hold in CIA or the proper pay of the office, but not both; and

That the Department of Defense make extensive use of Schedule

A of the Civil Service Regulations (non-competitive appointments) in

P.L. 359, approved October 15, 1949. (63 Stat. 880)

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the employment by the military services of civilian Intelligence ana-
lysts and other specialists in order to provide the necessary flexibility
in the recruitment of qualified civilian personnel (to include retired cit-
izens with wide previous business experience in the foreign field) and
to facilitate the interchange of such personnel between zone of interior
competitive service and the overseas excepted service.

The task force is satisfied that the personnel security program and

procedures within the Intelligence community are adequate to mini-
mize the possibility of security risks and to make extremely unlikely
their employment in sensitive positions in the Intelligence agencies, ex-
cept in the procedure for systematic rechecking of all personnel to make
sure that the passage of time has not altered the trustworthiness of any
employee, and to make certain that none has succumbed to some weak-
ness of intoxicants or sexual perversion, or developed some other short-
coming that would disqualify him from further sensitive work. The
Federal Bureau of Investigation has adequate safeguards against such
a danger.

Recommendation No. 5

That measures be instituted in all agencies for rechecking the se-

curity status of all personnel engaged in Intelligence activities at peri-
odic intervals not to exceed 5 years in any individual case.

Our Government and its Intelligence forces are not fully exploit-

ing the possibilities of valuable military and technological data poten-
tially available in scientific reports and technical publications issued in
foreign countries. The State Department now is charged with this duty.
Under this arrangement, we lack adequate collection facilities and staff
experts to evaluate the material.

Recommendation No. 6

That the responsibility for procurement of foreign publications and

for collection of scientific Intelligence be removed from the State De-
partment and placed in the hands of the CIA, with authority to ap-
point such scientific attachés as may be necessary to carry on this work
abroad.

Efficient handling of Intelligence information demands modern

quarters for the personnel and the records. The Central Intelligence
Agency, after 8 years of operation, still lacks such facilities.

Recommendation No. 7

That the Congress appropriate as soon as practicable the funds

necessary to construct adequate headquarters facilities for CIA in or
near Washington, D.C.

The task force believes not only that great care must be taken in

the selection of highly qualified persons, both technologically and

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223. Central Intelligence Agency Comments on the Report of the

Technological Capabilities Panel

NSC 5522

Washington, June 8, 1955.

[Omitted here are a June 8 note from the NSC Executive Secretary

to the NSC, a memorandum of July 1 to all holders of NSC 5522, a table
of contents, an index to agency comments, a summary of agency com-
ments, and Annexes A and B containing comments by the Department
of State and Department of Defense, respectively.]

ANNEX C

TAB A

Technological Capabilities Panel Recommendations on Which the

Central Intelligence Agency Has Full Responsibility for Study and

Report to the National Security Council

Specific Recommendation C. 4

1. This recommendation reads as follows:
“We need to examine intelligence data more broadly, or to invent

some new technique, for the discovery of hoaxes. As a first step, we
recommend a National Intelligence Estimate, with adequate safe-

Source: Eisenhower Library, Records of White House Staff Secretary, Comments

on the Report to the President by the Technological Capabilities Panel. Top Secret. A
typed notation at the bottom of the first page reads: “Revised 7/26/55.” On February
14, the Technological Capabilities Panel (the Killian Panel) of the Science Advisory Com-
mittee reported to President Eisenhower on “Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack.”
Background on that report and extracts from it are printed in

Foreign Relations,

1955–1957,

vol. XIX, pp. 41–56. See also the editorial note, ibid., p 83. The full report is in National
Archives, RG 59, S/S–RD Files: Lot 71 D 171, Top Secret Restricted Data. On June 8, Ex-
ecutive Secretary of the National Security Council Lay circulated to NSC members a pa-
per entitled “Comments on the Report to the President by the Technological Capabili-
ties Panel of the Science Advisory Committee” under NSC Action No. 1355. (Ibid.,
S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action of the National Security
Council) Comments on the February 14 Panel Report were submitted by the Depart-
ments of State and Defense, Office of Defense Mobilization, Atomic Energy Commission,
Bureau of the Budget, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference–Interdepartmental
Committee on Internal Security, the Special Committee established to coordinate the im-
plementation of NSC 5513/1, the NSC Planning Board, and the Central Intelligence
Agency. (Eisenhower Library, Records of White House Staff Secretary, Comments on the
Report to the President by the Technological Capabilities Panel) Also see

Foreign Rela-

tions,

1955–1957, vol. XIX, pp. 95–108. The judgment of the report at that time “that the

United States had no reliable early warning and the Strategic Air Command was vul-
nerable, perhaps tempting, the Soviets to attempt a surprise attack” was to have a sig-
nificant impact on the course of the nascent U–2 program.

The CIA comments in Annex C were sent to the Executive Secretary of the Na-

tional Security Council under cover of a June 6 memorandum from Director of Central
Intelligence Dulles. (Ibid.)

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guards, of our success in keeping secret our most useful techniques of
intelligence. This estimate would suggest the extent to which an en-
emy might be manipulating the information obtained through these
sources.”

2. Discussion:
The problem of ascertaining the validity of information concern-

ing the USSR, collected through various sources available to us, is a
continuing one in the intelligence process. Thus, while no attempt has
been made in the past to prepare a comprehensive estimate concern-
ing Soviet attempts at deception, and the effect of such activity on the
validity of National Intelligence Estimates, a considerable amount of
research and analytical time has been expended. This effort could fruit-
fully be brought to bear in the preparation of a study of Soviet success
in penetrating our most useful techniques of intelligence. A compre-
hensive study will be initiated through an appropriate mechanism. Our
initial investigations do not reveal any requirements for additional per-
sonnel or funds for the accomplishment of this task.

[Omitted here are Specific Recommendation C. 9 and discussion

of it.]

Specific Recommendation C. 10

1. This recommendation reads as follows:
“A heavy long-term investment should be made in the prepara-

tion of covert agents as eventual sources of high-level intelligence.”

2. Discussion:
This recommendation, as amplified by the pertinent discussion in

the report,

has implicit in it the expansion of clandestine networks in

non-communist areas looking to the time, perhaps even twenty years
from now, when some of these areas may be critically important. It sug-
gests the slow and careful preparation of agents in the event of a po-
litical coup, a threatened coup, or some similar governmental crisis;
and finally, the use of such agents in legal travel operations against the
communist countries and in the penetration of communist and pro-
communist groups outside of the communist-controlled areas.

”It has become exceedingly difficult to obtain significant information from covert

operations inside Russia. The security zones at the border, the general restrictions in the
interior, the thousands of security police, and the innumerable informers among the pop-
ulation are brutally effective in limiting the infiltration, exfiltration, and usefulness of
agents. Therefore, we must more and more depend upon science and technology to as-
sist and complement the best efforts of classical intelligence.” (National Archives, RG 59,
S/S–RD Files: Lot 71 D 171, The Report to the President of the Technological Capabili-
ties Panel)

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It is noted that a recent recapitulation of high-level intelligence ef-

forts with long-term potential shows that the CIA possesses several
score agent assets of this type situated in almost every sensitive non-
orbit area of the world and in many areas which, though not presently
significant, could become so in the years to come. It is this type of agent
facility which has contributed to the success of certain political opera-
tions which have been reported to the NSC.

The CIA accepts and endorses the emphasis placed in the report

on the importance of using individuals of great intelligence, training
and experience [

⁄

lines not declassified

]. This type of activity has been

a part of our operational program for some time but it clearly deserves
an effort above that which we are now putting forth. It is most difficult
to locate people who are not too selfish, too insecure, or too naive to
produce material of value within such a program. The security precau-
tions erected by the Russians, the Chinese and the Satellites have im-
posed very rigid requirements in the selection of such individuals.
Therefore, an expansion of our present activities is certainly called for,
including the availability of additional manpower to make possible slow
and careful development of highly intelligent penetration agents.

Laying the groundwork for extensive covert operations in every

country available to our agents, to the extent outlined above, would
require additional effort through intensification and limited expansion
of our U.S. case officer selection and training facilities, an increase in
our case officer corps, and a limited broadening of our several support
structures (administrative, communications, and technical). A general
estimate of the proportion of the required increases in terms of case of-
ficer personnel would be approximately 10%.

TAB B

Recommendations On Which CIA Has Primary Responsibility for

Reporting to the NSC, Subject to Coordination With Other Agencies

General Recommendation 6 and Specific Recommendation C 7:

1. These recommendations read as follows:

GR6:

The National Security Council establish policies and take ac-

tions which will permit the full exploitation of the intelligence and
other advantages which can be made available to us through the es-
tablishment [

1 line not declassified

[

1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified

]

2. Discussion:
The Central Intelligence Agency, in coordination with the De-

partment of Defense, concurs in these recommendations. [

4 lines not

declassified

]

[

4 paragraphs (48 lines) not declassified

]

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Specific Recommendation C 3

1. This recommendation reads as follows:
We

must

find ways to increase the number of hard facts upon which

our intelligence estimates are based, to provide better strategic warn-
ing, to minimize surprise in the kind of attack, and to reduce the dan-
ger of gross overestimation or gross under-estimation of the threat. To
this end, we recommend adoption of a vigorous program for the ex-
tensive use, in many intelligence procedures, of the most advanced
knowledge in science and technology.

2. Discussion:
The CIA agrees with these statements and recommendations. The

Director of Central Intelligence has developed plans for implementa-
tion in the near future which will make possible a further step toward
the achievement of the objective underlying the TCP recommendation,
namely: to “use the ultimate in science and technology to improve our
intelligence take.”

The Agency has created a permanent Scientific Advisory Board,

composed largely of former members of the Technological Capabilities
Panel, to advise the Director and to supplement existing activities.

The Agency’s plans envisage:
a. The establishment of a suitable unit, with its supporting labo-

ratory facility, to insure the continual creation, recognition and appli-
cation of new scientific and technical methods for the acquisition, proc-
essing, and production of all forms of foreign intelligence,

b. The establishment of procedures for developing the concomi-

tant equipment and instrumentation peculiar to the production of in-
telligence, and

c. The establishment of close working relationships between the

unit mentioned in paragraph a. above, and all correlative develop-
mental divisions within the intelligence community and in particular
with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (R&D).

TAB C

Recommendations Under Which Primary Responsibility Was

Assigned to Other Agencies Subject to Coordination

With the Central Intelligence Agency

[Omitted here are the CIA comments on General Recommendation

11 and Specific Recommendations A. 9, B. 12c, C. 1, C. 5, and C. 6.]

Specific Recommendation C. 8

1. This recommendation reads as follows:
“Intelligence applications warrant an immediate program leading

to very small artificial satellites in orbits around the earth. Construction

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of large surveillance satellites must wait upon adequate solutions to
some extraordinary technical problems in the information gathering
and reporting and its power of supply, and should wait upon devel-
opment of the intercontinental ballistic missile rocket propulsion sys-
tem. The ultimate objective of research and development on the large
satellite should be continuous surveillance that is both extensive and
selective and that can give fine scale details sufficient for the identifi-
cation of objects (airplanes, trains, buildings) on the ground.”

2. Discussion:
The psychological warfare value of launching the first earth satel-

lite makes its prompt development of great interest to the intelligence
community and may make it a crucial event in sustaining the interna-
tional prestige of the United States.

There is an increasing amount of evidence that the Soviet Union is

placing more and more emphasis on the successful launching of the satel-
lite. Press and radio statements since September 1954 have indicated a
growing scientific effort directed toward the successful launching of the
first satellite. Evidently the Soviet Union has concluded that their satel-
lite program can contribute enough prestige of cold war value or knowl-
edge of military value to justify the diversion of the necessary skills, scare
material and labor from immediate military production. If the Soviet ef-
fort should prove successful before a similar United States effort, there
is no doubt but that their propaganda would capitalize on the theme of
the scientific and industrial superiority of the communist system.

The successful launching of the first satellite will undoubtedly be

an event comparable to the first successful release of nuclear energy to
the world’s scientific community, and will undoubtedly receive com-
parable publicity throughout the world. Public opinion in both neutral
and allied states will be centered on the satellite’s development. For
centuries scientists and laymen have dreamed of exploring outer space.
The first successful penetration of space will probably be the small
satellite vehicle recommended by the Technological Capabilities Panel.
The nation that first accomplishes this feat will gain incalculable pres-
tige and recognition throughout the world.

The United States’ reputation as the scientific and industrial

leader of the world has been of immeasurable value in competing
against Soviet aims in both neutral and allied states. Since the war the
reputation of the United States’ scientific community has been sharply
challenged by Soviet progress and claims. There is little doubt but that
the Soviet Union would like to surpass our scientific and industrial
reputation in order to further her influence over neutralist states and
to shake the confidence of states allied with the United States. If the
Soviet Union’s scientists, technicians and industrialists were appar-
ently to surpass the United States and first explore outer space, her

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propaganda machine would have sensational and convincing evidence
of Soviet superiority.

If the United States successfully launches the first satellite, it is most

important that this be done with unquestionable peaceful intent. The So-
viet Union will undoubtedly attempt to attach hostile motivation to this
development in order to cover her own inability to win this race. To max-
imize our cold war gain in prestige and to minimize the effectiveness of
Soviet accusations, the satellite should be launched in an atmosphere of
international good will and common scientific interest. For this reason
the CIA strongly concurs in the Department of Defense’s suggestion that
a civilian agency such as the U.S. National Committee of the IGY su-
pervise its development and that an effort be made to release some of
the knowledge to the international scientific community.

The small scientific vehicle is also a necessary step in the develop-

ment of a larger satellite that could possibly provide early warning in-
formation through continuous electronic and photographic surveillance
of the USSR. A future satellite that could directly collect intelligence data
would be of great interest to the intelligence community.

The Department of Defense has consulted with the Agency, and

we are aware of their recommendations, which have our full concur-
rence and strong support.

[Omitted here are annexes bearing comments by other U.S. de-

partments and agencies on the Technological Capabilities Panel report
of February 14, 1955.]

224. Editorial Note

A group of national security experts headed by Nelson A. Rocke-

feller met in Quantico, Virginia June 5–10, 1955, to explore vulnerabili-
ties of the Communist bloc. See

Foreign Relations,

1955–1957, volume XIX,

page 84. A summary of the recommendations of the Quantico Panel is
printed ibid., 1955–1957, volume V, page 216. Walt W. Rostow, then at
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a member of the panel,
published an account of the Quantico deliberations in

Open Skies: Eisen-

hower’s Proposal of July 21, 1955

(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982).

Another panel called together by Rockefeller in late August 1955

met in Washington, D.C. and Quantico to discuss and review the
psychological aspects of U.S. national security policy. The Quantico II
Panel, as it was often called, submitted its recommendations to Presi-
dent Eisenhower in early December 1955. See

Foreign Relations,

1955–

1957, volume XIX, pages 153–154.

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225. Minutes of a Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Committee

IAC–M–200

Washington, June 14, 1955, 10:45 a.m.

Director of Central Intelligence

Allen W. Dulles

Presiding

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Lieutenant General Charles P. Cabell

Presiding

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Special Assistant for Intelligence, Department of State
Major General Robert A. Schow, acting for Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2,

Department of the Army

Rear Admiral Carl F. Espe, Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Major General John A. Samford, Director of Intelligence, Headquarters,

United States Air Force

Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton, Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Mr. Charles H. Reichardt, acting for Atomic Energy Commission Representative

to the IAC

Mr. M.W. Kuhrtz, acting for Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of

Investigation

ALSO PRESENT

Mr. Sherman Kent, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. H. Marshall Chadwell, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Otto E. Guthe, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Abbot E. Smith, Central Intelligence Agency
[

name not declassified

], Central Intelligence Agency

[

name not declassified

], Central Intelligence Agency

[

name not declassified

], Central Intelligence Agency

[

name not declassified

], Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. Edward W. Proctor, Central Intelligence Agency
[

name not declassified

], Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. P.A. Trezise, Department of State
Mr. Howard Furnas, Department of State
Colonel J. H. Montgomery, Department of the Army

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Job 85–500362R, Box 2,

Folder 6. Secret. The meeting was held in the Director’s Conference Room in the Ad-
ministration Building in the Central Intelligence Agency.

Part of meeting. [Footnote in the original.]

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Lieutenant Colonel W.J. Lage, Department of the Army
Lieutenant Colonel V.J. Fenili, Department of the Army
Captain Bruce E. Wiggin, Department of the Navy
Mr. Lawrence Healey, Department of the Navy
Colonel P.D. Wynne, United States Air Force
Lieutenant Colonel Van A. Woods, Jr., United States Air Force
Mr. John A. Power, United States Air Force
Colonel John E. Leary, USA, The Joint Staff
Colonel Robert Totten, USAF, The Joint Staff
Captain Ralph Metcalf, USN, The Joint Staff

[Omitted here is discussion of agenda items 1. Approval of the

minutes of the June 7, 1955 meeting, and 2. Noting of Watch Commit-
tee Report No. 253.]

3. Proposed DCID 3/6: Establishment of a Guided Missile Intelligence

Committee (IAC–D–81/9, 31 May 1955)

a. The Chairman stressed the importance to the security of the US

of doing everything possible to improve intelligence on guided mis-
siles. He stated that he would not wish to take the responsibility for
not going forward with some community approach which was re-
sponsive to the need. He further stated that he realized that the sug-
gested draft was not the only way to get at the problem and that he
was more anxious to press for the principle of interagency cooperation
in this field than for the details of the present proposal.

b. The Service members generally took exception in principle to

the proposed draft as an invasion of the weapons field now allocated
to the services under DCID 3/4.

Moreover, they tended to view the

key gap in the field of guided missiles intelligence as collection. This
has been given a high priority by the services and it is not clear how
the establishment of another committee would improve current efforts.

c. The Air Force member referred to the Air Force program to at-

tack the problem more broadly and indicated that while collection was
an important aspect of the problem, there also were possibilities in the
field of research and analysis. He suggested that an alternative to set-
ting up a new committee would be to broaden the charter of the Sci-
entific Estimates Committee.

d. The State member stated that he would support the proposal but

indicated that his department had a less direct interest in this subject
than did the other members. The AEC member was in favor of the
proposal. His agency has been pleased with the JAEIC approach to an

Not found.

Document 126.

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702 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: National Archives, RG 306: USIA Files Lot 63 A 190, B. 172, IRI Memo-

randa (IAN), 1954–56. Confidential; Official–Informal. A cover letter from Clary Thomp-
son, Deputy Assistant Director, Near East, South Asia and Africa, U.S. Information
Agency, to Dear ______, June 22, 1955, suggests that the letter was intended to be sent
to multiple U.S. posts abroad.

Not further identified.

320-672/B428-S/11008

important problem and he felt that the establishment of a GMIC might
help AEC augment its contribution in this field. He believed that the
biggest gain would be in the development of new techniques and meth-
ods for exploiting intelligence in this field. The FBI member had no ob-
jection to any proposal designed to improve the end-product but indi-
cated his agency would not be competent to sit on the committee if
formed.

e. The Chairman and General Cabell reiterated that the proposal

was in no way designed to supersede individual efforts but to give
them added impetus. Mr. Kent pointed out that under the present setup
it is not clear who takes the action called for in agreed post-mortem
findings in this field. The pulling together of all individual efforts is
thus left largely undone.

Action:

The IAC deferred action on the draft directive pending

the receipt in two weeks of a report prepared by the SEC in coordina-
tion with EIC. The SEC report is to include a proposal of how the ob-
jectives of the draft DCID could be met by SEC, the changes in SEC’s
charter which an assumption of this responsibility would entail, and
an evaluation of current Air Force efforts in the field of guided missile
intelligence.

[Omitted here is discussion of agenda item 4. The North African

and Arab-Israeli Situations.]

226. Letter From the Chief of the Office and Research and

Intelligence, U.S. Information Agency (Loomis) to the Country
Public Affairs Officer at the Embassy in South Africa
(Graves)

Washington, June 22, 1955.

Dear Mr. Graves:

Several weeks ago an addition to your operating manual was sent

to all posts for inclusion in Part 1, Section 223.

This addition included

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about four pages describing the organization and functions of the Of-
fice of Research and Intelligence (IRI). While this statement described
what we are supposed to do, it was, of necessity, written in formal Gov-
ernment language.

I thought it might be helpful if I filled you in more completely and

more informally, with particular emphasis on how we hope to be of
service to you.

When IIA was part of the Department of State,

it depended on

the Intelligence Area of the Department (OIR) to collect and produce
the kind of intelligence needed for policy and programming. This
arrangement was never completely satisfactory since OIR had insuffi-
cient resources to devote to our requirements, and of course became
impossible after USIA was separated from the Department.

About a year ago Mr. Streibert

went to Mr. Allen Dulles and asked

him to take a look at the problem of how best to supply USIA with all
the information it required to function. Mr. Dulles accepted the job, and
appointed a task force which studied the issue for several months in
great detail both in Washington and in selected posts overseas.

Both the National Security Council’s Intelligence Advisory Com-

mittee (IAC) and the Agency accepted the recommendations of the task
force

and they were put into effect in September 1954.

The survey team first identified six types of information which

were needed by USIA. I am enclosing an excerpt from the Report which
describes these in detail.

The survey team concluded on the basis of these requirements that

the intelligence needs of USIA did not differ

in kind

from the intelli-

gence required to support the political, economic, and military activi-
ties of the Government, but that USIA did require such intelligence
“with an emphasis, a detail and a form not normally required in in-
telligence produced for other purposes”. I should point out that “in-
telligence”, as used in this letter and with respect to USIA in general,
does not mean covert or “cloak and dagger” operations. Rather, it refers
to the entire process of overt collection, collation, evaluation and dis-
semination of information and analyses on subjects relevant to USIA
activities.

For documentation on the establishment and responsibilities of the International

Information Administration (IIA) on January 16, 1953, see

Foreign Relations,

1952–1954,

vol. II, Part 2, pp. 1591ff.

For documentation on the creation of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) later

in 1953, see ibid., pp. 1709–1711.

Theodore E. Streibert, Director of the U.S. Information Agency.

The task force and its recommendations have not been further identified, but

many features of the report are summarized below and quoted in the enclosure.

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The survey concluded further that:

(a) The total available intelligence of the types required by USIA had

been inadequate in character and quantity, and should be increased;

(b) The primary responsibility for the provision of the types of in-

telligence required by USIA should continue to be assigned to the De-

partment of State and in a lesser degree to the other agencies of the In-

telligence Community;

lor the output of the other intelligence agencies to the particular and

peculiar applied needs of the Information Agency.

This, in a nutshell, is our primary function.
The survey group also concluded that on occasion the U.S. Infor-

mation Agency, particularly its field staff, was a unique source of intel-
ligence information. This would include information that field officers
pick up about the organization and operations of foreign and commu-
nist media in a particular country. The survey group concluded that
USIS should, therefore, have the responsibility of reporting this special
type of information in coordination with the reporting by the other
sections of the Embassy. You can use the most convenient channel for
this reporting; the psychological section of the WEEKA, State Depart-
ment despatches, or USIA despatches. One point was stressed—USIS
field personnel should not be expected to undertake activities for the
sole purpose of gathering information. Rather, their responsibility is to
report information which they had gathered as a by-product to their
regular activities in support of the general USIA program.

Another point stressed by the Survey group was the function of

evaluation. The group concluded, and we strongly concur, that the re-
sponsibility for evaluating the program cannot be separated from the
executive responsibility for running and planning the program. We be-
lieve that IRI’s job is to provide to the responsible USIA executives all
the facts and figures which are available, and upon which they can
base their judgment as to what actions they should take.

For example, if IRI were asked—“Is the radio program in the Union

of South Africa

any good?”—we would say that it was not our func-

tion to answer that question since it involves judgment—program judg-
ment. We would try to work out with you the questions to which we
wanted answers, such as:

“How many people listen to USIS radio programs as compared to

the competition?”

“What type of people listen?”

The words “Southern Rhodesia” are crossed out and “the Union of South Africa”

has been inserted by hand.

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“Why do they listen to the programs?”

“What is their opinion of the programs?”

etc. We would then present those findings to all levels concerned;

you, your radio officer, IBS, the Area Directors, etc. You all could ar-
gue as to whether or not the findings indicated that the program was
good, bad or indifferent, and whether or not the program needed
change. IRI will follow the same principles as the FBI, which, as you
know, has always been scrupulously careful never to tell any operat-
ing unit what to do as a result of its findings. Our mission in IRI, there-
fore, is completely a service mission to provide both the USIS field mis-
sions, and the headquarters elements of USIA, with the information
they want about foreign programs, issues and conditions. Specifically,
IRI is not responsible for gathering or analyzing statistics about
the output of USIS programs. That is the responsibility of each media
concerned.

The survey team found that the following four separate units, deal-

ing with various phases of research and intelligence, existed within
USIA: the Evaluation Staff (IEV) (which, among other things, con-
tracted for research studies with universities and private research
firms); the Coordinator of Psychological Intelligence (CPI) (which was
a group of some 35 people assigned to the State Department, but paid
by USIA); the Research and Library Section of IBS; and the IPS Library.
Upon approval of the Report, these units were abolished and a new
central organization was established called the Office of Research and
Intelligence (IRI).

After the usual delays caused by the merging of functions and or-

ganizations and the slow recruitment and appointment of qualified per-
sonnel, IRI is now getting to the point where it can begin to carry out
its responsibilities.

As a manual outlines, IRI is composed of four divisions: Collec-

tion and Liaison, Library, Production, and External Research. The first
of these, the

Collection and Liaison Division,

is primarily responsible for

collecting the raw and finished intelligence from other intelligence
agencies, both within this Government and from foreign governments;
falling within the six categories spelled out in the IAC Survey. In ad-
dition, this division has the job of trying to convince other agencies to
produce finished intelligence for us. To the extent that it succeeds, the
work of the Production Division is simplified.

The Collection Division also disseminates the raw and finished in-

telligence which it collects to all elements of USIA. They distribute to
USIS in the field, and to other Government agencies, the finished pro-
duction turned out by IRI. They are the people responsible for getting
scripts declassified which have utilized paraphrases of some classified
material in their preparation.

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Another major responsibility of the Collection and Liaison Divi-

sion is to formulate intelligence requirements. Normally, people come
to us with a vague desire for “all the facts” on a given subject. We then
must get them to refine and sharpen their requirements until we know
exactly what they want, and how they plan to use the information. We
then list the minimum information which must be collected.

The Division lays requirements on the other intelligence agencies

(State, Defense, CIA) to do production for us when they are better
equipped. It will lay requirements on the field to collect information
when you are the best source. As I mentioned above, this will primar-
ily be where we are anxious to learn about the Communist and in-
digenous activities in the various media. In other words, this Division
is the middleman between the user of intelligence and those who col-
lect and produce it.

The Collection and Liaison Division is headed by Ed Carroll, who

had a lot of wartime service with OSS in Europe, and was with the In-
telligence Collection group in the Department of State for the past nine
years.

The second Division is the

Library Division.

The nucleus of the col-

lection and personnel of this Division is the old IBS and IPS libraries.
The Division is headed by Roth Newpher, who headed the IBS Library
and Research Staffs for 12 years. The Library has four rather distinct
collections.

The first section is the

book and periodical collection.

We have some

25,000 volumes and 260 periodicals and newspapers. The collection is
heavily weighted with Russian and Communist materials, but does
cover the waterfront. Also, of course, we have excellent relationships
with all other libraries, both Government and private, so that the Li-
brary can obtain almost any book on very short notice.

The second section is the

unclassified morgue,

which has more than

5 million items, classified under 80,000 headings. This is a unique fa-
cility in Government. Nowhere else is there such a large amount of un-
classified intelligence material.

The third section is the

classified file.

This resembles the unclassi-

fied, except that all documents in it are classified. This is a new section
for the Agency, and is rapidly expanding. We have excellent relation-
ships with the CIA Library so that if we do not have a classified doc-
ument ourselves, we can get it shortly from CIA.

The fourth section is the

propaganda collection,

which is unique among

collections in or out of the intelligence community. It represents an ex-
tensive collection of the published propaganda of foreign countries, and
contains some 30,000 items organized by country of distribution. It is ex-
tensively cross-indexed. We must rely heavily on you to send us ex-
amples from your area. Many have already contributed significantly.

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This material is constantly used by the Director and other headquar-
ters personnel because it is particularly effective in demonstrating the
opposition.

The Library Division is prepared to give you very rapid service.

The Library provides reference service for Agency personnel in Wash-
ington. It can do so by telegram or despatch for you.

The third IRI division is the

Production Division,

headed by Lou

Olom, who for three years was Chief of the CPI unit located in the State
Department, and who has been in intelligence for the last 15 years.

The Production Division has the responsibility of answering ques-

tions from any part of USIS or USIA. Sometimes these questions can
be answered on the telephone very speedily. Sometimes they require
considerable work and result in a memorandum of some length.

The Production Division does not always answer these questions

itself. If a large and comprehensive study is required, we will lay the
requirement on other appropriate intelligence organizations—State,
CIA, Defense as well as non-IAC agencies such as Labor, Agriculture
and Commerce Departments. The Production Division will make every
effort to meet any deadline which you establish. We are a “quick and
dirty” shop completely geared to the operational needs of the Agency.
We will give you whatever information we are able to obtain within
your time limit—an hour, a day, or a week. We believe you, the user,
rather than we, should establish the deadline, since you know how and
when you expect to use the information. Obviously, the shorter the
deadline, the more superficial the answer.

Requests from the field for information can be sent either directly

to IRI or to IPS, depending on the type of product desired. Both IPS
and IRI often work on the same requests. We in IRI do the research,
and try to obtain all the facts bearing on the subject and place them in
some logical order, irrespective of whether they help or hinder our
cause. IPS utilizes these facts, as appropriate in its output. There is,
therefore, no reason for you to change whatever system you are now
using. However, if you only wish a fact or an intelligence analysis rather
than a story, it might be a little quicker if you made that request to IRI.

The Production Division has seven branches—the five regular ar-

eas, the USA Branch, and the Functional Branch.

The Functional Branch is responsible for following international

Communism, front organizations as well as local and national party
propaganda methods and activities. They also follow media activities
worldwide, so that we can detect and analyze changes in emphasis or
procedures in Communist radio, Communist movies, etc. Paul Phillips
is Acting Chief.

The USA Branch is headed by Dick Fitzpatrick, and is responsible

for providing background information on the United States, which you

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and other elements of this Agency request. Again, if you want an arti-
cle about some facet of the United States, or American life, we often
provide the material to IPS and they, of course, do the final writing.

The Soviet-Satellite Branch is responsible for obtaining the facts and

figures about the Soviet and European Satellites, and for following their
activities, particularly their current propaganda lines and operations. The
Division is headed by Mike Fodor, who has lived in the area for many
years, and most recently was the editor of the

Neue Zeitung.

Your Branch, the Near East Branch, does not yet have a Branch

Chief, although Joe Dees is acting in that capacity. Joe was at one time
in the operational intelligence division of the Voice, but came to us from
Radio Liberation.

The fourth Division is the External Research Division, which has

the mission of supplementing classical intelligence, using the unique
techniques of social science. The most obvious area not touched by tra-
ditional intelligence seems to be public opinion surveys. We believe
that suveys of public opinion are a unique and important addition to
other sources of information, such as newspaper comment, editorial
comment, and estimates of the situation by qualified observers.

We are now using the survey technique to get two different types

of information. The first is opinion on political matters, particularly as
they concern our global themes—such matters as:

What is your opinion of the United States?—of Russia?

In your opinion, how are the relations between your country and

the United States at the present time?

Do you think the local Communist party is an independent party

or is it controlled by the Soviet Union?

If Western Europe were attacked with atomic or hydrogen bombs,

would you approve or disapprove of the use of such bombs on enemy

cities?

Survey techniques also provide unique information on specific

USIS activities, such as exhibits, radio programs, etc. In these surveys
we ask such questions as:

What radio programs did you listen to last night?

How often do you listen to _____________ program?

What is your opinion of the program?

Which do you think gives you more reliable reports of the news—

radio or newspaper?

What is your opinion of the exhibit you have just seen?

What part did yo like the best?

Which the least? Why?

etc.
Through the science of sampling and questionnaire research, the

opinions of small, carefully selected groups can be used to estimate the
attitudes of larger groups with a high degree of accuracy (3–5% with

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the sample-size generally employed). This tool can be used to study
the opinions of the entire adult population, or just of certain groups—
the youth, the educated, the city dweller, or whatever particular seg-
ment you are interested in.

We are now conducting political surveys every four months in four

countries of Western Europe, which we are calling Barometer Reports.
We began survey operations in Western Europe, in part because pub-
lic opinion in the American sense of the word is more meaningful there,
and in part because the local research concerns were further developed.
We believe that one of the chief values of these surveys is that it allows
both us and you to chart trends in opinion with more accuracy than
any other method. We plan to extend these surveys to the other major
countries of the world as rapidly as possible. We have just finished an
exploratory survey in four countries of Latin America, and hope to put
them also on a regular basis.

The External Research Division is very small—only five profes-

sionals—since the work is essentially a field function. The Agency has
thus far established a TO of twelve research officers overseas, seven
are already assigned as follows: England, France, Germany, Austria,
Italy, Brazil and Mexico. We hope to establish research offices soon in
India, Thailand, Japan, Egypt and Iran. These officers will be regular
members of the PAO’s staff, reporting to him, spending his GOE, in
order to provide the PAO with the facts and figures he needs, through
individual research, local contractors, or any other means available.

If some headquarters’ element in Washington, or some other

Agency, such as the National Security Council, desires local survey in-
formation, we will lay that requirement on the Public Affairs Officer.
Under this system, the Research Officer becomes really familiar with
his country and can produce rapid, efficient, and meaningful research
studies. This is particularly true of research dealing with the impact of
the USIS programs. During the initial stages, we are supplementing the
post’s GOE with additional funds, earmarked for research, but this is
only an interim measure until the Public Affairs Officer can include re-
search in his regular budget. However, whenever IRI places an addi-
tional requirement on any post, which is over and above its normal
concern, we will provide the Public Affairs Officer with additional
funds so that these special requirements will not be a financial burden.

The function of the External Research Division is to provide tech-

nical backstopping services to these research officers. Also, the Divi-
sion prepares the detailed requirements, such as questions to be asked
in order to satisfy headquarters’ needs. In the case of those countries
which do not have a research officer, the External Research Division
will provide as much help as possible to the Public Affairs Officer. If
the PAO has some particularly pressing problem, IRI is prepared to

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send one of its Washington staff on TDY for as long as necessary to ob-
tain the information required by the PAO.

The Division is headed by Leo Crespi, who was Research Officer

in Germany for six years. This Division will no longer emphasize long-
range basic studies. It, like the Production Division, is now a service
shop trying to provide information as quickly as possible, so that it can
be of practical use to all elements of USIS and USIA.

I am afraid this letter has become a little long, but I wanted to de-

scribe in some detail our assets, and our mission, so that you could un-
derstand it better, and therefore use it. Our sole mission is to be of serv-
ice, and we will change our methods and procedures as required to
give you what you want.

I will be very glad to get your comments on our service, both good

and bad, particularly any recommendations which you may have for
improvement.

Sincerely,

Henry Loomis

Enclosure

IDENTIFICATION OF INTELLIGENCE NEEDS

USIA has essential needs for the following types of intelligence

and intelligence information:

Selected segments of societies:

selected classes, groups, organiza-

tions (public and private), and their leadership, present and potential

a) Size, composition, ideologies and attitudes, predispositions,

and reactions to: (1) the United States, the USSR and other countries

of greatest significance and their basic policies, (2) critical foreign and

internal problems.

b) The patterns of influence among groups, organizations, and

leaders (including the government); specifically, who is influential, on

whom, how, and how much

Media Research and Analysis:

a) Communication habits and types of media in the country (press,

publications, radio, motion pictures, TV).

b) Organizational aspects of each medium, including location, key

personnel, finance, distribution and exhibition outlets, and a descrip-

tion of the facilities of the media.

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Confidential.

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c) The political orientation of the media.

d) The content of the communications output by the media.

e) Location, size and type of audience receiving the output of the

media.

f) The reactions of the audience to the media, and why.

Foreign Propaganda,

both friendly and unfriendly, including ex-

change of persons or cultural exchange

a) Facilities and personnel.

b) Program content and plans.

c) Estimate of probable courses of foreign propaganda.

d) Analyses of foreign propaganda vulnerabilities.

4. Impact of factors affecting public opinion and attitudes and the

net impact of such factors on people of a country. Such factors would
include historical attitudes of people, and the influence of current do-
mestic and foreign official and unofficial activities.

Descriptive Detail,

that is, unclassified or declassified intelligence

information to supplement the content of USIA media with items of
local interest in order to make the output appear more interesting and
more authoritative, particularly in denied areas.

International Communism:

a) International organizations, personalities, programs, fiscal sup-

port, methods and success or failure of operations.

b) Local applications, including counterespionage information,

with emphasis on communications facilities.

227. Editorial Note

In an effort to improve coordination of intelligence collection in

the field, Secretary of State Dulles on June 23, 1955, instructed 71 diplo-
matic posts on domestic and field procedures for acquiring intelligence
and requested those posts to report on their current handling of intel-
ligence collection coordination. The Secretary suggested that missions
with USIA and FOA staffs could include representatives of those agen-
cies in the collection activities. (CA–9152, June 23, 1955; National
Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1955–60, 120.201/6–2355)

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228. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles to the

Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Hughes)

Washington, June 25, 1955.

Dear Mr. Hughes:

For some time I have been concerned with the adequacy of the re-

sources of the Department of State’s intelligence organization. I have
consulted with Mr. W. Park Armstrong on this question and studied in
detail the proposed strengthening of the State Department’s intelli-
gence program as reflected in the Department’s FY 1957 budget esti-
mates. On the basis of this study I am convinced that the increases in
personnel and funds sought must be granted in order to avoid serious
impairment of the national intelligence effort.

The intelligence framework of the Government has its particular

problems in that, to a degree not often found in other governmental
functions, each intelligence agency is heavily dependent upon others,
and the President and the National Security Council are dependent
upon the community as a whole, not simply upon one or several of its
parts. I might add that this governmental area differs from others also
in that the Director of Central Intelligence has certain statutory re-
sponsibilities with regard to the coordination of the activities of the
several intelligence agencies; this indeed accounts for, and I believe jus-
tifies, my present comment.

A careful review of the intelligence produced by the Department

of State for National Intelligence Estimates and for other purposes of
direct concern to this Agency indicates the need for increased positions,
particularly in the following fields of endeavor:

Special Intelligence

—In this period of intensive diplomatic activity

the Department’s particular responsibilities in this field must be dis-
charged promptly and thoroughly, and the present limited staff is badly
overstretched.

Intelligence on the Soviet Orbit and Its Integration

—We are entering

a period of significant change in the organization of the Communist
Bloc and relations between Communist parties and governments. Our
ability to anticipate major Communist moves and to conduct appro-
priate cold war countermeasures requires a major stepping-up of our
analysis of the techniques, strengths, and weaknesses of the Commu-
nist Bloc mechanism. This can only be accomplished by the most de-

Source: National Archives, RG 59, INR Historical Files: Lot 59 D 27, Box 73. Se-

cret. Drafted by Robert Amory, Deputy Director for Intelligence, on June 24.

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tailed scrutiny of each item of evidence, whether overtly or covertly
obtained, by highly competent political analysts.

Intelligence on Underdeveloped Areas

—The ferment that exists in the

large and highly populated areas of the world in which the U.S. and
the USSR are engaged in an acute struggle for men’s minds requires
far more detailed knowledge, both economic and political, than we
have as yet been able to produce. Here the problem does not lie in the
paucity of information but in adequate resources for compiling and an-
alyzing data.

Public Opinion Analysis

—We are only just beginning to develop ad-

equate barometers of public opinion in the Free World and are be-
coming more and more aware of the need to respond to and influence
such if our leadership of the Free World coalition is to be effective.
USIA’s efforts to collect raw data in this field must be supported by
highly competent evaluation by political intelligence experts.

Watch Function

—With the approval of the NSC, the National In-

dications Center has been established on a 24-hour basis. Moreover, the
Watch Committee’s activities have materially stepped up as a result of
a constantly increasing danger of devastating damage to the U.S. in the
event major aggression caught us flat-footed. The Department of State’s
political intelligence is as vital a contribution to this work as is the mil-
itary contributions; hence the additional positions requested for this
work are indispensable to the over-all discharge of our early warning
responsibility.

United Nations and International Conference Biographic Support

—In

an era of intensive diplomatic activity including special conferences
and lengthy sessions of the United Nations, the Department’s bio-
graphic resources have been found badly overstrained. This condition
is enhanced by the large number of personalities included in Com-
munist delegations and by the growing need to handle effectively the
representatives of small but crucial countries.

Private Research

—The need to maximize the contribution to intel-

ligence by private and institutional research is obvious, not only be-
cause of its substantive merit, but because in the long run it involves
a saving to the tax payer. Every effort is being made to insure that the
intelligence agencies carefully coordinate their efforts in this field, and
a considerable work load falls on the Department of State. Their work
contributes not only to the Department but to the entire intelligence
community.

Summing up the foregoing, I would like to emphasize that the in-

creases sought by the Department are necessary to the

national

intelli-

gence effort. They will not constitute a duplication of effort currently
expended by the intelligence community nor could they be more log-
ically performed by another intelligence agency. I would like also to

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stress the care with which the necessity for the proposed increases has
been scrutinized. This is in part borne out by the fact that if all the pro-
posed increases are granted, the intelligence organization of the De-
partment of State will still be substantially smaller than in FY 1953.

I strongly recommend that the Bureau of the Budget give its sup-

port to the proposed intelligence program of the Department of State
for FY 1957.

Sincerely,

Allen W. Dulles

Printed from a copy that indicates Dulles signed the original.

229. Editorial Note

The U.S. Air Force had been developing the concept of plastic bal-

loon reconnaissance since 1946. After studying the use of plastic bal-
loons as carriers of photographic and electronic reconnaissance equip-
ment since 1948, the Air Force by 1953 was experimenting and testing
the balloons directed at the Soviet bloc. By the middle of 1954 the Air
Force had test-launched over 500 reconnaissance balloons in Project
Moby Dick and had by fall 1954 drawn up a basic operational concept
for all future important reconnaissance programs. On March 23, 1955,
Air Force headquarters assigned the Strategic Air Command to un-
dertake a pioneer reconnaissance of Soviet territory. (Memorandum of
conversation by Robert F. Packard, July 22; National Archives, RG 59,
INR Files: Lot 61 D 67, Genetrix; John T. Bohn, “History of the First Air
Division,” unpublished history done in SAC History Division, Office
of Information, Headquarters, SAC, November, 1956, vol. 1, pp. 2–3)

Project Genetrix, the codename ultimately adopted for the first U.S.

Air Force large-scale, unmanned, high altitude balloon intelligence op-
eration, was conceived and designed by the RAND Corporation for the
Air Force as a means of overcoming the lack of photographic and me-
teorological intelligence on the Soviet bloc land mass. SAC was charged
with operational responsibility for Genetrix. The plans for Genetrix ini-
tially called for free flight of balloons from west to east across the So-
viet land mass from launching sites in either England, northern Eu-
rope, or the eastern Mediterranean. On June 28, the Air Force requested
concurrence of the Department of State for conducting negotiations
with German, Norwegian, and Turkish authorities to obtain coopera-
tion on Genetrix activities on their territories.

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Source: National Security Agency, Accession 23034, H02–0106–1, Folder 2,

Correspondence–Memos concerning ELINT. Secret.

320-672/B428-S/11008

By August 19, the German and Turkish Governments had assented

to the operation, and, according to the Ambassador to Norway, the
Norwegian Government was expected soon to accept the U.S. plans
for Genetrix operations within its boundaries. (Memorandum of con-
versation by W. Park Armstrong, Jr., November 29; National Archives,
RG 59, Central Files 1955–60, 700.5411/11–2955; memoranda of con-
versation by Robert F. Packard, July 22 and August 22; both ibid., INR
Files: Lot 61 D 167, Genetrix)

While British Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden consented to co-

operation on Genetrix, he told President Eisenhower on August 19 that
if Genetrix followed soon after the Geneva Foreign Ministers’ confer-
ence scheduled for October, the Soviet Government could conceivably
contrast the balloon operation with the President’s aerial inspection
proposals made at the July summit conference. Consequently, Presi-
dent Eisenhower agreed on August 23 to postpone the initiation of Gen-
etrix from November 1 until after the United States could assess the
results of the Geneva Foreign Ministers’ meeting. (Memorandum by
W. Park Armstrong, Jr., August 23; letter from Secretary of State Dulles
to Sir Robert Scott, British Embassy, August 23; copy of an undated let-
ter to President Eisenhower from Sir Anthony Eden, noted as received
by the President on August 19 in a memorandum by John W. Hanes,
Jr., August 24; all ibid.)

President Eisenhower described his proposal on mutual aerial ob-

servation to the Soviet Government in Geneva on July 21 and in his
July 27 White House press conference. (

Public Papers: Eisenhower, 1955,

pages 713–716, 731–733)

230. Department of Defense Directive

S–3115.2

Washington, July 13, 1955.

SUBJECT

Electronics Intelligence (ELINT)

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I. Establishment

Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense and

subject to his authority, direction and control, and in accordance with
NSCID 17,

the Secretary of the Air Force is hereby assigned the re-

sponsibility and delegated the necessary authority to direct and super-
vise the consolidated processing, analysis, and dissemination of infor-
mation on foreign non-communication electromagnetic radiations and
to guide and coordinate Electronics Intelligence (ELINT) activities of all
agencies of the Department of Defense. In the development and appli-
cation of ELINT policies and procedures, the Secretary of the Air Force
will give due consideration to recommendations of the U.S. Communi-
cations Intelligence Board and the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

II. Purpose

The objectives of this directive are to consolidate Department of

Defense ELINT analysis activities under a single direction, to guide
and coordinate Department of Defense collection of ELINT informa-
tion and to provide for optimum interaction and mutual support be-
tween ELINT and COMINT in order to produce efficiently the best pos-
sible ELINT results for all users, and to provide for the establishment
of a Technical Processing Center pursuant to NSCID 17. The Secretary
of the Air Force will bring about the orderly consolidation of the sep-
arate ELINT analysis and processing centers heretofore operated by the
several military Departments and agencies. In carrying out these ob-
jectives, the Secretary of the Air Force will not abridge the authority of
operational commanders over integral ELINT resources in support of
their operations nor the freedom of such commanders to exchange
ELINT materials for their mutual support. Consistent with the over-all
policies established by the Secretary of the Air Force, operational com-
manders will be authorized to establish such policies, procedures, and
mechanisms as they deem necessary for the rapid lateral interchange
of ELINT information.

III. Mission

The Secretary of the Air Force will provide common services for

ELINT, specifically to include:

1. Organization and administration of the Technical Processing

Center for central technical analysis based on all ELINT observations
and other relevant information. The results of the central technical
analysis will be made directly available to all consumers of this type
of information.

Document 259.

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2. Effective and timely guidance to Department of Defense field

collection agencies and advice to the Central Intelligence Agency. Such
guidance shall be expeditiously transmitted through appropriate chan-
nels as prescribed by the several Departments and agencies concerned.
Such guidance will reflect the interests of all users and will provide for
the coordination of and technical assistance to field activities to maxi-
mize their total usefulness.

3. Guidance and advice, as in paragraph III. 2. above, concerning

methods and procedures for the improvement and standardization of
the operations and equipment related to ELINT collection, analysis,
evaluation, and dissemination, and recommendations concerning re-
search and development programs as appropriate.

4. Technical support to the Department of State in its negotiations

for the acquisition of intercept sites in foreign countries; technical sup-
port to designated representatives of the U.S.; and technical represen-
tation on behalf of the Department of Defense in ELINT discussions.

IV. Administration

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) shall arrange

with the Secretary of the Air Force, the Secretaries of the other two Mil-
itary Departments, the Director of Central Intelligence, and heads of
other appropriate Departments and Agencies for the financing of the
consolidated activities provided for by this directive.

The Secretary of the Air Force may reassign his responsibilities for

the ELINT activities as prescribed by this directive within the com-
mand structure of the Department of the Air Force. It is the intent of
this directive that the Secretary of the Air Force will provide for the
performance of the functions of the consolidated activities within the
organizational structure of his Department and that he shall not es-
tablish a joint agency for that purpose, although individuals drawn
from other Departments and the Central Intelligence Agency may be
integrated therein. This provision, however, will not preclude the es-
tablishment of such advisory committees or groups as may be consid-
ered necessary for the effective administration of the consolidated
activities.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall assure active par-

ticipation by their Departments through the detail of qualified military
and civilian personnel to staff the consolidated activities and through
such other measures as may be mutually agreed.

The Secretary of the Air Force, in collaboration with the heads of

the other Military Departments and Agencies, will issue the necessary
implementing instructions to accomplish actions required by this di-
rective. The Secretary of the Air Force will periodically report on the
activities under this directive to the Secretary of Defense.

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718 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: Eisenhower Library, Papers of John Foster Dulles. Confidential; Personal

and Private; Eyes Only. Drafted by R.L. O’Connor of the Secretary’s staff. The memo-
randum bears the handwritten notation “Copy to Mr. Hoover.”

320-672/B428-S/11008

V. Participation

The Secretary of the Air Force will collaborate fully with the Cen-

tral Intelligence Agency as an active collector and user in the field of
ELINT, as well as with other interested agencies, and will provide for
the participation of the Central Intelligence Agency in the operation of
the Technical Processing Center, in accordance with NSCID 17.

RB Anderson

Acting Secretary of Defense

231. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 19, 1955.

[Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–55,

101.21/7–1955. Top Secret. 2 pages not declassified.]

232. Memorandum of Conversation Between President

Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles.

Washington, August 5, 1955, 12:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Nelson Rockefeller

I raised with the President the situation re Nelson Rockefeller, stat-

ing that I simply wanted the President to know at this stage that we
were having a very difficult time working with him and that, although
I was trying to work the situation out, I was not at all sure that I would
be successful in doing so. I then described to the President briefly my
own thinking as to the proper role that someone in Rockefeller’s posi-

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234. National Security Council Report

NSC 5525

Washington, August 31, 1955.

STATUS OF UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS

AS OF JUNE 30, 1955

[Omitted here are Parts 1–6.]

Part 7—THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

(Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency and concurred in by

the Intelligence Advisory Committee)

[Omitted here is a Table of Contents.]
(

Note:

The intelligence community was recently investigated by

the Clark Task Force of the Hoover Commission.

The findings of the

Commission, which are presently under advisement, are not covered
or commented on in this report. The comments of the organizations re-
ported on are being transmitted separately to the White House in ac-
cordance with customary procedure.)

I. Summary

A. Evaluation of U.S. Capabilities to Provide Warning of Attack

We believe, as we did at the time of our previous report, that the

U.S. could expect possibly as much as six months and not less than 30
days warning of Soviet preparation for full-scale land, sea, and air at-
tack, providing that the Soviets went to full, or nearly full mobiliza-
tion prior to the attack.

The current estimate of the growing air capabilities of the USSR

has made us somewhat more pessimistic than we were last year re-
garding our ability to give advance intelligence warning of surprise air
attack. Should the USSR attempt a major surprise air attack against the
U.S. from forward bases in 1955, the preparations might be detected,

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5525. Top

Secret. The full report was transmitted to the National Security Council under cover of
an August 31 memorandum from Acting Executive Secretary of the National Security
Council Gleason.

On July 19, A. Sidney Buford III, Director of the Office of Libraries and Intelli-

gence Acquisition, Department of State, sent to the IAC the State Department’s contri-
bution to the IAC’s semi-annual report on the Foreign Intelligence Program to the Na-
tional Security Council. The Department of State report is in National Archives, RG 59,
INR Files: Lot 58 D 776, IAC–D–55 Series on Foreign Intelligence Program.

See Document 220. For the public report by the task force on intelligence, see Doc-

ument 221.

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and if they were, would provide a generalized degree of warning of
several days, and specific warning of unusual and possibly threaten-
ing air activity on the order of 18–24 hours. A lesser scale of attack, in-
volving about 250 aircraft, if accompanied by an extraordinary secu-
rity effort could be launched as early as 1955 with no assurance of
specific advance warning to U.S. intelligence (apart from that provided
by early warning radar). Attacks against U.S. bases or forces overseas,
or against U.S. allies, could be made with equal or greater likelihood
of being accomplished without advance warning.

In the period between now and 1958, Soviet capabilities for sur-

prise attacks will almost certainly increase. Furthermore, the USSR will
have a progressively increasing capability for launching attacks on the
U.S. from interior Soviet bases. Such a method of attack would proba-
bly provide no specific advance warning to U.S. intelligence.

The USAF now operates world-wide on a 24-hour basis an Indi-

cations System for detecting imminent Communist attacks, especially
air attack with nuclear weapons. Major air commands have subsidiary
centers tied in with Washington by preferential use channels of com-
munication for flash transmission of early warning intelligence. This
system is in turn tied in with the unified command indications centers
and with the National Indications Center in Washington, which is
maintained on a 24-hour basis by the Watch Committee of the IAC.

B. Evaluation of Soviet Capabilities and Intentions

Intelligence to support over-all assessments of the strengths of the

USSR, Communist China, and the Satellites is generally improving. The
general limitations of intelligence on the USSR are evident in the process
of attempting to measure the forces shaping Soviet policy. We can illu-
minate the broad outlines of the chief problems confronting Soviet lead-
ership, but we are still unable to determine the degree to which these
problems, such as allocation of Soviet economic resources and German
rearmament, generate pressures on Soviet policy. The main questions of
political intelligence often involve matters of judgment on which little or
no factual evidence can be brought to bear—the degree of independence
enjoyed by Communist China in matters of major policy, the degree of
likelihood that the USSR will withdraw from East Germany, the likeli-
hood of open intervention by the USSR in hostilities between the U.S.
and Communist China which threatened the existence of the latter.

We have made progress in economic intelligence on the USSR,

most notably in improving techniques for measuring economic growth.

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For a description of the National Indications Center and the Watch Committee of

the IAC, see Document 218.

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722 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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However, there remains the basic problem, that of determining the ex-
tent to which the Soviet economy is capable of meeting the competing
claims for resources arising from the various internal and external com-
mitments of Soviet policy. In an effort to find some solution to this
problem, we have recently focused attention on a particularly difficult
aspect of intelligence on Soviet resources allocation, the estimated eco-
nomic cost of the over-all Soviet military effort.

New techniques for acquiring and analyzing data have advanced

our knowledge of Soviet scientific and technological capabilities.
Progress has been made in intelligence on Soviet development of
guided missiles and electronic equipment, and on the Soviet nuclear
program. Despite advances in these and other fields, important ques-
tions such as the characteristics of various guided missiles, the exist-
ence and nature of a Soviet biological warfare program, and the
apportionment of nuclear material among various types of weapons
and systems, remain to be answered.

Although we have succeeded in collecting much information on

the separate branches of the Soviet armed forces, we have yet to con-
struct the picture of probable Soviet strategy so essential to estimating
general trends in the Soviet military establishment, probable Soviet
choices in weapons systems, or the strength of particular military com-
ponents. The requirement for such estimates is particularly urgent at
the present time because of recent indications that Soviet military think-
ing is adjusting to the impact of modern military technology.

C. Collection

In most respects there has been little over-all change in our col-

lection capabilities within the Bloc, largely because of the continued
strict enforcement of Sino-Soviet security and counterintelligence
measures. However, there has been a considerable improvement in the
collection of intelligence data through technological means such as
ELINT, together with increasing use of aerial reconnaissance. Evacua-
tion of U.S. forces from Austria will deprive the military services of a
significant intelligence base. Service collection units in Austria will be
transferred to West Germany, where operational requirements are be-
ing carefully considered in U.S.-West German negotiations on a new
Forces Arrangement.

Under the terms of the Austrian State Treaty signed in Vienna on May 15 all World

War II allied occupying powers were scheduled to evacuate Austria within 90 days of
the treaty coming into force. (See

Foreign Relations,

1955–1957, vol. V) This provision is

in Article 20 of the treaty, which is printed in full in Department of State

Bulletin,

Vol.

XXXII, June 6, 1955, pp. 916ff. In preparation, the U.S. Government was negotiating a
new status of forces agreement with the West German government. (

Foreign Relations,

1955–1957, vol. XXVI, pp. 242 and 300)

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235. Letter From the Chairman of the Planning Coordination

Group (Rockefeller) to the Director of the Bureau of the
Budget (Hughes)

Washington, September 23, 1955.

Dear Rowland:

This is to confirm our conversation in which I recommended to

you that the Planning Coordination Group be abolished, and that I re-
sign as Vice Chairman of the Operations Coordinating Board. We are
preparing an informal memorandum for you setting forth the prob-
lems that must be considered in regard to the functions of the Group.

I would suggest that December thirty-first be considered the ter-

mination date as this would give time to arrange for the orderly trans-
fer of existing responsibilities and completion of the work in progress.

I am sorry to make this recommendation. However, it is clear af-

ter six months experience that this mechanism will not be able to ac-
complish the objectives set forth in the memorandum of March 3, 1955,

which was approved by the President.

A meeting of the Planning Coordination Group members will be

held next week. At that time I will discuss this recommendation with
them.

Sincerely,

Nelson A. Rockefeller

Special Assistant

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66 D 148, PCG, Coordina-

tion of Psychological and other Warfare Activities. Confidential.

Document 210.

Rockefeller informed the PCG of his intention at the Group’s September 26 meet-

ing. Item 4 of the minutes of this meeting reads:

“The Chairman announced his conviction that after six months’ experience the PCG

cannot discharge its functions and made a recommendation that it be abolished on De-
cember 31, 1955. The CIA representative indicated no objection to this recommendation
and discussed briefly methods by which the coordination of major covert programs could
be handled after the abolishment of PCG. The State and Defense representatives reserved
position on the recommendation by the Chairman. Copies of a letter from the Chairman,
PCG, to the Director, Bureau of the Budget, dated September 23, 1955, recommending
the abolishment of PCG, were furnished the PCG members.” (Minutes of Third Meet-
ing, September 26; National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66 D 148, PCG, Coor-
dination of Psychological and other Warfare Activities.)

Printed from a copy that indicates Rockefeller signed the original.

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724 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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236. Letter From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant for

Intelligence and Research (Armstrong) to Director of Central
Intelligence Dulles

Washington, October 5, 1955.

Dear Allen:

The Task Force on Intelligence Activities (“Clark Committee”) of

the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Gov-
ernment (Hoover Commission), in its

public

Report to the Congress on

Intelligence dated May 1955, but released in June,

makes a number of

disparaging statements concerning the attitude of the Department of
State toward intelligence collection activities. In the Conclusions and
Recommendations (Part VII, pages 37–38) it is stated:

“. . . Also among some of those responsible for implementation of

our foreign policy by diplomacy and negotiation, there seems to exist

an abhorrence to anything that might lead to diplomatic or even pro-

tocol complications.

“This negative attitude, usually at the desk level, at times stifled

initiative and action in the collection of intelligence. Some of these ef-

forts, if permitted to proceed properly, might have brought direct and

immediate results and made positive contributions to the national wel-

fare that would have justified the attendant political risks and possi-

ble inconsequential diplomatic embarrassment.”

Further on, referring to the inadequacy of data on the Soviet Bloc,

the Report says that:

“. . . Success in this field depends on greater boldness at the pol-

icy level, a willingness to accept certain calculated political and diplo-

matic risks, and full use of technological capabilities.”

The Department is naturally concerned at such allegations and de-

sires to learn what the basis for them might be. In the Top Secret Task
Force Report dated May 1955,

I can find no substantiating data or ar-

gumentation for the implied charges against the Department made in
the public report. However, according to the

Top Secret

Report, Ap-

pendix II, which has not been available to the Department, fully dis-
cusses [

less than 1 line not declassified

]. Would it be possible for you to

make this Appendix available to me on a highly restricted basis? Al-
ternatively, could you send to us a statement, generally summarizing

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1955–60, 711.5200/11–2555. Se-

cret. Drafted by Fisher Howe on October 5, concurred in by W. Tapley Bennett, Jr. (G),
Robert G. Barnes (S/S), and Loy Henderson (O). All ellipses in the original.

Document 220.

Document 221.

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the Report’s position on this matter, as was, I believe, suggested by the
President’s Military Secretary.

Directly related to the question of what was said by the public Task

Force Report would be the views of your Agency on the question of
the Department’s attitude toward intelligence and intelligence opera-
tions. Naturally the Department would wish to know it if this analy-
sis is correct in your view, and would wish promptly to take remedial
action if legitimate intelligence activities are inhibited by the actions of
Foreign Service or Departmental officers.

Sincerely,

W. Park Armstrong, Jr.

Printed from a copy that indicates Armstrong signed the original.

237. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State

for European Affairs (Barbour) to the Under Secretary of
State (Hoover)

Washington, October 18, 1955.

SUBJECT

Abolition of the Planning Coordination Group

At a PCG Alternates meeting this morning we discussed the at-

tached draft documents

to accomplish the abolition of the Planning

Coordination Group.

Substantive comment was made on the following two points in

the proposed memorandum to the Chairman of the OCB.

1. CIA proposed that Par. 4(a) be redrafted to amend NSC 5412/1

to specify the individuals originally designated in Sec. 4(a) of that NSC

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66 D 148, PCG. No classi-

fication marking.

Not printed.

See Document 235 and footnote 3 thereto.

The Under Secretary of State was chairman of the Operations Coordinating Board.

Document 212.

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238. Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 4/5

Washington, October 18, 1955.

PRIORITY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES

1. Pursuant to National Security Council Intelligence Directive

No. 4,

paragraph 2, the following list of priority national intelligence

objectives is established as a guide for the coordination of intelligence
collection and production in response to requirements relating to the
formulation and execution of national security policy.

2. By definition, all items in this listing are deemed to be critical

national intelligence factors requiring priority attention and effort. Dis-
tinction is made, however, between three levels of priority within the
general priority category. Order of listing within these three groups is
a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with
respect to the relative priority of specific items within the group.

3. In order to afford a stable basis for intelligence planning, this

directive is designed to remain valid over an extended period. It will
be reviewed annually, or on the request of any member of the IAC. It
is recognized that urgent interim requirements may arise requiring ad
hoc treatment, and that the criteria on which the following priorities
are established shall remain under continuing review. These criteria
were issued in IAC–D–50/7, 16 August 1955,

and define categories of

priority as follows:

a. First Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will per-

mit the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies or actions of
foreign states which would occasion gravest consequences to the US;
and (2) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or actions
within them) which could occasion greatest benefit to the US.

b. Second Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will per-

mit the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies or actions of

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC Intelligence

Directives. Secret. On December 7, the Department of State sent this directive to all diplo-
matic posts and Hong Kong and Singapore in Circular Airgram 4388, to aid the De-
partment in improving the organization and coordination of intelligence reporting from
the field. (Ibid., Central Files 1955–60, 101.21/12–755)

See

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment,

Document 422.

Documentation on IAC–D–50/7, “Criteria for Determining Priority National In-

telligence Objectives,” August 16, is in National Archives, RG 59, INR Files: Lot 58 D
776, Box 27.

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728 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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foreign states which would have serious consequences for the US; and
(2) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or actions within
them) which could occasion great benefit to the US.

c. Third Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will per-

mit the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies or actions of
foreign states which would have harmful consequences to the US; and
(2) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or actions within
them) which could occasion substantial benefits to the US.

4. DCID 4/4 is hereby rescinded.

I. First Priority Objectives

a. Soviet over-all politico-military strategy, intentions, and plans,

particularly with respect to initiating hostilities using Soviet or Satel-
lite armed forces, and to disarmament and arms inspection.

b. Chinese Communist over-all politico-military strategy, inten-

tions, and plans, particularly with respect to initiating hostilities using
Chinese Communist armed forces.

c. Present and probable future Soviet capabilities for nuclear at-

tack on the United States or key US overseas installations and for de-
fense against air attack.

d. Soviet capabilities, plans, and intentions for the clandestine de-

livery of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons against the US or key
US overseas installations.

II. Second Priority Objectives

The USSR and European Satellites

a. The Soviet estimate of US and allied capabilities and intentions;

of US and allied economic and political stability, and of the strength,
cohesion, and probable development of the NATO Bloc.

b. Major Soviet international political objectives and courses of ac-

tion, including economic policies and actions, with particular reference
to courses designed to weaken and disrupt the NATO alliance or to fo-
ment antagonism between Western and Asian powers.

c. Soviet political strengths and weaknesses: the actual locus of

political power in the USSR; actual or potential personal or policy con-

DCID 4/4, “Priority List of Critical National Intelligence Objectives,” was issued

14 December 1954. [Footnote in the original. For DCID 4/4, see Document 201.]

Note:

Order of listing within Category I is a matter of convenience in presenta-

tion and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of specific items within
that category. [Footnote in the original.]

Note:

Order of listing within Category II is a matter of convenience in presenta-

tion and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of specific items within
that category. [Footnote in the original.]

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flicts within the ruling group; Soviet-Satellite relations, with particular
reference to the character and degree of Soviet control; the strengths
and weaknesses of the Soviet and Satellite apparatus of police control;
the extent of actual disaffection and of potential resistance in the So-
viet and Satellite populations.

d. The strength and weaknesses of the Soviet (including Satellite)

economy, with particular reference to its ability to support a major war;
the motivation, character, and magnitude of current economic devel-
opment programs, their implementation, and their effect upon the
economic, political, and military strength of the Soviet Bloc; the capa-
bilities and vulnerabilities of the Soviet and Satellite internal commu-
nications systems.

e. Soviet and Satellite scientific and technical strengths and weak-

nesses substantially affecting Soviet military, economic, and political
capabilities.

f. The general capabilities of the Soviet and Satellite armed forces.
[

9 headings and 31 paragraphs (96 lines) not declassified

]

Allen W. Dulles

Director of Central Intelligence

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

239. Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense

Washington, undated.

COMMENTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ON THE

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE HOOVER COMMISSION TASK

FORCE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT

The following comments are addressed to the Recommendations

of the Task Force which are applicable to the Department of Defense.

Source: Defense Intelligence Agency Files. No classification marking. The paper

was enclosed in a November 10 letter from Secretary of Defense Wilson to President
Eisenhower, and both were under cover of a November 10 letter from Wilson to Row-
land R. Hughes. Attached to the paper, but not printed, is Tab A, a draft of Department
of Defense comments on all nine recommendations. Both of Wilson’s letters indicate that
the responses were to the unclassified Hoover Commission Report on Intelligence Ac-
tivities. For extracts from this unclassified report, see Document 221.

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Recommendations (a) and (b) of the Commission itself, and Recommen-
dations Nos. 1, 2, and 7 of the Task Force, are considered not to be suffi-
ciently applicable to the Department of Defense to justify comment by it.

Recommendation No. 3

“That the chiefs of the various intelligence units of the military

services be elevated in the organizational structure to the level of
Deputy Chiefs of Staff in the Army and the Air Force, and Deputy Chief
of Naval Operations in the Navy.”

Non-concur

Comment

The Department of Defense agrees that it is essential that intelli-

gence be given adequate weight and representation in the staff orga-
nization of the military services if it is to function with optimum effi-
ciency,—but it considers that this can be assured without the recom-
mended organizational changes at this time.

Implementation:

None at this time.

Recommendation No. 4

“That the Department of Defense make extensive use of Schedule

A of the Civil Service Regulations (non-competitive appointments) in
the employment by the military services of civilian intelligence ana-
lysts and other specialists in order to provide the necessary flexibility
in the recruitment of qualified civilian personnel (to include retired cit-
izens with wide previous business experience in the foreign field) and
to facilitate the interchange of such personnel between zone of interior
competitive service and the overseas excepted service.”

Concur

Comment

Each of the three Services has taken or is developing measures to ap-

ply Schedule A to elements of its civilian intelligence staff. In addition,
the Department of Defense is studying the matter with a view to finding
an optimum balance between desirable flexibility in hiring and rotation
of skilled career personnel on the one hand and providing the fullest prac-
ticable job security and incentive (as a vital morale factor) on the other.

Implementation:

Take action in accordance with the results of such study.

Recommendation No. 5

“That measures be instituted in all agencies for rechecking the se-

curity status of all personnel engaged in intelligence activities at peri-
odic intervals not to exceed 5 years in any individual case.”

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Concur in principle

Comment

It is considered that the current security practices and the proce-

dures for acting on adverse information essentially fulfill the objectives
of these recommendations. Within the objectives, however, it is desir-
able to leave to each individual service reasonable latitude in the
method of implementation. For example, it may in some cases aid the
investigation not to alert the individual involved by suspending him.
Measures are taken, of course, in such cases to insure that classified in-
formation is adequately safeguarded. This general subject is being re-
viewed in order to insure that the underlying objectives of these rec-
ommendations are adequately served.

Implementation:

Additional precautions indicated by such review.

Recommendation No. 6

“That the responsibility for procurement of foreign publications and

for collection of scientific intelligence be removed from the State Depart-
ment and placed in the hands of CIA, with authority to appoint such sci-
entific attachés as may be necessary to carry on this work abroad.”

Concur in part

Comment

The collection of scientific intelligence is one of the most important

intelligence activities of the Government. It is of vital concern to the De-
partment of Defense. The CIA should have coordinating responsibility
but it would be unwise and inefficient to give it or any other agency
a monopoly in this field, nor does any one agency now have such a
monopoly. The Department of Defense considers it inappropriate for the
Central Intelligence Agency to have overt attachés stationed abroad.

Implementation:

None by Department of Defense.

Recommendation No. 8

“That steps be taken to introduce highly selective methods of choos-

ing members of the coordinating committee on atomic energy intelli-
gence, not only to get the benefit of service by the most competent indi-
viduals, but also to assure long tenure in this important assignment.”

Concur

Comment

The salaries the Department of Defense can pay for top-flight tal-

ent in this field compare unfavorably with those offered outside the
Government, and this makes it difficult to insure long-term continuity.

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732 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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Implementation:

The Department of Defense will use its best efforts to

carry out this Recommendation.

Recommendation No. 9

“That a comprehensive, coordinated program be developed to ex-

pand linguistic training among American citizens serving the Intelli-
gence effort; and

“That the Department of Defense expand and promote language

training by offering credit toward reserve commissions to ROTC stu-
dents and drill credit to Reserve personnel for completion of selected
language courses.”

Concur in principle

Comment

The Department of Defense endorses the importance of a compre-

hensive program of foreign language and area specialist training for per-
sons serving the national intelligence effort and allied activities. It and its
elements have taken various measures during the past years to further
such a program. But in the case of ROTC and reserves, the Department
of Defense is reluctant to provide for additional language training if such
training must be at the expense of training in primary military subjects.
Specifically, the Task Force’s recommendation would make for wider par-
ticipation but would, not by itself, produce well-trained linguists.

Implementation:

The various existing programs are being studied in the

light of this recommendation with a view to achieving an optimum
balance between qualitative and quantitative standards.

240. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary

of State Dulles and Director of Central Intelligence Dulles

Washington, November 22, 1955, 3:39 p.m.

The Sec. referred to Grayback.

Radford has written Wilson,

who

took it up with the Pres., requesting that he be authorized to proceed.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Papers of John Foster Dulles, Telephone Conversa-

tions, General. No classification marking. Drafted by Phyllis D. Bernau. Secretary Dulles
placed the call.

Formerly known as Project Genetrix. See Document 229.

Memorandum from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of De-

fense, November 16. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1955–60, 711.5261/11–1655)

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The Sec. has reservations about it—this is a dangerous and cumber-
some way of going about it. AWD said there are two feelings in De-
fense. AWD talked with Quarles the other day. AWD thinks it will get
them so alerted it will spoil other things he thinks have more poten-
tial.

The Sec. has to make a decision. AWD suggested they, Radford,

Wilson and Quarles get together—AWD does not feel he knows
enough about the potential to pass good judgment. The Sec. said they
want authority here before December 1. The Sec. may call Wilson to
see if it can wait until next week, or maybe Hoover can handle it. The
Sec. said the Pres. is dubious about it on general principles. The Sec.
said a lot of money was spent on it. The Sec. will find out how fast it
has to move.

AWD said Strauss will use “megaton” instead of “large” in the re-

lease for Thursday’s papers. The Sec. said o.k.

Dulles is alluding to the U–2 which would fly over Eastern Europe in June 1956.

241. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles to the

Secretary of State’s Special Assistant for Intelligence and
Research (Armstrong)

Washington, November 25, 1955.

Dear Park:

This is with reference to your letter of 5 October 1955

concerning

the statements made in the report of the Task Force on Intelligence Ac-
tivities (Clark Committee)

regarding the attitude of the Department

of State toward intelligence collection activities.

As you point out, there is no substantiating data or argumentation

for the implied charges made against the Department of State in the
Top Secret Task Force Report, dated May 1955—at least not in that

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1955–60, 711.5200/11–2555. Top

Secret. The letter is attached to a November 29 memorandum from Armstrong indicat-
ing that Dulles’ letter was being forwarded to Hoover, Murphy, and MacArthur.

Document 236.

Documents 220 and 221.

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734 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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portion of the report, which excludes pages 76–204,

made available to

this Agency.

We have once again carefully reviewed Appendix II which deals

with certain aspects of CIA’s work.

The pertinent portions of this re-

port appear to be:

“The allocation of funds for all projects of psychological warfare to

specific areas, more particularly for propaganda, has been consistently
influenced and too frequently interfered with by low-level State Depart-
ment representatives since the beginning of the cold-war program. This
intervention in the program by such representatives, whose interests are
narrow and restricted to their assigned country areas, has at times in the
past resulted not only in misdirected efforts on the part of the Clandes-
tine Services, but in serious financial losses to the Government also, with-
out a fair measure of gainful return. These might have been avoided had
the DCI been given long-range national policy guidance at higher State
Department level and had been permitted then to act on his own judg-
ment, or, better still, had NSC more clearly defined the prerogatives of
the DCI in carrying out his cold-war mission. To the surveying officer it
is significant that NSC gave to the DCI the sole responsibility for carry-
ing out cold-war operations aimed at the Communist bloc. Nowhere in
NSC directives pertaining to this mission is it indicated that the DCI’s re-
sponsibility therefor may be delegated to, or shared with, any other Gov-
ernment agency. . . . While there is no evidence revealed in this survey
concerning any serious disagreement between CIA officials and these
same representatives with respect to psychological warfare, it is clearly
indicated that, as far as the Office of the Secretary of State is concerned,
such policy advice has come on a piece-meal basis and too often not from
specifically designated representatives of that agency.”

[

1 paragraph (3

⁄

lines) not declassified

]

I consider that there is no real basis of fact for the above allegations

regarding the State Department’s attitude. As regards policy guidance,
the Department has been wholly cooperative and I do not consider that
there has been any improper “intervention” or “interference” in the car-
rying out by CIA of cold war programs. [

3 lines not declassified

]

Sincerely,

Allen W. Dulles

Pages 76–88 concerned the Department of State and pages 89–205 examined the

intelligence role of the Department of Defense. (Memorandum from Dillon Anderson to
Goodpaster, February 14, 1956; Eisenhower Library, Hoover Commission Report on In-
telligence Activities, May 1955–October 1956)

Appendix II, which discussed the clandestine service of the Central Intelligence

Agency, is not printed.

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242. Memorandum From Secretary of State Dulles to President

Eisenhower

Washington, December 1, 1955.

SUBJECT

“Operation Grayback”

I have been fully briefed by the Air Force on “Operation Grayback”.

It is my view that while I would not today start the operation in view of
possible newer techniques, nevertheless the operation is already mounted
at a cost of approximately $70,000,000, with personnel all over the world.
The operation will probably produce intelligence data of considerable sig-
nificance. Also, reasonable cover has been devised in that similar opera-
tions have, in fact, been conducted from a good many points in the United
States and elsewhere, designed to obtain meteorological data. This cover
will probably not fool the Soviets, but it will create a situation such that
they cannot take any very great offense publicly.

On balance, I would be inclined to go ahead with it if Sir Anthony

Eden is also prepared to do so. While some operations will be started
from Norway, Germany and Turkey, there is, I believe, primary de-
pendence upon the British Isles.

I would suggest your authorizing me to advise Eden of the fore-

going attitude on our part and see what his reaction is.

JFD

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1955–60, 711.5261/12–1555. Top

Secret.

Formerly known as Project Genetrix. See Document 229.

The Secretary of State received an Air Force briefing on Grayback on November

29. (Memorandum of conversation by Armstrong; National Archives, RG 59, INR Files:
Lot 58 D 766, Genetrix)

According to the memorandum of the November 29 briefing, the Air Force pro-

posed to say that the balloons were part of a worldwide meteorological research survey
that the U.S. Government had been conducting for years. (Ibid.)

A handwritten note on the memorandum reads: “I concur C.E. Wilson O.K.” Below

this note President Eisenhower wrote: “Original query to be of a

non

-pressure type. D.” Sec-

retary Dulles wrote a December 1 letter to British Ambassador Sir Roger Makins in which
he noted that he had discussed “Grayback” with the President who had asked him to no-
tify Prime Minister Eden, through Makins, that he, the President, was disposed to let the
operation proceed. He would, however, not take final action until he had Eden’s response.
(Ibid., Central Files 1955–60, 711.5261/12–155) On December 3, Secretary Dulles informed
Secretary of Defense Wilson that he had solicited Eden’s views and would let Wilson know
of Eden’s response. He added: “I showed the President my memorandum with your con-
currence with respect to ‘Grayback’. The President said that he was disposed to go along,
provided Eden concurred. However, the President asked me, in putting it up to Eden, to
make clear that the President was not trying to pressure him. I gathered that the President
has not much enthusiasm for the project.” (Ibid., INR Files: Lot 61 D 67, Genetrix)

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243. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles

to the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant for Intelligence
and Research (Armstrong)

Washington, December 3, 1955.

[Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1955–60, 101.21/

12–355. Top Secret. 5 pages not declassified.]

244. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles

to Secretary of Defense Wilson

Washington, December 3, 1955.

SUBJECT

Research on Psychochemicals

1. For the past four years the Central Intelligence Agency has been

actively engaged in research on a group of powerful chemicals affect-
ing the human mind called psychochemicals. We have developed ex-
tensive professional contacts, experience and a considerable amount of
information on many psychochemicals including in particular a mate-
rial known as LSD. This Agency is continuing its interest in this field,
and in the light of its accumulated experience offers its cooperation
and assistance to research and development programs which the De-
partment of Defense is considering at this time.

2. The Agency became interested in the potential importance of

psychochemicals, primarily because of the enthusiasm and foresight of
Dr. L. Wilson Greene, Technical Director of the Chemical and Radio-
logical Laboratories at the Army Chemical Center. Dr. Greene’s ideas
were included in a report written by him in 1949 entitled “Psycho-
chemical Warfare, a New Concept of War”.

3. Since 1951 this Agency has carried out a program of research

which has provided important information on the nature of the ab-
normal behavior produced by LSD and the way this effect varies with
such factors as size of dose, differences in the individual and environ-
ment. The behavioral effects of repeated doses given over a long time

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01731R, Box 15.

Secret.

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has been studied. We have established that individuals may develop a
tolerance to LSD. A search for possible antidotes is being made. It has
been found that LSD produces remarkable mental effects when taken
in exceedingly small doses. The foregoing became increasingly inter-
esting when it was recently discovered that LSD could be synthesized
in quantity.

4. There are many characteristics of LSD and other psychochem-

icals which either have not been studied or require further study. We
are continuing to search for a satisfactory antidote for LSD as well as
other defensive measures. More data should be accumulated if it is de-
sired to predict the precise effect upon a given individual under given
circumstances. It would appear to be important that field trials be made
to determine the effects on groups of people or on individuals engaged
in group activities.

5. This Agency’s scientists who have been responsible for this re-

search in psychochemicals have maintained close and effective liaison
with various research and development groups in the Department of
Defense who are aware of our interest and, in varying degrees, of our
progress in psychochemicals. Some of these individuals are:

Dr. L. Wilson Greene, Technical Director, Chemical Corps, Chem-

ical and Radiological Laboratories, Army Chemical Center

Dr. Bruce Dill, Scientific Director, Chemical Corps, Medical Labo-

ratory, Army Chemical Center

Dr. Amendeo Marrazzi, a scientist at the Medical Laboratory, Army

Chemical Center

Capt. Clifford P. Phoebus, Chief, Biological Sciences Division, Of-

fice of Naval Research

Brig. Gen. Don D. Flickinger, ARDC, U.S.A.F.

Lt. Col. Alexander Batlin, Office of the Assistant Secretary of De-

fense (Research and Development)

6. In addition, this Agency has provided financial support for cer-

tain projects in the field of psychochemicals being conducted by the
Chemical Corps and by the Office of Naval Research. We have noted
with considerable interest the current Department of Defense study of
the potential importance of certain psychochemical materials includ-
ing LSD which is being carried out by the Ad Hoc Study Group on
Psychochemicals under the Technical Advisory Panel on CW and BW
of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and De-
velopment. If our accumulated information, experience and profes-
sional contacts can be of any assistance, this Agency gladly offers its
co-operation in this program.

Allen W. Dulles

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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738 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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245. Minutes of a Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Committee

IAC–M–222

Washington, December 13, 1955, 10:45 a.m.

Director of Central Intelligence

Allen W. Dulles

Presiding

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Lieutenant General Charles P. Cabell

Presiding

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Special Assistant for Intelligence, Department of State
Major General Ridgely Gaither, Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, Department of the

Army

Rear Admiral Carl F. Espe, Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the

Navy

Major General John A. Samford, Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, United

States Air Force

Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton, Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Mr. Harry S. Traynor, Atomic Energy Commission representative to the IAC
Mr. Alan H. Belmont, Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

1. Report of the IAC Ad Hoc Guided Missile Intelligence Survey

Committee

(IAC–D–81/13, 25 November 1955)

a. Colonel White, Chairman, Ad Hoc Guided Missile Intelligence

Survey Committee led off the discussion by summarizing briefly the
conclusions reached by the Committee.

b. Admiral Layton, supported by Admiral Espe and General

Gaither, took the position that under existing NSC directives, guided
missiles intelligence, being intelligence on weapons, fell clearly within
the responsibility of the Department of Defense. In short, that guided
missiles intelligence is departmental intelligence. He further expressed
the view that the creation of an IAC subcommittee on guided missiles
was not the answer to what is basically a collection problem.

c. General Samford stated that, based on the experience of the Air

Force as the primary collector of guided missiles intelligence, he be-

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 85–500362R, Box 2,

Folder 6. Secret. The meeting was held in the IAC Conference Room, Administration
Building, Central Intelligence Agency.

Part of meeting. Lieutenant General Ralph Canine, Director, National Security

Agency, attended part of the meeting. [Footnote in the original.]

Not found.

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lieved that there was merit in the idea of a coordinated community ap-
proach. This approach had demonstrated its value in the field of atomic
energy intelligence.

d. Mr. Dulles expressed the view that guided missiles intelligence

was national intelligence of the highest priority, probably of even greater
ultimate importance to our national security than atomic energy intelli-
gence. A concerted attack on the problem by the community, under the
guidance of an IAC guided missiles committee, is therefore essential
if he and the community are to discharge their responsibilities under
existing NSC directives.

e. It was agreed that Mr. Dulles would draw up his views for pres-

entation to the National Security Council under the procedure provided
in NSCID No. 1, paragraph 3 a.

Document 255.

246. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Planning

Coordinating Group (Rockefeller) to the Chairman of the
Operations Coordinating Board (Hoover)

Washington, December 14, 1955.

SUBJECT

Report of the Planning Coordination Group

I. Background

1. The Planning Coordination Group was established within the

framework of the OCB by letter of the President of March 10, 1955.

The Group’s functions and composition are described in the Budget

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66 D 148, PCG, Part 2. Top

Secret. Attached to Rockefeller’s memorandum was a December 14 letter from the Di-
rector of the Bureau of the Budget expressing concurrence in the abolition of the Plan-
ning Coordination Group. When Hoover sent Rockefeller’s memorandum to President
Eisenhower under cover of a December 16 memorandum, he recommended that the pro-
posal to abolish the PCG be approved. (Ibid.)

See footnotes 1 and 16, Document 210.

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740 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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Director’s memorandum to the President of March 3, which the Pres-
ident approved March 4, subject: “Coordination of Economic, Psycho-
logical, Political Warfare, and Foreign Information Activities.”

2. Paragraph 3 a of the Budget Director’s memorandum states that

the Planning Coordination Group should report directly to the Chair-
man of OCB, who would from time to time transmit progress reports
of the Group to the President through the National Security Council.
Accordingly, this report is submitted with the request that it be so
transmitted.

II. Report

3. The Planning Coordination Group was established to aid in de-

veloping planning in both overt and covert fields and to advise and
assist the responsible operating agencies in the coordinated develop-
ment of plans and programs to carry out those national security poli-
cies appropriate to its functions. After seven months’ experience, it is
clear to the four members of the Group that the Planning Coordina-
tion Group mechanism will not be able to accomplish these objectives.
The Group therefore

recommends

that the President abolish the Plan-

ning Coordination Group effective December 31, 1955.

4. The Planning Coordination Group was also given specific re-

sponsibilities for being advised of and channeling support to major
covert programs (NSC 5412/1)

and for being the coordinating agency

for the statements of policy in NSC 5505/1 and NSC 5502/1.

a. Respecting covert operations, the Group

recommends

that the

President approve that paragraph 7 a of NSC 5412/1 be amended so
as to read substantially as follows:

“Except as the President otherwise directs, the designated repre-

sentatives of the Secretary of State and of the Secretary of Defense re-

ferred to in paragraph 4 a, above, and a designated representative of

the President whenever one has been designated for this purpose, shall

hereafter be advised in advance of major covert programs initiated

by CIA under this policy or as otherwise directed, and shall be the

normal channel for giving policy approval for such programs as well

as for securing coordination of support therefor among the Depart-

ments of State and Defense and the CIA.”

Document 210.

Document 248.

Document 212.

For NSC 5505/1, see

Foreign Relations,

1955–1957, vol. XXIV, pp. 20–22. For NSC

5502/1, see ibid., pp. 12–19.

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and that paragraphs 4 a and 7 b of NSC 5412/1 be amended as neces-
sary to take account of the termination of the PCG and to conform to
the substance of the language quoted above.

b. Respecting the coordination of NSC 5505/1, the OCB has for-

warded to the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs the
Group’s recommendation that that policy statement (as well as the re-
lated policy statement in NSC 174

) should be reviewed by the NSC

Planning Board in the light of and subsequent to the pending revision
of NSC 5501.

By December 31, 1955, the Group will have transmitted

to the NSC a progress report on NSC 5505/1. The Group

recommends

that the President designate the OCB as the coordinating agency for
the statements of policy in NSC 5505/1 and NSC 174 effective De-
cember 31, 1955.

c. Respecting the coordination of NSC 5502/1, the Group

recom-

mends

that the President designate OCB as the coordinating agency ef-

fective December 31, 1955.
(With reference to the recommendations in this paragraph, the neces-
sary action should be taken to revise NSC Action 1349, March 10, 1955,

to reflect the President’s actions.

)

Nelson A. Rockefeller

In NSC Action No. 1497, “Abolition of the Planning Coordination Group,” De-

cember 28, the National Security Council amended NSC 5412/1 to take account of the
abolition of the PCG. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66
D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) For NSC 5412/2, see Docu-
ment 250.

For NSC 174, “U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe,” De-

cember 11, 1953, see

Foreign Relations,

1952–1954, vol. VIII, pp. 110–127.

Ibid., 1955–1957, vol. XIX, pp. 24–38.

In NSC Action No. 1349, “Coordination of Economic, Psychological and Politi-

cal Warfare and Foreign Information Activities,” the National Security Council approved
amendments to NSC 5412 at its March 10 meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC
(Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
See footnote 16, Document 210.

On December 20, President Eisenhower approved the recommendations to abol-

ish the Planning Coordination Group and to designate the Operations Coordinating
Group as the coordinating agency for NSC 5505/1, NSC 5502/1, and NSC 174 effective
December 31. The National Security Council was notified of the President’s action by a
December 27 memorandum from Executive Secretary of the National Security Council
Lay. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 148, Box 127,
Coordination of Economic, Psychological and Political Warfare and Foreign Information
Activities)

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247. Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant

for Intelligence and Research (Armstrong) to Secretary of
State Dulles

Washington, December 22, 1955.

SUBJECT

Board of Consultants for the Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. Allen Dulles informed me today that the White House will

soon announce the appointment by the President of a Board of Con-
sultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, with broad authority to keep
itself informed and to advise the President on matters falling within
that field.

Subject to final acceptance in the case of some individuals,

the following are expected to make up the Board:

Gen. John E. Hull, USA (Ret.)

Adm. Richard E. Connolly, USN (Ret.)

Gen. James Doolittle, USAF (Ret.)

Mr. James Killian, President of MIT

Mr. David Bruce

Mr. Benjamin Fairless, U.S. Steel Corp.

Mr. Morris Hadley

Mr. Allen Dulles pointed out that all of the above, except Mr. Fair-

less, have had extensive experience in the use of intelligence or on com-
mittees that have made detailed surveys in the intelligence field. This
move, at least in part, is intended to blunt the drive manifesting itself
on the Hill to set up a joint committee in Congress to supervise for-
eign intelligence activities.

W. Park Armstrong, Jr.

742 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1955–60, 101.21/12–2255. Official

Use Only. Copies were sent to Murphy, Henderson, MacArthur, and Bowie. A handwrit-
ten notation on the memorandum by Dulles’ secretary Phyllis D. Bernau reads, “Sec. saw.”

The President’s Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities was es-

tablished by President Eisenhower’s Executive Order 10656, February 6, 1956. It was suc-
ceeded by the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), established by
Executive Order 10938, May 4, 1961, in the wake of the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of
Cuba and increased attention to the role and activities of the intelligence community.

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Records of White House Staff Secretary, Intelligence

Matters. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on December 28.

248. Editorial Note

Under a December 27, 1955, covering memorandum to the National

Security Council, Executive Secretary Lay transmitted an undated report
prepared by Nelson Rockefeller, “Coordination of Foreign Political, Mil-
itary, Economic, Informational, and Cover Operations,” which recom-
mended farreaching changes in military theater and command organi-
zation and in the Operations Coordinating Board. (Eisenhower Library,
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, William H. Jackson,
Records, President’s Papers) Rockefeller was scheduled to defend his
views before the NSC Planning Board on February 20, 1956. Documen-
tation on the Department of State’s opposition to Rockefeller’s recom-
mendations is in National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 430.

Subsequently, Eisenhower’s Assistant, Sherman Adams, asked the

Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, William
H. Jackson, to examine Rockefeller’s proposal. Jackson prepared a crit-
ical memorandum on April 2, 1956. (Eisenhower Library, Special As-
sistant to the President for National Security Affairs Records, OCB Or-
ganization) Finally, on March 26, 1957, following the issuance of
Executive Order 10700 of February 25, 1957 (22

Federal Register

1111),

which amended E.O. 10483 of September 2, 1953, by placing the Op-
erations Coordinating Board within the National Security Council
structure, Eisenhower agreed that Rockefeller’s report could be re-
moved from the NSC’s agenda. At the same time, however, he referred
the relevant recommendations for wartime responsibility for foreign
information and psychological operations to the Director of the Office
of Defense Mobilization to prepare plans. (National Archives, RG 59,
S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, 1935–62, Box 115)

249. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Washington, December 27, 1955.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Dulles
Assistant Secretary Gardner (Air Force)
General Twining

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General Cabell
Colonel Randall
Colonel Goodpaster

The President said that the background regarding project “Gray-

back”

was very hazy in his mind. He did not know how it had got-

ten started, although he did recall that it had been mentioned by Dr.
Land in his office at the time of the Killian Report.

He now under-

stood that it represents about a $75 million investment, and that it is
ready for initiation very soon. General Twining said that Admiral Rad-
ford had stated that he had presented the matter to the President for
consideration, and he also said that Mr. Quarles had also stated that
the matter had been presented to the President. He said that there is
nothing in the records about this. Secretary Dulles recalled that just
prior to the Geneva meeting he had raised with the President the ques-
tion whether it should be held in abeyance.

The President then said that regardless of how the matter pro-

gressed, it is timely to consider what should be done now. He under-
stood that a plane that is being developed is coming along very well.

It also appeared that if the balloons were discovered, as they will be,
certain questions become important—such as what will public reaction
be in the UK and Japan, how many of them are likely to be shot down,
whether their release will spur the development of higher altitude
radar, etc. General Twining said it is practically impossible to pick these
up by radar. It is also practically impossible to intercept them—our Air
Force has made extensive attempts to do so and has never succeeded.

Replying to a question by the President, Mr. Gardner said there

are approximately 2500 of these balloons. It is expected that 500 to 600
would pass through to the Western coast of the Pacific. One-half would
travel at about 40,000 feet and the other half could be sent much higher.
The project is manned with 4400 people in the United States and 1400
overseas. The President asked whether the project should not be pre-
sented as meteorological, with pictures taken to show ground speed,
etc. Secretary Dulles said a further question is whether to do it at all.
Mr. Gardner said that by late April or May four alternative items,
with trained crews, should be available and capable of operating at

Previously known as Project Genetrix. See Documents 229, 240, and 242.

Headed by James R. Killian, President of Massachusetts Institute of Technology,

the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee prepared a study,
issued on February 14, requested by the President on U.S. technological capability to re-
duce the threat of surprise attack. See Document 223.

See Document 229.

The U–2, a joint CIA–U.S. Air Force reconnaissance aircraft.

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approximately 80,000 feet.

General Cabell viewed the present project

as a supplement, and thought if the balloons were kept below 50,000
feet they would not stimulate a “crash” radar program. There was dis-
cussion whether possible political reaction might tend to prevent use
of the alternative when it is ready—in that case it might be well to con-
sider delaying the whole project a year. The President said that there
is a natural tendency toward reluctance for a bold program. If the re-
sults seem necessary, he would do it, but that is the question. He
thought that an effort involving 2500 in a few months might cause
alarm, where a dozen or so a week would not have a “crash” signifi-
cance (Secretary Dulles asked what would be lost if the action were de-
layed for a year—Mr. Gardner said that the force will have to be largely
disbanded and material would crack and disintegrate).

Mr. Gardner said that low altitude winds are satisfactory through-

out the year except in July and August, and that if the lower altitudes
were used—which seem desirable—the release could be phased out.
The President thought they should be released at a number of points
throughout the world. Mr. Dulles felt an agreed news release will be
extremely important, and the President said it must tell a good story.
General Cabell suggested that other countries be approached to ask
them to return the equipment gondolas when they come down. Mr.
Dulles agreed that it made a great difference if they were released a
few at a time and in many places all over the world. The President
thought that the announcement should be on the basis that when the
winds are right, we will get off a number from all stations. He thought
that if this is presented as a meteorological operation, it would be all
right; he did not feel it could be done just in January and February, i.e.,
it should not be a “crash” program. Mr. Dulles suggested the follow-
ing as points on which to agree: Launchings should be spread over
time; medium altitudes should be used—50 to 55 thousand feet; some
should be released from Japan, Honolulu and Alaska; notice should be
given to other countries and to the world at large. The President indi-
cated agreement and suggested that this notice bring out that we would
like to have the items returned; that if any country wanted to develop
the prints, they should take care not to destroy the negatives; that all
languages should be used on the request for return, including Russ-
ian; that State Department should review the cover plan (Secretary
Dulles to get a little group together to look at this); that the long-term
aspect of the thing should be emphasized, bringing out that efforts in
the past have been too intermittent and relating it to the “jet stream”
shift responsible for the recent floods in California. To a question
by Secretary Dulles as to how the photographing operation is to be

Gardner apparently is alluding to the U–2.

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746 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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explained, it was indicated that operations are well advanced to inform
the authorities of the International Geophysical Year

of this activity as

a means of mapping cloud formations (which is, in fact, all that most
photographs will show.)

AJG

Colonel, CE, US Army

The International Geophysical Year was scheduled to begin July 1, 1957, with

worldwide scientific observations of earth and astronomical phenomena. It would con-
tinue for one and a half years.

President Eisenhower was given a technical briefing on December 27. On the next

day Secretary Dulles told Fisher Howe that those attending the briefing included Secre-
tary Dulles, General Twining, Trevor Gardner, and an aide to Secretary of Defense Wil-
son. The Secretary indicated at the briefing that the British had given their go ahead on
December 25, and the President approved the operation subject to “certain modifica-
tions,” which included slowing down the rate of launching, extending the time period
of the operation, and resubmission of the program to Secretary Dulles to whom the Pres-
ident “delegated authority for the final decision and triggering of the operation.” (Mem-
orandum by Fisher Howe, December 28; National Archives, RG 59, INR Files: Lot 61 D
67, Genetrix) Another account of this December 27 briefing is in a telegram from Bergquist
to General LeMay, December 28. (Ibid.)

250. National Security Council Directive

NSC 5412/2

Washington, undated.

COVERT OPERATIONS

1. The National Security Council, taking cognizance of the vicious

and 10/5,

that,

in the interests of world peace and U.S. national security, the overt

Source: Eisenhower Library, Special Assistant to President for National Security

Affairs Records, President’s Papers. Top Secret. This directive was transmitted to the
NSC under cover of a December 28 note from NSC Executive Secretary Lay. Lay stated
that the President had approved the directive on the same date.

See

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment,

Document 292.

Document 90.

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foreign activities of the U.S. Government should be supplemented by
covert operations.

2. The Central Intelligence Agency had already been charged by

the National Security Council with conducting espionage and counter-
espionage operations abroad. It therefore seemed desirable, for opera-
tional reasons, not to create a new agency for covert operations, but,
subject to directives from the NSC, to place the responsibility for them
on the Central Intelligence Agency and correlate them with espionage
and counter-espionage operations under the over-all control of the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence.

3. The NSC has determined that such covert operations shall to

the greatest extent practicable, in the light of U.S. and Soviet capabili-
ties and taking into account the risk of war, be designed to:

a. Create and exploit troublesome problems for International

Communism, impair relations between the USSR and Communist

China and between them and their satellites, complicate control within

the USSR, Communist China and their satellites, and retard the growth

of the military and economic potential of the Soviet bloc.

b. Discredit the prestige and ideology of International Commu-

nism, and reduce the strength of its parties and other elements.

c. Counter any threat of a party or individuals directly or indi-

rectly responsive to Communist control to achieve dominant power in

a free world country.

d. Reduce International Communist control over any areas of the

world.

e. Strengthen the orientation toward the United States of the peo-

ples and nations of the free world, accentuate, wherever possible, the

identity of interest between such peoples and nations and the United

States as well as favoring, where appropriate, those groups genuinely

advocating or believing in the advancement of such mutual interests,

and increase the capacity and will of such peoples and nations to re-

sist International Communism.

f. In accordance with established policies and to the extent prac-

ticable in areas dominated or threatened by International Communism,

develop underground resistance and facilitate covert and guerrilla op-

erations and ensure availability of those forces in the event of war, in-

cluding wherever practicable provision of a base upon which the mil-

itary may expand these forces in time of war within active theaters of

operations as well as provision for stay-behind assets and escape and

evasion facilities.

4. Under the authority of Section 102(d)(5) of the National Secu-

rity Act of 1947, the National Security Council hereby directs that the
Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for:

a. Ensuring, through designated representatives of the Secretary

of State and of the Secretary of Defense, that covert operations are

planned and conducted in a manner consistent with United States for-

eign and military policies and with overt activities, and consulting with

and obtaining advice from the Operations Coordinating Board and

other departments or agencies as appropriate.

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b. Informing, through appropriate channels and on a need-to-

know basis, agencies of the U.S. Government, both at home and abroad

(including diplomatic and military representatives), of such operations

as will affect them.

5. In addition to the provisions of paragraph 4, the following pro-

visions shall apply to wartime covert operations:

a. Plans for covert operations to be conducted in active theaters

of war and any other areas in which U.S. forces are engaged in com-

bat operations will be drawn up with the assistance of the Department

of Defense and will be in consonance with and complementary to ap-

proved war plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Covert operations in active theaters of war and any other areas

in which U.S. forces are engaged in combat operations will be con-

ducted under such command and control relationships as have been

or may in the future be approved by the Department of Defense.

6. As used in this directive, “covert operations” shall be under-

stood to be all activities conducted pursuant to this directive which are
so planned and executed that any U.S. Government responsibility for
them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the
U.S. Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them.
Specifically, such operations shall include any covert activities related
to: propaganda; political action; economic warfare; preventive direct ac-
tion, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition; escape and evasion
and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states or groups
including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas
and refugee liberation groups; support of indigenous and anti-commu-
nist elements in threatened countries of the free world; deception plans
and operations; and all activities compatible with this directive neces-
sary to accomplish the foregoing. Such operations shall not include:
armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage and counter-
espionage, nor cover and deception for military operations.

7. Except as the President otherwise directs, designated represent-

atives of the Secretary of State and of the Secretary of Defense of the
rank of Assistant Secretary or above, and a representative of the Presi-
dent designated for this purpose, shall hereafter be advised in advance
of major covert programs initiated by CIA under this policy or as oth-
erwise directed, and shall be the normal channel for giving policy ap-
proval for such programs as well as for securing coordination of sup-
port therefor among the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA.

8. This directive supersedes and rescinds NSC 10/2, NSC 10/5,

NSC 5412,

NSC 5412/1,

and subparagraphs “a” and “b” under the

Document 171.

Document 212.

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heading “Additional Functions of the Operations Coordinating Board”
on page 1 of the President’s memorandum for the Executive Secretary,
National Security Council, supplementing Executive Order 10483.

Document 157.

251. Paper Prepared by J. Patrick Coyne of the National Security

Council Staff

Washington, undated.

Report on Intelligence Activities in the Federal Government

Prepared for the Commission on Organization of the Executive

Branch of the Government

By the Task Force on Intelligence Activities

CHAPTER I—Brief History of U.S. Foreign Intelligence Activities

(Pages 1–12)

This Chapter contains no recommendations.

CHAPTER II—The Central Intelligence Agency (Pages 13–75)

Recommendation 1

(page 72): That “covert intelligence” and “cold

war” functions of the current DD/P be assigned to separate Deputy
Directors whose areas of responsibility shall be administratively and
logistically self-supporting. (A minority of the Task Force members did
not concur in this recommendation, believing that “covert intelligence”
and “cold war” operations should be under the staff and operating con-
trol of a single operating Deputy Director—as at present.)

Source: Eisenhower Library, Records of White House Staff Secretary, Subject Series,

Alphabetical Subseries, Box 13, Hoover Commission Report on Intelligence Activities, May
1955–October 1956. Top Secret. President Eisenhower had referred the classified Clark Task
Force Report (Document 221), along with departmental and agency comments on applic-
able sections of it, to Dillon Anderson, the President’s Special Assistant, on December 15
for further action and recommendations as appropriate. This report is Coyne’s compila-
tion of the departmental and agency responses, including his added “Additional Action
Required” and “Observations,” which he completed in early 1956. (Memorandum from
Anderson to Goodpaster, February 14, 1956; Eisenhower Library, Hoover Commission Re-
port on Intelligence Activities, May 1955–October 1956, and memorandum from Coyne to
NSC Executive Secretary Lay, January 20, 1956; ibid.) Some documentation on depart-
mental and agency responses to the Clark Task Force Report are ibid. and in the National
Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1955–60, 711.52 and 711.5200. All ellipses in the original.

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Agency Comment:

CIA opposes the recommendation on the

grounds that: (1) “the experience of CIA during the period of separate
operation prior to 1952 proved the operational disadvantages of at-
tempting to conduct, on a secure and efficient basis, two world-wide
clandestine organizations, each compartmented from the other”; and
(2) organizations of separate supporting elements for each of the clan-
destine services would be duplicative, costly and ineffective.

Additional Action Required:

Presidential decision as to whether the

Task Force (majority) recommendation or the contrary views of CIA
should be adopted.

Observation:

CIA’s view should be adopted since the majority pro-

posal of the Task Force has been tried previously and found less satis-
factory than present organizational arrangements which combine the
covert and cold war functions of CIA. (The CIA view is consistent with
that of the Doolittle Committee

whose survey of CIA’s clandestine

services was much more extensive than that made by the Task Force.)

Recommendation 2

(page 73): That CIA be reorganized with a Di-

rector, a Deputy Director, an Executive Director, a general Secretariat,
necessary staff sections and offices of the administrative and logistic
services and an operating Deputy Director of Intelligence with seven
operating offices thereunder, including an Office of Basic Intelligence.

Agency Comment:

CIA concurs in the creation of, and has estab-

lished, an Office of Basic Intelligence. CIA notes that the balance of this
recommendation consists of suggesting that the names of four of the
offices under the Deputy Director of Intelligence be changed. CIA will
change the name of one of these offices shortly, but believes that little
will be accomplished in effecting the other name changes suggested.

Additional Action Required:

None.

Recommendation 3

(page 73): That CIA re-establish the Office of Ex-

ecutive Director to relieve the DCI of the necessity of having to devote
a large part of his time to the solution of many daily administrative
and minor operational problems.

Agency Comment:

CIA is opposed on the grounds that the inter-

position of another command echelon would not necessarily accom-
plish the intended objective. CIA is giving this recommendation fur-
ther study, however.

Additional Action Required:

None by the White House or the NSC.

Observation:

This recommendation does not involve any major pol-

icy considerations. Internal reorganizations of the type recommended
should be left to the sound discretion of the agency head.

Document 192.

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Recommendation 4

(page 73): That the status of the three major op-

erating Deputy Directors be changed from Civil Service appointees
(now Grade GS-18) to Public Law Presidential appointees, at an annual
salary of $16,000.

Agency Comment:

CIA concurs in the recommended pay increases

but thinks it unwise that the Operating Deputy Directors require
Senatorial approval, particularly where an individual’s background
and competence in clandestine operations would have to be re-
viewed. CIA has received no indication of any Senatorial desire to
review CIA appointments, other than the appointments of the DCI and
his Deputy.

Additional Action Required:

None by the White House or NSC. CIA

is taking action through appropriate channels in an effort to obtain the
pay increases recommended.

Recommendation 5

(page 73): That the “cold war” operating deputy

director be designated as CIA’s representative on the Operations Co-
ordinating Board to free the DCI to devote a greater share of his time
to the Agency’s intelligence functions.

Agency Comment:

CIA is opposed. It notes that the DCI is required

to personally attend OCB meetings by virtue of a Presidential Direc-
tive, and that his participation in OCB meetings is not unduly bur-
densome. CIA notes further that the Deputy Director/Plans is closely
associated with OCB activity in that CIA members of OCB working
groups are drawn from CIA’s clandestine services.

Additional Action Required:

Presidential decision as to whether the

Task Force recommendation should be adopted.

Observation:

Because the benefits derived from DCI’s participation

in OCB meetings outweighs the burdens occasioned by such partici-
pation, the Task Force recommendation should be rejected. If this ob-
servation is concurred in advice should be communicated to CIA as to
the President’s reaffirmation of the directive which provides for DCI’s
membership on the OCB.

Recommendation 6

(page 73): That a comprehensive internal man-

agement survey of the Agency be conducted by CIA within a year fol-
lowing the reorganization of CIA, as recommended by the Task Force.

Agency Comment:

CIA presently has in progress three concurrent

programs of an internal management nature.

Additional Action Required:

None, at this time.

Recommendation 7

(page 74): That all NSC, IAC, and DCI Intelli-

gence Directives be reviewed by the IAC and others concerned, with
a view to establishing clearer areas of responsibility and to allocating
intelligence tasks in accord with each agency’s capability, interest, and
paramount national responsibilities.

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Agency Comment:

The DCI will recommend the establishment of

an IAC Subcommittee to review all such Intelligence Directives, as nec-
essary, to clarify areas of responsibility or reallocate tasks.

Additional Action Required:

Action at appropriate levels (IAC, DCI,

NSC) to be taken on the basis of the review of Intelligence Directives
being initiated by CIA.

Recommendation 8

(page 74): That responsibility for procurement

of foreign publications and collection of scientific intelligence be shifted
from State to CIA, and that CIA be authorized to appoint scientific at-
tachés to U.S. diplomatic missions as necessary.

Agency Comment:

CIA agrees that facilities for procurement of for-

eign publications and collection of scientific intelligence should be
strengthened. The substance of this recommendation is under active
study by State and CIA and it is hoped that an agreement thereon will
be reached at an early date.

Additional Action Required:

None by the White House or the NSC.

Recommendation 9

(page 74): That the Scientific Estimates Com-

mittee be abolished and in lieu thereof there be established under the
IAC a Scientific Intelligence Committee with appropriate subcommit-
tees to insure community-wide coordination.

Agency Comment:

CIA is in general agreement with this recom-

mendation. The substance thereof is under active consideration in the
IAC.

Additional Action Required:

None, other than the normal actions

which will flow from IAC consideration of the recommendation.

Recommendation 10

(page 74): That the effectiveness of CIA’s secu-

rity program be re-evaluated to establish a system assuring personnel
security rechecks on a minimum five year basis.

Agency Comment:

CIA reports that the recommended program has

been in effect as of March 26, 1955 and, in addition, that there is a con-
tinuing review made of the security of its employees, including auto-
matic rechecks in the case of personnel actions, such as transfers, pro-
motions, appointments to special activities, etc.

Additional Action Required:

None.

Recommendation 11

(page 74): That Congress be requested to ap-

propriate funds to construct adequate CIA housing facilities in or near
Washington.

Agency Comment:

CIA reports this has been done.

Additional Action Required:

None.

Recommendation 12

(page 74): That the CIA Act of 1949 be amended

to authorize employment of “any” (instead of 15 now authorized) re-
tired officers or warrant officers of the Armed Services; and to autho-
rize overseas personnel additional dependent medical benefits and

1363_A49-A51.qxd 9/28/07 9:35 AM Page 752

employee leave accumulations equivalent to those authorized for For-
eign Service personnel.

Agency Comment:

CIA would welcome an increase in the number

of retired officers of the Armed Services authorized to be employed by
the Agency. It believes that the authorized number should be between
twenty-five and fifty. CIA concurs in granting additional Foreign Serv-
ice benefits for dependents as well as leave benefits and leave accu-
mulations for CIA employees.

(Current inquiry of CIA reflects the Agency has prepared draft leg-

islation—now being processed by the Budget Bureau—designed to au-
thorize employment of as many as forty retired officers of the Armed
Services, as well as draft legislation designed to carry into effect the
Task Force recommendations concerning CIA personnel, their leave ac-
cumulations, and additional medical benefits for dependents of CIA
employees stationed abroad.)

Additional Action Required:

None.

Recommendation 13

(page 75): That legislation be sought to increase

the annual salary of the DCI to $20,000; to increase the compensation
of the Deputy DCI to $17,500; and to authorize the appointment of an
Executive Director of CIA at an annual salary of $16,000.

Agency Comment:

The recommended increases in the salaries of the

DCI and the Deputy DCI have been included in proposed amendments
to the Executive Pay Bill of 1949.

CIA, as indicated in Recommenda-

tion 3 above, opposes establishing the office of Executive Director, but
is giving further study to the Task Force recommendation on this point.

Additional Action Required:

None.

CHAPTER III—The Department of State (Pages 76–88)

Recommendation 1

(page 87): That the personnel strength of the In-

telligence Area be maintained at a level consistent with functional re-
sponsibilities and work load.

Agency Comment:

State concurs. An increase of ten persons for the

present fiscal year has been authorized for the Intelligence Area. State
is budgeting a substantial increase for its intelligence function in fiscal
year 1957.

Additional Action Required:

None.

Recommendation 2

(page 88): That NSCID No. 10

be revised to

place responsibility for collection of information in the basic sciences
in CIA.

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See footnote 10, Document 221.

Dated January 19, 1949; text is in

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the

Intelligence Establishment, Document 429.

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Agency Comment:

State reports that while it is not possible to com-

ment favorably or unfavorably on this recommendation at this time,
meetings on the subject are being held with CIA and every effort will
be made to develop a satisfactory solution.

Additional Action Required:

Action is dependent upon the outcome

of the State–CIA meetings mentioned above and on the IAC review of
all Intelligence Directives (to which reference is made in Chapter II,
Recommendation 7).

Recommendation 3

(page 88): That State finalize its plans for the pe-

riodic review of all personnel coming within the provisions of Execu-
tive Order 10450.

Agency Comment:

State has given substantial thought to the matter

and agrees that a program for periodic review should be carefully con-
sidered. Through its normal channels State will pursue the matter with
interested agencies, such as Justice and the Civil Service Commission.

Additional Action Required:

None, beyond that indicated in State’s

comment.

Recommendation 4

(page 88): That intelligence personnel occupy-

ing positions which have been designated as Foreign Service assign-
ments be included in State’s program for accelerated language and area
training.

Agency Comment:

State reports that such personnel are eligible for

participation in these programs and that the Intelligence Area is rep-
resented in the planning and selection process for such training.

Additional Action Required:

None.

Recommendation 5

(page 88): That in implementing the Foreign

Service Integration Program due regard should be given the special
qualifications of intelligence personnel transferred to foreign posts; and
to the extent practicable special qualifications developed should be
safeguarded upon reassignment.

Agency Comment:

State concurs and is developing procedures to

accomplish the intent of this recommendation.

Additional Action Required:

None.

CHAPTER IV—The Department of Defense (Pages 89–205)

A. Office of Special Operations (Pages 89–94)

Recommendation 1

(page 94): That DOD Directive 5105.7

be exam-

ined with a view to clarifying and eliminating any ambiguities which
would lead to a misinterpretation of the functions and misapplication

Security Requirements for Government Employment, April 27, 1953. (18 F.R. 2489)

Not found.

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of the authority of OSO; and that the relationships of OSO with the in-
telligence organization of the JCS and the military departments be
spelled out more specifically to reduce possibilities of friction and mis-
understanding.

Agency Comment:

DOD does not consider that the Directive is am-

biguous. However, DOD will give continuing attention to the opera-
tions of OSO under the Directive.

Additional Action Required:

None, beyond that referred to in DOD’s

comment.

B. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (Pages 94–99)

This Section contains no recommendations.

C. Department of the Army (Pages 99–137)

Recommendation 1

(page 137): That the Army Attaché System be

manned to permit full exploitation of its collection potential and that
present personnel ceilings imposed by DOD be lifted in order to achieve
greater flexibility and permit more extensive prior training of assigned
personnel.

Agency Comment:

DOD agrees with the concept calling for maxi-

mum exploitation of the intelligence potential of the Attaché System.
It does not agree that present personnel ceilings are seriously inhibi-
tive. DOD reports that its ceilings on Attaché strength (in the three serv-
ices) are flexible; that DOD now has underway a program for consol-
idating and simplifying the Attaché functions of the services; and that
it is studying ways of improving selection and training of Attachés.

Additional Action Required:

Final decision by DOD as to lifting per-

sonnel ceilings in the Attaché System.

Recommendation 2

(page 137): That the (Army) Assistant Chief of

Staff, Intelligence, be elevated to the level of Deputy Chief of Staff.

Agency Comment:

DOD does not concur. It notes that the top staff

of the Army was recently reorganized following a balanced consider-
ation of all its aspects and it concludes that it would be premature to
reorganize now as recommended, particularly since legislation would
be necessary to achieve the Task Force’s recommendation.

Additional Action Required:

None by the White House or the NSC.

Observation:

This recommendation does not involve any major pol-

icy considerations. Internal reorganizations of the type recommended
should be left to the sound discretion of the agency head.

Recommendation 3

(page 137): That the National Security Council

revise NSCID No. 5

to provide for clandestine intelligence activity on

Document 256.

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the part of the Military Services consistent with their capabilities and
statutory responsibilities under the National Security Act of 1947.

Agency Comment:

DOD notes that this recommendation “reflects

the strong and unanimous views of the Services” and that “it involves
a fundamental issue within the intelligence community.” Because of
the importance of this particular recommendation the remainder of the
Defense comment thereon is quoted in full:

“NSCID No. 5 has been interpreted as assigning to CIA the ex-

clusive right to control and conduct covert foreign intelligence opera-
tions. Such activities as the services have been allowed to conduct dur-
ing the past 7 or 8 years in this important field even in war theaters
have been essentially on the sufferance of CIA. Meanwhile, however,
CIA’s record of performance in covert intelligence operations of direct
interest to the mission of the Armed Services has been disappointing,
particularly against primary Soviet orbit intelligence targets. The serv-
ices, which consider that they have generally a longer record of expe-
rience in this work, are convinced that they can produce through covert
operations more effectively than CIA various needed categories of in-
telligence related to their particular missions and requirements. They
point out moreover that CIA’s covert operations are conducted to a
large extent under military cover.

The Agreed Activities paper (DCID No. 5/8)

represents a cau-

tious compromise, which is not altogether satisfactory to the services.
It provides for a measure of participation by them in covert operations
on a best-qualified basis. The services believe their right to participate
should be explicit in a NSCID and not dependent on a subsidiary
agreement.

It is too early to judge whether this agreement will prove work-

able. First steps have been taken by CIA to function under the agree-
ment, and the services are proceeding to strengthen their covert col-
lection resources. Each side tends to be wary of the other; and more
generosity and good will than has been shown in the past will be nec-
essary if the present tentative arrangement is to work.

Monitorship over this problem has been assigned to the Assistant

to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) who has been directed
to keep the developments under continuing review. If events develop
favorably under the Agreed Activities paper, revision of NSCID No. 5
may prove to be unnecessary.”

Additional Action Required:

Further action may be taken by IAC and

NSC now or it may be delayed, depending upon: (1) developments

A copy is in the Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff, Job 84–B00389R, Box 4.

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under the “Agreed Activities Paper,” as revised, or (2) the outcome of
the proposed review of all NSC, DCI and IAC Intelligence Directives,
as set forth in Chapter II, Recommendation 7 of the Task Force Report.

Observation:

It is to be noted that: (1) the Task Force Report and

the comments thereon present only the military side of this contro-
versy; and (2) CIA, despite its primary responsibility in the field, is not
cognizant of—and, therefore, has had no opportunity to comment on
this and other military-related segments of the Task Force Report which
are germane to the primary mission of CIA. The controversy over
NSCID No. 5 has raged too long (several years); IAC and, if necessary,
NSC should act upon it at an early date.

Recommendation 4

(page 137): That the implementation of NSCID

No. 13

be extended to permit participation in the Soviet and Satellite

defector inducement program by the Military Services and CIA in di-
rect proportion to the capabilities of each.

Agency Comment:

DOD reports that the three Services strongly sup-

port this and related recommendations, believing that at the working
level CIA has often tended unnecessarily to restrict their participation
in this area of intelligence operations which is of vital importance to
them. The Military Services believe they have substantial present and
potential capabilities in the inducement of defection of which full use
should be made. DOD will undertake to negotiate with the Director of
Central Intelligence to bring about optimum participation by the Serv-
ices and fullest realization of their potential in the defector program.

Additional Action Required:

NSCID No. 13 should be expeditiously

reviewed by IAC and modified by NSC, if modification is determined
to be necessary.

Observation:

This recommendation of the Task Force appears to be

somewhat at variance with its Recommendation 6, Appendix II,
wherein it proposes “that the inducement phase of the Defector Pro-
gram, as applicable to active participation by diplomatic and

military

representatives serving overtly abroad, be discontinued.”

Recommendation 5

(page 137): That consideration be given to more

extensive use of “Schedule A”

in the employment of civilian analysts

and other intelligence specialists in the Department of the Army, in or-
der to achieve necessary flexibility.

Document 252.

The U.S. Civil Service Commission defined “Schedule A” positions as those jobs

that were other than confidential or policy determining in character, and for which it
was impractical to require examinations. “Schedule A” positions also were excepted from
the regular competitive U.S. Civil Service. (5

CFR,

1956

SUPP.,

6.100)

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Agency Comment:

DOD concurs in general and has initiated a thor-

ough study of the problem.

Additional Action Required:

Decision by DOD following its study of

the problem.

Recommendation 6

(page 137): That the Army aggressively attack

the linguist problem by developing and using outside sources for train-
ing in colleges and universities through the method of (for example)
its comprehensive ROTC and Reserve programs.

Agency Comment:

DOD reports that considerable use is now being

made of civilian facilities for the purpose indicated, but that the prob-
lem involves quality rather than quantity and is most acute in the case
of rare languages. The recommendation concerning ROTC language
training requires further study.

Additional Action Required:

Decision by DOD following its further

study.

Recommendation 7

(page 137): That measures be instituted for the

periodic security rechecking of personnel assigned in sensitive areas at
intervals not to exceed 5 years.

Agency Comment:

DOD believes that its current security practices

essentially fulfill the objectives of this recommendation. The general
subject will be reviewed by DOD however to insure that the underly-
ing objective of the recommendation is adequately served.

Additional Action Required:

Apart from the review referred to by

DOD, no additional action is required.

D. Department of the Navy (Pages 138–156)

Recommendation 1

(page 156): That the Navy put its counterintel-

ligence program on a wider base so as to bring its worldwide protec-
tion up to an adequate level.

Agency Comment:

DOD concurs but believes that the actual method

of expansion should be further investigated.

Additional Action Required:

Further investigation as suggested by

DOD, followed by action consistent with its investigative findings and
with the objective of establishing an adequate counterintelligence pro-
gram in the Navy.

Recommendation 2

(page 156): That the Navy provide for periodic

review of the security status of intelligence personnel who come within
the provisions of Executive Order 10450.

Agency Comment:

DOD believes that its current security practices

essentially fulfill the objectives of this recommendation. The general
subject will be reviewed by DOD however to insure that the underly-
ing objective of the recommendation is adequately served.

Additional Action Required:

None.

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Recommendation 3

(page 156): That the Navy expand its intelligence

collection effort.

Agency Comment:

See DOD’s comment on Recommendation 1 of

the Task Force Report on the Department of the Army, (page 7, above).

Additional Action Required:

Final decision by DOD as to lifting per-

sonnel ceilings in the Attaché System.

Recommendation 4

(page 156): That the Navy continue and expand

its efforts to improve intelligence consciousness at all ranks and levels
of the Department.

Agency Comment:

DOD concurs. Instruction on the mission and

role of intelligence is included in the regional training schools, intelli-
gence centers, and in the curricula of line schools at all levels.

Additional Action Required:

None.

E. Department of the Air Force (Pages 156–179)

Recommendation 1

(page 178): That the position of Director of In-

telligence, Air Force, be raised to that of a Deputy Chief of Staff.

Agency Comment:

DOD does not concur. It notes that the Task Force

made a similar recommendation (which DOD opposes) with respect to
the Director of Intelligence, Army, but that it made no recommenda-
tion respecting the position of the Director of Naval Intelligence.

Additional Action Required:

None by the White House or the NSC.

Observation:

This recommendation does not involve any major pol-

icy considerations. Internal reorganizations of the type recommended
should be left to the sound discretion of the agency head.

Recommendation 2

(page 178): That a limited number of civilian per-

sonnel spaces for Air Force Intelligence be exempt from certain Civil
Service requirements.

Agency Comment:

DOD concurs in general and has initiated a thor-

ough study of the problem.

Additional Action Required:

Decision by DOD following its study of

the problem.

Recommendation 3

(page 178): That a board or commission be es-

tablished to make an equitable and coordinated allocation among the
member agencies of personnel spaces exempt from certain Civil Serv-
ice requirements.

Agency Comment:

DOD has initiated a thorough study of the problem.

Additional Action Required:

None, pending the completion of DOD’s

study.

Recommendation 4

(page 178): That the Air Attaché System be main-

tained at a level which will insure an adequate collection capability
and that Air Attaché qualifications be commensurate with the collec-
tion potential of the station.

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Agency Comment:

See DOD’s comment on Recommendation 1 of

the Task Force’s Report on the Department of the Army (page 7, above).

Additional Action Required:

Final decision by DOD as to the Attaché

System, its adequacy, personnel strength, training, qualifications, etc.

Recommendation 5

(page 179): That an Intelligence Research Cen-

ter be established under CIA to guide the total intelligence research
program.

Agency Comment:

DOD notes that each service intelligence agency

and CIA conduct research programs and it agrees that a common re-
search service would be desirable. However, it believes that the effort
to establish such a center “should be under the DCI acting for the IAC
and not under the CIA.”

Additional Action Required:

Joint consideration of this recommen-

dation by the IAC agencies.

Observation:

It would appear desirable that CIA be apprised of, and

be afforded an opportunity to comment on, this recommendation. This
is particularly so if the “additional action” indicated above is not taken
(if such action is taken, CIA will automatically have such an opportu-
nity by virtue of its identification with the IAC).

Recommendation 6

(page 179): That a board be established to su-

pervise declassification of security information.

Agency Comment:

DOD does not concur. It believes such a proce-

dure would be cumbersome, and is of the view that its present prac-
tices in this area are adequate.

Additional Action Required:

None, because ultimate responsibility

for such matters is lodged in the head of the Department concerned.

Recommendation 7

(page 179): That a periodic examination be made

of Air Force intelligence publications to assure justification for both the
publication and distribution thereof.

Agency Comment:

DOD concurs; the recommended action is now

being implemented.

Additional Action Required:

None.

Recommendation 8

(page 179): That mechanical and electronic de-

vices to analyze, classify, file, and produce intelligence information be
put into use at the earliest possible moment.

Agency Comment:

DOD concurs. It believes that automation in in-

telligence production has undoubted value and it notes that consider-
able investigation has been conducted along the lines indicated in this
recommendation.

Additional Action Required:

Implementation of the recommendation

by DOD.

Recommendation 9

(page 179): That all possible resources be used

to exploit technological means for intelligence collection.

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Agency Comment:

DOD concurs, advising that the recommenda-

tion is currently receiving attention.

Additional Action Required:

None (assuming the attention being

afforded this matter by DOD results in the implementation of this
recommendation).

Recommendation 10

(page 179): That the use of “overflights” to se-

cure vital information receive constant consideration.

Agency Comment:

DOD concurs, noting that the constant support

of other U.S. Government agencies is required if full results are to be
achieved. (DOD observes that upon resolution of some of the details
involved in this recommendation, it may be advisable to seek NSC ac-
tion thereon.)

Additional Action Required:

Presidential and/or NSC consideration

following receipt of DOD’s recommendation on the subject.

Recommendation 11

(page 179): That the Air Force develop adequate

procedures for the periodic security review of personnel occupying sen-
sitive positions.

Agency Comment:

DOD believes that its current security practices

essentially fulfill the objective of this recommendation. The general
subject will be reviewed by DOD however to insure that the underly-
ing objective of the recommendation is adequately served.

Additional Action Required:

Apart from the review referred to by

DOD, no additional action is required.

F. Covert Operations—Department of Defense (Pages 179–205)

Recommendation 1

(page 204): That under the terms of the “Agreed

Activities” paper, the services expand their clandestine collection ef-
forts with primary emphasis focused on targets in the Soviet Union
and Communist China. Personnel and funds to accomplish this objec-
tive should be made available to the military intelligence services.

Agency Comment:

DOD concurs and suggests that the satellites, in-

cluding areas of Southeast Asia, should be added to the primary tar-
get area.

Additional Action Required:

This recommendation should be re-

viewed and acted upon by the IAC and, if necessary, the NSC. (See
Chapter II, Recommendation 7, which calls for IAC review of all NSC,
DCI, and IAC Intelligence Directives and Chapter IV, C, Recommen-
dation 3, which calls for revision of NSCID No. 5 in particular.)

Observation:

It is noted that CIA has not been advised of, nor oth-

erwise afforded an opportunity to comment on, this recommendation,
which involves one of the primary missions of that Agency. (This sit-
uation will be remedied if the additional action mentioned above is
carried into effect.)

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Recommendation 2

(page 204): That the intelligence community es-

tablish adequate and positive measures for the identification and list-
ing of all clandestine operators as provided in IAC Directive No. 54,
approved July 24, 1952.

Mutual trust regarding the divulgence of in-

telligence sources should be cultivated within the community.

Agency Comment:

DOD concurs, noting that an effort has been

made under the IAC Directive to create a national source control mech-
anism. DOD thinks it probable that the recommendation can be im-
plemented effectively on some clearly mutual basis, such as rotating
the chairmanship of the source control mechanism.

Additional Action Required:

None for the reasons set forth in the fol-

lowing paragraph.

Observation:

The Task Force seems in its recommendation to have

missed the point of IAC–D–54. This directive is designed to identify
for the entire intelligence community “papermills” and “fabricators”
who have been exposed as such. It does not provide that each intelli-
gence agency disclose to the others the identities of their “clandestine
operators”—such a practice would be foolhardy. Current inquiry re-
flects that in the main the intelligence agencies are exchanging infor-
mation concerning fabricators, frauds, etc., as provided in IAC–D–54.

Recommendation 3

(page 204): That the defector program, includ-

ing inducement policies, early access to the defector and prompt de-
termination of the use to which he is to be put, be improved, with the
objective of making defection more attractive and of deriving greater
benefit for the entire intelligence community.

Agency Comment:

DOD’s comments on this general subject are

set forth under Recommendation 4, Chapter IV (page 9, above). CIA
was not furnished with the section of the report which contains this
recommendation.

Additional Action Required:

IAC review of NSCID No. 13.

Recommendation 4

(page 205): That the military services be per-

mitted greater latitude in offering inducements to potential defectors.

Agency Comment:

DOD concurs. The gist of DOD’s comments on

this and related aspects of the defector program are summarized un-
der Chapter IV, Recommendation 4 (page 9, above).

Additional Action Required:

As set forth under Chapter IV, Recom-

mendation 4.

Observation:

This recommendation of the Task Force is, in part at

least, contrary to its Recommendation 6, Part II, wherein it is proposed

IAC–D–54, approved July 24, 1952. (Central Intelligence Agency, Community

Management Staff, Job 82–00400R, Box 2, Folder 9)

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that the inducement phase of the Defector Program, as applicable to
active participation by diplomatic and military representatives serving
overtly abroad, be discontinued.

Recommendation 5

(page 205): That the National Security Council re-

view present assets and direct the necessary action to assure adequate
preparation for evasion and escape and support of guerrilla warfare.

Agency Comment:

DOD concurs. To facilitate the review recom-

mended DOD suggests that CIA and DOD report the pertinent facts to
the NSC with recommendation for necessary action. To that end DOD
will initiate a proposal looking to the preparation of an appropriate
report.

Additional Action Required:

None, pending preparation of the ref-

erenced report.

Recommendation 6

(page 205): [

14 lines not declassified

]

Recommendation 7

(page 205): That when military cover is used

steps be taken to insure that the person so covered lives in consonance
with the cover position and duties.

Agency Comment:

DOD concurs, noting that an interim effort is be-

ing made to insure that all persons wearing the uniform are qualified
to play the role convincingly.

Additional Action Required:

None, other than continuing effort along

the lines mentioned above.

CHAPTER V—Atomic Energy Intelligence (Pages 206–220)

Recommendation 1

(page 220): That CIA pay special attention to the

production of atomic energy intelligence.

Agency Comment:

CIA reports that that agency and the entire in-

telligence community long ago agreed that the highest priority be ac-
corded this subject. Continuous attention at the highest level is directed
to seeing that this program is energetically implemented.

DOD concurs, noting that in CIA’s appointed role as coordinator

for the production of national intelligence it should pay special at-
tention to the

coordination

of the production of atomic energy intelli-

gence. DOD believes that the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Com-
mittee is an adequate instrument for this purpose and is now being
so used.

Additional Action Required:

None, since CIA reports that the high-

est priority and continuous attention is already being accorded this
subject by the entire intelligence community.

Recommendation 2

(page 220): That the responsibility of AEC for in-

telligence be defined in an NSC Intelligence Directive and that an NSC
Intelligence Directive set forth the responsibility, authority, functions,
and composition of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee.

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Agency Comment:

AEC agrees. It is of the belief that this two-fold

recommendation may be accomplished by one NSC Intelligence Di-
rective; that such a Directive should also establish the responsibilities
of the other IAC agencies for atomic energy intelligence “in order that
ambiguities of present directives . . . be clarified.”

CIA advises that AEC’s intelligence responsibilities are now un-

der discussion between CIA and AEC, and that at the appropriate time
an intelligence directive thereon will be proposed to the NSC.

DOD concurs in this two-fold recommendation. It favors an

NSCID for the purpose of defining AEC’s intelligence responsibility;
but it believes that since the JAEIC is a subcommittee of the IAC, a
DCID (rather than an NSCID) will suffice to carry out the latter part
of the recommendation.

Additional Action Required:

None, pending completion of IAC’s pro-

cessing of the directives envisaged by this recommendation.

Recommendation 3

(page 220): That the AEC define the responsi-

bility and functions of its Division of Intelligence.

Agency Comment:

AEC reports that its Division of Intelligence has

received the informal concurrence of the other intelligence agencies as
to its national intelligence responsibilities. Following Commission con-
sideration thereof, the intelligence agencies will be formally notified of
same.

Additional Action Required:

None.

Recommendation 4

(page 220): That each of the member agencies of

the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee insure that it is repre-
sented on that Committee by the best qualified individual available
concerning the matter under discussion, and that changes in repre-
sentation be made as infrequently as practicable.

Agency Comment:

AEC concurs. AEC reports that every effort has

been and will continue to be made to comply with this recommendation.

CIA reports that it has pressed for the assignment of the best qual-

ified personnel to the Committee, and it notes that the record of the
Committee in the matter of continuity and length of tenure is a very
favorable one.

DOD concurs in this recommendation noting that it will continue

to make every effort to insure the fulfillment thereof.

State reports that it has been following the practice recommended

by the Task Force.

Additional Action Required:

None.

Recommendation 5

(page 220): That there be a thorough review of

the processes for development of the atomic energy portions of Na-
tional Intelligence Estimates to insure, in the first place, that everything
practicable is done to develop intelligence regarding intentions, plans,

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programs, policies, doctrines and capabilities of the Soviet Union with
regard to war-time use of atomic energy and, secondly, that the Na-
tional Intelligence Estimates reflect the full extent of available intelli-
gence in those matters.

Agency Comment:

AEC strongly endorses this recommendation,

noting that the accuracy and completeness of estimates on foreign
atomic energy capabilities are of deep concern to it.

CIA reports that its Board of Estimates is already carrying out this

recommendation; that the Board is not only going into Soviet war-time
use of atomic energy, but is working on peace-time applications as well;
and that it goes without saying that every effort is being made to have
the National Intelligence Estimates reflect the full extent of available
knowledge on the subject.

DOD concurs in this recommendation.
State concurs. In order that the National Intelligence Estimates may

reflect the full extent of available intelligence in this field, State rec-
ommends specific courses of action which appear appropriate for IAC
consideration.

Additional Action Required:

Consideration by the IAC.

CHAPTER VI—The Federal Bureau of Investigation (Pages 221–226)

This Chapter contains no recommendations.

CHAPTER VII—Intelligence Production (Pages 227–244)

Recommendation 1

(page 244): That an agreed glossary of intelli-

gence terms be produced and reviewed periodically.

Agency Comment:

DOD agrees and suggests that an IAC Subcom-

mittee be appointed to produce it.

State has no particular difficulty in this area, but it will be pleased

to assist IAC in implementing the recommendation.

CIA reports that it has compiled a glossary of intelligence terms

and that action will be taken through the IAC to secure acceptance
thereof as the authoritative dictionary of intelligence nomenclature.

Additional Action Required:

Completion of the project by the IAC.

Recommendation 2

(page 244): That positive measures be taken to

increase the quantity and improve the quality of information collected,
with special emphasis on the primary target area, to include the revi-
sion of existing directives to assign more explicit responsibility to agen-
cies which can fulfill the requirement.

Agency Comment:

DOD concurs, adding that in its opinion and in

the opinion of the military services the briefing and debriefing for in-
telligence purposes of U.S. travelers (now exclusively the prerogative
of CIA) could profitably be decentralized to some extent. It believes

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that review of “official cover” requirements may indicate that certain
intelligence operations now being performed by CIA may be more ef-
fectively conducted by other agencies. As to the Task Force recom-
mendation that there be special emphasis on the primary target area,
DOD notes that, in general, the service intelligence agencies have their
sights set on the primary target.

CIA notes that NSC, IAC and CIA intelligence directives are being

reviewed with a view to revision where appropriate (as indicated in
Chapter II, above). As to the Task Force exhortation that, in the collec-
tion of intelligence, there be special emphasis on the primary target area,
CIA notes that the entire intelligence community has invariably accorded
the Soviet Union the highest priority as a target of intelligence.

Additional Action Required:

None, other than that now being car-

ried out, or that which may be indicated by current intelligence or by
the review of Intelligence Directives referred to by CIA.

Observation:

The oft-repeated exhortations of the Task Force that pri-

mary emphasis be placed upon the USSR as the primary intelligence tar-
get are in a sense misleading in that they could leave the casual reader
with the erroneous impression that the USSR is not the primary intelli-
gence target. Individually and collectively the intelligence forces of the
United States Government concentrate on the USSR, its satellites, and
International Communism in general, as the primary U.S. intelligence
target. U.S. intelligence agencies are not satisfied with the quality or
quantity of intelligence gained thus far with respect to this primary tar-
get, but they have felt it better to accept criticism such as that leveled in
the Task Force Report and in the published report on the subject rather
than risk disclosure of highly sensitive operations which do indicate that
some inroads are being successfully made on the primary target.

CHAPTER VIII—Functional Intelligence (Pages 245–254)

Recommendation 1

(page 254): That the intelligence community ac-

tively give recognition to this primary intelligence target, i.e., the Soviet
Union, and take such actions as are necessary to present a concerted ef-
fort for the single purpose of breaking this vital intelligence block.

Agency Comment:

State notes that the intelligence community has

been doing precisely this for some time and it adds that it is prepared
to give continuing support to this intelligence priority.

Defense and CIA (as indicated previously) have commented (in

the several instances wherein the point of this recommendation has
been made) that the intelligence community is concentrating upon the
USSR as a primary intelligence target.

Recommendation 2

(page 254): That the State Department’s pro-

grams for integration and expansion of the Foreign Service and for
acceleration of language and area training be pursued vigorously.

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Agency Comment:

State reports that this matter is the subject of vig-

orous action at all levels of the Department on a continuous and top
priority basis.

CHAPTER IX—Personnel (Pages 255–274)

Recommendation 1

(page 273): That DOD give consideration to the

exploitation of the ROTC and reserve intelligence programs for lan-
guage training purposes by offering credit toward reserve commissions
and drill credits respectively, for the completion of selected language
courses.

Agency Comment:

DOD notes that considerable use is now being

made of civilian facilities for the purpose indicated in this recommen-
dation; that the problem involves quality rather than quantity; that the
recommendations concerning ROTC language training require thor-
ough study; and that it would be unwise to give blanket accreditation
for language work regardless of the type of service for which the trainee
is destined.

Additional Action Required:

Completion of DOD’s study and con-

sideration of the recommendation.

Recommendation 2

(page 273): That DOD conduct periodic surveys

of service personnel procedures to insure that adequate consideration
is being given to the requirements of the intelligence agencies for their
share of the best qualified military personnel.

Agency Comment:

DOD does not concur. DOD believes its current

practices are adequate. It agrees that the highest practicable standards
should be applied in the selection of attaché personnel.

Additional Action Required:

None, assuming DOD’s current prac-

tices are in fact adequate.

Recommendation 3

(page 273): That DOD require that the Military

Services study the problem of improving the prestige of the civilian an-
alyst vis-à-vis his military colleagues.

Agency Comment:

DOD concurs, noting that in practical terms there

is no easy solution to this problem. DOD reports much has been done
on the problem and that it will keep same under review.

Recommendation 4

(page 273): That DOD facilitate the employment

as intelligence specialists of qualified retired military personnel by ini-
tiating action toward amending the laws concerning Federal employ-
ment of retired military personnel, with a view to removing the pres-
ent ceiling on the Federal pay of such individuals.

Agency Comment:

DOD believes present laws on this subject are

too restricted; on the other hand it is fearful lest statutory amendments
be such as to permit retired officers with intelligence experience to
automatically find employment as civilian intelligence analysts. DOD

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reports that the CSC has developed a proposal to relax existing leg-
islative requirements along the general lines of this recommendation.

Additional Action Required:

Executive Branch processing of CSC’s leg-

islative proposal and submission thereof for Congressional consideration.

Recommendation 5

(page 273): That DOD give consideration to more

extensive use of “Schedule A” in the employment of civilian analysts
and other intelligence specialists, in order to provide necessary flexibil-
ity in the recruitment of qualified civilian personnel by the military serv-
ices, and to facilitate the interchange of such personnel between the Zone
of Interior competitive service and the overseas excepted service.

Agency Comment:

DOD agrees that greater flexibility in hiring and

in the ability to shift civilian personnel between the Zone of the Inte-
rior and foreign stations is essential. It believes a degree of relaxation
of Civil Service regulations is desirable to deal with these problems.
DOD has initiated a thorough study of the matter.

Additional Action Required:

Appropriate action by DOD following

completion of its study of the problem.

Recommendation 6

(page 273): That DOD, in the consideration of

future economies, give proper weight to the importance of intelligence
in peace time, so as to avoid serious reductions-in-force in our centers
of intelligence production.

Agency Comment:

DOD concurs, noting that the purpose of this rec-

ommendation can be further served by applying such reductions-in-
force as do occur to overhead positions rather than to basic productive
elements.

Recommendation 7

(page 274): That DOD take prompt action to in-

sure that proper consideration in personnel planning is given to the
impact of the time lag involved in our present clearance requirements
for filling sensitive positions.

Agency Comment:

DOD believes this recommendation requires fur-

ther study.

Additional Action Required:

Further study and appropriate action

by DOD.

CHAPTER X—Security (Pages 275–283)

Recommendation 1

(page 273): That any individual employed in an

intelligence organization “about whom sufficient doubt concerning his
security has been raised . . . should be removed from employment
pending final determination of his case.”

Agency Comment:

DOD considers that its current security practices

and procedures essentially fulfill the objectives of this recommenda-
tion. However, it reports that the general subject will be reviewed in
order to insure that those objectives are adequately served.

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CIA reports that it is carrying out the intent of this recommenda-

tion in that it adheres carefully to Executive Order 10450 which pro-
vides for the suspension of Federal employees when a reasonable doubt
exists as to their security status. State reports that “this recommenda-
tion requires no implementation in the Department of State” . . . since
State’s regulations do not preclude employee suspensions in such
circumstances.

Additional Action Required:

Strict adherence to Executive Order

10450 by the agencies concerned—such adherence will accomplish the
objective of this recommendation.

Observation:

State has missed the point of this recommendation.

All agencies now have the authority to suspend employees under the
circumstances indicated in the recommendation. The point the Task
Force appears to be making is that some of the agencies fail to suspend
when there is sufficient cause and it is the Task Force’s view that in the
intelligence organizations of our government in particular, such sus-
pension should occur pending final determination of the employee’s
case.

Recommendation 2

(page 283): That the “findings and proposed dis-

position of those cases which were reported as still in process at the
time the survey by this Task Force was concluded should be reported
to the President.”

Agency Comment:

DOD did not comment on this point.

CIA noted that under normal reporting procedures as established

by Executive Order 10450, information is furnished to the Civil Service
Commission or the FBI on such cases, and that thereafter the status of
such cases is available to the President, through the executive agencies
he has designated, to report on the implementation of Executive Or-
der 10450.

State advises that detailed reports concerning the very small per-

centage of such employees in its Intelligence Area have been made
available to the Civil Service Commission, and that CSC makes a com-
posite report periodically on such cases in all government agencies.

Observation:

CIA and State seem to have missed the point of this rec-

ommendation. (DOD did not comment upon it at all.) If the recommen-
dation is deemed to have validity, the White House may wish to request
that the heads of the intelligence agencies concerned report the findings
and disposition of alleged security risk cases (in their intelligence areas)
in process at the time the Task Force concluded its survey.

Recommendation 3

(page 283): That measures be instituted in all

agencies to recheck the security status of all personnel engaged in in-
telligence activities at periodic intervals not to exceed 5 years in any
individual case.

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Agency Comment:

CIA reports that this is now being done in that

agency. State reports that the problem of periodic review of such cases
is being given serious study, following which State will bring its views
thereon to the attention of the agencies concerned, such as the CSC and
the Department of Justice.

DOD considers that its current security practices essentially fulfill

the objectives of this recommendation. However, the general subject
will be reviewed to insure that the underlying objectives of the rec-
ommendation are adequately served.

Additional Action Required:

This recommendation should be rejected.

Observation:

This recommendation has been made in varying forms

on a number of occasions in the Task Force report. In theory it has os-
tensible merit; in practice it is unsound. In lieu of subjecting employ-
ees to reinvestigations at least every 5 years a good counterintelligence
program is what is needed. When employees are initially brought on
board they should be exhaustively checked. Thereafter they should not
be harassed by reinvestigations, but should be accepted as loyal, bona
fide Americans unless counterintelligence discloses reasons for con-
trary views. Wholesale investigations of the type called for by the Task
Force would constitute unjustifiable use of manpower and money,
would not be productive of substantial results, and would be harmful
to the morale of the employees concerned. Reinvestigations should be
made on a selective, rather than wholesale, basis and only when there
is reasonable cause therefor.

CHAPTER XI—Counterintelligence (Pages 284–292)

Recommendation 1

(page 292): That the Navy give due considera-

tion to the requirement for additional competent and trained counter-
intelligence personnel in order to provide adequate security for its per-
sonnel and facilities.

Agency Comment:

DOD concurs in principle, but believes that the

actual method of expansion should be investigated.

Additional Action Required:

Further investigation as suggested by

DOD, followed by action consistent with its investigative findings
and with the objective of providing adequate security for naval per-
sonnel and facilities. (See Recommendation 1, Chapter IV, D, page 10,
above.)

CHAPTER XII—Maps and Libraries (Pages 293–305)

Recommendation 1

(page 305): That the IAC consider the adoption

of a single index system based on the Intelligence Subject Code now
in use by CIA.

Agency Comment:

CIA and DOD concur. CIA reports that this rec-

ommendation is currently under study in a special subcommittee of

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the IAC. The subcommittee is expected to report to the IAC within the
next few weeks.

CHAPTER XIII—Coordination in Overseas Areas (Pages 306–309)

Recommendation 1

(page 309): That senior military commanders in

the field be given greater flexibility in their use of information on a
need-to-know basis, giving due regard to the protection of its source.

Agency Comment:

CIA comments that it is not aware of any com-

plaints of restrictions on use of information supplied. CIA reports that
it is fully cognizant of its obligation and responsibility to get informa-
tion to the senior officer responsible for action and policy.

DOD considers that “current practices in the DOD are satisfactory

within the regulations imposed by other agencies.”

CHAPTER XIV—Development of New Equipment and Techniques

(Pages 310–311)

Recommendation 1

(page 311): That the IAC take positive action to

insure that a definite and concerted effort is made to develop new tech-
niques, methods and equipment for the collection and production of
intelligence and insure that a free exchange of information concerning
such projects is accomplished within the intelligence community.

Agency Comment:

CIA reports that compliance with this recom-

mendation will be accomplished in conjunction with IAC actions cur-
rently underway and that the means of producing intelligence on the
Soviet/Sino Bloc are “always under continuous scrutiny.”

DOD concurs, stating that continuing efforts are being devoted to

fulfillment of this recommendation. DOD observes that in all cases full
effectiveness can be achieved only with a frank and free interchange
of information.

State concurs, noting that it has initiated a number of steps in so-

cial science, psychological and research areas, all of which are designed
to further the objective of this recommendation.

CHAPTER XV—“Watch-Dog” Commission (Pages 312–317)

Recommendation 1

(page 317): That a small, permanent, bipartisan

commission, composed of members of both Houses of the Congress
and other public-spirited citizens commanding the utmost national re-
spect and confidence, be established by Act of Congress to make peri-
odic surveys of the organization, functions, policies, and results of the
Government agencies handling foreign intelligence operations; and to
report, under adequate security safeguards, its findings and recom-
mendations to the Congress, and to the President, annually and at such
other times as may be necessary or advisable. The proposed “watch-
dog” commission should be empowered by law to demand and receive

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any information it needs for its own use. It would be patterned after
the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Gov-
ernment (Hoover Commission). Appointments by the President of per-
sons from private life to the proposed commission should be made
from a select list of distinguished individuals of unquestioned loyalty,
integrity, and ability, with records of unselfish service to the nation.

Agency Comment:

CIA does not concur in this recommendation.

CIA believes, with the Hoover Commission itself, that “while mixed
Congressional and citizens committees for temporary service are useful
and helpful to undertake specific problems and to investigate and make
recommendations, such committees, if permanent, present difficulties.”
CIA points out that it now reports to the Armed Services Committees
of the Senate and House, and to the Senate and House Appropriations
Committees. As a consequence CIA does not consider that a Joint Con-
gressional Committee would add any essential helpful element. CIA does
concur, however, in the appointment (as recommended by the Hoover
Commission, but not by its Task Force) by the President of a committee
of experienced private citizens to examine and report periodically on the
work of the Government’s foreign intelligence activities.

DOD believes that the permanent, bipartisan commission recom-

mended by the Task Force would afford improved protection for, as
well as efficiency in, foreign intelligence operations.

Additional Action Required:

None, in view of the establishment on

January 13, 1956 by the President of a Board of Consultants

to review

periodically the foreign intelligence activities of the Government.

CHAPTER XVI—Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations

(Pages 318–348)

This Chapter is merely repetitious of information appearing ear-

lier in the Report. Conclusions and recommendations are restated in
verbatim fashion in some instances; in other instances they are para-
phrased and combined with still other opinions and recommendations
contained in the body of the report. This Chapter does not appear to
contain any new information. It merely restates, repeats, and re-
emphasizes certain of the points previously made.

Appendix

The recommendations discussed below are from Appendix I of the

Task Force Report. The Department of Defense comments are supple-
mentary to those submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence for
the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) and the

Regarding the creation of this board, see

Public Papers: Eisenhower, 1956,

pp. 72–74.

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United States Communications Security Board (USCSB), in which the
Department of Defense and the three Services concur.

Recommendation No. 1

“That the National Security Council direct USCIB to establish

COMINT realities and consideration of capabilities of other intelligence
sources. This operational guidance to NSA should be so clear and suc-
cinct as to require minimum interpretation by the Director, NSA, of
what is required and its degree of importance. USCIB should be pri-
marily concerned with end products and the Director, NSA, should de-
termine the best way of producing the end product. If USCIB fails af-
ter a reasonable length of time to provide more adequate guidance to
the Director, NSA, then the latter should be made a member of the In-
telligence Advisory Committee.”

Department of Defense Position:

1. Concur, subject to comment.
2.

Comment:

It is doubtful that IAC membership for the Director, NSA, would

solve the problem; it would probably raise additional complications.

In this connection, the Department of Defense considers that the

present status and membership of the IAC give rise to ambiguity which
this particular recommendation would only sharpen. The IAC is unique
in being neither a policy nor an operational body, but a mixture of the
two. This is the result partly of unforeseen evolution within the IAC,
and partly of significant changes which have occurred within the De-
partment of Defense since the IAC was established.

To the extent that the NSC intended the IAC to serve as a policy

body, its Defense membership (the three Services and JCS) is at once
diffuse and incomplete in that the Service representation is largely at
an operating rather than a policy level and the Secretary of Defense is
not directly represented, although the JCS representative (Chairman,
Joint Intelligence Committee) coordinates with the appropriate ele-
ments of OSD. On the other hand, to the extent that the IAC serves as
a body concerned with the coordination and formulation of intelligence
estimates and the coordination of operational intelligence matters, its
present formalized structure may not be entirely necessary. The three
Service intelligence chiefs are suitable representation in this context,
and although the Chairman, JIC, does not conduct operations, he is the
appropriate indirect representative of the Secretary of Defense for these
matters. In its dual capacity the IAC works, but in an unnecessarily
complicated and probably uneconomical context of differing levels of
activity.

The Department of Defense considers that a more desirable ulti-

mate organization of the top structure of U.S. intelligence would

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involve a single board with policy cognizance over all aspects of in-
telligence. The Secretary of Defense’s representative would be an ap-
propriate civilian official, competent to act for him. Under this board
would be several specialist committees to deal with operational mat-
ters; one concerned with communications and electronics intelligence
and communications security (as recommended by the Clark Task
Force); another with intelligence operations; a third with intelligence
production; and possibly others. Representation on these committees
would be provided by the Service intelligence chiefs and other opera-
tors (such as the Director, NSA) when appropriate.

The following main points summarize the views that are crystalliz-

ing in the Department of Defense on the general subject of intelligence:

1. The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense must as-

sume final responsibility for guidance and control over all aspects of
intelligence.

2. The Director of Central Intelligence as the actual executive agent

must have adequate and clearly defined coordinative powers under
the Secretaries of State and Defense.

3. National intelligence policy is under the cognizance of the Na-

tional Security Council. However, because of the sensitive nature of im-
portant elements of intelligence, intelligence matters might most ap-
propriately be dealt with by a Special Committee of the NSC (which
is now the case, to the satisfaction of all concerned, with respect to
COMINT and COMSEC matters: the Secretaries of State and Defense,
and the Attorney General for matters under his cognizance, with the
advice of the Director of Central Intelligence, constitute the Special
Committee of the NSC).

4. The concept behind USCIB has proved to be the most satisfac-

tory solution so far in one important intelligence area. Appropriately
modified, it could usefully be applied to the entire intelligence field.

The changes which this general concept would involve do not re-

quire legislation. Internal reorganization within the IAC and probably
an executive order to establish the new organization would suffice.

The Department of Defense proposes to discuss this subject fur-

ther with the Director of Central Intelligence and the Department of
State, and hopes in due course together with them to arrive at an agreed
proposal for submission.

Recommendation No. 2

“That the Director, NSA, be given clearcut directives which will

enable him to make much greater and continuing effort to produce
high-level communications intelligence. This is of such great impor-
tance that monetary considerations should be waived and an effort at
least equal to the Manhattan Project should be exerted at once.”

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Department of Defense Position:

With respect to that portion of the Recommendation advocating

“an effort at least equal to the Manhattan Project” [

1 line not declassi-

fied

] the Department of Defense considers some expansion on the US-

CIB comments is warranted.

[

24 lines not declassified

]

With this objective in mind the Department of Defense has au-

thorized the Director, NSA, to bring the best possible analytical brains
from outside NSA to bear on the problem (if they can be found); and
USCIB has recommended that this country undertake a maximum ef-
fort to [

⁄

lines not declassified

The Department of Defense considers that [

⁄

lines not declas-

sified

] as to warrant the full force of the government behind both

projects.

Recommendation No. 6

“That the Department of Defense carefully study the organiza-

tional structure and proper positioning within its respective services of
the three cryptologic agencies—AFSS, ASA, and NSG—with a view to-
ward improving their prestige and effectiveness, thereby strengthen-
ing their personnel assignment policies and logistical support.”

Department of Defense Position:

USCIB considered that this recommendation pertains to an inter-

nal problem within the Department of Defense, and has accordingly
referred it to this Department for comment.

The Department of Defense has long recognized that high profes-

sional standards and opportunity for a rewarding career for military
and civilian personnel engaged in the communications intelligence ef-
fort must be strengthened if we are to deal successfully with the in-
creasingly difficult technical problems confronting that effort. One
means of achieving this objective is to constitute the Service crypto-
logic agencies as major commands. These should be subordinate nei-
ther to the intelligence nor to the communications elements within the
Services, but should in each case report directly to the chief of staff.
Adequate recognition of cryptology as a major operational career field
cannot be otherwise achieved.

The Air Force cryptologic agency, the Security Service (AFSS), has

been so constituted for approximately seven years. The AFSS is re-
sponsible for COMINT production [

less than 1 line not declassified

] and

COMSEC activities, and in addition operated the Air Force’s ground-
based ELINT stations and its SSO (Special Security Officer) sys-
tem for the dissemination of COMINT. Largely because of its status as
a major command, the AFSS has developed a dynamic and promising

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program for recruiting, developing and holding on to technically qual-
ified military career personnel.

Until recently the Army cryptologic agency (the Army Security

Agency (ASA)) was responsible for COMINT production [

less than 1

line not declassified

] and for COMSEC. It was subordinate to G–2. On

23 June 1955, the ASA was designated as a major command responsi-
ble to the Chief of Staff, with virtually complete cognizance over all
Army aspects of COMINT, COMSEC, ELINT and communications elec-
tromagnetic countermeasures (ECM). It is anticipated that this action
will facilitate development of an energetic Army cryptologic career pro-
gram paralleling that of the Air Force.

The Navy cryptologic activity, the Navy Security Group (NSG), is

not so constituted. It operates at a lower echelon and under divided
intelligence and communications cognizance. The NSG does not nom-
inally have a commanding officer; it functions under the Chief of Se-
curity Branch who in turn reports to the Director, Naval Communica-
tions. The responsibilities of the NSG include COMINT production [

less

than 1 line not declassified

] COMSEC, and ELINT.

The Secretary of Defense proposes in the near future to ask the

Secretary of the Navy to review the placement of the Navy cryptologic
organization to determine whether a subordination and structure more
closely paralleling that of the Army and the Air Force might not be
advantageous.

Recommendation No. 7

“That the military Services give greater attention to selecting offi-

cers for COMINT duties, assign regular or ‘career’ reserve officers to the
maximum extent possible, indoctrinate officers in COMINT prior to
sending them to command field stations, and establish career opportu-
nities for specialists equal to those of the line or general service officers.
Rotation and replacement procedures should be improved. The feasi-
bility of using [

less than 1 line not declassified

] should be thoroughly tested.

“It is also recommended that the Congress enact legislation to au-

thorize the National Security Agency to employ specially qualified re-
tired military personnel as presently authorized the Central Intelligence
Agency and with no restriction on the number so employed. Such legis-
lation should also permit the Secretary of Defense to recall retired offi-
cers to active duty with NSA and have those officers counted against the
authorized strength of NSA but not of the respective military services.”

Department of Defense Position:

The Department of Defense submits the following additional

observations in expansion of the USCIB comment on this recommen-
dation. As set forth in its comments on Recommendation No. 6, the
Department of Defense believes that the establishment of major cryp-

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tologic commands in each of the military services will do much to pro-
mote the career possibilities advocated in Recommendation No. 7. Also,
with the support of this Department, the Army and NSA are already
embarked on a program to develop [

less than 1 line not declassified

]. Re-

cently the Secretary of Defense endorsed a Navy proposal to augment
the Naval Security Group with civilians.

With respect to the employment by NSA of specially qualified

retired military personnel, the Department of Defense supports this
proposal for NSA in principle as an element of the Department, but
would emphasize that the highest objective standards of professional
or technical skill should be applied in hiring such persons, in order to
avoid possible abuses which could seriously prejudice career civilian
morale.

Full consideration of the application of this proposal is currently

in progress among personnel and legislative experts within the De-
partment of Defense.

Recommendation No. 8

“That the Secretary of Defense give further consideration to the al-

location of an appropriate number of ‘super grades’ and positions un-
der Public Law 313

to NSA; to the possibility of further inducements

or higher pay to selected consultants; and to privileges extended to
civilians overseas.”

Department of Defense Position:

The Department of Defense is supporting the efforts of the Di-

rector, NSA, to obtain additional super grades from the Civil Service
Commission. Further, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower
and Personnel) is seeking as a priority matter (within existing legis-
lation) to meet the request of the Director, NSA, for further induce-
ments to selected consultants and privileges for civilians employed
overseas. The consultant problem is not confined to NSA alone, and
the Department prefers to resolve it for NSA as part of an over-all De-
partment of Defense solution. Such additional legislation as may be
required to achieve these objectives is also under consideration.

Reference presumably is to the law relating to the compensation of the profes-

sional and scientific services in the War and Navy Departments, approved August 1,
1947. (61 Stat. 715)

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Appendix I

Part 1—The National Security Agency (Pages 1–58)

Recommendation 1

(page 46): That NSC direct USCIB to establish

COMINT requirements in the light of COMINT realities and consid-
eration of capabilities of other intelligence sources. This operational
guidance to NSA should be so clear and succinct as to require mini-
mum interpretation of what is required and of its degree of importance.
USCIB should be primarily concerned with end products and the Di-
rector, NSA, should determine the best way of producing same. If
USCIB fails after a reasonable length of time to provide more adequate
guidance to the Director, NSA, the latter should be made a member of
the IAC.

Agency Comment:

USCIB considers the first part of this recommen-

dation to be in hand in that a revised COMINT requirements list, pre-
pared with NSA participation, has been approved by a Working Com-
mittee within USCIB and will soon be presented for USCIB approval.
With respect to the second part of the recommendation, USCIB does not
believe that NSA membership on the IAC should be related to the de-
velopment of or failure to develop USCIB directives or requirements.

DOD concurs, but is doubtful that the problem to which the lat-

ter part of the recommendation is addressed would be solved by mak-
ing the Director, NSA, a member of the IAC. DOD is presently crys-
talizing its views on the general subject of intelligence and on the
ultimate organization of the top structure of U.S. intelligence. DOD pro-
poses to discuss the matter with State and CIA and hopes in due course,
together with those agencies, to arrive at an agreed proposal for sub-
mission.

Additional Action Required:

As to COMINT requirements—none. As

to NSA’s membership on the IAC—defer decision pending a determi-
nation as to whether USCIB’s revised COMINT requirements consti-
tute sufficient guidance for NSA. (In the interim consideration should
be given to granting observership status on the IAC to the Director,
NSA.)

Recommendation 2

(page 48): That the Director, NSA, be given clear

cut directives which will enable him to make much greater and con-
tinuing effort to produce high level communications intelligence. This
is of such great importance that monetary considerations should be
waived and an effort at least equal to the Manhattan Project should be
exerted at once. (It is noted that in forwarding Appendix I, Part 1, the

This section of Coyne’s report was classified Top Secret; U.S. Eyes Only; Handle

Via COMINT Channels Only.

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Task Force indicated that “the importance of the adoption of Recom-
mendation 2 is especially emphasized—this is believed to be vital to
the intelligence effort.”)

Agency Comment:

USCIB does not concur in the implication that

guidance or lack thereof has adversely affected the production of high
level communications intelligence. USCIB notes that “emphasis upon
the guidance factor has tended to obscure the real, and critical, weak-
ness which does exist, namely, [

4 lines not declassified

]. As to the pro-

posed initiation of efforts in this field along the lines of the Manhattan
Project, USCIB states that it is not now in a position to determine the
nature and scope of the increased effort which might be applied to the
solution of COMINT’s chief problem [

less than 1 line not declassified

USCIB believes it will be in a better position to decide this matter as a
result of NSA’s plan for implementing the new COMINT objectives list,
or as a result of a special study which is being undertaken by highly
qualified, technical experts in an effort to [

less than 1 line not declassi-

fied

] problem referred to above. USCIB is convinced that maximum as-

sistance would be provided to NSA in the solution of its major prob-
lem by the [

2 lines not declassified

]. Based thereon, the Special Committee

of the NSC for COMINT (Sec/State and Sec/Def) has agreed that an
optimum, if not indeed a prerequisite, step toward [

2 lines not declassi-

fied

] and should be accorded maximum priority. To that end the Spe-

cial Committee has authorized marshalling of all relevant [

less than 1

line not declassified

] resources of the intelligence agencies.

Additional Action Required:

Reconsideration by NSC’s Special Com-

mittee for COMINT of the recommended expansion of NSA’s efforts.

Observation:

Such reconsideration should be deferred pending

completion of the study and related steps referred to by USCIB and
summarized above.

Recommendation 3

(page 49): That ELINT and COMINT be inte-

grated to the extent of placing ELINT under NSA for analysis of the
product and guidance and coordination in the collection and dissemi-
nation of ELINT. The authority of operational commanders over the
integral ELINT resources, however, should not be abridged. USCIB or
the combined board which is recommended in this report to replace it
should exercise only policy control over ELINT matters.

Agency Comment:

USCIB believes this recommendation has been

overtaken by the issuance of NSCID No. 17

and by the DOD Direc-

Document 259.

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tive on ELINT dated July 13, 1955.

USCIB believes no further action

should be taken on this recommendation until these recent directives
have been implemented and tried.

Additional Action Required:

Following a reasonable trial period the

reference directives should be re-examined in the light of this recom-
mendation.

Observation:

The USCIB response is unclear. By inference it appears

that ELINT has not been placed under NSA, as recommended by the
Task Force.

Recommendation 4

(page 50): That the military services and NSA

continue to strive for a higher degree of cryptographic security; that
the problem of communications security be restudied by USCSB (or
the combined board as recommended in this report) with a view to re-
ducing to the lowest practicable level the quantity of information re-
leased through telecommunications; and that NSC 168

be re-examined

to ascertain if the Director, NSA, has sufficient authority to carry out
his COMSEC responsibilities.

Agency Comment:

USCIB agrees with the need for a higher degree

of communications security and feels that efforts to attain this end
should continue; however, it does not consider that the recommenda-
tion falls within the purview of USCIB.

USCSB reports that, at all times, the military services and NSA

keep the problem of cryptographic security under thorough review.
USCSB concurs in the recommended review of NSC 168, but notes that
in essence this review is already underway pursuant to the provisions
of NSC 168 itself.

Recommendation 5

(page 51): That a single board with appropriate

technical subcommittees have policy guidance over communications
intelligence and communications security. If the recommendation to
place the evaluation and analysis of ELINT under NSA is adopted, then
policy guidance for ELINT as well as COMINT and COMSEC should
be exercised by the proposed single board.

Agency Comment:

USCIB is not now willing to recommend estab-

lishment of a single board “because the basic functions and organiza-
tional arrangements within a number of the interested agencies are suf-
ficiently divergent to justify the continued separate existence of USCIB
and USCSB.” USCSB opposes the recommendation because of the dif-
ficulties of implementation which would result from the establishment
of a single board, as proposed.

Document 230.

The title of NSC 168, November 1953 was “Communications Security.” Docu-

mentation on this NSC paper is in the National Archives, RG 273, Policy Papers.

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Recommendation 6

(page 51): That DOD study the organizational

structure and proper positioning within its respective services of the
three cryptologic agencies—AFSS, ASA, and NSG—with a view toward
improving their prestige and effectiveness, thereby strengthening their
personnel assignment policies and logistic support.

Agency Comment:

USCIB endorses the aim of this recommendation

but considers it a problem internal to DOD. DOD believes that one
means of achieving the objective of this recommendation is to consti-
tute the service cryptologic agencies as major commands. The Air Force
Cryptologic Agency (AFSS) has been so constituted for about seven
years. The Army Cryptologic Agency (ASA) was designated as a ma-
jor command following the submission of the Task Force Report. The
Navy Cryptologic activity (NSG) is not so constituted at present; DOD
will in the near future ask the Secretary of the Navy to review his cryp-
tologic organization to determine whether it might be re-established
on a basis paralleling that of the Army and the Air Force.

Recommendation 7

(page 52): That the military services give greater

attention to selecting officers for COMINT duties, assign regular or “ca-
reer” reserve officers to the maximum extent possible, indoctrinate of-
ficers in COMINT prior to sending them to command field stations,
and establish career opportunities for specialists equal to those of the
line or general service officers. Rotation and replacement procedures
should be improved. The feasibility of using civilian intercept opera-
tors should be tested. It is also recommended that Congress enact leg-
islation to authorize NSA to employ especially qualified retired mili-
tary personnel with no restriction on the number so employed. Such
legislation should also permit Sec. Def. to recall active officers to duty
with NSA and have those officers counted against the authorized
strength of NSA, but not of the respective military services.

Agency Comment:

USCIB concurs in this recommendation. DOD re-

ports that full consideration of these proposals is currently in progress
within DOD.

Recommendation 8

(page 54): That the Secretary of Defense give fur-

ther consideration to the allocation of an appropriate number of “su-
per grades” and positions under Public Law 313 to NSA; to the possi-
bility of further inducements or higher pay to selected consultants; and
to privileges extended to civilians overseas.

Agency Comment:

USCIB concurs in this recommendation. DOD

also concurs and is taking the steps it deems appropriate in an effort
to accomplish the objectives of this recommendation.

Recommendation 9

(page 55): That USCIB or its successor board clar-

ify the objectives and functions of intelligence liaison detachments with
NSA, establish uniform procedures to be followed for such detach-
ments in their relationship with NSA, and specify maximum numbers

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of personnel to be assigned for liaison duties after examining the ex-
tent of interest of each agency concerned. Intelligence personnel as-
signed to liaison duty with NSA should be required to attend an in-
doctrination course conducted by NSA.

Agency Comment:

USCIB does not concur in this recommendation.

It agrees that mutual familarization with the requirements, capabilities
and operations of both NSA and consumer agencies is desirable; it feels,
however, that because the necessary functions of intelligence liaison
detachments vary continuously with the missions of the consumer
agencies and the character of COMINT production activities, the
arrangements called for by this recommendation cannot successfully
be rendered uniform.

Additional Action Required:

Decision as to whether the view of the

Task Force or the view of USCIB should be adopted.

Observation:

USCIB’s view is most sound. The Task Force recom-

mendation should be rejected.

Recommendation 10

(page 56): That NSA and the three cryptologic

services give greater emphasis to, and continue to develop mutual co-
operation in, improving the technical factors of intercept stations.

Agency Comment:

USCIB concurs. Greater emphasis has been given

this matter and USCIB considers the arrangements which have been
undertaken in this regard to be satisfactory.

Recommendation 11

(page 56): That more thorough periodic re-

investigations of personnel be made. Particular effort should be con-
centrated on persons occupying the more sensitive positions.

Agency Comment:

USCIB has established a special committee to in-

vestigate the matter, and USCIB is prepared to act on whatever rec-
ommendations are made by that committee.

Observation:

See “Observation” Section of Chapter X, Recommen-

dation 3.

Recommendation 12

(page 57): That the Director, NSA, be given au-

thority to inspect the service cryptologic schools and make appropri-
ate recommendations for improvement where COMINT is affected.

Agency Comment:

USCIB concurs.

Part 2—Communications and Electronics in Support of Intelligence

Activities (Pages 1–44)

Recommendation 1

(page 37): That an Intelligence Communications

and Electronics Subcommittee (ICES) to the Combined Intelligence
Board (this assumes that USCIB and USCSB have been combined into
a single board, as proposed elsewhere in the report) be established to
review and produce recommendations to the Combined Intelligence
Board with respect to all communications and electronics proposals

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from intelligence activities which call for facilities, equipments, or ad-
ditional personnel which cannot be obtained from existing resources;
and to supply technical advice to the Board on such matters as it might
request.

Agency Comment:

USCIB does not agree. It believes that the spirit

of this recommendation is being accomplished by expert communica-
tions and electronics advice provided from within the agencies con-
cerned with the subject.

Additional Action Required:

None, assuming the USCIB comment

on this recommendation is accurate.

Recommendation 2

(page 38): That more effective use be made

within DOD of the high potential value and know-how available in the
Joint Communications-Electronics Committee of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to deal with communications and electronics problems related to
the broad intelligence field. Responsibility should be placed on that
group for reviewing and commenting on communications and elec-
tronics requirements that the NSA considers necessary to meet the in-
telligence objectives, and the demands being placed by NSA on the
special communications and electronics groups in the military services
under NSA operational control; and for submitting recommendations
to the Secretary of Defense on ways and means to insure maximum co-
ordination and effectiveness in the over-all communications and elec-
tronics effort in support of intelligence.

Agency Comment:

USCIB considers that existing procedures for re-

viewing and commenting on NSA requirements are satisfactory.

Recommendation 3

(page 38): That more effective technical advice

be injected into USCIB deliberations to permit development of more
appropriate statements of the intelligence objectives to be accomplished
by communications or electronics means.

Agency Comment:

USCIB agrees with the spirit of this recommen-

dation and believes that it is now being carried into effect.

Recommendation 4

(page 38): That the present basic policy for the

provision of point-to-point communications services to intelligence
community activities from existing governmental or civil communica-
tions services be continued. That any attempt to set up separate, du-
plicate, or paralleling point-to-point communications facilities be au-
thorized only when the necessity therefor has been fully reviewed and
agreed to by the Intelligence Communications and Electronics Sub-
committee recommended in Recommendation 1, above.

Agency Comment:

USCIB concurs in the first sentence of the rec-

ommendation. It agrees with the second sentence to the extent of be-
lieving that no separate facilities should be established for intelligence
use without full consideration by appropriate authority.

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Recommendation 5

(page 39): That a basic policy of utilizing exist-

ing facilities, services, and equipment to the maximum degree be ap-
plied wherever it is determined to be technically feasible in the
COMINT, ELINT, and COMSEC operations (this applies particularly
to certain aspects of the technical training phases, operational proce-
dures, and logistics); that exceptions to this policy be authorized only
when the necessity therefor has been fully reviewed and agreed to by
the Intelligence Communications and Electronics Subcommittee rec-
ommended in Recommendation 1, above.

Agency Comment:

USCIB considers that the spirit of this recom-

mendation is now being carried out. It does not agree that the additional
review (called for in the last sentence) is either necessary or desirable.

Recommendation 6

(page 39): That any arrangements with respect

to centralized control of ELINT give adequate consideration to the im-
mediate and vital interest of the military in this field and the need to
keep electronic countermeasures (ECM)—a tactical weapon—clearly
under military operational control.

Agency Comment:

USCIB believes that this recommendation has

been overtaken by the issuance of NSCID 17 and the related Depart-
ment of Defense Directive of July 13, 1955.

Recommendation 7

(page 39): That all planning and operation of

communications and electronics efforts in support of intelligence ac-
tivities include full consideration of the following to meet national
emergency conditions:

a. Day-to-day operation and training be based on realism in light

of the situation and facilities expected to be available in time of war or

national emergency. This applies in a special manner to planning op-

erations to be effective in case of heavy jamming operations.

b. Key intelligence installations, served by costly, hard-to-replace

electronics equipment and associated records be located outside es-

tablished target areas. That these installations have integrated plans for

national emergency or disaster operations. That all agencies involved

in planning new, alternate, or emergency locations for Federal agen-

cies expedite action to assist NSA in its current efforts to obtain a suit-

able site.

c. Pending accomplishment of b, that effective interim disaster

plans be developed promptly for each key intelligence installation to

include as a minimum (1) alternate site, (2) installed and tested mini-

mum equipment with necessary basic records at the alternate site, and

(3) adequate knowledge of disaster plans by key personnel.

Agency Comment:

USCIB concurs in Recommendation 7-a and con-

siders that it is now being carried out. USCIB agrees in principle with
Recommendation 7-b but notes that the great extension of target areas
by fallout hazards would require relocation at such great distances that
reduction in operational efficiency would be unacceptable and the
agency concerned would be unable to retain or attract key personnel.

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USCIB reports that plans for the location of alternate NSA sites are now
being developed by DOD. USCIB concurs in Recommendation 7-c and
reports that it is being carried into effect except for bulky, costly, and
complex cryptoanalytic machinery.

Recommendation 8

(page 40): That the present basic communica-

tions (cryptographic) security plan, providing for centralized control
with effective decentralization of operations, be continued; that each
agency and service maintain effective inspection and vigorous training
programs to reduce to the minimum cryptographic operational secu-
rity violations.

Agency Comment:

USCSB concurs, noting that the Communications

Security Plan referred to represents, in reality, a number of communi-
cations security arrangements each of which is considered satisfactory.

Recommendation 9

(page 40): That NSC determine ways and means

to control more effectively release of valuable intelligence to potential
enemies via clear text messages being transmitted over government
and civil communication networks.

Agency Comment:

USCSB considers that the policy responsibility

for control of governmental clear text messages falls within its charter.
It reports that it has long recognized this problem and is working to-
ward its solution. It does not believe that the problem is one for NSC
consideration. USCSB considers that the policy responsibility for con-
trol of nongovernmental clear text messages over civil communications
networks is outside its purview.

Additional Action Required:

Referral of the nongovernmental aspects

of the subject to Commerce for consideration in the light of its NSC-
assigned responsibilities relating to the safeguarding of unclassified
strategic information.

Recommendation 10

(page 40): That the general tendency within the

communications intelligence and the communications security agen-
cies to overemphasize the special security facets of their operations
with respect to basic communications and electronics features be ex-
amined objectively and comprehensively by [a] competent, technically
qualified authority to insure that such overemphasis is not producing
unnecessary duplication of facilities and operations in peacetime which
will grow to completely unrealistic figures in wartime, and producing
a system which may fail in an emergency because it will require con-
siderable readjustment of basic operational practices at a critical time.

Agency Comment:

USCIB believes existing procedures for review of

communications requirements are adequate. USCIB does not believe that
the security aspects of COMINT are significantly overemphasized. Ac-
cordingly, USCIB opposes creation of the special committee called for by
this recommendation. USCSB, in essence, concurs in USCIB’s view; it be-
lieves that no separate examination of the problem is required.

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Recommendation 11

(page 41): “SPECIAL RECOMMENDATION”:

That the President set up a special commission composed of techni-
cally qualified civil and military communications and electronics rep-
resentatives, to survey and produce recommendations as to ways and
means to insure the more effective utilization of all communications
and electronics resources of the United States in the national interests
in case of war or national emergency. (This recommendation was sin-
gled out by the Task Force as one worthy of special emphasis and as
one believed to be of great importance.)

Agency Comment:

ODM expressed the view (7/6/55)

that the Re-

port which was shortly thereafter to be made to the NSC by the Sci-
ence Advisory Committee would contain organizational recommen-
dations somewhat more far reaching than those suggested in the Task
Force Report and, if adopted, would probably satisfy the recommen-
dations of the Task Force Report.

Additional Action Required:

DOD, ODM and CIA views should be

obtained on this recommendation, including recommendations as to
its implementation. (The ODM comment of 7/6/55 is not specific
enough to assess the validity of the Task Force recommendation.)

Appendix II

The Clandestine Services of the Central Intelligence Agency

Recommendation 1

(page 42): That the “covert intelligence” and

“cold war functions” of the Deputy Director/Plans be assigned to sep-
arate Deputy Directors whose areas of responsibility should be ad-
ministratively and logistically self-supporting.

Agency Comment:

CIA does not concur, noting that the recom-

mended system had been tried prior to 1952 and abandoned; that CIA’s
experience during the period of separate operations proved the oper-
ational disadvantages of attempting to conduct on a secure and effi-
cient basis two worldwide clandestine organizations, each compart-
mented from the other.

Additional Action Required:

See Chapter II, Recommendation 1,

Page 1, above.

Recommendation 2

(page 42): That the part of CIA’s July 15, 1952

Directive appointing area division chiefs as executives of the DCI and
providing for their direct dealing with him and senior overseas repre-
sentatives

be rescinded.

Not found.

This section of Coyne’s report was classified Top Secret.

Printed in Warner, ed.,

The CIA Under Harry Truman,

pp. 465–467.

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Agency Comment:

CIA reports this Directive has been reviewed and

rescinded.

Recommendation 3

(page 42): That the DCI re-establish the office of

Executive Director of that agency.

Agency Comment:

CIA is opposed to this recommendation on the

ground that the interposition of another command echelon would not
necessarily accomplish the intent of the recommendation. Further
study, however, is being given the subject.

Observation:

Because this is purely of an intra-agency character, it

would seem appropriate to defer to DCI’s judgment thereon.

Recommendation 4

(page 42): That CIA’s espionage and counteres-

pionage programs against Soviet targets be intensified.

Agency Comment:

CIA concurs fully, noting that it is assiduously

pursuing the course recommended. Recent organizational changes
have stimulated a more intensified effort on the part of the clandestine
services in the espionage and counterespionage fields.

Recommendation 5

(page 42): That the proposed annual CIA psy-

chological warfare budget and allocations be submitted for NSC ap-
proval and subsequent changes presented by DCI to the OCB.

Agency Comment:

CIA does not agree. CIA notes that the recom-

mendation is inconsistent with the charter and function of the NSC;
that NSC is an organ for the formulation of basic policy; that NSC does
not have the time and staff required to consider details of budgets and
funds allocation. CIA notes that in developing its psychological war-
fare budget, it is careful to conform to policy established by the Coun-
cil, and to request Council authorization for any proposed action which
is not covered by existing policy. In addition it is the practice of DCI
to keep the NSC closely informed concerning psychological warfare
programs.

Additional Action Required:

Decision as to whether the Task Force

recommendation should be adopted.

Observation:

In view of the reasons advanced by CIA, all of which

are valid, the Task Force recommendation should not be adopted.

Recommendation 6

(page 42): That the inducement phase of the De-

fector Program, as applicable to active participation by diplomatic and
military representatives serving overtly abroad, be discontinued.

Agency Comment:

CIA does not concur. It notes that cover em-

ployed by CIA personnel overseas often precludes direct contact with
potential defectors and the use of overt diplomatic and military per-
sonnel for this purpose is a natural and essential adjunct to the defec-
tor program, provided their activities are closely coordinated with
CIA. CIA believes that the fact that such work may result in occasional
embarrassment is a calculated risk which it considers worthwhile

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inasmuch as the intelligence and cold war gains for defection or re-
cruitment of Soviet personnel are considerable.

Additional Action Required:

Expeditious review of NSCID No. 13 by

IAC and, if necessary, NSC.

Observation:

This recommendation of the Task Force is not fully

consistent with its recommendations on pages 137 and 205. (On page
137 the Task Force recommends greater participation by the military
services in the Soviet and Satellite defector inducement program; on
page 205 the Task Force recommends that the military services be per-
mitted greater latitude in offering inducements to potential defectors.)

Recommendation 7

(page 43): That the program for training of spe-

cialists in covert intelligence collection and for the development of lin-
guists be intensified.

Agency Comment:

CIA concurs and has in effect a number of meas-

ures the objectives of which coincide with this recommendation. A
mandatory quota of five per cent of all clandestine service personnel
are in training at all times.

Recommendation 8

(page 43): That submission of individual budg-

ets to the CIA Project Review Committee by the area division chiefs be
discontinued and funds for each cold war component be prepared un-
der the supervision of its chief and submitted for the component to the
Project Review Committee.

Agency Comment:

CIA observes that this recommendation is based

on a separation of CIA “cold war” and “covert intelligence functions”
with which CIA does not concur. It notes, however, that in relation to
its existing organization the programming system of the clandestine
services now being put into operation assures a review by the DDP
and his staff of the budget recommendations of the area divisions of
CIA clandestine services.

Recommendation 9

(page 43): That the number of auditors of the

regular CIA audit staff be increased materially.

Agency Comment:

CIA concurs. This action is being taken as rap-

idly as possible in line with an internal organization survey made by
CIA several months ago.

Recommendation 10

(page 43): That greater efforts be exerted to

establish long-range deep cover for CIA personnel serving covertly
overseas.

Agency Comment:

CIA concurs. It has been working toward the ob-

jective of this proposal for many years. As a result of a current review
of all aspects of “cover,” recommendations are now being studied
which are designed to produce better results in this complex field.

Recommendation 11

(page 43): That the NSC render a specific in-

terpretation of the provisions of paragraph 4-b, NSC 5412/1 as it af-
fects the several members of the intelligence community.

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National Security Council Intelligence Directives,
1950–1955

252. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 13

Washington, January 19, 1950.

EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET AND SATELLITE DEFECTORS

OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102(d)(4) of the National Se-

curity Act of 1947,

as amended, Section 4(a)(7) of NSC 50,

and NSCID

No. 5,

the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that:

1. It is in accord with the best U.S. tradition to endeavor to pro-

tect and assist those fleeing from persecution. Under present condi-
tions, and with due regard for the effects of such action on the diplo-
matic and political interests of the United States, it is also in the
important interests of national security that defectors be welcomed and
assisted in obtaining a degree of personal and economic security and
made to feel that there is a place for them in a free society. The best
sources of information and intelligence on the Soviet world, necessary
in the interests of the national security, are defectors from Soviet con-
trol. The most effective agents to destroy the communist myth of the
Soviet paradise are defectors who are able to tell the truth about con-
ditions of life behind the Iron Curtain.

2. The term “defectors” is here employed to denote individuals

who escape from the control of the USSR or countries in the Soviet or-
bit, or who, being outside such jurisdiction or control, are unwilling
to return to it,

and

who are of special interest to the U.S. Government

(a) because they are able to add valuable new or confirmatory infor-
mation to existing U.S. knowledge of the Soviet world, (b) because they
are of operational value to a U.S. agency, or (c) because their defection
can be exploited in the psychological field.

a. A

potential defector

is a person who may reasonably be expected

to become a defector if he is induced to do so.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95,

NSCIDs. Top Secret. NSCID No. 13 received NSC approval by memorandum action on
January 19. (Ibid., Records of Action by the National Security Council)

61 Stat. 495–510.

See

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment,

Document 384.

Ibid., Document 423.

790

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b. A

declared defector

is a person who has left the service of his

country and therefore requires protection and assistance.

Inducement

means the commission of an act by, or manifestly at

the instigation of, an American official which is demonstrably intended

to bring about a defection and for which the U.S. Government might,

if the act were discovered, be called upon to account.

Potential Defectors

3. CIA shall be responsible for inducing the defection of potential

defectors, except in the cases where it is manifestly in the interest of
security or efficiency that representatives of other agencies undertake
such action.

Declared Defectors

4. The ranking American official in the area concerned shall be re-

sponsible for determining the manner and degree to which the ac-
ceptance or rejection of a declared defector may affect the diplomatic
and political interests of the United States. Any overt publicity and
propaganda exploitation of a defector shall be coordinated with the
Department of State.

5. The Central Intelligence Agency shall be responsible for the

covert exploitation of defectors, and shall, within the framework of
paragraph 4, coordinate all matters concerned with the handling and
disposition of declared defectors from the Soviet Union and the satel-
lite states in order to assure the effective exploitation of all defectors
for operational, intelligence, or psychological purposes by the U.S. Gov-
ernment.

6. CIA shall seek the guidance of the appropriate Departments to

insure that no action taken under this directive jeopardizes the mili-
tary, security, political, or diplomatic interests of the United States and
shall keep the other IAC agencies adequately informed of actions taken
with respect to individual defector cases.

7. Subject to the over-all direction of the Chief of Mission, CIA

representatives in the field shall have operating responsibility outside
U.S. occupied areas for:

a. Providing secure facilities and preliminary assessment of a de-

fector’s bona fides and his intelligence or other potential value to the

U.S. Government.

b. Assuring that the other IAC agencies have adequate opportu-

nity to exploit a defector for intelligence or operational purposes, in-

cluding immediate access to the defector in the field.

c. Arranging secure movement of defectors as required.

8. In U.S. occupied areas CIA shall establish, together with the De-

partment of State and that military department having executive au-
thority in the area, adequate procedures designed to carry out the ob-
ligations listed in paragraphs 7 a–c.

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9. Field representatives of the IAC agencies shall be responsible for:

a. Informing promptly the ranking American official and the CIA

representative of any potential or declared defector who comes to their

attention.

b. Directly or through questionnaires, representing the intelli-

gence interests of their respective agencies in the debriefing of such

defectors.

10. To the extent that there are available funds, CIA shall be re-

sponsible for the final disposal and rehabilitation of defectors. The IAC
agencies shall provide all possible assistance to CIA in establishing
rapid and effective means of disposal.

11. If it appears to be in the national interest to bring a defector

to the United States for intelligence purposes or operational use, CIA
shall be responsible for coordinating with the interested departments
and agencies for policy approval and for making necessary arrange-
ments in advance for entry. CIA shall also be responsible for handling
and disposal of the defector in agreement with the interested depart-
ments or agencies. In each case, notice and full available biographic
and background information will be given to the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation in advance. No commitments for entry for intelligence pur-
poses or operational use will be made by any United States official
without coordination and notice as set forth in this paragraph.

253. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 14

Washington, March 3, 1950.

EXPLOITATION OF DEFECTORS AND OTHER ALIENS WITHIN

THE UNITED STATES

Pursuant to the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947,

as amended, and Section 4 of NSC 50,

the National Security Council,

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95,

NSCIDs. Top Secret. NSCID No. 14 received NSC approval by memorandum action on
March 3. (Ibid., Records of Action by the National Security Council)

61 Stat. 495–510.

See

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment,

Document 384.

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with the concurrence of the Attorney General of the United States,
hereby authorizes and directs that:

1. Exploitation of aliens within the U.S. for internal security pur-

poses shall be the responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Exploitation of aliens as sources of foreign intelligence information or
for other foreign intelligence purposes shall be the responsibility of the
Central Intelligence Agency. This allocation to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and to the Central Intelligence Agency of separate areas
of alien exploitation responsibility does not preclude joint exploitation,
which must be encouraged whenever feasible. It further carries with it
the obligation for each agency to give to the other, without delay and
directly, all information pertinent to the activities and responsibilities
of that other agency, such as the FBI notifying CIA promptly of aliens
of potential foreign intelligence interest who may come to its attention
and CIA notifying FBI of information it obtains relating to internal se-
curity problems.

2. Exploitation of aliens by the Central Intelligence Agency or by

the other member agencies of the Intelligence Advisory Committee
shall be conducted for the following purposes:

a. To obtain foreign intelligence information required in the in-

terests of national security or by the member agencies of the Intelli-
gence Advisory Committee.

b. To obtain internal security information or other data required

by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the discharge of its domestic
responsibilities.

c. For such other purposes as the National Security Council shall

deem to be in the interests of national security.

3. In the case of any official, employee, or other individual offi-

cially attached to a foreign government or one of its agencies, an offi-
cial of a political party officially recognized by its government, or an
official of an international organization, in an overt or covert capacity,
who defects within the United States, the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion shall:

a. Immediately notify CIA, as well as the other IAC members and

other interested agencies, of the actual or potential defection.

b. Determine insofar as is possible the legitimacy of such reported

potential or actual defection within the United States, and whether the
individual’s determination to defect or his defection is or is not known
to his government.

c. Immediately notify the Attorney General and the Department

of State of the identity of the individual concerned and his official con-
nection with a foreign government, as well as his status as a defector.
Comments and observations will be solicited from the Attorney Gen-
eral and the State Department.

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d. Be initially responsible for exploitation of all such actual or po-

tential defectors, and maintain sole jurisdiction over them until com-
pletion of its internal security exploitation, unless it is jointly deter-
mined that the foreign intelligence interest shall be paramount in the
particular case.

e. Determine whether such potential defector can be utilized in a

clandestine capacity and when so utilized provide through CIA, or the
other interested agency, for satisfaction of foreign intelligence require-
ments. Appropriate security restrictions will be agreed upon in indi-
vidual cases. If, for operational reasons, it is not possible for the FBI to
immediately fulfill foreign intelligence requirements of the other
agency, such notice will be provided to CIA and the other agency.

f. Make immediately available to CIA with copies to interested

IAC members all foreign intelligence information resulting from the
initial exploitation of such a defector, and provide, through established
channels, for his interview by other member agencies of the IAC upon
their request, prior to the full exhaustion of internal security require-
ments if feasible.

g. On request by CIA, arrange for the transfer of such a defector

to the jurisdiction of the CIA upon completion of its internal security
exploitation, unless it is jointly determined that the foreign intelligence
interest is paramount prior to that time. The CIA will assume respon-
sibility for necessary maintenance and custody during the period of its
exploitation and shall be responsible for the final disposal and reha-
bilitation of all such defectors. Internal security problems will remain
the responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The final
disposition of the alien and reimbursement of maintenance expenses
will be determined by mutual agreement in advance among the CIA
and interested agencies in each case, based upon future operational
considerations.

h. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102(e) of the National Se-

curity Act of 1947, as amended, upon the written request of the Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence, provide all available information and per-
tinent observations with respect to the internal security factors involved
in the exploitation of each defector for foreign intelligence information.

4. In the case of aliens within the U.S., other than those covered

in paragraph 3 above, CIA shall:

a. Be responsible for their exploitation for foreign intelligence un-

der the provisions of NSCID No. 7.

Ibid., Document 427.

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b. In order that the statutory responsibilities and domestic intel-

ligence jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may be ad-
equately handled and in order to prevent confusion in internal secu-
rity matters, the CIA or any other authorized intelligence agency will,
prior to exploiting an alien within the United States, advise the FBI in
advance of the exploitation. The FBI will then provide information it
has which may be of assistance in the exploitation by the other agency
and will make such observations as are pertinent, including notice that
exploitation by the other agency would interfere with matters involved
in internal security or execution of the statutory obligations of the FBI.

c. After determining priorities, arrange for exploitation of the alien

for foreign intelligence purposes by any other IAC agency or agencies
which may request independent exploitation of the alien. The CIA will
assume responsibility for necessary maintenance and custody during
the period of exploitation. During the period of such maintenance, in-
ternal security problems will remain the responsibility of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, except as is provided below. Reimbursement
of maintenance expenses will be determined by mutual agreement in
advance among the CIA and interested agencies in each case.

d. Notify the FBI immediately of information obtained through its

own facilities or from other IAC agencies that an alien within the U.S.
has defected or may defect. To accomplish this end, the other IAC agen-
cies will transmit without delay all such pertinent information to the
CIA and the FBI.

5. If it appears to be in the national interest to bring a defector to

the United States for intelligence purposes or operational use under
the provisions of this Directive, CIA shall be responsible for coordi-
nating with the other interested departments and agencies for policy
approval and for making necessary arrangements in advance for en-
try. CIA shall also be responsible for handling and disposal of the de-
fector in agreement with the interested departments or agencies, and
until such disposal will make adequate provisions to insure that the
defector does not endanger the internal security of the United States.
In each case, notice and full available biographic and background in-
formation will be given to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in ad-
vance. No commitments for entry for intelligence purposes or opera-
tional use will be made by any United States official without
coordination and notice as set forth in this paragraph.

6. Any overt publicity and propaganda exploitation of a defector

shall be coordinated with the Department of State.

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254. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 15

Washington, June 13, 1951.

COORDINATION AND PRODUCTION OF FOREIGN

ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 (d) of the National Se-

curity Act of 1947,

as amended, the National Security Council hereby

authorizes and directs the Central Intelligence Agency to perform the
following functions with respect to foreign economic intelligence re-
lating to the national security:

1. Maintain a continuing review of the requirements of the United

States Government for foreign economic intelligence relating to the na-
tional security, and of the facilities and arrangements available to meet
those requirements, making from time to time such recommendations
to the National Security Council concerning improvements as may re-
quire National Security Council action.

2. Insure through regular procedures that the full economic

knowledge and technical talent available in the Government is brought
to bear on important issues involving national security, including is-
sues on which assistance is requested by the National Security Coun-
cil or members thereof.

3. Evaluate, through regular procedures, the pertinence, extent,

and quality of the foreign economic data available bearing on national
security issues, and develop ways in which quality could be improved
and gaps could be filled.

4. Conduct, as a service of common concern, such foreign eco-

nomic research and produce such foreign economic intelligence as may
be required (a) to supplement that produced by other agencies either
in the appropriate discharge of their regular departmental missions or
in fulfillment of assigned intelligence responsibilities; (b) to fulfill re-
quests of the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

Source: Truman Library, President’s Secretary Files, Subject File. Confidential.

NSCID No. 15 was approved by the NSC at its 94th meeting on June 13 (NSC Action
No. 495). (National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records
of Action by the National Security Council) A correction to NSCID No. 15 was issued
on June 22. The text was unchanged, the only change being a minor adjustment to
format.

61 Stat. 495–510.

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255. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 5 Revised

Washington, August 28, 1951.

ESPIONAGE AND COUNTERESPIONAGE OPERATIONS

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 (d) of the National Se-

curity Act of 1947,

the National Security Council hereby authorizes

and directs that:

1. The Director of Central Intelligence shall conduct all organized

Federal espionage operations outside the United States and its pos-
sessions for the collection of foreign intelligence information required
to meet the needs of all Departments and Agencies concerned, in con-
nection with the national security, except for certain agreed activities
by other Departments and Agencies.

2. The Director of Central Intelligence shall conduct all organized

Federal counterespionage operations outside the United States and its
possessions and in occupied areas, provided that this authority shall
not be construed to preclude the counter-intelligence activities of any
army, navy or air command or installation and certain agreed activi-
ties by Departments and Agencies necessary for the security of such
organizations.

3. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for co-

ordinating covert and overt intelligence collection activities.

4. When casual agents are employed or otherwise utilized by an

IAC Department or Agency in other than an overt capacity, the Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence shall coordinate their activities with the or-
ganized covert activities.

5. The Director of Central Intelligence shall disseminate such in-

telligence information to the various Departments and Agencies which
have an authorized interest therein.

6. All other National Security Council Intelligence Directives or

implementing supplements shall be construed to apply solely to overt
intelligence activities unless otherwise specified.

Source: National Archives, RG 273, NSCIDs. Top Secret. This revision of NSCID

No. 5, December 12, 1947 (see

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence

Establishment, Document 423) added paragraphs 7–10. These paragraphs were proposed
by the Department of Defense and circulated to the NSC under cover of July 30 and Au-
gust 8 memoranda from NSC Executive Secretary Lay. (Truman Library, President’s Sec-
retary’s Files, Subject File) The revised NSCID No. 5 was approved by the NSC by mem-
orandum action on August 28 (NSC Action No. 534). It was circulated to Council
members by Lay by a memorandum of the same date. (Ibid.)

61 Stat. 495–510.

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7. In an occupied area, the representative of the Director of Cen-

tral Intelligence will coordinate espionage and counterespionage op-
erations in or from the area with the senior U.S. Representative and
keep the Senior U.S. Military Commander informed in general of the
clandestine collection activities conducted by DCI in or from such area.

8. In an area other than theaters of war or occupied areas, the rep-

resentative of the Director of Central Intelligence will keep the senior
U.S. Representative appropriately advised of the espionage and coun-
terespionage operations in or from the area.

9. When CIA requires Service support for espionage and coun-

terespionage projects, such support as may be authorized by the De-
partment of Defense will be planned jointly with the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.

10. In time of war or when the President directs, the Director of

Central Intelligence will coordinate espionage and counterespionage
operations in or from a theater of active military operations with the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. In active theaters of war, where American forces
are engaged, representatives of the Director of Central Intelligence con-
ducting espionage and counterespionage operations in or from the the-
ater shall be under the direct command of the United States theater
commander.

256. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1 Revised

Washington, March 28, 1952.

DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security

Act of 1947,

and for the purposes enunciated in paragraphs (d) and

798 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955

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Source: National Archives, RG 273, NSCIDs. Secret; Security Information. This re-

vised version of NSCID No. 1 was approved by the National Security Council by mem-
orandum action on March 28 (NSC Action No. 623). (National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC
Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council). NSCID No. 1 as
originally adopted by the NSC on December 12, 1947, is printed in

CIA Cold War Records,

The CIA Under Harry Truman,

pp. 169–171. For the revision of July 7, 1949, see

Foreign

Relations,

1945–1950, Emergency of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 385 and

Document 431, footnote 2. For the revision of January 19, 1950, see ibid., Document 432.

61 Stat. 495–510.

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(e) thereof, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs
that:

1. To maintain the relationship essential to coordination between

the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations, an
Intelligence Advisory Committee consisting of the Director of Central
Intelligence, who shall be chairman thereof, the Director, Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation, and the respective intelligence chiefs from the De-
partments of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force, and from the Joint Staff
(JCS), and the Atomic Energy Commission, or their representatives, shall
be established to advise the Director of Central Intelligence. The Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence will invite the chief, or his representative, of
any other intelligence Agency having functions related to the national
security to sit with the Intelligence Advisory Committee whenever mat-
ters within the purview of his Agency are to be discussed.

2. To the extent authorized by Section 102 (e) of the National Se-

curity Act of 1947, the Director of Central Intelligence, or representa-
tives designated by him, by arrangement with the head of the depart-
ment or agency concerned, shall make such surveys and inspections of
departmental intelligence material of the various Federal Departments
and Agencies relating to the national security as he may deem neces-
sary in connection with his duty to advise the NSC and to make rec-
ommendations for the coordination of intelligence activities.

3. Coordination of intelligence activities should be designed pri-

marily to strengthen the over-all governmental intelligence structure.
Primary departmental requirements shall be recognized and shall re-
ceive the cooperation and support of the Central Intelligence Agency.

a. The Director of Central Intelligence shall, in making recom-

mendations or giving advice to the National Security Council pertain-
ing to the intelligence activities of the various Departments and Agen-
cies, transmit therewith a statement indicating the concurrence or
non-concurrence of the members of the Intelligence Advisory Com-
mittee; provided that, when unanimity is not obtained among the De-
partment heads of the National Military Establishment, the Director of
Central Intelligence shall refer the problem to the Secretary of Defense
before presenting it to the National Security Council.

b. Recommendations of the Director of Central Intelligence shall,

when approved by the National Security Council, issue as Council
Directives to the Director of Central Intelligence. The respective intel-
ligence chiefs shall be responsible for insuring that such orders or
directives, when applicable, are implemented within their intelligence
organizations.

c. The Director of Central Intelligence shall act for the National Se-

curity Council to insure full and proper implementation of Council
directives by issuing such supplementary DCI directives as may be

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required. Such implementing directives in which the Intelligence Advi-
sory Committee concurs unanimously shall be issued by the Director
of Central Intelligence, and shall be implemented within the Depart-
ments and Agencies as provided in paragraph b. Where disagreement
arises between the Director of Central Intelligence and one or more
members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee over such directives,
the proposed directive, together with statements of non-concurrence,
shall be forwarded to the NSC for decision as provided in paragraph a.

4. The Director of Central Intelligence shall produce intelligence

relating to the national security, hereafter referred to as national intel-
ligence. In so far as practicable, he shall not duplicate the intelligence
activities and research of the various Departments and Agencies but
shall make use of existing intelligence facilities and shall utilize de-
partmental intelligence for such production purposes. For definitions
see NSCID No. 3.

5. a. The Director of Central Intelligence shall disseminate Na-

tional Intelligence to the President, to members of the National Secu-
rity Council, to the Intelligence Chiefs of the IAC Agencies, and to such
Governmental Departments and Agencies as the National Security
Council from time to time may designate. Intelligence so disseminated
shall be officially concurred in by the Intelligence Agencies or shall
carry a statement of substantially differing opinions.

b. Unless otherwise provided by law or NSC Directive, the Di-

rector of Central Intelligence is authorized to disseminate National In-
telligence on a strictly controlled basis to foreign governments and in-
ternational bodies upon determination by the Director of Central
Intelligence, concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee, that
such action would substantially promote the security of the United
States; provided that any disclosure of classified military information
included in such national intelligence is in accordance with the poli-
cies laid down in the U.S. National Disclosure Policy (MIC 206/29),

such determination to be made by the Army, Navy, and Air Force; and
provided further that any disclosure of FBI intelligence information
will be cleared with that Agency prior to dissemination.

6. Whenever any member of the Intelligence Advisory Commit-

tee obtains information that indicates an impending crisis situation,
such as the outbreak of hostilities involving the United States, or a con-
dition which affects the security of the United States to such an extent
that immediate action or decision on the part of the President or the

See

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment,

Document 426.

For a partial text of the National Disclosure Policy, see ibid., 1948, vol. I, Part 2,

p. 575.

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National Security Council seems to be required, he shall immediately
furnish the information to the other members of the Intelligence Ad-
visory Committee as well as to other officials or agencies as may be in-
dicated by the circumstances. The Director of Central Intelligence shall
immediately convene the Intelligence Advisory Committee. After re-
ceiving the views of the Intelligence Advisory Committee members,
the Director of Central Intelligence shall promptly prepare and dis-
seminate the national intelligence estimate in accordance with para-
graphs 4 and 5 above.

7. When Security Regulations of the originating Agency permit,

the Director of Central Intelligence shall disseminate to the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation and other Departments or Agencies intelligence
or intelligence information which he may possess when he deems such
dissemination appropriate to their functions relating to the national
security.

8. The Director of Central Intelligence shall perform for the ben-

efit of the existing intelligence Agencies such services of common con-
cern to these Agencies as the National Security Council determines can
be more efficiently accomplished centrally.

9. The intelligence organizations in each of the Departments and

Agencies shall maintain with the Central Intelligence Agency and with
each other, as appropriate to their respective responsibilities, a contin-
uing interchange of intelligence information and intelligence available
to them.

10. The intelligence files in each intelligence organization, includ-

ing the CIA, shall be made available under security regulations of the
Department or Agency concerned to the others for consultation.

11. The intelligence organizations within the limits of their capa-

bilities shall provide, or procure, such intelligence as may be requested
by the Director of Central Intelligence or by one of the other Depart-
ments or Agencies.

12. The Director of Central Intelligence shall make arrangements

with the respective Departments and Agencies to assign to the Central
Intelligence Agency such experienced and qualified officers and mem-
bers as may be of advantage for advisory, operational, or other purposes,
in addition to such personnel as the Director of Central Intelligence may
directly employ. In each case, such departmental personnel will be sub-
ject to the necessary personnel procedures of each Department.

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257. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 9 Revised

Washington, December 29, 1952.

COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 101 and Section 102 of the

National Security Act of 1947,

as amended, and to the Presidential di-

rective approved October 24, 1952,

which

a. Stated that the communications intelligence (COMINT) activi-

ties of the United States are a national responsibility, and that they must
be so organized and managed as to exploit to the maximum the avail-
able resources in all participating departments and agencies and to sat-
isfy the legitimate intelligence requirements of all such departments
and agencies;

b. Designated the Secretaries of State and Defense as a Special

Committee of the National Security Council for COMINT, which Com-
mittee shall, with the assistance of the Director of Central Intelligence,
establish policies governing COMINT activities, and keep the Presi-
dent advised of such policies through the Executive Secretary of the
National Security Council (The President in approving this direc-
tive also directed that the Attorney General shall be a member of the

Source: Truman Library, President’s Secretary’s Files, Subject File. Top Secret. The

March 10, 1950, version of NSCID No. 9, is

Foreign Relations,

1945–1950, Emergence of

the Intelligence Establishment, Document 435. For the original July 1, 1948, version, see
ibid, Source note. This version was originally issued on October 24, 1952. (Truman Li-
brary, President’s Secretary’s Files, Subject File) After its issuance, on October 31 the Di-
rector of the Federal Bureau of Investigation J. Edgar Hoover wrote to Executive Secre-
tary of the National Security Council Lay with three “observations.” First, Hoover wrote,
the Attorney General should be a member of the Special Committee whenever matters
of interest to the FBI were before the Committee. Second, the right of the USCIB “to in-
vestigate and study the standards and practices of its member agencies” was too broad.
Third, the authority of the NSA Director to “have direct access” and “technical control”
of “any elements” of the member agencies also was too broad (Ibid.) In his December
17 reply, Lay informed Hoover the decision of the Special Committee to amend NSCID
No. 9. There were three changes. First the sentence in parentheses at the end of pream-
bular paragraph “b” was added. Second, in paragraph 1 d. (1) the Secretary of Defense
and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation were added to those who were
given two votes. Finally, paragraph 4 was added. (Ibid.) Montague has an interesting ac-
count of the interagency sensitivities involved in this episode in

General Walter Bedell

Smith As Director of Central Intelligence, October 1950-February 1953,

p. 253.

61 Stat. 495–510.

By memorandum of October 28, Executive Secretary of the National Security

Council Lay informed the Secretaries of State and Defense that President Truman had
approved this revised version of NSCID No. 9 on October 24. (Truman Library, Presi-
dent’s Secretary’s Files, Subject File)

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Special Committee whenever matters of interest to the Federal Bureau
of Investigation are before that Committee.); and

c. Further designated the Department of Defense as executive

agent of the Government, for the production of COMINT information;

the Special Committee of the National Security Council for COMINT
hereby authorizes and directs that:

Directive to the United States Communications Intelligence Board

(USCIB).

a. USCIB shall be reconstituted as a body acting for and under the

Special Committee, and shall operate in accordance with the provisions
of this directive. Only those departments or agencies represented in
USCIB are authorized to engage in COMINT activities.

b. The Board shall be composed of the following members:

(1) The Director of Central Intelligence, who shall be Chairman of

the Board.

(2) A representative of the Secretary of State.

(3) A representative of the Secretary of Defense.

(4) A representative of the Director of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation.

(5) The Director of the National Security Agency (NSA).

(6) A representative of the Department of the Army.

(7) A representative of the Department of the Navy.

(8) A representative of the Department of the Air Force.

(9) A representative of the Central Intelligence Agency.

c. The Board shall have a staff headed by an executive secretary

who shall be appointed by the Chairman with the approval of the ma-
jority of the Board.

d. It shall be the duty of the Board to advise and make recommen-

dations to the Secretary of Defense, in accordance with the following pro-
cedure, with respect to any matter relating to communications intelligence
which falls within the jurisdiction of the Director of NSA:

(1) The Board shall reach its decision by a majority vote. Each

member of the Board shall have one vote except the representatives of

the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Fed-

eral Bureau of Investigation, and of the Central Intelligence Agency

who shall each have two votes. The Director of Central Intelligence, as

Chairman, will have no vote. In the event that the Board votes and

reaches a decision, any dissenting member of the Board may appeal

from such decision within 7 days to the Special Committee. In the event

that the Board votes but fails to reach a decision, any member of the

Board may appeal within 7 days to the Special Committee. In either

event the Special Committee shall review the matter, and its determi-

nation thereon shall be final. Appeals by the Director of NSA and/or

the representatives of the Military Departments shall only be filed with

the approval of the Secretary of Defense.

(2) If any matter is voted on by the Board but

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(a) no decision is reached and any member files an appeal;

(b) a decision is reached in which the representative of the

Secretary of Defense does not concur and files an appeal;

no action shall be taken with respect to the subject matter until the ap-

peal is decided, provided that, if the Secretary of Defense determines, af-

ter consultation with the Secretary of State, that the subject matter pre-

sents a problem of an emergency nature and requires immediate action,

his decision shall govern, pending the result of the appeal. In such an

emergency situation the appeal may be taken directly to the President.

(3) Recommendations of the Board adopted in accordance with

the foregoing procedures shall be binding on the Secretary of Defense.

Except on matters which have been voted on by the Board, the Direc-

tor of NSA shall discharge his responsibilities in accordance with his

own judgment, subject to the direction of the Secretary of Defense.

(4) The Director of NSA shall make such reports and furnish such

information from time to time to the Board, either orally or in writing,

as the Board may request, and shall bring to the attention of the Board

either in such reports or otherwise any new major policies or programs

in advance of their adoption by him.

e. It shall also be the duty of the Board as to matters not falling

within the jurisdiction of NSA:

(1) To coordinate the communications intelligence activities

among all departments and agencies authorized by the President to

participate therein;

(2) To initiate, to formulate policies concerning, and subject to the

provisions of NSCID No. 5,

to supervise all arrangements with for-

eign governments in the field of communications intelligence; and

(3) To consider and make recommendations concerning policies

relating to communications intelligence of common interest to the de-

partments and agencies, including security standards and practices,

and, for this purpose, to investigate and study the standards and prac-

tices of such departments and agencies in utilizing and protecting

COMINT information.

f. Any recommendation of the Board with respect to the matters de-

scribed in paragraph e above shall be binding on all departments or agen-
cies of the Government if it is adopted by the unanimous vote of the mem-
bers of the Board. Recommendations approved by a majority, but not
all, of the members of the Board shall be transmitted by it to the Special
Committee for such action as the Special Committee may see fit to take.

g. The Board will meet monthly, or oftener at the call of the Chair-

man or any member, and shall determine its own procedures.

Directive to the Secretary of Defense.

a. Subject to the specific provisions of this directive, the Secretary

of Defense may delegate in whole or in part authority over the Direc-
tor of NSA within his department as he sees fit.

Document 255.

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b. The COMINT mission of the National Security Agency (NSA)

shall be to provide an effective, unified organization and control of the
communications intelligence activities of the United States conducted
against foreign governments, and to provide for integrated operational
policies and procedures pertaining thereto. As used in this directive,
the terms “communications intelligence” or “COMINT” shall be con-
strued to mean all procedures and methods used in the interception of
communications other than foreign press and propaganda broadcasts
and the obtaining of information from such communications by other
than the intended recipients,

but shall exclude censorship and the pro-

duction and dissemination of finished intelligence.

c. NSA shall be administered by a Director, designated by the Sec-

d. Under the Secretary of Defense, and in accordance with approved

e. Specific responsibilities of the Director of NSA include the

following:

(1) Formulating necessary operational plans and policies for the

conduct of the U.S. COMINT activities.

See Public Law 513, 81st Congress, 1950. [Footnote in the original. P.L. 513, May

13, 1950 (64 Stat. 159) deals with the safeguarding of communications intelligence
information.]

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806 Foreign Relations, 1950–1955